Rotating electric machine control device and control program

Abstract

A target torque calculation unit (50) calculates a target torque including a regenerative torque based on regenerative power generation of a rotating electric machine (20) on the basis of the operation amount of an acceleration operation member (11) and the operation amount of a brake operation member (12), and a monitoring torque calculation unit (70a) calculates a monitoring torque based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation member and the operation state of the brake operation member. The abnormality detection unit (70b) detects an acceleration abnormality when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is greater than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit by more than a predetermined degree, and detects an acceleration abnormality when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is greater than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit by more than a predetermined degree. The detection invalidation unit (70c) invalidates the acceleration abnormality detection by the abnormality detection unit when the target torque is equal to or less than the mask threshold value, and sets the mask threshold value when the brake operation member is not operated to be greater than the mask threshold value when the brake operation member is operated.

Description

[0001] Cross-referencing of related applications This application is based on Japanese Application No. 2023-131424, filed on August 10, 2023, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0002] This disclosure relates to a control device for performing control of a rotating electric machine and detecting control malfunctions. Background Technology

[0003] For example, there exists a control device that calculates a target value and a target monitored value of the torque of a rotating electric motor that serves as the driving power source for a vehicle. If the deviation between the target value and the target monitored value is above a threshold, it is considered that the control device of the rotating electric motor has malfunctioned and fault-safe processing is performed. Here, in order to suppress the situation where fault-safe processing is mistakenly performed even when it is not a situation that should be performed, there exists a control device that performs monitoring of the target value of the torque based on the condition that the target value of the torque is above a judgment value (see Patent Document 1).

[0004] Existing technical documents Patent documents Patent Document 1: Japanese Patent Application Publication No. 2021-112115 Summary of the Invention

[0005] However, the target torque value of the rotating electric motor varies depending on whether regenerative power generation is performed or whether a one-pedal mode, in which the vehicle is accelerated and decelerated solely by accelerator operation, is performed. The control device described in Patent Document 1 does not take into account the changes in the target torque value caused by these factors, and there is room for improvement in suppressing the false detection of abnormalities when the control of the rotating electric motor is not abnormal (false detection of control abnormality).

[0006] This disclosure was made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and its main purpose is to suppress false detection of control anomalies in the control device of a rotating electric machine.

[0007] A first approach to solve the aforementioned problem is a control device for a rotating electric motor, the rotating electric motor being applied to a vehicle having an acceleration operation component, a braking operation component, and a rotating electric motor capable of transmitting power to drive wheels. The control device comprises: a target torque calculation unit that calculates a target torque, including regenerative torque based on regenerative power generation from the rotating electric motor, based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component; a monitoring torque calculation unit that calculates a monitoring torque used when monitoring the target torque, based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component; an anomaly detection unit that detects an acceleration anomaly if the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is significantly larger than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit by a predetermined degree; and a detection invalidation unit that invalidates the acceleration anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit when the target torque is below a shielding threshold, and sets the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is operated.

[0008] According to the above structure, the target torque calculation unit calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque based on the regenerative power generation of the rotating motor, based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component. Therefore, generally, the larger the operation amount of the acceleration operation component, the larger the target torque (towards vehicle acceleration), and if the braking operation component is operated, the smaller the target torque (towards vehicle deceleration through regenerative power generation). The monitoring torque calculation unit calculates the monitoring torque used for monitoring the target torque based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component. Therefore, the monitoring torque is calculated in the same way as the target torque. The anomaly detection unit detects an acceleration anomaly when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is significantly larger than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit by a predetermined degree. Therefore, for example, if an anomaly occurs in the target torque calculation unit and the target torque increases beyond the driver's intention, an acceleration anomaly can be detected. Furthermore, in the event of an acceleration anomaly, fail-safe procedures are generally performed.

[0009] The detection invalidation unit invalidates the acceleration anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit when the target torque is below the shielding threshold. Therefore, when acceleration anomaly detection is unnecessary when the target torque is below the shielding threshold, false detection of acceleration anomalies can be suppressed. Here, the target torque is larger when the braking operation member is not operated compared to when it is operated. Therefore, the region of target torque for which acceleration anomaly detection is unnecessary expands towards the side with larger target torque. In this regard, the detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold when the braking operation member is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold when it is operated. Therefore, the shielding threshold can be appropriately set depending on whether the braking operation member is operated. Therefore, in the case of regenerative power generation of the rotating electric machine, false detection of acceleration anomalies (control anomalies) can be suppressed, and missed detection of acceleration anomalies can be suppressed. Furthermore, if the shielding threshold is too large, missed detection of acceleration anomalies may occur, such as acceleration anomalies occurring but not being detected.

[0010] In the second embodiment, the vehicle is capable of performing a one-pedal mode that accelerates and decelerates the vehicle based on the operation of the acceleration operation component. The target torque calculation unit also calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque, based on whether the one-pedal mode is performed. The detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold when the one-pedal mode is not performed to be larger than the shielding threshold when the one-pedal mode is performed.

[0011] According to the above structure, the vehicle can perform a one-pedal mode that accelerates and decelerates the vehicle based on the operation of the acceleration control unit. Furthermore, the target torque calculation unit calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque, based on whether the one-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the target torque is larger when the one-pedal mode is not executed compared to when it is executed. Thus, the region of target torque for which acceleration anomaly detection is not required expands towards the side with the larger target torque. In this regard, the detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold for the case where the one-pedal mode is not executed to be larger than the shielding threshold for the case where the one-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the shielding threshold can be appropriately set based on whether the one-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, when the one-pedal mode can be executed, false detections of acceleration anomalies can be suppressed, and missed detections of acceleration anomalies can be suppressed.

[0012] The regenerative torque (target torque) calculated by the target torque calculation unit varies depending on the operating state of the braking operation components and whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, based on the changes in the regenerative torque caused by these factors, the region of the target torque that does not require acceleration anomaly detection also changes.

[0013] Regarding this, in the third approach, the detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold based on the regenerative torque determined according to the operating state of the braking operation component and whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the shielding threshold can be easily and appropriately set according to changes in the regenerative torque.

