Relay protection action behavior evaluation method and device based on fault path deduction

Abstract

The invention discloses a relay protection action behavior evaluation method and device based on fault path deduction. The method comprises the steps that power grid fault positioning is executed, a power grid fault positioning result is obtained, and the power grid fault positioning result at least comprises fault equipment and a fault phase; relay protection related information is accessed, wherein the relay protection related information comprises wiring mode information, protection configuration information, protection action information and protection fixed value information; and performing fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis based on a power grid fault positioning result and relay protection related information, and evaluating the action behavior of each relay protection function.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system relay protection technology, and more specifically, to a method and apparatus for evaluating relay protection action behavior based on fault path deduction. Background Technology

[0002] The existing relay protection behavior evaluation methods are based on the principle of substituting the analog and switching quantities received by the relay protection into the action equation to determine whether the action conditions are met, and thus obtaining the action evaluation result. For example, for a line fault, the action equation for the line protection distance I stage is as follows: Figure 1 As shown. When the measured impedance calculated at the line protection installation location is... Figure 1 When the distance to the first protection zone is within the "distance I operating zone", the first protection zone should operate. Operation of the first protection zone indicates correct operation; failure to operate the first protection zone indicates failure to operate. When the measured impedance calculated at the line protection installation location is within... Figure 1 When outside the "distance I action zone", distance I should not move; if it does move, it is a false alarm.

[0003] The problem with this method is that if errors occur in the voltage and current of the input line protection due to secondary circuit issues, or if the relay protection settings are incorrect, it will lead to inaccurate evaluation results of the relay protection's action behavior. For example, if the line protection originally had a fault and the impedance from the fault point to the line protection installation location is... Figure 1 The device is located within the Distance I operating zone. However, if the current value input to the relay protection device decreases due to insulation failure in the secondary current circuit, the calculated measured impedance will increase and be located outside the "Distance I operating zone". Originally, Distance I should have operated (conclusion of failure to operate). However, due to voltage and current sampling issues, it is mistakenly judged that Distance I should not have operated (conclusion of correct operation).

[0004] Another existing method for evaluating relay protection behavior is to use the method of mutual calibration of dual protection systems. However, this method is limited by the amount of information that can be obtained. It cannot determine the location of the power grid fault and can only passively assume that the possibility of both sets of protection systems operating incorrectly at the same time is low. Therefore, the method of mutual calibration of the behavior of dual relay protection systems is used to evaluate the behavior of relay protection. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention provides a method and apparatus for evaluating relay protection action behavior based on fault path deduction.

[0006] According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for evaluating the action behavior of relay protection based on fault path deduction is provided, comprising:

[0007] Perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results. The power grid fault location results shall include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase.

[0008] Access relay protection related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information;

[0009] Based on the power grid fault location results and relay protection related information, fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis are performed, and the action behavior of each relay protection function is evaluated.

[0010] Optionally, perform power grid fault location to obtain power grid fault location results, including:

[0011] Based on the circuit breaker displacement information, a set of candidate faulty devices is determined through topology analysis;

[0012] For each device in the candidate fault device set, extract its power grid fault characteristic quantity;

[0013] Based on the power grid fault characteristics, we identify whether each device has a fault and the fault phase, and then synthesize the results to obtain the power grid fault location.

[0014] Optionally, based on the power grid fault location results and relay protection related information, fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis are performed, and the action behavior of each relay protection function is evaluated, including:

[0015] Based on the four characteristics of relay protection and the protection action logic, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions. The action expectations define the expected behavior of the relay protection functions that should or should not operate under the fault scenario determined by the power grid fault location results.

[0016] Taking the isolation of power grid faults as the main line, and based on the logical coordination relationship between different relay protection functions, an action expectation deduction path is formed; the action expectation deduction path is a sequence that arranges the relay protection functions in the order of responding to the fault.

[0017] Following the deduction path of the expected action, the actual action of each relay protection function is compared with its corresponding expected action in turn to complete the evaluation of the action behavior of each relay protection function.

[0018] Optionally, based on the four characteristics and protection operation logic of relay protection, operation expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions, including:

[0019] For faulty equipment, establish the expected operation of its full-line high-speed main protection and distance I-stage protection;

[0020] For faulty equipment, the expected operation of its near-backup protection is established by combining the operation status and protection range of the time-limitless protection.

[0021] Establish the expected actions for circuit breaker failure protection, remote transmission, and tripping functions;

[0022] When the protection of the faulty equipment fails to operate, establish the expected operation of its upstream remote backup protection.

