Trusted access authentication method and system for distributed terminal of novel power system

Abstract

The invention discloses a trusted access authentication method and system for a distributed terminal of a novel power system, and the method comprises the steps: enabling the distributed terminal to initiate an access request, enabling a newly accessed distributed terminal to initiate an access request to a smart grid server SGSi, and carrying out the identity generation and signature through employing the ECC (Elliptic Curve Encryption); the smart grid server SGSi verifies the identity authenticity of the distributed terminal and evaluates the running state of the distributed terminal; the smart grid server SGSi performs dynamic permission allocation by using a minimum permission principle according to roles and functions of the distributed terminals; the distributed terminal is in encrypted communication with the SGSi through the secure channel, and the SGSi monitors the state of the distributed terminal in real time at the same time; the smart grid server SGSi introduces a deep learning technology LSTM and a CNN to record an access process and a communication behavior of the distributed terminal; according to the invention, high efficiency and safety of the distributed terminal access process can be realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of information technology, and in particular relates to a trusted access authentication method and system for distributed terminals in a new type of power system. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of smart grid technology, power systems are gradually exhibiting characteristics of digitalization, distribution, and intelligence. As a crucial component of the new power system, the smart grid achieves precise management of power production, transmission, distribution, and consumption by introducing distributed terminal devices (such as smart meters, edge computing nodes, and smart sensors). These distributed terminal devices, as an important part of the smart grid, not only undertake the task of collecting and transmitting user electricity data but also widely participate in advanced functions such as dynamic electricity price adjustment and distributed energy management. The realization of these functions requires the establishment of secure and reliable communication links between the distributed terminal devices and the grid server. However, due to the widespread distribution of smart meters, limited computing resources, and the openness of the network environment, their access authentication faces a series of technical challenges.

[0003] Traditional authentication schemes for distributed terminal devices, such as electricity meters, rely heavily on fixed identity verification and simple access control mechanisms. While these methods are applicable to traditional closed networks, they reveal several shortcomings in smart grid environments. First, the sheer number and diverse types of grid terminal devices make it difficult for traditional methods to meet dynamic requirements in large-scale access scenarios. Second, the open network environment increases the risks of device forgery, data tampering, and replay attacks. Vulnerabilities in the authentication process can lead to user privacy breaches, illegal occupation of power resources, and even system-wide disruptions in power dispatching.

[0004] In the smart grid environment, the access of distributed terminal devices (such as smart meters and edge computing nodes) has increased significantly. These devices play a crucial role in collecting user data, supporting dynamic electricity pricing, and distributed energy management, but they have also become targets for attackers. Vulnerabilities in distributed terminal access authentication can lead to unauthorized access by counterfeit devices, leakage of user privacy, abuse of grid resources, and even widespread power outages. Therefore, how to efficiently and reliably authenticate smart terminals in the grid has become a critical technical issue in the smart grid field. Smart meters, as one of the core distributed terminals of the smart grid, are mainly used to collect user electricity consumption data, implement electricity price regulation, and communicate with the grid server. However, in the open network environment, smart meter access faces various security threats, including but not limited to: Identity forgery: Attackers may impersonate legitimate devices to forge access, obtain grid data, or occupy power resources. Data tampering: Due to the open data transmission between terminal devices and the grid server, replay attacks or man-in-the-middle attacks are possible. Resource abuse: Unauthorized devices may illegally access grid resources, leading to chaotic resource allocation and even affecting grid dispatch. Abnormal operating status: Meters operating in harsh environments may generate abnormal data, increasing the complexity of the authentication process. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Purpose of the invention: The purpose of this invention is to provide a trusted access authentication method and system for distributed terminals in new power systems that can improve the efficiency and security of the distributed terminal access process.

[0006] Technical solution: The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system, as described in this invention, includes:

[0007] (1) A distributed terminal initiates an access request. The newly connected distributed terminal sends an access request to the smart grid server SGSi, and uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information;

[0008] (2) The smart grid server SGSi verifies the authenticity of the distributed terminal's identity by using random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology to complete the identity confirmation.

[0009] (3) The Smart Grid Server SGSi evaluates the operating status of distributed terminals and verifies the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology.

[0010] (4) The Smart Grid Server SGSi dynamically allocates permissions based on the roles and functions of the distributed terminals using the principle of least privilege.

