Transmission data encryption method for through-the-earth type wireless detonator controller

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of wireless detonators. The transmission data encryption method of the through-the-earth type wireless detonator controller comprises the following steps: the controller sends a new round of operation instruction and a key generation trigger instruction to the controller, and synchronously sends controller information and date information to obtain RSA public keys generated by a plurality of wireless detonators; the controller generates a random number as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key, and encrypts the AES key by using the obtained RSA public key to generate an RSA encrypted key packet; the controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator, and the wireless detonator calls an RSA decryption module, decrypts the RSA encryption key packet by using a retained RSA private key, and extracts an AES key; and in the wireless detonator, storing the AES secret key in an AES decryption module, and when the controller sends frame structure data to the wireless detonator, obtaining original data sent by the controller.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of wireless detonator technology, and more specifically, to a method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller. Background Technology

[0002] In existing ground-penetrating wireless detonator communication solutions, traditional encryption algorithms such as DES and 3DES are mostly used to encrypt transmitted data, and the key transmission stage is mostly sent in plaintext or simple symmetric encryption. Some solutions do not even perform data encryption processing for ground-penetrating transmission, neglecting the security of data transmission.

[0003] Therefore, existing technologies suffer from low encryption security, high key transmission risk, and poor security adaptability. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The main objective of this application is to provide a method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, in order to solve the technical problems in the background art.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application proposes a method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, comprising: The controller acquires information from multiple wireless detonators; Based on the information of multiple wireless detonators, the controller sends a new round of operation instructions and a key generation trigger instruction to it, and simultaneously sends the controller information and date information to obtain the RSA public keys generated by the multiple wireless detonators. The RSA public key represents the RSA public key and RSA private key generated by the wireless detonator through a built-in algorithm based on the controller information and date information sent to it by the controller. The RSA public key is fed back to the controller, and the RSA private key is stored in the wireless detonator. The controller generates a random number as the AES key and calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key with the obtained RSA public key to generate an RSA encryption key packet. The controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator. The wireless detonator calls the RSA decryption module and decrypts the RSA encryption key packet using the stored RSA private key to extract the AES key. In the wireless detonator, the AES key is stored in the AES decryption module. When the controller sends frame structure data to the wireless detonator, the wireless detonator can use the AES key in the AES decryption module to decrypt the data and obtain the original data sent by the controller.

[0006] In some implementable methods, the step of the controller acquiring multiple wireless detonator information includes: The controller establishes wired communication connections with each of the wireless detonators and collects the identification information of each wireless detonator one by one through serial bus communication, thereby completing the acquisition of information on the multiple wireless detonators.

[0007] In some feasible methods, the step of the controller sending a new round of operation instructions and a key generation trigger instruction to multiple wireless detonator information, and simultaneously sending controller information and date information to obtain the RSA public key generated by the multiple wireless detonators, includes: The controller sends a new round of operation instructions and key generation trigger instructions to each of the wireless detonators via wired communication, and simultaneously sends the controller's device information and date information. Each of the wireless detonators generates a 1024-bit RSA key pair by combining the device information and date information received from the controller through a built-in algorithm. The RSA key pair includes an RSA public key and an RSA private key, and each of the wireless detonators stores the RSA private key locally. Each of the wireless detonators sends the generated RSA public key back to the controller via wired communication. The controller receives the RSA public key of each wireless detonator and verifies each RSA public key individually. If the verification matches, the corresponding RSA public key is retained; if the verification does not match, the registration process is terminated.

[0008] In some feasible implementations, the controller generates a random number as the AES key and calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key using the obtained RSA public key, generating an RSA encryption key packet including: The controller generates a 128-bit random number using a built-in true random number generator, and uses the 128-bit random number as an AES key. It then calls the built-in RSA encryption module and uses the RSA public key corresponding to each wireless detonator to encrypt the generated 128-bit AES key, generating a 1024-bit RSA encryption key packet.

[0009] In some feasible implementations, the controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator, and the wireless detonator invokes the RSA decryption module and decrypts the RSA encryption key packet using the stored RSA private key to extract the AES key. The steps include: The controller sends data frames to the corresponding wireless detonator via wired serial communication. The data frame includes a frame header, the RSA encryption key packet, and a frame trailer. After receiving the data frame, the wireless detonator verifies the validity of the frame header and frame trailer. If the verification is successful, the decryption operation is performed; if the verification fails, the data frame is discarded. Once the verification is successful, the wireless detonator calls its built-in RSA decryption module and uses the locally stored RSA private key to decrypt the RSA encryption key packet in the data frame, extracting the 128-bit AES key.

[0010] In some feasible methods, the step of storing the AES key in the wireless detonator within an AES decryption module, so that when the controller sends frame structure data to the wireless detonator, the wireless detonator can use the AES key in the AES decryption module to decrypt the data and obtain the original data sent by the controller, includes: The wireless detonator will extract the 128-bit AES key and load it into its built-in AES decryption module. The controller transmits data through a 10K-100K frequency very low frequency ground-penetrating channel, randomly generates a 16-byte initialization vector, and then calls its built-in AES encryption module to encrypt the raw data to be sent using the AES key in CBC mode, generating encrypted data. The controller then encapsulates the frame header, the initialization vector, the encrypted data, and the frame tail into a ground-penetrating communication frame structure data and sends it to the wireless detonator. The wireless detonator receives the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, verifies the validity of the frame header and frame tail, and extracts the initialization vector and encrypted data within the frame if the verification is successful. It then calls the built-in AES decryption module, combines the loaded AES key with the initialization vector to decrypt the encrypted data, and restores the original data sent by the controller.

