A method and system for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises

Abstract

This invention discloses a method and system for determining differentiated subsidy amounts for emission reduction in port and shipping enterprises. Belonging to the field of emission reduction assessment technology, the method includes: acquiring key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain; classifying the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies; obtaining information on emission reduction subsidies to shipping companies and green subsidies to shippers, and constructing a game model for dual subsidies; solving the game model to obtain the range of subsidy coefficients; and determining differentiated subsidy amounts based on emission reduction targets. This invention addresses the differences in power structures within the port and shipping supply chain, designs a dual subsidy mechanism that considers both shipping companies and shippers, clarifies scientifically reasonable subsidy amounts and coefficient ranges, and improves emission reduction effectiveness and supply chain efficiency.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of emission reduction assessment technology, and more specifically to a method and system for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, due to the continuous strengthening of economic and trade ties, maritime commercial activities have become increasingly intensive, resulting in huge environmental problems.

[0003] To promote emission reduction in port and shipping enterprises, subsidies are commonly used as a core measure. However, existing subsidy policies and related research still have significant limitations: First, the subsidy targets are relatively singular. Most existing policies only subsidize shipping companies or ports individually, and a few studies involve subsidies for shippers, but very few simultaneously consider emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, failing to form a full-chain incentive mechanism. Second, the differences in the power structure of the port and shipping supply chain are ignored. With the formation of shipping alliances, the bargaining power of shipping companies and ports has changed, forming three typical power structures: port-dominated, shipping company-dominated, and equal status for both parties. Existing subsidy policies have not been designed in accordance with the decision-making logic of different power structures, resulting in inconsistent subsidy efficiency. Third, the subsidy effect lacks precise evaluation. Existing research has not clarified the effective range of subsidy coefficients. Some policies have failed to effectively incentivize emission reduction due to inappropriate subsidy levels, or have caused a waste of public resources. Furthermore, there is no systematic comparison of the optimization effects of dual subsidies versus single subsidies, making it difficult to support the government in formulating efficient emission reduction policies.

[0004] Therefore, how to provide a method and system for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises has become an urgent problem to be solved by those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, the present invention provides a method and system for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises. It designs a dual subsidy mechanism that takes into account the differences in the power structure of the port and shipping supply chain, and clarifies the scientific and reasonable subsidy amount and coefficient range, thereby improving the emission reduction effect and supply chain efficiency.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: A method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises includes: Obtain key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain; Classify the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies; Obtain information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and construct a game model for dual subsidies; Solving the game theory model yields the range of subsidy coefficients. Differentiated subsidy amounts are determined based on emission reduction targets.

[0007] Preferably, the key parameters include market size, demand sensitivity coefficient to market price per unit TEU, shippers' green preference, shipping company's unit shipping cost, shipping company's emission reduction cost coefficient, and port loading and unloading cost-related parameters.

[0008] Preferably, the dominant structure types include three categories: port-dominated, shipping company-dominated, and ports and shipping companies having equal status.

[0009] Preferably, the game model includes the Stackelberg game model and the Nash game model, wherein the Stackelberg game model is used when the port or shipping company is in control, and the Nash game model is used when both parties are of equal status.

[0010] Preferably, the green subsidy for shippers is positively correlated with the shipping company's emission reduction efforts.

[0011] Preferably, the demand function for the dual subsidies is: ; Where a represents the market size, and b represents the demand sensitivity coefficient to the market price per unit TEU. Based on the shipper's green preference, The price per TEU for shipping companies; The price per TEU for loading and unloading at the port. To reduce emissions.

[0012] Preferably, the game model is solved by reverse induction to obtain the effective range of subsidy coefficients that meet the preset conditions of port and shipping supply chain profits and shipping companies' emission reduction efforts.

[0013] A system for determining differentiated subsidy amounts for emission reduction by port and shipping enterprises, comprising: The parameter acquisition module acquires key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain. The structural classification module categorizes the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies. The model building module obtains information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and constructs a game model of dual subsidies. The coefficient calculation module solves the game model to obtain the range of subsidy coefficients. The amount determination module determines the differentiated subsidy amount based on the emission reduction target.

