A method for self-checking of an aircraft operation identification broadcast function and an aircraft

Abstract

The embodiment of the application provides a kind of aircraft operation identification broadcast function self-checking method and aircraft, aircraft is equipped with broadcast device, including first broadcast device and second broadcast device;The method comprises: in the first state of aircraft, first detection is carried out to operation identification broadcast function, and first processing operation is executed based on first detection result;Multiple broadcast link function detection of first detection includes: receiving the first operation identification data sent by first broadcast device and the second operation identification data sent by second broadcast device, and obtaining identification code information by analyzing first operation identification data and second operation identification data;If respective identification code information is consistent, then determine whether first operation identification data and second operation identification data are consistent;If not consistent, then determine that the sending function of aircraft is abnormal, and execute first exception handling operation.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of aircraft, in particular to a self-checking method of an aircraft operation identification broadcast function and an aircraft. BACKGROUND

[0002] In the operation management of an aircraft, real-time and accurate sending of operation identification information is the key to ensuring airspace safety. However, in the related art, the self-checking process of the operation identification broadcast function of the aircraft system is not perfect. Especially when the operation identification broadcast function fails, there is a lack of effective processing, which may lead to loss of control of the aircraft or illegal flight, and there is a great safety hazard. SUMMARY

[0003] The purpose of the embodiments of the present application is to provide a self-checking method of an aircraft operation identification broadcast function and an aircraft, to realize self-checking of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function, and to improve the technical effects of aircraft operation safety and compliance.

[0004] The first aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a self-checking method of an aircraft operation identification broadcast function, the aircraft is equipped with a broadcast device; the broadcast device includes a first broadcast device corresponding to a first broadcast link and a second broadcast device corresponding to a second broadcast link; the method comprises:

[0005] In the first state of the aircraft, the operation identification broadcast function of the aircraft is first detected, and a first processing operation is performed based on the first detection result; wherein the multi-broadcast link function detection in the first detection comprises:

[0006] Receiving first operation identification data sent by the first broadcast device and second operation identification data sent by the second broadcast device, and analyzing the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data to obtain identification code information;

[0007] If the identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is consistent, it is further determined whether the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are consistent.

[0008] If the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are inconsistent, it is determined that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, and a first abnormal processing operation is performed.

[0009] In the implementation process, first, the identification code information in the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is compared for consistency. If the identification code information is inconsistent, it can be directly determined that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, without the need to compare other information one by one, thereby improving the detection efficiency. In the case where the identification information is consistent, other information carried is compared one by one, thereby ensuring that the operation identification information sent by the two broadcasting devices is consistent.

[0010] Further, the method further comprises:

[0011] In the second state of the aircraft, a second detection is performed on the operation identification broadcast function of the aircraft, and a second processing operation is performed based on the second detection result.

[0012] In the implementation process, different detections are performed on the operation identification broadcast function in the whole operation cycle of the aircraft, which can ensure that the operation identification broadcast function operates normally in the whole operation cycle, and abnormal processing operations can be performed in time when the operation identification broadcast function fails, thereby reducing the risk of loss of control caused by sending function failure.

[0013] Further, the first detection further comprises one or more of the following: white list detection of the broadcasting device, broadcast signal quality detection, operation identification data consistency detection, data tampering detection, data protocol detection, and storage detection.

[0014] The second detection comprises one or more of the following: white list detection of the broadcasting device, broadcast signal quality detection, operation identification data consistency detection, data tampering detection, and storage detection.

[0015] In the implementation process, different detections are performed on the operation identification broadcast function in the whole operation cycle of the aircraft, which can ensure that the operation identification broadcast function operates normally in the whole operation cycle, and abnormal processing operations can be performed in time when the operation identification broadcast function fails, thereby reducing the risk of loss of control caused by sending function failure.

[0016] Further, the white list detection of the broadcasting device comprises:

[0017] In the case where the identity identification information of the broadcasting device does not match the broadcasting device white list of the aircraft, an abnormal processing operation is performed; and / or

[0018] In the case where the firmware version of the broadcasting device does not match the firmware version white list of the aircraft, an abnormal processing operation is performed.

[0019] In the implementation process, by checking whether the broadcast device and the firmware version thereof are adapted to the aircraft before takeoff of the aircraft, it is ensured that the aircraft is not illegally disassembled and modified. Meanwhile, by checking whether the broadcast device and the firmware version thereof are adapted to the aircraft during flight, it is ensured that the broadcast device line is not detached or in poor contact, thereby reducing the risk of loss of control caused by failure of the sending function.

[0020] Further, the broadcast signal quality detection comprises:

[0021] receiving the broadcast signal sent by the broadcast device, and obtaining a quality parameter of the broadcast signal; the quality parameter comprises signal strength and / or signal-to-noise ratio;

[0022] if the quality parameter exceeds a preset parameter range, or the fluctuation of the quality parameter exceeds a preset fluctuation range, an abnormal processing operation is performed.

[0023] In the implementation process, by performing broadcast signal quality detection during the whole cycle of the operation of the aircraft, it is ensured that the aircraft takes off and operates under the condition that the broadcast signal quality meets the requirements, thereby avoiding the risk of loss of control caused by sending identification of operation identification data due to poor broadcast signal quality.

[0024] Further, the operation identification data consistency detection comprises:

[0025] obtaining to-be-detected data from the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device;

[0026] obtaining original data used for generating the operation identification data;

[0027] in the case that the to-be-detected data is inconsistent with the original data, performing an abnormal processing operation.

[0028] In the implementation process, by performing operation data consistency detection during the whole cycle of the operation of the aircraft, it is ensured that the broadcast device sends correct and error-free operation identification data, thereby avoiding the risk of loss of control of the aircraft caused by errors in the operation identification data.

[0029] Further, the operation identification data comprises a plurality of data items; and the obtaining to-be-detected data from the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device comprises:

[0030] in the first state of the aircraft, obtaining a first data item corresponding to the first state from the operation identification data as the to-be-detected data;

[0031] in the second state of the aircraft, obtaining a second data item corresponding to the second state from the operation identification data as the to-be-detected data.

[0032] In the implementation process, the embodiment can improve the detection efficiency and reduce the detection cost by performing consistency comparison on the data items corresponding to the current state of the aircraft through sampling inspection.

[0033] Further, the data tampering detection comprises:

[0034] receiving first to-be-verified data sent by the first broadcast device and second to-be-verified data sent by the second broadcast device;

[0035] obtaining, from the first to-be-verified data, a first plaintext segment, a second hash value corresponding to a second plaintext segment, and a first hash segment in a hash value corresponding to a target plaintext;

[0036] obtaining, from the second to-be-verified data, the second plaintext segment, a first hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, and a second hash segment in the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext;

[0037] assembling the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment to obtain the target plaintext, and assembling the first hash segment and the second hash segment to obtain a third hash value;

[0038] if the first hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, or the second hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, or the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, performing an abnormal processing operation.

[0039] In the implementation process, the third hash value and the target plaintext can be used to quickly determine whether data tampering occurs in the data transmission process. The first hash value and the second hash value can be used to further determine the broadcast link where data tampering occurs, so that the transmission environment can be investigated and repaired in a targeted manner, and the safety of the data transmission for operation recognition can be ensured.

[0040] Further, the storage detection comprises:

[0041] if the remaining storage space of the aircraft is less than a preset storage space threshold, or the storage resource write speed of the aircraft is less than a preset write speed threshold, performing an abnormal processing operation.

