An unmanned aerial vehicle photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system

Abstract

The application provides an unmanned aerial vehicle photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system, and relates to the field of information systems, comprising a central rule kernel module, a reverse re-entry authorization ring module, a revocable channel permission module, a mirror time slot mutual verification module and a log auditing module; the system is used for realizing relay execution and data management of the unmanned aerial vehicle after the remote centralized control platform issues an inspection task; continuity verification is realized through trajectory reproduction and data comparison in the task succession process; when a restricted channel is involved, security check can be realized through the permission mechanism, and the operation is stopped when the conditions are not met; when the data is in an uncertain state, cross verification can be realized through reacquisition under the mirror condition, and mutual verification records are generated; the whole process is recorded by the log module to ensure that the operation is traceable.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information systems, specifically to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of the new energy industry and the gradual expansion of photovoltaic power station scale, it is particularly important to ensure the stability and economic operation of the power station. Traditional manual inspection methods are inefficient due to the large area and complex environment of the site. Drone inspection has gradually become the mainstream method due to its flexibility and efficiency, but it still faces great challenges in terms of task coordination, data management and security.

[0003] Existing inspection solutions mostly adopt a mode that combines single-machine task execution with ground station control. Its characteristic is to complete the image acquisition of photovoltaic panels through preset flight paths and transmit the results to the background for analysis. Some solutions introduce AI-based defect identification or multi-drone collaborative operation, but usually rely on manual scheduling and data confirmation, and lack effective cross-regional connection and verification mechanisms.

[0004] The shortcomings of existing technologies are: they lack effective guarantees for task continuity and data integrity in complex scenarios; when tasks are interrupted or flight conditions change, the system cannot coordinate new execution paths in a timely manner; and data results across sites or multiple devices lack unified cross-validation methods, which can easily lead to information lag and increased management burden. Summary of the Invention

[0005] (a) Technical problems to be solved

[0006] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention provides an autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) photovoltaic power stations. This system solves the problems mentioned in the background, such as the lack of effective guarantees for mission continuity and data integrity in complex scenarios, the inability of the system to coordinate new execution paths in a timely manner when missions are interrupted or flight conditions change, and the lack of unified cross-verification methods for data results across sites or multiple devices, which can easily lead to information lag and increased management burden.

[0007] (II) Technical Solution

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solution: an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system, comprising a central rule kernel module, a reverse re-entry authorization ring module, a revocable channel permission module, a mirror time slot mutual verification module, and a log audit module;

[0009] When the central rule kernel module receives an inspection task from the remote control platform, it calls the reverse re-entry authorization loop module to require the subsequent UAV to perform a reverse re-flight operation to re-enter the task area before entering the formal data collection, based on the last flight trajectory and data summary left by the previous UAV in the relay section. The reverse re-flight operation is defined as reverse re-entry. When the central rule kernel module confirms that the verification record is consistent with the last flight trajectory and data summary, it closes the authorization loop and allows the subsequent UAV to continue collecting data, and the collection results enter the publishable data stream.

[0010] If the reverse re-entry involves a restricted corridor, the central rule kernel module calls the revocable channel permission module to verify the exit path verification conditions before initiating the reverse re-entry, and issues a temporary permission token to allow the reverse re-entry when the verification is successful; if the exit path verification conditions fail during the reverse re-entry process, the revocable channel permission module revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module to stop the reverse re-entry and put the relevant area into a sealed state.

[0011] The region in the sealed state is scheduled by the mirror time slot mutual verification module to have a drone from another airport perform peer re-entry under the illumination conditions of the mirror image and generate a mutual verification record; when the mutual verification record is consistent with the original collection record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unsealing event and allows the region data to enter the publishing channel; if the mutual verification fails, the region remains sealed and is scheduled to enter the next mirror time slot for mutual verification until it is unsealed or transferred to manual review.

[0012] The log auditing module generates immutable audit records during the reverse reentry verification process, the issuance and revocation of revocable channel licenses, the execution of mirror time slot mutual authentication, and the unblocking and release process, and binds them to the judgment results of the central rule kernel module.

