Deception signal detection and mitigation
By using a network of multiple ranging circuits to perform cross-verification through a deception detection system, the problem of vehicle radar systems being susceptible to interference from deception signals is solved, ensuring the normal operation of vehicle safety functions.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-09-05
- Publication Date
- 2026-03-13
Smart Images
Figure CN121656982A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to systems and methods for detecting and mitigating deceptive signals. Background Technology
[0002] To enhance safety, some vehicles employ features such as obstacle detection, blind spot detection, and automatic braking to help avoid collisions and maintain driver attention. These vehicles achieve this by using onboard radar systems, which include transmitters configured to emit radar waveforms toward one or more obstacles in multiple directions. When the emitted waveforms reflect off the obstacle, the radar system's receiver measures the reflected parameters and determines the distance between the vehicle and the obstacle based on these measured parameters. Depending on this determined distance, the vehicle performs one or more of these functions by warning the driver of the obstacle, automatically braking the vehicle before a collision with the obstacle, maintaining a safe distance from the obstacle, or any combination thereof. Summary of the Invention
[0003] For example, one method includes:
[0004] The deception detection circuit estimates multiple positions of the target vehicle based on a first set of distance measurements received from a first ranging circuit and at least a second set of distance measurements received from a second ranging circuit; and
[0005] The spoofing detection circuit determines, based on the spatial or temporal consistency of the plurality of locations, that at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit has received a spoofing signal.
[0006] For example, the first set of distance measurements is received from a first location, and the second set of distance measurements is received from a second location different from the first location.
[0007] For example, both the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements are received from the first vehicle.
[0008] For example, the method further includes:
[0009] Select a predetermined number of distance measurements from each of the first and second sets of distance measurements.
[0010] For example, selecting the predetermined number of measurements from each of the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements includes: selecting the predetermined number of measurements based on a predetermined number of times randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time periods represented by the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements.
[0011] For example, the plurality of locations are estimated based on the predetermined number of measurements from the first set of distance measurements and the predetermined number of measurements from the second set of distance measurements.
[0012] For example, determining that the spoofing signal has been received includes:
[0013] Determine the path between a first location and a second location among the plurality of locations; and
[0014] Check the spatial consistency or temporal consistency of the path.
[0015] For example, the method further includes:
[0016] In response to determining that at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit has received the spoofing signal, the function of the vehicle associated with the at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit is disabled.
[0017] For example, a deception detection system includes:
[0018] One or more processors, said one or more processors being configured to:
[0019] Multiple positions of the target vehicle are estimated based on a first set of distance measurements received from a first ranging circuit and at least a second set of distance measurements received from a second ranging circuit; and
[0020] Based on the spatiotemporal consistency of the multiple locations, it is determined that at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit receives a spoofing signal.
[0021] For example, the one or more processors are configured to:
[0022] A request for measurement values indicating a time period is sent to the first ranging circuit and the second ranging circuit, wherein both the first set of distance measurement values and the second set of distance measurement values correspond to the time period.
[0023] For example, the one or more processors are configured to:
[0024] The request for the measurement value is sent based on a predetermined amount of time elapsed.
[0025] For example, the one or more processors are configured to:
[0026] The request for the measurement value is transmitted based on the vehicle associated with the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit being in a predetermined position.
[0027] For example, the one or more processors are configured to:
[0028] Select a predetermined number of distance measurements from each of the first and second sets of distance measurements.
[0029] For example, the one or more processors are configured to:
[0030] The predetermined number of measurements are selected based on a predetermined number of time periods randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time periods represented by the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements.
[0031] For example, the one or more processors are configured to estimate the plurality of locations based on the predetermined number of measurements from the first set of distance measurements and the predetermined number of measurements from the second set of distance measurements.
[0032] For example, the one or more processors are implemented in a vehicle.
[0033] For example, the one or more processors are implemented in one or more servers.
[0034] For example, a deception detection system includes:
[0035] A first ranging circuit, the first ranging circuit being configured to:
[0036] Transmit a first waveform based on a received request for a measurement value within an indicated time period; and
[0037] Based on the first waveform, a first set of distance measurements corresponding to the time period is determined; and a second ranging circuit is configured to:
[0038] A second waveform is transmitted based on a received request for a measurement indicating the time period, wherein the second waveform has a different start time than the first waveform; and
[0039] Based on the second waveform, a second set of distance measurements corresponding to the time period is determined.
[0040] For example, the first ranging circuit is installed on a first vehicle, and the second ranging circuit is installed on a second vehicle, which is different from the first vehicle.
[0041] For example, the first ranging circuit is disposed at a first position on the vehicle, and the second ranging circuit is disposed at a second position on the vehicle, wherein the first position is different from the second position. Attached Figure Description
[0042] This disclosure can be better understood by referring to the accompanying drawings, and many features and advantages of this disclosure will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The same reference numerals are used in different drawings to indicate similar or identical items.
[0043] Figure 1 This is a block diagram of a spoofing detection system configured to detect one or more emitted spoofing signals, according to some embodiments.
[0044] Figure 2 This is a diagram illustrating the measurement of reflection by a ranging circuit when a spoofing signal is received, according to some embodiments.
[0045] Figure 3 This is a block diagram of example operations for detecting spoofing signals according to some embodiments.
[0046] Figures 4 to 6 These are block diagrams illustrating corresponding example configurations of a deception detection system according to some embodiments.
[0047] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of an example method for detecting spoofing signals according to some embodiments. Detailed Implementation
[0048] For example, some vehicle implementations, such as automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, SUVs, autonomous vehicles, drones, robotic platforms, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), include one or more ranging circuits configured to detect the position of one or more target vehicles. For instance, a vehicle may include one or more ranging circuits configured to detect the position of a target vehicle traveling on the same road as the vehicle. To detect the position of the target vehicle, each ranging circuit is configured to transmit a waveform, such as a series of chirps (e.g., radar chirps or LiDAR chirps), based on one or more parameters including, for example, one or more start times, frequencies, directions, time periods, etc. When the transmitted waveform is reflected from the target vehicle, the ranging circuit measures the reflected parameters and determines one or more distance measurements based on the transmitted waveform, the measured reflected parameters, or both. These distance measurements may indicate, for example, the distance between the target vehicle and the ranging circuit, the angle of the target vehicle relative to the ranging circuit, the speed of the target vehicle, or any combination thereof. After determining such distance measurements, the vehicle's processing system uses the determined distance measurements to implement one or more vehicle functions, such as cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management, etc.
