Near-field one-way anti-cracking remote control system and method based on time-stamp dynamic coupling chaos iteration

Abstract

The scheme provides a near-field one-way anti-cracking remote control system and method based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaos iteration, which comprises a code center, a super remote controller, a decoding remote controller and an anti-theft device. The code center generates group passwords and fills them in batches through near-field broadcasting of the super remote controller; the decoding remote controller takes the current timestamp as the driving parameter of chaos iteration number, sequence truncation position and dynamic S-box generation, generates a dynamic authentication signature through nonlinear operation; and the anti-theft device verifies the timestamp incrementality and the signature. The application does not need real-time clock synchronization at the device end, realizes dynamic coupling change of authentication parameters, effectively prevents replay and forgery attacks, and has the advantages of low cost, low power consumption and high deployment efficiency.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of wireless remote control security communication technology, and in particular to a near-field one-way anti-hacking remote control system and method based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration. Background Technology

[0002] With the widespread application of radio frequency anti-theft technology in retail, warehousing, asset management and other fields, the deployment scale of anti-theft devices is constantly expanding. How to achieve batch authorization and one-way unlocking control of a large number of anti-theft devices while ensuring the security of the devices has become a technical problem that urgently needs to be solved in the field of radio frequency anti-theft.

[0003] Existing radio frequency (RF) anti-theft systems typically use remote controls to send wireless control commands to the anti-theft devices to perform operations such as unlocking and status switching. However, due to the open propagation characteristics of wireless communication links, remote control signals are susceptible to eavesdropping, interception, and replay attacks. Therefore, dynamic authentication mechanisms are needed to improve the security of remote control systems. Existing technologies mainly suffer from the following shortcomings:

[0004] Firstly, traditional fixed-code remote controls send the same coded information in every control operation, and the remote control code remains unchanged over a long period. If an attacker obtains a valid control signal through radio frequency eavesdropping, they can directly copy and retransmit the control signal in a subsequent period, thereby achieving unauthorized unlocking. This results in a serious risk of replay attacks and low security.

[0005] Secondly, to address the issue of fixed codes being easily copied, existing technologies have proposed rolling code authentication schemes. These schemes generate a changing authentication code with each remote control operation to reduce the risk of signal duplication. However, existing rolling code schemes typically rely on synchronizing time or count states between the remote control and the receiver. In practical applications, this is easily affected by factors such as device power outages, prolonged inactivity, and communication anomalies, leading to state discrepancies between the sender and receiver. This necessitates the design of additional synchronization recovery mechanisms, increasing system complexity. Furthermore, such schemes are generally more suitable for one-to-one device authentication scenarios and are insufficiently adaptable to scenarios involving multiple remote controls and batch management of multiple devices.

[0006] Third, some remote authentication schemes based on timestamp synchronization mechanisms require the receiver to be configured with a continuously running real-time clock module to ensure that the receiver can determine the validity of the authentication data based on time information. However, in actual radio frequency anti-theft applications, anti-theft devices are usually battery-powered and operate in a low-power state for extended periods, making it difficult to maintain a high-precision real-time clock continuously. Furthermore, time synchronization needs to be reconfigured after power loss, reducing the convenience of device deployment and maintenance.

[0007] Fourth, some existing rolling code schemes use dedicated encryption chips or complex cryptographic algorithms to achieve dynamic authentication. While this can improve security, it increases hardware costs and computational resource requirements, making it unsuitable for use in low-cost anti-theft devices with limited resources. Furthermore, some schemes use linear encryption to generate dynamic codes, resulting in a relatively fixed pattern in the authentication process. After intercepting multiple consecutive communication data, attackers may deduce the authentication pattern through differential analysis and other methods, further reducing system security.

[0008] Fifth, existing technologies include anti-cracking schemes that combine chaotic techniques with rolling codes. These schemes pre-install identical chaotic functions in the remote control transmitting and receiving modules, using these functions to generate pseudo-random sequences, which are then combined with fixed encoding to generate dynamic authentication information. While this approach improves the randomness of the authentication information by utilizing chaotic sequences, the number of iterations of the chaotic function is typically fixed. Each remote control operation generates a chaotic sequence only at a fixed iteration depth, and the timestamp information is only used as ordinary data in the calculation, not participating in controlling the evolution of the chaotic system. Therefore, the dynamic anti-cracking capability remains insufficient.

