Safety and credible module design and implementation method of video monitoring system

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of video monitoring systems, and discloses a safe and credible module design and implementation method of a video monitoring system, which comprises the following steps that: a master station end executes classified access management according to the type of video terminal equipment, executes two-way identity authentication based on a hardware chip on safe and credible equipment, and executes white list auditing on other equipment; after the authentication is passed, establishing an encrypted communication channel based on an IPSec protocol and a national cryptographic algorithm; the video terminal performs encrypted transmission and encrypted storage on the data; and the master station end monitors the network state of the terminal in real time, and executes the emergency processing of terminal isolation or network banning when an abnormity is found, and the invention also relates to a multi-device concurrent access processing and network interruption automatic recovery mechanism. Through the integrated security design, the security access of equipment, the encryption protection of the full life cycle of data and the active defense of security threats are realized, and the security, reliability and stability of the system are improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of video monitoring systems, in particular to a security and trust module design and implementation method for a video monitoring system. BACKGROUND

[0002] Video monitoring systems are important technical means in the field of security and protection, and their applications have expanded from local area networks to wide area and complex network environments. Under this background, the security of the system is increasingly prominent, and there are corresponding technical problems in device access authentication, data transmission security, and systematic security management. Therefore, the field needs a technical solution that can provide security protection covering the whole process of device access, data transmission, and backend management.

[0003] To meet the security protection needs of video systems, existing technologies provide some solutions. For example, Chinese patent document CN120128423A discloses a security monitoring method, system, device and medium for networked video, which detects the link state and video content by constructing a front-end acquisition link, and uses multiple communication links for security risk prediction. Another Chinese patent document CN218888592U discloses a video security management and control system based on multi-path protection, which deploys a security access gateway between different network domains such as video monitoring terminals, core data areas, and client access areas, to realize access control between network areas.

[0004] However, the above-mentioned existing technologies still have the following technical limitations in realizing integrated and proactive security protection:

[0005] Firstly, in terms of device access control, existing solutions usually adopt a unified network layer access strategy and do not provide an authentication mechanism based on the classification and grading of terminal device security capabilities. This makes it difficult for the system to perform high-strength verification of the physical legitimacy of device identity in scenarios where different security level devices are mixed deployed, and there is a risk of fake devices accessing.

[0006] Secondly, in terms of data transmission, existing solutions do not form a complete cryptographic application closed loop covering key negotiation, data encryption and integrity verification. In the transmission chain from the terminal to the main station, due to the lack of a set of collaborative encryption protection and verification mechanisms, the confidentiality and integrity protection is insufficient.

[0007] Finally, in terms of security response and system reliability, the security monitoring and disposal of existing solutions are not sufficient. They lack real-time monitoring of the running state of terminal devices and do not provide a quick response mechanism that can automatically execute terminal isolation or network ban when an anomaly is detected. At the same time, for network interruption and other abnormal situations, there is no specific solution for automatic reconnection and local data continuation, affecting the continuity of the business.

[0008] Therefore, the application provides a secure and reliable module design and implementation method of a video monitoring system to solve the problems in the prior art. SUMMARY

[0009] In view of the deficiencies in the prior art, the application provides a secure and reliable module design and implementation method of a video monitoring system to solve the problems of unreliable device access authentication, easy eavesdropping and tampering in data transmission process, and difficulty in effectively monitoring and quickly disposing security threats caused by the lack of an integrated security control mechanism in the existing video monitoring system.

[0010] To achieve the above object, the application is implemented by the following technical scheme: the application provides a secure and reliable module design and implementation method of a video monitoring system, comprising the following steps:

[0011] S1, a master station end receives an access request of a video terminal device;

[0012] S2, the master station end executes a corresponding access management process according to a preset access policy and according to the device type;

[0013] S3, after the access management process is executed, an encrypted communication channel is established between the master station end and the video terminal device;

[0014] S4, the video terminal device encrypts and stores video data, and transmits the encrypted video data to the master station end through the encrypted communication channel;

[0015] S5, the master station end monitors the network access state of the video terminal device in real time to determine whether there is an anomaly;

[0016] S6, when the result of the real-time monitoring shows that the network access state has a security risk, the master station end executes a preset security response strategy.