[0011] In some feasible methods, after the step of storing the AES key in the wireless detonator in the AES decryption module, and the wireless detonator being able to decrypt the frame structure data sent by the controller to the wireless detonator using the AES key in the AES decryption module to obtain the original data sent by the controller, the method further includes: After the wireless detonator performs the operation corresponding to the original data, it processes the feedback status data using the same AES encryption method and then sends it back to the controller.

[0012] Some feasible approaches also include key expiration management steps: The controller configures the validity period of the AES key, records the key generation time when generating the 128-bit AES key, and verifies the time interval between the current time and the key generation time before sending ground-penetrating communication frame structure data to the wireless detonator each time. If the time interval exceeds the configured validity period, the controller automatically triggers a new round of registration process for RSA key generation and AES key encrypted transmission.

[0013] In some possible implementation methods, the communication connection established between the controller and the plurality of wireless detonators is a wired communication connection or a near-field communication (NFC) connection. When using near-field communication (NFC) connection, it replaces wired communication connection to complete all registration communication operations, including wireless detonator identification information collection, operation command and key generation trigger command sending, controller information and date information synchronization, RSA public key feedback, and RSA encrypted key packet sending.

[0014] In some feasible implementations, the transparent communication frame structure data encapsulated by the controller also includes a CRC16 check bit, and the frame structure consists of a frame header, the initialization vector, encrypted data, a CRC16 check bit, and a frame tail. The wireless detonator receives ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, calculates the CRC16 check value of the frame initialization vector and encrypted data, compares it with the CRC16 check bit in the frame body, and performs frame header and frame tail validity verification if they match. If they do not match, the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data is directly discarded. The controller generates a 256-bit random AES key, and the wireless detonator generates a 2048-bit RSA key pair. The controller calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the 256-bit AES key to generate a 2048-bit RSA encryption key packet. The wireless detonator decrypts and extracts the 256-bit AES key before loading and storing it.

[0015] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application may include the following beneficial effects: This application presents a data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, which effectively solves the technical problems of low encryption security, high key transmission risk, and poor security adaptability in existing ground-penetrating wireless detonator communications. Compared to traditional schemes that use short-key encryption algorithms such as DES and 3DES, and transmit keys in plaintext or with simple symmetric encryption, this method dynamically generates RSA public and private keys based on controller and date information. The RSA public key is then used to encrypt the AES key for targeted key transmission, eliminating the risk of plaintext leakage during key transmission and significantly improving key security. Simultaneously, the AES algorithm is used to encrypt the actual data transmitted through the ground, replacing traditional encryption algorithms that are easily brute-forced, significantly improving the security level of data encryption. Furthermore, each round of operation regenerates a unique RSA key pair and AES key, achieving dynamic and personalized key generation. This changes the previous pattern of repeatedly using fixed keys, effectively improving the security adaptability of the wireless detonator communication system. It fundamentally avoids the security risks of unauthorized use after fixed key leakage, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of through-ground communication between the ground controller and the underground wireless detonator, and meeting the high security requirements of wireless detonator communication in the civilian blasting field. Attached Figure Description

[0016] The accompanying drawings, which form part of this application, are used to provide a further understanding of the application and to make other features, objects, and advantages of the application more apparent. The illustrative embodiments and descriptions of this application are used to explain the application and do not constitute an undue limitation of the application. In the drawings: Figure 1 This application provides a schematic diagram of the transmission system architecture for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, which is a method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller.

[0017] Figure 2 The flowchart of the registration process (key transmission) of a data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller provided in this application.

[0018] Figure 3 A flowchart of the wireless data communication link (AES encryption) of a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller data encryption method provided in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0019] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0020] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate for the embodiments of this application described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0021] In this application, the terms "upper," "lower," "left," "right," "front," "rear," "top," "bottom," "inner," "outer," "middle," "vertical," "horizontal," "lateral," and "longitudinal" indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings. These terms are primarily for the purpose of better describing this application and its embodiments, and are not intended to limit the indicated device, element, or component to having a specific orientation, or to be constructed and operated in a specific orientation.

[0022] Furthermore, in addition to indicating location or positional relationship, some of the aforementioned terms may also have other meanings. For example, the term "above" may also be used in some cases to indicate a certain dependency or connection relationship. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of these terms in this application based on the specific circumstances.

[0023] Furthermore, the terms "installation," "setup," "equipped with," "connection," "linked," and "socketing" should be interpreted broadly. For example, "connection" can be a fixed connection, a detachable connection, or an integral structure; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium, or an internal connection between two devices, components, or parts. Those skilled in the art can understand the specific meaning of the above terms in this application according to the specific circumstances.

[0024] The following explanations of the terms used in this application are provided to aid in understanding the technical solution of this application: AES, Advanced Encryption Standard, is a symmetric-key block cipher algorithm. Symmetric means that the same key is used for encryption and decryption, and block cipher means that the data to be encrypted is divided into fixed-length blocks and encrypted one block at a time.

[0025] CBC, Cipher Block Chaining, AES and other block cipher algorithms are classic working modes. They are not independent encryption algorithms. When encrypting data blocks, the ciphertext of the previous block is used as the "input factor" of the plaintext of the next block. At the same time, a randomly generated initialization vector (IV) is required to complete the encryption of the first block.

[0026] RSA, or Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, is an asymmetric key encryption algorithm. The core difference between RSA and AES is that encryption and decryption use a different pair of keys (public key + private key). The public key can be publicly transmitted, while the private key is kept locally by the holder and can only be used to decrypt data encrypted with the corresponding public key.

