Safety verification method and equipment for heavy-duty car AEB and medium
By identifying safety objectives through hazard analysis and risk assessment, designing safety mechanisms, and conducting multi-level testing and verification, the systemic safety verification problem of heavy-duty vehicle AEB systems was solved, improving the completeness and reliability of verification and reducing safety risks.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-12-30
- Publication Date
- 2026-04-03
AI Technical Summary
Existing technologies lack systematic, full-lifecycle functional safety verification methods for heavy-duty vehicle AEB systems, especially for multi-level fault injection and safety mechanism verification that meets automotive functional safety standards, making it difficult to identify and control potential safety risks.
A safety verification method is provided, which includes Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) to determine safety objectives and ASIL levels, designing safety mechanisms, conducting unit, integration, system and vehicle-level testing and verification, and meeting safety indicators through iterative optimization.
It achieves end-to-end coverage from safety target definition to vehicle safety verification, improves the integrity and reliability of functional safety verification of heavy-duty vehicle AEB system, detects design defects early, and reduces rectification costs and safety risks.
Smart Images
Figure CN121783573A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of automotive safety verification technology, and in particular to a safety verification method, device and medium for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles. Background Technology
[0002] With the widespread use of heavy vehicles in logistics, transportation, and construction, their driving safety has become an increasingly important concern. Due to their large mass and high inertia, heavy vehicles have significantly longer braking distances in emergency situations, often resulting in severe personal injury and property damage in the event of a collision. Studies have shown that equipping vehicles with Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) systems can effectively reduce the accident rate and mitigate damage when a collision is unavoidable. However, the AEB system itself is a safety-critical system; false triggering, missed triggering, or malfunction can all lead to danger, especially for heavy vehicles, where system failure has even more severe consequences.
[0003] Currently, verification of AEB systems primarily focuses on functional performance testing, such as braking distance and response time. However, systematic, full-lifecycle functional safety verification remains inadequate. Especially when it comes to meeting automotive functional safety standards, there is a lack of systematic methods and tools to support a complete safety process from hazard analysis to vehicle verification. Existing verification methods often emphasize single-level or later-stage real-vehicle testing, failing to adequately cover multi-level fault injection and safety mechanism verification from unit and integration to the system level. This makes it difficult to identify and control potential safety risks early.
[0004] Therefore, it is urgent to build a set of safety verification methods that meet functional safety standards for heavy-duty vehicle AEB systems, and realize a closed-loop process from safety target definition and safety mechanism design to multi-level testing and verification, so as to comprehensively improve the reliability and safety of the system. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This application provides a safety verification method, device, and medium for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles to solve the above-mentioned problems.
[0006] On the one hand, this application provides a safety verification method for AEB (Automatic Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles, the method comprising the following steps: Step S1: Determine the safety objectives and ASIL (Automatic Emergency Braking Scale) level of the AEB system based on Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA); Step S2: Conduct technical safety concept design according to the safety objectives, allocate functional safety requirements to the perception, decision-making, and execution modules of the system architecture, and design corresponding safety mechanisms; Step S3: Based on the safety mechanisms and the identified fault types, design and perform functional safety verification tests at the unit, integration, system, and vehicle levels during the system development process; Step S4: Iteratively optimize the safety mechanism or architecture of the AEB system according to the results of the verification tests at each level until the preset safety indicators are met.
[0007] In one implementation of this application, step S1, the hazard analysis and risk assessment includes: defining the relevant items and boundaries of the automatic emergency braking system; identifying potential hazards and hazard events of the system under various operating scenarios; and determining the safety target and its corresponding vehicle safety integrity level ASIL based on the severity, exposure probability and controllability of the hazard event.
[0008] In one implementation of this application, step S2, the technical security concept design includes: determining the required security mechanisms based on the ASIL level, including at least one of the following: verification of the rationality of sensor signals, security monitoring of control algorithms, end-to-end protection of communication signals, and actuator redundancy design; and decomposing the technical security requirements into hardware components and software units.
