A method and device for adaptive triggering DoS elastic control of DC microgrid

By adopting an adaptive two-layer event triggering mechanism and local information attack detection, the communication security problem of DC microgrids under DoS attacks is solved, realizing on-demand communication and rapid isolation, and improving the system's anti-attack capability and communication efficiency.

CN122870544BActive Publication Date: 2026-11-17WUHAN UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611265658.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-20
Publication Date
2026-11-17
Estimated Expiration
2046-08-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing DC microgrids suffer from communication link disruptions under communication attack environments, leading to the destruction of consensus protocol convergence conditions and system instability. Furthermore, existing event triggering methods do not consider communication security, resulting in high communication overhead and delayed defense response.

Method used

An adaptive two-layer event triggering mechanism is adopted. On-demand communication is achieved through composite error evaluation and adaptive threshold dynamic adjustment. A signal freeze detector and acknowledgment counting mechanism are embedded in the event triggering node to detect DoS attacks in real time, and rapid isolation is achieved through channel locking and replacement with the last valid value.

Benefits of technology

It enables on-demand communication under DoS attack environments, reduces communication frequency, improves system resilience, ensures voltage regulation and current sharing control performance, and reduces communication overhead and defense response lag.

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Abstract

This invention discloses an adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method and device for DC microgrids. The invention constructs a composite error integrating current variation and voltage deviation, and sets a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and adaptive internal variables. An adaptive variable update law is designed to increase the threshold upon triggering and exponentially decay the threshold when not triggered, thereby achieving on-demand communication. For attack detection, a freeze counter is defined, and a DoS attack is determined when the counter exceeds the detection threshold. An acknowledgment counter is introduced to prevent false alarms. After detection and confirmation, the communication link is locked. During the locking period, the last valid value replaces the zero signal, and the lock is automatically released after the safety counter exceeds the recovery threshold. This invention also provides corresponding devices, equipment, and storage media. This invention achieves a balance between communication savings and attack defense, effectively adapting to different types of DoS attack scenarios.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of microgrid communication security control, specifically relating to a DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS (Denial of Service) elastic control method and device. Background Technology

[0002] DC microgrids, as core infrastructure capable of operating in grid-connected or isolated modes, have become a key supporting technology for future energy networks. Microgrids rely on information and communication technologies to achieve coordinated control of multiple distributed generation (DG) sources. Distributed secondary control, through consensus protocols, can achieve voltage recovery and current sharing, but this method places high demands on the quality of the communication network. Malicious attacks on the control system can lead to voltage instability, current oscillations, and even large-scale power outages. Therefore, how to ensure the resilient control of microgrids under communication attack environments, and how to detect, isolate, and recover from attacks, has become an urgent problem to be solved in the field of control security.

[0003] Current communication attacks targeting microgrids have evolved into more covert, complex, and destructive patterns. Denial-of-service attacks prevent nodes from receiving neighbor information by blocking communication links, directly undermining the convergence conditions of consensus protocols. These attacks are characterized by targeting secondary control itself, not directly attacking physical devices, but rather manipulating the communication layer to disrupt the coordination between nodes, thereby creating communication congestion.

[0004] Event-triggered control (ETC) has gained widespread attention in the microgrid field in recent years as an effective means of reducing distributed communication. Static ETC sets a fixed threshold, only initiating communication when system state changes exceed the threshold, reducing unnecessary data transmission. However, fixed thresholds cannot adapt to dynamic system changes, potentially leading to excessively frequent or sparse triggering during transient processes such as load disturbances. Dynamic ETC introduces internal dynamic variables to adaptively adjust the trigger threshold, further reducing communication frequency while maintaining control performance. However, most existing event-triggered methods assume an ideal communication environment, failing to consider the impact of communication attacks on the triggering mechanism itself, and few studies integrate event-triggered control with attack detection and defense.

[0005] Current research on defense against communication attacks includes approaches such as detection-based switching and resilient control. Detection-based switching methods modify the secondary controller after an attack is detected, but this reactive mechanism is relatively ineffective. Model-based resilient control mitigates the negative impact of communication attacks through robust state estimation and attack compensation mechanisms, but this method relies on accurate microgrid dynamic models. Furthermore, these methods generally employ periodic communication, resulting in significant communication overhead, and the separation of attack detection and control strategies leads to delayed defense responses. Therefore, further research is needed on how to reduce communication overhead while implementing control defense. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the issues of DoS communication attacks disrupting communication links and compromising consensus protocol convergence conditions in distributed secondary control of DC microgrids, leading to system instability, and the problems of existing event-triggered methods neglecting communication security and attack defense strategies employing periodic communication resulting in high communication overhead and delayed response, this invention provides an adaptive-triggered DoS elastic control method for DC microgrids. This method aims to reduce communication frequency by implementing on-demand communication through an adaptive two-layer event-triggered mechanism, and to detect and defend against DoS attacks in real time through attack detection and channel isolation recovery strategies based on local information. By co-designing event-triggered control and attack recovery methods, this method achieves a balance between communication savings and attack defense while ensuring voltage regulation and current sharing control performance.