[0023] Optionally, the expected action derivation path is arranged in the following order: starting with the timeless protection of the faulty equipment, followed by the time-delayed protection of the faulty equipment, the circuit breaker failure protection, and the next-level relay protection.

[0024] Optionally, the conclusions of the behavioral evaluation include correct action, refusal to act, and mis-act.

[0025] According to another aspect of the present invention, a relay protection action behavior evaluation device based on fault path deduction is provided, comprising:

[0026] The execution module is used to perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results, which include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase.

[0027] The access module is used to access relay protection-related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information.

[0028] The analysis module is used to perform fault path deduction and relay protection behavior analysis based on power grid fault location results and relay protection related information, and to evaluate the behavior of each relay protection function.

[0029] Optionally, the execution module includes:

[0030] Based on the circuit breaker displacement information, a set of candidate faulty devices is determined through topology analysis;

[0031] For each device in the candidate fault device set, extract its power grid fault characteristic quantity;

[0032] Based on the power grid fault characteristics, we identify whether each device has a fault and the fault phase, and then synthesize the results to obtain the power grid fault location.

[0033] Optionally, the analysis module includes:

[0034] Based on the four characteristics of relay protection and the protection action logic, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions. The action expectations define the expected behavior of the relay protection functions that should or should not operate under the fault scenario determined by the power grid fault location results.

[0035] Taking the isolation of power grid faults as the main line, and based on the logical coordination relationship between different relay protection functions, an action expectation deduction path is formed; the action expectation deduction path is a sequence that arranges the relay protection functions in the order of responding to the fault.

[0036] Following the deduction path of the expected action, the actual action of each relay protection function is compared with its corresponding expected action in turn to complete the evaluation of the action behavior of each relay protection function.

[0037] Optionally, based on the four characteristics and protection operation logic of relay protection, operation expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions, including:

[0038] For faulty equipment, establish the expected operation of its full-line high-speed main protection and distance I-stage protection;

[0039] For faulty equipment, the expected operation of its near-backup protection is established by combining the operation status and protection range of the time-limitless protection.

[0040] Establish the expected actions for circuit breaker failure protection, remote transmission, and tripping functions;

[0041] When the protection of the faulty equipment fails to operate, establish the expected operation of its upstream remote backup protection.

[0042] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, the storage medium storing a computer program for performing the method of any of the above aspects of the present invention.

[0043] According to another aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, the electronic device comprising: a processor; a memory for storing executable instructions of the processor; the processor being configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the method described in any of the preceding aspects of the present invention.

[0044] Therefore, this invention application proposes the expected behavior of relay protection operation. Based on the grid fault location results, a deduction path between grid fault and relay protection operation is formed. Based on whether the relay protection operation situation meets the expected relay protection operation, the correct operation, failure to operate, or false operation of the relay protection is determined to support grid fault recovery. Attached Figure Description

[0045] Exemplary embodiments of the present invention can be more fully understood by referring to the following figures:

[0046] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the line protection distance I-stage operating range provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

[0047] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the present invention for evaluating the action behavior of relay protection based on fault path deduction.

[0048] Figure 3This is a primary wiring diagram of an exemplary system provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the process of fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis in a case system provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a relay protection action behavior evaluation device based on fault path deduction provided in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 6 This is the structure of an electronic device provided in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0052] Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the exemplary embodiments described herein.

[0053] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement, numerical expressions, and values ​​of the components and steps described in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the invention.

[0054] Those skilled in the art will understand that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the embodiments of the present invention are only used to distinguish different steps, devices, or modules, and do not represent any specific technical meaning, nor do they indicate a necessary logical order between them.

[0055] It should also be understood that in the embodiments of the present invention, "multiple" can refer to two or more, and "at least one" can refer to one, two or more.

[0056] It should also be understood that any component, data or structure mentioned in the embodiments of the present invention can generally be understood as one or more unless explicitly defined or given contrary instructions in the context.

[0057] Furthermore, the term "and / or" in this invention is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this invention generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0058] It should also be understood that the description of the various embodiments in this invention emphasizes the differences between the various embodiments, and the similarities or similarities can be referred to each other. For the sake of brevity, they will not be described in detail.

[0059] At the same time, it should be understood that, for ease of description, the dimensions of the various parts shown in the accompanying drawings are not drawn according to actual scale.

[0060] The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative and is in no way intended to limit the invention or its application or use.

[0061] Techniques, methods, and equipment known to those skilled in the art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, they should be considered part of the specification.

[0062] It should be noted that similar labels and letters in the following figures indicate similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it does not need to be discussed further in subsequent figures.