[0042] In the implementation process, the storage detection is performed throughout the whole cycle of the aircraft operation, so that the data write speed and the remaining storage space of the aircraft can meet the requirements, and data loss can be avoided to ensure traceability in the later stage.

[0043] Further, the data protocol detection comprises:

[0044] determining a flight area that the aircraft plans to pass through;

[0045] acquire a data protocol standard used in the flight region;

[0046] if the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device does not conform to the data protocol standard, perform an abnormal processing operation.

[0047] In the implementation process described above, by acquiring the data protocol standard used in the flight region planned to pass through before the aircraft takes off, and then verifying whether the current operation identification data of the aircraft conforms to the data protocol standard, flight safety risks induced by the interaction failure between the aircraft and the flight control system of the flight region are avoided.

[0048] The second aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a kind of aircraft, the aircraft includes:

[0049] processor;

[0050] memory for storing processor executable instructions;

[0051] Wherein, the processor calls the executable instructions when realizing the operation of the method of any one of the first aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0052] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments of the present application, it should be understood that the following drawings only show some embodiments of the present application, therefore should not be regarded as the limitation to the scope, for the ordinary skilled in the art, without paying creative labor, other related drawings can also be obtained according to these drawings.

[0053] Figure 1 The flowchart of a self-checking method for aircraft operation identification broadcast function provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown.

[0054] Figure 2 The hardware structure diagram of the aircraft provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0055] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application.

[0056] It should be noted that: similar labels and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in the subsequent drawings. At the same time, in the description of the present application, the terms "first", "second" and the like are only used for distinguishing description, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0057] An aerial vehicle refers to any device capable of achieving flight and carrying personnel, cargo or equipment, including but not limited to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned aircraft, manned aircraft, flying cars, civil aviation aircraft, and various types of air vehicles. Among them, unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles, refer to unmanned aerial vehicles controlled by remote control devices or self-programmed control devices.

[0058] In the related art, with the popularization of the application of aerial vehicles, the real-time sending of operational identification information is a core requirement of airspace management. The aerial vehicle system, especially the unmanned aerial vehicle system, actively sends the relevant information of the unmanned aerial vehicle system through a qualified link during operation, and is received by the receiving system and sent to the data processing system through the ground transmission network for processing. The relevant information includes operational identification information. Among them, the operational identification information includes but is not limited to the identity information of the aerial vehicle, the system attributes and the operational related data, etc.

[0059] Generally, the operational identification information can be sent through a broadcast communication link, also known as a broadcast operational identification mode. Specifically, the aerial vehicle broadcasts the operational identification information through a specific radio frequency and transmission protocol without specifying the object, and the broadcast operational identification receiving and processing system receives and processes the operational identification mode.

[0060] However, in the related art, the self-checking process of the operational identification broadcast function of the aerial vehicle system is not perfect. For example, most aerial vehicles only detect the power-on state of the hardware, lack dynamic checking of data integrity and real-time performance, and lack corresponding error indication and troubleshooting suggestions when the operational identification broadcast function fails. In addition, the data storage capacity is insufficient during the failure of the operational identification broadcast function, there is no automatic retransmission mechanism, and it does not meet the regulatory requirements for data retention, resulting in missing data traceability.

[0061] In order to solve at least one of the above technical problems, the present application provides a self-checking method for the operational identification broadcast function of an aerial vehicle. The aerial vehicle is equipped with a broadcast device. The broadcast device includes a first broadcast device and a second broadcast device. That is, the aerial vehicle is equipped with a first broadcast device and a second broadcast device. The first broadcast device corresponds to the first broadcast link, and the second broadcast device corresponds to the second broadcast link. Specifically, the first broadcast device uses the first broadcast link for data broadcast, and the second broadcast device uses the second broadcast link for data broadcast.

[0062] In some embodiments, the first broadcast link is a Bluetooth broadcast link, and the first broadcast device is a Bluetooth broadcast device; the second broadcast link is a WIFI broadcast link, and the second broadcast device is a WIFI broadcast device. Of course, in addition to the two broadcast links, the first broadcast link and the second broadcast link can also be other broadcast links available to the aircraft, which are not limited in the present application.

[0063] Based on this, the present application provides an aircraft operation identification broadcast function self-checking method, comprising:

[0064] Step S1: In the first state of the aircraft, the first detection of the operation identification broadcast function of the aircraft is performed, and the first processing operation is executed based on the first detection result.

[0065] The first state includes the take-off state. That is, the first detection of the operation identification broadcast function is performed when the aircraft takes off, and the first detection result is obtained. The first detection can be performed periodically in the first state of the aircraft. If the first detection result indicates that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, i.e., the operation identification broadcast function is abnormal, the first processing operation includes the first abnormal processing operation; if the first detection result indicates that the sending function of the aircraft is normal, i.e., the operation identification broadcast function is normal, the first processing operation includes the first normal processing operation.

[0066] In addition, the first detection includes one or more detections, and each first detection is a detection of the operation identification broadcast function in different dimensions. As an example, the first detection includes one or more of multi-broadcast link function detection, broadcast device whitelist detection, broadcast signal quality detection, operation identification data consistency detection, data tampering detection, data protocol detection, and storage detection. The first processing operation corresponding to different first detections is the same or different, which will be described below.

[0067] The multi-broadcast link function detection in the first detection is used to detect the consistency of the first broadcast link and the second broadcast link on the broadcast data, which specifically includes steps 110-130 as shown in the following figure. Figure 1

[0068] Step 110: receiving the first operation identification data sent by the first broadcast device and the second operation identification data sent by the second broadcast device, and parsing the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data to obtain identification code information.

[0069] ​Exemplarily, the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data should be generated at the same time. The first operation identification data and the second operation identification data can be received by a receiving end, and then the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are respectively parsed by a data processing module to obtain the identification code information. The receiving end and the data processing module can be coupled in the same device, that is, the device has both data receiving capability and parsing capability. Alternatively, the receiving end and the data processing module are two separate devices, and the receiving end receives the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data and then sends them to the data processing module for parsing.

[0070] Optionally, the receiving end can be deployed in the ground end corresponding to the aircraft. The ground end corresponding to the aircraft means that the aircraft is in communication connection with the ground end. The ground end includes, but is not limited to, a remote control device, a control platform, or a hangar of the aircraft, and the like. The receiving end includes a first receiving end corresponding to the first broadcasting device and a second receiving end corresponding to the second broadcasting device. The first receiving end receives the first operation identification data broadcast by the first broadcasting device, and the second receiving end receives the second operation identification data broadcast by the second broadcasting device. In this way, before the aircraft takes off, the ground end receives and parses the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data.

[0071] Optionally, the receiving end can be deployed in the aircraft. For example, the receiving end can be deployed in the load of the aircraft. The receiving end includes a first receiving end corresponding to the first broadcasting device and a second receiving end corresponding to the second broadcasting device. The first receiving end receives the first operation identification data broadcast by the first broadcasting device, and the second receiving end receives the second operation identification data broadcast by the second broadcasting device. In this way, before the aircraft takes off, the receiving end carried on the load of the aircraft receives the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data, and the aircraft parses the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data.

[0072] The operation identification data (including the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data) carries the identification code information. The identification code information is used to uniquely identify the aircraft and is the identity information of the aircraft. For example, the identification code information is the unique product identification code of the aircraft. By respectively parsing the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data, the respective identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data can be obtained.

[0073] Step 120: If the identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is consistent, it is further determined whether the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are consistent.

