Fair sorting blocking MEV method and system based on secret election, corresponding computer terminal and computer readable storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a fair sorting blocking MEV method and system based on secret election. The method comprises the steps of appointing public parameters when a block chain network is initialized; nodes participating in secret election generate unique identity certificates, generate commitments of a corresponding number according to the ranking of the reputation points, and store the commitments in an identity certificate list and a candidate pool list respectively; the candidate pool list is blindly disrupted, a random number r is obtained through a random beacon, and the rth committed owner in the candidate pool list is selected as a sorter node of the round; the presenter node broadcasts the packaged transaction blocks to the candidate group, and the sorter node sorts transactions according to a preset rule and broadcasts sorted blocks, secrets and identities; and after the presenter passes the identity verification, the blocks are linked to finish fair sorting and block the MEV, and the sorter and the presenter obtain corresponding rewards. According to the method, the confidentiality of the sorting nodes is guaranteed through secret election and candidate pool blinding, the loop attack is prevented, the attack difficulty is improved, and it is ensured that the sorting result is fair and unpredictable based on the sorting rule.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of blockchain technology and decentralized finance (DeFi), and particularly relates to a method and system for fair ordering and blocking maximal extractable value (MEV) based on secret election, a corresponding computer terminal and a computer readable storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] Blockchain technology has been widely applied in many fields such as finance, medicine and supply chain due to its decentralization and tamper-proof characteristics. Among them, decentralized finance (DeFi) as an important direction of the integration of blockchain and finance has developed rapidly in recent years. As of 2024, the total locked value of the DeFi market remains stable at about $130 billion, reflecting its huge market size and active trading ecosystem.

[0003] The huge market size has given rise to high-frequency trading scenarios, with tens of thousands of transactions flowing through the network every minute. In the process of ordering these transactions, there are a large number of opportunities to extract maximal extractable value (MEV), which has attracted the attention of many DeFi participants, and even led to the emergence of arbitrage robots specifically for MEV extraction. MEV itself is not harmful, but when the potential earnings are substantial, attackers may seize such earnings through malicious means.

[0004] The acquisition of MEV is directly related to transaction ordering. In a blockchain network with open ordering rules, miner nodes that have the right to order can freely adjust the execution order of transactions within a block. With this right, miners can launch a front-running attack or a sandwich attack to pursue MEV benefits: a front-running attack refers to an attacker monitoring the mempool and finding a profitable target transaction, then submitting their own transaction and ensuring its priority execution to earn the price difference; a sandwich attack, as an advanced form of front-running attack, the attacker will insert a transaction of his own before and after the target transaction, forming the structure of "attacker transaction - target transaction - attacker transaction", and maximizing profits through two-way price manipulation. Both attacks come at the cost of harming user interests and disrupting transaction fairness. At the same time, nodes with transaction ordering rights also become the main target of MEV hunters, and some attackers may bribe the orderer, or implement distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, eclipse attacks and other threat methods to force the orderer to prioritize transactions that meet their interests.

[0005] Therefore, there is an urgent need in the art for a fair ordering MEV blocking technology that blocks the malicious extraction path of MEV by limiting the transaction ordering freedom in the blockchain network, while protecting the ordering node, resisting the DDoS attack of the attacker and avoiding the private collusion of the bribe. SUMMARY

[0006] In view of the problems of vulnerable ordering nodes to attacks and bribery, predictable and manipulable ordering process, and lack of effective incentives and checks and balances for node behavior in the prior art, the present application provides a fair ordering MEV blocking method and system based on secret election, corresponding computer terminal and computer readable storage medium. By constructing a "candidate-orderer-proposer" three-role separation architecture, and combining single secret leader election and cryptography commitment mechanism, the secret, fair and unpredictable election of the ordering node is realized; further, through the deterministic ordering rule based on XOR distance, the ordering freedom is limited while the fairness and anti-manipulation of the ordering result are ensured, so as to block the extraction path of malicious MEV from the root.

