Train control interlocking integrated system based on virtual gate

Abstract

The invention provides a train control interlocking integrated system based on a virtual gate, and the system comprises an ATS subsystem which is used for train operation scheduling and state monitoring; the trackside ATP subsystem is used for executing train movement authorization, turnout control, signal control and interlocking functions; the trackside ATO subsystem is used for route management, train station stop control and non-safety function execution; the vehicle-mounted ATP / ATO subsystem is used for train overspeed protection, mobile authorization receiving and speed curve control; the PDCU subsystem is used for platform door control and linkage with a vehicle-mounted system; and the DCS subsystem is used for data communication among the subsystems. According to the invention, an interlocking function is integrated to the RATP subsystem, a route arrangement function is integrated to the trackside ATO subsystem, and interlocking control of trackside equipment and automatic management of routes are realized through an intelligent algorithm.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the technical field of integrated train control and interlocking systems, specifically to an integrated train control and interlocking system based on virtual gates. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid expansion of urban rail transit networks and the increasing diversification of operational scenarios, the limitations of traditional separate train control and interlocking system architecture in terms of adaptability, economy, and operational efficiency are becoming increasingly apparent. This contradiction is particularly prominent in special projects such as airport APM (Automated People Mover) and straddle-type monorails, where high construction costs and complex operation and maintenance requirements cannot meet diverse user needs. To effectively address these challenges, this invention proposes to deeply integrate train control and interlocking systems to construct an "integrated train control and interlocking" system, thereby improving overall performance and economic benefits.

[0003] Airport APM projects typically feature short routes, small station spacing, and high departure frequencies. Traditional separate systems not only require independent train control and interlocking equipment but also complex inter-system interfaces, leading to high equipment redundancy, large equipment room footprint, and increased energy consumption. Furthermore, in special systems like monorail, the installation and maintenance of traditional systems face practical challenges such as limited space and operational difficulties due to track constraints, further increasing the overall lifecycle operating costs.

[0004] Patent application CN120246041A discloses a train control system, method, and readable storage medium based on vehicle-to-vehicle communication. The system includes: an Automatic Train Monitoring System (ATS) for sending route information and train operation information to onboard equipment; an Object Controller (OC) for controlling trackside equipment according to instructions from the onboard equipment and providing feedback on equipment status; and onboard equipment for establishing or canceling vehicle-to-vehicle communication connections by real-time identification and verification of the preceding vehicle ID, for virtually coupling or canceling virtual coupling with the preceding vehicle by real-time calculation and verification of the vehicle-to-vehicle distance, and for controlling the Object Controller (OC), acquiring switch status, verifying the switch status, and determining the movement authorization of the current vehicle. However, this patent cannot completely solve the existing technical problems and does not meet the needs of this invention. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the purpose of this invention is to provide an integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates.

[0006] The train control and interlocking integrated system based on virtual gates provided by the present invention includes: an ATS subsystem, a trackside ATP subsystem, a trackside ATO subsystem, an onboard ATP / ATO subsystem, a PDCU subsystem, and a DCS subsystem; The ATS subsystem is used for train operation scheduling and status monitoring; The trackside ATP subsystem is mainly used to execute train movement authorization, as well as interlocking functions such as virtual gate control, turnout control, signal control, and turnout side protection. The trackside ATO subsystem is used for route management, train station stop control, and other non-safety functions. The onboard ATP / ATO subsystem is used for train overspeed protection, motion authorization reception and speed curve control, train operation control, etc. The PDCU subsystem is used for platform door control and linkage with the vehicle system. The DCS subsystem is used for data communication between the various subsystems; The trackside ATP subsystem controls turnouts and signals through the OCS interface, while the trackside ATO subsystem integrates route arrangement functions and achieves interlocking control through virtual gates.

[0007] Preferably, the ATS subsystem is communicatively connected to the trackside ATO subsystem and is used to receive train location information, trackside equipment status information, platform door status information, vehicle door status information and alarm information reported by the trackside ATO subsystem. The ATS subsystem is also used to issue control commands to the trackside ATO subsystem. These control commands include turnout control commands, signal control commands, traffic direction control commands, vehicle impoundment commands, stop commands, remote door opening / closing commands, temporary speed limit commands, and remote guide switching commands.