[0017] Preferably, the preset access policy in the S2 step is specifically: judging according to the device type of the video terminal device, and the access management process specifically includes:

[0018] if the device type is a secure and reliable device, executing a device registration and two-way identity authentication process;

[0019] if it is other device, executing a white list audit process.

[0020] Preferably, the preset security response strategy in the S6 step specifically includes:

[0021] The emergency disposal instruction is sent to the video terminal device, or the access permission of the video terminal device is blocked at the host station end.

[0022] Further, in the step of registering and performing the two-way identity authentication process with the execution device, the encryption chip and the trusted chip integrated in the secure trusted device are specifically utilized, and the challenge-response mechanism is adopted for the two-way identity authentication.

[0023] Further, in the step of performing the white list audit process, the device information is added to the white list through the batch import function of the system, and the firewall rule is configured according to the white list to control the access permission of other devices.

[0024] Preferably, in the step of establishing the encrypted communication channel in the S3 step, the encrypted communication channel is established between the host station end and the video terminal device based on the IPSec protocol, and the dynamic key management mechanism and the anti-replay attack and anti-forgery mechanism are adopted to ensure the security of data transmission.

[0025] In a specific embodiment, the encryption processing of the video data in the S4 step specifically includes:

[0026] The identity authentication and key agreement are performed by using the national encryption algorithm SM2, and the process specifically includes:

[0027] The host station end and the video terminal device each generate and exchange SM2 public keys, agree to generate a session key for SM4 symmetric encryption by using the SM2 key exchange protocol, and use the SM2 private key to digitally sign the challenge data and use the SM2 public key to verify the signature in the identity authentication process;

[0028] The video data is symmetrically encrypted by using the national encryption algorithm SM4;

[0029] The data integrity check is performed by using the national encryption algorithm SM3, and the check process specifically includes: concatenating the ciphertext data encrypted by SM4, a unique sequence number and a time stamp at the sending end, and generating a hash value by using the SM3 algorithm, performing the same hash operation on the received ciphertext data, sequence number and time stamp at the receiving end, and comparing the newly generated hash value with the received hash value.

[0030] Preferably, when there are multiple video terminal devices concurrently accessing, the method further includes independently and in parallel performing the steps of the access management process and the encrypted communication channel establishment for each video terminal device.

[0031] Preferably, when the video terminal device is interrupted, the method further includes the following steps:

[0032] The video terminal device starts an automatic reconnection mechanism to restore network connection;

[0033] After network connection is restored, the device registration and bidirectional identity authentication process and the establishment of the encrypted communication channel are re-executed;

[0034] Data cached locally during network interruption is transmitted through the newly established encrypted communication channel.

[0035] Preferably, the method further comprises the following steps:

[0036] Information of the video terminal device passing through the access management process is added, deleted, modified or inquired, and the working state is monitored in real time;

[0037] Logs of the access management process and system program running logs are recorded, and a query and analysis function of the recorded logs is provided.

[0038] The application provides a secure and trusted module design and implementation method of a video monitoring system.

[0039] 1. The application improves the access security and device compatibility of the system by setting a classified and graded access management process. The application adopts differentiated access control strategies for different device types: for secure and trusted devices with built-in encryption chips and trusted chips, a challenge-response bidirectional identity authentication based on a hardware trust root is performed to ensure the physical legality and non-falsification of the device identity; for other devices, a whitelist audit and firewall rule configuration are performed to include them in a unified network access control strategy. This dual-path access mechanism realizes high-strength secure access to new devices and compatible management of inventory devices, preventing illegal device access risks from the source.

[0040] 2. The application guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of data throughout the life cycle by establishing an end-to-end encrypted communication mechanism based on national cryptographic algorithms. The application establishes an encrypted communication channel between the authenticated device and the host station based on the IPSec protocol. In the channel, the SM2 algorithm is used for key negotiation and identity authentication, the SM4 algorithm is used for high-speed symmetric encryption of video data, and the SM3 algorithm is used for integrity verification of data packets combined with sequence numbers and time stamps. The coordinated application of this set of algorithms ensures that the video data is protected throughout the process from collection, transmission to reception at the host station, effectively preventing data from being eavesdropped, tampered with or replayed during transmission.