[0007] Technical solution of the present application Compared with the prior art, the technical effect of the present application The fair ordering MEV blocking method and system based on secret election provided by the present application clearly defines the node responsibility boundary through the "candidate-orderer-proposer" three-role separation MEV blocking architecture, splits the core power, and avoids the malicious extraction of MEV benefits by a single node due to power concentration from the root.

[0008] The fair ordering MEV blocking method and system based on secret election provided by the present application realizes the uniqueness and unpredictability of the ordering node identity by using single secret leader algorithm (Single Secret Leader Election, SSLE), realizes the identity hiding of the ordering node, and avoids the attack threat or bribery of the ordering node due to the transparent identity.

[0009] The fair ordering MEV blocking method and system based on secret election provided by the present application drives the candidate multi-commitment registration mechanism through the election weight, links the election weight with the commitment number in the registration stage, dynamically adjusts the selection probability, and encourages the node to perform compliant behavior; at the same time, the ordering node is not rewarded for the increase of the election weight, and the registration upper limit is set, so as to avoid the monopoly of the ordering right by the high-weight node.

[0010] The application provides a fair ranking blocking MEV method and system based on secret election, adopts a transaction fair ranking method of XOR distance, and aims at the MEV vulnerability that the traditional "Gas fee priority" ranking is easy to be manipulated and malicious ranking of malicious attackers. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0011] Other features, objects, and advantages of the application will become more apparent from the following detailed description of non-limiting embodiments, when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 A workflow diagram of the fair ranking blocking MEV method based on secret election in an embodiment of the application.

[0012] Figure 2 A workflow diagram of the fair ranking blocking MEV method based on secret election in a preferred embodiment of the application.

[0013] Figure 3 A workflow diagram of the SSLE algorithm when a node is registered in a preferred embodiment of the application.

[0014] Figure 4 A workflow diagram of the SSLE algorithm when a ranking node is elected in a preferred embodiment of the application.

[0015] Figure 5 A flowchart of the ranking based on XOR distance calculation when a block is ranked in a preferred embodiment of the application.

[0016] Figure 6 A relationship diagram of the time overhead and the number of network nodes in each round of election in a preferred embodiment of the application.

[0017] Figure 7 A component module schematic diagram of the fair ranking blocking MEV system based on secret election in an embodiment of the application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0018] The embodiments of the application are described in detail as follows: The embodiments are implemented on the premise of the technical scheme of the application, and detailed implementation modes and specific operation processes are given. It should be noted that, for ordinary skilled persons in the art, without departing from the concept of the application, a number of modifications and improvements can be made, which all belong to the protection scope of the application.

[0019] In view of the lack of fair ordering blocking MEV technology in the prior art to effectively resist the malicious attack of an attacker to threaten and manipulate transaction ordering to maliciously obtain MEV benefits, an embodiment of the present application provides a fair ordering blocking MEV method based on secret election. The method is based on an SSLE algorithm and realizes a fair ordering blocking MEV technology based on ordering node hiding for an attacker to threaten an ordering node through malicious attacks to affect the fairness of ordering.

[0020] The method provided by the present application runs in a decentralized finance (DeFi) blockchain network composed of N nodes. The network adopts a core architecture of "candidate-orderer-proposer" three role separation: Candidate: refers to all nodes that have staked assets and registered to participate in the election of ordering nodes, and the core responsibility is to generate and maintain their own identity proof and commitment.

[0021] Orderer: refers to a single node randomly selected from the candidates in each round through a secret election mechanism, and the core responsibility is to sort the transactions in the block according to the fair rules.

[0022] Proposer: usually a node selected by the protocol or through another mechanism (such as PoS rotation), responsible for collecting transactions, packaging raw blocks, coordinating the election process, and finally verifying the output of the orderer.

[0023] The roles are separated and balanced, avoiding the monopoly of transaction ordering rights from the system design level.

[0024] Embodiment 1: Flow of fair ordering blocking MEV method based on secret election As shown in Figure 1 , the fair ordering blocking MEV method based on secret election provided by the embodiment can include the following operations: S1, when the blockchain network is initialized, the public parameters are agreed, and the public parameters include a group G of prime order q, empty vectors H and L, and a proposer P; S2, the nodes in the blockchain network that intend to participate in the secret election generate unique identity proofs and different numbers of commitments according to the election weight of each node, and put the generated identity proofs and commitments into vectors H and L; that is, the identity proof list H is used to store the unique identity of all candidate nodes. The candidate pool list L is used to store the election commitments submitted by all candidate nodes.