[0008] Preferably, the trackside ATO subsystem is communicatively connected to the trackside ATP subsystem, the onboard ATP / ATO subsystem, and the ATS subsystem, respectively. The trackside ATO subsystem is used to receive the currently set operating route number sent by the ATS subsystem, determine the automatic triggering of the forward route based on the current route number and the train position, and send an equipment status transition request to the trackside ATP subsystem when the equipment status of the route does not meet the route conditions (such as: turnout position, traffic zone direction, signal status, etc.), thereby realizing the automatic arrangement and management of routes. The trackside ATO subsystem is also used to receive temporary speed limit requests sent by the ATS subsystem and forward the requests to the trackside ATP subsystem. The trackside ATP subsystem sets a temporary speed limit when conditions are met and sends the speed limit status to the onboard ATP / ATO subsystem.

[0009] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem includes three processors: VPC_A, VPC_B, and VPC_C; VPC_A and VPC_B constitute two independent processing channels, which receive the same input and perform cross-validation respectively; VPC_C is used to generate the final output when the outputs of VPC_A and VPC_B are consistent, and then send it to other subsystems through an Ethernet switch.

[0010] Preferably, the on-board ATP / ATO subsystem includes two ATP boards and one ATO board; The ATP board is equipped with safety software for safe train operation, and the ATO board is equipped with software for performing unsafe train operation functions. For flexible train formations, each car is equipped with an onboard ATP / ATO device. After the device is powered on, VATP determines the active terminal according to logic, and the remaining cars serve as backup terminals. After establishing communication with the trackside and completing initialization, if the currently active terminal has no alarm or is in an unhealthy state, the current active terminal is maintained; otherwise, RATO will reselect the active terminal based on the VATC health status of each car.

[0011] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem and the object controller system (OCS) communicate via a data communication system (DCS). The main and backup systems of the trackside ATP subsystem are each equipped with a communication controller, and each communication controller is connected to a different switch of the DCS. The OCS system is configured with two communication boards, which are connected to different switches in the DCS respectively; The trackside ATP subsystem, acting as the master station, sends commands to the OCS via a polling mechanism, and the OCS, acting as the slave station, responds and returns status information.

[0012] Preferably, the communication messages between the trackside ATP subsystem and the OCS adopt the A / B complementary code encoding method, wherein the A frame is the original data frame and the B frame is the complementary frame generated by bit-inverting the original data frame; after receiving the A frame and the B frame, the receiving end performs a bit-inverting operation on the B frame and compares the result with the A frame bit by bit; if the comparison result is consistent, the data is determined to be valid; otherwise, the data is determined to be invalid and a safety processing mechanism is triggered.

[0013] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem is used to control virtual gates set in each direction of traffic of the turnout; The trackside ATP subsystem controls the virtual gate to open when all of the following conditions are met: Receive a virtual gate opening request from the trackside ATO subsystem; The positions of all relevant turnouts are consistent with the positions protected by the gates and are in a locked state; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the opening direction of the virtual gate; Other virtual gates entering this route are closed; Conflict-free paths exist; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The turnouts within the route are not in local control mode; The turnout is not in a prohibited state.

[0014] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem is used to control the opening of trackside signals; The trackside ATP subsystem allows the signal to be opened under the following conditions: RATP received a request from RATO to open the signal gate; All relevant turnouts and signals are in the same position as the open request and are locked; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the protection direction of the signal. Other signals entering this route are in the off state; There are no conflicting routes; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The turnout is not in local control mode; The relevant turnouts are in automatic mode.

[0015] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem is used to control the rotation of the turnout; The trackside ATP subsystem allows turnout rotation when all of the following conditions are met: Receive turnout position requests from the trackside ATO subsystem; The requested turnout position is different from the current turnout position; No other trains are authorized to move within the turnout protection zone; All virtual gates leading to this turnout are closed; No virtual gate opening request was received for this turnout; The entire line is not in a stopped state. Recovery route through the turnout in non-degradation mode; The turnout is in automatic mode.

[0016] Preferably, the trackside ATP subsystem is used to perform lateral protection of the turnout; Turnout side protection principle: When a route passes through a turnout, it is necessary to ensure that no train occupies the reverse area of ​​the adjacent turnout; when a route passes through a turnout in reverse, no train occupies the protection area of ​​the adjacent virtual gate at the positioning point.