[0014] In the fourth method, the anomaly detection unit detects a deceleration anomaly when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is below the deceleration anomaly threshold, and sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is operated to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is not operated.

[0015] Based on the above structure, the anomaly detection unit detects a deceleration anomaly when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is below the deceleration anomaly threshold. Therefore, for example, if an anomaly occurs in the target torque calculation unit and the target torque decreases beyond the driver's intended range, a deceleration anomaly can be detected. Furthermore, in the event of a deceleration anomaly detection, fail-safe procedures are generally performed.

[0016] Here, when the braking operation component is operated, the target torque is smaller compared to when the braking operation component is not operated. Therefore, the region where the target torque for detecting deceleration anomalies should be narrowed towards the side with smaller target torque. In this regard, the anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is operated to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is not operated. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold can be appropriately set depending on whether the braking operation component is operated or not. Therefore, when detecting deceleration anomalies, false detection of deceleration anomalies (control anomalies) can be suppressed, and missed detection of deceleration anomalies can be suppressed. Furthermore, if the deceleration anomaly threshold is too small, it is possible to miss the detection of deceleration anomalies, such as deceleration anomalies occurring but not being detected.

[0017] In the fifth method, the vehicle is capable of performing a one-pedal mode that accelerates and decelerates the vehicle based on the operation of the acceleration operation component. The target torque calculation unit also calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque, based on whether the one-pedal mode is executed. The anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the one-pedal mode is executed to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the one-pedal mode is not executed.

[0018] When the one-pedal mode is executed, the target torque is smaller compared to when the one-pedal mode is not executed. Therefore, the region where the target torque for detecting deceleration anomalies should be narrowed towards the side with smaller target torque. In this regard, the anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the one-pedal mode is executed to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the one-pedal mode is not executed. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold can be appropriately set depending on whether the one-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, when the one-pedal mode can be executed, false detection of deceleration anomalies (control anomalies) can be suppressed, and missed detection of deceleration anomalies can be suppressed.

[0019] The regenerative torque (target torque) calculated by the target torque calculation unit varies depending on the operating state of the braking operation components and whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, based on the changes in the regenerative torque caused by these factors, the area of ​​the target torque that should detect deceleration anomalies also changes.

[0020] In this regard, in the sixth embodiment, the anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold based on the operating state of the braking operation component and whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold can be easily and appropriately set according to changes in regenerative torque.

[0021] The seventh method is a control program applied to a vehicle having an acceleration operation component, a braking operation component, and a rotating electric motor capable of transmitting power to the drive wheels. The control program causes a computer to perform the following processes: calculating a target torque, including regenerative torque based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component; calculating a monitoring torque used for monitoring the target torque based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component; detecting an acceleration anomaly if the calculated target torque is significantly larger than the calculated monitoring torque by a predetermined amount; and invalidating the detection of the acceleration anomaly if the target torque is below a shielding threshold, and setting the shielding threshold for when the braking operation component is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold for when the braking operation component is operated.

[0022] Based on the above structure, by having the computer execute the control program applied to the vehicle, the same effect as the first method can be achieved. Attached Figure Description

[0023] The foregoing and other objects, features, and advantages of this disclosure will become more apparent from the accompanying drawings and from the detailed description that follows.

[0024] Figure 1 It is a block diagram of a vehicle.

[0025] Figure 2 This is a functional block diagram representing the processing of the vehicle control unit.

[0026] Figure 3 This is a functional block diagram representing the processing of the monitoring unit.

[0027] Figure 4 This is an example diagram representing the target torque diagram.

[0028] Figure 5 This is a graph showing the relationship between the target torque and the abnormal threshold.

[0029] Figure 6 This is a graph representing the shielding threshold when the brake is on (ON).

[0030] Figure 7 This is a graph representing the shielding threshold when the brake is off and the single pedal is on.

[0031] Figure 8 This is a graph representing the shielding threshold when the brake is off and the single pedal is off.

[0032] Figure 9 This is a flowchart showing the steps involved in calculating the target torque.

[0033] Figure 10 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps to accelerate the detection of dangerous anomalies.

[0034] Figure 11 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in setting the masking threshold.

[0035] Figure 12 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in detecting deceleration hazards.

[0036] Figure 13 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in setting the deceleration anomaly threshold.

[0037] Figure 14 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in fail-safe handling. Detailed Implementation

[0038] Hereinafter, an embodiment of a control device for a rotary electric motor mounted in a vehicle will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. The vehicle is a hybrid electric vehicle, electric vehicle, or the like, in which the rotary electric motor is the power source for propulsion.

[0039] like Figure 1 As shown, the vehicle 10 includes a rotary motor 20, an inverter 30, and a battery 31 as an energy storage device. The rotary motor 20 has a three-phase stator winding and a rotor, such as a permanent magnet type synchronous machine.

[0040] The vehicle 10 is equipped with a transmission 23 and drive wheels 24. The rotor of the rotary motor 20 can transmit power to the drive wheels 24 via the transmission 23. That is, the rotary motor 20 becomes the driving power source of the vehicle 10.

[0041] The stator winding of the rotary motor 20 is electrically connected to the battery 31 via an inverter 30. The inverter 30 has upper and lower arm switches. The battery 31 is a battery pack composed of multiple battery cells connected in series, such as a lithium-ion battery or a nickel-metal hydride battery, etc.

[0042] Vehicle 10 includes an acceleration sensor 40, a vehicle speed sensor 41, a gear position sensor 42, a driving mode switch 43, a brake switch 44, and a brake sensor 45. The acceleration sensor 40 detects the amount of pressure applied to the accelerator pedal 11, which is the driver's acceleration control component, i.e., the acceleration operation amount Acc. The vehicle speed sensor 41 detects the vehicle speed Vs, which represents the vehicle 10's travel speed. The brake sensor 45 detects the amount of pressure applied to the brake pedal 12, which is the driver's braking control component, i.e., the braking operation amount Bp.

[0043] The gear position sensor 42 detects the position of the gear lever of the transmission device 23 operated by the driver, i.e., the gear SP. In this embodiment, the gear SP includes a parking gear (P gear) used when the vehicle 10 is parked, a reverse gear (R gear) that indicates that the vehicle 10 is moving backward, a neutral gear (N gear) that cuts off the power transmission between the rotor and the drive wheel 24, and a drive gear (D gear) that indicates that the vehicle 10 is moving forward.

