Shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple subjects of power grid, port and ship owner

Abstract

The invention discloses a shore power interaction optimization synergistic method based on multiple subjects of a power grid, a port and a ship owner, and the method comprises the steps: building a power grid operation benefit model, building a port operation benefit model, building a ship owner operation benefit model, building a two-way master-slave game model, and solving the two-layer master-slave game model through employing a two-layer particle swarm algorithm. A decentralized efficient distributed decision-making method is realized, a power grid-port-ship owner three-party friendly interactive cooperation mechanism is established, efficient coupling of an energy flow and a value flow is realized by constructing a power grid, port and ship owner three-party benefit cooperation framework, and the flexibility and economical efficiency of system operation are remarkably improved. The method is suitable for being applied as a shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple subjects such as a power grid, a port and a ship owner.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of energy synergy optimization, and more particularly to energy system management and multi-entity collaboration, specifically a shore power interaction optimization and efficiency enhancement method based on multiple entities including power grids, ports, and ship owners. Background Technology

[0002] With countries worldwide proposing "dual-carbon" goals and green port development initiatives, promoting the transformation of ports towards low-carbon, electrified, and intelligent operations has become a key task. One mainstream technological approach is the promotion of "shore power technology," where ships shut down their diesel generators while berthed and instead connect to the port's power grid, using shore-based power to meet their load demands for refrigeration, lighting, and communications. This effectively eliminates ship exhaust emissions in port areas. Simultaneously, ports are also beginning to introduce distributed energy resources such as distributed photovoltaic power plants and energy storage power stations on a large scale to optimize their energy structure and reduce their dependence on traditional power grids.

[0003] However, despite the increasing maturity of these technologies, their practical promotion and application face a systemic coordination dilemma.

[0004] First, from the perspective of the power grid, port shore power and large-scale energy storage facilities are high-power loads. Their concentrated start-up and shutdown can significantly impact the local distribution network, causing problems such as voltage fluctuations and line overloads. As an infrastructure operator, the power grid company lacks effective price signals to guide the electricity consumption behavior of ports and ships, making it difficult to achieve peak shaving and valley filling, and ensure the safe and stable operation of the power grid.

[0005] Secondly, from the port's perspective, its role is shifting from a simple energy consumer to an "energy hub." It needs to purchase electricity from the grid and may also generate electricity through its own photovoltaic and energy storage systems, selling it to berthed ships. Currently, port energy dispatch decisions often prioritize economic efficiency alone, lacking coordination with the grid and ship owners. For example, during peak grid load periods, ports may purchase large amounts of electricity from the grid due to lower prices, exacerbating the grid's operational pressure. Furthermore, their internal energy storage systems often employ a simplistic "low-storage, high-generation" strategy, failing to adequately consider the real-time status of the grid and the electricity demands of ships, resulting in limited overall energy efficiency improvements and emissions reductions falling short of expectations.

[0006] Furthermore, from the ship owners' perspective, while connecting to shore power can reduce emissions, it often increases their operating costs. Due to the lack of dynamic incentive mechanisms, ship owners are not strongly motivated to use shore power or adjust their berthing times to match the grid and port load. Currently, ports mostly charge ship owners fixed electricity prices or simple time-of-use pricing, which cannot truly reflect the scarcity of energy and environmental costs, making it difficult to effectively motivate ship owners to participate in demand-side response.

[0007] In summary, existing technologies suffer from a core flaw: the three key stakeholders—the power grid, the port, and the ship owner—are relatively isolated, lacking an effective mechanism to coordinate their interests, facilitate information sharing, and promote collaborative decision-making. Current optimization research largely focuses on two-way game theory or single-point optimization within the port, failing to systematically characterize the existing vertical master-slave relationship between the three—"power grid-port-ship owner"—and the horizontal competitive relationship between "power grid-port" on the electricity sales side. Without effective modeling and optimization of this complex "two-way master-slave" interaction, it will be difficult to fundamentally stimulate the intrinsic motivation of all parties to participate in energy conservation and carbon reduction, resulting in the investment of technological equipment failing to achieve its maximum effectiveness.