[0009] Sixth, existing dynamic S-box construction schemes based on multi-level chaotic systems improve the security of nonlinear replacement processes by mapping keys to the initial conditions and evolution parameters of the chaotic mapping system, enabling the system to generate different dynamic S-boxes in real time according to different keys. However, this type of dynamic S-box generation method usually only depends on key parameters. Once the dynamic S-box is determined by the key, it remains fixed under the same key conditions. It does not further introduce time state parameters to dynamically control the S-box generation process, and cannot achieve the dynamic characteristic of "one S-box at a time" where different S-boxes are generated at different times under the same key conditions. Summary of the Invention

[0010] The purpose of this invention is to provide a near-field one-way anti-hacking system and method based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration. Without the need for bidirectional communication or real-time clock synchronization on the device side, it generates one-time authentication information by driving chaotic dynamic evolution through timestamps, thereby achieving one-way remote control anti-hacking.

[0011] To achieve the above objectives, this technical solution provides a near-field one-way anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration, including: The QR code center is used to generate random group passwords and write them to the super remote control and the decoding remote control, while also configuring the initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control is used to obtain the group password and broadcast it to surrounding anti-theft devices that are listening within a preset range. At least one decoding remote control, wherein each decoding remote control has a unique identifier and a corresponding timestamp value, used to perform nonlinear operations based on the group password, the identifier and the current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and send an unlocking command containing the identifier, timestamp value, instruction code and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device, with the timestamp value increasing after each transmission; The anti-theft device stores group passwords and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls. Upon receiving an unlock command, it queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, increments and verifies the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. In nonlinear operations, the current timestamp value serves as a parameter for determining the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter for the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter for generating the dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value.

[0012] Secondly, this solution provides a near-field one-way anti-cracking method based on timestamp-dynamically coupled chaotic iteration, including the following steps: S1: The QR code center generates a random group password, writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control, and configures an initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control broadcasts the group password to the anti-theft device. S2: The decoding remote control performs nonlinear operations based on the group password, identity identifier, and current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and sends an unlock command containing the identity identifier, timestamp value, and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device. The timestamp value increases after each transmission. In the nonlinear operation, the current timestamp value is also used as a parameter to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter to determine the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter to generate a dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value. S3: The anti-theft device that obtains the unlock command queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, performs incremental verification on the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. After the verification is successful, the unlocking action is executed. The anti-theft device stores the group password and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls.

[0013] Compared with existing technologies, this technical solution has the following characteristics and beneficial effects: This system significantly improves deployment efficiency and device adaptability: through the near-field broadcast technology of the super remote control, it enables rapid batch loading of group passwords, resolving management conflicts when multiple remote controls coexist, and greatly reducing on-site deployment costs. In terms of hardware design, it requires only basic computing power, without the need for dedicated encryption chips or real-time clock support, offering advantages in low cost and low power consumption; moreover, it can resume operation without resynchronizing time after power failure, greatly facilitating maintenance and use.

[0014] The core algorithm innovatively implements timestamp-driven multi-dimensional dynamic security protection. The timestamp value simultaneously serves as the driving parameter for the number of chaotic mapping iterations, the sequence truncation position, and the generation of dynamic S-boxes, constructing a comprehensive dynamic effect of "one depth per iteration, one truncation per iteration, and one S-box per iteration," significantly improving anti-cracking capabilities. This mechanism not only ensures constant computational efficiency but also, through a two-factor protection model of firmware algorithm parameters and group ciphers, ensures that even if the key is leaked, it is difficult to forge legitimate instructions. Simultaneously, a comprehensive defense system from the physical layer to the logical layer is constructed. Utilizing incremental verification of large-range timestamps and nonlinear dynamic signatures to form dual protection completely eliminates replay attacks and overflow logic vulnerabilities; the physical layer employs the natural barrier of near-field communication, combined with preamble and power randomization anti-interception measures, effectively defending against remote eavesdropping. Furthermore, the device has a self-destruct mechanism to prevent brute-force attacks, further increasing the cost of attacks and forming a tight security protection closed loop. Attached Figure Description

[0015] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is an architecture diagram of a near-field one-way anti-cracking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a near-field one-way anti-cracking method based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0016] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numerals in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with one or more embodiments of this specification. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of one or more embodiments of this specification as detailed in the appended claims.