[0044] The driving mode switch 43 is used to set the torque output characteristics of the rotary motor 20 and is operated by the driver. The driving mode of the vehicle 10 is set by operating the driving mode switch 43. Driving modes include Eco mode, Normal mode, Sport mode, and One-pedal mode. Eco mode prioritizes the energy efficiency of the vehicle 10, emphasizing power consumption over output; Sport mode prioritizes the driving performance of the vehicle 10, emphasizing output over power consumption; Normal mode is a mode between Eco mode and Sport mode. One-pedal mode accelerates and decelerates the vehicle 10 based on the operation of the accelerator pedal 11.

[0045] The brake switch 44 is turned on when the brake pedal 12 is pressed and turned off when it is not pressed.

[0046] The output signals of each sensor 40-42 and the driving mode signal Mo, indicating the operating state of the driving mode switch 43, are sent to the control device 100 of the vehicle 10. The brake signal BS, indicating the ON / OFF state of the brake switch 44, is sent to the control device 100 and the brake ECU 80 of the vehicle 10. The brake operation quantity Bp detected by the brake sensor 45 is sent to the brake ECU 80. The control device 100 (computer) includes a vehicle control unit 50, an MG control unit 60, and a monitoring unit 70.

[0047] like Figures 1-3 As shown, the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring unit 70 are input to the acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, and braking signal BS as redundant signals, and the driving mode signal Mo as a non-redundant signal. Additionally, the output signal of the gear position sensor 42 is also input to the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring unit 70. Furthermore, the braking operation amount Bp is a redundant signal.

[0048] Taking the vehicle control unit 50 as an example, the redundant signal is a signal input to the vehicle control unit 50 from a redundant sensor, or a signal input to the vehicle control unit 50 from a sensor via a redundant signal line. The non-redundant signal is a signal input to the vehicle control unit 50 from a sensor that has not been redundant, or a signal input to the vehicle control unit 50 from a sensor via a single signal line.

[0049] Redundancy of the sensor can be achieved, for example, by duplicating the detection element, signal processing circuit, and output section of the sensor, or by using a single detection element and duplicating the signal processing circuit and output section. Additionally, signal line redundancy can be achieved, for example, by connecting the sensor and the vehicle control unit 50 with two or more signal lines.

[0050] On the other hand, a non-redundant sensor is one that has a single detection element, signal processing circuit, and output unit. Furthermore, non-redundant signal lines can be achieved, for example, by connecting the sensor and the vehicle control unit 50 via a single signal line.

[0051] Alternatively, it can be said that redundant signals are highly reliable signals, while non-redundant signals are less reliable than redundant signals.

[0052] The vehicle control unit 50 (target torque calculation unit) calculates the target torque of the rotary motor 20 based on the acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, driving mode signal Mo, and braking signal BS, according to a predetermined control cycle. The target torque is calculated by the braking ECU 80 and includes the regenerative torque Tks received by the vehicle control unit 50. When the target torque is positive, the vehicle 10 is accelerated in its direction of travel; when the target torque is negative, the vehicle 10 is decelerated. The vehicle control unit 50 performs gradual change processing on the calculated target torque and outputs it. Gradual change processing is a process that gradually changes the target torque before the change towards the target torque after the change. Gradual change processing is used to suppress abrupt changes in the torque of the rotary motor 20 (torque shock) and suppress the deterioration of driving performance. Gradual change processing is, for example, known smoothing processing or rate processing.

[0053] In order to control the torque of the rotary motor 20 to the target torque Tv after gradual processing output from the vehicle control unit 50, the MG control unit 60 performs switching control of the upper arm switch and lower arm switch of the inverter 30. Specifically, the MG control unit 60 performs either power operation drive control or regenerative drive control. Power operation drive control is a switching control that converts the DC power output from the battery 31 into AC power and supplies it to the stator windings. When this control is performed, the rotary motor 20 functions as a motor, generating power operation torque. Regenerative drive control is a switching control that converts the AC power generated by the rotary motor 20 into DC power and supplies it to the battery 31. When this control is performed, the rotary motor 20 functions as a generator, generating regenerative torque. Braking force is applied to the wheels by the regenerative torque.

[0054] The monitoring unit 70 includes a monitoring torque calculation unit 70a, an anomaly detection unit 70b, and a detection invalidation unit 70c. When monitoring by the vehicle control unit 50, the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a calculates the monitoring torque based on the acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, driving mode signal Mo, and braking signal BS, at each predetermined control cycle. The monitoring torque is calculated by the braking ECU 80 and includes the regenerative torque Tks received by the monitoring unit 70. Furthermore, the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a performs gradual processing on the calculated monitoring torque and outputs it. The gradual processing performed by the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a is either smoothing or rate processing; the smoothing and rate processing performed by the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a are the same as those performed by the vehicle control unit 50. It is not necessary for the smoothing processing to be identical in both the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a, nor is it necessary for the rate processing to be identical in both the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a. In addition, when performing gradual change processing on the monitored torque, the gradual change processing of the monitored torque can be simplified to avoid overly restricting the change of the monitored torque.

[0055] The anomaly detection unit 70b processes the fault-safe signal Sfs, the main signal that causes an anomaly in the vehicle control unit 50, based on a comparison between the target torque Tv after gradual processing output from the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring torque Tvr after gradual processing. The anomaly detection unit 70b detects an acceleration hazard anomaly (acceleration anomaly) when the target torque calculated by the vehicle control unit 50 is significantly larger than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a than a predetermined level. The fault-safe signal Sfs is a signal indicating that the output torque of the rotary motor 20 should be reduced to the creep torque, or a signal indicating that the output torque of the rotary motor 20 should be reduced to 0 to stop the rotary motor 20. When the MG control unit 60 determines that a fault-safe signal Sfs has been input, it processes either the output torque of the rotary motor 20 to the creep torque or the output torque of the rotary motor 20 to 0.