[0008] Therefore, there is an urgent need in this field for a comprehensive technical solution that can connect the power grid, ports, and ship owners, and achieve a win-win situation for economic and environmental benefits through reasonable market mechanisms and game strategies. Summary of the Invention

[0009] To optimize energy consumption among ports, power grids, and ship owners and reduce power loss, this invention proposes a shore power interaction optimization and efficiency enhancement method based on multiple stakeholders, including power grids, ports, and ship owners. This method, grounded in a two-way master-slave game model, effectively balances the interests of the power grid, ports, and ship owners, achieving a balance among them and improving the overall economic efficiency and shore power utilization efficiency of the system. This significantly enhances the optimization of power consumption efficiency among the power grid, ports, and ship owners, thereby effectively reducing energy consumption.

[0010] The solution adopted by this invention to solve the technical problem is: A shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grids, ports, and ship owners includes the following steps: S1. Establish a power grid operation benefit model, and construct the power grid operation benefit objective function and constraints; the power grid uses dynamic electricity sales price as the decision variable and maximum operation benefit as the optimization objective. Based on maximizing the revenue of power grid operation, an objective function is established as follows:

[0011] Among them, C port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C Ship For the benefits of power interaction between the power grid and the ship owner, C Grid This refers to the power interaction cost between the power grid and the external power grid.

[0012] S2. Establish a port operation efficiency model, construct the port operation efficiency objective function and constraints; establish the objective function based on maximizing port operation efficiency:

[0013] Where C port,dFor the benefits of power interaction between ports and ship owners, C Port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C port,com Port operation and maintenance costs.

[0014] S3. Establish a ship owner's operational efficiency model, construct the objective function and constraints for the ship owner's operational efficiency; based on minimizing the cost and maximizing the benefits of the ship owner's participation in friendly interactive operations, the objective function is established as follows:

[0015] in, C x This is a function for the efficiency of electricity use; C e The cost of purchasing and selling electricity for the ship owner; C fuel For the ship owner's fuel costs; C om For the ship owner's operating and maintenance costs; C q Penalty costs for reducing comfort caused by heat load and heat loss.

[0016] S4. Construct a two-way master-slave game model: with the power grid as the leader, the port as the secondary leader, and the ship owner as the follower, define the strategy set and utility function of the three parties; The bidirectional master-slave game model can be represented as follows:

[0017] Among them, the strategy set of the leader grid is The strategy set of the second-level leader port is The strategy set for following the ship owner is .

[0018] S5. Solve the two-layer master-slave game model using a two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm: Define the optimal response payoff for each agent, for any combination of strategies. ,definition: uDSO(S): The payoff of DSO under the current strategy; uPort(s): The return of Port under the current strategy; uship(S): Ship's payoff under the current strategy; For each subject i, the strategies S of other subjects are fixed. -i Find the maximum payoff under its optimal response strategy:

[0019] Nash fitness function:

[0020] Ideal Nash Equilibrium: F Nash =3 indicates that none of the entities can unilaterally increase their profits; Optimization objective: F Nash Maximize it to approach 3.

[0021] The present invention has the following technical improvements and effects: A friendly and interactive collaborative mechanism among the power grid, port, and ship owners has been established: by constructing a framework for the coordinated interests of the power grid, port, and ship owners, the efficient coupling of energy flow and value flow has been achieved. A benefit-sharing mechanism was established: based on dynamic electricity pricing and energy dispatch strategies, the electricity sales revenue of the power grid, the energy arbitrage and operating costs of the port, and the energy costs and satisfaction of ship owners were effectively coordinated, achieving Pareto improvement in the overall benefits of the three parties. Energy coordinated dispatch has been achieved: as an energy hub, the port flexibly adjusts its power purchase plan from the grid and its own energy storage charging and discharging strategy according to the grid electricity price signal, while guiding ship owners to optimize their shore power usage time, thus realizing peak shaving and valley filling and efficient utilization of regional energy. Improving energy utilization efficiency: As price responders, ship owners' flexible energy consumption behavior is effectively activated. By adjusting their berthing electricity plans, they transform from passive price takers to active participants in the system's adjustment, significantly improving the system's operational flexibility and economy.