[0013] Preferably, when the central rule kernel module issues an inspection task on the remote control platform, it first receives the task instruction and generates a task relay identifier. The central rule kernel module immediately calls the reverse re-entry authorization loop module and requires subsequent drones to perform a reverse re-flight operation to re-enter the task area based on the final flight trajectory and data summary left by the previous drone in the relay segment before entering the formal data collection action. The reverse re-flight operation is defined as reverse re-entry. During the process of supervising reverse re-entry, the central rule kernel module compares in real time whether the verification record generated by the subsequent drone is completely consistent with the archived final flight trajectory and data summary. If the verification record is consistent with the archived data, the central rule kernel module closes the authorization loop. The central rules kernel module grants subsequent drones the right to continue collecting data and allows their collected results to enter the publishable data stream. If the verification record is inconsistent with the archived data, the central rules kernel module immediately refuses to close the authorization ring and calls the mirror time slot mutual verification module to put the relevant area into a sealed state and forcibly prohibit data from entering the publishing channel. When reverse re-entry involves a restricted corridor, the central rules kernel module calls the revocable channel permission module before initiating reverse re-entry and requires verification of the exit path verification conditions. If the exit path verification conditions are met, the central rules kernel module issues a temporary permission token and allows reverse re-entry to continue. If the exit path verification conditions fail, the revocable channel permission module immediately revokes the permission and notifies the relevant parties. The central rules kernel module aborts reverse reentry and places the corresponding region into a sealed state. In the sealed state, the mirror time slot mutual authentication module schedules a drone from another airport to perform peer reentry under mirror illumination conditions and generate a mutual authentication record. If the mutual authentication record matches the original collection record, the central rules kernel module triggers an unsealing event and allows the region data to enter the publishing channel. If mutual authentication fails, the region remains sealed and enters the next mirror time slot for mutual authentication until unsealing or manual review. The log audit module generates immutable audit records throughout the process and records the reverse reentry verification process, the issuance and revocation of temporary licenses, the execution of mirror time slot mutual authentication, and the unsealing process. The release process is tied to the judgment results of the central rule kernel module. When the task is issued by the remote control platform and the terminal flight trajectory and data summary of the previous UAV exist and are retrievable, and the restricted corridor condition is triggered, the execution action is to reverse re-fly and verify consistency, close the authorization loop, issue or revoke the temporary license, seal the box, perform mutual verification, unseal, and release. Reverse re-entry increases relay delay, license revocation causes data collection interruption, and box sealing causes regional results to be unable to be released in time. The subsequent remedy is to complete mutual verification through mirror time slot mutual verification by UAV peer re-entry at dual airports and trigger the unsealing event, or to manually review and take over the area that has not been unsealed for a long time and allow the data to enter the operation and maintenance report channel after the unsealing event is completed.

[0014] Preferably, when the reverse re-entry authorization loop module issues a relay task from the remote control platform and is scheduled by the central rule kernel module, it first forces the successor drone to enter the replay mode and requires it to strictly follow the archived terminal flight trajectory and data summary of the previous drone for reverse re-entry operation before entering the task area. When the central rule kernel module can completely retrieve the terminal flight trajectory data and data summary of the previous drone from the data storage and ensure that the information has not been tampered with, the execution action is for the successor drone to sequentially reproduce the archived action under the supervision of the central rule kernel module and generate a real-time verification record, which is then transmitted to the central rule kernel module for consistency comparison. If the verification record and the archived terminal flight trajectory and data summary are consistent in the order of trajectory points, attitude, viewpoint and content of the data summary, the central rule kernel module immediately changes the task status from relay pending to authorization loop closed state, grants the successor drone the right to continue the task and allows the data collection results to enter the publishable data. According to the flow; if the verification record is inconsistent with the archived data, the central rule kernel module refuses to generate an authorization ring and immediately calls the mirror time slot mutual verification module to put the corresponding area into a sealed state. It also requires the mirror time slot mutual verification module to schedule a drone from another airport to perform peer re-entry data collection under mirror lighting and angle conditions, and generate mutual verification records to ensure the correctness of context continuity. If the subsequent drone fails the consistency verification, all data collection results are marked as read-only and are not allowed to enter the publishing channel, causing task delays and data unavailability. The subsequent remedy is that the mirror time slot mutual verification module completes peer re-entry by scheduling a drone from another airport. After the mutual verification is successful, the central rule kernel module triggers an unsealing event and allows the data in the sealed area to enter the publishing channel. If the mutual verification fails, the sealed state is maintained, and the data continues to be scheduled to enter the next mirror time slot for verification until the mutual verification is successful or the data is transferred to manual review. This ensures that all data entering the publishing channel has completed the semantic confirmation of reverse re-entry or cross-site mutual verification.