[0017] It should be noted that the steps of the corresponding methods are not necessarily performed in the order shown and described in this specification in other embodiments. In some other embodiments, the methods may include more or fewer steps than described in this specification. Furthermore, a single step described in this specification may be broken down into multiple steps in other embodiments; and multiple steps described in this specification may be combined into a single step in other embodiments.

[0018] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, this solution provides a near-field one-way anti-hacking system based on timestamp-dynamically coupled chaotic iteration, including: The QR code center is used to generate random group passwords and write them into the super remote control and the decoding remote control, while also configuring an initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control is used to obtain the group password and broadcast authorization information containing the group password to surrounding anti-theft devices that are listening within a preset range; At least one decoding remote control, wherein each decoding remote control has a unique identifier and a corresponding timestamp value, used to perform nonlinear operations based on the group password, the identifier and the current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and send an unlocking command containing the identifier, timestamp value, instruction code and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device, with the timestamp value increasing after each transmission; The anti-theft device stores group passwords and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls. Upon receiving an unlock command, it queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, increments and verifies the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. In nonlinear operations, the current timestamp value serves as a parameter for determining the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter for the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter for generating the dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value.

[0019] This solution establishes a one-way authorization architecture by setting up a QR code center, a super remote control, multiple decoding remote controls, and multiple anti-theft devices. The super remote control batch-installs group passwords on multiple anti-theft devices. The decoding remote control generates a dynamic authentication signature based on its unique identifier, the group password, and the current timestamp value. The current timestamp value also serves as a parameter for driving the number of chaotic iterations, a parameter for the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter for generating the dynamic S-box. This allows each remote control to generate a different dynamic authentication result, achieving "one-time password" anti-cracking authentication.

[0020] Specifically, regarding the QR code center for this solution; The QR code center serves as the system's key management and authorization initialization hub, responsible for generating, managing, and distributing system-level group passwords, and establishing the initial authentication state for each decoding remote control. The group password generated by the QR code center serves as a system-level shared authentication parameter, used for subsequent dynamic authentication calculations between the decoding remote control and the anti-theft device.

[0021] In some embodiments, the group password K is preferably stored in a non-volatile storage medium.

[0022] It is worth mentioning that this solution differs from the traditional fixed-code remote control method. This solution does not directly use fixed codes as control commands, but instead uses group passwords to participate in dynamic authentication signature generation.

[0023] In some embodiments, the QR code center identifies the accessed decoding remote control, obtains the unique identifier of the decoding remote control, and configures a corresponding initial timestamp value for each decoding remote control, wherein the unique identifier of each decoding remote control is bound to the initial timestamp value. It should be noted that the initial timestamp value is a non-zero value, preferably the lower 24 bits of the current timestamp value or a random number.

[0024] In some embodiments, the QR code center writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control via a wired communication interface to prevent the key from being exposed via a wireless link.

[0025] Regarding the super remote control for this solution: The super remote control serves as a management tool, used as a batch authorization management device for field devices, enabling the near-field secure loading of group passwords to multiple anti-theft devices.

[0026] In some embodiments, the super remote control broadcasts a group password to nearby listening anti-theft devices via near-field wireless communication, enabling batch encoding commands to be applied to multiple devices at close range. Furthermore, the super remote control approaches a group of unauthorized anti-theft devices and sends a low-power near-field broadcast signal; the nearby listening anti-theft devices receive the group password K and store it.

[0027] Furthermore, when the super remote control is brought close to the anti-theft device and the "Code Broadcast" button is pressed, a code frame containing the group password K is continuously broadcast using a low-power near-field carrier. All anti-theft devices in the vicinity that are in listening mode receive the group password K and write it into the non-volatile memory. At the same time, the ID-C_last mapping table is initialized (to be empty), and batch authorization is completed.