[0022] Simultaneously, a distributed decision optimization framework for bidirectional master-slave game theory was established: Based on the constructed two-way master-slave game model with the power grid as the leader, the port as the secondary leader, and the ship owners as followers, a decentralized and efficient distributed decision-making method has been realized. A hierarchical decision-making structure was realized: the model accurately depicts the two-level master-slave relationship between "power grid-port" and "port-ship owner". The port plays a key role in connecting the upper and lower levels, responding to the scheduling of the upper power grid and guiding the energy use of the lower ship owner. Strategy Iteration Optimization: Through the designed game steps, the three parties optimize their own strategies in turn (grid pricing, port charging and discharging and pricing, ship owner electricity consumption), and quickly converge to a stable market equilibrium state through multiple iterations, avoiding the information barriers and computational burden caused by centralized optimization. Equilibrium solution guarantee: A two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to solve the two-layer master-slave game model, thereby ensuring the accuracy of system operation.

[0023] In summary, this method is suitable for application as an optimization and efficiency-enhancing approach for shore power interaction among multiple stakeholders, including power grids, ports, and ship owners. Attached Figure Description

[0024] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the framework of a two-way master-slave game economic operation model; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the process of solving a two-layer master-slave game model using a two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm. Detailed Implementation

[0025] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. The components of the embodiments of the present invention described and shown in the accompanying drawings can generally be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention, but merely to illustrate selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0026] In this invention, all embodiments, implementation methods, and features can be combined with each other without contradiction or conflict. In this invention, conventional equipment, devices, and components can be commercially available or self-made according to the disclosure of this invention. In this invention, to highlight the key points, some conventional operations and equipment, devices, and components are omitted or only briefly described.

[0027] This application proposes a shore power interaction optimization and efficiency enhancement method based on multiple stakeholders including the power grid, port, and ship owners. The main purpose is to achieve coordinated operation among the power grid, port, and ship owners based on a two-way master-slave game, aiming to reduce port energy consumption and carbon emissions. First, considering the port's dual role as both an energy consumer (purchasing electricity from the grid) and an energy supplier (providing power to ship owners), the complex game-like interaction among the power grid, port, and ship owners is analyzed in depth. Second, independent optimization operation models are established for each of the three parties, focusing on economic benefits while also considering environmental constraints. Next, a two-way master-slave game framework is innovatively constructed, with the power grid as the leader, the port as a secondary leader, and the ship owners as followers. This framework simultaneously considers master-slave coordination between levels and potential competition within the same level. Finally, a two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to solve the two-layer master-slave game model.

[0028] This invention proposes a shore power interaction optimization and efficiency enhancement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owners. It establishes a two-way master-slave game model architecture, which can effectively balance the interests among power grid, port, and ship owners, achieve a balance of interests among stakeholders, improve the overall economic benefits of the system, and enhance the efficiency of shore power use, thereby achieving the goal of reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions for the port.

[0029] See Figures 1 to 3 The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grids, ports, and ship owners is achieved through the following steps: Step S1: Establish a power grid operation benefit model, construct the power grid operation benefit objective function and constraints; the power grid uses dynamic electricity sales price as the decision variable and maximum operation benefit as the optimization objective. Based on maximizing the revenue of power grid operation, an objective function is established as follows: ; Among them, C port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C Ship For the benefits of power interaction between the power grid and the ship owner, C Grid This refers to the power interaction cost between the power grid and the external power grid.

[0030] Interactive benefits between power grid and port

[0031] Interactive revenue between power grid and ship owners

[0032] Electricity purchase cost

[0033] In the formula, T This represents the number of time periods in the scheduling cycle. The electricity price sold by the power grid; The charging power for the port; The power exchange between the ship owner and the power grid; The electricity price sold to the external power grid; This refers to the amount of electricity the power grid purchases from external power grids.