[0049] However, some platforms include systems configured to transmit spoofing signals that prevent ranging circuits from determining the location of a target vehicle. These platforms include, for example, one or more mobile systems (e.g., those in a vehicle), stationary systems, or both. As used herein, such a platform transmitting spoofing signals is referred to herein as an “attacker.” As an example, some attackers include spoofing circuits that listen to waveforms transmitted by a vehicle’s ranging circuits. Based on the received waveform, the spoofing circuit determines parameters of the waveform transmitted by the ranging circuit and generates a spoofing signal based on the determined parameters. For example, the spoofing circuit alters one or more determined parameters of the waveform, such as phase, time period, time, etc., to generate the spoofing signal. The spoofing circuit then transmits the spoofing signal to the vehicle’s ranging circuit. Because the attacker’s spoofing circuit transmits the spoofing signal to the vehicle’s ranging circuit, the ranging circuit receives both the reflection of the transmitted waveform and the spoofing signal, causing the ranging circuit to measure parameters of the waveform formed by the combination of the reflection and the spoofing signal (e.g., the spoofing waveform), rather than just measuring the received reflection. Based on the measured parameters of this deceptive waveform, the ranging circuit determines a distance measurement indicating the attacker's deceptive location. This prevents the vehicle's processing system from determining the attacker's actual location and from accurately performing one or more functions of the vehicle.
[0050] Therefore, the systems and techniques disclosed herein relate to the detection and mitigation of received spoofing signals. For example, a spoofing detection system includes a spoofing detection circuit communicatively coupled to a group of ranging circuits via a wired or wireless connection. As an example, a spoofing detection system includes a spoofing detection circuit implemented in a vehicle communicatively coupled to the group of ranging circuits. As another example, a spoofing detection system includes a spoofing detection circuit system implemented by one or more servers communicatively coupled to the group of ranging circuits via a wireless network (e.g., a wide area network, a cellular network). The group of ranging circuits includes, for example, two or more ranging circuits each located at different locations. For example, the group of ranging circuits includes two or more randomly or pseudo-randomly selected ranging circuits located at different locations on the same vehicle, on different vehicles, or both. To detect that a vehicle's ranging circuit has received a spoofing signal, the spoofing detection circuit requests a determined distance measurement from each ranging circuit in the group of ranging circuits over a period of time. For example, based on one or more triggering events, such as the vehicle's processing system launching an application, the vehicle's processing system performing a vehicle function, a predetermined amount of time elapsed, the vehicle being in a certain location, or any combination thereof, the spoofing detection circuit provides a request for measurement values to each ranging circuit in the ranging circuit group. This request for measurement values may include, for example, requesting data for distance measurements to be determined during a certain time period.
[0051] Based on a request for measurement values received from the spoofing detection circuit, each ranging circuit in the ranging circuit group provides data representing distance measurements determined within the time period indicated in the request for measurement values to the spoofing detection circuit. As an example, based on receiving the request for measurement values, each ranging circuit in the ranging circuit group begins measuring parameters of the received reflections within the time period indicated in the request for measurement values. Based on the measured parameters, each ranging circuit determines a corresponding distance measurement value and provides data representing these distance measurements to the spoofing detection circuit via a wired or wireless connection. After receiving a corresponding set of distance measurements from each ranging circuit in the group, the spoofing detection circuit selects a predetermined number of measurements from each set of distance measurements. As an example, the spoofing detection circuit first selects multiple times within the time period indicated by the request for measurement values. Then, the spoofing detection circuit selects distance measurements from each set of distance measurements corresponding to the selected times.
[0052] Using selected distance measurements, the spoofing detection circuit is configured to estimate the position of the target vehicle at selected times. That is, the spoofing detection circuit determines two or more estimated positions of the target vehicle, each estimated position corresponding to a selected time. To this end, for each selected time with selected distance measurements, the spoofing detection circuit determines the position of the target vehicle based on the selected distance measurements from each ranging circuit corresponding to that time. For example, for each selected time and using one or more equations, the spoofing detection circuit triangulates the position of the target vehicle based on the selected distance measurements from three ranging circuits at the corresponding time. After determining two or more estimated positions of the target vehicle at different times, the spoofing detection circuit estimates the path of the target vehicle. For example, based on determining four estimated positions of the target vehicle at different times, the spoofing detection circuit estimates a first branch of the path between a first estimated position (e.g., a first position in time) and a second estimated position (e.g., a second position in time), a second branch of the path between the second and third estimated positions (e.g., a third position in time), and a third branch of the path between the third and fourth estimated positions (e.g., a fourth position in time). Each of these branches of the path represents, for example, the speed at which the target vehicle moves, the direction in which the target vehicle moves, or both.
[0053] Based on the estimated position, estimated path, or both of each target vehicle at different times, the deception detection circuit then checks for spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both of the estimated position, estimated path, or both. That is, the deception detection circuit determines whether the estimated position, estimated path, or both of the target vehicle is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both of the movement or position of a moving vehicle. As an example, the deception detection circuit compares the estimated path of the target vehicle with one or more predetermined paths to determine whether the estimated path exhibits spatial or temporal consistency with a moving vehicle. Based on the estimated path deviating from one or more predetermined paths by a predetermined degree, the deception detection circuit determines that the estimated path does not exhibit spatial, temporal, or both of consistency with a moving vehicle. As another example, the deception detection circuit compares the estimated position of the target vehicle with one or more predetermined positions to determine whether the estimated position exhibits spatial or temporal consistency with a moving vehicle. Based on one or more estimated positions matching one or more of certain predetermined positions, such as the median of off-road positions (e.g., positions adjacent to, above, or below a road), areas between road lanes, or any combination thereof, the deception detection circuit determines that the estimated position does not exhibit spatial, temporal, or both of consistency with a moving vehicle.
[0054] In response to determining that the estimated path, estimated location, or both of the target vehicle do not exhibit spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both with a moving vehicle, the spoofing detection circuit determines that a spoofing signal has been received by one or more ranging circuits in a ranging circuit group. Based on the determination that the spoofing signal has been received by one or more ranging circuits in the ranging circuit group, the spoofing detection system is configured to take one or more spoofing mitigation actions, such as providing an alert to one or more vehicles including the ranging circuits determined to have received the spoofing signal, providing an alert to one or more authorities, instructing the processing systems of one or more vehicles to disable one or more functions, instructing the processing systems of one or more vehicles to terminate one or more applications, or any combination thereof. As an example, based on the determination that the spoofing signal has been received by one or more ranging circuits in the ranging circuit group, the spoofing detection system disables cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management, or any combination thereof for the vehicle including the ranging circuits in the ranging circuit group. In this way, the spoofing detection system is configured to detect and mitigate spoofing signals emitted by one or more attackers, which helps prevent such spoofing signals from interfering with certain functions of the vehicle and helps improve vehicle safety.