[0028] It should be noted that the Super Remote Control itself does not participate in routine unlocking authentication, but is mainly used for batch configuration of anti-theft devices.

[0029] In some embodiments, the super remote control and the QR code center are wired together to trigger the code setting operation. Both parties negotiate to generate the same group password (32 bits) and store it in their respective non-volatile memory.

[0030] Regarding the decoding remote control for this solution: The decoding remote control has a unique identifier (preset at the factory or assigned when obtaining the group password). It is used to obtain the group password from the QR code center via wired connection. Based on the group password K, its own identifier ID, and the current timestamp value C, a dynamic signature is generated through nonlinear calculation. The remote control sends an unlocking command containing the ID, timestamp value, and dynamic signature to the anti-theft device via near-field wireless communication. After sending, the timestamp value is incremented and stored in non-volatile memory.

[0031] In some embodiments, the timestamp value of the decoding remote control is incremented by 1 after sending the unlock command.

[0032] In some embodiments, the decoding remote control is inserted into the QR code center, obtains the group password via a wired communication interface, and stores it in non-volatile memory. The QR code center assigns a non-zero initial timestamp value to the decoding remote control (preferably the lower 24 bits of the current Unix timestamp, or a random number), and the decoding remote control stores this initial timestamp value as the current timestamp value in the non-volatile memory. Simultaneously, the decoding remote control starts a preset validity period timer (preferably 12 hours), with a built-in backup power supply to maintain the timer in the event of a power outage. Correspondingly, the QR code center records the identity ID of the authorized decoding remote control.

[0033] In some embodiments, the decoding remote control is set to start a countdown of a preset validity period (preferably 12 hours) after obtaining the group password K. When the countdown reaches zero, the group password K and the timestamp value are automatically cleared, and the device enters an invalid state. The group password must be obtained again before it can be used again. The decoding remote control has a built-in backup power supply to maintain the countdown state when the power is off.

[0034] The decoding remote control performs nonlinear operations to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the group password, identity identifier, and current timestamp value. The current timestamp value also serves as a parameter for determining the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter for the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter for generating the dynamic S-box.

[0035] Specifically, the decoding remote control performs non-linear calculations in the following way: Nonlinear coupling operations are performed based on the group password and timestamp value to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping. The number of iterations is used to control the chaotic mapping to iterate and obtain a chaotic sequence. The dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence is determined based on the timestamp value and identity identifier, and authentication data is extracted from the chaotic sequence. Dynamic replacement rules are generated based on the group password and timestamp value. The authentication data is then subjected to non-linear transformation using the dynamic replacement rules, and a dynamic authentication signature is generated by combining the timestamp value.

[0036] In the step of "determining the number of iterations for the chaotic mapping by performing nonlinear coupling operations based on the group password and timestamp value", the group password is used as the initial parameter for the chaotic mapping, and the timestamp value is used as the driving parameter for determining the chaotic mapping. The number of iterations for the chaotic mapping is determined according to the following formula: IterCnt = HMAC(K, C) mod Range + BaseIter; Where HMAC is a hash-based message authentication code function, Range is the range of iterations, BaseIter is the minimum number of iterations (preferably 256) to ensure that the chaotic map fully enters the chaotic state, IterCnt is the number of iterations of the chaotic map, K is the group key, and C is the current timestamp value.

[0037] In some embodiments, the number of iterations ranges from approximately 256 to 4351.

[0038] In some embodiments, the number of iterations is preferably 4096, and the minimum number of iterations for chaotic states is preferably 256.

[0039] The HMAC function can employ a lightweight hash algorithm (such as SipHash-2-4), whose computational cost is on the same order of magnitude as that of chaotic iteration.

[0040] Since the number of iterations of the chaotic state is determined by the group password and the timestamp value, each increase of 1 in the timestamp value will result in a completely different number of iterations, making the depth of each chaotic iteration different as well.

[0041] In the step of "controlling the chaotic mapping to iterate and obtain a chaotic sequence according to the number of iterations", the chaotic mapping is iterated to generate a chaotic sequence according to the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping.

[0042] In some embodiments, the chaotic mapping includes at least one of a Logistic mapping, a Cubic mapping, or a Chebyshev mapping.