[0063] The embodiments of this invention can be applied to electronic devices such as terminal devices, computer systems, and servers, and can operate together with a wide range of other general-purpose or special-purpose computing system environments or configurations. Well-known examples of terminal devices, computing systems, environments, and / or configurations suitable for use with electronic devices such as terminal devices, computer systems, and servers include, but are not limited to: personal computer systems, server computer systems, thin clients, thick clients, handheld or laptop devices, microprocessor-based systems, set-top boxes, programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputer systems, mainframe computer systems, and distributed cloud computing environments including any of the above systems, etc.

[0064] Electronic devices such as terminal devices, computer systems, and servers can be described in the general context of computer system executable instructions (such as program modules) executed by a computer system. Typically, program modules can include routines, programs, object programs, components, logic, data structures, etc., which perform specific tasks or implement specific abstract data types. Computer systems / servers can be implemented in distributed cloud computing environments, where tasks are executed by remote processing devices linked through communication networks. In distributed cloud computing environments, program modules can reside on local or remote computing system storage media, including storage devices.

[0065] Exemplary methods

[0066] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the present invention regarding a relay protection action behavior evaluation method based on fault path deduction. This embodiment can be applied to electronic devices, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the relay protection action behavior evaluation method 200 based on fault path deduction includes the following steps:

[0067] Step 201: Perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results. The power grid fault location results shall include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase.

[0068] Step 202: Access relay protection related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information;

[0069] Step 203: Based on the power grid fault location results and relay protection related information, perform fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis, and evaluate the action behavior of each relay protection function.

[0070] Specifically, after a power grid fault occurs, and after the fault location is completed, the relay protection behavior is further evaluated to determine whether the relay protection is operating correctly, refusing to operate, or operating erroneously, in order to support the recovery of the power grid fault.

[0071] This invention application, for the first time, establishes the expected action of relay protection based on the results of power grid fault location, combined with the "four characteristics" requirements of relay protection and the protection action logic, and completes the evaluation of relay protection action behavior through relay protection action logic deduction. The technical features of this method are:

[0072] (1) Technical Feature 1: The basic starting point for evaluating the action behavior of relay protection is whether the relay protection operates according to its expected logic and whether it responds to power grid faults in accordance with the "four characteristics" requirements of relay protection. It assesses the protection action behavior (correct operation, failure to operate, and false operation) from the perspective of power grid fault clearing. This departs from the existing approach of evaluating action behavior by analyzing the voltage and current information connected to the relay protection. Instead, it treats the relay protection, including its secondary circuits, channels, and its own settings, as a whole, examining whether the entire relay protection system accurately and reasonably responded to specific power grid faults. Therefore, a prominent feature of this technology is the establishment of a correlation between power grid faults and relay protection action behavior.

[0073] (2) Technical Feature 2: Existing relay protection action behavior evaluation is limited by information sources confined to the local power grid. It lacks global information on the power grid and relay protection, and action behavior evaluation can only target individual components of local (substation) relay protection equipment. It cannot establish the coordination relationship between local relay protection functions and relay protection functions at other locations in the power grid, resulting in a technical bottleneck in the evaluation of remote backup protection action behavior. This application fully considers the coordination relationship between relay protection functions at different installation locations. Taking the collaborative action of relay protection functions at different installation locations to isolate power grid faults as the main line, it organically connects relay protection functions at different installation locations and with different action time limits. Combining power grid faults, relay protection actions, and circuit breaker change information, it performs fault path deduction and applies relay protection logic to comprehensively determine the action expectation of relay protection functions, thereby realizing relay protection action behavior evaluation.

[0074] (3) Technical feature 3: The granularity of the relay protection action behavior evaluation is the relay protection function.

[0075] The steps of this method are as follows:

[0076] (1) Power grid fault location, determining the faulty equipment and faulty phase. Candidate power grid faulty equipment is determined through topology analysis. Power grid fault feature quantities are extracted for each candidate power grid faulty equipment. The power grid fault feature quantities are used to identify whether each candidate power grid faulty equipment has a fault and the faulty phase. The power grid fault location result is obtained by combining the conclusions of whether each candidate faulty equipment has a fault and the faulty phase.

[0077] (2) Access to relay protection related information: Access information includes wiring method information, which determines the hierarchical relationship between relay protections at different installation locations; protection configuration information, which is used to determine the scope of relay protection action evaluation, i.e., only the relay protection functions that have been put into operation need to be evaluated; protection action information, i.e. the object of evaluation; protection setting information, for functions such as distance I that can only provide partial protection for power grid equipment, when applying action expectations to perform action evaluation, to determine whether the relay protection function should operate at a specific power grid fault point.