[0017] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention integrates interlocking functions into the trackside ATC system, which not only significantly reduces equipment procurement and installation costs, but also optimizes operation and maintenance processes, improves system reliability, and provides a more cost-effective solution for special-type rail transit projects. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Other features, objects, and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent from the following detailed description of non-limiting embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 Diagram of the RATP system structure; Figure 2 Diagram of the RATO system configuration; Figure 3 VATC system configuration diagram; Figure 4 This is a diagram showing the interface connection between RATP and OCS. Figure 5 A schematic diagram illustrating the side protection function of a turnout implemented by RATP; Figure 6 This is a framework diagram of a train control interlocking integrated system based on virtual gates. Detailed Implementation

[0019] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to specific embodiments. These embodiments will help those skilled in the art to further understand the present invention, but do not limit the invention in any way. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make several changes and improvements without departing from the concept of the present invention. These all fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0020] Example like Figure 6 The train control and interlocking integrated system based on virtual gates provided by this invention includes: an ATS subsystem, a trackside ATP / ATO subsystem, an onboard ATP / ATO subsystem, a PDCU subsystem, and a DCS subsystem. Trackside equipment includes signals, axle counters, transponders, etc. Each subsystem is interconnected and communicates with the DCS system to achieve various functions of the signaling system. Compared to the traditional CBTC system architecture, this system simplifies the interlocking and axle counter subsystems, integrating some interlocking functions into the trackside ATC system. Specifically: The ATS subsystem intelligently schedules trains on the line based on the timetable, ensuring orderly train operation. The dynamic location of trains and equipment status on the line are displayed in real time on a large screen in the control center, allowing dispatchers to have a comprehensive understanding of the entire line's train operation status. The ATS system dynamically monitors train operation, and to ensure timetable punctuality and headway, it can flexibly adjust train operation levels and station dwell times. It supports a two-level control architecture at the control center and stations, effectively reducing the impact of equipment or system failures. The system is also equipped with comprehensive diagnostic functions, automatically sending accurate fault reports and early warning information to maintenance personnel. The ATS system not only controls and supervises the signaling subsystem but also provides seamless integration with other systems. The ATS interfaces with RATO, with RATO reporting real-time train location information, trackside equipment status information, platform / car door status, alarm information, etc., to the ATS; the ATS issues manual control commands to RATO, such as: turnout control, signal control, traffic direction control, train impoundment, train stop, remote door opening / closing, temporary speed limits, etc. The ATS interfaces with external systems, such as: with the master clock system to synchronize the signaling system with the master clock; with SCADA to display the power rail status and transmit the power rail de-energization status to RATC so that the signaling system can take appropriate protective measures; and with the passenger information system to send information such as train location and next station to the passenger information system.

[0021] The RATO subsystem interfaces with RATP, VATC, and ATS, and is responsible for executing non-safety functions related to train operation and station operations within a designated area. The main functions implemented by RATO include: train removal (RATP controls the train removal process and RATO updates the removal status); train position (RATO obtains train position information from RATP and forwards it to ATS for display); station stop time control (RATO calculates the stop time and continuously updates the remaining stop time to ATS); train arrest (RATO can automatically arrest trains in specific scenarios, such as when a train occupies a ventilation area ahead); and ATS operator control commands (RATO receives control commands from ATS, such as temporary speed limits, turnout control, signal control, and remote control switching). Taking temporary speed limits as an example, RATO forwards the temporary speed limit request from ATS to RATP. After checking that the relevant conditions are met, RATP sets a temporary speed limit for the relevant section and sends the speed limit status of the relevant section to VATP / VATO. VATO adjusts the train speed curve based on the speed limit information to adjust the train's operating speed. In addition, RATO is also responsible for controlling train routes. RATO's route function is the core and key to realizing the integration of train control and interlocking, and it is also the main feature that distinguishes it from traditional system architectures. RATO receives route requests from ATS and determines how the trackside equipment should be configured to realize the route (such as: turnout position, traffic direction, signal status, etc.). When the relevant conditions are not met, RATO requests RATP to switch the trackside equipment to the required position, such as requesting turnout position, traffic direction, and open signal.