[0043] Preferably, the chaotic mapping uses the Logistic mapping: X n+1 = μ X n (1 - X n ); Where μ is a system parameter (determined by the low-order bits of the group cipher K), X nX0 is the nth chaotic value, and X0 is the initial value (determined by the high-order bits of the group cipher K and the identity identifier ID).

[0044] The extreme sensitivity of chaotic mapping to initial conditions ensures that even a difference of only 1 bit in the group cipher K will result in drastically different outputs after iterations. More importantly, even if the group cipher K and the initial value are exactly the same, the output chaotic sequence will be completely different due to the different number of iterations each time—achieving true "one-time pad". Furthermore, regardless of how large the timestamp value C grows, the number of iterations remains within a finite range of 256 to 4351, and a single MAC operation takes only 3 to 5 ms on mainstream low-power MCUs, with computational efficiency unaffected by the growth of C.

[0045] Furthermore, the pseudo-random sequence generated by chaotic iteration is not used in its entirety. Instead, it needs to be truncated according to the rules determined by the low-order bits of the timestamp value C and the identity identifier ID. That is, in the step of "determining the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence based on the timestamp value and the identity identifier, and extracting authentication data from the chaotic sequence", the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence is determined according to the low-order bits of the timestamp value and the identity identifier. From the dynamic truncation position, the chaotic sequence is truncated without alignment to obtain authentication data.

[0046] In some embodiments, the formula for determining the dynamic truncation position is as follows: P = (lower 4 bits of C × lower 4 bits of ID + lower 4 bits of Hash(K)) mod N; Where C is the current timestamp value, ID is the identity identifier, K is the group password, Hash(K) is a preset lightweight hash function whose implementation parameters are built into the firmware, and N is the length of the chaotic sequence.

[0047] Because the truncation rule in this scheme is a "hidden parameter," it is not distributed with the group password K but is only embedded in the firmware. Even if an attacker obtains the group password K and the firmware code, the truncation position will dynamically change each time due to the different timestamp values, making it difficult to determine the specific truncation position each time.

[0048] In the step of "generating dynamic replacement rules based on group password and timestamp value, performing nonlinear transformation on authentication data using dynamic replacement rules, and generating dynamic authentication signature by combining timestamp value", the group password K is used as seed and the timestamp value C is used as second driving parameter to drive a multi-level chaotic system to generate dynamic S-box. The dynamic S-box is used to perform nonlinear replacement on authentication data and combine it with timestamp value by displacement or shift to obtain dynamic authentication signature.

[0049] Specifically, the dynamic S-box generation process includes: generating an initial seed for the chaotic system using a group cipher K, generating dynamic perturbation parameters using a timestamp value C, inputting the initial seed and dynamic perturbation parameters into a multi-level chaotic mapping model, obtaining a chaotic sequence through multi-level chaotic iteration, sorting and permuting the chaotic sequence to generate a dynamic mapping table between input and output elements, thereby forming a dynamic S-box corresponding to the current timestamp value.

[0050] As described above, the dynamic S-box is generated by cascading a chaotic mapping system and a piecewise linear chaotic mapping system. Since different keys are mapped to different system parameters and different timestamp values ​​are mapped to different iteration numbers and evolution states, the dynamic characteristics of generating different S-boxes in real time are realized.

[0051] Because the timestamp value of the dynamic S-box changes dynamically with each button press, the S-box generated by the same remote control at different times is completely different. The addition of the timestamp value C makes it possible that even if the group password K is the same, the dynamic S-box generated at different times will be completely different, thus realizing the dynamic characteristic of "one S-box per press".

[0052] In some embodiments, the unlocking command sent by the decoding remote control to the anti-theft device includes at least an identity identifier, a timestamp value, a command code, and a dynamic authentication signature. Furthermore, the unlocking command includes a verification code.

[0053] The data frame format of the unlocking command in this scheme is as follows: preamble - identification of the decoding remote control - command code cmd - timestamp value C - dynamic signature MAC - verification code, with corresponding byte lengths of 1, 1, 3, 4, and 1 respectively.