[0056] If the target torque Tv after the gradual change is below the shielding threshold Tmsk, the detection invalidation unit 70c invalidates the acceleration hazard anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit 70b. The shielding threshold Tmsk will be explained later. As a way to invalidate the acceleration hazard anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit 70b, acceleration hazard anomaly detection is not performed in this embodiment. Furthermore, the acceleration hazard anomaly detection can also be invalidated by ignoring the detection result.

[0057] The brake ECU 80 calculates the required deceleration torque for vehicle 10 based on the braking operation amount Bp. The brake ECU 80 calculates the regenerative torque Tks by subtracting the deceleration torque generated by the brake (not shown) from the required deceleration torque for vehicle 10. Additionally, when the one-pedal mode is ON, the brake ECU 80... Figure 4 The target torque diagram M1 shown is used when the single-pedal mode is ON. The regenerative torque Tks is calculated when the acceleration operation amount Acc is small. The brake ECU 80 sends the calculated regenerative torque Tks to the control device 100.

[0058] like Figure 2 As shown, the vehicle control unit 50 includes a central processing unit (CPU 51), a memory 52, an input / output interface 53, and a bus 54. The CPU 51, memory 52, and input / output interface 53 are connected via the bus 54 in a bidirectional communication manner. The memory 52 includes a non-volatile memory (e.g., ROM) storing a target torque calculation program P1 for calculating the target torque Tv, and a memory (e.g., RAM) that can be read and written by the CPU 51.

[0059] The non-volatile memory constituting memory 52 also stores a target torque map M1 used to calculate the target torque. The target torque map M1 is a mapping information that defines the target torque in association with the driving mode, acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, and braking signal BS. CPU 51 calculates the target torque by expanding and executing the target torque calculation program P1 stored in memory 52 in a read-write memory. CPU 51 performs a gradual change process on the calculated target torque.

[0060] An acceleration sensor 40, a vehicle speed sensor 41, a gear position sensor 42, a driving mode switch 43, a brake switch 44, an MG control unit 60, and a monitoring unit 70 are connected to the input / output interface 53 via signal lines. Detection signals are input from the acceleration sensor 40, vehicle speed sensor 41, gear position sensor 42, driving mode switch 43, and brake switch 44. Redundant signals are input from at least the acceleration sensor 40, vehicle speed sensor 41, gear position sensor 42, and brake switch 44, while a non-redundant signal is input from the driving mode switch 43. That is, in this embodiment, the acceleration sensor 40, vehicle speed sensor 41, gear position sensor 42, and brake switch 44 are redundant sensors (switches), while the driving mode switch 43 is a non-redundant sensor.

[0061] like Figure 3 As shown, the monitoring unit 70 includes a CPU 71, a memory 72, an input / output interface 73, and a bus 74. This enables the functions of a monitoring torque calculation unit 70a, an anomaly detection unit 70b, and a detection invalidation unit 70c. The CPU 71, memory 72, and input / output interface 73 are connected via the bus 74 in a bidirectional communication manner. The memory 72 includes: a non-volatile memory (e.g., ROM) storing a monitoring program P2 used to calculate the monitoring torque, determine anomalies in the vehicle control unit 50, and decide on fault-safe execution; and a memory (e.g., RAM) that can be read and written by the CPU 71. Furthermore, a control program is constituted by the target torque calculation program P1 and the monitoring program P2.

[0062] The non-volatile memory constituting memory 72 also stores a monitoring torque map M2 for calculating the monitoring torque. The monitoring torque map M2 is a mapping information that defines the monitoring torque Tvr in relation to the driving mode, acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, and braking signal BS.

[0063] CPU 71 calculates the monitoring torque by expanding and executing the monitoring program P2 stored in memory 72 in a read-write memory. CPU 71 performs a gradual change process on the calculated monitoring torque. CPU 71 compares the gradually changed monitoring torque Tvr with the gradually changed target torque Tv to determine fault-safe execution. Additionally, CPU 71 compares the gradually changed monitoring torque Tvr with a deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec to determine fault-safe execution. The deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec will be explained later.

[0064] The input / output interface 73 is connected via signal lines to an acceleration sensor 40, a vehicle speed sensor 41, a gear position sensor 42, a driving mode switch 43, a brake switch 44, a vehicle control unit 50, and an MG control unit 60. Detection signals are input from the acceleration sensor 40, vehicle speed sensor 41, gear position sensor 42, driving mode switch 43, and brake switch 44.

[0065] Figure 4 This is a diagram illustrating an example of the target torque diagram M1. The one-pedal mode is represented by a solid line when it is OFF, and by a dashed line when it is ON. The larger the acceleration operation amount (Acc) when both the one-pedal mode is OFF and ON, the larger the target torque. Furthermore, the higher the vehicle speed (Vs), the faster the target torque increases relative to the acceleration operation amount (Acc). When the one-pedal mode is OFF, the target torque is approximately 0 when the acceleration operation amount (Acc) is 0. On the other hand, when the one-pedal mode is ON, the target torque becomes negative (deceleration torque) when the acceleration operation amount (Acc) is 0. Additionally, when the brake pedal 12 is depressed, the target torque becomes the regenerative torque (Tks). The regenerative torque (Tks) is smaller than the target torque when the one-pedal mode is ON and the acceleration operation amount (Acc) is 0. Furthermore, the monitoring torque diagram M2 (not shown) is set to have the same tendency as the target torque diagram M1, but it does not necessarily have to be the same.

[0066] Figure 5This is a graph showing the relationship between the target torque and the abnormal threshold. When the one-pedal mode is off, under normal conditions of the vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring unit 70, the target torque Tv1 and the monitoring torque Tvr1 are approximately equal. On the other hand, for example, if the vehicle control unit 50 malfunctions and the monitoring torque Tvr1 is too large, the deviation ΔT (ΔT=Tv1-Tvr1) between the target torque Tv1 and the monitoring torque Tvr1 is greater than the deviation threshold α (ΔT>α), and the target torque Tv1 enters the acceleration hazard abnormality region. As a result, an acceleration hazard abnormality (acceleration abnormality) is detected. When the one-pedal mode is on, the target torque Tv2 and the monitoring torque Tvr2 are calculated to be smaller than the target torque Tv1 and the monitoring torque Tvr1, but the acceleration hazard abnormality is detected in the same way as when the one-pedal mode is off. In addition, when the brake pedal 12 is depressed, the acceleration hazard abnormality is detected by comparing the target torque Tv and the monitoring torque Tvr corresponding to the regenerative torque Tks. Furthermore, the deceleration anomaly thresholds Tdec (Tdec1~Tdec3) will be explained later.