[0011] (5) The distributed terminal communicates with SGSi through a secure channel with encrypted communication, and SGSi monitors the status of the distributed terminal in real time.

[0012] (6) The Smart Grid Server SGSi introduces deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

[0013] Further, step (1) includes:

[0014] (11) Distributed terminals generate a unique device identifier (SMID). i The current timestamp T1 and a random number R1, where i is the distributed terminal number, are used with the distributed terminal's private key SK. meter For {SMID i Perform ECC signing on {T1,R1} to generate a request packet Req. Auth ={SMID i ,T1,R1,Sig meter} and send to SGSi, where Sig meter For signature;

[0015] (12) When sending an access request, the distributed terminal collects the current status information and attaches it to the request packet for subsequent security status assessment.

[0016] Further, step (2) includes:

[0017] (21) The smart grid server SGSi receives and parses the authentication request packet Req. Auth Use the public key PK of the distributed terminal meter Verify signature Sig meter The system verifies the authenticity of the signature. If the verification fails, access is denied, and the device is prompted to re-initiate the authentication request.

[0018] (22) Smart Grid Server SGSi checks SMID i Check if the device is in the trusted device list. If the device is not registered, deny access. If the device is successfully registered, record the device's role information and permission template.

[0019] (23) The smart grid server SGSi verifies whether the request is recently generated by using timestamp T1 and random number R1 to avoid replay attacks. If the timestamp or random number verification fails, authentication is rejected.

[0020] Further, step (3) includes:

[0021] (31) Check the firmware version FW of the distributed terminals. versionVerify whether it matches the trusted firmware version library. If the firmware version is too low or does not match, refuse access and require the device to update.

[0022] (32) By analyzing the geographical location and network environment information of the distributed terminal, confirm whether the distributed terminal is in the allowed access area; if the location is abnormal or the network environment is risky, refuse access.

[0023] (33) Combine fuzzy extraction technology to calculate the distributed terminal state feature template, and compare the state data reported by the distributed terminal with the trusted state by Hamming distance; if the Hamming distance exceeds the preset security threshold, it is determined that the operating environment of the distributed terminal is abnormal and authentication is rejected.

[0024] Further, step (4) includes:

[0025] (41) The smart grid server SGSi loads the corresponding preset permission template according to the role of the distributed terminal and restricts the access scope of the distributed terminal.

[0026] (42) The smart grid server SGSi generates the session key SK. session The key is encrypted using the ECC public key and then sent to the distributed terminal; this session key will be used for symmetric encryption of data in subsequent communications.

[0027] Further, step (5) includes:

[0028] (51) Distributed terminals use the session key SK generated by SGSi. session Encrypt the runtime data of the distributed terminals and attach a signature Sig. meter The data is then uploaded to SGSi, where SGSi uses the shared session key to decrypt the data and verify the integrity and authenticity of the running data.

[0029] (52) The Smart Grid Server SGSi monitors the operating status and power consumption data uploaded by the device in real time to detect whether the device has abnormal behavior. Once abnormal behavior is detected, SGSi will dynamically adjust the device permissions or interrupt communication.

[0030] Further, step (6) includes:

[0031] (61) The smart grid server SGSi records the identity authentication results, status authentication process, permission allocation and session information of the distributed terminals, and stores the operating status and communication logs of the distributed terminals.

[0032] (62) Use LSTM network to analyze the time series operation data of distributed terminals, predict the future operation trend of distributed terminals, and judge whether the behavior of the meter deviates from the preset range by identifying changes in behavior patterns.

[0033] (63) CNN is used to convert the operation data of the distributed terminal into a graphical representation, automatically extract features and detect abnormal behavior; the abnormal detection results are linked with the permission management system to adjust the permissions of the electricity meter in real time;

[0034] (64) Regularly store all log data and analysis results of deep learning models in a secure database for subsequent security audits and dynamic optimization.

[0035] Based on the same inventive concept, this invention also provides a trusted access authentication system for distributed terminals in novel power systems, comprising:

[0036] The request module is used for distributed terminals to initiate access requests. Newly connected distributed terminals send access requests to the smart grid server SGSi, using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including the firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information;

[0037] The identity authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to verify the authenticity of the distributed terminals' identities, and completes identity confirmation through random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology.

[0038] The status authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to evaluate the operating status of distributed terminals and verify the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology.