[0007] According to one aspect of the present invention, an adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method for a DC microgrid is provided, comprising: constructing a composite error integrating current variation and voltage deviation, and setting a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and an adaptive internal variable; triggering communication when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold; designing an update law for the adaptive variable, updating the baseline and increasing the dynamic trigger threshold using an exponentially weighted average of the composite error when triggered, and causing the dynamic trigger threshold to decay exponentially when not triggered, and setting a lower bound of the threshold greater than zero; defining a freeze counter, accumulating when the difference between adjacent samples is less than a minimum value, otherwise resetting to zero, and determining that the communication link has been subjected to a DoS attack when the freeze counter exceeds a detection threshold. The communication link serves as a channel for transmitting neighbor current signals between distributed generation units. An acknowledgment counter is introduced, which increments when the DoS detection conditions are continuously met and resets otherwise. Channel isolation of the communication link is initiated when the acknowledgment counter exceeds an acknowledgment threshold. The communication link is locked after detection confirmation. During the locking period, if the received signal is zero, it is replaced by the last valid signal; if the received signal returns to non-zero, the neighbor signal is used again and the valid value record is updated. A security counter is defined, which increments when the freeze detection conditions are no longer met after the attack is revoked. When the security counter exceeds a security recovery threshold, it is determined that the attack has been revoked and the communication link has been restored to security. The locking of the communication link is then released, and communication using neighbor information resumes.

[0008] As a further technical solution, the composite error is constructed by defining the current change of the neighbor signal between two triggers and the normalized voltage error, and weighting the current change and the normalized voltage error to obtain the composite error.

[0009] As a further technical solution, the dynamic trigger threshold is composed of the neighbor deviation coupling term and the adaptive internal variable, wherein the neighbor deviation coupling term reflects the degree of difference in weighted current between the current node and its neighboring nodes.

[0010] As a further technical solution, the confirmation counter is reset to zero when the DoS detection conditions are not met continuously.

[0011] As a further technical solution, the baseline of the adaptive internal variable is updated by an exponentially weighted average of the composite error.

[0012] As a further technical solution, the communication link is kept locked when the security counter does not exceed the security recovery threshold.

[0013] According to one aspect of the present invention, an adaptive triggering DoS resilient control device for a DC microgrid is provided, comprising: an adaptive two-layer event triggering module, configured to construct a composite error integrating current variation and voltage deviation, and set a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and an adaptive internal variable, triggering communication when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold; the adaptive two-layer event triggering module is further configured to design an update law for the adaptive variable, updating the baseline and increasing the dynamic trigger threshold using an exponentially weighted average of the composite error when triggered, and causing the dynamic trigger threshold to decay exponentially when not triggered, and setting a lower bound of the threshold greater than zero; an attack detection module, configured to define a freeze counter, accumulating when the difference between adjacent samples is less than a minimum value, otherwise resetting to zero, determining that the communication link has suffered a DoS attack when the freeze counter exceeds a detection threshold, wherein the communication link is a channel for transmitting neighbor current signals between distributed generation units; the attack The detection module is also used to introduce an acknowledgment counter, which is incremented when the DoS detection conditions are continuously met and reset otherwise. When the acknowledgment counter exceeds the acknowledgment threshold, channel isolation of the communication link is initiated. The channel isolation and recovery module is used to lock the communication link after detection confirmation. During the locking period, if the received signal is zero, it is replaced by the last valid signal. If the received signal recovers to non-zero, the neighbor signal is used and the valid value record is updated. The channel isolation and recovery module is also used to define a security counter. When the detection conditions are no longer met after the attack is withdrawn, the security counter is incremented. When the security counter exceeds the security recovery threshold, it is determined that the attack has been withdrawn and the communication link has been restored to security. The lock of the communication link is released and communication is resumed using neighbor information. The secondary control output module is used to generate a secondary control correction quantity from the processed signal through a current equalization integrator and a voltage recovery integrator, and output the correction quantity to generate the control signal for driving the converter.

[0014] As a further technical solution, when the security counter does not exceed the security recovery threshold, the channel isolation and recovery module maintains the locked state of the communication link.