[0055] Now for reference Figure 1This paper presents a spoofing detection system 100 for detecting one or more emitted spoofing signals according to some embodiments. In one embodiment, the spoofing detection system 100 includes a ranging circuit group 102 comprising ranging circuits 104, each ranging circuit 104 configured to emit a waveform 110 (e.g., radar waveform, LiDAR waveform) toward a target vehicle 114 and measure the reflection of the received emitted waveform 110. Such target vehicles 114 include, for example, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, SUVs, autonomous vehicles, drones, robotic platforms, UAVs, etc. In one embodiment, each ranging circuit 104 of the ranging circuit group 102 is located at a different location than each other ranging circuit 104 of the ranging circuit group 102. As an example, in one embodiment, the ranging circuit group 102 includes two or more ranging circuits 104 located at different locations on the same vehicle, on different vehicles, or both. Such vehicles include, for example, one or more automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, SUVs, autonomous vehicles, drones, robotic platforms, UAVs, etc. Furthermore, according to some embodiments, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to randomly select, pseudo-randomly select, or both of two or more ranging circuits 104 to form a ranging circuit group 102. That is, the spoofing detection circuit 120 randomly selects, pseudo-randomly selects, or both of two or more ranging circuits 104 respectively located at different positions on the same vehicle, on different vehicles, or both, to form a ranging circuit group 102. Although Figure 1 The example embodiment presented shows that the ranging circuit group 102 includes three ranging circuits (104-1, 104-2, 104-N), representing N integer ranging circuits (where N≥1), but in other embodiments, the ranging circuit group 102 may include any non-zero integer ranging circuits 104.
[0056] Each of these ranging circuits 104 includes, for example, one or more processors, microprocessors, microcontrollers, programmable logic devices, memories, storage devices, transmitters 106, receivers 108, antenna elements, or any combination thereof. In an embodiment, each ranging circuit 104 includes a corresponding transmitter 106, which includes one or more antenna elements (e.g., radar antenna elements, LiDAR antenna elements) that transmit a corresponding waveform 110 (e.g., continuous wave frequency modulation (CWFM) waveform, linear frequency modulation (LFMW) waveform, LiDAR waveform, etc.). As an example, transmitter 106 is configured to transmit a CWFM waveform comprising one or more frames to be transmitted. Each of these frames includes one or more chirps to be transmitted and a processing time in which no chirps are transmitted. As another example, transmitter 106 is configured to transmit a LiDAR waveform comprising one or more wavelengths of light. Furthermore, the waveform 110 transmitted by transmitter 106 is defined by one or more parameters, such as chirp duration, start time, bandwidth, number of chirps, etc. According to some embodiments, each ranging circuit 104 is configured to transmit a waveform 110 having parameters different from those transmitted by one or more other ranging circuits 104. As an example, each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102 is configured to transmit a waveform 110 having a corresponding start time (e.g., chirp start time) different from those transmitted by each other ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102.
[0057] After the transmitter 106 of the ranging circuit 104 has transmitted waveform 110, the receiver 108 of the same ranging circuit 104 is configured to measure parameters of the reflection of the transmitted waveform 110 received by one or more antenna elements (e.g., radar antenna elements, LiDAR antenna elements) of the receiver 108. As an example, the receiver 108 is configured to measure parameters of the reflection of the transmitted waveform 110 from the target vehicle 114. These parameters of the reflection of the transmitted waveform 110 represent, for example, the amplitude, angle, or both of the reflection received at a corresponding time. As another example, the receiver 108 is configured to measure the reflection of the transmitted LiDAR waveform, as a discrete return or a waveform return. According to some embodiments, the ranging circuit 104 is configured to determine the position of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104 based on the measured parameters of the received reflections. In other words, the ranging circuit 104 is configured to determine a distance measurement value 112 based on measured parameters of the received reflections, the distance measurement value 112 representing the distance between the ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. For example, the ranging circuit 104 is configured to perform one or more operations (e.g., Fourier transform, addition, subtraction) using the transmitted waveform and the measured parameters of the received reflections to determine a ranging data cube representing the position of the target vehicle 114 in three-dimensional space. Such a ranging data cube indicates the distance between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104, the Doppler shift of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, etc. Using the ranging data cube, the ranging circuit 104 then determines the distance measurement value 112 representing the distance between the ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114. After determining the distance measurement value 112, the vehicle's processing system uses the distance measurement value 112 for certain functions, such as cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management, etc.
[0058] However, in embodiments, one or more mobile platforms, fixed platforms, or both (e.g., an attacker) include spoofing circuitry 116, which includes one or more processors, microprocessors, microcontrollers, memories, storage devices, transmitters, receivers, or any combination thereof configured to generate spoofing signals 118. Figure 1In the example embodiment presented, an attacker configured to generate spoofing signal 118 operates within target vehicle 114. According to the embodiment, to generate spoofing signal 118, the attacker's spoofing circuit 116 is configured to measure parameters of a received waveform 110 transmitted from ranging circuit 104, such as the angle and amplitude of the received waveform 110 at corresponding times. Based on these measurements, spoofing circuit 116 then estimates parameters of the transmitted waveform 110 (e.g., amplitude, frequency, time period, phase) and generates spoofing signal 118 by modifying the estimated waveform 110. For example, after determining one or more parameters of the transmitted waveform 110, spoofing circuit 116 modifies the phase of the transmitted waveform 110 by introducing a phase shift to generate spoofing signal 118. As another example, spoofing circuit 116 modifies the frequency of the transmitted waveform 110 to generate spoofing signal 118. Spoofing circuit 116 then transmits spoofing signal 118, causing ranging circuit 104, which transmitted waveform 110, to receive spoofing signal 118. Because the deception circuit 116 emits a deception signal 118, the receiver 108 of the ranging circuit 104 receives both the reflection of waveform 110 and the deception signal 118, causing the ranging circuit 104 to measure the combination of the reflection of waveform 110 and the deception signal 118, rather than just the reflection of waveform 110. The ranging circuit 104 then uses the measurement of the combination of the reflection of waveform 110 and the deception signal 118 to determine the distance measurement 112, thus hindering the ranging circuit 104 from determining the actual position of the target vehicle 114 (e.g., determining the actual distance measurement 112). For example, due to the deception signal 118, the ranging circuit 104 determines a ghost position at a point different from the target vehicle 114 instead of the actual position of the target vehicle 114. Because the ranging circuit 104 determines this ghost position instead of the actual position of the target vehicle 114, the vehicle's processing system cannot accurately determine the distance measurement 112 or perform certain functions (e.g., cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management), which compromises vehicle safety.