[0039] The permission allocation module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to dynamically allocate permissions based on the roles and functions of distributed terminals, using the principle of least privilege.

[0040] The communication monitoring module is used for encrypted communication between distributed terminals and SGSi through a secure channel, while SGSi monitors the status of distributed terminals in real time.

[0041] The recording and monitoring module is used in the smart grid server SGSi to introduce deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

[0042] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a computing device, comprising: one or more processors, one or more memories, and one or more programs, the programs being stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, wherein when the programs are loaded onto the processor, they implement the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals for novel power systems according to any of the preceding claims.

[0043] Based on the same inventive concept, the present invention also provides a storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program including program instructions, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system according to any of the preceding claims.

[0044] Beneficial effects: Compared with existing technologies, this invention realizes the verification and allocation of automatic power generation control after the electric hydrogen production station is connected to the grid control. Considering the high safety requirements of hydrogen storage tanks and the complexity of hydrogen production scenarios, this invention improves the safety verification and interlocking logic of the electric hydrogen production station, proposes a strategy that considers the hydrogen storage capacity correction allocation of the hydrogen storage tank, calculates the maximum and minimum power generation under different operating conditions, and provides multiple control strategies for electric hydrogen production stations. It also proposes an automatic power generation control system in which electric hydrogen production stations participate, ensuring that electric hydrogen production stations are connected to the grid control and supporting the coordinated and orderly participation of the electric hydrogen production industry in automatic power generation control. Attached Figure Description

[0045] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the distributed terminal access process according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0047] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. These descriptions are intended to provide reference for those skilled in the art, but do not constitute any limitation on the scope of the present invention. Any improvements, adjustments, modifications, or equivalent technical substitutions made to the content described in the present invention without departing from its core ideas and technical solutions should be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention is determined by the appended claims, and the spirit and core principles of its technical solutions cover reasonable improvements that may be made in the art. Any design changes or functional enhancements that do not depart from the spirit of the technical solutions of the present invention are included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0048] To more clearly demonstrate the specific implementation method of this invention, some related concepts and theories are first described:

[0049] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a highly efficient public-key encryption algorithm whose core idea is based on the computational complexity of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. This encryption method offers extremely high security while outperforming traditional public-key encryption methods (such as RSA and DSA) in terms of computational complexity and resource requirements, making it particularly suitable for resource-constrained devices such as smart meters. A significant feature of ECC is its ability to provide security comparable to traditional algorithms using shorter key lengths. For example, to provide the same level of security, ECC key lengths can be only one-tenth that of RSA, significantly reducing computational and storage requirements. This characteristic makes ECC an ideal choice for device authentication and communication encryption in smart grid scenarios. The mathematical foundation of ECC is elliptic curves and their properties over finite fields. The basic form of an elliptic curve is: y 2 =x 3 +ax+b(mod p). Where parameters a and b satisfy 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0 to ensure the curve has no singularities. Points on an elliptic curve can be used to generate new points through point addition and point multiplication operations, which form the basis of ECC encryption and decryption. In point addition, if P and Q are any two points on the curve, then the coordinates (x, y) of the point addition result R = P + Q are... r ,y r x is determined by the following formula: r =λ 2 -x p -x q ,y r =λ(x) p -x r )-y p The calculation of the slope λ involves two cases: if P ≠ Q, then... If P = Q, then ECC's security stems from the intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Specifically, given a point P on the curve and its dot product Q = kP, even knowing P and Q, it is difficult to calculate the multiplication factor k using currently known mathematical methods. This characteristic allows ECC to provide extremely high security even with relatively small keys. In smart grid scenarios, ECC is widely used for smart meter authentication and key negotiation. Smart meters typically generate a public key PK = kP and a private key k using ECC. When connecting to the grid server, the private key is used to sign identity information (such as device identifiers). The server verifies the authenticity of the signature using the smart meter's public key, thus completing authentication. Furthermore, ECC is also used for session key negotiation between devices and servers. Both parties calculate a shared session key using their respective private keys and the other party's public key, thereby ensuring communication security. During session key negotiation, the calculations are based on elliptic curve dot product operations. Overall, ECC's advantages lie in its efficiency, security, and lightweight nature, making it irreplaceable in resource-constrained smart grid terminal devices. By adopting ECC technology, smart grids can achieve secure device access and data encryption, providing an important guarantee for the stable operation of the entire network.