[0067] As described above, the target torque of the rotary motor 20 varies depending on whether regenerative power generation is being performed (operation state of brake pedal 12) and whether the single-pedal mode is on or off (whether single-pedal mode is being performed). Therefore, based on the changes in the regenerative torque Tks caused by these factors, the region of the target torque for which acceleration hazard detection is not required also changes. Therefore, in this embodiment, the region (shielding region) for which the detection of acceleration hazard abnormality is invalidated by the detection invalidation unit 70c is variable depending on the operation state of brake pedal 12 and the on or off state of single-pedal mode.

[0068] Figure 6 This is a diagram showing the shielding threshold Tmsk1 when the brake is ON. In the region where the target torque is below the shielding threshold Tmsk1 when the brake is ON, the detection of acceleration hazard is invalidated. The shielding threshold Tmsk1 is a value obtained by adding the minimum value Tb1 (the strongest deceleration torque) of the regenerative torque Tks required from the brake ECU 80 when the brake is ON under normal conditions to the allowable change in unwanted acceleration torque, i.e., the allowable torque change ΔTp. The allowable torque change ΔTp is, for example, the torque of the rotary motor 20 required to accelerate the vehicle 10 at an acceleration of 0.2 [G]. The region where the target torque is less than the minimum value Tb1 is a region not used under normal conditions. The minimum value Tb1 is a known value, and the detection invalidation unit 70c obtains (masters) the minimum value Tb1 in advance.

[0069] Figure 7This diagram shows the shielding threshold Tmsk2 when the brake is off and the one-pedal mode is on. The shielding threshold Tmsk2 is the value obtained by adding the allowable torque variation ΔTp to the minimum value Tb2 of the regenerative torque Tks required by the brake ECU80 when the brake is off and the one-pedal mode is on under normal conditions. The minimum value Tb2 of the regenerative torque Tks when the brake is off and the one-pedal mode is on is greater than the minimum value Tb1 of the regenerative torque Tks when the brake is on. The minimum value Tb2 is a known value, and the detection invalidation unit 70c obtains (masters) the minimum value Tb2 in advance.

[0070] Figure 8 This is a diagram showing the shielding threshold Tmsk3 when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is off. The shielding threshold Tmsk3 is the value obtained by adding the allowable torque change ΔTp to the minimum value Tb3 of the regenerative torque Tks required by the brake ECU80 when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is off under normal conditions. The minimum value Tb3 of the regenerative torque Tks when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is off is greater than the minimum value Tb2 of the regenerative torque Tks when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is on. The minimum value Tb3 is a known value, and the detection invalidation unit 70c obtains (masters) the minimum value Tb3 in advance.

[0071] In other words, the detection invalidation unit 70c sets the shielding threshold Tmsk3 when the single-pedal mode is not executed to be larger than the shielding threshold Tmsk2 when the single-pedal mode is executed. Furthermore, the detection invalidation unit 70c sets the shielding thresholds Tmsk2 and Tmsk3 when the brake pedal 12 is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold Tmsk1 when the brake pedal 12 is operated. Thus, the detection invalidation unit 70c sets the shielding thresholds Tmsk1, Tmsk2, and Tmsk3 based on the minimum values ​​Tb1, Tb2, and Tb3 of the regenerative torque Tks, which are set according to the operating state of the brake pedal 12 and whether the single-pedal mode is executed.

[0072] Furthermore, if the shielding threshold Tmsk (Tmsk1~Tmsk3) is too large, it is possible to miss the detection of acceleration hazard anomalies, such as those occurring but not being detected. Regarding this, as mentioned above, by setting the shielding threshold Tmsk according to the operating state of the brake pedal 12 and whether a single-pedal mode is being executed, the shielding threshold Tmsk can be set appropriately.

[0073] Furthermore, when the brake pedal 12 is operated, the brake ECU 80 calculates the regenerative torque Tks and sends it to the control unit 100. When the brake switch 44 is ON, the vehicle control unit 50 sets the target torque to the regenerative torque Tks. Therefore, when the brake pedal 12 is operated, the target torque is smaller compared to when the brake pedal 12 is not operated. Therefore, when the brake pedal 12 is operated, the area where abnormal deceleration should be detected should narrow towards the side with the smaller target torque.

[0074] Therefore, as Figure 5 As shown, the anomaly detection unit 70b sets the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec1 when the brake is on (ON) to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec2 when the brake is off (OFF) and the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec3 when the brake is off (OFF) and the single-pedal mode is off (OFF). The deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec1 when the brake is on (ON) is a value smaller than the regenerative torque Tks.

[0075] Furthermore, when the one-pedal mode is activated, the target torque is smaller compared to when it is not activated. Therefore, when the one-pedal mode is activated, the area of ​​target torque that should detect abnormal deceleration should narrow towards the side with the smaller target torque.

[0076] Therefore, the anomaly detection unit 70b sets the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec2 when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is on to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec3 when the brake is off and the single-pedal mode is off.

[0077] Furthermore, if the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec (Tdec1~Tdec3) is too small, it is possible to miss detection of deceleration anomalies, such as those that occur but are not detected. Regarding this, as mentioned above, by setting the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec according to the operating state of the brake pedal 12 and whether a single-pedal mode is being used, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec can be set appropriately.

[0078] Figure 9 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in calculating the target torque. This series of processes is repeatedly executed by the vehicle control unit 50 at a predetermined cycle (e.g., 10 [ms]).

[0079] First, the target torque Tv (S10) is calculated. Specifically, this is based on the acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, driving mode signal Mo, braking signal BS, and... Figure 4The target torque Tv of the rotating motor 20 is calculated using the target torque diagram M1. The target torque Tv is then subjected to a gradual change process, and the target torque Tv after the gradual change process is calculated (S11).