[0027] CRC, Cyclic Redundancy Check, is a data transmission error detection algorithm that uses a specific mathematical algorithm to calculate a fixed-length check bit on the original data and transmits it along with the original data. The receiver recalculates the check value on the received data and compares it with the transmitted check bit to determine whether the data has been corrupted due to interference during transmission.

[0028] NFC, or Near Field Communication, is a short-range wireless communication technology based on radio frequency identification (RFID). The communication distance is typically within 10 centimeters. It supports point-to-point bidirectional communication and enables fast data transfer between devices without the need for complex pairing procedures.

[0029] like Figures 1 to 3 As shown, this application provides a method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, comprising: S100: The controller acquires information from multiple wireless detonators.

[0030] The controller acquires information from multiple wireless detonators as the initial operation of the ground registration process. The core of this process is for the ground controller to establish a physical communication link with the underground wireless detonators, complete the collection of detonator identity information, and provide an identity binding basis for subsequent key generation.

[0031] Specifically, the controller may acquire information on multiple wireless detonators through the following steps: S101, the controller establishes wired communication connections with the multiple wireless detonators respectively, and collects the identification information of each wireless detonator one by one through serial bus communication, thereby completing the acquisition of information of the multiple wireless detonators.

[0032] Specifically, once the physical connection is established, the ground controller and multiple wireless detonators are electrically connected to each other and a wired serial bus communication link is established synchronously to provide a stable physical channel for data interaction. The ground controller invokes its built-in registration module to send an identity information reading command to each wireless detonator via a wired serial bus. Upon receiving the command, each wireless detonator replies to the ground controller with its unique identification information (wireless detonator ID). The ground controller receives and stores the identification information of all wireless detonators one by one according to the connection order. After completing the collection of the identity information of all wireless detonators, the ground controller confirms that the communication link is normal, ends this step, and prepares for the subsequent key generation command issuance.

[0033] S200, based on the information of multiple wireless detonators, the controller sends a new round of operation instructions and a key generation trigger instruction to them, and simultaneously sends the controller information and date information to obtain the RSA public keys generated by the multiple wireless detonators.

[0034] The RSA public key represents the RSA public key and RSA private key generated by the wireless detonator through a built-in algorithm based on the controller information and date information sent to it by the controller. The RSA public key is fed back to the controller, and the RSA private key is stored in the wireless detonator.

[0035] Specifically, obtaining the RSA public keys generated by multiple wireless detonators may include the following steps: S201, the controller sends a new round of operation instructions and key generation trigger instructions to each of the wireless detonators via wired communication, and simultaneously sends the controller's device information and date information.

[0036] Specifically, the ground controller calls its built-in registration module and, based on the wired serial bus communication link established by the S100, sequentially sends a new round of operation instructions and RSA key generation trigger instructions to each wireless detonator.

[0037] While sending the above instructions, the ground controller simultaneously sends its own controller device information (including the device's unique number and inherent hardware identifier) ​​and date information (including the current operation's year, month, day, hour, minute, and timestamp) to each wireless detonator. After receiving the instructions and information, each wireless detonator sends a successful reception signal to the ground controller via a wired serial bus communication link. Once the ground controller confirms that all wireless detonators have completed reception, it triggers the next step of the operation.

[0038] S202, each of the wireless detonators generates a 1024-bit RSA key pair by combining the device information and date information received from the controller using a built-in algorithm.

[0039] The RSA key pair includes an RSA public key and an RSA private key, and each wireless detonator stores the RSA private key locally.

[0040] Specifically, each wireless detonator activates its built-in key generation logic based on the received controller device information and date information, using these two types of information as unified input to generate a 1024-bit RSA key pair.

[0041] The key generation logic built into the wireless detonator has a consistent generation feature, ensuring that all wireless detonators generate completely identical 1024-bit RSA key pairs based on the same controller device information and date information.

[0042] Each wireless detonator splits the generated 1024-bit RSA key pair into an RSA public key and an RSA private key. The RSA private key is securely stored in its own local secure storage area. This RSA private key is only used by this wireless detonator for subsequent decryption operations and is not transmitted to external devices.

[0043] After each wireless detonator completes the local storage of its RSA private key, it temporarily stores the generated RSA public key, pending subsequent feedback operations.

[0044] S203, each of the wireless detonators feeds back the generated RSA public key to the controller via wired communication. The controller receives the RSA public key of each wireless detonator and verifies each RSA public key one by one. If the verification matches, the corresponding RSA public key is retained; if the verification does not match, the registration process is terminated.

[0045] Specifically, each wireless detonator sends its generated RSA public key back to the ground controller via a wired serial bus communication link. When sending the key back, it also carries its own identification information (wireless detonator ID), thus associating the RSA public key with the corresponding wireless detonator. The ground controller receives the RSA public key and associated identity information of each wireless detonator in the feedback order of the wireless detonators, binds the two and stores them temporarily. The ground controller initiates the RSA public key verification process, which uses the RSA public key of the first wireless detonator to complete public key feedback as a benchmark, and then compares the RSA public keys of the remaining wireless detonators with this benchmark public key for consistency. If the RSA public keys of all wireless detonators match the base public key, the ground controller will permanently bind and store the identification information and corresponding RSA public key of each wireless detonator. If the RSA public key of any wireless detonator does not match the reference public key, the ground controller terminates the registration process and sends a registration failure error feedback message to all wireless detonators via the wired serial bus communication link, while recording the identity information of the abnormal wireless detonator.

[0046] S300, the controller generates a random number as the AES key and calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key with the obtained RSA public key to generate an RSA encryption key packet.