[0050] Random number and timestamp mechanisms are commonly used security measures in identity authentication. By using random numbers and timestamps in combination, replay attacks and delay attacks can be effectively defended against. Random number R i Used to generate a unique identifier for each authentication request, ensuring that even if an attacker intercepts a previous authentication packet, they cannot impersonate a legitimate device by replaying that packet, because the random number for each request is different. Timestamp T i This ensures the real-time nature of requests by limiting the effective time window of messages, preventing attackers from delaying the sending of legitimate data packets for spoofing or misleading. Specifically, when the server receives a request, it checks whether the timestamp difference is within a set time threshold ΔT, calculated as: T_received - T_sent < ΔT. If the time difference exceeds ΔT, the request is considered invalid. The unpredictability of random numbers greatly increases the difficulty for attackers to forge data packets, while timestamps limit the validity of authentication packets, reducing the probability of a successful attack. The combination of these two features provides double protection for authentication, ensuring the security and reliability of communication.

[0051] Zero Trust security is a security architecture based on the principle of "never trust, always verify," requiring all devices and users to undergo rigorous multi-factor authentication before accessing resources, while continuously monitoring the access process to ensure its trustworthiness. Unlike traditional trust boundary security models, zero trust architecture assumes potential threats both inside and outside the network, thus requiring re-verification of identity and status for each request. In smart grids, smart meters implement minimal access control through role-based access templates. For example, after authentication, a meter may only be granted permission to upload electricity consumption data, but not to access other sensitive system resources. This access control method reduces the attack surface and fundamentally improves system security.

[0052] Dynamic permission adjustment is a key feature of the zero-trust model. It dynamically manages access permissions based on the real-time status and behavior of devices, ensuring rapid restriction of device operation in abnormal situations and thus reducing security threats. For example, when a smart meter exhibits high-frequency data transmission due to abnormal behavior, the system triggers a permission adjustment mechanism to disable its data upload function to curb potential attacks. The allocation rules for dynamic permission adjustment can be quantified using a device status score (St) and a permission policy formula.

[0053]

[0054] Among them, P t For current permissions, S t T represents the device's status score. safe This is a security threshold. Based on the device's status score, the system can flexibly assign permissions, such as granting full permissions (F) when the device is in a good status. full When the state is critical, restrict some permissions (P) restricted ), or directly deny access when the status is abnormal (P deny This dynamic adjustment mechanism can not only adapt to changes in equipment status in real time, but also effectively prevent potential security threats, providing a strong guarantee for the safe operation of the smart grid.

[0055] Fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance are important tools in equipment condition assessment, used for feature extraction and reliability judgment of equipment operating status data. Fuzzy extraction is a method to transform noisy data (such as equipment operating parameters) into unique feature templates, which can serve as a benchmark for equipment status for subsequent verification. Hamming distance is used to calculate the difference between the current equipment state and a reliable state template, quantifying this difference by comparing the number of different corresponding bits in the two binary sequences. The formula is: A and B are binary sequences of the same length.

[0056] In device status assessment, fuzzy extraction generates feature templates, and Hamming distance is used to compare the similarity between the current state and the trusted template. If the Hamming distance is less than a preset threshold, the device is considered trusted; otherwise, the device is determined to be in an abnormal state. This combined approach can tolerate some noise interference while accurately detecting abnormal states, providing a reliable guarantee for the security of device access.

[0057] Security is a core design requirement for device access authentication protocols. Based on the Dolev-Yao threat model and the Canetti-Krawczyk key negotiation model, the system must meet two key objectives: anonymity and attack resistance. Anonymity requires that the device's identity information be transmitted encrypted to prevent interception and leakage during data transmission, thus protecting device privacy. Attack resistance requires the system to be able to resist various common attacks, including man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, and forgery attacks, ensuring the integrity and reliability of communication and preventing malicious behavior from compromising system security. BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic is an important method for verifying protocol security. It infers the trust relationship between participating entities by formally analyzing the protocol's steps. For example, when device A receives a message X and believes it to be genuine, it is represented by the symbol A∣~X; if the device is certain that X is reliable, it is represented by A∣≡X. The relationship between the two can be expressed by the formula... Description. Through BAN logic analysis, the trustworthiness of devices and servers in identity authentication and key negotiation can be verified, ensuring that the generated session key is mutually recognized and can resist potential attack threats, thus providing strong protection for the secure access of smart grid devices.