[0074] After obtaining the identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data, it can be determined whether the identification code information of the two is consistent. Alternatively, if the identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is inconsistent, it can be directly determined that the transmission function of the aircraft is abnormal, and the first abnormal handling operation is performed. If the identification code information of the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is consistent, it means that the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are from the same aircraft, and at this time, it can be further determined whether the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are consistent.

[0075] It can be understood that the operation identification data carries other information of the aircraft in addition to the identification code information, for example, including but not limited to aircraft classification information, remote control station position information, aircraft position information, and aircraft operation state information, etc. The so-called determination of whether the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are consistent refers to whether the information carried by the first operation identification data and the information carried by the second operation identification are consistent.

[0076] Step 130: If the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data are inconsistent, it is determined that the transmission function of the aircraft is abnormal, and the first abnormal handling operation is performed.

[0077] Exemplarily, if the difference between the information carried by the first operation identification data and the information carried by the second operation identification does not exceed the allowed difference threshold, for example, 0.01%, it is considered that the first operation identification information and the second operation identification information are consistent. On the contrary, if the difference between the information carried by the first operation identification data and the information carried by the second operation identification exceeds the difference threshold, it is considered that the first operation identification information and the second operation identification information are inconsistent, it is determined that the transmission function of the aircraft is abnormal, that is, the operation identification broadcast function is abnormal, and the first abnormal handling operation is performed.

[0078] The first abnormal handling operation corresponding to the first detection includes one or more of determining the take-off permission of the aircraft, outputting error indication information, and troubleshooting suggestions. The take-off permission of the aircraft includes preventing take-off and cautious take-off. The error indication information and the troubleshooting suggestions can be output on the aircraft and / or the ground end.

[0079] In this embodiment, the first abnormal handling operation corresponding to the multi-broadcast link function detection includes outputting error indication information of "multi-link transmission and reception data abnormality" and / or "dual-mode operation identification transmission inconsistency", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as preventing take-off, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "restarting the module or performing firmware upgrade".

[0080] Optionally, if the first operation identification data is consistent with the second operation identification data, it is determined that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, i.e., the operation identification broadcast function is normal, and a first normal processing operation is performed. The first detection corresponding first normal processing operation includes determining that the take-off permission of the aircraft is to allow take-off and outputting normal indication information. The normal indication information can be output on the aircraft and / or the ground end.

[0081] It can be understood that, since the first broadcast device and the second broadcast device are deployed on the same aircraft, the identification code information carried by the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data should be consistent. Meanwhile, in the case that the first broadcast device and the second broadcast device are normally operated, the difference between the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data generated at the same time should not exceed the allowed difference threshold. In addition, the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data carry a large amount of information, and it takes a certain amount of time to compare the information carried by the two one by one. Therefore, in the embodiment, it is proposed to first compare whether the identification code information in the first operation identification data and the second operation identification data is consistent. If the identification code information is inconsistent, it can be directly determined that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, without the need to compare other information one by one, thereby improving the detection efficiency. In the case that the identification information is consistent, the other information carried is compared one by one, thereby ensuring that the operation identification information sent by the two broadcast devices is consistent.

[0082] According to some embodiments of the present application, the present application provides a self-checking method for an operation identification broadcast function of an aircraft, in addition to step S1, further comprising step S2.

[0083] Step S2: In the second state of the aircraft, the operation identification broadcast function of the aircraft is second detected, and a second processing operation is secondly performed based on the second detection result.

[0084] The second state includes a flight state. That is, the operation identification broadcast function is second detected during the flight of the aircraft, and the second detection result is obtained. The second detection can be periodically performed. If the second detection result indicates that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, i.e., the operation identification broadcast function is abnormal, the second processing operation performed includes a second abnormal processing operation; if the second detection result indicates that the sending function of the aircraft is normal, i.e., the operation identification broadcast function is normal, the second processing operation performed includes a second normal processing operation. The first processing operation and the second processing operation are different, including that the first abnormal processing operation and the second abnormal processing operation are different, and the first normal processing operation and the second normal processing operation are different.

[0085] Optionally, the second abnormal handling operation comprises determining one or more of a flight permission of the aerial vehicle, outputting error indication information, and troubleshooting suggestions. The flight permission of the aerial vehicle comprises hovering, returning, and continuing flight. The second normal handling operation comprises determining that the flight permission of the aerial vehicle is continuing flight and outputting normal indication information.

[0086] In addition, the second detection comprises one or more detections, each second detection being a detection in a different dimension for the operation identification broadcast function. As an example, the second detection comprises one or more of a whitelist detection of the broadcast device, a broadcast signal quality detection, an operation identification data consistency detection, a data tampering detection, and a storage detection. The second processing operations corresponding to different second detections are the same or different, which will be described below.

[0087] In this way, by performing different detections on the operation identification broadcast function in the whole operation cycle of the aerial vehicle, it can be ensured that the operation identification broadcast function operates normally in the whole operation cycle, and when the operation identification broadcast function fails, an abnormal handling operation can be performed in time to reduce the risk of loss of control caused by failure of the sending function.

[0088] According to some embodiments of the present application, the whitelist detection of the broadcast device included in the first detection in step S1 and the whitelist detection of the broadcast device included in the second detection in step S2 comprise steps 210 and / or 220.

[0089] Step 210: in the case where the identity identification information of the broadcast device does not match the broadcast device whitelist of the aerial vehicle, performing an abnormal handling operation.

[0090] Illustratively, the identity identification information of the broadcast device can be read, which is used to uniquely identify the broadcast device, for example, a hardware ID (Identity Document) of the broadcast device. Then the read identity identification information is matched with the pre-stored broadcast device whitelist of the aerial vehicle. If the identity identification information is recorded in the whitelist, it means that the broadcast device is installed after authorized verification. On the contrary, if the identity identification information is not recorded in the whitelist, the identity identification information does not match the whitelist, indicating that the broadcast device is not compatible with the aerial vehicle.

[0091] If it is found that the broadcast device is not compatible with the aerial vehicle before takeoff, the aerial vehicle may have been illegally disassembled. If it is found that the broadcast device is not compatible with the aerial vehicle during flight, it may be because the line is detached or not in good contact due to vibration during flight, causing abnormal reading of the identity identification information.

[0092] Step 220: in the case where the firmware version of the broadcast device does not match the firmware version whitelist of the aerial vehicle, performing an abnormal handling operation.

[0093] Exemplarily, the firmware version of the broadcast device can be read and matched with a pre-stored firmware version whitelist of the aircraft. If the firmware version is recorded in the whitelist, it means that the firmware version of the broadcast device is installed after authorized verification. Otherwise, if the firmware version is not recorded in the whitelist, the firmware version does not match the whitelist.

[0094] Similarly, if the firmware version is found to be incompatible with the aircraft before takeoff, the aircraft can be disassembled illegally. If the firmware version is found to be incompatible with the aircraft during flight, it can be because the line is disconnected or not in good contact due to vibration during flight, causing abnormal reading of the firmware version.

[0095] As an example, if the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S1 (i.e. in the first state), the abnormal handling operation performed in steps 210 and 220 is a first abnormal handling operation, including outputting error indication information of "hardware version abnormal", determining the takeoff permission of the aircraft as preventing takeoff, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "restart the module" and / or "contact the manufacturer's maintenance personnel for confirmation".

[0096] Optionally, when the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S1 (i.e. in the first state), if the identity information of the broadcast device matches the broadcast device whitelist and the firmware version matches the firmware version whitelist, a first normal handling operation is performed, i.e. determining the takeoff permission of the aircraft as allowing takeoff and outputting normal indication information.