[0034] To prevent malicious competition between the power grid and the port when electricity prices are too low, the power interaction between the two meets the following protection mechanism:

[0035] when At that time, the electricity price sold by the power grid was higher than that sold by the external power grid. The power grid could profit from buying electricity from the external grid and then selling it to ports and ship owners. Therefore, ports could normally buy electricity from the power grid. When the electricity price sold by the power grid is lower than that sold by the external power grid, the power grid will operate at a loss when buying electricity from the external grid and then selling it to ports and ship owners. To prevent ports from buying electricity from the grid at a low price, charging it, and then selling it at a high price, thus increasing the power grid's losses through malicious competition, at this time... Ports cannot purchase electricity from the power grid. The power grid must meet the following constraints when setting dynamic electricity prices and conducting energy exchanges:

[0036] In the formula, , These are the minimum and maximum electricity prices, respectively; P ship,DSO,max P represents the maximum transmission power between the power grid and the ship owner. Port,max The maximum charging and discharging power of the port; P DSO,max This represents the maximum power transmitted between the power grid and the external power grid.

[0037] Step S2: Establish a port operation efficiency model, construct the port operation efficiency objective function and constraints; based on the dynamic electricity price of the power grid, the port should rationally formulate charging plans and electricity pricing strategies to guide ship owners to adjust their energy demand and achieve peak shaving and valley filling of the power system. The objective function, with the goal of maximizing port operation efficiency, is as follows: ; Where C port,d For the benefits of power interaction between ports and ship owners, C Port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C port,com Port operation and maintenance costs.

[0038]

[0039] In the formula, The electricity price at the port; K represents the discharge power from the port to the ship owner. port This represents the port operation and maintenance cost coefficient. The port's autonomous pricing and power interaction satisfy:

[0040] The port's energy storage status meets the following requirements:

[0041] In the formula, For the port's electricity; E port,min E port,max These are the minimum and maximum values ​​of the port capacity, respectively. , These are the charging and discharging efficiencies of the port, respectively. and These are the charging and discharging status quantities of the port, respectively.

[0042] Step S3. Establish a shipowner operational benefit model and construct the objective function and constraints for shipowner operational benefits; good economic benefits are a prerequisite for promoting the widespread application of shore power systems by shipowners. Therefore, this application aims to maximize the operational benefits of the IES, and establishes the objective function based on minimizing the costs and maximizing the benefits of shipowner participation in friendly interactive operation. The objective function is as follows: ; in, C x This is a function for the efficiency of electricity use; C e The cost of purchasing and selling electricity for the ship owner; C fuel For the ship owner's fuel costs; C om For the ship owner's operating and maintenance costs; C q Penalty costs for reducing comfort caused by heat load and heat loss.

[0043]

[0044] In the formula, This refers to the adjusted electrical load power. a , b Here are the parameters of the power efficiency function, where a =−0.05, b =4; when When i=1, it is the electricity price of the port; when i=2, it is the electricity price of the power grid. The power output of the ship owner to the external power grid; when When i=1, it is the interaction power between the ship owner and the port; when i=2, it is the interaction power between the ship owner and the power grid. Power loss; ρ g For natural gas prices; H g The calorific value of natural gas; This represents the loss value of the natural gas pipeline. The power generation efficiency of a combined heat and power (CHP) unit; This refers to the output electrical power of the CHP. To reduce power consumption due to heat load; Power lost due to heat energy loss; β This represents the penalty coefficient for heat load reduction. Based on changes in electricity price signals, movable electrical loads within the ship can be shifted to off-peak electricity periods to reduce electricity costs; some heat loads within the ship can be reduced to lower heating costs. Movable and reducible loads must satisfy the following conditions:

[0045] In the formula, For fixed electrical loads; For the transferable electrical load; The power consumption of electric heating equipment; This is the adjusted heat load power; The original heat load power; This represents the maximum value of the transferable load. This is the maximum load that can be reduced. To ensure safe and stable operation, the ship owner should meet the following requirements:

[0046] In the formula, P CHP,pmax This represents the maximum output electrical power of the CHP. This refers to the heating power of the CHP. R is the thermoelectric ratio of CHP. CHP,up R CHP,down These represent the maximum rise and fall rates of CHP's output power in adjacent time periods.

[0047] During the ship owner's operation, the power balance constraints are as follows:

[0048] In the formula, Electric heating power; The conversion efficiency of electric heating equipment; This refers to the photovoltaic power generation capacity.