[0054] It should be noted that the timestamp value of this scheme uses a 3-byte (24-bit) unsigned integer with a value range of 0 to 16777215, which can have a service life far exceeding the actual use cycle of the product. The total frame length of the unlocking instruction is 10 bytes, which takes into account both compactness and long-term operational reliability.

[0055] It should be noted that the complete implementation parameters of the nonlinear operation (including but not limited to the chaotic mapping equation type and system parameters, BaseIter, Range, HMAC function, dynamic truncation rules, S-box generation parameters, byte order, bit reflection configuration, etc.) are built into the firmware of the decoding remote control and anti-theft device, and are not transmitted in any form over the wireless channel, nor are they distributed along with the distribution of the group cipher K. Since an attacker, with only access to the wireless signal, faces a double-blind system "without key or algorithm parameters," they cannot deduce the group cipher K or reconstruct the MAC generation rules from a limited number of (C, MAC) data points. Even if an attacker obtains the group cipher K unauthorizedly, the dynamic changes in C result in different iteration counts, truncation positions, and S-boxes for each iteration, preventing the attacker from forging legitimate data frames.

[0056] The nonlinear operation of this scheme is achieved through a cascade of three nonlinear transformations (timestamp-driven iteration depth → timestamp + ID-driven truncation position → timestamp + key-driven S-box). Any 1-bit change in the input parameters will cause about half of the bits in the output MAC to change, rendering differential analysis and linear analysis invalid.

[0057] Regarding the anti-theft equipment in this solution: The anti-theft device, as the controlled end, is used to receive one-way remote control commands and complete local authentication. All wireless communication operates in near-field mode. The device's internal non-volatile memory stores the group password K and a mapping table of the identity IDs of multiple decoding remote controls and their respective last valid timestamp values ​​C_last. After receiving a command, it looks up the corresponding C_last based on the identity ID, then verifies the increment of the timestamp value and the correctness of the dynamic signature to determine whether to perform unlocking.

[0058] In some embodiments, the limitation of the communication distance of multiple anti-theft devices ensures that even if multiple anti-theft devices are densely arranged, there will be no false triggering of adjacent anti-theft devices. At the same time, it ensures that the key is only received by the device that is close to the super remote control during broadcast filling, and the risk of leakage is extremely low.

[0059] In some embodiments, the mapping table between the identity identifier and historical timestamp value corresponding to the decoding remote control stored in the anti-theft device is initially empty.

[0060] In the "Incremental Verification of Current Timestamp Value" step, if the current timestamp value is monotonically increasing compared to the historical timestamp value stored in the current decoding remote control, the verification passes; otherwise, the unlock command is discarded.

[0061] It should be noted that since the timestamp value of this solution is three bytes, there is no need to consider the overflow wrapback problem during the normal service life of the product, and there is no fuzzy range for overflow judgment. Therefore, the logic of this incremental verification is absolutely reliable. In the "Validation of Legality Based on Dynamic Authentication Signature" section, the decryption signature is calculated using the same non-linear operation as the remote control used for decoding, based on the group password, identity identifier, timestamp value, and instruction code in the unlocking command. If the decryption signature is the same as the dynamic authentication signature, it is a valid instruction, the historical timestamp value is updated, and the unlocking action corresponding to the instruction code is executed.

[0062] For example, after the anti-theft device obtains the unlock command, it looks up the corresponding historical timestamp value C_last in the locally stored ID-C_last mapping table according to the identity ID in the unlock command. If the current identity ID does not exist in the mapping table, the historical timestamp value C_last is 0, and the identity ID and the historical timestamp value are written into the mapping table. If the current timestamp value is increasing compared to the historical timestamp values, and C_rx > C_last, then the attack passes; if C_rx ≤ C_last, then it is determined to be a replay attack, the data frame is discarded, and the mapping table is not updated. Using the locally stored group password and the identity identifier, timestamp value, and command code from the received unlock command, perform the same non-linear operation as decoding the remote control to obtain the unlock signature MAC_calc. Determine if MAC_rx is equal to the dynamic authentication signature MAC_calc. If they are different, it is determined to be a forgery attack, and the data frame is discarded; if they are the same, the verification passes, the historical timestamp value corresponding to the identity identifier ID_rx is updated to the latest timestamp value C_rx, the mapping table in the non-volatile memory is updated synchronously, and the unlock action corresponding to the command code is executed.