[0058] This invention proposes a trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in novel power systems. Based on the need for smart meter devices to access the power grid network, and with multi-level authentication and dynamic permission management as its core, it provides comprehensive security assurance for the smart meter access process. It performs comprehensive trusted authentication of the meter from multiple perspectives, including device identity and operating status, ensuring that the meter can only access necessary resources, and continuously performs dynamic monitoring and anomaly detection during its operation. This method achieves trustworthiness assurance throughout the entire lifecycle of the device, from the initiation of the access request to the end of communication, significantly improving the security and reliability of the smart grid system, ensuring secure resource access and stable system operation.

[0059] Example 1, as shown in the attached document Figure 1 As shown in this embodiment, the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system includes:

[0060] (1) A distributed terminal initiates an access request. The newly connected distributed terminal sends an access request to the smart grid server SGSi, and uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information;

[0061] (2) The smart grid server SGSi verifies the authenticity of the distributed terminal's identity by using random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology to complete the identity confirmation.

[0062] (3) The Smart Grid Server SGSi evaluates the operating status of distributed terminals and verifies the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology.

[0063] (4) The Smart Grid Server SGSi dynamically allocates permissions based on the roles and functions of the distributed terminals using the principle of least privilege.

[0064] (5) The distributed terminal communicates with SGSi through a secure channel with encrypted communication, and SGSi monitors the status of the distributed terminal in real time.

[0065] (6) The Smart Grid Server SGSi introduces deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

[0066] Specifically, in step (1), the distributed terminal device initiates an access request. After startup, the distributed terminal device (such as a smart meter or smart sensor) generates a unique device identifier (such as SMID) through its built-in communication module. i The system generates an authentication request packet containing a random number (R1) and a timestamp (T1). This data is then signed by the device's private key (based on ECC technology) to ensure data integrity and identity authenticity. Simultaneously, the device collects operational status information (including firmware version, network environment, geographical location, etc.) and sends it along with the signature to the Smart Grid Server (SGSi) to initiate the access process.

[0067] This also includes: server verification of the random number and timestamp. Upon receiving an authentication request, SGSi first verifies the uniqueness of the random number R1 to ensure the request has not been reused and to prevent replay attacks. Then, it checks if the timestamp T1 is within a set time window (e.g., ΔT = 5 minutes) to prevent delay attacks. If both R1 and T1 meet the requirements, the server continues with authentication; otherwise, it rejects the connection request and logs the exception.

[0068] In step (2), terminal authentication is performed. SGSi uses the device's public key PK. terminal The signature Sig in the request packetterminal Verify that the requested data has not been tampered with and was indeed generated by a legitimate device. Also, check the device identifier (SMID). i Check if the device is in the server's trusted device list. If signature verification fails or the device is untrusted, the server refuses the connection; if verification succeeds, the device is allowed to proceed to the next step of state authentication.

[0069] In step (3), terminal operation status authentication is performed. The server parses the operation status information uploaded by the device and performs a multi-layered security assessment. First, it checks whether the firmware version is consistent with the trusted version repository to ensure the security of the device's operating environment. Second, it analyzes the device's operation process using fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology, compares it with dangerous process templates, and determines whether the device's current status is trustworthy. Finally, it checks whether the network environment is secure (e.g., whether traffic exceeds limits or ports are abnormal) and confirms whether the device is in an allowed area through geographical location. If any verification fails, the server will refuse access and notify the device to repair it.

[0070] In step (4), after identity authentication and status verification, the server assigns corresponding permission templates based on the device role (such as industrial meters, smart sensors) to restrict the device's access scope. For example, only industrial meters are allowed to upload electricity consumption data and query operating status, while modification of configuration or access to other sensitive resources is prohibited. The server generates interface-level access tokens (such as R...) for the devices. token The access scope and permissions are clearly defined and returned to the device through an encrypted channel.

[0071] In step (5), data is encrypted during transmission and resource access. The terminal device uses the session key SK generated by the server. session Encrypting operational data before it is uploaded ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data transmission. For example, when smart meters upload data such as electricity consumption, voltage, and frequency, the encrypted data is sent to the server through an encrypted channel. After the server decrypts the data and verifies its legitimacy, it stores the data in the database and monitors resource access behavior in real time to ensure that devices can only access authorized resources.