[0080] Next, it is determined whether there is a requirement for regenerative torque Tks from the braking ECU 80 (S12). If the requirement for regenerative torque Tks is determined to be yes (S12: Yes), the target torque Tv is set to the regenerative torque Tks (S13). Conversely, if the requirement for regenerative torque Tks is determined not to be yes (S12: No), the process proceeds to S14. The target torque Tv is corrected based on various protection requirements (S14). For example, the target torque Tv is corrected to protect the rotating motor 20, inverter 30, and battery 31. The corrected target torque Tv is output to the MG control unit 60 and the monitoring unit 70. Afterwards, this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0081] Figure 10 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps for accelerating the detection of dangerous anomalies. This series of processes is repeatedly executed by the monitoring unit 70 at a predetermined cycle (e.g., 10 [ms]).

[0082] First, the monitoring torque Tvr (S20) is calculated. Specifically, this is based on the acceleration operation amount Acc, vehicle speed Vs, driving mode signal Mo, braking signal BS, and other parameters. Figure 4 Using the same monitoring torque diagram M2, calculate the monitoring torque Tvr of the rotating motor 20. Perform a gradual change or a simplified gradual change on the monitoring torque Tvr, and calculate the monitored torque Tvr after the gradual change. Calculate the deviation ΔT (ΔT=Tv-Tvr) between the target torque Tv after the gradual change and the monitored torque Tvr after the gradual change (S21).

[0083] Next, it is determined whether the target torque Tv after the gradual change is greater than the shielding threshold Tmsk (S22). (Refer to...) Figures 6-8 As explained, the shielding threshold Tmsk is achieved through... Figure 11 The calculation is performed using the steps outlined in the flowchart. Figure 11 A series of processes are repeatedly executed by the detection invalidation unit 70c at a predetermined cycle (e.g., 10 [ms]). Figure 11As shown, it is determined whether the brake switch 44 is ON (S30). If the brake switch 44 is ON (S30: Yes), the shielding threshold Tmsk = Tb1 + ΔTp is set. If the brake switch 44 is NOT ON (S30: No), it is determined whether the one-pedal mode is ON (S32). If the one-pedal mode is ON (S32: Yes), the shielding threshold Tmsk = Tb2 + ΔTp is set. If the one-pedal mode is NOT ON (S32: No), the shielding threshold Tmsk = Tb3 + ΔTp is set. After that, this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0084] return Figure 10 If the target torque Tv after the gradual change is determined to be greater than the shielding threshold Tmsk (S22: Yes), it is determined whether the aforementioned deviation ΔT of the torque is greater than the deviation threshold α (S23). The deviation threshold α is, for example, the torque of the rotary motor 20 required to accelerate the vehicle 10 at an acceleration of 0.1 [G]. In this determination, if the aforementioned deviation ΔT of the torque is determined to be greater than the deviation threshold α (S23: Yes), the failure counter Cfa is incremented (Cfa←Cfa+1) (S24).

[0085] Next, it is determined whether the failure counter Cfa is greater than the counting threshold Cfr1 (S25). The counting threshold Cfr1 is, for example, a count value equivalent to 1 [s]. In this determination, if the failure counter Cfa is determined to be greater than the counting threshold Cfr1 (S25: Yes), the failure flag XFMG is set to 1 (S26). The initial value of the failure flag XFMG is 0. With the failure flag XFMG=1, the monitoring unit 70 sends a safety fault signal Sfs to the MG control unit 60. After that, this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0086] Furthermore, in the determination of S22, if the target torque Tv after the gradual change is determined to be no greater than the shielding threshold Tmsk (S22: No), the failure counter Cfa is set to 0 (S27). That is, the processing of S23 to S26, which detects acceleration hazard anomalies, is not performed (invalidated). After that, this series of processes is temporarily terminated. In addition, in the determination of S23, if the above-mentioned deviation ΔT of the torque is determined to be no greater than the deviation threshold α (S23: No), and in the determination of S25, if the failure counter Cfa is determined to be no greater than the counting threshold Cfr1 (S25: No), this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0087] Furthermore, the processing of S20 is equivalent to the processing of the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a, the processing of S21, S23 to S26 is equivalent to the processing of the abnormality detection unit 70b, and the processing of S22 and S27 is equivalent to the processing of the detection invalidation unit 70c.

[0088] Figure 12 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in detecting deceleration hazards. This series of processes is repeatedly executed by the monitoring unit 70 at a predetermined interval (e.g., 10 [ms]).

[0089] First, determine whether the target torque Tv after the gradual change is below the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec (S40). (Refer to...) Figure 5 As explained, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec passes Figure 13 The calculation is performed using the steps outlined in the flowchart. Figure 13 A series of processes are repeatedly executed by the anomaly detection unit 70b at a predetermined cycle (e.g., 10 [ms]). Figure 13 As shown, it is determined whether the brake switch 44 is ON (S50). If the brake switch 44 is ON (S50: Yes), the deceleration abnormality threshold Tdec is set to Tdec1 (S51). If the brake switch 44 is NOT ON (S50: No), it is determined whether the one-pedal mode is ON (S52). If the one-pedal mode is ON (S52: Yes), the deceleration abnormality threshold Tdec is set to Tdec2. If the one-pedal mode is NOT ON (S52: No), the deceleration abnormality threshold Tdec is set to Tdec3. After that, this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0090] return Figure 12 If the target torque Tv after the gradual change is determined to be below the deceleration abnormal threshold Tdec (S40: Yes), the failure counter Cfd is incremented (Cfd←Cfd+1) (S41).

[0091] Next, it is determined whether the failure counter Cfd is greater than the counting threshold Cfr2 (S42). The counting threshold Cfr2 is, for example, a count value equivalent to 1 [s]. In this determination, if it is determined that the failure counter Cfd is greater than the counting threshold Cfr2 (S42: Yes), the failure flag XFMG is set to 1 (S43). The initial value of the failure flag XFMG is 0. With the failure flag XFMG=1 as a condition, the monitoring unit 70 sends a safety fault signal Sfs to the MG control unit 60. After that, this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0092] Furthermore, in the determination of S40, if the target torque Tv after the gradual change is determined to be not below the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec (S40: No), the failure counter Cfd is set to 0 (S44). Then, this series of processes is temporarily terminated. Additionally, in the determination of S42, if the failure counter Cfd is determined to be not greater than the counting threshold Cfr2 (S42: No), this series of processes is temporarily terminated.