[0059] To aid in detecting these spoofing signals 118, the spoofing detection system 100 includes a spoofing detection circuit 120 having one or more processors, microprocessors, microcontrollers, programmable logic devices, memories, storage devices, or any combination thereof configured to detect spoofing signals 118 based on distance measurements 112 taken by each ranging circuit 104 within the ranging circuit group 102. For example, in embodiments, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is communicatively coupled to each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102 using one or more wired communication protocols (e.g., Ethernet, Universal Serial Bus (USB), Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), Internal Integrated Circuit (I2C), Universal Asynchronous Receiver / Transmitter (UART)), wireless communication protocols (e.g., cellular protocols, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X)), or both. As an example, in some embodiments, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is implemented by one or more servers communicatively coupled to each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102 via one or more wireless communication protocols. As another example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is implemented in a vehicle that includes one or more ranging circuits 104 in a ranging circuit group 102. Based on the implementation of the spoofing detection circuit 120 in such a vehicle, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is communicatively coupled to the ranging circuits 104 of the vehicle via one or more wired communication protocols, wireless communication protocols, or both, and is coupled to each other to the ranging circuits 104 of the ranging circuit group 102 via one or more wireless communication protocols.
[0060] To detect that one or more ranging circuits 104 in the ranging circuit group 102 have received a spoof signal 118, the spoofing detection circuit 120 first sends a request 126 for a measurement value to each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102. The request 126 includes data indicating a time period for which the requested distance to the measurement value 112 is to be measured. This time period indicated by the request 126 for the measurement value is identified, for example, a start time, an end time, a time quantity (e.g., a time quantity defined by microseconds, milliseconds, seconds, minutes, or any fraction thereof), or any combination thereof. According to some embodiments, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to send the request 126 for the measurement value to each ranging circuit 104 based on one or more triggering events that occur. Such triggering events include, for example, one or more vehicle processing systems launching an application, one or more vehicle processing systems performing a function, a predetermined time quantity elapsed, one or more vehicles being in certain locations, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the time period indicated by the request 126 for the measurement value is based on the triggering event that occurs. For example, when a function is performed based on the processing system of one or more vehicles, the spoofing detection circuit 120 sends a request 126 for a measurement value, the request 126 indicating a time period corresponding to the function. As another example, when an application is launched based on the processing system of one or more vehicles, the spoofing detection circuit 120 sends a request 126 for a measurement value, the request 126 corresponding to a time period of the application.
[0061] Based on the received request 126 for measurement values, the ranging circuit 104 is configured to transmit a distance measurement value 112 determined during the time period indicated in the request 126. For example, in response to the received request 126, the ranging circuit 104 begins transmitting waveform 110 and measures parameters of the reflection of the transmitted waveform 110 during the time period indicated by the request 126. Based on these measured reflection parameters, the ranging circuit 104 determines distance measurement values 112, each distance measurement value 112 representing the distance between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 at a corresponding time within the time period indicated by the request 126. For example, based on the transmitted waveform 110 and the reflection parameters measured at the corresponding time, the ranging circuit 104 determines ranging data cubes, each ranging data cube indicating the distance between the ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle at the corresponding time (e.g., distance measurement value 112). After determining these distance measurements 112, the ranging circuit 104 then transmits a set of distance measurements 112 to the deception detection circuit 120, each distance measurement 112 representing the distance between the ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114 at a corresponding time within a time period indicated by the request for measurement 126.
[0062] After receiving a set of distance measurements 112 from each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102, the spoofing detection circuit 120 selects one or more times within a time period indicated by the request for measurements 126. As an example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 randomly, pseudo-randomly, or both selects a predetermined number of times within the time period indicated by the request for measurements 126. The spoofing detection circuit 120 selects distance measurements 112 from each set of distance measurements 112 received from the ranging circuits 104 in the ranging circuit group 102, each distance measurement 112 corresponding to a selected time. Based on the distance measurements 112 selected from each received set of distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines the estimated position of the target vehicle 114 for each selected time. As an example, based on selecting a distance measurement value 112 from three sets of received distance measurements 112 (e.g., from each of the three ranging circuits 104), the spoofing detection circuit 120 triangulates the position of the target vehicle 114 at each selected time to generate an estimated position. As another example, based on selecting a distance measurement value 112 from two sets of received distance measurements 112 (each set representing the distance between the target vehicle 114 and the corresponding ranging circuit 104 and the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the corresponding ranging circuit 104 at the corresponding time), the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines the position of the target vehicle 114 at each selected time to generate an estimated position.
[0063] After determining the estimated location of the target vehicle 114, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated location. That is, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks whether the estimated location is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both consistent with a moving vehicle (e.g., a car, truck, motorcycle, SUV, autonomous vehicle, drone, robotic platform, UAV, or any combination thereof). For example, in some embodiments, the spoofing detection circuit 120 compares the estimated location with one or more predetermined locations to determine whether the estimated location is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both consistent with a moving vehicle. These predetermined locations include, for example, off-road locations (e.g., locations adjacent to, above, or below a road on which the vehicle including the ranging circuit 104 is traveling), medians, areas between road lanes, or any combination thereof. Based on one or more estimated locations that match one or more of these predetermined locations, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines, for example, whether the estimated location is spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both inconsistent with a moving vehicle.
[0064] As another example, to check the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated position, the deception detection circuit 120 determines the path taken by the target vehicle 114 during the time period indicated by the request for measurement 126 based on the estimated position of the target vehicle 114. To determine such a path, the deception detection circuit 120 determines the corresponding branches of the path based on each pair of corresponding estimated positions. For example, based on a first estimated position representing a first position in time (e.g., the first position in time within the time period indicated by the request for measurement 126) and a second estimated position representing a second position in time, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a first branch indicating the estimated direction, speed, or both of the target vehicle 114. Furthermore, based on the second estimated position and a third estimated position representing a third position in time, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a second branch indicating the estimated direction, speed, or both of the target vehicle 114. The deception detection circuit 120 then continues in this manner until a path between the estimated position and the final estimated position representing the last position in time is determined. After determining two or more branches of the path, the deception detection circuit 120 combines the determined branches to determine the estimated path of the target vehicle. The deception detection circuit 120 then compares the estimated path with one or more predetermined paths to check whether the estimated path is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both with the moving vehicle. Based on the estimated path deviating from one or more predetermined paths by a predetermined degree (e.g., a threshold degree), the deception detection circuit 120 determines that the estimated path and estimated location are spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both with the moving vehicle.