[0072] This also includes dynamic status verification. During resource access, the server continuously and dynamically verifies the device's operational status. By acquiring real-time device status information (such as nodeStatus), the status authentication process is repeatedly executed to detect potential risks such as newly added dangerous processes, abnormal network traffic, or changes in geographical location. If an abnormal device status is detected, the server immediately disconnects the device and saves the current operational status; if the status is normal, the device can continue to access resources until the task is completed.

[0073] In step (6), logging and security auditing are performed. The server records complete operation logs throughout the entire access authentication process, including authentication results, status verification records, permission allocation information, data access operations, and dynamic status change records. These logs are stored in the server's security database to ensure the transparency and traceability of the authentication process. If a security issue arises with the device, these logs can be used for subsequent security audits and problem tracing, while also providing a basis for improving system security strategies. The distributed terminal implements the access process as follows: Figure 2 As shown.

[0074] In the above steps, the terminal operation status authentication in step (3) and the dynamic status verification in step (5) can be repeatedly called. The former is executed during the access phase for initial verification, while the latter is executed in real time during the access process for continuous monitoring. The permission allocation and token generation in step (4) and the data encryption transmission and resource access in step (5) are sequential. The device must complete the permission allocation before it can perform encrypted transmission and resource access. At the same time, the log recording and security audit in step (6) run through the entire process, recording the authentication and operation details of each stage in parallel with other steps to ensure that the entire process is transparent and traceable.

[0075] Example 2 simulates the security authentication of an industrial smart meter connecting to a smart grid. Background: An industrial park needs to connect a new industrial smart meter (model: IMD-5000), which is installed and configured by technician Li. The meter needs to upload electricity consumption data in real time and accept remote status monitoring. The grid server (SGSi) needs to ensure the meter's identity is trustworthy, its operating status is secure, and that the connection process meets security objectives such as anonymity and anti-attack capabilities.

[0076] The following is the entire authentication process, which follows the methods described above. It covers the entire lifecycle authentication from device access to operation, explaining the relevant theories and technical applications in detail. The specific steps are as follows:

[0077] First, Mr. Li started the IMD-5000 electricity meter. The meter initiated an access request, and the device generated an identifier SMID. i ="IMD5000001", random number R1 ="12a3bc", timestamp T1 =

[0078] "2024-12-10T09:00:00". The device uses the private key SK via ECC. meter For SMID i Sign R1 and T1 to generate Sig meter :

[0079] Sig meter =k·P where k = SK meterP is the base point of the elliptic curve. Simultaneously, the running status nodeStatus is collected, including the firmware version FW. Version ="3.2.5", the list of running processes, geographical location and network environment, encapsulated in the request packet Req Auth Req Auth ={SMID i ,R i ,T1,Sig meter The request packet is sent to the power grid server SGSi via an encrypted channel.

[0080] The second step involves SGSi receiving the device's authentication request and first verifying the uniqueness of the random number R1. By checking the temporarily stored random number database, if R1 already exists, the system will immediately reject the access and return an error message; if R1 has not been reused, the verification passes. Subsequently, the server checks if the timestamp T1 is within the specified time window (ΔT = 5 minutes) and calculates the difference between the receiving and sending times: T 接收 -T 发送 If the time difference exceeds the set threshold, it is considered a delay attack and the request is rejected; if the timestamp verification is successful, the identity authentication stage begins.

[0081] Third, after receiving the authentication request from the device, SGSi uses the device's public key PK. meter Verify signature Sig meter The validity of the data is verified. The verification process is based on the computational principles of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC): by checking... The system determines whether the signature was generated by the device's private key, thereby verifying the integrity of the data packet and the authenticity of the device's identity. If signature verification fails, or if the device identifier (SMID) is incorrect... i If a device is not in the server's trusted device list, the server will immediately reject the connection request and return an error message. If both signature verification and trusted list checks pass, the device is deemed legitimate, and the system allows it to proceed to the next state authentication stage.