[0041] 3.The application enhances the system's operational stability and active defense capability by integrating real-time monitoring and automated handling mechanisms. The scheme continuously monitors the network status of video terminal devices and can promptly detect abnormal access behavior. Once an abnormality is detected, the system can automatically execute instructions to isolate the terminal or directly block its access rights at the network layer of the host station, providing dual emergency handling. At the same time, the scheme includes a multi-device concurrent access processing mechanism and a network interruption automatic reconnection and data continuation mechanism, ensuring service continuity and data integrity in large-scale deployment and unstable network environments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0042] Fig. 1 is a flowchart of the overall application;

[0043] Fig. 2 is a flowchart of the implementation method of the terminal video security and trust module of the application;

[0044] Fig. 3 is a flowchart of the implementation method of the host station video security and trust service module of the application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the application will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of the application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work fall within the scope of the application.

[0046] Referring to the accompanying drawings, Figs. 1-3 The application provides a security and trust module for a video monitoring system, which is deployed in a video monitoring system composed of a host station and at least one video terminal device. The security and trust module is physically and functionally divided into two parts: a terminal video security and trust module deployed in the video terminal device, and a host station video security and trust service module deployed in the host station.

[0047] In a specific embodiment, the system performs a classified access management process for different types of video terminal devices. For new security and trust devices with a terminal video security and trust module, the system performs a high-security level device registration and two-way identity authentication process. For inventory or other third-party devices without the module, the system performs a whitelist-based and network access control policy review process.

[0048] When a brand new video terminal device with built-in terminal video security trusted module first attempts to access the system, the device establishes a network layer connection with the base station of the mobile communication network through its integrated wireless communication unit, obtains an IP address, and initiates an initial access request containing its device unique identifier to the host station according to the pre-configured host station address.

[0049] After receiving the request, the access management module of the host station video security trusted service module first queries its device information library to confirm whether the device unique identifier is a pre-registered device. After confirmation, the access management module initiates a two-way identity authentication process based on the challenge-response mechanism to verify the physical legality and identity authenticity of the device. This process deeply utilizes the internally integrated and physically isolated encryption chip and trusted chip of the terminal device. The trusted chip is responsible for providing a hardware root of trust to guarantee the uniqueness and integrity of the device identity; the encryption chip is responsible for performing high-performance cryptographic operations and securely storing the private key of the device.

[0050] The specific implementation steps of the two-way identity authentication are as follows:

[0051] The access management module of the host station calls the cryptographic service unit to generate a 256-bit random number with cryptographic security, denoted as challenge. This random number has one-time validity, i.e., a brand new random number is used for each authentication session.

[0052] The host station encapsulates this challenge in an authentication request message and sends it to the video terminal device.

[0053] The terminal video security trusted module of the video terminal device receives the authentication request message, parses out the terminal video security trusted module of the video terminal device, and then passes it to the internal encryption chip through the secure interface.

[0054] The encryption chip internally stores the device's unique and non-exportable private key. The encryption chip uses and calls the digital signature function of the SM3 algorithm to perform signature operation on the received In the signature process, the hash algorithm is first used to calculate the digest, and then the digest is signed to generate the digital signature value.

[0055] The terminal video security trusted module encapsulates the original challenge and the generated signature value in an authentication response message and returns it to the host station.

[0056] After receiving the authentication response message, the access management module of the host station extracts the device public key corresponding to the device unique identifier from its device information library. This public key is securely imported and bound to the device identifier when the device is manufactured or registered in the network. ​

[0057] The host end uses the signature verification function of the national secret algorithm to verify the received response message. If the verification is successful, the host end can confirm that the response message indeed comes from a legal device holding the corresponding private key, thereby completing the one-way authentication of the device identity.

[0058] To achieve mutual authentication, the above steps will be executed once in reverse. The host end uses its own platform private key to sign a challenge generated by the terminal, and the terminal uses the pre-set to verify, ensuring that the terminal is communicating with a legal host end, not a fake intermediate person.