[0015] Preferably, if the reverse re-entry authorization loop module involves a restricted corridor during execution, the reverse re-entry operation can only be initiated after the revocable channel permission module has completed the exit path verification condition confirmation. When the central rule kernel module retrieves the real-time environmental data of the restricted corridor and can establish the exit path verification conditions, including a corridor width of not less than 3 meters, an angle change of no more than 15 degrees on both sides of the support, a wind speed of less than 8 meters per second, and a remaining flight time of not less than 12 minutes, the execution action is as follows: when the exit path verification conditions are met, the central rule kernel module issues a temporary permission token to the subsequent drone and allows the reverse re-entry to continue, and the reverse re-entry authorization loop module supervises the subsequent drone to perform reverse re-entry according to the terminal flight trajectory and the collected data summary. During the reverse re-entry process, if the exit path verification conditions fail, including a wind speed increase exceeding 8 meters per second, a support angle change exceeding 15 degrees, a corridor width reduction to less than 3 meters, or a drone remaining flight time of less than 12 minutes, the revocable channel permission module immediately revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module. The kernel module aborts reverse re-entry and triggers a boxed state. Any reverse re-entry operation that fails to prove the existence of an exit path cannot generate an authorization ring, and the corresponding area is forcibly placed into a boxed state, causing inspection progress delays and preventing data from entering the publishing channel. The subsequent remedy is that after the area is boxed, the mirror time slot mutual verification module schedules another airport UAV to perform peer re-entry under the illumination conditions of relative mirror image and generates a mutual verification record. When the mutual verification is successful, the central rule kernel module triggers an unsealing event, allowing the area data to enter the publishing channel. If the mutual verification fails, the area remains in a boxed state and enters the next mirror time slot until unsealing is successful or manual review is initiated. This ensures that all area data involving restricted corridors are verified through exit path verification or mirror mutual verification to guarantee safety and reliability. The corridor is a virtual or preset three-dimensional airspace channel that UAVs are allowed to pass through when conducting inspection flights within a photovoltaic power station. This channel is set up to ensure flight safety, avoid obstacles such as high-voltage lines, supports, and trees, and optimize flight paths.

[0016] Preferably, after the revocable channel permission module revokes the permission, the central rule kernel module must force the subsequent drone to perform the external corridor dual-view alternative data acquisition operation. When the central rule kernel module confirms that the exit path verification conditions have failed, and the restricted corridor no longer meets the safe entry conditions during the reverse re-entry process, including: wind speed exceeding 8 meters per second, support angle change exceeding 15 degrees, corridor width less than 3 meters, or drone endurance less than 12 minutes; the execution action is for the central rule kernel module to issue an external corridor dual-view alternative data acquisition command to the subsequent drone, requiring the drone to perform a coverage action at the outer edge of the corridor, and to complete data acquisition from two different perspectives or for two drones to complete the external corridor coverage separately to generate verifiable data; the generated data is directly archived as a pending verification state under the control of the central rule kernel module, and the permission is simultaneously recorded by the log audit module. The process involves canceling events and alternative data collection processes, generating unalterable audit logs. However, the dual-view alternative data collection method for the outer corridor, compared to directly entering the restricted corridor, fails to obtain precise details within the corridor, resulting in reduced data coverage and increased time costs associated with multiple collections. The subsequent remedy involves a mirror time-slot mutual verification module that, after the data to be verified is generated, schedules another airport drone to perform a peer-to-peer re-entry under mirror-like lighting and angle conditions, generating a mutual verification record. Upon successful verification, the central rule kernel module triggers an unblocking event, allowing the alternative data collection to enter the publishing channel. If verification fails, the area remains sealed, and the process continues into the next mirror time slot for verification until successful or manual review is initiated. This ensures that even when access to the restricted corridor is impossible, the alternative data collection method for the outer corridor can still maintain the availability and reliability of the results through the mutual verification mechanism.