[0015] According to one aspect of the present invention, an adaptive triggering DoS resilient control device for a DC microgrid is provided, comprising: a processor; and a memory storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the aforementioned adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method for a DC microgrid.

[0016] According to one aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein a computer program is stored on the storage medium, and the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the aforementioned adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method for a DC microgrid.

[0017] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: 1. An adaptive two-layer event triggering mechanism based on composite error evaluation and adaptive threshold dynamic adjustment is proposed to realize on-demand communication in distributed secondary control, which significantly reduces the communication frequency compared with the periodic communication method; 2. Design a communication attack detection, isolation and recovery strategy based on local information. Embed a signal freeze detector and confirmation counting mechanism in the event triggering node to detect DoS attacks in real time. After detection and confirmation, rapid isolation is achieved by channel locking and last valid value replacement. The system automatically unlocks the signal recovery status by monitoring the security counter, thereby improving the attack resilience of the system. 3. By coordinating event triggering control with attack detection, isolation and recovery methods, the limitations of delayed defense response caused by the separation of attack detection and control strategies are overcome, and communication savings and attack defense are unified. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a diagram of the DC microgrid structure in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a comparison diagram of three types of DoS attack modes in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the adaptive two-layer event triggering (ADLET) control principle in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a diagram of the attack detection mechanism in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a diagram illustrating the channel isolation and recovery mechanism in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 6 This is a flowchart of the overall control of the model in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] It should be noted that: Given the current technological background, there is an urgent need to propose a novel distributed secondary control method for DC microgrids that can simultaneously achieve communication savings and attack defense in the context of communication attacks. This method should coordinate event-triggered control with attack detection, isolation, and recovery to improve the voltage regulation and current sharing capabilities of DC microgrids under DoS attack scenarios. To this end, this invention proposes an adaptive-triggered DoS elastic control method for DC microgrids. It achieves on-demand communication through an adaptive two-layer event-triggered mechanism and embeds a detector within the event-triggered node to detect DoS attacks in real time. After detection and confirmation, rapid recovery is achieved through channel isolation. This effectively solves the problems of existing event-triggered methods that do not consider communication security, attack defense strategies that often use periodic communication leading to high communication overhead and response lag, and the separation of event triggering and attack detection / defense design.

[0021] The terms “comprising” and “having”, and any variations thereof, in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this invention are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such as a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that includes a series of steps or units, not necessarily limited to those explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0022] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention. In addition, the technical features of the various embodiments or individual embodiments provided by the present invention can be arbitrarily combined to form new technical solutions. Such combinations are not bound by the order of steps and / or structural composition patterns, but must be based on the ability of those skilled in the art to implement them. When the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or cannot be implemented, it should be considered that such a combination of technical solutions does not exist and is not within the scope of protection claimed by the present invention.

[0023] This invention, primarily based on adaptive event-triggered control theory and communication attack detection and defense strategies, proposes an adaptive event-triggered resilient control method for DC microgrids under DoS attacks to enhance the resilience and communication efficiency of distributed secondary control in DC microgrids. This invention fully leverages the advantages of an adaptive two-layer event-triggered mechanism in reducing communication frequency, achieving on-demand communication through composite error assessment and adaptive threshold dynamic adjustment. For communication security, it designs attack detection and channel isolation recovery strategies based on local information, coordinating event triggering and attack defense to achieve a balance between communication savings and attack prevention. The control effect obtained through this invention is more precise, effectively resisting the impact of different types of DoS attacks on voltage regulation and current distribution, and significantly reducing communication overhead.

[0024] The method provided by this invention can be implemented using computer simulation software technology (such as Simulink / RTlab). The DC microgrid structure in the embodiments of this invention is as follows: Figure 1 As shown.

[0025] In this invention, when modeling a DC microgrid and constructing a distributed secondary control protocol, the following steps are taken: First, an islanded DC microgrid topology model composed of distributed generation units (DGs) is established. Each DG is connected to a common bus via line impedance and supplies power to the local load. A dynamic model of each DG is then established, including the relationship between input voltage, inductor current, filter inductor capacitance, and duty cycle. Droop control is employed at the primary control layer to obtain the voltage after droop control. At the local control layer, a dual-closed-loop PI controller with an outer voltage loop and an inner current loop is used. The outer loop generates a current reference from the voltage deviation, and the inner loop generates a PWM duty cycle signal from the current deviation. Then, a distributed secondary control protocol based on a consensus protocol is constructed, consisting of a voltage recovery channel to eliminate steady-state voltage deviation and a current sharing channel based on neighbor current information exchange, with droop control superimposed to obtain the reference voltage.

[0026] Specifically, define and These are the input voltage and inductor current, respectively; L i With C i For filtering inductors and capacitors; i is the duty cycle. i (t) represents the output current of the i-th DG, v i Let be the output voltage of the i-th DG.