[0078] (3) Fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis

[0079] First, the expected protection action is established based on the "four characteristics" requirements of relay protection and the protection action logic.

[0080] The expected action of relay protection is the expectation that the relay protection should or should not operate under certain fault conditions in the power grid, the operation of relevant relay protection, and the change of circuit breaker position, based on the "four characteristics" requirements of relay protection and the relay protection logic.

[0081] 1) The selection criteria for the grid faults related to the expected operation of relay protection are the various types of grid faults that have occurred in recent years.

[0082] 2) The expected operation of relay protection includes the following:

[0083] A. Directly establish the correlation between power grid faults and protection actions. For example, in the event of a power grid equipment fault, the full-line fast-acting main protection of this power grid equipment should operate. If the full-line fast-acting main protection operates, it is considered a correct operation; otherwise, it is considered a failure to operate. The distance protection I range of this power grid equipment should operate according to its operating range. If the power grid fault point is within the distance protection I range, then the distance protection I range should operate. If it operates, it is considered a correct operation; otherwise, it is considered a failure to operate. If the power grid fault point is outside the distance protection I range, then the distance protection I range should not operate; if it operates, it is considered a false operation. The full-line fast-acting main protection of other power grid equipment should not operate; if it operates, it is considered a false operation.

[0084] b. In the case of a power grid equipment failure, whether the near-backup protection of this power grid equipment operates is determined by considering the operation of the non-time-delay protection of this power grid equipment and the operating range of this protection function. For example, in the case of a power grid equipment failure, if the non-time-delay protection of this power grid equipment operates to clear the fault, then the near-backup protection of this power grid equipment should not operate; if the near-backup protection operates, it is a false operation. In the case of a power grid equipment failure, the near-backup protection element should operate under the condition that all protection elements with short operating times do not operate; if it operates, it is a correct operation; if it does not operate, it is a failure to operate. For example, in the case of a line failure, if the non-time-delay protection of the line does not operate, then the distance II protection should operate (distance II protects the entire length of the line); if distance II operates, it is a correct operation; if distance II does not operate, it is a failure to operate. The distance III protection should operate under the condition that the non-time-delay protection, distance II protection, and other protection elements with short operating times have not operated; if it operates, it is a correct operation; if it does not operate, it is a failure to operate, and so on.

[0085] When a circuit breaker fails, the failure protection, remote transmission (remote tripping), and interlocking tripping should operate. If they do not operate, it is considered a failure to operate. If no circuit breaker fails (i.e., no power grid fault, no protection driving the circuit breaker to trip, or the circuit breaker does not fail), the failure protection should not operate. If it does operate, it is considered a false trip.

[0086] If the protection of a faulty power grid device fails to operate, requirements are placed on the remote backup protection. For line faults and bus faults, if the relay protection of the faulty device fails to operate, the fault should be cleared by the next higher-level relay protection (remote backup protection). If the next higher-level relay protection operates, it is considered a correct operation; if it does not operate, it is considered a failure to operate. For transformer faults where the transformer protection fails to operate, whether the next higher-level relay protection operates depends on the severity of the fault characteristics. When a transformer fault occurs and the conditions for operation of the next higher-level relay protection are met, the next higher-level relay protection should operate. If it operates, it is considered a correct operation; if it does not operate, it is considered a failure to operate. When a transformer fault occurs but the conditions for operation of the next higher-level relay protection are not met, it may not operate (Note: the characteristics of a transformer fault may not be obvious, and the conditions for operation of the next higher-level relay protection may not be met).

[0087] For special types of faults such as high-resistance faults on line E, since they do not have a substantial impact on power grid safety, it is not required whether the line's time-limitless protection function can operate to clear the fault; it is sufficient that the line's protection function can clear the fault.

[0088] When a single-phase fault occurs, the phase should be selected accurately. When reclosing is engaged, not locked, and under the condition of single-phase reclosing, the reclosing should operate.

[0089] The expected action evaluation also takes into account fault scenarios such as open circuit faults and increased operating voltage, and establishes the expected action of related protection functions.