[0049] Step S4. Construct a two-way master-slave game model: with the power grid as the leader, the port as the secondary leader, and the ship owner as the follower, define the strategy set and utility function of the three parties; Two-way Master-Slave Game Interaction Mechanism: In a system composed of power grids, ports, and ship owners, there are both explicit hierarchical master-slave relationships and potential competitive relationships among the parties. To accurately characterize this complex interactive structure, based on master-slave game theory, a "two-way master-slave game" is proposed as an analytical framework to coordinate the interests of all parties and achieve the overall economic operation of the system. The port and ship owner collaborative operation model framework based on two-way master-slave game theory constructed in this application is as follows: Figure 2 As shown, power grids, ports, and ship owners, among other stakeholders, work together to maintain stable system operation through energy dispatch and electricity trading. Each participant formulates corresponding energy trading strategies based on its own operational status and benefit objectives to optimize internal operational efficiency and meet diverse energy demands.

[0050] As a stable supplier of fundamental energy to the system, the power grid plays a leading role in economic operations. It maximizes its own benefits by setting dynamic electricity prices to guide ports and ship owners in responding to their peak-shaving needs. Ports act as secondary leaders in the system, leveraging the rapid and flexible nature of their energy conversion and storage facilities. On the one hand, they respond to the grid's price signals to arrange charging activities; on the other hand, they independently formulate their electricity sales strategies to downstream ship owners. Ports thus possess a dual identity as both followers and leaders, becoming a crucial hub bridging the two sides in this two-way master-slave game. Ship owners, as followers of the system, flexibly adjust the output and load demand of their internal energy-consuming equipment based on external electricity price signals, meeting their diverse energy needs while improving economic efficiency.

[0051] The specific execution steps of the two-way master-slave game proposed in this application are as follows: 1) The power grid, as the leader, is the first to release the initial electricity sales price strategy.

[0052] 2) The port responds to the price signals released by the power grid, formulates its own charging plan, and reports the plan to the power grid; at the same time, the port releases its electricity sales price strategy to ship owners.

[0053] 3) Ship owners comprehensively consider the electricity prices of the power grid and the port, optimize and adjust the output plan and flexible load of their internal energy conversion equipment, formulate electricity purchase strategies from the power grid and the port accordingly, and report the strategies to both simultaneously.

[0054] 4) The power grid updates its electricity sales prices based on the electricity purchase strategies provided by ports and ship owners in order to guide subsequent energy interaction behavior and ensure optimal economic benefits for itself.

[0055] 5) Based on the updated electricity prices in the power grid and the electricity purchase strategies reported by ship owners, ports will adjust their charging plans and electricity sales prices accordingly in order to maximize their own benefits.

[0056] 6) Repeat steps 3) to 5) until the electricity pricing strategy of the power grid, the charging and selling strategy of the port, and the electricity purchase strategy of the ship owner all become stable and no longer change. At this time, the system reaches the game equilibrium state.

[0057] 7) All participants use the game equilibrium solution reached as the final energy trading strategy to guide actual operation.

[0058] Two-way Master-Slave Game Interaction Model: The two-way master-slave game model described in this application depicts the decision-making process of the power grid, port, and ship owner pursuing their respective optimal objectives. This process considers the master-slave relationships between the power grid and the port, the ship owner, the port and the ship owner, and the competitive relationship between the power grid and the port. The two-way master-slave game model can be expressed as: ; Among them, the strategy set of the leader grid is The strategy set of the second-level leader port is The strategy set for following the ship owner is Combining the objective functions of the three main entities mentioned earlier, in the game theory model, for a given strategy... ,in,

[0059] If satisfied

[0060] Then strategy This is the equilibrium solution for the game.

[0061] Step S5. Solve the two-layer master-slave game model using a two-layer particle structure: Define the optimal response payoff for each agent; for any combination of strategies, definition: uDSO(S): The payoff of DSO under the current strategy; uPort(s): The return of Port under the current strategy; uship(S): Ship's payoff under the current strategy; For each subject i, the strategies S of other subjects are fixed. -i Find the maximum payoff under its optimal response strategy:

[0062] Nash fitness function:

[0063] Ideal Nash Equilibrium: F Nash =3 indicates that none of the entities can unilaterally increase their profits; Optimization objective: F Nash Maximize it to approach 3.