[0027] The dynamic model of the i-th DG can be represented as: .

[0028] Define v d,i The voltage after droop control; r d,i Virtual impedance for power distribution; Vnom This is the rated voltage.

[0029] DC microgrids have two main control objectives: voltage regulation and power balancing. Droop control can be expressed as: .

[0030] Define K pv K iv For voltage loop proportional and integral gain; K pi K ii For the proportional and integral gain of the current loop, v i It is a voltage output.

[0031] To achieve voltage tracking and current regulation, each DG employs a voltage-current dual closed-loop PI controller. The outer loop uses the deviation between the reference voltage and the actual output voltage as input to generate a current reference value; the inner loop uses the deviation between the current reference value and the actual inductor current as input to generate a PWM duty cycle signal. .

[0032] The communication network of a microgrid uses an undirected graph. ,in ={1,2,…,N} is the set of nodes. Let be a set of edges. If there is a communication link between nodes i and j, then (i,j)∈ Define the adjacency matrix A=[a ij ]∈R N×N degree matrix The Laplace matrix is ​​defined as L=DA, and this invention adopts a ring communication structure.

[0033] Define k v k i These are the voltage recovery and current sharing gains, respectively; G ii For voltage recovery weights; c i This is the power distribution factor.

[0034] The distributed secondary control based on the consensus protocol includes two channels: voltage recovery and current sharing. The voltage recovery channel eliminates steady-state voltage deviations caused by droop control, while the current sharing channel achieves proportional power allocation through the exchange of current information between neighbors. .

[0035] Integrating droop control and secondary control, the reference voltage v of the i-th DG ref for: .

[0036] The three types of DoS attack modes in the embodiments of the present invention are compared as follows: Figure 2 As shown, this invention considers three typical DoS communication attack modes, covering the main forms of information layer blocking:

[0037] Define T off T is the attack interval. on For the duration of the attack, T c For the attack cycle, For the phase during the attack cycle, x j (t) represents the original signal of neighbor node j.

[0038] 1) Periodic DoS Attack: An attacker launches a periodic DoS attack on a selected communication link, disrupting the control protocol by blocking information exchange between nodes, causing nodes to be unable to receive neighbor information. The attack start time is defined as t. a The signal model of the attacked channel is: , .

[0039] Define p 01 p represents the probability of transitioning from blockage to normal. 10 This represents the transition probability from normal to blocked state.

[0040] 2) Random DoS Attack: Attackers employ random strategies to launch DoS attacks on communication links. The channel state randomly switches between normal and blocked states, providing greater stealth. Define the channel state s(t)∈{0,1}, and its state transitions follow a Markov chain: , The signal model of the attacked channel is then: .

[0041] Define H k For the k-th attack time window, S k This represents the k-th sleep time window.

[0042] 3) Intermittent DoS Attack: The attacker blocks the communication link within multiple time windows, simulating a scenario where the attacker has limited resources and launches an attack in stages. Communication is completely interrupted during the attack and resumes normally during the dormant period. The signal model of the attacked channel is as follows: .

[0043] Under the above attack environment, distributed secondary control faces the following challenges: (1) Convergence disruption: DoS attacks block communication links, disrupt the convergence conditions of the consistency protocol, and make it impossible to eliminate voltage deviations; (2) Communication security contradiction: Reducing the communication frequency can reduce the impact of attacks, but it will also affect control performance.

[0044] Therefore, the present invention aims to design a distributed secondary controller that enables the system to simultaneously satisfy the following conditions under a DoS attack environment: (1) Voltage regulation: The output voltage of each DG converges to the nominal value, i.e. ; (2) Current sharing: Each DG shares the load current according to its capacity ratio, that is ; (3) Communication savings: Reduced number of event triggers, eliminating Zeno behavior triggered by events; (4) Attack resilience: Under attack, the voltage and current deviations are bounded and can be recovered.

[0045] The adaptive two-layer event triggering (ADLET) control principle in this embodiment of the invention is as follows: Figure 3 As shown.

[0046] Traditional distributed secondary control uses periodic communication, where each node broadcasts current information to its neighbors during each sampling period, resulting in significant unnecessary communication overhead. This invention proposes an adaptive two-layer event triggering (ADLET) mechanism that only initiates communication when the system state changes significantly, while dynamically matching the system's operating state through adaptive thresholds.

[0047] definition Let this be the neighbor signal. Define the weighted current signal sampled by node i at the k-th trigger time as... The previous sampled value remains unchanged between two triggers: .