[0022] The RATP subsystem executes the safety functions of the ATC system. RATP controls trackside equipment (turnouts, signals, etc.) through the OCS (Object Controller System). RATP's main functions include controlling train movement, turnout control, and signal control within its control area. Specifically, this includes: train initialization (after a train enters the CBTC area, RATP establishes communication with it and adds it to the system; once initialization is complete, RATP sends a movement authorization to VATC); train removal (if a train leaves the CBTC area and communication with RATP fails, RATP removes the train from the RATP database based on predetermined principles); movement authorization (RATP calculates movement authorization for the train based on its position and trackside route conditions, controlling the safe interval between trains); and interlocking functions (the implementation of interlocking functions is the core and key to integrated train control and interlocking, and is also its main feature distinguishing it from traditional system architectures). Implemented interlocking functions include: virtual gate control, turnout control, signal control, and turnout protection. For traffic direction control, for automatic routes, changes in traffic direction are controlled by RATO and requested from RATP; for manual routes, changes in traffic direction are controlled by ATS sending control commands to RATO, which then forwards them to RATP; when RATP receives a turning request from RATO, it changes the direction of traffic area after checking that all relevant conditions are met.

[0023] The VATC system is responsible for the safe operation of the train. Its main functions include: Train-ground communication. The VATP receives route and speed limit information from the RATP, and the VATP sends position and various status information to the RATP. When no valid information is received within a specific time, the VATP determines that the communication with the RATP is interrupted and applies service braking. Train safety spacing. The RATP sends a route that the train can travel on (permitted movement authority) to the VATP. This route includes conflict points / authority endpoints, running direction, and speed limits. Based on this information, the VATP ensures that the safe braking distance or virtual occupancy (safety envelope) of the train does not exceed the conflict point position established by the RATP. Once the safe braking distance is insufficient, the VATP will disconnect the traction system and apply emergency braking. Overspeed protection. To prevent the train from speeding, the VATP continuously monitors the train speed to ensure that it is always lower than the line speed limit of the current section (including any adjustment requirements imposed by the RATO), and at the same time ensures that the train speed can be lower than the line speed limit requirements of the upcoming section when entering it. Train operation control. The VATC generates a speed control curve limited by acceleration and jerk rates, which is the target speed or command speed of the train. Applying brakes. There are two braking methods: service braking and emergency braking. Service braking: The train uses a combination of pneumatic friction braking and electric braking to decelerate at a preset jerk rate limit. When the train speed drops to zero, the system will apply sufficient pressure to the friction brakes to prevent the train from moving. If the train does not decelerate at the preset rate, the on-board ATP (VATP) will trigger emergency braking. Emergency braking: Emergency braking can be triggered by an on-board ATP command or directly initiated by interrupting the emergency braking loop. Emergency braking also has the function of parking braking to ensure that the vehicle remains stationary when the train needs to stop for a long time. Driving modes. The driving modes supported by this system include: fully automatic driverless mode (FAM), manual driving mode under ATP supervision (CM), restricted manual driving mode (RM), and full manual driving mode (EUM).

[0024] The platform door control unit (PDCU) is responsible for interfacing with the platform door system to achieve the opening and closing of the platform doors and the linkage with the train doors. The PDCU interfaces with the VATC through the TWC wireless system to receive the train's door opening / closing commands, door enabling requests, and the information on the train's accurate stop and stable stop. Based on the above information, it generates enabling and opening / closing requests for the platform doors, thus achieving the interlocking control between the platform doors and the train doors. The PDCU receives the locking status, bypass status, local control status, etc. of the platform doors from the platform screen door system, and transfers them to the VATC for train departure control, and transfers them to the RATO, and the RATO transfers them to the ATS for status display or alarm, etc.

[0025] The RATP (trackside ATP) safety computer system VCS_N consists of 3 processors, VPC_A, VPC_B, and VPC_C. The system composition is as Figure 1RATP employs a 2-out-of-2 safety redundancy architecture: VPC_A and VPC_B processors constitute two channels that perform independent calculations on the same input. Each channel uses a different CPU and a different operating system, running the same application. Both channels (CPUs) receive the same input and perform cross-checking before use. The two channels independently calculate the output, requiring cross-comparison before output. If the comparison results match, the final output is generated and sent to other subsystems via an Ethernet switch by VPC_C. If the comparison results do not match, the primary system and hot standby system automatically switch over, and another regional ATP system performs the 2-out-of-2 function. RATP meets the SIL4 safety integrity level.