[0093] Figure 14 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in fail-safe procedures. This series of procedures is repeatedly executed by the MG control unit 60 at a predetermined cycle (e.g., 10 [ms]).

[0094] First, it is determined whether the failure flag XFMG=1 (S60). Specifically, it is determined whether a fail-safe signal Sfs has been received from the monitoring unit 70. If the failure flag XFMG=1 is determined (S60: Yes), zero-torque control is executed (S61). Zero-torque control is a control that is executed even if the failure flag XFMG=1, while still being able to control the torque generated by the rotary motor 20, and it is a control that gradually brings the torque generated by the rotary motor 20 closer to 0.

[0095] Next, it is determined whether a microcomputer malfunction or a battery overcharge malfunction has occurred (S62). A microcomputer malfunction is, for example, an abnormality in which the torque generated by the rotary motor 20 cannot be controlled by the control device 100. A battery overcharge malfunction is an abnormality in which the battery 31 is overcharged. In this determination, if it is determined that a microcomputer malfunction or a battery overcharge malfunction has occurred (S62: Yes), the system main relay SMR is deactivated (OFF) (S63). The system main relay SMR (not shown) is a relay that switches the supply and disconnection of power from the battery 31 to the system.

[0096] In addition, if the decision in S60 is that the failure flag XFMG=1 is not true (S60: No), and if the decision in S62 is negative (S62: No), the series of processes will be temporarily terminated.

[0097] The implementation method described above has the following advantages.

[0098] The vehicle control unit 50 calculates the target torque Tv, including the regenerative torque Tks (calculated by the brake ECU 80 based on the braking operation amount Bp) from the acceleration operation amount Acc of the accelerator pedal 11 and the operating state of the brake pedal 12. Therefore, the larger the acceleration operation amount Acc of the accelerator pedal 11, the larger the target torque Tv (towards vehicle acceleration); conversely, if the brake pedal 12 is operated, the smaller the target torque Tv (towards vehicle deceleration through regenerative power generation). The monitoring torque calculation unit 70a calculates the monitoring torque Tvr used when monitoring the target torque Tv, based on the acceleration operation amount Acc of the accelerator pedal 11 and the operating state of the brake pedal 12. Therefore, the monitoring torque Tvr is calculated in the same way as the target torque Tv. The anomaly detection unit 70b detects an acceleration hazard anomaly when the target torque Tv calculated by the vehicle control unit 50 is significantly larger than the monitoring torque Tvr calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a (ΔT > α) by a predetermined amount. Therefore, for example, if an malfunction occurs in the vehicle control unit 50 and the target torque Tv increases beyond the driver's intention in driving the vehicle 10, an acceleration hazard can be detected. Furthermore, due to malfunctions, open circuits / short circuits in the acceleration sensor 40, vehicle speed sensor 41, and driving mode switch 43, the target torque Tv may sometimes increase beyond the driver's intention in driving the vehicle 10.

[0099] • The detection invalidation unit 70c invalidates the acceleration hazard anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit 70b when the target torque Tv is below the shielding threshold Tmsk. Therefore, when the target torque Tv is below the shielding threshold Tmsk and there is no need to perform acceleration hazard anomaly detection, false detection of acceleration hazard anomalies can be suppressed.

[0100] The detection invalidation unit 70c sets the shielding thresholds Tmsk2 and Tmsk3 when the brake pedal 12 is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold Tmsk1 when the brake pedal 12 is operated. Therefore, the shielding threshold Tmsk can be easily and appropriately set according to whether the brake pedal 12 is operated or not. Therefore, when the rotating motor 20 is performing regenerative power generation, false detection of acceleration hazard anomalies (control anomalies) can be suppressed, and missed detection of acceleration hazard anomalies can be suppressed.

[0101] The detection invalidation unit 70c sets the shielding threshold Tmsk3 when the single-pedal mode is not executed to be larger than the shielding threshold Tmsk2 when the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the shielding threshold Tmsk can be easily and appropriately set depending on whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Thus, when the single-pedal mode can be executed, false detections of acceleration hazard anomalies can be suppressed, and missed detections of acceleration hazard anomalies can be suppressed.

[0102] The detection invalidation unit 70c sets shielding thresholds Tmsk1, Tmsk2, and Tmsk3 based on the minimum values ​​Tb1, Tb2, and Tb3 of the regenerative torque Tks, which are set according to the operating state of the brake pedal 12 and whether the single-pedal mode is executed. Therefore, the shielding threshold Tmsk can be easily and appropriately set according to the change of the regenerative torque Tks.

[0103] • The anomaly detection unit 70b detects a deceleration hazard when the target torque Tv calculated by the vehicle control unit 50 is below the deceleration anomaly threshold. Therefore, for example, if an anomaly occurs in the vehicle control unit 50 and the target torque Tv decreases beyond what the driver of the vehicle 10 intends, a deceleration hazard can be detected.

[0104] The anomaly detection unit 70b sets the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec1 when the brake pedal 12 is operated to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly thresholds Tdec2 and Tdec3 when the brake pedal 12 is not operated. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec can be easily and appropriately set depending on whether the brake pedal 12 is operated. Thus, in the case of detecting a deceleration hazard (control anomaly), false detection of the deceleration hazard (control anomaly) can be suppressed, and missed detection of the deceleration hazard can be suppressed.

[0105] The anomaly detection unit 70b sets the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec2 when the one-pedal mode is executed to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec3 when the one-pedal mode is not executed. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec can be easily and appropriately set depending on whether the one-pedal mode is executed. Thus, when the one-pedal mode can be executed, false detection of deceleration hazard anomalies (control anomalies) can be suppressed, and missed detection of deceleration hazard anomalies can be suppressed.