[0063] In addition, the anti-theft device is equipped with a built-in anti-brute-force attack protection mechanism. When it receives a preset number (preferably 10) of illegal commands (including MAC verification failures or timestamp values ​​not incrementing), it automatically clears the internally stored group password K and the historical timestamp values ​​C_last corresponding to all identity IDs, entering a failure alarm state. It needs to be reinstalled by the super remote control to recover. Under normal use, the group password K and historical timestamp values ​​stored in the anti-theft device have no time expiration limit. That is, in some embodiments, the anti-theft device counts the number of consecutive illegal authentications. When the number of illegal authentications reaches a preset threshold, it deletes the stored group password K and the historical timestamp information corresponding to the identity IDs, entering a failure alarm state.

[0064] In some embodiments, the wireless communication employs an OOK (On-Off Keying) modulation scheme, the communication distance is within the near-field communication range, and the following anti-interception enhancement measures are implemented at the physical layer: The preamble duration is randomly jittered based on the timestamp value C, interfering with automatic interception devices that match fixed waveform templates. The communication carrier frequency is determined by the timestamp value C and the identity ID, enabling frequency hopping communication. Even if an attacker intercepts a signal once, they cannot predict the next communication frequency. The transmission power varies with the low-order randomization of C, increasing the difficulty for attackers to detect the signal.

[0065] In other words, in some embodiments, the wireless communication adopts a near-field communication mode and adjusts the communication preamble length, carrier frequency, and transmit power according to the timestamp value C. The advantage of doing so is that it increases the difficulty for attackers to launch attacks.

[0066] As described above, the QR code center in the near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration contains an MCU, a random number generator, a wired communication interface, and a near-field wireless communication circuit. Both the super remote and the decoding remote are handheld devices, containing an MCU, non-volatile memory, buttons, and a near-field wireless transmission circuit. The decoding remote has a built-in small backup battery to maintain its validity period. Each decoding remote has a factory-preset unique identification ID. The anti-theft device is a low-power device, containing an MCU, non-volatile memory, a near-field wireless receiving circuit, and an alarm indication circuit, and has a periodic monitoring function. The communication distance limitation ensures that even if multiple devices are densely arranged, there will be no false triggering by adjacent devices. Simultaneously, it ensures that during broadcast filling, the key is only received by the device closest to the super remote, resulting in an extremely low risk of leakage.

[0067] Example 2 like Figure 2 As shown, this scheme provides a near-field one-way anti-cracking method based on timestamp-dynamically coupled chaotic iteration, including the following steps: S1: The QR code center generates a random group password, writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control, and configures an initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control broadcasts the group password to the anti-theft device. S2: The decoding remote control performs nonlinear operations based on the group password, identity identifier, and current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and sends an unlock command containing the identity identifier, timestamp value, and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device. The timestamp value increases after each transmission. In the nonlinear operation, the current timestamp value is also used as a parameter to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter to determine the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter to generate a dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value. S3: The anti-theft device that obtains the unlock command queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, performs incremental verification on the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. After the verification is successful, the unlocking action is executed. The anti-theft device stores the group password and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls.

[0068] The content of this second embodiment is the same as that of the first embodiment, so it will not be repeated here.

[0069] Example 3 This embodiment provides a specific near-field one-way anti-hacking system based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration. The near-field one-way anti-hacking system based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration consists of a QR code center (1), a super remote control (1), a decoding remote control (20), and anti-theft devices (80). All wireless communications operate in near-field mode.

[0070] Insert the super remote control into the QR code center and press the code setting button. The QR code center generates a random password K, which is stored in non-volatile memory by both parties. Insert the decoded remote control into the QR code center one by one. The QR code center reads the unique identification ID of each remote control, writes the password K through the wired interface, and assigns an initial timestamp value (such as the lower 24 bits of the current Unix timestamp) to start the 12-hour validity period timer.