[0065] In response to determining that the estimated location, estimated path, or both are spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both with a moving vehicle, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines that one or more ranging circuits 104 of the ranging circuit group 102 have received a spoofing signal 118. Based on the determination that one or more ranging circuits 104 have received the spoofing signal 118, the spoofing detection circuit 120 performs one or more mitigation actions 128. These mitigation actions 128 include, for example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 providing an alert to one or more vehicles including ranging circuits 104 determined to have received the spoofing signal 118, providing an alert to one or more authorities, instructing the processing system of one or more vehicles to disable one or more functions, instructing the processing system of one or more vehicles to terminate one or more applications, or any combination thereof. As an example, based on the determination that one or more ranging circuits 104 have received the spoofing signal 118, the spoofing detection circuit 120 transmits one or more signals to the vehicle including the ranging circuit 104, each signal including data instructing the vehicle's processing system to disable cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management, or any combination thereof. As another example, based on the determination that one or more ranging circuits 104 have received a spoofing signal 118, the spoofing detection circuit 120 transmits one or more signals to one or more authorities (e.g., police, highway authorities) indicating that the spoofing signal 118 has been detected at a certain location. Thus, by including the spoofing detection circuit 120 in this manner, the spoofing detection system 100 is able to detect and mitigate spoofing signals 118 emitted by one or more attackers, helping to prevent such spoofing signals 118 from interfering with certain functions of the vehicle and helping to improve vehicle safety.
[0066] Now for reference Figure 2Example Figure 200 illustrates the measurement of reflection by a ranging circuit when a spoofing signal is received, according to an embodiment. According to some embodiments, Example Figure 200 shows the measurement of reflection by a first ranging circuit 104-1 (e.g., ranging circuit 0) and a second ranging circuit 104-2 (e.g., ranging circuit 1) when a spoofing signal 118 is received. For example, the first ranging circuit 104-1 is configured to transmit a first waveform 110-1 including, for example, multiple chirps. In an embodiment, the first ranging circuit 104-1 is configured to transmit the first waveform 110-1 such that the first waveform 110-1 has a first start time 234 (e.g., chirp start time). Furthermore, the first ranging circuit 104-1 is configured to receive the spoofing signal 118, which shares one or more parameters (e.g., time period, amplitude, frequency) with the first waveform 110-1 but has a second start time 236 different from the first start time 234 of the first waveform 110-1. In other words, the deception signal 118 includes a second start time 236 that differs from the first start time 234 of the first waveform 110-1, resulting in a phase shift 230 between the first waveform 110-1 and the deception signal 118. Due to this phase shift 230, the receiver 108 of the first ranging circuit 104-1 measures a first deception waveform 244-1 formed by the combination of the first waveform 110-1 and the deception signal 118, rather than simply measuring the reflection of the first waveform 110-1. As an example, the receiver 108 measures the first deception waveform 244-1, which has a start time 238 that differs from the start times 234 and 236 of both the first waveform 110-1 and the deception signal 118. In an embodiment, the first ranging circuit 104-1 determines a distance measurement 112 based on this first deception waveform 244-1, which results in the first ranging circuit 104-1 determining a distance measurement 112 that indicates the ghost position of the target vehicle 114 rather than its actual position.
[0067] Furthermore, the second ranging circuit 104-2 is configured to transmit a second waveform 110-2 such that the second waveform 110-2 shares one or more parameters with the first waveform 110-1 but has a third start time 240 different from the first start time 234. Like the first ranging circuit 104-1, the second ranging circuit 104-2 receives a spoofing signal 118 having a second start time 236 different from the third start time 240 of the second waveform 110-2. Because the spoofing signal 118 has a second start time 236 different from the third start time 240 of the second waveform 110-2, a phase shift 232 occurs between the second waveform 110 and the spoofing signal 118. Based on this phase shift 232, the receiver 108 of the second ranging circuit 104-2 measures the second spoofing waveform 244-2 formed by the combination of the second waveform 110-2 and the spoofing signal 118, rather than simply measuring the reflection of the second waveform 110-2. As an example, receiver 108 measures a second spoof waveform 244-2, which has a start time 242 that differs from the start times 240 and 236 of both the second waveform 110-1 and the spoof signal 118. Then, the second ranging circuit 104-2 determines a distance measurement value 112 based on this second spoof waveform 244-2. This causes the second ranging circuit 104-1 to also determine a distance measurement value 112 that indicates the ghost position of the target vehicle 114 rather than its actual position.
[0068] Now for reference Figure 3 This document presents example operation 300 for spoofing signal detection according to some embodiments. In some embodiments, at least a portion of example operation 300 is implemented by spoofing detection circuitry 120. In some embodiments, spoofing detection circuitry 120 is configured to perform example operation 300 when implemented by one or more servers 346 communicatively coupled to each ranging circuit 104 in ranging circuitry group 102 via network 348. Such network 348 includes, for example, cellular networks, wide area networks, local area networks, etc. Furthermore, in other embodiments, spoofing detection circuitry 120 is configured to perform example operation 300 when implemented by a vehicle 350 communicatively coupled to each ranging circuit 104 in ranging circuitry group 102 via one or more wired communication protocols (e.g., Ethernet, USB, PCI, SPI, I2C, UART), wireless communication protocols (e.g., cellular protocols, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, V2X), or both. Vehicle 350 includes, for example, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, SUVs, autonomous vehicles, drones, robotic platforms, UAVs, etc.
[0069] In this embodiment, example operation 300 first includes, at block 305, the spoofing detection circuit 120 requesting a distance measurement value 112 from each ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102. As an example, at block 305, the spoofing detection circuit 120 first sends a request 126 for the measurement value to each ranging circuit 104, the request 126 indicating a time period identifying a start time, an end time, a time quantity (e.g., a time quantity defined by microseconds, milliseconds, seconds, minutes, or any fraction thereof), or any combination thereof. In response to receiving the request 126 for the measurement value from the spoofing detection circuit 120, each ranging circuit 104 begins to transmit a corresponding waveform 110 and measures the parameters of the reflected waveform 110. As an example, each ranging circuit 104 transmits a waveform 110 that shares one or more parameters with the waveform 110 transmitted by each other ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102, but has a corresponding start time different from that of each other ranging circuit 104 in the ranging circuit group 102. Based on the corresponding waveform 110 transmitted by the ranging circuit 104 and the corresponding parameters of the received reflection measured by the ranging circuit 104, each ranging circuit 104 determines a set of distance measurements 112, which indicate the distance between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 during the time period indicated in the request for measurements 126, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. After determining the set of distance measurements 112, the ranging circuit 104 transmits the distance measurements 112 to the spoofing detection circuit 120.