[0025] S3, a random number r is obtained through a random beacon, and the ordering node is determined according to the random number, and the work of sorting the transactions in the block is performed; S4, the proposer node broadcasts the packaged block to the candidate group, and the ordering node sorts the transactions according to the preset rules after receiving the block and broadcasts the sorted block, and discloses the secret ski and the corresponding unique identity proof hi.

[0026] S5, the proposer node verifies the identity of the ordering node, and if the identity verification is passed, the sorted block is added to the blockchain network, and the fair sorting of the transaction is completed; if the verification fails, the ordering node is punished, and a new ordering node is elected to generate a new ordering block.

[0027] In some preferred embodiments, S1 above can further include the following operations: When the blockchain network is initialized, the nodes in the blockchain network perform node role division, clearly define the node responsibility boundary based on the "candidate-orderer-proposer" three-role separation architecture, split the core rights of miners, and avoid a single node from obtaining MEV due to centralized rights.

[0028] In some preferred embodiments, S2 above, the nodes in the blockchain network that have the intention to participate in secret election generate a candidate pool list L and an identity proof list H for ordering node election, can further include the following operations: S21, provide two public lists; S22, in the blockchain network, the nodes that have the intention to participate in election submit a hash hi to one of the public lists; S23, in the blockchain network, the nodes that have the intention to participate in election submit different shares of commitment com(ski, ri) to the other public list according to their own election weight; S24, obtain the list of node hashes H(ski) as the identity proof list H[h1, h2,..., hn] for the candidate nodes to store the unique identity proofs, wherein h1 to hn are the unique identity proofs of each candidate node; S25, obtain the list of node commitments com(ski, ri) as the candidate pool list L[com1, com2,..., comn] for ordering node election, wherein com1 to comn are the commitments of each candidate node.

[0029] In some preferred embodiments, S22 above, in the blockchain network, the nodes that have the intention to participate in election submit a hash H(ski) to one of the public identity proof lists, can further include the following operations: S221, the nodes in the blockchain network that are willing to participate in the election submit a hash H(ski) to the public identity list H, where ski is a secret belonging to the node Ni, and H(·) is a hash operation.

[0030] In some preferred embodiments, the above S23, in the blockchain network, the nodes that are willing to participate in the election submit different shares of commitments to another public list according to their own election weights, can further include the following operations: S231, the nodes in the blockchain network that are willing to participate in the election submit commitments to the public candidate pool list L , wherein, is a generator in a DDH problem in a group G with a prime order q that is difficult to solve, ski is a secret belonging to the node Ni, and ri is a number randomly sampled in .

[0031] S232, the nodes that are willing to participate in the election can submit different numbers of commitments to the candidate pool list L according to their election weights, wherein the nodes with high election weights can submit commitments according to a certain proportion according to the number of current candidate nodes, dynamically adjust the probability of being elected, and encourage nodes to behave honestly.

[0032] S233, the candidate nodes that have completed commitment submission will check the commitments and the corresponding identity proofs of the new entries into the candidate pool list to ensure that there is no duplication.

[0033] In some preferred embodiments, the above S233, the candidate nodes that have completed commitment submission will check the commitments com(ski, ri) and the corresponding identity proofs hi of the new entries into the candidate pool list to ensure that there is no duplication, can further include the following operations: S2331, check whether the commitment com(ski, ri) of the new entry into the candidate pool list satisfies , wherein C is the submitted commitment list of the current candidate node, and com1 to comj are the submitted commitments; if the formula is satisfied, the new commitment is added to the candidate pool list, and if it is not satisfied, the new commitment is rejected to join the candidate pool list.

[0034] S2332, check whether the identity proof hi of the new entry into the identity list satisfies , wherein hj is the unique identity proof of the current candidate node; if the formula is satisfied, the new identity proof is added to the identity list, and if it is not satisfied, the new identity proof is rejected to join the identity list.