[0014] As can be seen from the above technical solution, compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a method and system for determining the differentiated subsidy amount for emission reduction of port and shipping enterprises. By constructing a dual subsidy mechanism that combines emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, it adapts to three types of power structures in the port and shipping supply chain: port-led, shipping company-led, and equal status of both parties. It uses Stackelberg and Nash game models combined with backward induction to accurately solve the problem, clarifying the effective range of the subsidy coefficient. This not only significantly enhances the emission reduction efforts of shipping companies and expands market demand, but also maximizes the profits of the port and shipping supply chain, achieving synergistic development of environmental protection and industrial benefits. Moreover, the method is scientific and reliable, adaptable to different market scenarios, and provides precise and operable technical support for industry authorities to formulate efficient emission reduction subsidy policies. Attached Figure Description

[0015] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without creative effort.

[0016] Figure 1 This invention provides a flowchart illustrating a method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises. Figure 2 The power structure of ports and shipping companies under different subsidy policies; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a system for determining the amount of differentiated subsidies for emission reduction by port and shipping enterprises. Detailed Implementation

[0017] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0018] See Figure 1 This invention discloses a method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises, including: Obtain key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain; Classify the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies; Obtain information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and construct a game model for dual subsidies; Solving the game theory model yields the range of subsidy coefficients. Differentiated subsidy amounts are determined based on emission reduction targets.

[0019] See Figure 2 This embodiment first considers the decision-making problem of shipping companies to take emission reduction measures under three different power structures when the government implements emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers. Then, it compares and analyzes the differences between the government's dual subsidy and single subsidy policies under different power structures.

[0020] Parameter descriptions and assumptions: Market size; : Sensitivity coefficient of demand to the market price per unit TEU; The degree of green preference of shippers; Market price per TEU / RMB ; Price per TEU transported by the shipping company / RMB; Price per TEU for port loading and unloading (in RMB); : Shipping company unit shipping cost / yuan; Demand per 10,000 tons.

[0021] To simplify the research question, the following assumptions are made: Assumption 1: The government incentivizes shipping companies to adopt emission reduction measures through subsidies, thereby reducing their emission reduction costs. Assume the government's emission reduction subsidy coefficient for shipping companies is... .

[0022] Assumption 2: The government provides green subsidies to shippers to encourage them to choose shipping companies that have adopted emission reduction measures for cargo transportation. Referring to the product supply chain, assuming that the government's green subsidies to shippers are positively correlated with the emission reduction efforts of shipping companies, then the shipper's subsidy would be... .in This is a unit subsidy coefficient based on the emission reduction efforts. .

[0023] Assumption 3: Based on the analysis of Sang Gaofeng et al., assuming that shipping companies take emission reduction measures when navigating or berthing in port areas, their emission reduction costs... ,in This represents the emission reduction cost coefficient for shipping companies. To support the shipping company's emissions reduction efforts, .

[0024] Assumption 4: This embodiment takes into account the market price per unit TEU when the government implements a double subsidy policy. The shipping company's emission reduction efforts And government green subsidies for shippers Changes in any of these factors will alter demand; therefore, we assume that the demand function when the government implements double subsidies is as follows: When the government provides a single subsidy to shipping companies, the market price per unit TEU is... The shipping company's emission reduction efforts This will affect demand, so let's assume the demand function at this time is: .

[0025] Specifically, the model is constructed as follows: The port profit function is: (1) The shipping company's profit function is: (2) The profit function for the entire supply chain is: (3) Model solution: The Stackelberg game in which the port holds a dominant position involves: first, the government determines the subsidy coefficient, and then the port determines the loading and unloading prices. In order to maximize its own profits, the shipping company ultimately... Determine the transportation price under the circumstances and emission reduction efforts To maximize the profit, we use backward induction to solve the problem.

[0026] The government implements a double subsidy policy: First, given government subsidies and port service prices, shipping companies pursue profit maximization, namely: ; Will right and Find the first-order partial derivatives for each, and then solve the system of equations. and We can obtain: (4) (5) Similarly, ports pursue profit maximization, that is: ; Substituting equations (4) and (5) into the port profit function above, and combining... We can obtain: (6) Substituting equation (6) into equations (4) and (5), we obtain the optimal result. and They are respectively: (7) (8) Then, substituting equations (6), (7), and (8) into equations (1) and (2), we finally obtain the port, shipping company, supply chain profits, and demand, respectively: (9) (10) (11) (12) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0027] The government only implements a single subsidy policy for shipping companies: The subsequent calculation process is the same as the government's dual subsidy policy mentioned above, and therefore omitted. The prices, profits, and demand of ports and shipping companies are as follows: (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0028] Stackelberg game where shipping companies are dominant: First, the government determines the subsidy coefficient, and then the shipping companies decide on the transportation prices. and emission reduction efforts To maximize profits, the final port is located in the known area. and The loading and unloading price is determined under the circumstances. To maximize its own profit, it uses reverse induction to solve the problem.