[0070] After receiving a corresponding set of distance measurements 112 from each ranging circuit 104, at block 315, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to select a predetermined number of measurements from each set of distance measurements 112. For example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 first randomly, pseudo-randomly, or both selects a predetermined number of times within the time period indicated in the request for measurements 126. As an example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 randomly or pseudo-randomly selects four times within the time period indicated in the request for measurements 126. After selecting times within the time period indicated in the request for measurements 126, the spoofing detection circuit 120 selects distance measurements 112 from each set of received distance measurements 112 corresponding to the selected times. That is, the spoofing detection circuit 120 selects distance measurements 112 from each set of received distance measurements 112 indicating the distance, angle, speed, or any combination thereof of the target vehicle 114 at the selected time.
[0071] Based on the selected distance measurement 112, at block 325, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to determine the estimated position 332 of the target vehicle 114 at the selected time. In an embodiment, for example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 uses the selected distance measurement 112 to perform one or more operations to determine the estimated position 332 of the target vehicle 114 at the selected time. As an example, based on selecting a distance measurement 112 from each set of distance measurements 112 received from the three ranging circuits 104, the spoofing detection circuit 120 uses the selected distance measurement 112 to triangulate the estimated position 332 of the target vehicle 114. For example, for each selected time, the spoofing detection circuit 120 uses the following formula to triangulate the estimated position 332:
[0072] [EQ01]
[0073] Wherein, at the selected time, x a This indicates the position of target vehicle 114 along the first axis (e.g., the x-axis), y a The values represent the positions of the target vehicle 114 along a second axis (e.g., the y-axis), where x1 represents the position of the first ranging circuit 104 along the first axis, y1 represents the position of the first ranging circuit 104 along the second axis, d1 represents the distance between the first ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114, x2 represents the position of the second ranging circuit 104 along the first axis, y2 represents the position of the second ranging circuit 104 along the second axis, d2 represents the distance between the second ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114, x3 represents the position of the third ranging circuit 104 along the first axis, y3 represents the position of the third ranging circuit 104 along the second axis, and d3 represents the distance between the third ranging circuit 104 and the target vehicle 114. As another example, based on selected distance measurements 112 from two sets of distance measurements 112, each representing the distance and angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the corresponding ranging circuit 104, the deception detection circuit 120 determines the estimated position 332 of the target vehicle 114.
[0074] After determining the estimated location 332 of the target vehicle 114 at the selected time, in box 325, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated location 332. That is, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines whether the estimated location 332 is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both with a moving vehicle. As an example, in box 325, the spoofing detection circuit 120 compares each estimated location 332 with one or more predetermined locations representing, for example, an off-road location (e.g., a location adjacent to a road, above or below a road), a median, an area between road lanes, or any combination thereof. Based on the matching of one or more estimated locations 332 with one or more predetermined locations, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines that there is no spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both in the estimated location 332 (e.g., the estimated location 332 is spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both with a moving vehicle). As another example, based on the estimated location 332, the spoofing detection circuit 120 estimates the path of the target vehicle 114. As an example, based on a first estimated position 332 corresponding to a first selected time and a second estimated position 332 corresponding to a second selected time, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a first branch representing a first rate (e.g., direction and speed) of the target vehicle 114. Furthermore, based on the second estimated position 332 and a third estimated position 332 corresponding to a third selected time, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a second branch representing a second rate of the target vehicle 114. The deception detection circuit 120 then continues in this manner until a last branch is determined based on an estimated position 332 corresponding to the second-to-last selected time and a last estimated position 332 corresponding to the last selected time. After determining these branches, the deception detection circuit 120 combines the branches to determine an estimated path 334 and compares the estimated path 334 with one or more predetermined paths. Based on the estimated path 334 deviating from one or more predetermined paths by a predetermined degree, the deception detection circuit 120 determines that there is no spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both in the estimated path 334 (e.g., the estimated path 334 is spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both with a moving vehicle).
[0075] Still referring to frame 325, based on the spoofing detection circuit 120 determining that the estimated location 332, estimated path 334, or both do not exhibit spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both, the spoofing detection circuit 120 performs one or more mitigation actions 128. As an example, based on the estimated location 332, estimated path 334, or both not exhibiting spatiotemporal consistency 124, the spoofing detection circuit 120 transmits one or more signals to a vehicle including ranging circuit 104, each signal including data instructing the vehicle's processing system to disable cruise control, blind spot detection, traffic alert, collision detection, emergency steering, throttle management, or any combination thereof. As another example, based on determining that the estimated location 332, estimated path 334, or both do not exhibit spatiotemporal consistency 124, the spoofing detection circuit 120 transmits one or more signals to one or more authorities (e.g., police, highway authorities) indicating that a spoofing signal 118 has been detected at a certain location.
[0076] Now for reference Figures 4 to 6 , Figures 4 to 6 Corresponding example configurations 400, 500, and 600 for the deception detection system 100 according to some embodiments are presented. For example, now referring to... Figure 4 The first example configuration 400 is presented, which includes a ranging circuit group 102, wherein each ranging circuit 104 of the ranging circuit group 102 is disposed on a corresponding vehicle 350. For example, in the first example configuration 400, a first ranging circuit 104-1 (e.g., ranging circuit 0) is disposed on a first vehicle 350-1, a second ranging circuit 104-2 (e.g., ranging circuit 1) is disposed on a second vehicle 350-2, and a third ranging circuit 104-3 (e.g., ranging circuit 2) is disposed on a third vehicle 350-3. Additionally, based on a request 126 for measurement values received from the spoofing detection circuit 120, each ranging circuit 104-1, 104-2, 104-3 is configured to determine a set of distance measurements 112, representing the distance 114 between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 during the time period indicated in the request 126, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. After determining such a set of distance measurements 112, the ranging circuit 104 transmits the distance measurements 112 to the spoofing detection circuit 120.
[0077] From each set of received distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 selects a predetermined number of distance measurements 112 corresponding to a time period randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time period indicated in the request for measurements 126. Using these selected distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 estimates the estimated position 332 of the target vehicle 114 at the selected time. As an example, refer to... Figure 4 In the embodiment presented, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a first estimated position 332-1 at a first selected time, a second estimated position 332-2 at a second selected time, a third estimated position 332-3 at a third selected time, and a fourth estimated position 332-4 at a fourth selected time. Furthermore, in this embodiment, from these estimated positions 332, the deception detection circuit 120 determines an estimated path 334 for the target vehicle 114. For example, between the first estimated position 332-1 and the second estimated position 332-2, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a first branch 434-1; between the second estimated position 332-2 and the third estimated position 332-3, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a second branch 434-2; and between the third estimated position 332-3 and the fourth estimated position 332-4, the deception detection circuit 120 determines a third branch 434-3. The deception detection circuit 120 then combines these branches 434 to determine the estimated path 334. Furthermore, in the embodiment, after determining the estimated location 332, the estimated path 334, or both, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated location 332, the estimated path 334, or both to determine whether the ranging circuits 104-1, 104-2, and 104-3 have received a spoofing signal 118.