[0017] Preferably, when the revocable passage permission module revokes the permission, the central rule kernel module immediately sends an entry prohibition command via the communication link, requiring subsequent drones to immediately exit the corridor entrance area and prohibiting them from hovering and waiting in the corridor entrance area; when the exit path verification conditions fail and the central rule kernel module has determined that continuing to execute the reverse re-entry poses a serious risk, including: wind speed exceeding 8 meters per second, support angle change exceeding 15 degrees, corridor width less than 3 meters, or drone remaining flight time less than 12 minutes; the action is that the subsequent drone, upon receiving the entry prohibition command, immediately stops the entry action and performs an evacuation operation, returning to the safe zone along a preset safe path, and enters a standby state to await a new permission application after the evacuation is completed; the central rule kernel module can only accept a new permission application and allow the drone to attempt again after confirming that the drone's evacuation action is completed and generating an unalterable evacuation record in the log audit module. The trial task involved the interruption of data collection during the drone's withdrawal, resulting in data loss in some restricted corridor areas and delays in inspection progress. The subsequent remedial measure was that after the central rule kernel module completed the withdrawal and entered standby mode, it could schedule a dual-view alternative data collection operation on the outer corridor. The mirror time slot mutual verification module would then schedule another drone from a different airport to perform a peer-to-peer re-entry under mirrored lighting and angle conditions to generate a mutual verification record. Upon successful mutual verification, an unsealing event would be triggered, allowing data to enter the publishing channel. If mutual verification failed, the data would remain sealed and enter the next mirror time slot or eventually be transferred to manual review. Simultaneously, no manual operation could forcibly issue instructions to enter the corridor during the permission revocation period; manual opinions could only be archived in read-only form in the log audit module's audit records and could not affect the validity of the permission revocation. This ensured dual protection of flight safety and data authenticity in the event of a failed exit path.

[0018] Preferably, after the central rule kernel module triggers the boxing state, the mirror time-slot mutual authentication module must immediately mark the relevant micro-area as prohibited from publishing and initiate the cross-airport scheduling mechanism to ensure the independence of mutual authentication collection. When reverse re-entry fails or the revocable channel permission is revoked, causing the regional data to be marked as untrustworthy, and the central rule kernel module has already placed the region into the boxing state and synchronously generated a boxing record, the execution action is for the mirror time-slot mutual authentication module to schedule a UAV from another airport to enter the task area under mirror-like lighting and angle conditions, and perform peer re-entry collection to generate a new mutual authentication record, and transmit the mutual authentication record to the central rule kernel module for comparison. If the mutual authentication record and the original collection record are consistent in terms of trajectory order, image collection summary, and key attitude consistency, the central rule kernel module triggers an unboxing event and allows data to be collected. The data enters the release channel and is unsealed by the log audit module, which generates an unsealing log and binds it to the judgment result of the central rule kernel module. If the mutual verification record is inconsistent with the original collection record, the area remains sealed and the mirror time slot mutual verification module continues to schedule the data to the next mirror time slot for mutual verification. Repeated mutual verification in multiple mirror time slots increases the inspection cycle and causes the area data to be unable to be released for a long time, thus affecting the overall inspection task progress. The subsequent remedy is that when the system fails mirror mutual verification multiple times in a row, the central rule kernel module marks the micro-area as requiring manual review and blocks the automatic release permission until manual review and collection are completed and alternative evidence is generated before the unsealing event can be triggered and the data enters the release channel. This ensures that all data entering the release channel undergoes double verification by mirror mutual verification or final confirmation by manual review to ensure that the release result is true and reliable.

[0019] Preferably, after the central rule kernel module triggers the boxing state, the mirror time slot mutual verification module must immediately set all boxed data to read-only status and prohibit manual operation from directly promoting this data to publishable data; when the boxing event has been recorded by the central rule kernel module and the regional data is in an untrusted state due to reverse re-entry verification failure or revocable channel permission revocation; the execution action is that the mirror time slot mutual verification module continuously schedules a drone from another airport to perform peer re-entry data collection under mirrored lighting and angle conditions, and generates mutual verification records, which are submitted to the central rule kernel module for comparison; when the mutual verification record is consistent with the original collection record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unblocking event and allows the regional data to enter the operation and maintenance report channel, and the log audit module generates an unblocking log and archives it synchronously; when the mutual verification record is inconsistent with the original collection record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unblocking event and allows the regional data to enter the operation and maintenance report channel, and the log audit module generates an unblocking log and archives it synchronously; when the mutual verification record is inconsistent with the original collection record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unblocking event. The kernel module maintains the region in a sealed state and requires the mirror time slot mutual verification module to schedule the region into the next mirror time slot for continued mutual verification until it passes or is transferred to manual review. When multiple mirror time slot mutual verifications fail, the region data remains in a sealed state for a long time, making it difficult to summarize the inspection results within the predetermined period and report them, causing maintenance personnel to be unable to obtain defect information in a timely manner. The subsequent remedy is that when the central rules kernel module fails mirror mutual verification multiple times in a row, it marks the region as requiring manual review and permanently blocks its automatic publishing permission until manual on-site review is completed. It also generates alternative evidence records. Only after the alternative evidence is confirmed by the central rules kernel module can the unsealing event be triggered, and the data is allowed to enter the maintenance report channel, thereby ensuring that all data has completed the integrity verification of mirror mutual verification or manual review when the maintenance report is transmitted to the remote centralized control platform.