[0090] Then, fault path deduction is performed, focusing on isolating the power grid fault. Based on the logical causal relationships between the protection functions of different power grid equipment, the relevant relay protection functions are arranged in order, such as from non-time-delay protection of the faulty equipment, time-delay protection of the faulty equipment (sorted from shortest to longest time), circuit breaker failure protection, and the next higher-level relay protection, reflecting the sequential response of different power grid equipment's relay protection functions to power grid faults from near to far, from fast to slow, and from small to large scope, thus representing the entire process of isolating the power grid fault. The process of relay protection functions cooperating to achieve the goal of isolating the power grid fault is used as the main thread to form the expected action deduction path. The evaluation conclusions of the corresponding protection functions obtained in the previous step serve as the input for the next step of analysis and evaluation. The evaluation is executed sequentially to realize the evaluation of the relay protection functions of different power grid equipment.

[0091] In a specific embodiment of the present invention, taking the case of a relay protection failure causing the remote backup protection function of an adjacent line to operate, resulting in an expansion of the power grid tripping range as an example, the analysis process of the action behavior analysis method of the relay protection action logic deduction of this application is illustrated.

[0092] Figure 3 This is the topology diagram for this case. The circuit breaker marked in red is the displacement circuit breaker.

[0093] The detailed process of relay protection action behavior analysis is as follows:

[0094] (1) Power grid fault location. From Figure 2 The circuit breaker shown is analyzed using topology analysis to find its minimum cut set. The primary equipment within this minimum cut set constitutes the power grid candidate fault equipment set, including lines A-B-I, A-B-II, bus A at station B, bus B at station B, bus C at station B, line B-C-I, and line B-C-II. For each primary equipment in the candidate fault equipment set, power grid fault characteristic quantities are calculated from waveform data. Based on these characteristics, power grid fault location analysis is performed to determine whether each candidate fault equipment has failed and the faulty phase. By combining the fault identification and phase selection results of each candidate fault equipment, the power grid fault location result is obtained. In this case, the power grid fault point is located on phase B of line B-C-I (near station C).

[0095] (2) Relevant information for accessing relay protection.

[0096] 1) Wiring method as follows Figure 1 As shown, under the fault condition of the B-C I line, it can be determined that the protection of the A-B I line at station A, the protection of the A-B II line at station A, and the protection of the B-C II line at station C are all the higher level protection of the B-C I line at station B.

[0097] 2) Protection configuration information. Taking the configuration information of the dual protection system for Line B-C-I at Station B as an example, the high-speed protection system for the entire Line B-C-I at Station B is deactivated due to a channel fault, while Distance Section I, Distance Section II, Distance Section III, and Zero Sequence Section III are in the activated state;

[0098] 3) Protection Action Information. In this case, the protection functions of the actions are: distance stage I protection for line B-C I at station C (action time is 15ms), zero-sequence stage III protection for line A-B I at station A (action time is 3000ms), zero-sequence stage III protection for line A-B II at station A (action time is 3000ms), zero-sequence stage III protection for line B-C I at station B (action time is 3000ms), zero-sequence stage III protection for line B-C II at station C (action time is 3000ms), and zero-sequence stage III protection for the medium-voltage side of main transformers #1 and #2 at station B (action time is 3000ms).

[0099] 4) Protection setting information. The setting information for distance segment I, distance segment II, and distance segment III is the set impedance for distance segment I, distance segment II, and distance segment III, and the setting information for zero-sequence segment III is the set zero-sequence current for zero-sequence segment III.

[0100] (3) Fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis.

[0101] The process of fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis in the case system is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, the specific analysis process is as follows:

[0102] 1) When a single-phase ground fault occurs on line B-C-I, the non-time-delay relay protection should be the first to respond. In this case, the fast-acting main protection of both line B-C-I at stations B and C is tripped due to channel damage. Both line B-C-I at stations B and C are equipped with non-time-delay distance protection (section I). Since the fault point is located near station C, within the distance I range of line B-C-I at station C, but outside the distance I range of line B-C-I at station B, according to the relay protection logic, the expected action of the distance I protection for line B-C-I at stations B and C is: the distance I protection for line B-C-I at station C should operate, and the distance I protection for line B-C-I at station B should not operate. Based on the relay protection operation, it is determined that the distance I protection for line B-C-I at station C operates correctly. After the distance I protection for line B-C-I at station C operates correctly, the 203 circuit breaker at station C trips, thus isolating the fault on line B-C-I from the station C side.

[0103] 2) After the 203 circuit breaker at Station C trips, the short-circuit current is still fed from Station B to the fault point of Line B-C I. Since the time-delay protection for Line B-C I at Station B does not operate, and the distance protection section II of Line B-C I can protect the entire length of the line, the distance protection section II of Line B-C I at Station B should operate. According to the relay protection functional logic, the expected operation of the distance protection section II of Line B-C I at Station B is: the distance protection section II of Line B-C I at Station B should operate. However, since the distance protection section II of Line B-C I at Station B does not actually operate, the distance protection section II of Line B-C I at Station B fails to operate.