[0078] Now for reference Figure 5The second example configuration 500 is presented, which includes a ranging circuit group 102, wherein each ranging circuit 104 of the ranging circuit group 102 is disposed on the same vehicle 350. For example, in the second example configuration 500, a first ranging circuit 104-1 (e.g., ranging circuit 0) is disposed at a first position on the vehicle 350, a second ranging circuit 104-2 (e.g., ranging circuit 1) is disposed at a second position on the vehicle 350 different from the first position, and a third ranging circuit 104-3 (e.g., ranging circuit 2) is disposed at a third position on the vehicle 350 different from the first and second positions. Furthermore, based on a request 126 for measurement values received from the spoofing detection circuit 120, each ranging circuit 104-1, 104-2, 104-3 is configured to determine a set of distance measurements 112, representing the distance 114 between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 during the time period indicated in the request 126, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. After determining such a set of distance measurements 112, the ranging circuit 104 transmits the distance measurements 112 to the spoofing detection circuit 120. Based on these distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines estimated positions 332-1, 332-2, 332-3, 332-4 of the target vehicle 114, each estimated position corresponding to a corresponding time randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time period indicated in the request 126. Additionally, based on these estimated locations 332, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to determine the estimated path 334 of the target vehicle 114 by identifying, for example, a first branch 534-1, a second branch 534-2, and a third branch 534-3. After determining these estimated locations 332, estimated paths 334, or both, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated locations 332, estimated paths 334, or both to determine whether the ranging circuits 104-1, 104-2, and 104-3 have received a spoofing signal 118.
[0079] Now for reference Figure 6A third example configuration 600 is presented, which includes a ranging circuit group 102, comprising ranging circuits 104 disposed on two vehicles 350-1 and 350-2. For example, in the third example configuration 600, a first ranging circuit 104-1 (e.g., ranging circuit 0) is disposed at a first position on the first vehicle 350-1, a second ranging circuit 104-2 (e.g., ranging circuit 1) is disposed at a second position on the first vehicle 350-1, different from the first position, and a third ranging circuit 104-3 (e.g., ranging circuit 2) is disposed on the second vehicle 350-2. Furthermore, based on a request 126 for measurement values received from the spoofing detection circuit 120, each ranging circuit 104-1, 104-2, 104-3 is configured to determine a set of distance measurements 112, representing the distance 114 between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 during the time period indicated in the request 126, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. After determining such a set of distance measurements 112, the ranging circuit 104 transmits the distance measurements 112 to the spoofing detection circuit 120. Based on these distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines estimated positions 332-1, 332-2, 332-3, 332-4 of the target vehicle 114, each estimated position corresponding to a corresponding time randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time period indicated in the request 126. Additionally, based on these estimated locations 332, the spoofing detection circuit 120 is configured to determine the estimated path 334 of the target vehicle 114 by identifying, for example, a first branch 634-1, a second branch 634-2, and a third branch 634-3. After determining these estimated locations 332, estimated paths 324, or both, the spoofing detection circuit 120 checks the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated locations 332, estimated paths 334, or both to determine whether the ranging circuits 104-1, 104-2, and 104-3 have received a spoofing signal 118.
[0080] Now for reference Figure 7An example method 700 for detecting spoofing signals according to an embodiment is presented. In some embodiments, the example method 700 is implemented at least in part by a spoofing detection circuit 120 and one or more ranging circuits 104. For example, block 705 of the example method 700 includes the spoofing detection circuit 120 transmitting a request 126 for a measurement value to each ranging circuit 104 in a group of ranging circuits 102. This request 126 for a measurement value includes, for example, requesting data for a distance measurement value 112 over a period of time. In an embodiment, each ranging circuit 104 within the group of ranging circuits 102 is located at a different corresponding location. For example, two or more ranging circuits 104 in the group of ranging circuits 102 are located at different locations on the same vehicle 350, on different vehicles 350, or both. In response to receiving the request 126 for a measurement value from the spoofing detection circuit 120, each ranging circuit 104 in the group of ranging circuits 102 is configured to transmit a corresponding waveform 110 during the time period indicated in the request 126 for the measurement value and to measure parameters of the reflection of the transmitted waveform 110. As an example, each ranging circuit 104 transmits a waveform 110 that shares one or more parameters with waveforms 110 transmitted by other ranging circuits 104 in the ranging circuit group 102, but has a different start time than each of the other waveforms 110 transmitted by the other ranging circuits 104. Based on the transmitted waveform 110 and the parameters of the reflected light measured during the time period indicated in the request for measurement value 126, at block 710, each ranging circuit 104 determines one or more distance measurements 112, each distance measurement 112 indicating the distance between the target vehicle 114 and the ranging circuit 104 at a corresponding time within the time period indicated by the request for measurement value 126, the angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to the ranging circuit 104, the speed of the target vehicle 114, or any combination thereof. After determining a set of distance measurements 112 within the indicated time period, each ranging circuit 104 transmits the set of distance measurements 112 to the spoofing detection circuit 120.
[0081] At block 715, the spoofing detection circuit 120 randomly or pseudo-randomly selects a predetermined number of distance measurements 112 from each set of received distance measurements 112. For example, from the time period indicated in the transmitted request for measurements 126, the spoofing detection circuit 120 randomly, pseudo-randomly, or both selects a predetermined number of time periods. Then, the spoofing detection circuit 120 selects distance measurements 112 corresponding to the selected time periods from each set of received distance measurements 112. Based on these selected distance measurements 112, at block 720, the spoofing detection circuit 120 estimates the number of estimated locations 332 of the target vehicle 114 during the indicated time period. As an example, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines the number of estimated locations 332 equal to the predetermined number of distance measurements 112 selected from each set of received distance measurements 112. According to some embodiments, for example, based on receiving three sets of distance measurements 112, the spoofing detection circuit 120 performs triangulation on a plurality of estimated positions 332 that are equal to a predetermined number of distance measurements 112 selected from each of the received sets of distance measurements 112. As another example, based on receiving two sets of distance measurements 112, each set indicating the distance and angle of the target vehicle 114 relative to a corresponding ranging circuit 104, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines a number of estimated positions 332 that are equal to a predetermined number of distance measurements 112 selected from each of the received sets of distance measurements 112.