[0020] Preferably, the reverse re-entry authorization loop module, the revocable channel permission module, and the mirror time slot mutual verification module operate in a fixed order under the unified control of the central rule kernel module to ensure that all data undergoes strict semantic verification before entering the release channel during task execution. When the remote control platform has issued the task and the terminal flight trajectory and data summary of the previous UAV have been archived, and the system identifies that the relay task involves a restricted corridor or an area requiring mutual verification, the execution action is as follows: the central rule kernel module first calls the reverse re-entry authorization loop module and requires the subsequent UAV to perform reverse re-entry according to the archived trajectory and data summary to generate a context continuation authorization loop. When a restricted corridor is involved, the revocable channel permission module is immediately called to verify the exit path verification conditions. If the conditions are met, a temporary permission token is issued; if the conditions fail, the permission is immediately revoked and a boxed state is triggered. In the case of inconsistent reverse re-entry verification or revocation of the temporary permission, the central rule kernel module immediately calls the mirror time slot mutual verification module. The inter-slot verification module places the relevant area into a sealed state and schedules another airport drone to re-enter under mirror lighting and angle conditions, generating a verification record. Upon successful verification, it triggers an unsealing event, allowing the area data to enter the publishing channel. The log auditing module generates immutable audit records in real time throughout the process and binds the judgment results of the reverse re-entry verification process, the license issuance and revocation process, the mirror verification process, and the unsealing publishing process into a unified evidence chain. Fixed-order execution increases the overall time consumption of the inspection task, and when reverse re-entry or license verification fails, the area is frequently sealed, causing data to not be published immediately, thus delaying the operation and maintenance response. The subsequent remedy is that the mirror time slot inter-verification module completes the reconfirmation of the area data within the mirror time slot through a multi-airport inter-verification mechanism. After the unsealing event is triggered, the central rule kernel module restores the data publishing channel to ensure that even if the fixed order reduces efficiency, the final result can be guaranteed to be true and credible with a complete evidence chain and unsealing mechanism.

[0021] (III) Beneficial Effects

[0022] This invention provides an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system for photovoltaic power plants. It has the following beneficial effects:

[0023] 1. This invention can effectively avoid data inconsistency caused by drone switching by introducing a verification mechanism in the task connection; when dealing with complex areas, the system can dynamically judge environmental conditions and issue permission or revocation instructions; when data cannot be confirmed temporarily, the continuity and traceability of the results can be ensured by alternative collection and cross-regional comparison.

[0024] 2. When performing inspection tasks, this invention can automatically trigger multi-level verification and recording mechanisms according to different scenarios; before entering the release stage, all data must undergo consistency verification or cross-regional mutual verification and form tamper-proof log records; this mechanism reduces manual intervention while realizing closed-loop processing of task scheduling and data confirmation. Detailed Implementation

[0025] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] Example 1:

[0027] This invention provides an autonomous inspection and remote control system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) photovoltaic power stations. The system includes: after an inspection task is issued by a remote control platform, a central rule kernel module receives the instruction and generates a task relay identifier; subsequently, it calls a reverse re-entry authorization loop module and instructs the subsequent UAV to enter a replay mode before formal data collection; the replay mode requires the subsequent UAV to perform a reverse re-flight according to the last flight trajectory and data summary archived by the previous UAV in the relay segment to re-enter the task area; the central rule kernel module retrieves the last flight trajectory and data summary of the previous UAV from the storage unit and verifies their integrity.

[0028] The subsequent UAV reproduces the archived trajectory and collects real-time verification records, which are then uploaded to the central rule kernel module. The central rule kernel module compares and verifies the consistency of the verification records with the archived final trajectory and the collected summary in terms of trajectory order, attitude, viewpoint, and summary content. If they are consistent, the central rule kernel module closes the authorization loop, sets the task status to authorized loop closed, and allows the collected results to enter the publishing stream. If they are inconsistent, the central rule kernel module refuses to close the authorization loop, calls the mirror time slot mutual verification module to place the micro-area into a box, marks the relevant area data as read-only, and prohibits publishing.