[0097] As another example, if the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S2 (i.e. in the second state), the abnormal handling operation performed in steps 210 and 220 is a second abnormal handling operation, including outputting error indication information of "hardware version abnormal, hardware may malfunction, please return as soon as possible for inspection", determining the flight permission of the aircraft as hovering and returning as soon as possible, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "check the module connection state after returning" and / or "contact the manufacturer's support".

[0098] Optionally, when the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S2 (i.e. in the second state), if the identity information of the broadcast device matches the broadcast device whitelist and the firmware version matches the firmware version whitelist, a second normal handling operation is performed, i.e. determining the flight permission of the aircraft as continuing to fly and outputting normal indication information.

[0099] In addition, if the identity recognition information or the firmware version of the broadcast device cannot be read when the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S1, it means that the broadcast device may be disconnected or have poor contact, at this time, error indication information of "module connection abnormality" and troubleshooting suggestions of "restart the module" or "return to the factory for maintenance" can be output, and the takeoff permission of the aircraft is determined to be prevented from taking off.

[0100] In addition, if the identity recognition information or the firmware version of the broadcast device cannot be read when the whitelist detection of the broadcast device is performed in step S2, it means that the broadcast device may be disconnected or have poor contact, at this time, error indication information of "module abnormality or module connection abnormality" and troubleshooting suggestions of "check the module connection state after returning" or "contact the manufacturer for support" can be output, and the flight permission of the aircraft is determined to be hovering and returning as soon as possible.

[0101] It can be known that, by checking whether the broadcast device and the firmware version thereof are adapted to the aircraft before the aircraft takes off, it is ensured that the aircraft is not illegally disassembled and modified. At the same time, whether the broadcast device and the firmware version thereof are adapted to the aircraft is checked during the flight, and the situation that the broadcast device is disconnected or has poor contact is checked in time, so as to reduce the risk of losing control caused by the failure of the sending function.

[0102] According to some embodiments of the present application, the broadcast signal quality detection included in the first detection in step S1 and the broadcast signal quality detection included in the second detection in step S2 include the following steps:

[0103] The broadcast signal transmitted by the broadcast device is received, and a quality parameter of the broadcast signal is obtained; the quality parameter includes signal strength and / or signal-to-noise ratio; if the quality parameter exceeds a preset parameter range, or the fluctuation of the quality parameter exceeds a preset fluctuation range, an abnormality processing operation is performed.

[0104] The broadcast signal carries operation identification data. For example, the broadcast signal transmitted by the first broadcast device carries first operation identification data, and the broadcast signal transmitted by the second broadcast device carries second operation identification data. The broadcast signal quality detection in the embodiment can be broadcast signal quality detection of the first broadcast device and / or the second broadcast device.

[0105] As an example, if broadcast signal quality detection is performed in step S1 (i.e., the first state), the broadcast signal transmitted by the broadcasting device can be continuously scanned by a receiver deployed on the ground, or by a receiver deployed in an aircraft. The receiver continuously acquires the broadcast signal and determines the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and / or Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) to obtain quality parameters. Optionally, real-time spectrum analysis can be introduced to detect the interference intensity of the surrounding 2.4 GHz band. If the quality parameters exceed a preset parameter range, or the fluctuation of the quality parameters exceeds a preset fluctuation range, a first anomaly handling operation is performed.

[0106] For example, if the signal strength is insufficient and does not reach the preset signal strength range, the first abnormal handling operation includes: outputting the error indication message "module signal strength is abnormal", determining that the takeoff permission of the aircraft is to prevent takeoff, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions such as "restart module and payload" and / or "contact the manufacturer's maintenance personnel for confirmation".

[0107] For example, if the signal strength fluctuation exceeds the preset fluctuation range, the first abnormality handling operation includes outputting an error indication message "Running identification transmits abnormal energy".

[0108] For example, if the signal-to-noise ratio fluctuation exceeds the preset fluctuation range, the first abnormal handling operation includes: outputting an error indication message that "there may be significant interference in the surrounding area", determining that the aircraft's takeoff permission is to take off with caution, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions such as "adjust the antenna angle" and / or "use a spectrum analyzer to detect surrounding interference".

[0109] Optionally, if the mass parameters fall within a preset parameter range and the fluctuation of the mass parameters does not exceed a preset fluctuation range, then the first normal processing is performed, that is, the takeoff permission of the aircraft is determined to be allowed to take off and normal indication information is output.

[0110] As another example, if broadcast signal quality detection is performed in step S2 (i.e., the second state), the receiver deployed in the aircraft can continuously scan the broadcast signal transmitted by the broadcasting device. The receiver continuously collects the broadcast signal and determines the signal strength and / or signal-to-noise ratio to obtain quality parameters. If the quality parameters exceed a preset parameter range, or the fluctuation of the quality parameters exceeds a preset fluctuation range, a second anomaly handling operation is performed.

[0111] For example, if the signal-to-noise ratio fluctuation exceeds the preset fluctuation range, the second abnormal handling operation includes: outputting an error indication message "Ambient interference is increasing, which may affect the transmission of operational identification information. Pay close attention to the signal situation," determining that the aircraft's flight permission is to continue flying, the aircraft can continue to perform its mission and pay close attention to the equipment status, and outputting a troubleshooting suggestion to "check the source of interference in the nearby environment."

[0112] Optionally, if the mass parameters fall within a preset parameter range and the fluctuation of the mass parameters does not exceed a preset fluctuation range, then the second normal processing operation is performed, that is, the flight permission of the aircraft is determined to continue flying and normal indication information is output.

[0113] As can be seen, this embodiment ensures that the aircraft takes off and operates when the broadcast signal quality meets the requirements by performing broadcast signal quality detection throughout the entire operation cycle of the aircraft, thus avoiding the risk of loss of control caused by poor broadcast signal quality leading to the transmission and identification of operational identification data.

[0114] According to some embodiments of this application, the first detection in step S1 includes runtime identification data consistency detection, and the second detection in step S2 includes runtime identification data consistency detection, comprising the following steps:

[0115] Obtain the data to be detected from the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcasting device; obtain the original data used to generate the operation identification data; and perform an exception handling operation if the data to be detected is inconsistent with the original data.

[0116] For example, the aircraft can first generate operational identification data including the data to be detected, and broadcast the operational identification data through a broadcasting device. Then, the operational identification data is received by a receiving end to obtain the subsequent data to be detected. The operational identification data consistency detection described in this embodiment can be a consistency detection performed on the operational identification data broadcast by the first broadcasting device and / or the second broadcasting device.

[0117] As an example, if the operation identification data consistency detection is performed in step S1 (i.e. in the first state), the operation identification data can be received by a receiving end deployed in the ground terminal, or can be received by a receiving end deployed in the aircraft. The operation identification data carries the to-be-detected data. The to-be-detected data can include, but is not limited to, the identification code information and / or the remaining power information of the aircraft. The data processing module deployed in the same device as the receiving end can obtain the original data used to generate the operation identification data from the aircraft. The original data refers to the original data corresponding to the to-be-detected data. In this way, by comparing the to-be-detected data with the original data, if the difference between the two does not exceed the allowed difference threshold, for example, 0.01%, it is considered that the to-be-detected data is consistent with the original data. Otherwise, if the difference between the two exceeds the difference threshold, it is considered that the to-be-detected data is inconsistent with the original data, and a first abnormal handling operation is performed, including outputting error indication information that the "operation identification information is inconsistent with the aircraft itself information", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as preventing take-off, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "restarting the module and the load" and / or "contacting the manufacturer for support".