[0059] After strict mutual identity authentication is passed, the system enters the stage of establishing a secure encrypted channel for the current communication session. The core of this stage is to negotiate to generate a one-time symmetric encryption key only for the current session. The host end and the video terminal device jointly execute the key exchange protocol based on the national secret algorithm, and the specific process is as follows:

[0060] Both the host end and the terminal generate a pair of temporary public and private key pairs using the internal cryptographic service unit. Both parties exchange their temporary public keys over the network.

[0061] The host end uses its temporary private key and the received terminal temporary public key, combined with the device identifier and other information, to calculate a shared secret value. Similarly, the terminal uses its temporary private key and the received host end temporary public key to perform the same calculation. Based on the characteristics of elliptic curve cryptography, both parties will calculate the same shared secret value.

[0062] The shared secret value is not directly used as an encryption key, but as the input of a key derivation function (KDF). Both parties jointly use the KDF based on the hash algorithm to derive one or more session keys that meet the algorithm key length (128 bits) requirement from the shared secret value. After the session key negotiation, the encryption channel module of the host end and the terminal video security trusted module cooperate to initialize and establish an encrypted communication tunnel based on the IPSec protocol. The specific process is as follows:

[0063] Start the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2. In the security association initialization exchange phase, both parties exchange encryption parameter proposals, and use the session key negotiated in the previous step as the pre-shared key to encrypt and authenticate subsequent signaling interactions, establishing a secure Internet Key Exchange security association.

[0064] Start the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2. In the security association initialization exchange phase, both parties exchange encryption parameter proposals, and use the session key negotiated in the previous step as the pre-shared key to encrypt and authenticate subsequent signaling interactions, establishing a secure Internet Key Exchange security association.

[0065] ​​​In the authentication exchange phase, both sides use the established Internet Key Exchange security association to reconfirm the identity information and negotiate to create a sub-security association for actual data transmission.

[0066] In the negotiation process of the sub-security association, both sides explicitly specify the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol used, the encryption algorithm is SM4 , and the authentication and integrity check algorithm is the Hash Message Authentication Code based on SM3 . At the same time, both sides set a life cycle for the sub-security association, which can be time-based (e.g. 3600 seconds) or data transmission volume-based (e.g. 1 GB). When the threshold is reached, it will automatically trigger a re-negotiation to ensure regular updates of the key.

[0067] After the establishment of the encrypted channel, all business data, including H.264 / H.265 video streams, audio data collected by video terminal devices, and device control signaling, need to undergo strict encryption and integrity protection before being sent. The terminal video security trusted module of the sending end (e.g. terminal) performs the following operations:

[0068] Data encryption: The plaintext data to be sent is divided according to the packet length (128 bits) of the algorithm, and a high-security block cipher mode (such as CBC or GCM mode) is used to encrypt the data using the session key to generate ciphertext data.

[0069] Integrity and anti-replay protection: A monotonically increasing and unique 32-bit sequence number within the session is assigned to each data packet to be sent. At the same time, the high-precision (millisecond level) timestamp of the current system is obtained. The encrypted ciphertext data, sequence number, and timestamp are concatenated in byte according to the predetermined format to form a message body for hash calculation.

[0070] Hash calculation: The hash algorithm is used to operate on the above message body to generate a 256-bit hash digest value.

[0071] Data packet encapsulation: The ciphertext data, sequence number, timestamp, and calculated hash value are encapsulated in the ESP payload and sent out through the established IPSec tunnel.

[0072] The receiving end (e.g. master station) performs unpacking and verification operations after receiving the IPSec data packet:

[0073] First, check the sequence number of the data packet. A sliding window is maintained to determine whether the sequence number is repeated. If it is repeated, it is determined as a replay attack and the data packet is discarded immediately.

[0074] Then the timestamp is checked to determine whether it is within an acceptable, preset window of the current system time (e.g. ±5 seconds). If it is outside the window, it is determined to be an outdated packet and discarded.

[0075] If both the sequence number and the timestamp are valid, the receiving end uses the same method to concatenate the received ciphertext data, sequence number and timestamp, and applies the algorithm to recalculate a hash value.

[0076] The newly calculated hash value is compared with the hash value carried in the packet. If they are completely identical, it is proved that the data has not been tampered with in any form during transmission. After verification, the ciphertext data is decrypted using the session key to restore the plaintext data. If they are not identical, it is proved that the data integrity has been destroyed, the data packet is discarded and a security event is recorded.