[0048] The core of the ADLET mechanism is composite error assessment. It defines the change e of the neighbor signal between two triggers. i1 e i2 and normalized voltage error e v : .

[0049] Define σ i With σ v These are the weighting coefficients for current and voltage, respectively.

[0050] The composite error combines two dimensions: current variation and voltage deviation. .

[0051] Define α as the deviation coupling coefficient.

[0052] The dynamic trigger threshold consists of two parts: a neighbor bias coupling term and an adaptive internal variable. The neighbor bias metric Δ... iReflecting the degree of difference between the current of the current node and its neighbors, when the difference is large, the system is in an adjustment process, requiring a higher trigger threshold to avoid frequent communication; adaptive variable η i Dynamically adjusted based on historical trigger strength: , When the composite error M i Exceeding the dynamic trigger threshold H i When a node i triggers communication to update its neighbor signal, it will do so; otherwise, it will retain the previous value.

[0053] Define β as the exponential decay factor; μ as the proportionality coefficient; η min The threshold is set as a lower bound and its value is greater than 0, ensuring that the trigger interval has a positive lower bound to exclude Zeno behavior.

[0054] For the adaptive variable η i The update, when triggered, uses an exponentially weighted average of the composite error to update the baseline. And adjust the threshold accordingly: .

[0055] Define k η is the decay rate; h is the sampling period.

[0056] When not triggered, the threshold decays exponentially, ensuring that the system can respond promptly to new disturbances near steady state. .

[0057] The attack detection mechanism in this embodiment of the invention is as follows: Figure 4 As shown.

[0058] The attack detection mechanism is embedded within the event trigger, utilizing signal freeze characteristics to achieve real-time detection of DoS attacks. When a DoS attack sets the channel signal to zero, the zero-order hold circuit retains the previous sampled value, resulting in the same value being received for multiple consecutive sampling periods. This characteristic is used to define a freeze counter n. s The counter increments when the difference between adjacent samples is extremely small, and resets to zero otherwise. This process can be represented by the following formula: , Here, ε is a local minimum.

[0059] When the freeze counter exceeds the detection threshold n s,max At that time, it was determined that the channel was under a DoS attack.

[0060] To prevent false alarms caused by transient disturbances, an acknowledgment counter n is introduced. c The counter increments when the DoS detection conditions are met consecutively; otherwise, it is reset. This process can be represented by the following formula: , When the confirmation counter exceeds the confirmation threshold n c,max At that time, channel isolation will be activated.

[0061] The channel isolation and recovery mechanism in this embodiment of the invention is as follows: Figure 5 As shown.

[0062] definition The neighbor signal that actually participates in the current sharing control after being processed by the isolation mechanism, l ij For channel locking, l ij =1 means locked.

[0063] After detection and confirmation, the corresponding neighbor channel is locked. During the locking period, if the received neighbor signal is zero, the last valid signal will be used. Replace; if the signal recovers to a non-zero value, continue using the neighbor's signal and update the valid value record: .

[0064] When the attack is retracted, the freeze detection condition is no longer met, and a security counter n is defined. a Used for channel signal recovery: .

[0065] When the safety counter exceeds the safety recovery threshold n a,max If the attack has been revoked and the channel is now secure, the channel is unlocked, and communication is resumed using neighbor information.

[0066] The overall control flow of the model in this embodiment of the invention is as follows: Figure 6 As shown.

[0067] Based on the above analysis, the specific steps of the constructed control flow are as follows: 1) Neighbor current signals are transmitted via communication links and may be subject to DoS attacks; 2) The ADLET event triggering module determines whether to update the signal based on the composite error and the adaptive threshold, and only triggers communication when the state changes significantly, thereby reducing the communication frequency; 3) The detection module uses an attack detection mechanism to determine whether the signal has been attacked; 4) If an attack is detected and confirmed, the channel is locked, and the tampered neighbor signal is replaced with the local signal to achieve channel isolation; 5) The processed signal enters the current equalization integrator and the voltage recovery integrator to generate the secondary control correction quantity; 6) The correction value is superimposed on the droop control to generate a reference voltage, which is then output by the dual-loop PI controller to drive the converter with the PWM duty cycle.

[0068] This embodiment achieves stable operation of DC microgrids under DoS attack environments through an adaptive two-layer event triggering and attack detection, isolation and recovery coordinated control framework, and enables communication to be triggered only when the state changes significantly. It provides an effective technical solution for the resilience control of DC microgrids in communication attack environments and communication resource-constrained scenarios.

[0069] This invention also provides an adaptive triggering DoS elastic control device for DC microgrids. This device belongs to the same inventive concept as the aforementioned method embodiments, and its specific implementation can be referred to the description of the aforementioned method embodiments. Repeated details will not be repeated.