[0082] After determining the estimated location 332, at block 725, the deception detection circuit 120 is configured to check the spatiotemporal consistency 124 of the estimated location 332 to determine whether the estimated location 332 is spatially consistent, temporally consistent, or both with a moving vehicle. As an example, the deception detection circuit 120 compares one or more of the estimated locations 332 with one or more predetermined locations representing, for example, off-road locations (e.g., locations adjacent to, above, or below a road), medians, areas between road lanes, or any combination thereof. Based on a match between one or more estimated locations 332 and one or more of these predetermined locations, the deception detection circuit 120 determines that the estimated location 332 lacks spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both (e.g., spatially inconsistent, temporally inconsistent, or both with a moving vehicle). As another example, based on the estimated location 332, the deception detection circuit 120 determines the estimated path 334 of the target vehicle 114. For example, for one or more pairs of temporally adjacent locations in the estimated locations 332, the deception detection circuit 120 determines corresponding branches 434, 534, 634. Then, the spoofing detection circuit 120 aggregates these branches 434, 534, and 634 to determine an estimated path 334. After determining the estimated path 334, the spoofing detection circuit 120 compares the path with one or more predetermined paths. Based on the estimated path 334 deviating from one or more predetermined paths by a predetermined degree, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines that the estimated position 332 and the estimated path 334 lack spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both. In response to determining that the estimated position 332, the estimated path 334, or both lack spatial consistency, temporal consistency, or both, the spoofing detection circuit 120 determines that one or more ranging circuits 104 have received a spoofing signal 118 and performs one or more mitigation actions 128, such as providing an alert to one or more vehicles 350 including ranging circuits 104 determined to have received a spoofing signal 118, providing an alert to one or more authorities, instructing the processing systems of one or more vehicles 350 to disable one or more functions, instructing the processing systems of one or more vehicles 350 to terminate one or more applications, or any combination thereof.
[0083] In some embodiments, certain aspects of the techniques described above may be implemented by one or more processors of a processing system that executes the software. The software includes one or more sets of executable instructions stored or otherwise tangibly embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The software may include instructions and certain data that, when executed by one or more processors, manipulate the one or more processors to perform one or more aspects of the techniques described above. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may include, for example, disk or optical disk storage devices, solid-state storage devices (e.g., flash memory), caches, random access memory (RAM), or one or more other non-volatile memory devices. The executable instructions stored on the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be source code, assembly language code, object code, or other instruction formats that are interpreted or otherwise executable by one or more processors.
[0084] Computer-readable storage media can include any storage medium or combination of storage media that can be accessed by a computer system during use to provide instructions and / or data to the computer system. Such storage media can include, but are not limited to, optical media (e.g., optical disc (CD), digital versatile optical disc (DVD), Blu-ray disc), magnetic media (e.g., floppy disk, magnetic tape, or magnetic hard disk), volatile memory (e.g., random access memory (RAM) or cache), non-volatile memory (e.g., read-only memory (ROM) or flash memory), or microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) based storage media. Computer-readable storage media can be embedded in a computing system (e.g., system RAM or ROM), permanently attached to a computing system (e.g., magnetic hard disk), removably attached to a computing system (e.g., optical disc or USB-based flash memory), or coupled to a computer system via a wired or wireless network (e.g., network accessible storage device (NAS)).
[0085] It should be noted that not all of the activities or elements described in the general description above are necessary, and may not be required as part of a particular activity or apparatus. Furthermore, one or more additional activities or elements may be performed in addition to those described. Moreover, the order in which the activities are listed is not necessarily the order in which they are performed. Additionally, these concepts have been described with reference to specific embodiments. However, those skilled in the art will understand that various modifications and changes can be made without departing from the scope of this disclosure as set forth in the appended claims. Therefore, the specification and drawings should be viewed in an illustrative rather than restrictive sense, and all such modifications are contemplated to be included within the scope of this disclosure.
[0086] The foregoing description of specific embodiments has described benefits, other advantages, and solutions to the problem. However, these benefits, advantages, solutions to the problem, and any features that may bring any benefit, advantage, or solution to the forefront or make more prominent should not be construed as key, essential, or indispensable features of any or all claims. Furthermore, the specific embodiments disclosed above are merely illustrative, as the disclosed subject matter can be modified and practiced in different but equivalent ways that will be apparent to those skilled in the art who have benefited from the teachings herein. No limitation is intended to be made on the details of the constructions or designs shown herein, except as described in the appended claims. Therefore, it will be apparent that changes or modifications can be made to the specific embodiments disclosed above, and all such changes are considered to be within the scope of the disclosed subject matter. Therefore, the protection sought herein is as set forth in the appended claims.
Claims
1. A method, characterized in that, include: The deception detection circuit estimates multiple positions of the target vehicle based on a first set of distance measurements received from a first ranging circuit and at least a second set of distance measurements received from a second ranging circuit. as well as The spoofing detection circuit determines, based on the spatial or temporal consistency of the plurality of locations, that at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit has received a spoofing signal.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In addition, including: Select a predetermined number of distance measurements from each of the first and second sets of distance measurements.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Selecting the predetermined number of measurements from each of the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements includes: selecting the predetermined number of measurements based on a predetermined number of times randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time periods represented by the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements.
4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The plurality of locations are estimated based on the predetermined number of measurements from the first set of distance measurements and the predetermined number of measurements from the second set of distance measurements.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining that the spoofing signal has been received includes: Determine the path between a first location and a second location among the plurality of locations; and Check the spatial consistency or temporal consistency of the path.
6. A deception detection system, characterized in that, include: One or more processors, said one or more processors being configured to: Multiple positions of the target vehicle are estimated based on a first set of distance measurements received from a first ranging circuit and at least a second set of distance measurements received from a second ranging circuit. as well as Based on the spatiotemporal consistency of the multiple locations, it is determined that at least one of the first ranging circuit or the second ranging circuit receives a spoofing signal.
7. The deception detection system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The one or more processors are configured to: Select a predetermined number of distance measurements from each of the first and second sets of distance measurements.
8. The deception detection system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The one or more processors are configured to: The predetermined number of measurements are selected based on a predetermined number of time periods randomly or pseudo-randomly selected from the time periods represented by the first set of distance measurements and the second set of distance measurements.
9. The deception detection system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The one or more processors are configured to estimate the plurality of locations based on the predetermined number of measurements from the first set of distance measurements and the predetermined number of measurements from the second set of distance measurements.
10. A deception detection system, characterized in that, include: A first ranging circuit, the first ranging circuit being configured to: The first waveform is transmitted based on the received request for a measurement value for an indicated time period; as well as Based on the first waveform, determine the first set of distance measurement values corresponding to the time period; as well as A second ranging circuit, configured to: A second waveform is transmitted based on a received request for a measurement indicating the time period, wherein the second waveform has a different start time than the first waveform; and Based on the second waveform, a second set of distance measurements corresponding to the time period is determined.