[0035] In some preferred embodiments, S3, the random number r is obtained through the random beacon, the sorting node is determined according to the random number, and the work of performing the sorting of the intra-block transaction can further include the following operations: S31, blinding the candidate pool list L; S32, obtaining a random number r through the random beacon, and determining the commitment owner at the corresponding position in the candidate pool list L as the sorting node according to the random number r.

[0036] In some preferred embodiments, S31, blinding the candidate pool list L, can further include the following operations: S311, sampling a random number r from . re-randomizing the commitment in the candidate pool list, calculating the commitment , and putting the newly calculated commitment into the candidate pool list L, thereby cutting off the link caused by the numerical disclosure of the original commitment calculation result; S312, randomly shuffling the entries in the candidate pool list L, thereby cutting off the link between the commitment and the commitment owner caused by the position of the commitment in the list.

[0037] In some preferred embodiments, S32, obtaining a random number r through the random beacon, and determining the commitment owner at the corresponding position in the candidate pool list L as the sorting node according to the random number r, can further include the following operations: S321, the node obtains an unbiased random number r through the random beacon, and the elected commitment position , wherein N is the number of candidate nodes.

[0038] In some preferred embodiments, S4, the proposer broadcasts the packaged block to the candidate group, and the sorting node sorts the transactions according to a preset rule after receiving the block, and broadcasts the sorted block, while publicly disclosing the secret ski and the corresponding unique identity certificate hi, can further include the following operations: S41, after receiving the block broadcast by the proposer, the sorting node calculates the XOR distance between the transaction hash value H(TXi) in the block and the identity certificate hash value H(ski) of itself, and sorts the transactions according to the distance size.

[0039] In some preferred embodiments, S5, the proposer verifies the identity of the sorting node, and if the identity verification is passed, the sorted block is added to the block chain network, and the fair sorting of the transaction is completed; if the verification fails, the sorting node is punished, and a new sorting node is elected to generate a new sorting block, which can further include the following operations: S51, verifying whether the identity proof hi provided by the sorting node is equal to H (ski) and the commitment selected by the sorting node satisfies the equation ) whether the equation is satisfied, where u= , v= If both conditions are met, it is proved that the commitment is valid and generated by the sorting node, and the block is formally proposed; S52, if one of the conditions is not met, the block is abandoned, and the dishonest node is punished and its election weight is adjusted.

[0040] The fair sorting MEV method based on secret election provided by the above-mentioned embodiments of the application, through the cooperation of the SSLE algorithm (S2-S3) and the XOR distance sorting (S4), a technical solution for resisting the malicious threat of the attacker to manipulate the sorting of the sorting node is constructed, which realizes the attacker-agnostic of the sorting node identity and guarantees the fairness and unpredictability of the in-block transaction sorting. Among them, the application of the SSLE algorithm ensures the fairness, uniqueness and unpredictability of the sorting node election, and realizes the node identity hiding; the application also optimizes the original SSLE algorithm, dynamically optimizes the selection probability of each node by adjusting the election weight, and then encourages the nodes to participate honestly. Compared with other MEV resisting solutions, the method significantly improves the attack cost of the attacker with very low self-cost, and effectively reduces the attack success rate.

[0041] The above-mentioned embodiments of the application will be further described in detail below in combination with a preferred embodiment and the accompanying drawings, but the protection scope of the application should not be limited thereto.

[0042] As shown in Figure 2 , the fair sorting MEV method based on secret election provided by the preferred embodiment has a main workflow of 5 steps: Step 1: When the blockchain network is initialized, the required public parameters in the system are negotiated, including a DDH problem insolvable group G of a prime number order q, an empty vector H and an empty vector L, and the nodes in the blockchain network are divided into node roles, the node responsibility boundary is determined based on the "candidate-sorter-proposer" three-role separation architecture, the core authority of the miner is split, and the MEV obtained by a single node due to the centralized authority is avoided.