[0047] Specifically, generating an RSA encryption key packet may include the following steps: S301, the controller generates a 128-bit random number through a built-in true random number generator, and uses the 128-bit random number as an AES key. It then calls the built-in RSA encryption module and uses the RSA public key corresponding to each wireless detonator to encrypt the generated 128-bit AES key, generating a 1024-bit RSA encryption key packet.

[0048] Specifically, the ground controller activates its built-in true random number generator, which generates a 128-bit random character sequence based on the physical randomness of the hardware, and sets this 128-bit random character sequence as the AES key used for subsequent ground-to-ground communication. The ground controller retrieves the exclusive RSA public key that has been verified one by one in the previous steps and is bound to the identification information of each wireless detonator; The ground controller calls its built-in RSA encryption module, uses the generated 128-bit AES key as the data to be encrypted, and sequentially matches it with the corresponding wireless detonator's RSA public key to perform encryption processing; After each wireless detonator is individually encrypted, a corresponding 1024-bit RSA encryption key packet is generated. All generated RSA encryption key packets are stored in association with the identification information of the corresponding wireless detonator, awaiting subsequent transmission.

[0049] S400, the controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator, the wireless detonator calls the RSA decryption module, and decrypts the RSA encryption key packet with the stored RSA private key to extract the AES key.

[0050] Specifically, extracting the AES key may include the following steps: S401, the controller sends a data frame to the corresponding wireless detonator via a wired serial communication method. The data frame includes a frame header, the RSA encryption key packet, and a frame trailer.

[0051] Specifically, the ground controller relies on the established serial wired communication method and encapsulates the RSA encryption key packet bound with the unique identification information into a data frame according to the one-to-one matching relationship. The data frame always contains a preset frame header, an RSA encryption key packet, and a preset frame tail. The encapsulated data frame is then sent to the corresponding wireless detonator.

[0052] S402, after receiving the data frame, the wireless detonator verifies the validity of the frame header and frame trailer. If the verification is successful, the decryption operation is performed; if the verification fails, the data frame is discarded.

[0053] Specifically, when the wireless detonator monitors the data transmission of the wired communication link of the serial port, after receiving the entire data frame, it first performs a fixed format validity check on the frame header and frame tail within the data frame; if the check result is that the format is compliant, the verification is deemed successful, and subsequent decryption-related operations are initiated; if the frame header or frame tail format check is abnormal, the currently received data frame is directly discarded without data buffering or any subsequent decryption processing.

[0054] S403, when the verification is successful, the wireless detonator calls its built-in RSA decryption module and uses the locally stored RSA private key to decrypt the RSA encryption key packet in the data frame and extract the 128-bit AES key.

[0055] Specifically, after the data frame is verified, the wireless detonator retrieves the RSA private key stored in its local secure storage area and simultaneously activates its built-in RSA decryption module. Based on the working principle of asymmetric decryption, it uses the RSA private key to completely decrypt the RSA encryption key packet carried in the data frame, extracts the plaintext 128-bit AES key from the encrypted data, and verifies the bit specification of the extracted key to ensure that the key parameters are consistent with the key specifications generated by the ground controller.

[0056] S500, in the wireless detonator, the AES key is stored in the AES decryption module. When the controller sends frame structure data to the wireless detonator, the wireless detonator can use the AES key in the AES decryption module to decrypt the data and obtain the original data sent by the controller.

[0057] Specifically, obtaining the raw data sent by the controller may include the following steps: S501, the wireless detonator loads the extracted 128-bit AES key into its built-in AES decryption module.

[0058] Specifically, the wireless detonator extracts the 128-bit AES key and stores it in its own configured secure flash memory area for encrypted storage; at the same time, it loads the 128-bit AES key into the key storage area corresponding to the built-in AES decryption module, completes key binding and working parameter configuration, and puts the AES decryption module into a ready standby state, where the AES key can only be read and used when a legitimate decryption call is made, and the key is not output in plaintext.

[0059] S502, the controller transmits data through a 10K-100K frequency very low frequency through-ground channel, randomly generates a 16-byte initialization vector, calls its built-in AES encryption module, uses CBC mode to encrypt the raw data to be sent with the AES key, generates encrypted data, and encapsulates the frame header, the initialization vector, the encrypted data, and the frame tail into through-ground communication frame structure data and sends it to the wireless detonator.

[0060] Specifically, the ground controller switches the communication link to a 10kHz to 100kHz wireless very low frequency (VLF) ground-penetrating channel, which is suitable for the penetration transmission requirements of underground buried applications. The ground controller randomly generates an initialization vector of a fixed length of 16 bytes to ensure the random uniqueness of a single encrypted transmission. The ground controller calls its built-in AES encryption module, adopts CBC working mode, and uses the synchronized 128-bit AES key to encrypt the raw control data to be sent, generating corresponding encrypted data. The ground controller combines and encapsulates the preset frame header, initialization vector, encrypted data, and preset frame tail in sequence according to fixed encapsulation rules to form a complete ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, which is then directionally transmitted to the corresponding wireless detonator through the wireless VLF ground-penetrating channel.

[0061] S503, the wireless detonator receives the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, verifies the validity of the frame header and frame tail, and if the verification is successful, extracts the initialization vector and encrypted data within the frame, calls the built-in AES decryption module, and decrypts the encrypted data by combining the loaded AES key with the initialization vector to restore the original data sent by the controller.