[0070] The device includes: an adaptive dual-layer event triggering module, an attack detection module, a channel isolation and recovery module, and a secondary control output module.

[0071] The adaptive two-layer event triggering module constructs a composite error integrating current variation and voltage deviation, and sets a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and adaptive internal variables. Communication is triggered when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold, sending the currently sampled neighbor signal to the communication link. This module also performs adaptive updates to the dynamic trigger threshold. Upon triggering, it updates the baseline using an exponentially weighted average of the composite error and increases the dynamic trigger threshold; when not triggered, it allows the dynamic trigger threshold to decay exponentially. Simultaneously, the adaptive two-layer event triggering module sets a lower threshold greater than zero to ensure a positive lower bound on the trigger interval, thereby excluding Zeno behavior.

[0072] The attack detection module is connected to the adaptive dual-layer event triggering module to monitor signal changes between adjacent sampling times in the communication link in real time. This module defines a freeze counter, which increments when the difference between adjacent samples is less than a minimum value, and resets to zero otherwise. When the freeze counter exceeds a preset detection threshold, the attack detection module determines that the communication link is under a DoS attack. The attack detection module also defines an acknowledgment counter, which increments when the DoS detection conditions are continuously met, and resets to zero otherwise. When the acknowledgment counter exceeds a preset acknowledgment threshold, the attack detection module confirms the attack has occurred and initiates channel isolation.

[0073] The channel isolation and recovery module is connected to both the attack detection module and the adaptive two-layer event triggering module. It locks the corresponding communication link after the attack detection module confirms an attack. During the lockout period, if the received signal is zero, the last valid signal replaces it; if the received signal recovers to a non-zero value, the neighbor signal is used again and the valid value record is updated. The channel isolation and recovery module also defines a security counter, which increments when the freeze detection condition is no longer met after the attack is revoked. When the security counter exceeds a preset security recovery threshold, the channel isolation and recovery module determines that the attack has been revoked and the communication link is secure, unlocks the communication link, and resumes communication using neighbor information.

[0074] The secondary control output module is connected to the channel isolation and recovery module. It is used to send the isolated signal to the current equalization integrator and the voltage recovery integrator to generate the secondary control correction quantity, and output the correction quantity to generate the control signal for driving the converter.

[0075] In the adaptive two-layer event triggering module, the composite error is constructed as follows: The current change and normalized voltage error of the neighbor signal between two triggers are defined. The current change and normalized voltage error are weighted and combined to obtain the composite error. The dynamic trigger threshold is formed by adding the neighbor deviation coupling term and the adaptive internal variable. The neighbor deviation coupling term reflects the degree of difference in weighted current between the current node and its neighboring nodes. The baseline of the adaptive internal variable is updated by the exponentially weighted average of the composite error.

[0076] In the attack detection module, the confirmation counter is reset to zero when the DoS detection conditions are not met consecutively.

[0077] In the channel isolation and recovery module, the communication link is kept locked as long as the security counter does not exceed the security recovery threshold.

[0078] The above modules can be implemented by software, hardware, or a combination thereof. The connection relationship between the modules is as follows: the output of the adaptive dual-layer event triggering module is connected to the input of the attack detection module and the channel isolation and recovery module, respectively; the output of the attack detection module is connected to the input of the channel isolation and recovery module; and the output of the channel isolation and recovery module is connected to the input of the secondary control output module.

[0079] During device operation, neighbor current signals are transmitted via a communication link. The adaptive dual-layer event triggering module determines whether to update the signal based on the composite error and dynamic triggering threshold. The attack detection module uses a freeze counter and an acknowledgment counter to determine if the signal has been attacked. If an attack is detected and confirmed, the channel isolation and recovery module locks the communication link and replaces the tampered neighbor signal with a locally valid signal. The processed signal is then used by the secondary control output module to generate a secondary control correction value, which is output to generate the control signal driving the converter.

[0080] This invention also provides an adaptive triggering DoS resilient control device for a DC microgrid, comprising a processor and a memory. The memory stores a computer program containing program instructions for executing the adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method for a DC microgrid provided in this invention.