[0029] When reverse reentry involves a restricted corridor, the central rule kernel module calls the revocable channel permission module to verify the exit path verification conditions before initiating reverse reentry. The exit path verification conditions are: corridor width not less than 3 meters, support angle change not exceeding 15 degrees, wind speed less than 8 meters per second, and drone remaining flight time not less than 12 minutes. When the exit path verification conditions are met, the central rule kernel module issues a temporary permission token and allows reverse reentry to continue. If the exit path verification conditions fail during reverse reentry, such as wind speed reaching 8 meters per second or above, support angle change exceeding 15 degrees, corridor width less than 3 meters, or drone flight time less than 12 minutes, the revocable channel permission module immediately revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module to stop reverse reentry and triggers box sealing.

[0030] After the license is revoked, the central rules kernel module forces subsequent drones to perform dual-view alternative data collection on the outer corridor. Dual-view alternative data collection on the outer corridor generates verifiable data by covering the data from two different perspectives or by having two drones complete the coverage separately, and archives the alternative data collection results as pending mutual verification. The alternative data collection data shall not enter the release channel before the mirror mutual verification is unsealed. The log audit module writes the license revocation and alternative data collection process into an immutable audit record and binds it to the judgment of the central rules kernel module.

[0031] When a permit is revoked, the central rule kernel module sends an entry prohibition command to the subsequent drone via the communication link, requiring it to immediately exit the corridor entrance area and prohibiting hovering; the drone withdraws to the safe zone along the preset path and enters standby mode; the central rule kernel module can only accept a new permit application after confirming the withdrawal and writing it into the audit record; manual operation shall not forcibly issue an entry command during the permit revocation period, and manual opinions are archived in the audit record in read-only form without affecting the validity of the permit revocation;

[0032] The micro-area in the sealed state is scheduled by the mirror time slot mutual verification module to have a UAV at another airport perform corresponding re-entry acquisition under the illumination conditions of mirror image and angle to generate mutual verification records; the mirror time slot mutual verification module selects a mirror time slot and completes cross-airport scheduling to ensure the independence of mutual verification; when the mutual verification record is consistent with the original acquisition record in terms of trajectory sequence, image acquisition summary and key attitude consistency, it is triggered to unseale and allow the regional data to enter the publishing channel; if mutual verification fails, the micro-area remains sealed and enters the next mirror time slot to continue mutual verification until unsealed or transferred to manual review;

[0033] The log auditing module generates tamper-proof audit records throughout the process and binds the reverse re-entry verification, temporary license issuance and revocation, mirror mutual verification, and unblocking release process with the judgment results of the central rule kernel module to form a unified evidence chain for accountability. The process has shortcomings, including the increased relay delay caused by reverse re-entry, the interruption of data collection due to license revocation, and the inability to release regional results in a timely manner due to box sealing. The remedies are to complete the mutual verification of mirror time slots by corresponding re-entry across airports and trigger the unblocking event after the mutual verification is successful, or to generate alternative evidence by manual review and trigger unblocking in the case of long-term non-unblocking to restore the operation and maintenance report channel.

[0034] Example 2:

[0035] The difference between this embodiment and Embodiment 1 is that it elaborates on the execution details of sealing the box, revoking the license, replacing the acquisition of dual-view data from the outer corridor, cross-verification of mirror time slots, and manual review when the reverse re-entry verification is inconsistent or the exit path verification conditions fail.

[0036] After the remote control platform issues the relay task, the central rule kernel module receives it, generates a relay identifier, and calls the reverse re-entry authorization loop module to require the subsequent drone to re-fly in reverse mode according to the archived last segment trajectory and collected summary of the previous drone. Before entering the restricted corridor, the central rule kernel module calls the revocable channel permission module to check the exit path verification conditions. The exit path verification conditions are: the corridor width is not less than 3 meters, the support angle change is not more than 15 degrees, the wind speed is less than 8 meters per second, and the drone's remaining flight time is not less than 12 minutes. When the exit path verification conditions are met, the central rule kernel module issues a temporary permission token and allows entry into the reverse re-entry route.

[0037] During the subsequent re-entry process, the UAV generates a real-time verification record and uploads it to the central rule kernel module for consistency comparison. If the verification record and the archived trajectory at the end of the process are inconsistent with the collected summary, or if the exit path verification conditions fail during the re-entry process, the revocable channel permission module immediately revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module to stop the re-entry and trigger the box sealing. After receiving the permission revocation command, the central rule kernel module immediately issues an entry prohibition command through the communication link and requires the UAV to withdraw to the safe domain along the preset safe path and enter standby mode. The central rule kernel module only accepts a new permission application after confirming the withdrawal and writing an unalterable audit record.