[0062] Specifically, the wireless detonator continuously monitors the very low frequency (VLF) ground-penetrating channel and receives the complete ground-penetrating communication frame structure data. The wireless detonator first performs format validity verification on the frame header and frame tail. If the verification does not meet the preset standard, the current frame structure data is directly discarded and no subsequent decryption operation is performed. After the verification is passed, the wireless detonator accurately extracts the initialization vector and encrypted data from the frame structure data. The wireless detonator calls its own AES decryption module, which has completed key loading configuration, and uses the 128-bit AES key stored in the module, together with the extracted initialization vector, to complete the decryption of the encrypted data. Finally, it restores and outputs the original data sent by the ground controller for the wireless detonator to execute the corresponding working instructions.

[0063] In one embodiment, after the step of storing the AES key in the wireless detonator in the AES decryption module, and the wireless detonator being able to decrypt the frame structure data sent by the controller to the wireless detonator using the AES key in the AES decryption module to obtain the original data sent by the controller, the method includes: After the wireless detonator performs the operation corresponding to the original data, it processes the feedback status data using the same AES encryption method and then sends it back to the controller.

[0064] Specifically, after the wireless detonator is parsed and restored to obtain the original data sent by the ground controller, the corresponding practical action is executed according to the control instructions recorded in the original data. After the practical action is completed, the current operating status of the machine is automatically collected, and standardized feedback status data is generated. The wireless detonator, referring to the encryption rules of the ground controller, randomly generates a set of 16-byte initialization vectors. At the same time, it calls its own encryption processing unit, using the 128-bit AES key and CBC working mode that has been synchronized and stored, to encrypt the generated feedback status data and obtain encrypted feedback data. The wireless detonator uses a unified encapsulation format to encapsulate the preset frame header, the initialization vector generated this time, the encrypted feedback data, and the preset frame tail into a dedicated ground-penetrating communication frame structure data for transmission. The wireless detonator uses a 10kHz to 100kHz wireless very low frequency ground-penetrating channel to send the encapsulated return frame structure data back to the ground controller. After receiving the returned frame structure data, the ground controller performs validity verification of the frame header and frame tail. After successful verification, it extracts the initialization vector and encrypted feedback data, calls its own AES decryption module, and completes decryption with the locally stored 128-bit AES key. It then reads the feedback status data reported by the wireless detonator, thus realizing a two-way encrypted communication closed loop.

[0065] In one embodiment, a key expiration management step is also included: The controller configures the validity period of the AES key, records the key generation time when generating the 128-bit AES key, and verifies the time interval between the current time and the key generation time before sending ground-penetrating communication frame structure data to the wireless detonator each time. If the time interval exceeds the configured validity period, the controller automatically triggers a new round of registration process for RSA key generation and AES key encrypted transmission.

[0066] Specifically, the ground controller provides an operable key validity period configuration entry, allowing users to preset the validity period of the 128-bit AES key (example: 24 hours) according to actual construction conditions. After configuration, the validity period parameter is stored in the local secure storage area of ​​the ground controller as a benchmark for subsequent time verification, and the configuration parameter can be modified as needed.

[0067] While generating the 128-bit AES key in step S301, the ground controller simultaneously records the generation time of the AES key (the format is consistent with the date information mentioned above, including the year, month, day, hour, minute, second, and timestamp). The key generation time is then bound and stored with the corresponding 128-bit AES key and the identification information of each wireless detonator to ensure that each key is accurately associated with its generation time, facilitating subsequent verification and retrieval.

[0068] Before the ground controller prepares to send ground-penetrating communication frame structure data to the wireless detonator via the wireless VLF ground-penetrating channel, it automatically triggers a time verification process: retrieves the current system time (in the same format as the key generation time), calculates the time interval between the current time and the AES key generation time, and only verifies the AES key corresponding to this communication separately, without affecting the normal use of other keys that have not expired.

[0069] After the time interval verification is completed, subsequent operations are performed in two cases: (1) If the calculated time interval does not exceed the preset AES key validity period, it is determined that the AES key is still valid, and the ground controller normally performs the encapsulation and transmission operation of the through-ground communication frame structure data to ensure that the encrypted communication is carried out normally. (2) If the calculated time interval exceeds the preset validity period of the AES key, it is determined that the AES key has expired. The ground controller immediately terminates the current ground communication process, does not send any data to the wireless detonator, and automatically triggers a new round of ground registration process.

[0070] The new registration process is completely consistent with the steps from S200 to S400 described above: The ground controller reissues the RSA key generation trigger command and related information to each wireless detonator, triggering each wireless detonator to generate a new 1024-bit RSA key pair. After the public key is verified, a new 128-bit AES key is generated and transmitted to each wireless detonator via RSA encryption. The loading and storage of the new key is completed, and the old AES key automatically becomes invalid and is no longer used for any encryption or decryption operations.

[0071] In one embodiment, the communication connection established between the controller and the plurality of wireless detonators is a wired communication connection or a near-field communication (NFC) connection. When using near-field communication (NFC) connection, it replaces wired communication connection to complete all registration communication operations, including wireless detonator identification information collection, operation command and key generation trigger command sending, controller information and date information synchronization, RSA public key feedback, and RSA encrypted key packet sending.

[0072] Specifically, the ground controller can choose two communication connection methods with multiple wireless detonators, each suitable for different application scenarios: Wired communication connection: Suitable for scenarios where wireless detonators are centrally deployed and wiring is convenient (such as laboratory testing and small construction sites), achieving stable data transmission through physical lines; Near Field Communication (NFC) Connection: Suitable for scenarios where wiring is inconvenient or wireless detonators are scattered. No physical lines are required. Data interaction is achieved through NFC sensing, replacing wired communication to complete all communication operations in the registration process. It is only used for the registration interaction process.