[0106] • The anomaly detection unit 70b sets the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec based on the operating state of the brake pedal 12 and whether the single-pedal mode is activated. Therefore, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec can be easily and appropriately set according to the change in regenerative torque Tks.

[0107] Furthermore, the above embodiments can also be implemented by modifying them as follows. For parts that are the same as those described above, descriptions are omitted by using the same reference numerals.

[0108] It can also be used to Figure 11 The processing of S30 and Figure 13 The processing of S50 has been changed to determine whether the braking operation amount Bp detected by the brake sensor 45 is greater than the operation amount threshold Bpr. The operation amount threshold Bpr is the amount of operation that can determine when the brake pedal 12 is pressed.

[0109] • The anomaly detection unit 70b can also determine that the target torque Tv is significantly larger than the monitored torque Tvr by a specified degree based on the ratio of the target torque Tv to the monitored torque Tvr.

[0110] • The detection invalidation unit 70c can also set the shielding threshold Tmsk based solely on the operating state of the brake pedal 12, or solely based on whether a single-pedal mode is executed.

[0111] The anomaly detection unit 70b can also set the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec based solely on the operating state of the brake pedal 12, or solely on whether a one-pedal mode is being used. Alternatively, the deceleration anomaly threshold Tdec can be set to a constant value regardless of the operating state of the brake pedal 12 or whether a one-pedal mode is being used.

[0112] • The single-pedal mode can also be omitted.

[0113] ·exist Figure 10 In the determination of S22, if the target torque Tv after the gradual change is determined to be no greater than the shielding threshold Tmsk (S22: No), even if the failure flag XFMG=1, the fault safety signal Sfs can be ignored. That is, as a way to invalidate the detection of acceleration hazard anomaly performed by the anomaly detection unit 70b when the target torque Tv is below the shielding threshold Tmsk, the detection result of acceleration hazard anomaly can also be ignored.

[0114] The vehicle control unit 50 and the monitoring torque calculation unit 70a can also receive the regenerative torque Tks from the brake ECU 80 instead of the brake ECU 80, and calculate the regenerative torque Tks as the target torque Tv and the monitoring torque Tvr based on the braking operation amount Bp detected by the brake sensor 45.

[0115] It can also omit the gradual processing for the target torque and the monitored torque.

[0116] The control device 100 and method described in this disclosure can also be implemented using a dedicated computer, which is provided by a processor and memory programmed to execute one or more functions (commands) embodied in a computer program. Alternatively, the control device 100 and method described in this disclosure can also be implemented using a dedicated computer provided by a processor composed of one or more dedicated hardware logic circuits. Alternatively, the control device 100 and method described in this disclosure can also be implemented using one or more dedicated computers composed of a combination of a processor and memory programmed to execute one or more functions and a processor composed of one or more hardware logic circuits. Furthermore, the computer program can also be stored as instructions executed by the computer on a computer-readable non-transitional tangible recording medium.

[0117] Furthermore, the above-described embodiments and their variations can be combined within a range of possible combinations for execution.

[0118] This disclosure is based on embodiments, but it should be understood that this disclosure is not limited to those embodiments or constructions. This disclosure also includes various modifications and equivalent variations. In addition, various combinations and methods, and further combinations and methods that include only one element, or more or less thereof, also fall within the scope and spirit of this disclosure.

Claims

1. A control device (100) for a rotary electric motor, applied to a vehicle (10) having an acceleration operation component (11), a braking operation component (12), and a rotary electric motor (20) capable of transmitting power to drive wheels (24), the control device for the rotary electric motor being characterized in that, have: The target torque calculation unit (50) calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque based on the regenerative power generation of the rotating motor, based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component. The monitoring torque calculation unit (70a) calculates the monitoring torque used in monitoring the target torque based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component. The anomaly detection unit (70b) detects an acceleration anomaly when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is significantly larger than the monitoring torque calculated by the monitoring torque calculation unit by a predetermined amount. as well as The detection invalidation unit (70c) invalidates the acceleration anomaly detection performed by the anomaly detection unit when the target torque is below the shielding threshold, and sets the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is not operated to be larger than the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is operated.

2. The control device for a rotating electric motor as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The vehicle is capable of performing a one-pedal mode that accelerates and decelerates the vehicle based on the operation of the acceleration control component. The target torque calculation unit also calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque, based on whether or not the single-pedal mode is executed. The detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold when the single-pedal mode is not executed to be larger than the shielding threshold when the single-pedal mode is executed.

3. The control device for a rotating electric motor as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The detection invalidation unit sets the shielding threshold based on the regenerative torque set according to the operating state of the braking operation component and whether the single-pedal mode is executed.

4. The control device for a rotating electric motor as described in any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, The anomaly detection unit detects a deceleration anomaly when the target torque calculated by the target torque calculation unit is below the deceleration anomaly threshold, and sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is operated to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the braking operation component is not operated.

5. The control device for a rotating electric motor as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The vehicle is capable of performing a one-pedal mode that accelerates and decelerates the vehicle based on the operation of the acceleration control component. The target torque calculation unit also calculates the target torque, including the regenerative torque, based on whether or not the single-pedal mode is executed. The anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold when the single-pedal mode is executed to be smaller than the deceleration anomaly threshold when the single-pedal mode is not executed.

6. The control device for a rotating electric motor as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The anomaly detection unit sets the deceleration anomaly threshold based on the operating state of the braking operation component and whether the single-pedal mode is executed.

7. A control program applied to a vehicle having an acceleration control component, a braking control component, and a rotating electric motor capable of transmitting power to the drive wheels, the control program being characterized in that... The computer will perform the following processing: Based on the operation amount of the acceleration operation component and the operation state of the braking operation component, a target torque, including the regenerative torque based on the regenerative power generation of the rotating motor, is calculated. Based on the operating amount of the acceleration operating component and the operating state of the braking operating component, the monitoring torque used in monitoring the target torque is calculated. If the calculated target torque is significantly larger than the calculated monitored torque by a predetermined amount, an acceleration anomaly is detected. as well as If the target torque is below the shielding threshold, the detection of the acceleration anomaly is invalidated, and the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is not operated is set to be larger than the shielding threshold when the braking operation component is operated.

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