[0081] The processor is connected to a memory for loading and executing a computer program stored in the memory. When the processor executes the computer program, it performs the following functions: constructing a composite error of integrated current variation and voltage deviation, and setting a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and an adaptive internal variable; triggering communication when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold; updating the adaptive variable, updating the baseline and increasing the dynamic trigger threshold using an exponentially weighted average of the composite error when triggered, and causing the dynamic trigger threshold to decay exponentially when not triggered, and setting a lower threshold greater than zero; performing a freeze counter, accumulating the count when the difference between adjacent samples is less than a minimum value, otherwise resetting the count, and determining that the communication link has been compromised when the freeze counter exceeds a detection threshold. Under DoS attack: An acknowledgment counter is executed, incrementing when the DoS detection conditions are continuously met and resetting otherwise. Channel isolation of the communication link is initiated when the acknowledgment counter exceeds the acknowledgment threshold. After detection and confirmation, the communication link is locked. During the locking period, if the received signal is zero, the last valid signal is used instead; if the received signal recovers to non-zero, neighbor signals are used and the valid value record is updated. A security counter is executed, incrementing when the detection conditions are no longer met after the attack is revoked. When the security counter exceeds the security recovery threshold, it is determined that the attack has been revoked and the communication link has been restored to security. The communication link is unlocked and communication resumes using neighbor information.

[0082] The device may also include a communication interface for connecting to a communication network and interacting with other nodes, and may also include a data acquisition interface for acquiring current and voltage signals from the local distributed generation unit.

[0083] Optionally, the processor may be one or more central processing units, a specific integrated circuit, or one or more field-programmable gate arrays. The memory may be a read-only memory, random access memory, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory, optical disk storage, or magnetic disk storage medium, etc. The device may be a server, industrial control computer, embedded controller, or other terminal device with computing capabilities.

[0084] This invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements a DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method provided in this invention's method embodiment.

[0085] Specifically, the program code stored on the storage medium, when executed by the processor, performs the following functions: constructing a composite error of integrated current change and voltage deviation, and setting a dynamic trigger threshold composed of neighbor deviation coupling terms and adaptive internal variables; triggering communication when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold; updating the adaptive variables, updating the baseline and increasing the dynamic trigger threshold using the exponential weighted average of the composite error when triggered, and causing the dynamic trigger threshold to decay exponentially when not triggered, and setting a lower threshold greater than zero; performing a freeze counter, accumulating the freeze counter when the difference between adjacent samples is less than the minimum value, otherwise resetting it, and determining when the freeze counter exceeds the detection threshold. If a communication link is subjected to a DoS attack, the system will: 1) Execute an acknowledgment counter, incrementing it as long as the DoS detection conditions are met consecutively, otherwise resetting it; 2) Initiate channel isolation of the communication link when the acknowledgment counter exceeds the acknowledgment threshold; 3) Lock the communication link after detection and confirmation, and if the received signal is zero during the locking period, replace it with the last valid signal; if the received signal recovers to non-zero, continue using the neighbor signal and update the valid value record; 4) Execute a security counter, incrementing it when the freeze detection conditions are no longer met after the attack is revoked; 5) Determine that the attack has been revoked and the communication link has been restored to security when the security counter exceeds the security recovery threshold, unlock the communication link, and resume communication using neighbor information.

[0086] When the computer program is executed by the processor, it also performs the following functions: the composite error is constructed by defining the current change of the neighbor signal between two triggers and the normalized voltage error, and weighting the current change and the normalized voltage error to obtain the composite error; the dynamic trigger threshold is composed of the neighbor deviation coupling term and the adaptive internal variable, and the neighbor deviation coupling term reflects the degree of difference in the weighted current between the current node and the neighbor nodes; the baseline of the adaptive internal variable is updated by the exponential weighted average of the composite error.

[0087] The storage medium can be any medium capable of storing program code, such as a USB flash drive, portable hard drive, read-only memory, random access memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk, or it can be a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more sets of available media.

[0088] The computer program may be embodied, in whole or in part, in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, and includes several instructions to cause a computer device to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention.

[0089] In summary, the adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method for DC microgrids provided by this invention is suitable for addressing issues such as disrupted node cooperation and voltage instability in distributed secondary control of DC microgrids under communication attack environments, as well as the lack of communication security considerations in existing event triggering methods and the high communication overhead caused by the use of periodic communication in attack defense strategies. First, an adaptive two-layer event triggering mechanism is designed, achieving on-demand communication based on composite error assessment and adaptive threshold dynamic adjustment, only communicating when the system state changes significantly. Second, an exponential moving average detector is embedded within the event triggering node to detect DoS communication attacks in real time using local information, identifying signal freezing characteristics through a freeze counter and confirmation counting mechanism. Then, after detection and confirmation, rapid isolation is achieved through channel locking and last effective value replacement, and automatic unlocking is achieved by monitoring the signal recovery state through a safety counter. Finally, event triggering control is collaboratively designed with attack detection and isolation recovery methods, unifying communication savings with attack defense. This invention can effectively adapt to different DoS attack and load switching scenarios, significantly reducing communication overhead while ensuring voltage regulation and current sharing control performance, providing technical support for resilient control of DC microgrids.