[0073] Wired communication connection method: Physical connection: The ground controller and each wireless detonator are physically connected via wired lines to ensure good contact and provide a stable channel for data transmission; Information Acquisition: The ground controller collects the identity information and operating status of each wireless detonator through a serial bus to complete the initial information entry; Subsequent operations: Follow the steps S201-S203 above to complete the command issuance, key generation, public key verification, and other operations.

[0074] NFC registration link 1) NFC physical sensing link establishment: The NFC sensing area of ​​the ground controller is aligned with the NFC sensing area of ​​a single wireless detonator to maintain the standard near-field sensing distance and establish a dedicated encrypted near-field communication link.

[0075] 2) The NFC link completes the collection of wireless detonator identification information. The ground controller relies on the established NFC link to issue an identification reading command; the wireless detonator transmits its unique identification information back through the NFC link; the ground controller receives and binds the identification information to complete the initial registration information collection. This step completely replaces the original wired serial bus collection operation.

[0076] 3) The NFC link sends registration instructions and the ground controller sends a new round of operation instructions and key generation trigger instructions to the wireless detonator through the NFC link, and synchronously transmits controller device information and date information; the data is transmitted in a closed loop within the NFC near-field link.

[0077] 4) After the wireless detonator generates a 1024-bit RSA key pair based on the received information, it transmits the RSA public key back to the ground controller via the NFC link. The ground controller performs verification for each detonator according to the original rules. If the verification is compliant, the public key is retained. If the verification is abnormal, the registration process is terminated directly. This interaction relies entirely on the NFC link to replace the original wired transmission.

[0078] 5) After the ground controller generates and encapsulates the RSA encrypted key packet, it sends it to the corresponding wireless detonator via the NFC link. The wireless detonator receives, decrypts, extracts the 128-bit AES key, and completes local secure storage and module loading. After the key loading configuration is completed, the NFC near-field communication link between the two parties is disconnected, and all NFC interactions end.

[0079] Fixed communication rules after registration After the NFC link is disconnected, all subsequent business processes will execute in the same manner: The controller sends out business data such as blasting control and networking, still using a 10K to 100K frequency wireless very low frequency through-ground channel to transmit encrypted frame structure data. The wireless detonator decrypts and executes commands, collects operating status, and transmits feedback data, all relying on the existing ground-penetrating wireless channel to complete two-way encrypted communication.

[0080] In one embodiment, the transparent communication frame structure data encapsulated by the controller further includes a CRC16 check bit, and the frame structure consists of a frame header, the initialization vector, encrypted data, a CRC16 check bit, and a frame tail. The wireless detonator receives ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, calculates the CRC16 check value of the frame initialization vector and encrypted data, compares it with the CRC16 check bit in the frame body, and performs frame header and frame tail validity verification if they match. If they do not match, the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data is directly discarded. The controller generates a 256-bit random AES key, and the wireless detonator generates a 2048-bit RSA key pair. The controller calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the 256-bit AES key to generate a 2048-bit RSA encryption key packet. The wireless detonator decrypts and extracts the 256-bit AES key before loading and storing it.

[0081] Specifically, when encapsulating the data structure of the ground-penetrating communication frame, the ground controller adds a fixed CRC16 check bit according to the improved scheme, and standardizes the frame structure in the following order: frame header, initialization vector, encrypted data, CRC16 check bit, and frame tail. The ground controller generates a dedicated CRC16 check value based on the fixed check principle only for the combination of initialization vector and encrypted data in the frame, fills the CRC16 check bit in the frame with the check value, and after completing the encapsulation of the entire frame, it transmits it outward through the 10kHz to 100kHz wireless very low frequency ground-penetrating channel.

[0082] After the wireless detonator fully receives the structure data of the through-ground communication frame, it prioritizes the execution of the CRC16 verification process: the wireless detonator independently extracts the initialization vector and encrypted data within the frame, and calculates the corresponding CRC16 verification value according to the verification principle that is completely consistent with that of the ground controller.

[0083] The wireless detonator compares the CRC16 checksum calculated by the device with the CRC16 checksum bit in the data frame. If the two do not match, the entire data frame is discarded without performing frame header and trailer verification or triggering any decryption-related operations. If the two match, the validity verification steps for the frame header and trailer are performed according to the original standard.

[0084] The key generation has been upgraded. The ground controller now uses a built-in true random number generator to generate a 256-bit random number. This 256-bit random number is then set as the upgraded AES key, replacing the original 128-bit AES key. The uniqueness of the key is ensured throughout the process by relying on the hardware's randomness characteristics.

[0085] The RSA key specification has been upgraded. Each wireless detonator generates a 2048-bit RSA key pair based on the received controller device information and date information. This key pair still contains an RSA public key and an RSA private key. Each wireless detonator stores the 2048-bit RSA private key in a local secure storage area and only sends the 2048-bit RSA public key back to the ground controller, which then performs verification and storage for each detonator.

[0086] The key is encrypted and encapsulated. The ground controller calls the built-in RSA encryption module, uses the verified 2048-bit RSA public key to encrypt the 256-bit AES key, and generates a 2048-bit RSA encryption key package that is adapted to the key specifications.

[0087] After receiving the RSA encrypted key packet and completing the decryption operation, the wireless detonator accurately extracts the 256-bit AES key. The wireless detonator stores the 256-bit AES key in its own secure flash memory and loads it into the built-in AES decryption module to complete the key adaptation configuration and ensure the data matching for subsequent encryption and decryption.