[0064] See the attached instruction manual. Figure 3 The specific process of the two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm is as follows: I. Outer Particle Swarm Optimization (Searching for DSO and Port Strategies) 1) Each particle X represents a strategy combination of DSO and Port:

[0065] 2) Fitness assessment process (for each particle) 1. Fixed DSO and Port strategy:

[0066] 2. Invoke the inner-layer particle swarm optimization: Solve for Ship's optimal electricity purchase strategy.

[0067] 3. Calculate the three-way payoff under the current strategy:

[0068] 4. Calculate the optimal payoff for one party: Fixed Port and Ship strategies optimize DSO pricing →

[0069] Fix DSO and Ship strategies, optimize Port strategies →

[0070] Fix DSO and Port strategies, optimize Ship strategy → (Originally obtained in step 2) 5. Calculate Nash fitness:

[0071] 6. Return to F Nash As the fitness value of the particle 3) Update the formula using the standard PSO:

[0072] II. Inner-layer particle swarm optimization (solving for the optimal power purchase strategy for the ship) 1) Particle coding Each particle Y represents Ship's electricity purchasing strategy:

[0073] 2) Fitness function

[0074] That is, the objective function of Ship is to maximize its operational efficiency.

[0075] Finally, it should be noted that the above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art can still modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments or make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grids, ports, and ship owners, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Establish a power grid operation benefit model and construct the power grid operation benefit objective function and constraints; The power grid uses dynamic electricity sales price as the decision variable and maximum operating efficiency as the optimization objective. The objective function is established based on maximizing the revenue of power grid operation. S2. Establish a port operation efficiency model and construct the port operation efficiency objective function and constraints; Establish an objective function based on maximizing the port's operational efficiency: S3. Establish a ship owner operation benefit model and construct the ship owner operation benefit objective function and constraints; establish an objective function based on minimizing the cost and maximizing the benefit of ship owners participating in friendly interactive operations; S4. Construct a two-way master-slave game model: with the power grid as the leader, the port as the secondary leader, and the ship owner as the follower, define the strategy set and utility function of the three parties; S5. A two-layer particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to solve the two-layer master-slave game model.

2. The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owner, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The objective function for power grid operation benefits in step S1 is: ； Among them, C port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C Ship For the benefits of power interaction between the power grid and the ship owner, C Grid This refers to the power interaction cost between the power grid and the external power grid.

3. The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owner, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The objective function for port operation efficiency in step S2 is: ； Where C port,d For the benefits of power interaction between ports and ship owners, C Port,c For the benefits of interaction between the power grid and the port, C port,com Port operation and maintenance costs.

4. The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owner, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The objective function for the ship owner's operational efficiency in step S3 is: ； in, C x This is a function for the efficiency of electricity use; C e The cost of purchasing and selling electricity for the ship owner; C fuel For the ship owner's fuel costs; C om For the ship owner's operating and maintenance costs; C q Penalty costs for reducing comfort caused by heat load and heat loss.

5. The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owner, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The bidirectional master-slave game model in step S4 can be represented as follows: ； Among them, the strategy set of the leader grid is The strategy set of the second-level leader port is The strategy set of following the ship owner is .

6. The shore power interaction optimization and efficiency improvement method based on multiple stakeholders including power grid, port, and ship owner, as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... In step S5, a two-layer particle structure is used to solve the two-layer master-slave game model as follows: Define the optimal response payoff for each agent, for any combination of strategies. ,definition: uDSO(S): The payoff of DSO under the current strategy; uPort(s): The return of Port under the current strategy; uship(S): Ship's payoff under the current strategy; For each subject i, the strategies S of other subjects are fixed. -i Find the maximum payoff under its optimal response strategy: ； Nash fitness function: ； Ideal Nash Equilibrium: F Nash =3 indicates that no entity can unilaterally increase its profits; Optimization objective: F Nash Maximize it to approach 3.

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