[0104] 3) Substation B continues to supply short-circuit current to the fault point of line B-C-I. Since the time-delay protection and distance protection stage II of line B-C-I at Substation B have not operated, the distance protection stage III of line B-C-I at Substation B should operate. According to the relay protection functional logic, the expected operation of the distance protection stage III of line B-C-I at Substation B is: the distance protection stage III of line B-C-I at Substation B should operate. However, since the distance protection stage III of line B-C-I at Substation B has not actually operated, the distance protection stage III of line B-C-I at Substation B fails to operate.

[0105] 4) Substation B continues to supply short-circuit current to the fault point of Line B-C I. Since the time-delay protection, distance protection stages II and III of Line B-C I at Substation B have not operated, the zero-sequence stage III protection of Line B-C I at Substation B should operate. According to the relay protection functional logic, the expected operation of the zero-sequence stage III protection of Line B-C I at Substation B is: the zero-sequence stage III protection of Line B-C I at Substation B should operate. Since the zero-sequence stage III protection of Line B-C I at Substation B actually operates, the zero-sequence stage III protection of Line B-C I at Substation B operates correctly, the 2006 circuit breaker at Substation B trips, and the fault on Line B-C I is cleared from the Substation B side. Thus, the fault on Line B-C I has been cleared from both Substation B and Substation C.

[0106] 5) The zero-sequence stage III protection of the B-C-I line at station B has been activated, indicating that the fault on line B-C-I has been cleared. Therefore, the upstream protection of line B-C-I at station B should not activate. Based on the relay protection functional logic, the expected operation of the zero-sequence stage III protection on the medium-voltage side of the A-B-I line at station A, the A-B-II line at station C, the B-C-II line at station C, and the #1 and #2 main transformers at station B is as follows: the zero-sequence stage III protection on the medium-voltage side of the A-B-I line at station A, the A-B-II line at station C, the B-C-II line at station C, and the #1 and #2 main transformers at station B should not activate. The actual operation of the zero-sequence stage III protection on the medium-voltage side of the main transformers #1 and #2 at Station A, Station B, and Station C caused the circuit breakers 205 and 206 at Station A, 2001 and 2002 at Station B, and 204 at Station C to trip, expanding the scope of the power grid fault. Based on the expected operation of the relay protection, it can be determined that the zero-sequence stage III protection on the medium-voltage side of the main transformers #1 and #2 at Station B, Station C, and Station C was a maloperation.

[0107] Therefore, this invention application proposes the expected behavior of relay protection operation. Based on the grid fault location results, a deduction path between grid fault and relay protection operation is formed. Based on whether the relay protection operation situation meets the expected relay protection operation, the correct operation, failure to operate, or false operation of the relay protection is determined to support grid fault recovery.

[0108] Exemplary device

[0109] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a relay protection action behavior evaluation device based on fault path deduction provided in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, the device 500 includes:

[0110] The execution module 510 is used to perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results. The power grid fault location results include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase.

[0111] The access module 520 is used to access relay protection related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information.

[0112] Analysis module 530 is used to perform fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis based on power grid fault location results and relay protection related information, and to evaluate the action behavior of each relay protection function.

[0113] Optionally, the execution module 510 includes:

[0114] Based on the circuit breaker displacement information, a set of candidate faulty devices is determined through topology analysis;

[0115] For each device in the candidate fault device set, extract its power grid fault characteristic quantity;

[0116] Based on the power grid fault characteristics, we identify whether each device has a fault and the fault phase, and then synthesize the results to obtain the power grid fault location.

[0117] Optionally, the analysis module 530 includes:

[0118] Based on the four characteristics of relay protection and the protection action logic, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions. The action expectations define the expected behavior of the relay protection functions that should or should not operate under the fault scenario determined by the power grid fault location results.

[0119] Taking the isolation of power grid faults as the main line, and based on the logical coordination relationship between different relay protection functions, an action expectation deduction path is formed; the action expectation deduction path is a sequence that arranges the relay protection functions in the order of responding to the fault.

[0120] Following the deduction path of the expected action, the actual action of each relay protection function is compared with its corresponding expected action in turn to complete the evaluation of the action behavior of each relay protection function.

[0121] Optionally, based on the four characteristics and protection operation logic of relay protection, operation expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions, including:

[0122] For faulty equipment, establish the expected operation of its full-line high-speed main protection and distance I-stage protection;

[0123] For faulty equipment, the expected operation of its near-backup protection is established by combining the operation status and protection range of the time-limitless protection.