[0118] Optionally, if the to-be-detected data is consistent with the original data, a first normal handling is performed, i.e. determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as allowing take-off and outputting normal indication information.

[0119] As another example, if the operation identification data consistency detection is performed in step S2 (i.e. in the second state), the operation identification data can be received by a receiving end deployed in the aircraft. The aircraft obtains the original data used to generate the operation identification data, and determines whether the operation identification data is consistent with the original data by comparing whether the difference between the operation identification data and the original data exceeds a difference threshold. If not, a second abnormal handling operation is performed. Optionally, in order to avoid the occasional fluctuation of data caused by the flight of the aircraft from causing the operation identification data to be inconsistent with the original data, a plurality of frames of operation identification data and their corresponding original data can be compared for consistency multiple times, and the second abnormal handling operation is performed only when the plurality of frames of operation identification data and their original data are inconsistent. The second abnormal handling operation includes outputting error indication information that "the operation identification information sending is abnormal" and troubleshooting suggestions that "check the consistency of the operation identification sending module information after returning", and determining the flight permission of the aircraft as hovering, while restarting the broadcast device and the receiving end carried by the aircraft, and continuing the flight task of the aircraft by the operation identification data consistency detection after the restart. If the operation identification data consistency detection still fails after one or more restarts, the aircraft returns, and the inconsistent data content and time are recorded for subsequent analysis of the fault reason.

[0120] Optionally, if the to-be-detected data is consistent with the original data, a second normal processing operation is performed, i.e., determining the flight permission of the aircraft as continuing flight and outputting normal indication information.

[0121] It can be known that, by performing the operation data consistency detection in the whole operation cycle of the aircraft, the embodiment ensures that the broadcast device sends correct and error-free operation identification data, and avoids the risk of aircraft out of control caused by incorrect operation identification data.

[0122] Further, in some embodiments, the operation identification data includes a plurality of data items. The data items carry real-time data of the aircraft in various states. Of course, in addition to the data items, the operation identification data can also include other fields, such as but not limited to data type, version number, data length, and data identification, etc. Based on this, the to-be-detected data is obtained from the operation identification data in the above embodiment, which specifically includes the following two cases:

[0123] Case 1: In the first state of the aircraft, a first data item corresponding to the first state is obtained from the operation identification data as the to-be-detected data.

[0124] Case 2: In the second state of the aircraft, a second data item corresponding to the second state is obtained from the operation identification data as the to-be-detected data.

[0125] As described above, the data items are used to record real-time data of the aircraft in various states, so different states correspond to different data items recording related real-time data. As an example, the first data item corresponding to the first state (i.e., the take-off state) can include but is not limited to one or more of the aircraft remote control station position type data item, the aircraft remote control station position data item, and the aircraft remote control station height data item. Among them, the aircraft remote control station position data item records the longitude and latitude of the remote control station position, and the aircraft remote control station height data item records the height of the remote control station from the ground. In this way, when the aircraft is in the first state and performs operation identification data consistency detection, the data processing module can obtain one or more first data items from the operation identification data to compare with the corresponding original data.

[0126] As a further example, the second data item corresponding to the second state (i.e., the flight state) can include, but is not limited to, one or more of a track angle data item, a ground speed data item, a relative altitude data item, a vertical speed data item, a geodetic altitude data item, and a barometric altitude data item. The track angle data item is used to record a track angle measured clockwise from true north; the ground speed data item is used to record a relative speed of the aircraft with respect to the ground; the relative altitude data item is used to record an altitude of the aircraft based on a takeoff location; the vertical speed data item is used to record an ascending or descending speed of the aircraft based on a current coordinate system; the geodetic altitude data item is used to record an altitude of the aircraft based on the current coordinate system; and the barometric altitude data item is used to record a standard barometric altitude of the aircraft based on a reference surface of 101.325 kPa. Thus, when the aircraft is in the second state and the operation identification data consistency detection is performed, the data processing module can obtain one or more second data items from the operation identification data to compare with the corresponding original data.

[0127] It can be seen that, since only part of the data items in the operation identification data are used for consistency comparison in the embodiment, the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device can be an operation identification data segment, as long as the operation identification data segment includes the required first data item or second data item, thereby improving the detection efficiency of the operation identification data consistency. Meanwhile, since the data amount of the operation identification data is large, if every field is compared for consistency in the operation identification data consistency detection, a long detection time is obviously required. However, the embodiment can significantly improve the detection efficiency and reduce the detection cost by extracting and comparing the data items corresponding to the current state of the aircraft for consistency.

[0128] According to some embodiments of the present application, the data tampering detection included in the first detection in step S1 and the data tampering detection included in the second detection in step S2 include the following steps:

[0129] receiving the first to-be-verified data sent by the first broadcast device and the second to-be-verified data sent by the second broadcast device; obtaining, from the first to-be-verified data, a first plaintext segment, a second hash value corresponding to a second plaintext segment, and a first hash segment in a hash value corresponding to a target plaintext; obtaining, from the second to-be-verified data, the second plaintext segment, a first hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, and a second hash segment in the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext; assembling the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment to obtain the target plaintext, and assembling the first hash segment and the second hash segment to obtain a third hash value;

[0130] If the first hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, or the second hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, or the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, an abnormal processing operation is performed.

[0131] Exemplarily, when performing data tampering detection, the aircraft can first generate the target plaintext and calculate the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext. Then the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext is mechanically split into two parts to obtain the first hash segment and the second hash segment. At the same time, the aircraft can split the target plaintext into the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment, and calculate the first hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment and the second hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment. Subsequently, the aircraft can assemble the first plaintext segment, the second hash value and the first hash segment into the first to-be-verified data, and broadcast the first to-be-verified data through the first broadcast device. And the aircraft can assemble the second plaintext segment, the first hash value and the second hash segment into the second to-be-verified data, and broadcast the second to-be-verified data through the second broadcast device.

[0132] As an example, if data tampering detection is performed in step S1 (i.e. in the first state), the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data can be received by a receiving end deployed in the ground terminal, or the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data can be received by a receiving end deployed in the aircraft. Subsequently, the data processing module deployed in the same device as the receiving end can perform data tampering detection using the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data. Specifically, the first plaintext segment, the second hash value and the first hash segment can be parsed from the first to-be-verified data, and the second plaintext segment, the first hash value and the second hash segment can be parsed from the second to-be-verified data. Subsequently, assembling the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment can obtain the target plaintext, and assembling the first hash segment and the second hash segment can obtain the third hash value. It can be understood that if the first hash segment and the second hash segment are not tampered with during data transmission, the third hash value obtained by assembling is the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext.

[0133] Then, the aircraft sends the hash algorithm for calculating the first hash value to the receiving end, the receiving end calculates the hash value of the first plaintext segment by the hash algorithm, and judges whether the first hash value matches the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment (the hash value is calculated by the hash algorithm), that is, whether the first hash value is the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment. If yes, it means that the first to-be-verified data is not tampered with in the data transmission process; if no, it means that the first to-be-verified data is tampered with in the data transmission process. Similarly, the second hash value is obtained by the above method, and then it is judged whether the second hash value matches the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, that is, whether the second hash value is the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment. If yes, it means that the second to-be-verified data is not tampered with in the data transmission process; if no, it means that the second to-be-verified data is tampered with in the data transmission process. And it can be judged whether the third hash value matches the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, that is, whether the third hash value is the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext. If yes, it means that the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data are not tampered with in the data transmission process; if no, it means that the first to-be-verified data and / or the second to-be-verified data is tampered with in the data transmission process.