[0009] In one implementation of this application, step S3 specifically involves: at the unit level, performing model-in-the-loop testing on the software unit and electrical characteristic testing on the hardware module; at the integration level, performing software integration testing, hardware integration testing, and software-hardware integration testing, and injecting faults corresponding to the fault types to verify the effectiveness of the safety mechanism; at the system level, performing system safety requirement testing and fault injection testing in a simulation or bench environment; and at the vehicle level, performing real-vehicle road testing to verify the overall functional safety of the system and its safety status after failure. In one implementation of this application, the fault types include at least one of sensor failure, controller logic error, communication timeout or loss, and actuator response lag or jamming. The fault injection test simulates or physically injects faults for the fault types at the corresponding levels.
[0010] In one implementation of this application, step S4 includes iterative optimization: if the coverage or result of any level of test does not meet the requirements of the corresponding ASIL level, then backtrack to the design stage to supplement or enhance the corresponding security mechanism; for the system after supplementing the security mechanism, re-execute the verification test starting from the affected level until the test results of all levels meet the preset security indicators.
[0011] In one implementation of this application, during the testing process in step S3, variables including vehicle status, sensor data, controller decision commands, actuator responses, and fault injection status are also recorded, and clear test pass criteria are set based on the safety objective.
[0012] In one implementation of this application, the specific implementation of the security mechanism includes: setting physical range, rate of change, and consistency verification between signals for sensor signals; designing independent monitoring units or redundant calculation channels for control algorithms; adding check codes or serial numbers to key communication signals to achieve end-to-end protection; and designing dual-channel or backup control paths for brake actuators.
[0013] Secondly, this application also provides a safety verification device for heavy-duty vehicle AEB, the device comprising: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, the instructions being executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the aforementioned safety verification method for heavy-duty vehicle AEB.
[0014] Finally, this application also provides a non-volatile computer storage medium for safety verification of AEB for heavy-duty vehicles, storing computer-executable instructions that are executed by a processor to implement the aforementioned safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles.
[0015] This application provides a safety verification method, device, and medium for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles, which has the following beneficial effects: 1. By systematically conducting Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA), safety objectives and ASIL levels are clearly defined, and safety mechanisms are planned during the design phase based on this. Finally, closed-loop verification tests are performed at the unit, integration, system, and vehicle development levels, achieving end-to-end coverage from safety objective definition to vehicle safety verification, which significantly improves the completeness and reliability of functional safety verification of heavy-duty vehicle AEB systems.
[0016] 2. By proactively implementing fault injection tests for key fault types identified in unit testing, integration testing, and system testing, such as sensors, controllers, communication devices, and actuators, the effectiveness of various safety mechanisms can be verified early and thoroughly. This helps to discover and eliminate design defects in the early stages of development, reducing later rectification costs and safety risks.
[0017] 3. By establishing an iterative optimization process guided by test results, when any test level fails to meet the standard, the process can be traced back to the design phase to supplement security mechanisms and re-verify. At the same time, the entire development and verification process is fully recorded, which realizes continuous improvement of security performance and closed-loop management of the evidence chain, ensuring that the final system meets security standard requirements. Attached Figure Description
[0018] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1 A flowchart of a safety verification method for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles is provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 A logic diagram of an automatic emergency braking system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This application provides a schematic diagram of the testing and verification activities corresponding to each stage of development in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a safety verification device for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles, provided as an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0019] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the technical solutions of this application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with specific embodiments and corresponding drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this application, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0020] This application provides a safety verification method, device, and medium for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles. The technical solution proposed in this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0021] Figure 1 This application provides a flowchart of a safety verification method for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles. Figure 1 As shown, the method mainly includes the following steps: Step S1: Determine the safety objectives and ASIL level of the Automated Emergency Braking (AEB) system based on Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA); Step S2: Based on the security objectives, conduct technical security concept design, allocate functional safety requirements to the perception, decision-making and execution modules of the system architecture, and design corresponding security mechanisms; Step S3: Based on the safety mechanism and the identified fault types, perform functional safety verification tests at the unit, integration, system, and vehicle levels during the system development process. Step S4: Based on the results of verification tests at each level, iteratively optimize the safety mechanism or architecture of the automatic emergency braking system until the preset safety indicators are met.
[0022] In this application, the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system (such as...) Figure 2 The system monitors the driving environment in front of the vehicle in real time using sensors such as radar and cameras. By monitoring the distance and relative speed of targets ahead, and combining this with information such as the vehicle's own speed and distance, it calculates and analyzes to assess potential collision risks. If the driver brakes too late, the braking force is too weak, or there is no braking at all, it automatically takes measures to activate the vehicle's braking system to slow down the vehicle in order to avoid a collision or reduce the risk of a collision.