[0124] Establish the expected actions for circuit breaker failure protection, remote transmission, and tripping functions;

[0125] When the protection of the faulty equipment fails to operate, establish the expected operation of its upstream remote backup protection.

[0126] Optionally, the expected action derivation path is arranged in the following order: starting with the timeless protection of the faulty equipment, followed by the time-delayed protection of the faulty equipment, the circuit breaker failure protection, and the next-level relay protection.

[0127] Optionally, the conclusions of the behavioral evaluation include correct action, refusal to act, and mis-act.

[0128] Exemplary electronic devices

[0129] Figure 6 This is the structure of an electronic device provided in an exemplary embodiment of the present invention. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device 60 includes one or more processors 61 and a memory 62.

[0130] The processor 61 may be a central processing unit (CPU) or other form of processing unit with data processing and / or instruction execution capabilities, and may control other components in the electronic device to perform desired functions.

[0131] The memory 62 may include one or more computer program products, which may include various forms of computer-readable storage media, such as volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. The volatile memory may include, for example, random access memory (RAM) and / or cache memory. The non-volatile memory may include, for example, read-only memory (ROM), hard disk, flash memory, etc. One or more computer program instructions may be stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor 61 may execute the program instructions to implement the methods of the software programs of the various embodiments of the present invention described above, and / or other desired functions. In one example, the electronic device may also include an input device 63 and an output device 64, these components being interconnected via a bus system and / or other forms of connection mechanisms (not shown).

[0132] In addition, the input device 63 may also include, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, etc.

[0133] The output device 64 can output various information to the outside. The output device 64 may include, for example, a display, a speaker, a printer, and a communication network and its connected remote output devices, etc.

[0134] Of course, for the sake of simplicity, Figure 6Only some of the components of this electronic device relevant to the present invention are shown, omitting components such as buses, input / output interfaces, etc. In addition, the electronic device may include any other suitable components depending on the specific application.

[0135] Exemplary computer program products and computer-readable storage media

[0136] In addition to the methods and apparatus described above, embodiments of the present invention may also be computer program products, which include computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps in the methods according to various embodiments of the present invention described in the "Exemplary Methods" section above.

[0137] The computer program product can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages ​​to perform the operations of the embodiments of the present invention. The programming languages ​​include object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java and C++, as well as conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as C or similar languages. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computing device, partially on the user's computing device, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computing device and partially on a remote computing device, or entirely on a remote computing device or server.

[0138] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention may also be computer-readable storage media storing computer program instructions thereon, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the methods according to various embodiments of the present invention described in the "Exemplary Methods" section above.

[0139] The computer-readable storage medium may be any combination of one or more readable media. A readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. A readable storage medium may be, for example, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of readable storage media include: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof.

[0140] The basic principles of the present invention have been described above with reference to specific embodiments. However, it should be noted that the advantages, benefits, and effects mentioned in the present invention are merely examples and not limitations, and should not be considered as essential features of each embodiment of the present invention. Furthermore, the specific details disclosed above are for illustrative and facilitative purposes only, and are not limitations. These details do not limit the present invention to the necessity of employing the aforementioned specific details.

[0141] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For system embodiments, since they largely correspond to method embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the descriptions in the method embodiments.

[0142] The block diagrams of devices, systems, devices, and systems involved in this invention are merely illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that they must be connected, arranged, or configured in the manner shown in the block diagrams. As those skilled in the art will recognize, these devices, systems, devices, and systems can be connected, arranged, and configured in any manner. Words such as “comprising,” “including,” “having,” etc., are open-ended terms meaning “including but not limited to,” and are used interchangeably with them. The terms “or” and “and” as used herein refer to the terms “and / or,” and are used interchangeably with them unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The term “such as” as used herein refers to the phrase “such as but not limited to,” and is used interchangeably with it.

[0143] The methods and systems of the present invention may be implemented in many ways. For example, they may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination of software, hardware, and firmware. The above-described order of steps for the methods is for illustrative purposes only, and the steps of the methods of the present invention are not limited to the order specifically described above unless otherwise specifically stated. Furthermore, in some embodiments, the present invention may also be implemented as a program recorded on a recording medium, the program comprising machine-readable instructions for implementing the methods according to the present invention. Thus, the present invention also covers recording media storing programs for performing the methods according to the present invention.