[0134] Optionally, it can be first judged whether the third hash value matches the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext. If yes, it means that the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data are not tampered with in the data transmission process, then it can be determined that the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment are not tampered with, so there is no need to use the first hash value and the second hash value to verify the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment. On the contrary, if the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, it means that the first to-be-verified data and / or the second to-be-verified data is tampered with in the data transmission process. At this time, in order to further investigate the broadcast link where data tampering occurs, the first hash value and the second hash value can be used to verify the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment, and the broadcast link corresponding to the data that does not match is determined as the broadcast link where data tampering occurs.

[0135] Therefore, in the first state, when the first hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, or the second hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, or the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, it is considered that the data is tampered with, wherein the first hash value and the second hash value use which hash algorithm, the calculation method of the hash values of the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment is the same as the calculation method of the first hash value and the second hash value, and the first abnormal processing operation is performed, including outputting the error indication information of "data tampered with in the data transmission process", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as the organization take-off, and outputting the investigation suggestion of "check the data transmission environment".

[0136] Optionally, if the data is not tampered, the first normal processing is performed, i.e., determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as allowing take-off and outputting normal indication information.

[0137] As another example, if the data tampering detection is performed in step S2 (i.e., in the second state), the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data can be received by the receiving end deployed in the aircraft. The data tampering detection is performed by the data processing module in the aircraft using the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data. For details, refer to the foregoing description, which will not be repeated here.

[0138] In the second state, when the first hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, or the second hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, or the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, it is considered that the data is tampered, and the second abnormal processing is performed, including outputting the error indication information that the data is tampered in the data transmission process, determining the flight permission of the aircraft as hovering or returning, and outputting the troubleshooting suggestion that the data transmission environment is checked.

[0139] Optionally, if the data is not tampered, the second normal processing is performed, i.e., determining the flight permission of the aircraft as continuing to fly and outputting normal indication information.

[0140] In addition, optionally, the target plaintext can be the first running identification data or the second running identification data in steps 110-130. That is, in this embodiment, the first running identification data or the second running identification data can be split into the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment as the target plaintext, and the data tampering detection is performed by calculating the corresponding hash values.

[0141] It can be known that in this embodiment, the target plaintext is split into the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment, and then the hash values corresponding to the first plaintext segment, the second plaintext segment and the target plaintext are calculated respectively, and each part is combined and assembled into the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data. When the data tampering detection is performed, each segment data is obtained from the first to-be-verified data and the second to-be-verified data respectively, and the target plaintext and the third hash value are obtained by assembling. The third hash value and the target plaintext can be used to quickly judge whether the data tampering occurs in the data transmission process. The first hash value and the second hash value can be used to further judge the broadcast link where the data tampering occurs, so that the transmission environment can be checked and repaired in a targeted manner, and the safety of the running identification data transmission is ensured.

[0142] According to some embodiments of the present application, the storage detection included in the first detection in step S1 and the storage detection included in the second detection in step S2 include the following steps:

[0143] If the remaining storage space of the aircraft is less than a preset storage space threshold, or the storage resource write speed of the aircraft is less than a preset write speed threshold, an abnormal processing operation is performed.

[0144] It can be understood that the running identification information often needs to be stored for a certain amount of data, and the data storage time is not less than a specified time length to meet the subsequent traceability. Therefore, random data can be written into the storage space of the aircraft, and the random data is read immediately to verify its integrity. The storage space is, for example, a non-volatile memory. When the random data is written, the storage resource write speed of the aircraft can be detected, and the size relationship between the storage resource write speed and the preset write speed threshold is compared. In addition, the remaining storage space of the aircraft, for example, the remaining storage space in the non-volatile memory, can be read, and the size relationship between the remaining storage space and the preset storage space threshold is compared.

[0145] As an example, if the storage detection is performed in step S1 (i.e. in the first state), the first abnormal processing operation is performed in the case that the remaining space of the aircraft is less than the storage space threshold, or the storage resource write speed is less than the write speed threshold.

[0146] For example, if the storage resource write speed is less than the write speed threshold, which represents that the storage performance is reduced, the first abnormal processing operation performed includes outputting error indication information of "storage performance abnormal" or "slow storage read-write speed", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as cautious take-off, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "replace the storage".

[0147] For another example, if the remaining space of the aircraft is less than the storage space threshold, which represents that the storage space is insufficient, the first abnormal processing operation performed includes outputting error indication information of "storage remaining space abnormal", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as cautious take-off, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions of "replace the storage or clean up the internal space of the storage".

[0148] Optionally, if the remaining space of the aircraft is greater than the storage space threshold, and the storage resource write speed is greater than the write speed threshold, the first normal processing operation is performed, i.e. determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as allowed take-off and outputting normal indication information.

[0149] As another example, if the storage detection is performed in step S2 (i.e. in the second state), the second abnormal processing operation is performed in the case that the remaining space of the aircraft is less than the storage space threshold, or the storage resource write speed is less than the write speed threshold.

[0150] For example, if the storage resource write speed is less than the write speed threshold, the second abnormal processing operation performed includes outputting error indication information of "slow storage write speed, which may cause data loss, please continue to detect the storage condition".

[0151] For another example, if the remaining space of the aerial vehicle is less than the storage space threshold, which represents that the remaining storage space is insufficient, the second abnormal processing operation performed includes outputting error indication information of "insufficient remaining storage space" and troubleshooting suggestion of "replace the storage or clean the irrelevant historical content in the storage", and determining the flight permission of the aerial vehicle as hovering, which means that the aerial vehicle can continue to perform the task but needs to pay high attention to the device state. The aerial vehicle should end the flight as soon as possible and clean the storage content.

[0152] Optionally, if the remaining space of the aerial vehicle is greater than the storage space threshold and the storage resource write speed is greater than the write speed threshold, the second normal processing operation is performed, that is, the flight permission of the aerial vehicle is determined as continuing to fly and normal indication information is outputted.

[0153] It can be known that, by performing storage detection in the whole cycle of the aerial vehicle, the embodiment ensures that the aerial vehicle meets the requirements in terms of data write speed and remaining storage space, and avoids the situation that the aerial vehicle cannot be traced back due to data loss in the later period.

[0154] According to some embodiments of the present application, the data protocol detection included in the first detection in step S1 includes the following steps:

[0155] determining a flight area that the aerial vehicle plans to pass through; obtaining a data protocol standard of the flight area; and performing an abnormal processing operation if the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device does not conform to the data protocol standard.

[0156] It can be understood that the operation identification data should be generated according to the specified data protocol standard, which is embodied in that the operation identification data includes constituent fields specified by the data protocol standard, the length of each constituent field conforms to the length specified by the data protocol standard, each constituent field is encoded according to the data protocol standard, and the value of each constituent field is taken within the value range specified by the data protocol standard. For example, the operation identification data generated according to the data protocol standard should include a data type field, a version number field, a data length field, a data identification field, and N data item fields. Among them, the lengths of the data type field, the version number field, and the data length field are 1 byte respectively, the length of the data identification field is 3+N bytes, and the lengths of the N data item fields are variable. The value range of the data length field is 1-200, the value range of each bit in the data identification field is 0 or 1, and so on.