[0043] Step 2: Nodes in the blockchain network that are willing to participate in the secret election generate a unique identity certificate hi (as described in Step 2-1 below) and generate different numbers of commitments com(ski, ri) according to the election weight of each node (as described in Step 2-2 below), and put the generated identity certificate hi and commitment into vectors H and L, and adjust the selection probability dynamically to encourage nodes to behave honestly; finally, the newly added identity certificate and commitment are checked repeatedly (as described in Step 2-3 below) as follows: When the participating nodes register as candidate nodes, the participating nodes in the blockchain network generate an identity certificate list H and a candidate pool list L, as follows: Step 2-1, as shown in Figure 3 , the nodes in the blockchain network that are willing to participate in the election submit a hash H(ski) to the public identity certificate list H, where ski is a secret belonging to the node Ni, and H(·) is a hash operation.

[0044] Step 2-2, as shown in Figure 3 , the nodes in the blockchain network that are willing to participate in the election submit a commitment to the public candidate pool list L, where is a generator on a DDH problem group G of a previously agreed prime number q, ski is a secret belonging to the node Ni, and ri is a randomly sampled number in . The nodes that are willing to participate in the election can submit different numbers of commitments to the candidate pool list L according to their election weight, where the nodes with high election weight can submit commitments according to a certain proportion according to the current number of candidate nodes, dynamically adjust the selection probability, and encourage nodes to behave honestly.

[0045] Step 2-3, the candidate nodes that have completed the commitment submission will check the commitment com(ski, ri) and the corresponding identity certificate hi of the new candidate pool list to ensure that there is no duplication. For the newly added commitment, check whether the commitment com(ski, ri) satisfies , where C is the submitted commitment list of the current candidate node, and com1 to comj are the submitted commitments; if the formula is satisfied, the new commitment is added to the candidate pool list, and if it is not satisfied, the new commitment is rejected. For the newly added identity certificate, check whether the identity certificate hi satisfies , where hj is the unique identity certificate of the current candidate node; if the formula is satisfied, the new identity certificate is added to the identity certificate list, and if it is not satisfied, the new identity certificate is rejected.

[0046] Step 3: Obtain a random number r through a random beacon, determine the sorting node based on the random number, and perform the transaction sorting work within the block. The specific steps are as follows: Step 3-1, as follows Figure 4 As shown, the candidate pool list is blinded and shuffled, starting from... Sample a random number The commitments in the candidate pool are re-randomized, and the commitments are calculated. The newly calculated commitments are placed in the candidate pool list L, severing the link caused by the public disclosure of the original commitment calculation results; Then, the entries in the candidate pool list L are randomly shuffled to sever the link between the commitment's position in the list and the commitment owner.

[0047] Step 3-2: Obtain a random number r through a random beacon. Based on the random number r, determine the commitment owner at the corresponding position in the candidate pool list L as the sorting node. Here, the random number r obtained through the random beacon is an unbiased random number, and the elected commitment position... N is the number of candidate nodes.

[0048] Step 4: The proposing node broadcasts the packaged block to the candidate group. After receiving the block, the sorting node sorts the transactions according to preset rules and broadcasts the sorted block, while also revealing its secret (ski) and corresponding unique identity proof (hi). The specific steps are as follows: Step 4-1: The node proposes to package the transaction into a block according to the preset rules, and then broadcast the block to the candidate node group.

[0049] Step 4-2, as follows Figure 5 As shown, after receiving the block broadcast by the proposer, the sorting node calculates the XOR distance between the transaction hash value H(TXi) in the block and its own identity verification hash value H(ski), and sorts the transactions according to the distance.

[0050] Step 4-3: After submitting the sorted blocks, the sorting node publishes its key STi and unique identity proof hi for subsequent authentication.

[0051] Step 5: The proposing node verifies the identity of the sorting node. If the identity verification is successful, the sorted block is added to the blockchain network, completing the fair sorting of transactions. If the verification fails, the sorting node is penalized, and a new sorting node is elected to generate a new sorted block. The specific steps are as follows: Step 5-1: Verify whether the identity proof hi provided by the sorting node is equal to H(ski), and the selected commitment. Does it satisfy the equation? wherein u , v If both conditions are met, step 5-2 is executed, and if at least one of the conditions is not met, step 5-2' is executed.