[0077] In the actual application scenario where there are a large number of video terminal devices concurrently accessing, the architecture of the video security and trust service module of the host station is designed to be highly concurrent and scalable. The admission management module uses a multi-threaded or asynchronous I / O model and can handle tens of thousands of access requests simultaneously. When a new device requests access, the system allocates an independent session instance for it and performs the above complete identity authentication, key negotiation and channel establishment process in parallel and independently. The session manager of the host station maintains an independent security context for each established connection, including the security association (SA) parameters, session key, sequence number window and other state information of the connection, to ensure the secure isolation of communication between devices and that the abnormality or key leakage of a single device will not pose a threat to other devices.

[0078] In view of the high requirement of the video monitoring system for service continuity, the network interruption recovery mechanism is specially designed. When the video terminal device is disconnected with the host station due to network fluctuations, signal coverage or other reasons, its terminal video security and trust module will immediately detect the loss of connection and automatically start the reconnection mechanism. The mechanism uses an exponential backoff algorithm with random jitter to periodically attempt to reestablish the network connection, avoiding a signaling storm on the base station or host station at the moment of network recovery. During the connection interruption, the video data collected by the terminal device is not lost, but is temporarily stored in a special cache area of the local non-volatile storage medium after encryption. The size of the cache area is configurable and uses a circular coverage strategy.

[0079] ​​Once the network connection is successfully recovered, the terminal device will immediately re-initiate the access procedure to the host station, and re-perform the strict two-way identity authentication and key negotiation steps above in full, without any simplification, to establish a brand new, secure encrypted communication channel. This is to prevent the device from being physically touched or implanted with malicious software during the network outage. After the new channel is established, the terminal module will preferentially read and transmit the video data during the outage from the local cache area, and synchronize with the host station by serial number, and after the cache data is transmitted, switch to transmitting real-time video stream, thereby ensuring the integrity of the data and the continuity of the service.

[0080] During the stable operation of the system, the terminal video security and trust module also plays the role of a terminal-side security sentinel. It continuously actively monitors the running state of the device itself and the network behavior. The data points monitored include but are not limited to: the CPU and memory usage of the device, the storage space margin, the running state of the key processes, the network connection state and traffic statistics, the change events of the SIM card IMSI / ICCID information, and any abnormal behavior attempting to access unauthorized network addresses or ports. These collected state and event information are formatted into logs, which are reported to the network security monitoring function module of the host station through the established encrypted channel, periodically or when a trigger threshold is reached.

[0081] The network security monitoring function module of the host station is a component with data analysis capability. It aggregates and analyzes the reported information from all video terminal devices, identifies potential security threats by setting baselines and rules. For example, when it is monitored that the uplink and downlink network traffic of a terminal device fluctuates several times more dramatically than the historical baseline in a short time, or its SIM card information changes, or it continuously attempts to connect a known malicious IP address, the system will automatically trigger a hierarchical emergency handling mechanism.

[0082] The emergency handling mechanism includes two parallel, configurable operations:

[0083] Terminal-side active isolation: the host station video security and trust service module generates a remote emergency handling instruction signed by its platform private key, and issues it to the video terminal device that has occurred an anomaly through the encrypted channel. After receiving the instruction, the terminal video security and trust module first verifies its signature legality, confirming that the instruction comes from a legitimate host station. After verification, the module will execute the communication blocking function, such as modifying the local firewall rules of the device to block all network connections except communication with a specific management server, so that the device self-isolates from the service network, preventing it from becoming a stepping stone for attacks.

[0084] Network side forced ban: At the same time, the master station end video security trusted service module can link the devices of its network access control layer through the standard interface, directly add a rule in its access control list (ACL), permanently or temporarily ban all access rights of the IP address or MAC address associated with the abnormal device, so that it cannot access any service resources of the master station end from the network level.

[0085] In order to protect the static security of data, the terminal video security trusted module also realizes the function of encrypted storage. All video data segments or other sensitive configuration information that need to be stored locally are encrypted by the module using an independent local data encryption key (LDEK) that is irrelevant to the communication key before being written into the storage medium. This LDEK itself is protected by the trusted chip or TEE, ensuring that even if the video terminal device is physically stolen and its storage system is disassembled and directly read, the stored video content and configuration information will still be in an encrypted state and cannot be easily parsed.