[0157] In addition, the data protocol standards used by different flight regions can be the same or different. If the aircraft does not generate operation identification data using the corresponding data protocol standard of a flight region when passing through the flight region, the aircraft and the flight control system of the flight region will fail to interact, inducing flight safety risks. Therefore, in the embodiment, the flight regions passed through by the flight plan are determined before the aircraft takes off. Specifically, the flight regions passed through by the plan can be determined based on the planned route. Then, the data protocol standard used by the flight region is obtained, for example, the data protocol standard can be downloaded from the official website of the airspace management corresponding to the flight region. Then, it is checked whether the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcast device conforms to the data protocol standard. If not, a first abnormal handling operation is performed, including outputting error indication information such as "current regional protocol version is abnormal" or "current version does not conform to the requirements of the clauses, which may cause the operation identification data to be inconsistent with the protocol", determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as cautious take-off, and outputting troubleshooting suggestions such as "performing firmware upgrade or contacting manufacturer support". If it is consistent, a first normal handling operation is performed, that is, the take-off permission of the aircraft is determined as allowed take-off and normal indication information is outputted.

[0158] It can be known that, by obtaining the data protocol standard used by the flight region passed through by the plan before the aircraft takes off, and then checking whether the current operation identification data of the aircraft conforms to the data protocol standard, the flight safety risks induced by the failure of the aircraft and the flight control system of the flight region to interact are avoided.

[0159] In addition, the application also provides a self-checking method of an aircraft operation identification broadcast function, including a first detection and failure disposal mode before the aircraft takes off, and a second detection and failure disposal mode during the flight of the aircraft.

[0160] The first detection and the corresponding failure disposal mode include:

[0161] 1.1, read the hardware ID of the broadcast device (including the first broadcast device and / or the second broadcast device), and check the module model and the firmware version. The hardware ID and the firmware version are matched with the white list set locally in the aircraft respectively. If the hardware ID or the firmware version is not in the white list, the related information is recorded and error indication is outputted: the hardware or firmware version is not suitable, take-off is prohibited.

[0162] 1.2 The aircraft is equipped with both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi broadcasting devices, and a Bluetooth receiver and a Wi-Fi receiver are added to the aircraft's payload. The Bluetooth and Wi-Fi broadcasting devices transmit operational identification data every second. The Bluetooth receiver continuously scans the broadcast signals transmitted by the Bluetooth broadcasting device, and the Wi-Fi receiver continuously scans the broadcast signals transmitted by the Wi-Fi broadcasting device, calculating the signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio of the broadcast signals. Real-time spectrum analysis is also incorporated to detect the interference intensity of the surrounding 2.4GHz frequency band. If the signal strength fluctuation of the broadcast signal exceeds a preset fluctuation range within 5 seconds, the transmitted signal energy is determined to be abnormal, generating an error message "Operational identification transmission energy abnormal"; if the signal-to-noise ratio fluctuation of the broadcast signal exceeds a preset fluctuation range within 5 seconds, strong interference is determined to be present, generating an error message "Strong interference present, please take off with caution".

[0163] 1.3 The aircraft automatically generates operational identification data for testing, including the aircraft ID and battery level information. This data is broadcast via a broadcast device and received and decoded by the receiver in the payload. The consistency of the operational identification data is compared with the original data. The original data also includes the aircraft ID and battery level information. If the error rate between the operational identification data and the original data is greater than 0.01%, an error message "Operational identification data is inconsistent with the aircraft's own data information, takeoff is prohibited, please check and confirm" is generated.

[0164] 1.4 Establish a real-time synchronization mechanism for the cloud-based regulatory database. Before data protocol testing, automatically download the data protocol standards for the flight areas the aircraft plans to traverse to the cloud-based regulatory database via external communication modules such as 4G. During data protocol testing, verify the completeness of the operational identification data relative to the data fields specified in the data protocol standards. If the operational identification data is found to be inconsistent with the data protocol standards, generate an error message: "The current operational identification data does not meet the requirements of a certain clause, which may lead to a mismatch between the operational identification data and the data protocol standards. Take off with caution."

[0165] 1.5 Multi-link Redundancy Verification: The Bluetooth broadcasting device sends first operational identification data, and the WiFi broadcasting device sends second operational identification data. The first and second operational identification data are generated simultaneously. Verify whether the first and second operational identification data are consistent when both Bluetooth and WiFi broadcasting modes are working simultaneously (checksum difference ≤ 0.1%). If inconsistent, generate an error indication message based on the aircraft's own data: "Inconsistent dual-mode operational identification transmission; data transmitted in WiFi or Bluetooth mode is inconsistent with the aircraft's data. Takeoff is prohibited; please restart and try again."

[0166] 1.6, The running identification data often needs to be stored in the non-volatile memory, and the data retention time is not shorter than the preset time period, meeting the subsequent traceability. In the storage detection, 1MB random data can be written to the non-volatile memory, the random data integrity is read and verified immediately, and the writing speed is detected during the period whether it reaches the writing speed threshold. If not, a warning indication is generated: "Memory read-write speed is slow, please replace the memory". At the same time, the remaining space of the memory is read, and if the remaining space is less than the storage space threshold, an error indication information is generated: "The device storage capacity is insufficient, please clean up part of the content or replace the memory, be careful to take off".

[0167] The above 1.1-1.7 each first detection before take-off can be provided with a timeout mechanism, that is, in each first detection, if the detection result is not obtained within the preset detection time, it is determined that the detection fails and the corresponding first abnormal handling operation is performed. In addition, according to the possible causes of the failure item associated problem, a multi-level troubleshooting suggestion is generated for each first detection. The multi-level troubleshooting suggestion includes:

[0168] Level 1: User operable items (such as WiFi or Bluetooth mode data transmission inconsistency problem, which can be solved by restarting)

[0169] Level 2: Tool assistance (such as using professional analysis tools, such as spectrum analyzer to analyze the interference of the surrounding environment)

[0170] Level 3: Return to factory maintenance (such as module hardware damage, unable to read the corresponding hardware version number, etc.)

[0171] In the first detection, the corresponding impact level can be automatically determined according to the fault type, and the impact level determines the take-off permission of the aircraft. The error indication information, impact level and troubleshooting suggestion corresponding to each fault type are shown in Table 1.

[0172] Table 1

[0173]

[0174] In addition, the second detection and its corresponding failure handling mode include:

[0175] 2.1, Real-time detection of hardware status, read the hardware ID of the broadcast device every few seconds during flight, verify the module model and firmware version, and compare with the hardware ID and firmware version read before take-off. If they are not consistent, record the error information and generate an error indication information: "Hardware ID is abnormal, hardware may malfunction, please return as soon as possible for inspection".

[0176] 2.2, The Bluetooth receiver and the WiFi receiver in the aircraft load continuously scan the broadcast signals sent by the aircraft, and collect the signal strength and signal-to-noise ratio of the broadcast signals in real time. If the signal-to-noise ratio changes beyond the preset fluctuation range, an error indication information is generated: "The surrounding interference is enhanced, which may affect the operation of the identification information transmission, and the signal situation should be closely monitored".

[0177] 2.3, During the flight, the aircraft decodes and compares the received operation identification data with the original data in real time. If they are inconsistent, an error indication information is generated: "The operation identification data is inconsistent with the real-time flight data, try to resend, if the problem persists, please return immediately". At the same time, the inconsistent data content and time are recorded for subsequent analysis of fault causes.