[0052] Step 5-2, the block is submitted to the blockchain network, and the proposer node and the ordering node obtain different proportions of rewards.

[0053] Step 5-2', the block is directly discarded, and the dishonest block is punished by adjusting its election weight, and finally a new ordering node is elected to complete the ordering work.

[0054] As shown in Figure 6 , the relationship between the average time cost of five rounds of election ordering nodes and the number of network nodes in the technical solution implemented by the above blocking MEV method is shown. The dashed line in the figure represents the total time spent in completing the five rounds of election, and the remaining curves represent the time spent in the remaining steps during the election process. It can be found that the time cost required by the above embodiments of the application is extremely low, and the time spent increases almost linearly as the number of nodes increases, indicating that the method has excellent implementability.

[0055] An embodiment of the application provides a fair ordering blocking MEV system based on secret election.

[0056] Specifically, as shown in Figure 7 , the fair ordering blocking MEV system based on secret election provided by this embodiment can include the following modules: An initialization module, which is configured to agree on public parameters when the blockchain network is initialized, wherein the public parameters include a group G of a prime number q and a DDH problem that is difficult to solve, an empty vector H, and an empty vector L; A candidate node registration module, which is configured to generate a unique identity certificate and a commitment for a node willing to participate in secret election, and put them into the identity certificate list H and the candidate pool list L for electing ordering nodes, respectively; An ordering node election module, which is configured to obtain an unbiased random number r from the random beacon by the blockchain network, determine that a commitment owner in the list L is the ordering node of this round through the random number, and perform transaction ordering work; A block generation module, which is configured to sort transactions according to a predetermined rule by the ordering node in the blockchain network, and then send the sorted block together with the identity certificate related parameters to the proposer node; the proposer node verifies the identity of the ordering node, and if the verification is passed, the block is put into the blockchain network and the rewards are issued, and if the verification fails, the block is discarded and the ordering node is re-elected while the dishonest node is punished.

[0057] It should be noted that the steps in the method provided by the present application can be implemented by corresponding modules, devices, units, etc. in the system. Those skilled in the art can refer to the technical solutions of the method to realize the composition of the system, that is, the embodiments in the method can be understood as preferred examples of constructing the system, which will not be described here.

[0058] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer terminal, including a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the computer program can be used to execute the method of any one of the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application, or run the system of any one of the above-mentioned embodiments of the present application.

[0059] Optionally, the memory is used for storing programs; the memory can include volatile memory (English: volatile memory), such as random access memory (English: random-access memory, abbreviation: RAM), such as static random access memory (English: static random-access memory, abbreviation: SRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (English: Double Data Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory, abbreviation: DDR SDRAM) and the like; the memory can also include non-volatile memory (English: non-volatile memory), such as flash memory (English: flash memory). The memory is used for storing computer programs (such as application programs, functional modules and the like for realizing the above-mentioned method), computer instructions and the like, and the above-mentioned computer programs, computer instructions and the like can be stored in one or more memories. And the above-mentioned computer programs, computer instructions, data and the like can be called by the processor.

[0060] The above-mentioned computer programs, computer instructions and the like can be stored in one or more memories. And the above-mentioned computer programs, computer instructions, data and the like can be called by the processor.

[0061] The processor is used for executing the computer program stored in the memory to realize each step in the method or each module of the system related to the above-mentioned embodiments. For details, please refer to the related description in the above-mentioned method and system embodiments.

[0062] The processor and the memory can be an independent structure or an integrated structure. When the processor and the memory are independent structures, the memory and the processor can be coupled and connected through a bus.

[0063] An embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, can be used to perform the method of any of the above embodiments of the present invention, or to run the system of any of the above embodiments of the present invention.

[0064] Any matters not covered in the above embodiments of the present invention are well-known in the art.