[0086] Finally, in order to ensure the manageability, maintainability and traceability of the entire system, the master station end video security trusted service module also integrates a device management module and a log management module. The device management module provides a graphical or command line interface for system administrators to add, delete, modify and query the information of all admitted video terminal devices, including their identity certificates, public keys, states (online, offline, fault), etc., and can issue configuration updates or firmware upgrade packages. The log management module serves as the audit center of the system, and records all key logs in detail, including but not limited to device admission management logs, program running logs and security event logs. All logs are provided with precise time stamps and non-repudiable identifiers, supporting complex queries, analysis and report generation, providing a solid data foundation for post-tracing and security auditing.

Claims

1. A method for designing and implementing a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. The main station receives access requests from video terminal devices. S2. The main station executes the corresponding access management process according to the preset access policy and the device type. S3. After the access management process is completed, an encrypted communication channel is established between the main station and the video terminal device; S4. The video terminal device encrypts and stores the video data, and transmits the encrypted video data to the main station through the encrypted communication channel. S5. The main station monitors the network access status of the video terminal device in real time to determine whether there is any abnormality. S6. When the results of the real-time monitoring indicate that there is a security risk in the network access status, the master station executes a preset security response strategy.

2. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The preset access control strategy in step S2 specifically involves determining the access control based on the device type of the video terminal device. The access control management process specifically includes: If the device type is a secure and trusted device, then perform the device registration and two-way authentication process; If it is another device, then a whitelist review process will be executed.

3. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security response strategy preset in step S6 specifically includes: Issue emergency response instructions to the video terminal device, or block access permissions to the video terminal device at the main station.

4. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 2, characterized in that, The execution device registration and two-way authentication process specifically includes: The two-way authentication is performed using an encryption chip and a trusted chip integrated in the secure and trusted device, employing a challenge-response mechanism.

5. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 2, characterized in that, The whitelist review process specifically includes: The device information is added to the whitelist using the batch import function, and firewall rules are configured based on the whitelist to control the access permissions of other devices.

6. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The establishment of the encrypted communication channel in step S3 specifically includes: An encrypted communication channel is established between the master station and the video terminal device based on the IPSec protocol, and a dynamic key management mechanism and anti-replay attack and anti-forgery mechanism are adopted to ensure data transmission security.

7. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encryption process for the video data in step S4 specifically includes: The national cryptographic algorithm SM2 is used for identity authentication and key negotiation, wherein the identity authentication and key negotiation specifically include: The master station and the video terminal device each generate and exchange SM2 public keys, negotiate and generate a session key for SM4 symmetric encryption using the SM2 key exchange protocol, and use the SM2 private key to digitally sign the challenge data and use the SM2 public key to verify the signature during the identity authentication process. The video data is symmetrically encrypted using the national cryptographic algorithm SM4. Data integrity verification is performed using the national cryptographic algorithm SM3, wherein the integrity verification specifically includes: At the sending end, the ciphertext data encrypted by SM4, the unique sequence number, and the timestamp are concatenated and a hash value is generated using the SM3 algorithm. At the receiving end, the same hash operation is performed on the received ciphertext data, sequence number, and timestamp, and the newly generated hash value is compared with the received hash value.

8. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When multiple video terminal devices access the network concurrently, the method further includes: The access management process and the establishment of the encrypted communication channel are performed independently and in parallel for each of the video terminal devices.

9. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When the video terminal device experiences a network interruption, the method further includes the following steps: The video terminal device initiates an automatic reconnection mechanism to restore network connectivity; After the network connection is restored, the device registration and two-way authentication process and the encrypted communication channel are re-executed; Data cached locally during network outages will be transmitted through a newly established encrypted communication channel.

10. The design and implementation method of a secure and reliable module for a video surveillance system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The design and implementation method of the security and reliability module of the video surveillance system also includes the following steps: The system manages the addition, deletion, modification, and query of information for video terminal devices that pass through the access management process, and monitors their working status in real time. The system records the access management process logs and system program operation logs, and provides query and analysis functions for the recorded logs.

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