[0082] The fourth step is for the device to perform status authentication again. SGSi parses the nodeStatus information: (1) Firmware version check: FW version =3.2.5, the latest version, verification passed. (2) Dangerous process detection: Fuzzy extraction is performed on the list of running processes to generate state feature template A, and the Hamming distance is calculated with the trusted template B: If HD(A,B) < threshold, the status is considered reliable. (3) Network check: Traffic of 3Gb / min and access frequency of 50 times / min are both within the safe range. (4) Geographic location check: The location is in Zone A of the industrial park, and the verification is passed.

[0083] Fifth, the server generates a corresponding permission template based on the device's role (e.g., an industrial monitoring meter). This template restricts the device's operational scope, allowing only data upload and status query functions. Subsequently, the server generates an interface-level access token (R) for the device. token ="UPLOAD" A The "CCESS001" token carries information about the device's role and access permissions and is returned to the device through a secure channel. After receiving the token, the device can use it to access specific resources, with the scope of permissions strictly limited to ensure that the device's resource access complies with predefined rules.

[0084] Step 6: The smart meter uses the session key SK generated through negotiation. session The transmitted data is encrypted to ensure its confidentiality and integrity. The uploaded data includes electricity consumption of 2300 kWh, voltage of 380V, and frequency of 50Hz. After receiving the encrypted data, the server decrypts it using the corresponding session key and records the decrypted data in the database for subsequent analysis and management.

[0085] Step 7: SGSi continuously acquires the device status nodeStatus' and performs repeated status authentication: checking for newly added dangerous processes; checking for excessive network traffic; and checking for changes in geographical location. If the status is abnormal, the connection is immediately terminated and the current status is saved.

[0086] Step 8: SGSi records a complete operation log during the device access authentication process, including authentication results, status verification records, data upload logs, and dynamic status change records. The log content includes the device identifier SMID. i The logs record verification time, permission allocation information, and accessed resource operation records. If any abnormality occurs during device operation, such as an untrusted status or unauthorized operation, the logs will record the relevant events, providing important evidence for subsequent security audits, problem tracing, and system optimization, ensuring the transparency and traceability of the entire access process.

[0087] Example 3, based on the same inventive concept, also provides a trusted access authentication system for distributed terminals in a novel power system, comprising:

[0088] The request module is used for distributed terminals to initiate access requests. Newly connected distributed terminals send access requests to the smart grid server SGSi, using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including the firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information;

[0089] The identity authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to verify the authenticity of the distributed terminals' identities, and completes identity confirmation through random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology.

[0090] The status authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to evaluate the operating status of distributed terminals and verify the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology.

[0091] The permission allocation module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to dynamically allocate permissions based on the roles and functions of distributed terminals, using the principle of least privilege.

[0092] The communication monitoring module is used for encrypted communication between distributed terminals and SGSi through a secure channel, while SGSi monitors the status of distributed terminals in real time.

[0093] The recording and monitoring module is used in the smart grid server SGSi to introduce deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

[0094] Example 4, based on the same inventive concept, also provides a computing device, including: one or more processors, one or more memories, and one or more programs, the programs being stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, the programs being loaded onto the processor to implement the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals of a novel power system according to any of the preceding claims.

[0095] Example 5, based on the same inventive concept, also provides a storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program including program instructions, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system according to any of the preceding claims.

Claims

1. A trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system, characterized in that, include: (1) A distributed terminal initiates an access request. The newly connected distributed terminal sends an access request to the smart grid server SGSi, and uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information; (2) The smart grid server SGSi verifies the authenticity of the distributed terminal's identity by using random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology to complete the identity confirmation. (3) The Smart Grid Server SGSi evaluates the operating status of distributed terminals and verifies the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology. (4) The Smart Grid Server SGSi dynamically allocates permissions based on the roles and functions of the distributed terminals using the principle of least privilege. (5) The distributed terminal communicates with SGSi through a secure channel with encrypted communication, and SGSi monitors the status of the distributed terminal in real time. (6) The Smart Grid Server SGSi introduces deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

2. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a new type of power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (1) includes: (11) Distributed terminals generate a unique device identifier (SMID). i The current timestamp T1 and a random number R1, where i is the distributed terminal number, are used with the distributed terminal's private key SK. meter For {SMID i Perform ECC signing on {T1,R1} to generate a request packet Req. Auth ={SMID i ,T1,R1,Sig meter } and send to SGSi, where Sig meter For signature; (12) When sending an access request, the distributed terminal collects the current status information and attaches it to the request packet for subsequent security status assessment.

3. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a new type of power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (2) includes: (21) The smart grid server SGSi receives and parses the authentication request packet Req. Auth Use the public key PK of the distributed terminal meter Verify signature Sig meter The system verifies the authenticity of the signature. If the verification fails, access is denied, and the device is prompted to re-initiate the authentication request. (22) Smart Grid Server SGSi checks SMID i Check if the device is in the trusted device list. If the device is not registered, deny access. If the device is successfully registered, record the device's role information and permission template. (23) The smart grid server SGSi verifies whether the request is recently generated by using timestamp T1 and random number R1 to avoid replay attacks. If the timestamp or random number verification fails, authentication is rejected.

4. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a new type of power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (3) includes: (31) Check the firmware version FW of the distributed terminals. version Verify whether it matches the trusted firmware version library. If the firmware version is too low or does not match, refuse access and require the device to update. (32) By analyzing the geographical location and network environment information of the distributed terminal, confirm whether the distributed terminal is in the allowed access area; if the location is abnormal or the network environment is risky, refuse access. (33) Combine fuzzy extraction technology to calculate the distributed terminal state feature template, and compare the state data reported by the distributed terminal with the trusted state by Hamming distance; if the Hamming distance exceeds the preset security threshold, it is determined that the operating environment of the distributed terminal is abnormal and authentication is rejected.

5. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a new type of power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (4) includes: (41) The smart grid server SGSi loads the corresponding preset permission template according to the role of the distributed terminal and restricts the access scope of the distributed terminal. (42) The smart grid server SGSi generates the session key SK. session The key is encrypted using the ECC public key and then sent to the distributed terminal; this session key will be used for symmetric encryption of data in subsequent communications.

6. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a new type of power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (5) includes: (51) Distributed terminals use the session key SK generated by SGSi. session The runtime data of the distributed terminals is encrypted and a signature Sig is attached. meter The data is then uploaded to SGSi, where SGSi uses the shared session key to decrypt the data and verify the integrity and authenticity of the running data. (52) The Smart Grid Server SGSi monitors the operating status and power consumption data uploaded by the device in real time to detect whether the device has abnormal behavior. Once abnormal behavior is detected, SGSi will dynamically adjust the device permissions or interrupt communication.

7. The trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step (6) includes: (61) The smart grid server SGSi records the identity authentication results, status authentication process, permission allocation and session information of the distributed terminals, and stores the operating status and communication logs of the distributed terminals. (62) Use LSTM network to analyze the time series operation data of distributed terminals, predict the future operation trend of distributed terminals, and judge whether the behavior of the meter deviates from the preset range by identifying changes in behavior patterns. (63) CNN is used to convert the operation data of the distributed terminal into a graphical representation, automatically extract features and detect abnormal behavior; the abnormal detection results are linked with the permission management system to adjust the permissions of the electricity meter in real time; (64) Regularly store all log data and analysis results of deep learning models in a secure database for subsequent security audits and dynamic optimization.

8. A trusted access authentication system for distributed terminals in a novel power system, characterized in that, include: The request module is used for distributed terminals to initiate access requests. Newly connected distributed terminals send access requests to the smart grid server SGSi, using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for identity generation and signing. The access request includes current status information, including the firmware version FW. version Location and network environment information; The identity authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to verify the authenticity of the distributed terminals' identities, and completes identity confirmation through random number verification and asymmetric encryption technology. The status authentication module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to evaluate the operating status of distributed terminals and verify the security of the equipment by combining fuzzy extraction and Hamming distance technology. The permission allocation module is used by the smart grid server SGSi to dynamically allocate permissions based on the roles and functions of distributed terminals, using the principle of least privilege. The communication monitoring module is used for encrypted communication between distributed terminals and SGSi through a secure channel, while SGSi monitors the status of distributed terminals in real time. The recording and monitoring module is used in the smart grid server SGSi to introduce deep learning technologies LSTM and CNN to record the access process and communication behavior of distributed terminals for subsequent auditing, anomaly analysis and prediction.

9. A computing device, characterized in that, include: One or more processors, one or more memories, and one or more programs, said programs being stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the processor, said programs being loaded onto the processor to implement the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals for novel power systems according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program, which includes program instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the trusted access authentication method for distributed terminals in a novel power system according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

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