[0065] The specific embodiments of the present invention have been described above. It should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and those skilled in the art can make various modifications or variations within the scope of the claims, which do not affect the essence of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for blocking the maximum extractable value through fair ranking based on secret election, characterized in that, By employing a three-stage collaborative approach of role separation, secret election, and fair sorting, the transaction sorting process is made resistant to attacks and manipulation; the method includes: Node registration phase: Candidate nodes in the blockchain network generate secret identity certificates and, based on their dynamically adjusted election weights, submit a number of cryptographic commitments proportional to their weights to the network, which are stored in the public identity certificate list and candidate pool list, respectively. Secret election phase: Before each round of block generation, a blinding operation including re-randomization and reordering is performed on the candidate pool list, and a unique sorting node is elected unbiasedly and unpredictably from the blinded list using random numbers obtained from a verifiable random source, and the true identity of the sorting node is kept secret from other network participants before being actively revealed. Fair ordering and verification phase: The selected ordering node uses a predetermined distance metric between its secret parameter and the hash of the transaction to be ordered to order the transactions in a deterministic but unpredictable manner; after the ordering is completed, the ordering node exposes its secret parameter for verification. After the network verifies the legitimacy of its identity and ownership of the election commitment, it decides whether to accept the ordered block.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The role separation refers to establishing an architecture in the network that separates the roles of candidates, sorters, and proposers. Among them, candidates are responsible for registration and submitting commitments, sorters are generated in a secret election phase and are responsible for sorting transactions in a single round, and proposers are responsible for packaging transactions, coordinating the election process, and initiating verification of the sorting results. The permissions of the three roles are independent of each other and are mutually checked and balanced.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The submission of cryptographic commitments to the network in proportion to its dynamically adjusted election weight specifically includes: Each candidate node Ni maintains an election weight Wi, which is dynamically calculated by the network consensus protocol based on its historical behavior and / or staking status. During registration or update, candidate node N i The number m of cryptographic commitments allowed to be submitted to the candidate pool list i , by function m i = f(W i The condition is determined, where f(·) is a monotonically non-decreasing function, and an upper limit is set for the number of submissions; This mechanism economically links a node's long-term reputation to its selection probability.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The blinding operation, which includes re-randomization and reordering, performed on the candidate pool list specifically includes: Re-randomization: For each original commitment com = (u, v) in the list, select a new blinding factor r' ∈ Z q Calculate a new commitment to eliminate the direct numerical correlation between the commitment value and the submitter; Order rearrangement: The new set of commitments after re-randomization is subjected to a global, unpredictable random permutation to eliminate the correlation between the order of the commitment list and the submitter; The list obtained after the blinding operation does not statistically reveal any correspondence between commitments and specific candidate nodes.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The network verifies the legitimacy of the identity and ownership of the election commitment through the following two steps: (a) Verify whether the hash value H(sk') corresponding to the disclosed secret sk' is exactly the same as the identity certificate h registered by the node in the identity certificate list; (b) Based on the election result index, locate the original commitment com = (u, v) in the candidate pool list before blinding, and verify whether the equation u^{sk'} = v holds true to prove that the node has the private key that generated this commitment.

6. A system for blocking the maximum extractable value through fair ranking based on secret election, characterized in that, include: The role separation management module is used to implement and maintain the separation architecture and permission boundaries of the three roles of candidate, sorter and proposer in the blockchain network; The dynamic weight management module is used to calculate and update the election weight of each participating node according to preset rules. The weight is associated with the upper limit of the number of commitments submitted by the node. The registration and commitment management module is used to receive unique identity certificates and cryptographic commitments submitted by candidate nodes, maintain a global list of identity certificates and a candidate pool list, and perform uniqueness verification. The secret election execution module is used to perform a blinding operation on the candidate pool list, access a verifiable random source to obtain a random number, and elect a sorted node from the blinded list based on the random number, while ensuring the unpredictability of the election process and the anonymity of the node's identity. The fair ranking calculation module is configured in each node and is activated when the node is selected as the sorter. It is used to sort transactions using the XOR distance rule. The verification and reward / penalty execution module is used to perform automated cryptographic verification of the results submitted by sorting nodes, and to trigger the acceptance or rejection of blocks based on the verification results, as well as to issue rewards or implement penalties for nodes.

7. The system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The sub-module implementing the blinding operation in the secret election execution module adopts a non-interactive distributed computing protocol or is executed by the proposer node with verifiable proof to ensure the credibility and transparency of the blinding process.

8. A computer terminal, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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