[0088] Example 1: Implementation of Basic Technical Solution 1. Hardware components: Controller: Wireless ground-penetrating control system, integrating registration module, RSA encryption module, AES encryption module, and communication module; Wireless detonator: integrates a wireless receiver module, a communication module, an RSA decryption module, and an AES decryption module; 2. On-site registration process: Step 1: The controller is electrically connected to the wireless detonator. The controller registration module communicates via the serial bus to obtain information such as the detonator ID. Step 2: The controller is electrically connected to the wireless detonator. The controller registration module sends an instruction to generate an RSA key, and at the same time sends out the controller device information and date information. Step 3: The built-in algorithm of the wireless detonator combines the controller device information and date information to generate a pair of RSA keys, including a public key and a private key; Step 4: The wireless detonator returns the RSA public key to the controller; Step 5: If the number of wireless detonators registered exceeds one, the controller needs to check the RSA public key for each detonator. If they do not match, the registration will fail. Step 6: The controller generates a 128-bit AES key using a true random number generator; Step 7: The controller calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key with the RSA public key, generating a 1024-bit "RSA encryption key packet"; Step 8: The controller sends a data frame via the serial port: frame header (example: 0xAA55) + RSA encryption key packet + frame trailer (example: 0x55AA); Step 9: After receiving the data frame, the wireless detonator verifies that the frame header and frame tail are correct, calls the RSA decryption module, uses the private key to decrypt and obtain the AES key, and stores it in the secure flash memory; 3. Execution of wireless data communication (taking the controller sending networking commands as an example): Step 1: The controller generates network command data; Step 2: Generate a 16-byte initialization vector (IV); Step 3: The AES module encrypts the instruction data using CBC mode to generate encrypted data; Step 4: The controller uses a 10K to 100K frequency wireless very low frequency through-ground module to send frames: frame header (example: 0xAA55) + initialization vector (IV) + encrypted data + frame trailer (example: 0x55AA); Step 5: After receiving the wireless detonator, verify that the frame header and frame tail are correct, extract the initialization vector (IV) and encrypted data, decrypt them with the stored AES key, execute the command and report the status (the report data is also AES encrypted).

[0089] Example 2: Implementation of the Improved Technical Solution Based on Example 1, the following additions are made: 1. Key validity period management: The controller adds a key validity period preset time option. Users need to configure this time (e.g., 24 hours) before use. After the controller randomly generates an AES128 key, it records the key generation time and verifies it before each communication. If the interval exceeds the preset time, it will automatically trigger re-registration. 2. Optimized registration method: The controller can connect to the wireless detonator via Near Field Communication (NFC) for ground registration. 3. CRC check: The data frame format sent by the controller's grounding module is changed to "frame header (example: 0xAA55) + initialization vector (IV) + encrypted data + CRC16 + frame tail (example: 0x55AA)". After receiving the data, the wireless detonator calculates the CRC16. If it matches the check bit in the frame, it is decrypted; otherwise, it is discarded. 4. RSA Security Enhancement: The controller encrypts the AES key and can generate a 2048-bit "RSA encryption key packet"; 5. Enhanced AES security: The controller integrates a 256-bit AES encryption module, the wireless detonator uses a 256-bit AES decryption module, and the controller's grounding module sends control commands, which are encrypted using a 256-bit AES key.

[0090] In summary, the data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller provided in this application has the following beneficial effects: 1. Significantly enhanced encryption security: The AES algorithm is a nationally recommended encryption standard. Its 256-bit key has a much stronger resistance to brute-force attacks than DES (64-bit). Combined with 2048-bit RSA key transmission, it eliminates security risks from both the "data encryption" and "key transmission" stages, meeting the high security requirements of the civilian explosives field. 2. More reliable key management: By using "RSA public key encryption + AES key validity management", "one key for one batch of operations + validity period limit" is achieved. Only the detonators in this batch of operations can be decrypted to obtain the key, avoiding illegal control caused by key leakage and reducing the risk of security incidents; 3. High reliability of transmission through ground: The combination of CBC encryption mode and CRC check effectively reduces the false recognition rate of encrypted data transmission and ensures the reliable transmission of networking commands and status feedback; 4. High compliance and scalability: The algorithm complies with the requirement of "high-security encryption for wireless detonator communication" in the "Regulations on the Safety Management of Civil Explosives" and supports networking of multiple wireless detonators, which facilitates subsequent engineering application expansion.

[0091] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.

[0092] Obviously, those skilled in the art should understand that the various units or steps of this application described above can be implemented using general-purpose computing devices. They can be centralized on a single computing device or distributed across a network of multiple computing devices. Optionally, they can be implemented using computer-executable program code, thereby storing them in a storage device for execution by a computing device, or fabricating them separately as individual integrated circuit modules, or fabricating multiple modules or steps into a single integrated circuit module. Thus, this application is not limited to any particular combination of hardware and software.

[0093] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit this application. Various modifications and variations can be made to this application by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for encrypting data transmission in a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller, characterized in that, include: The controller acquires information from multiple wireless detonators; Based on the information of multiple wireless detonators, the controller sends a new round of operation instructions and a key generation trigger instruction to it, and simultaneously sends the controller information and date information to obtain the RSA public keys generated by the multiple wireless detonators. The RSA public key represents the RSA public key and RSA private key generated by the wireless detonator through a built-in algorithm based on the controller information and date information sent to it by the controller. The RSA public key is fed back to the controller, and the RSA private key is stored in the wireless detonator. The controller generates a random number as the AES key and calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key with the obtained RSA public key to generate an RSA encryption key packet. The controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator. The wireless detonator calls the RSA decryption module and decrypts the RSA encryption key packet using the stored RSA private key to extract the AES key. In the wireless detonator, the AES key is stored in the AES decryption module. When the controller sends frame structure data to the wireless detonator, the wireless detonator can use the AES key in the AES decryption module to decrypt the data and obtain the original data sent by the controller.

2. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The steps for the controller to acquire information on multiple wireless detonators include: The controller establishes wired communication connections with each of the wireless detonators and collects the identification information of each wireless detonator one by one through serial bus communication, thereby completing the acquisition of information on the multiple wireless detonators.

3. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of obtaining the RSA public key generated by the multiple wireless detonators by sending a new round of operation instructions and a key generation trigger instruction to the controller based on the information of multiple wireless detonators, and simultaneously sending the controller information and date information, includes: The controller sends a new round of operation instructions and key generation trigger instructions to each of the wireless detonators via wired communication, and simultaneously sends the controller's device information and date information. Each of the wireless detonators generates a 1024-bit RSA key pair by combining the device information and date information received from the controller through a built-in algorithm. The RSA key pair includes an RSA public key and an RSA private key, and each of the wireless detonators stores the RSA private key locally. Each of the wireless detonators sends the generated RSA public key back to the controller via wired communication. The controller receives the RSA public key of each wireless detonator and verifies each RSA public key individually. If the verification matches, the corresponding RSA public key is retained; if the verification does not match, the registration process is terminated.

4. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The controller generates a random number as the AES key and calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the AES key using the obtained RSA public key, generating an RSA encryption key package including: The controller generates a 128-bit random number using a built-in true random number generator, and uses the 128-bit random number as an AES key. It then calls the built-in RSA encryption module and uses the RSA public key corresponding to each wireless detonator to encrypt the generated AES key, generating a 1024-bit RSA encryption key packet.

5. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The controller sends the RSA encryption key packet to the wireless detonator. The wireless detonator calls the RSA decryption module and decrypts the RSA encryption key packet using the stored RSA private key to extract the AES key. The steps include: The controller sends data frames to the corresponding wireless detonator via wired serial communication. The data frame includes a frame header, the RSA encryption key packet, and a frame trailer. After receiving the data frame, the wireless detonator verifies the validity of the frame header and frame trailer. If the verification is successful, the decryption operation is performed; if the verification fails, the data frame is discarded. Once the verification is successful, the wireless detonator calls its built-in RSA decryption module and uses the locally stored RSA private key to decrypt the RSA encryption key packet in the data frame, extracting the 128-bit AES key.

6. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of storing the AES key in the wireless detonator, and enabling the wireless detonator to decrypt the frame structure data sent by the controller to the wireless detonator using the AES key in the AES decryption module to obtain the original data sent by the controller, includes: The wireless detonator will extract the 128-bit AES key and load it into its built-in AES decryption module. The controller transmits data through a 10K-100K frequency very low frequency ground-penetrating channel, randomly generates a 16-byte initialization vector, and then calls its built-in AES encryption module to encrypt the raw data to be sent using the AES key in CBC mode, generating encrypted data. The controller then encapsulates the frame header, the initialization vector, the encrypted data, and the frame tail into a ground-penetrating communication frame structure data and sends it to the wireless detonator. The wireless detonator receives the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, verifies the validity of the frame header and frame tail, and extracts the initialization vector and encrypted data within the frame if the verification is successful. It then calls the built-in AES decryption module, combines the loaded AES key with the initialization vector to decrypt the encrypted data, and restores the original data sent by the controller.

7. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 6, characterized in that, After the step of storing the AES key in the AES decryption module in the wireless detonator, and the wireless detonator being able to decrypt the frame structure data sent by the controller to the wireless detonator using the AES key in the AES decryption module to obtain the original data sent by the controller, the following steps are included: After the wireless detonator performs the operation corresponding to the original data, it processes the feedback status data using the same AES encryption method and then sends it back to the controller.

8. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 6, characterized in that, It also includes key expiration management steps: The controller configures the validity period of the AES key, records the key generation time when generating the 128-bit AES key, and verifies the time interval between the current time and the key generation time before sending ground-penetrating communication frame structure data to the wireless detonator each time. If the time interval exceeds the configured validity period, the controller automatically triggers a new round of registration process for RSA key generation and AES key encrypted transmission.

9. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The communication connection established between the controller and the multiple wireless detonators is either a wired communication connection or a near-field communication (NFC) connection. When using near-field communication (NFC) connection, it replaces wired communication connection to complete all registration communication operations, including wireless detonator identification information collection, operation command and key generation trigger command sending, controller information and date information synchronization, RSA public key feedback, and RSA encrypted key packet sending.

10. The data encryption method for a ground-penetrating wireless detonator controller as described in claim 6, characterized in that, The ground-penetrating communication frame structure data encapsulated by the controller also includes a CRC16 check bit. The frame structure consists of a frame header, the initialization vector, encrypted data, a CRC16 check bit, and a frame tail. The wireless detonator receives ground-penetrating communication frame structure data, calculates the CRC16 check value of the frame initialization vector and encrypted data, compares it with the CRC16 check bit in the frame body, and performs frame header and frame tail validity verification if they match. If they do not match, the ground-penetrating communication frame structure data is directly discarded. The controller generates a 256-bit random AES key, and the wireless detonator generates a 2048-bit RSA key pair. The controller calls the RSA encryption module to encrypt the 256-bit AES key to generate a 2048-bit RSA encryption key packet. The wireless detonator decrypts and extracts the 256-bit AES key before loading and storing it.

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