[0023] Automatic emergency braking systems typically consist of two main modules: warning and emergency braking. Warning function: The system monitors the distance to the vehicle ahead. When the distance is less than a set threshold, it prompts the driver to adjust driving behavior and maintain a safe following distance. The system also assesses potential collision risks and warns the driver through sound, the instrument panel, and other means. Emergency braking assist function: If the system detects a dangerous situation and the driver's braking force is insufficient, the system will assist in increasing braking to avoid or mitigate the risk of a collision.
[0024] Heavy-duty vehicles have greater mass and size, which places higher demands on their braking systems. When designing automatic emergency braking systems, it is necessary to fully consider the characteristics and needs of heavy-duty vehicles, such as higher braking force requirements, more complex road conditions, and higher safety requirements.
[0025] Hazard analysis and risk assessment are conducted based on the functional definition of the automatic emergency braking system to determine the types of failures. The functional safety concept is used to clarify the functional and performance requirements of the automatic emergency braking system, including braking response time, braking distance, and braking force distribution.
[0026] Furthermore, the functional safety design of the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system for heavy-duty vehicles aims to ensure that the vehicle can automatically and effectively brake in emergency situations, thereby reducing the risk of traffic accidents and mitigating their consequences. The architecture comprises key components such as sensors, controllers, and actuators. Safety design ensures the accuracy of sensor-collected information, the correctness of the decision-making system's risk assessment of the current driving environment, and the correctness of its response measures. The decision-making algorithm ensures accurate judgment in complex and changing environments. To ensure the reliability of the braking system, redundancy design and failure protection should be considered, along with fault detection and emergency measures for sensors and controllers, and corresponding testing and verification guidelines should be established.
[0027] Furthermore, the development of the technical safety concept for the Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) system for heavy-duty vehicles involves determining safety objectives based on hazard analysis and risk assessment, including the ASIL level and safety status of these objectives. The design of the AEB system architecture to meet these safety objectives involves multiple levels of consideration, including functional implementation, performance verification, and safety assurance. It requires comprehensive consideration of the system's perception, decision-making, and execution capabilities, as well as its ability to work collaboratively with other systems. The functional safety requirements from the concept phase are decomposed into the perception, decision-making, and braking systems. Corresponding safety mechanisms are designed for identified potential arbitrary hardware failures, E2E protection is designed for safety-related signals, safety monitoring is designed for safety-related programs, and rationality verification is designed for safety-related inputs. The system-level safety objectives are decomposed into specific technical safety requirements to guide the detailed design of the AEB system.
[0028] Furthermore, a safety analysis is conducted on the automatic emergency braking system to identify potential safety hazards and fault types. Based on the analysis results, appropriate risk mitigation measures are selected, and safety mechanisms and measures are designed within the framework of technical safety concepts. Based on the safety analysis results, the focus and strategies for verification are determined to ensure that the system can operate safely under various fault conditions.
[0029] Furthermore, based on safety requirements and in conjunction with the safety design and development phases, verification tests for the automatic emergency braking system are designed (e.g., Figure 3 The process involves determining the test objectives, methods, resources, and timeline. It also requires considering the steps of the verification activities, the selection of test tools and technologies, designing test scenarios, determining test conditions, clarifying the time, methods, and locations of security tests, and identifying the variables to be recorded and the pass / fail criteria.
[0030] The functional safety performance of the automatic emergency braking system is verified through methods such as simulation, testing, and review. Real-vehicle testing involves conducting actual tests on real roads to verify its performance in real-world environments. Review and evaluation involve examining and assessing the design documents and test reports of the automatic emergency braking system to ensure it meets functional safety standards.
[0031] Furthermore, iteration and optimization involve iterating and optimizing the automatic emergency braking system based on the verification results, thereby improving the design and verification methods of the automatic emergency braking system.
[0032] Furthermore, the design and verification process of the automatic emergency braking system is documented, including design documents, safety analysis, test reports, reviews and evaluations, to ensure that the development of the automatic emergency braking system complies with the requirements of relevant standards and regulations.