[0038] After the license is revoked, the central rules kernel module forcibly initiates the dual-view alternative data collection process on the outer corridor and issues specific data collection parameters and coverage paths. The alternative data collection is implemented by a single drone continuously covering the edge of the outer corridor from two different perspectives, or by two drones simultaneously completing the coverage from two outer corridor trajectories from their respective perspectives. The alternative data collection requires time synchronization and the generation of a data collection summary for subsequent comparison. The alternative data collection data is marked as read-only and archived for mutual verification before it is unsealed through mirror time slot mutual verification. The log audit module records the entire process of license revocation and alternative data collection and writes it into the tamper-proof audit chain.

[0039] After the box sealing event is triggered, the mirror time slot mutual verification module generates a box sealing record for the micro-area and calculates the mirror time slot window to meet the relative mirror conditions of illumination and angle, and completes cross-airport scheduling and task distribution. The cross-airport task includes micro-area identifier, mirror time slot window, expected viewpoint and verification point sequence. After receiving the task, the UAV at the scheduled airport performs the corresponding re-entry acquisition according to the plan and generates a mutual verification record to be reported to the central rule kernel module. The central rule kernel module compares the mutual verification record with the original acquisition record item by item in terms of trajectory order, image acquisition summary and key attitude consistency.

[0040] When the mutual verification is consistent, the central rule kernel module triggers unsealing and changes the sealed micro-area data from read-only to publishable state, allowing it to enter the operation and maintenance report channel; when the mutual verification is inconsistent, the mirror time slot mutual verification module continues to schedule the next mirror time slot or the central rule kernel module marks the micro-area as requiring manual review and blocks automatic publishing permissions until a human arrives to generate alternative evidence, and the central rule kernel module triggers unsealing after verifying that the alternative evidence is consistent.

[0041] Temporary permit tokens are issued by the central rule kernel module and associated with the task relay identifier and exit path verification snapshot for subsequent auditing. Temporary permits contain validity markers and become invalid when revoked by the revocable channel permit module. During reverse reentry, the central rule kernel module performs point-to-point comparisons of real-time verification records, including trajectory point sequence consistency, key attitude value range, viewpoint parameter matching, and semantic consistency of the acquisition summary. The mirror time slot mutual verification module records the mirror window and writes scheduling information into the audit chain to ensure the independence and traceability of mutual verification acquisition. If multiple consecutive mirror time slot mutual verifications still fail, the central rule kernel module marks the micro-area as requiring manual review and assigns a manual review task to the operations and maintenance personnel. The operations and maintenance personnel arrive on-site to complete the alternative acquisition and upload alternative evidence. The central rule kernel module then triggers unblocking after comparison and consistency.

[0042] Throughout the process, the log auditing module writes all the reverse re-entry verification records, temporary license issuance and revocation, external corridor alternative collection records, mirror mutual verification records, unblocking and manual review judgments into an immutable evidence chain and binds them to the judgment results of the central rule kernel module for accountability. In this embodiment, all collection results are read-only and cannot be published before the authorization loop of reverse re-entry is closed. Data can only enter the publication stream after the authorization loop is closed or mutual verification is unblocked.

[0043] Although embodiments of the invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A drone-based autonomous inspection and remote control system for photovoltaic power plants, characterized in that, include: The module includes a central rules kernel module, a reverse reentry authorization ring module, a revocable channel license module, a mirror time slot mutual authentication module, and a log auditing module. When the central rule kernel module receives an inspection task from the remote control platform, it calls the reverse re-entry authorization loop module to require the subsequent UAV to perform a reverse re-flight operation to re-enter the task area before entering the formal data collection, based on the terminal flight trajectory and data summary left by the previous UAV in the relay section. The reverse re-flight operation is defined as reverse re-entry. The reverse re-entry authorization loop module forces the subsequent UAV to reproduce the terminal flight trajectory and data summary archived by the previous UAV before taking over the task and generates a verification record under the supervision of the central rule kernel module. When the central rule kernel module confirms that the verification record is consistent with the terminal flight trajectory and data summary, it closes the authorization loop and allows the subsequent UAV to continue collecting data, and the collection results enter the publishable data stream. If the reverse re-entry involves a restricted corridor, the central rule kernel module calls the revocable channel permission module to verify the exit path verification conditions before initiating the reverse re-entry, and issues a temporary permission token to allow the reverse re-entry when the verification is successful; if the exit path verification conditions fail during the reverse re-entry process, the revocable channel permission module revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module to stop the reverse re-entry and put the relevant area into a sealed state. The region in the sealed state is scheduled by the mirror time slot mutual verification module to have a drone from another airport perform peer re-entry under the illumination conditions of the mirror image and generate a mutual verification record; when the mutual verification record is consistent with the original collection record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unsealing event and allows the region data to enter the publishing channel; if the mutual verification fails, the region remains sealed and is scheduled to enter the next mirror time slot for mutual verification until it is unsealed or transferred to manual review. The log auditing module generates tamper-proof audit records during the reverse reentry verification process, the issuance and revocation of revocable channel licenses, the execution of mirror time slot mutual authentication, and the unblocking and release process, and binds them to the judgment results of the central rule kernel module.

2. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: If the verification record matches the terminal flight trajectory and the data summary, the central rule kernel module will change the task status from relay pending to authorization loop closed state and grant the subsequent UAV the right to continue the task; if the verification does not match, the central rule kernel module will refuse to generate the authorization loop and immediately put the area into a sealed state; before and after the authorization loop closes, all data collection results of the subsequent UAV will be marked as read-only and will not be allowed to enter the publishing channel.

3. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 2, characterized in that: If a restricted corridor is involved during the execution of the reverse re-entry authorization ring module, reverse re-entry can only be initiated after the revocable channel permission module verifies the exit path verification condition. When the exit path verification condition is met, the central rule kernel module issues a temporary permission token and allows the reverse re-entry to continue. If the exit path verification condition fails during the reverse re-entry process, the revocable channel permission module immediately revokes the permission and notifies the central rule kernel module to suspend reverse re-entry and trigger a boxed state. This ensures that any reverse re-entry operation that fails to prove the existence of an exit path cannot generate an authorization ring.

4. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 3, characterized in that: After the revocable channel permission module revokes the permission, the central rule kernel module forces the drone to perform an outer corridor dual-view alternative acquisition operation; the outer corridor dual-view alternative acquisition operation is to generate verifiable data at the outer edge of the corridor through the coverage actions of two different perspectives or two different drones and archive it in a state awaiting mutual verification; the alternative acquisition data shall not enter the publishing channel before it has been mutually verified and unblocked by the mirror time slot mutual verification module; the log audit module writes the permission revocation and alternative acquisition process into an immutable record at the same time.

5. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 3, characterized in that: When a revocable passage permit is revoked, the central rules kernel module forcibly sends an entry prohibition command and requires the drone to immediately leave the corridor entrance area and is prohibited from hovering or waiting. After receiving the entry prohibition command, the drone performs an evacuation and returns to the safe zone, and enters a standby state after the evacuation is completed. The central rules kernel module can only accept a new permit application after confirming that the evacuation action has been completed and recorded. No manual operation may forcibly issue an entry command into the corridor during the permit revocation period, and manual opinions are only stored in the audit log in read-only form and do not affect the validity of the permit revocation.

6. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: After the central rule kernel module triggers the boxing state, the mirror time slot mutual verification module sets the relevant micro-area to a prohibited publishing state and schedules a drone from another airport to perform peer re-entry acquisition under illumination conditions that are mirror images of the original acquisition lighting and angle to generate a mutual verification record. When the mutual verification record is semantically consistent with the original acquisition record, the central rule kernel module triggers an unblocking event and allows the data to enter the publishing channel. If the mutual verification record is inconsistent with the original acquisition record, the micro-area remains boxed and is scheduled to enter the next mirror time slot to continue mutual verification.

7. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 6, characterized in that: Before the unblocking event is triggered, the mirror time slot mutual verification module sets all blocked data to read-only status and prohibits manual operation to upgrade it to publishable data. After the unblocking event is triggered, the central rule kernel module allows the data to enter the operation and maintenance report channel. The data in the operation and maintenance report channel is transmitted to the remote centralized control platform and unblocking logs are generated simultaneously. If the mirror time slot mutual verification still fails under multiple mirror conditions, the central rule kernel module marks the micro-zone as requiring manual review and permanently blocks its automatic publishing permission until manual review generates alternative evidence.

8. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) photovoltaic power station autonomous inspection and remote centralized control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The reverse re-entry authorization ring module, the revocable channel permission module, and the mirror time slot mutual verification module operate in a fixed order under the control of the central rule kernel module. The fixed order is to first execute reverse re-entry to generate a context continuation authorization ring, and when a restricted corridor is involved, call the revocable channel permission to verify the exit path verification conditions and issue or revoke the permission. If reverse reentry fails or revocation is permitted, mirror time slot mutual verification is immediately triggered to perform boxing and unboxing of the relevant micro-area; the log auditing module generates a complete chain of evidence throughout the process and binds it to the judgment result of the central rule kernel module.