[0029] The government implements a double subsidy policy; First, given government subsidies and shipping company prices, ports pursue profit maximization, namely: ; Will right Find the partial derivative and let We can obtain: (20) Similarly, shipping companies pursue profit maximization, that is: ; Substitute equation (20) into the above profit function, and then respectively... and Differentiate, and solve simultaneously and To obtain the optimal and optimal They are respectively: (twenty one) (twenty two) Substituting equations (21) and (22) into equation (20) yields the optimal solution. for: (twenty three) Then, substituting equations (21), (22), and (23) into equations (1) and (2), we finally obtain the profits and demands of the port, shipping company, and supply chain, respectively: (twenty four) (25) (26) (27) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0030] The government only implements a single subsidy policy for shipping companies: The subsequent calculation process is the same as the government's dual subsidy policy mentioned above, and therefore omitted. The prices, profits, and demand of ports and shipping companies are as follows: (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0031] Nash Game: Ports and Shipping Companies on Equal Footing First, the government determines the subsidy coefficient, and then the port and shipping company simultaneously decide on the loading and unloading prices. Transportation prices and emission reduction efforts To maximize the profit, we use backward induction to solve the problem.

[0032] The government implements a double subsidy policy: With government subsidies, ports and shipping companies pursue profit maximization, that is: ; ; Will right and Take the first-order partial derivatives respectively, and... right Find the first-order partial derivatives, and then solve the simultaneous equations. , and The optimal solution can be obtained. They are respectively: (35) (36) (37) Then, substituting equations (38), (39), and (40) into equations (1) and (2), we finally obtain the profits and demands of the port, shipping company, and supply chain, respectively: (38) (39) (40) (41) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0033] The government only implements a single subsidy policy for shipping companies: The subsequent calculation process is the same as the government's dual subsidy policy mentioned above, and therefore omitted. The prices, profits, and demand of ports and shipping companies are as follows: (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) Since the demand is greater than zero, assuming , ,therefore .

[0034] See Figure 3 A system for determining differentiated subsidy amounts for emission reduction by port and shipping enterprises, comprising: The parameter acquisition module acquires key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain. The structural classification module categorizes the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies. The model building module obtains information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and constructs a game model of dual subsidies. The coefficient calculation module solves the game model to obtain the range of subsidy coefficients. The amount determination module determines the differentiated subsidy amount based on the emission reduction target.

[0035] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the apparatus disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the method section.

[0036] The above description of the disclosed embodiments enables those skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Therefore, the invention is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A method for determining the amount of differentiated subsidies for emission reduction by port and shipping enterprises, characterized in that, include: Obtain key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain; Classify the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies; Obtain information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and construct a game model for dual subsidies; Solving the game theory model yields the range of subsidy coefficients. Differentiated subsidy amounts are determined based on emission reduction targets.

2. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The key parameters include market size, demand sensitivity to market price per unit TEU, shippers' green preferences, shipping company unit shipping cost, shipping company emission reduction cost coefficient, and port loading and unloading cost-related parameters.

3. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dominant structure types include three categories: port-dominated, shipping company-dominated, and ports and shipping companies having equal status.

4. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The game models include the Stackelberg game model and the Nash game model. The Stackelberg game model is used when the port or shipping company is in a dominant position, while the Nash game model is used when both parties are of equal status.

5. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The green subsidies for shippers are positively correlated with the shipping companies' efforts to reduce emissions.

6. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The demand function for the dual subsidies is: ； Where a represents the market size, and b represents the demand sensitivity coefficient to the market price per unit TEU. Based on the shipper's green preference, The price per TEU for shipping companies; The price per TEU for loading and unloading at the port. To reduce emissions.

7. The method for determining the amount of differentiated emission reduction subsidies for port and shipping enterprises according to claim 1, characterized in that, The game model was solved by backward induction, and the effective range of subsidy coefficients that meet the preset conditions of port and shipping supply chain profits and shipping companies' emission reduction efforts were obtained.

8. A system for determining differentiated subsidy amounts for emission reduction by port and shipping enterprises, characterized in that, include: The parameter acquisition module acquires key parameters of the port and shipping supply chain. The structural classification module categorizes the dominant structural types of ports and shipping companies. The model building module obtains information on emission reduction subsidies for shipping companies and green subsidies for shippers, and constructs a game model of dual subsidies. The coefficient calculation module solves the game model to obtain the range of subsidy coefficients. The amount determination module determines the differentiated subsidy amount based on the emission reduction target.

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