[0178] 2.4, During the flight, the remaining space of the storage is periodically checked every 10 minutes or longer. If the remaining space is less than the storage space threshold, an error indication information is generated: "The device storage capacity is insufficient, which may affect data storage, please end the flight as soon as possible and clean up the storage content". In addition, during the flight, the writing speed of the storage can also be continuously detected. If the writing speed is lower than the writing speed threshold, an error indication information is generated: "The storage writing speed is slow, which may cause data loss, and the storage situation is continuously detected".

[0179] Similarly, in the second detection, the corresponding influence level can be automatically determined according to the fault type, and the influence level determines the flight permission of the aircraft. The error indication information, influence level and troubleshooting suggestion corresponding to each fault type are shown in Table 2.

[0180] Table 2

[0181]

[0182] It can be seen that the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function provided by the application can effectively reduce the risk of loss of control caused by failure of the broadcast function by more than 70% through real-time self-checking and multi-mode emergency disposal of the aircraft. In addition, when the broadcast function fails during flight, error indication information can be triggered within 500 milliseconds to alert relevant personnel to handle, and the aircraft can enter a safe state such as hovering within 5 seconds, which can effectively prevent safety accidents. In addition, manual intervention and automatic execution are supported, which is suitable for different operation scenes and improves the controllability of the aircraft. The storage of the aircraft supports 30-day rolling coverage of operation identification data, which meets the needs of regulatory agencies for subsequent tracing. In addition, the multi-link redundancy design improves the operation stability in complex environments, and the use scene can be expanded by more than 30%.

[0183] Based on the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments, the application further provides a computer program product, which comprises one or more computer programs or instructions. The computer programs or instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium. The computer programs are executed by a processor to implement the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments.

[0184] Based on the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments, the application further provides a computer program product, which comprises one or more computer programs or instructions. The computer programs or instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium. The computer programs are executed by a processor to implement the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments. Figure 2 Figure 2 At the hardware level, the aircraft comprises a processor, an internal bus, a network interface, a memory and a non-volatile memory, and can also comprise other hardware required by the business. The processor reads the corresponding computer program from the non-volatile memory into the memory and then runs to implement the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments.

[0185] The application further provides a computer storage medium, which stores a computer program. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the self-checking method of the aircraft operation identification broadcast function of any of the above embodiments.

[0186] In several embodiments provided by the application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can also be implemented by other manners. The apparatus embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the drawings show the possible implementation architectures, functions and operations of the apparatus, method and computer program product according to the embodiments of the application. In this regard, each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams can represent a module, a program segment or a part of code, which contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the blocks can occur in different orders from those noted in the drawings. For example, two consecutive blocks can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and sometimes they can be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each block in the block diagrams and / or flowcharts, and the combination of blocks in the block diagrams and / or flowcharts, can be implemented by a dedicated hardware-based system for executing the specified functions or actions, or can be implemented by a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0187] ​In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module can exist independently, or two or more modules can be integrated to form an independent part.

[0188] If the functions are implemented in the form of software function modules and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the present application essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art or part of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), a random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and various program code storage media.

[0189] The above is only an embodiment of the present application and is not used to limit the protection scope of the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application can have various changes and modifications. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application. It should be noted that similar reference numbers and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, so once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent drawings.

[0190] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any skilled person in the art can easily think of changes or replacements within the technical range disclosed by the present application, which shall be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

[0191] It is to be noted that, as used in this specification and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" include plural referents unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. Thus, for example, reference to "a component" can include a combination of two or more components. Additionally, the terms "comprise," "comprises," and "comprising," or any variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements is not necessarily limited to those elements, but can include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Furthermore, unless otherwise indicated herein, the terms "first," "second," "third," etc., are used herein merely as labels, and are not intended to impose ordinal import.

Claims

1. An aircraft operation identification broadcast function self-checking method, characterized by, The aircraft is provided with a broadcast device; The broadcast device includes a first broadcast device corresponding to a first broadcast link and a second broadcast device corresponding to a second broadcast link; the method includes: In the take-off state of the aircraft, a first detection is performed on the operation recognition broadcast function of the aircraft, and a first processing operation is performed based on the first detection result; wherein the multi-broadcast link function detection in the first detection includes: Receiving first operation recognition data sent by the first broadcast device and second operation recognition data sent by the second broadcast device, and parsing the first operation recognition data and the second operation recognition data to obtain identification code information; If the identification code information of the first operation recognition data and the second operation recognition data is consistent, it is further determined whether the first operation recognition data and the second operation recognition data are consistent; If the first operation recognition data and the second operation recognition data are inconsistent, it is determined that the sending function of the aircraft is abnormal, and a first abnormal handling operation is performed, the first abnormal handling operation including: determining the take-off permission of the aircraft as preventing take-off.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further includes: In the second state of the aircraft, a second detection is performed on the operation recognition broadcast function of the aircraft, and a second processing operation is performed based on the second detection result.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The first detection further includes one or more of the following: whitelist detection of the broadcast device, broadcast signal quality detection, operation recognition data consistency detection, data tampering detection, data protocol detection, and storage detection; The second detection includes one or more of the following: whitelist detection of the broadcast device, broadcast signal quality detection, operation recognition data consistency detection, data tampering detection, and storage detection.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The whitelist detection of the broadcast device includes: In the case that the identity recognition information of the broadcast device does not match the broadcast device whitelist of the aircraft, an abnormal handling operation is performed; and / or In the case that the firmware version of the broadcast device does not match the firmware version whitelist of the aircraft, an abnormal handling operation is performed.

5. The method of claim 3, wherein, The broadcast signal quality detection includes: Receiving a broadcast signal sent by the broadcast device and obtaining a quality parameter of the broadcast signal; the quality parameter includes signal strength and / or signal-to-noise ratio; If the quality parameter exceeds the preset parameter range, or the fluctuation of the quality parameter exceeds the preset fluctuation range, an abnormal handling operation is performed.

6. The method of claim 3, wherein, The operation recognition data consistency detection includes: Obtaining to-be-detected data from the operation recognition data broadcast by the broadcast device; Obtaining original data used to generate the operation recognition data; In the case that the to-be-detected data does not match the original data, an abnormal handling operation is performed.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein, The operation recognition data includes a plurality of data items; the to-be-detected data obtained from the operation recognition data broadcast by the broadcast device includes: In the take-off state of the aircraft, a first data item corresponding to the take-off state is obtained from the operation recognition data as the to-be-detected data; In the second state of the aircraft, a second data item corresponding to the second state is obtained from the operation identification data as the to-be-detected data.

8. The method of claim 3, wherein, The data tampering detection comprises: receiving first to-be-verified data sent by the first broadcasting device and second to-be-verified data sent by the second broadcasting device; obtaining a first plaintext segment, a second plaintext segment, a second hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, and a first hash segment of a hash value corresponding to the target plaintext from the first to-be-verified data; obtaining the second plaintext segment, the first hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, and a second hash segment of the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext from the second to-be-verified data; assembling the first plaintext segment and the second plaintext segment to obtain the target plaintext, and assembling the first hash segment and the second hash segment to obtain a third hash value; if the first hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the first plaintext segment, or the second hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the second plaintext segment, or the third hash value does not match the hash value corresponding to the target plaintext, performing an abnormal handling operation.

9. The method of claim 3, wherein, The data protocol detection comprises: determining a flight area through which the aircraft is planned to pass; obtaining a data protocol standard of the flight area; if the operation identification data broadcast by the broadcasting device does not conform to the data protocol standard, performing an abnormal handling operation.

10. An aircraft, characterized in that The aircraft comprises: a processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; wherein the processor invokes the executable instructions to implement the operations of any one of claims 1-9.

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