[0033] The above describes a safety verification method for heavy-duty vehicle AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) provided by embodiments of this application. Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of this application also provide a safety verification device for heavy-duty vehicle AEB. Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a safety verification device for heavy-duty vehicle AEB is provided as an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 4 As shown, the device mainly includes: at least one processor 401; and a memory 402 communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein the memory 402 stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor 401, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor 401 to enable the at least one processor 401 to complete the aforementioned safety verification method for heavy-duty vehicle AEB.
[0034] In addition, this application embodiment also provides a non-volatile computer storage medium for safety verification of heavy-duty vehicle AEB, which stores computer-executable instructions, which are executed by a processor to implement the aforementioned safety verification method for heavy-duty vehicle AEB.
[0035] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.
[0036] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.
[0037] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.
[0038] In a typical configuration, a computing device includes one or more processors (CPU), input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.
[0039] The various embodiments in this application are described in a progressive manner. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, the device embodiments are basically similar to the method embodiments, so the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the descriptions of the method embodiments.
[0040] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.
[0041] The above description is merely an embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit the scope of this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the scope of the claims of this application.
Claims
1. A safety verification method for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: Step S1: Determine the safety objectives and ASIL level of the Automated Emergency Braking (AEB) system based on Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA); Step S2: Based on the security objectives, conduct technical security concept design, allocate functional safety requirements to the perception, decision-making and execution modules of the system architecture, and design corresponding security mechanisms; Step S3: Based on the safety mechanism and the identified fault types, perform functional safety verification tests at the unit, integration, system, and vehicle levels during the system development process; Step S4: Based on the results of verification tests at each level, iteratively optimize the safety mechanism or architecture of the automatic emergency braking system until the preset safety indicators are met.
2. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the hazard analysis and risk assessment include: Define the relevant terms and boundaries of the automatic emergency braking system; Identify potential hazards and incidents in various operating scenarios of the system; Based on the severity, probability of exposure, and controllability of the hazard event, safety objectives and their corresponding vehicle safety integrity levels (ASIL) are determined.
3. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S2, the technical security concept design includes: The required safety mechanisms are determined based on the ASIL level, including at least one of the following: verification of the rationality of sensor signals, security monitoring of control algorithms, end-to-end protection of communication signals, and actuator redundancy design. The technical security requirements are broken down into hardware components and software units.
4. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S3 is as follows: At the unit level, model-in-the-loop testing is performed on software units, and electrical characteristic testing is performed on hardware modules. At the integration level, software integration testing, hardware integration testing, and software-hardware integration testing are performed, and faults corresponding to the fault types are injected to verify the effectiveness of the security mechanism. At the system level, conduct system security requirements testing and fault injection testing in simulation or bench environments; At the vehicle level, real-vehicle road tests are conducted to verify the overall functional safety of the system and its safety status after failure.
5. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, The fault types include at least one of sensor failure, controller logic error, communication timeout or loss, and actuator response lag or jamming. The fault injection test simulates or physically injects faults at the corresponding level for the fault types.
6. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4, iterative optimization includes: If the coverage or results of any level of testing do not meet the requirements of the corresponding ASIL level, the process should be traced back to the design phase to supplement or enhance the corresponding security mechanisms. For the system with the added security mechanisms, the verification test is re-executed starting from the affected level until the test results of all levels meet the preset security indicators.
7. The safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the test in step S3, variables including vehicle status, sensor data, controller decision commands, actuator responses, and fault injection status are also recorded, and clear test pass criteria are set based on the safety objective.
8. A safety verification method for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles according to claim 3, characterized in that, The specific implementation of the security mechanism includes: setting physical range, rate of change, and consistency verification between signals for sensor signals; designing independent monitoring units or redundant calculation channels for control algorithms; adding check codes or serial numbers to key communication signals to achieve end-to-end protection; and designing dual-channel or backup control paths for brake actuators.
9. A safety verification device for AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) of heavy-duty vehicles, characterized in that, The device includes: At least one processor; and, A memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; wherein, The memory stores instructions that can be executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform a safety verification method for heavy-duty vehicle AEB as described in any one of claims 1-8.
10. A non-volatile computer storage medium for safety verification of AEB (Autonomous Emergency Braking) in heavy-duty vehicles, storing computer-executable instructions, characterized in that, The computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor to implement a safety verification method for AEB of heavy-duty vehicles as described in any one of claims 1-8.