[0026] RATO's system configuration is as follows Figure 2 RATO employs a hot-standby redundancy design: RATO's unsecured computer system, UCS-N, is a functional device that can be combined with multiple components. Two computer systems can be configured within its metal frame; these two systems operate independently, except for being mounted in the same chassis. During operation, one system serves as the primary system, and the other as the hot standby system. Both the primary and hot standby systems receive area data, but only the primary system sends commands and requests. The hot standby system seamlessly switches to become the primary system upon detecting a failure in the primary system. RATO meets the SIL2 security integrity level.

[0027] VATC system configuration as follows Figure 3 The onboard ATP system employs a dual-channel cross-checking redundancy configuration, adhering to the fault-oriented safety principle. To ensure system safety, two CPUs independently read the same inputs to determine the output status, guaranteeing no undetected single points of failure. All safety-related outputs are either designed according to fault-oriented safety principles or utilize a dual-output architecture, ensuring that a single point of failure in the output hardware will not lead to an unsafe state. The onboard ATC rack contains three CPU boards: two ATP boards and one ATO board. The ATP boards are configured with safety software to ensure safe train operation. The ATO board is configured with software to perform non-safety-related train operation functions. Each car is equipped with one VATC device; when coupled, the VATC devices in the first and last cars form a redundant configuration, while the devices in the remaining cars are powered off.

[0028] The core and key of this invention is to develop an interface between RATP and OCS to enable RATP to monitor trackside equipment, thereby achieving interlocking control of related functions.

[0029] RATP and OCS interface design: The RATP master and backup systems are each configured with a communication controller, which is connected to two switches in the data communication system (DCS). The OCS communication controller unit (CCU) is redundantly configured with two COM5 boards, each connected to a different switch in the DCS. Thus, RATP achieves redundant connection with the OCS communication board through the communication controller WCP. The communication protocol between RATP and OCS adopts a master-slave polling-response mechanism, where RATP, as the master, actively polls the OCS (referred to as "commands"), and the OCS, as the slave, responds to the polling requests (referred to as "status"). RATP controls the status of field devices through "command" information, while the OCS replies with the actual status of the field devices through "status" information.

[0030] RATP and OCS messages are encoded and transmitted using complementary A / B codes. For the same message, the system generates two data frames simultaneously. Frame A contains the original data, and frame B contains the bitwise inverted version of the original data. The receiver receives both A and B frames simultaneously, performs a bitwise inversion on the received B frame, and compares it bit by bit with the A frame. If they match completely, the data is valid; otherwise, it is considered invalid and a security mechanism is triggered.

[0031] The interface connection diagram between RATP and OCS is as follows: Figure 4 As shown.

[0032] This system ensures the safe operation of trains in turnout areas through a safety control mechanism. Turnouts (or turnout groups) are defined as interlocking zones, and virtual gates are set up in each zone to achieve real-time dynamic interlocking between turnout status and train operation. The main interlocking functions implemented include: virtual gate control, signal control, turnout control, turnout side protection, and route management.

[0033] 1. Virtual Gate Control: RATP implements the control function of virtual gates. Virtual gates are set in each direction that may allow passage through a turnout. When the virtual gate corresponding to a turnout is open, the train's movement is authorized to pass through the turnout, meaning the train can pass through the turnout area; otherwise, the train will stop before the virtual gate. The conditions under which RATP allows the opening of virtual gates are as follows: RATP received a request from RATO to open the gate; All relevant turnouts are in the same position as the gate protection and are locked; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the opening direction of the gate; Other gates leading to this route are closed; There are no conflicting routes; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The switches within the route are not in local control mode; The turnout is not in a prohibited state, etc.