[0090] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features therein; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for adaptive triggering DoS elastic control of a DC microgrid, characterized in that, include: A composite error of combined current variation and voltage deviation is constructed, and a dynamic trigger threshold consisting of a neighbor deviation coupling term and an adaptive internal variable is set. Communication is triggered when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold. The adaptive variable update rule is designed so that when triggered, the baseline is updated and the dynamic trigger threshold is increased by using the exponential weighted average of the composite error. When not triggered, the dynamic trigger threshold decays exponentially and a lower bound greater than zero is set. A freeze counter is defined, which is incremented when the difference between adjacent samples is less than the minimum value, and reset to zero otherwise. When the freeze counter exceeds the detection threshold, it is determined that the communication link has been subjected to a DoS attack. The communication link is the channel for transmitting neighbor current signals between distributed generation units. An acknowledgment counter is introduced, which is incremented when the DoS detection conditions are met consecutively and reset otherwise. Channel isolation of the communication link is initiated when the acknowledgment counter exceeds the acknowledgment threshold. After detection and confirmation, the communication link is locked. If the received signal is zero during the locking period, it is replaced by the last valid signal. If the received signal returns to non-zero, the neighbor signal is used and the valid value record is updated. Define a security counter. When the freeze detection condition is no longer met after the attack is revoked, the security counter is incremented. When the security counter exceeds the security recovery threshold, it is determined that the attack has been revoked and the communication link has been restored to security. The lock on the communication link is released and communication is resumed using neighbor information.

2. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method for a DC microgrid according to claim 1, characterized in that, The composite error is constructed as follows: define the current change of the neighbor signal between two triggers and the normalized voltage error, and weight the current change and the normalized voltage error to obtain the composite error.

3. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method for DC microgrids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dynamic trigger threshold is composed of the neighbor deviation coupling term and the adaptive internal variable, and the neighbor deviation coupling term reflects the degree of difference in weighted current between the current node and its neighboring nodes.

4. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method for a DC microgrid according to claim 1, characterized in that, The confirmation counter is reset to zero when the DoS detection conditions are not met consecutively.

5. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method for a DC microgrid according to claim 1, characterized in that, The baseline of the adaptive internal variables is updated by an exponentially weighted average of the composite error.

6. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method for a DC microgrid according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication link remains locked as long as the security counter does not exceed the security recovery threshold.

7. A DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS elastic control device, characterized in that, include: An adaptive two-layer event triggering module is used to construct a composite error of integrated current change and voltage deviation, and to set a dynamic trigger threshold composed of a neighbor deviation coupling term and an adaptive internal variable. Communication is triggered when the composite error exceeds the dynamic trigger threshold. The adaptive two-layer event triggering module is also used to design the update law of the adaptive variable. When triggered, the baseline is updated and the dynamic trigger threshold is increased by using the exponential weighted average of the composite error. When not triggered, the dynamic trigger threshold decays exponentially and a lower bound greater than zero is set. An attack detection module is used to define a freeze counter, which is incremented when the difference between adjacent samples is less than a minimum value, and reset to zero otherwise. When the freeze counter exceeds a detection threshold, it is determined that the communication link has been subjected to a DoS attack. The communication link is a channel for transmitting neighbor current signals between distributed generation units. The attack detection module is also used to introduce an acknowledgment counter, which is incremented when the DoS detection conditions are met continuously, and reset otherwise. When the acknowledgment counter exceeds an acknowledgment threshold, channel isolation of the communication link is initiated. The channel isolation and recovery module is used to lock the communication link after detection and confirmation. During the locking period, if the received signal is zero, it is replaced by the last valid signal. If the received signal recovers to non-zero, the neighbor signal is used and the valid value record is updated. The channel isolation and recovery module is also used to define a security counter. When the freeze detection condition is no longer met after the attack is withdrawn, the security counter is incremented. When the security counter exceeds the security recovery threshold, it is determined that the attack has been withdrawn and the communication link has been restored to security. The lock of the communication link is released and communication is resumed using the neighbor information. The secondary control output module is used to generate a secondary control correction quantity from the processed signal through a current equalization integrator and a voltage recovery integrator, and output the correction quantity to generate a control signal for driving the converter.

8. The adaptive triggering DoS elastic control device for a DC microgrid according to claim 7, characterized in that, When the security counter does not exceed the security recovery threshold, the channel isolation and recovery module maintains the locked state of the communication link.

9. A DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS elastic control device, characterized in that, include: processor; A memory storing a computer program, which, when executed by the processor, implements a DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS resilient control method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements a DC microgrid adaptive triggering DoS elastic control method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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