[0144] It should also be noted that in the systems, apparatus, and methods of the present invention, the components or steps can be disassembled and / or recombined. These disassemblies and / or recombinations should be considered equivalents of the present invention. The above description of the disclosed aspects is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these aspects will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein can be applied to other aspects without departing from the scope of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not intended to be limited to the aspects shown herein, but rather to be carried out within the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

[0145] The above description has been given for purposes of illustration and description. Furthermore, this description is not intended to limit the embodiments of the invention to the forms disclosed herein. Although numerous exemplary aspects and embodiments have been discussed above, those skilled in the art will recognize certain variations, modifications, alterations, additions, and sub-combinations thereof.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating the action behavior of relay protection based on fault path deduction, characterized in that, include: Perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results, wherein the power grid fault location results include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase; Access relay protection related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information; Based on the power grid fault location results and the relay protection related information, fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis are performed, and the action behavior of each relay protection function is evaluated.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results, including: Based on the circuit breaker displacement information, a set of candidate faulty devices is determined through topology analysis; For each device in the candidate fault device set, extract its power grid fault characteristic quantity; Based on the power grid fault characteristics, it is determined whether each device has a fault and the fault phase, and the power grid fault location result is obtained by combining the results.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the power grid fault location results and the relay protection related information, fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis are performed, and the action behavior of each relay protection function is evaluated, including: Based on the four requirements of relay protection and the protection action logic, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions; the action expectations define the expected behavior of the relay protection function in the fault scenario determined by the fault location results of the power grid, whether it should or should not act. Taking the isolation of power grid faults as the main line, and based on the logical coordination relationship between different relay protection functions, an expected action deduction path is formed; the expected action deduction path is a sequence arranged in the order in which the relay protection functions respond to the fault. Following the deduction path of the expected action, the actual action of each relay protection function is compared with its corresponding expected action in turn to complete the evaluation of the action behavior of each relay protection function.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Based on the four characteristics and protection action logic of relay protection, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions, including: For faulty equipment, establish the expected operation of its full-line high-speed main protection and distance I-stage protection; For faulty equipment, the expected operation of its near-backup protection is established by combining the operation status and protection range of the time-limitless protection. Establish the expected actions for circuit breaker failure protection, remote transmission, and tripping functions; When the protection of the faulty equipment fails to operate, establish the expected operation of its upstream remote backup protection.

5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The expected action deduction path is arranged in the following order: starting with the timeless protection of the faulty equipment, followed by the time-limited protection of the faulty equipment, the circuit breaker failure protection, and the next-level relay protection.

6. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The conclusions of the behavioral evaluation include correct action, refusal to act, and mis-act.

7. A relay protection action behavior evaluation device based on fault path deduction, characterized in that, include: An execution module is used to perform power grid fault location and obtain power grid fault location results, wherein the power grid fault location results include at least the faulty equipment and the faulty phase. The access module is used to access relay protection-related information, which includes wiring method information, protection configuration information, protection action information, and protection setting information. The analysis module is used to perform fault path deduction and relay protection action behavior analysis based on the power grid fault location results and the relay protection related information, and to evaluate the action behavior of each relay protection function.

8. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The execution module includes: Based on the circuit breaker displacement information, a set of candidate faulty devices is determined through topology analysis; For each device in the candidate fault device set, extract its power grid fault characteristic quantity; Based on the power grid fault characteristics, it is determined whether each device has a fault and the fault phase, and the power grid fault location result is obtained by combining the results.

9. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The analysis module includes: Based on the four requirements of relay protection and the protection action logic, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions; the action expectations define the expected behavior of the relay protection function in the fault scenario determined by the fault location results of the power grid, whether it should or should not act. Taking the isolation of power grid faults as the main line, and based on the logical coordination relationship between different relay protection functions, an expected action deduction path is formed; the expected action deduction path is a sequence arranged in the order in which the relay protection functions respond to the fault. Following the deduction path of the expected action, the actual action of each relay protection function is compared with its corresponding expected action in turn to complete the evaluation of the action behavior of each relay protection function.

10. The apparatus according to claim 9, characterized in that, Based on the four characteristics and protection action logic of relay protection, action expectations are established for the relevant relay protection functions, including: For faulty equipment, establish the expected operation of its full-line high-speed main protection and distance I-stage protection; For faulty equipment, the expected operation of its near-backup protection is established by combining the operation status and protection range of the time-limitless protection. Establish the expected actions for circuit breaker failure protection, remote transmission, and tripping functions; When the protection of the faulty equipment fails to operate, establish the expected operation of its upstream remote backup protection.

11. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program for performing the method described in any one of claims 1-6.

12. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the method described in any one of claims 1-6.

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