[0034] 2. Signal Control: RATP controls the signals. Signals are installed at the entrance of each interlocked zone, including a green light and a red light. A green light indicates the virtual gate is open, allowing safe passage; a red light indicates the virtual gate is closed or closing, disallowing passage. The conditions under which RATP allows the signals to be opened are as follows: RATP received a request from RATO to open the signal gate; All relevant turnouts and signals are in the same position as the open request and are locked; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the protection direction of the signal. Other signals entering this route are in the off state; There are no conflicting routes; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The turnout is not in local control mode; The relevant turnouts are in automatic mode, etc.

[0035] 3. Turnout Control: RATP implements turnout control functions. RATP monitors trackside conditions (such as train position, virtual gate status, etc.) to determine whether the turnout can rotate. RATP protects the turnout through a turnout locking function; when the turnout is locked, no turnout rotation request can be issued. The conditions under which RATP allows turnout rotation are as follows: RATP received a turnout position request from RATO; The turnout position requested by RATO is different from the current turnout position; No other trains are authorized to move within the turnout protection zone; All gates leading to the turnout are closed; There was no request to open the gate to the turnout; The entire line of parking was not activated; There is no recovery route passing through this turnout (protected route in degraded mode). The turnout is in automatic mode, etc.

[0036] 4. Side protection: RATP implements the side protection function of turnouts. When a route passes through a turnout, it must ensure that no train occupies the opposite area of ​​the adjacent turnout. For example... Figure 5 When the route passes through the SW21 positioning point, there must be no trains occupying the area of ​​the turnout in the reverse position SW22. When the route passes through the turnout in the reverse position, there must be no trains occupying the protection range of the adjacent Gate (virtual gate) on the positioning point. For example, when the route passes through the SW21 reverse position, there must be no trains occupying the protection range of G212.

[0037] 5. Route Management: RATO manages train routes. RATO is responsible for controlling train routes. Based on the operating route or route requests from the ATS operator, RATO automatically triggers the route and determines how trackside equipment should cooperate to achieve the route. Examples include: changing traffic zone direction, turning switches to the required positions, opening virtual gates in interlocking zones, and activating signals.

[0038] Those skilled in the art will understand that, in addition to implementing the system, apparatus, and their modules provided by this invention in purely computer-readable program code, the same program can be implemented in the form of logic gates, switches, application-specific integrated circuits, programmable logic controllers, and embedded microcontrollers by logically programming the method steps. Therefore, the system, apparatus, and their modules provided by this invention can be considered a hardware component, and the modules included therein for implementing various programs can also be considered structures within the hardware component; alternatively, modules for implementing various functions can be considered both software programs implementing the method and structures within the hardware component.

[0039] Specific embodiments of the present invention have been described above. It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and those skilled in the art can make various changes or modifications within the scope of the claims, which do not affect the essence of the present invention. Unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in this application can be arbitrarily combined with each other.

Claims

1. A train control interlocking integrated system based on virtual gates, characterized in that, include: ATS subsystem, trackside ATP subsystem, trackside ATO subsystem, onboard ATP / ATO subsystem, PDCU subsystem, and DCS subsystem; The ATS subsystem is used for train operation scheduling and status monitoring; The trackside ATP subsystem is used to execute train movement authorization, as well as interlocking functions including virtual gate control, turnout control, signal control, and turnout side protection. The trackside ATO subsystem is used for route management, train station stop control, and other non-safety functions. The onboard ATP / ATO subsystem is used for train overspeed protection, motion authorization reception and speed curve control, and train operation control. The PDCU subsystem is used for platform door control and linkage with the vehicle system. The DCS subsystem is used for data communication between the various subsystems; The trackside ATP subsystem controls turnouts and signals through the OCS interface, while the trackside ATO subsystem integrates route arrangement functions and achieves interlocking control through virtual gates.

2. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The ATS subsystem is communicatively connected to the trackside ATO subsystem and is used to receive train location information, trackside equipment status information, platform door status information, vehicle door status information and alarm information reported by the trackside ATO subsystem. The ATS subsystem is also used to issue control commands to the trackside ATO subsystem. These control commands include turnout control commands, signal control commands, traffic direction control commands, vehicle impoundment commands, stop commands, remote door opening / closing commands, temporary speed limit commands, and remote guide switching commands.

3. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATO subsystem is communicatively connected to the trackside ATP subsystem, the on-board ATP / ATO subsystem, and the ATS subsystem, respectively. The trackside ATO subsystem is used to receive the currently set operating route number sent by the ATS subsystem, determine the automatic triggering of the forward route based on the current route number and the train position, and send an equipment status transition request to the trackside ATP subsystem when the equipment status of the route does not meet the route conditions, thereby realizing the automatic arrangement and management of routes. The trackside ATO subsystem is also used to receive temporary speed limit requests sent by the ATS subsystem and forward the requests to the trackside ATP subsystem. The trackside ATP subsystem sets a temporary speed limit when conditions are met and sends the speed limit status to the onboard ATP / ATO subsystem.

4. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem includes three processors: VPC_A, VPC_B, and VPC_C; VPC_A and VPC_B constitute two independent processing channels, which receive the same input and perform cross-validation respectively; VPC_C is used to generate the final output when the outputs of VPC_A and VPC_B are consistent, and then send it to other subsystems through an Ethernet switch.

5. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The on-board ATP / ATO subsystem includes two ATP boards and one ATO board. The ATP board is equipped with safety software for safe train operation, and the ATO board is equipped with software for performing unsafe train operation functions. For flexible train formations, each car is equipped with an onboard ATP / ATO device. After the device is powered on, VATP determines the active end according to logic, and the remaining cars serve as backup ends. After establishing communication with the trackside and completing initialization, if the currently active end has no alarm or is in an unhealthy state, the current active end is maintained. Otherwise, RATO will reselect the activation terminal based on the VATC health status of each carriage.

6. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem communicates with the object controller system (OCS) via a data communication system (DCS). The main and backup systems of the trackside ATP subsystem are each equipped with a communication controller, and each communication controller is connected to a different switch of the DCS. The OCS system is configured with two communication boards, which are connected to different switches in the DCS respectively; The trackside ATP subsystem, acting as the master station, sends commands to the OCS using a polling mechanism, and the OCS, acting as the slave station, responds and returns status information. The communication messages between the trackside ATP subsystem and the OCS use A / B complementary code encoding. The A frame is the original data frame, and the B frame is the complementary frame generated by bit-inverting the original data frame. After receiving the A frame and the B frame, the receiving end performs a bit-inverting operation on the B frame and compares the result with the A frame bit by bit. If the comparison results are consistent, the data is determined to be valid; otherwise, the data is determined to be invalid and a safety processing mechanism is triggered.

7. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem is used to control the virtual gates set in each direction of traffic of the turnout; The trackside ATP subsystem controls the virtual gate to open when all of the following conditions are met: Receive a virtual gate opening request from the trackside ATO subsystem; The positions of all relevant turnouts are consistent with the positions protected by the gates and are in a locked state; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the opening direction of the virtual gate; Other virtual gates entering this route are closed; Conflict-free paths exist; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The turnouts within the route are not in local control mode; The turnout is not in a prohibited state.

8. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem is used to control the opening of trackside signals; The trackside ATP subsystem allows the signal to be opened under the following conditions: RATP received a request from RATO to open the signal gate; All relevant turnouts and signals are in the same position as the open request and are locked; The traffic direction entering and exiting the interlocked area is consistent with the protection direction of the signal. Other signals entering this route are in the off state; There are no conflicting routes; Meets the requirements for lateral defense; The turnout is not in local control mode; The relevant turnouts are in automatic mode.

9. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem is used to control the rotation of the turnouts; The trackside ATP subsystem allows turnout rotation when all of the following conditions are met: Receive turnout position requests from the trackside ATO subsystem; The requested turnout position is different from the current turnout position; No other trains are authorized to move within the turnout protection zone; All virtual gates leading to this turnout are closed; No virtual gate opening request was received for this turnout; The entire line is not in a stopped state. Recovery route through the turnout in non-degradation mode; The turnout is in automatic mode.

10. The integrated train control interlocking system based on virtual gates according to claim 1, characterized in that, The trackside ATP subsystem is used to perform lateral protection for the turnout; Turnout side protection principle: When a route passes through a turnout, it is necessary to ensure that no train occupies the reverse area of ​​the adjacent turnout; when a route passes through a turnout in reverse, no train occupies the protection area of ​​the adjacent virtual gate at the positioning point.

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