[0071] Bring the super remote control to the site, bring it close to the anti-theft device group, and press the "Code Broadcast" button. The system will continuously broadcast a code frame containing the group password K using a low-power near-field carrier. All anti-theft devices in listening mode will receive the password K and write it into non-volatile memory, while simultaneously initializing an empty ID-C_last mapping table.

[0072] Taking the Logistic chaotic mapping as an example, the system parameter μ is set to 3.9 (determined by the lower 8 bits of K), the initial value X0 is set to 0.123456 (determined by XORing the higher 8 bits of K with ID and then normalizing), BaseIter is set to 256, and Range is set to 4096. The HMAC function uses the SipHash-2-4 lightweight hash algorithm.

[0073] When the user presses the button, the decoding remote control A reads the current timestamp value C=10000, calculates IterCnt=SipHash(K,10000) mod 4096 + 256, and the result is approximately between 256 and 4351. Using IterCnt as the iteration number, the chaotic map is iterated IterCnt times to obtain a chaotic sequence. From the chaotic sequence, 32 bits are truncated according to the dynamic truncation rule (the truncation start position P is determined by the lower 4 bits of C, the lower 4 bits of ID, and the lower 4 bits of Hash(K)) as the chaotic kernel. This kernel then undergoes nonlinear replacement using a dynamic S-box jointly generated in real-time by K and C. Finally, it is XORed with the timestamp value C to generate a 4-byte dynamic signature MAC. After the unlock command is sent to the anti-theft device, the timestamp value is updated to 10001 and written to non-volatile memory. All operations are implemented using 32-bit fixed-point integers to ensure complete consistency between the calculation results of the decoding remote control and the anti-theft device. A single MAC operation takes approximately 3-5ms on a 16MHz MCU, meeting the real-time requirements of near-field communication unlocking. At this time, the decoding remote control A (ID=0x01) is placed near the anti-theft device's button and sends C=10000. After receiving the complete data frame, the anti-theft device extracts ID_rx=0x01, looks up the corresponding C_last=9000 in the stored ID-C_last mapping table, verifies that 10000>9000 and the MAC is correct, updates C_last=10000, and unlocks the device.

[0074] When the same decoding remote control A presses the button again, C=10001. The outputs of SipHash(K,10001) and SipHash(K,10000) are completely different. IterCnt changes, and the truncation position and S-box both change due to the change in C. The MAC changes again, truly achieving "one-time key". Even if the timestamp value increases to millions, IterCnt always remains within the range of 256 to 4351, and the computational load is constant.

[0075] Similarly, another decoding remote control B (ID=0x02) is placed close to the button of another anti-theft device and sends C=5000. The device searches for ID=0x02 and finds the corresponding C_last=4800. The verification 5000>4800 passes and the device is unlocked. The two decoding remote controls do not affect each other.

[0076] Example 4 This embodiment also provides an electronic device, see reference. Figure 3 It includes a memory 402 and a processor 401, the memory 402 storing a computer program and the processor 401 being configured to run the computer program to perform the steps in any of the above embodiments of the near-field one-way anti-hacking method based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration.

[0077] Specifically, the processor 401 may include a central processing unit (CPU), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits that can be configured to implement the embodiments of this application.

[0078] The memory 402 may include a large-capacity memory 402 for data or instructions. The memory 402 can be used to store or cache various data files that need to be processed and / or communicated, as well as possible computer program instructions executed by the processor 401.

[0079] The processor 401 reads and executes computer program instructions stored in the memory 402 to implement any of the near-field one-way anti-cracking methods based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration in the above embodiments.

[0080] Optionally, the electronic device may further include a transmission device 403 and an input / output device 404, wherein the transmission device 403 is connected to the processor 401 and the input / output device 404 is connected to the processor 401.

[0081] The transmission device 403 can be used to receive or send data via a network. Specific examples of the network described above may include wired or wireless networks provided by the communication provider of the electronic device. In one example, the transmission device includes a Network Interface Controller (NIC), which can connect to other network devices via a base station to communicate with the Internet. In another example, the transmission device 403 may be a Radio Frequency (RF) module used for wireless communication with the Internet.

[0082] Input / output device 404 is used to input or output information. In this embodiment, the input information may be a group password, etc., and the output information may be an unlock command, etc.

[0083] Optionally, in this embodiment, the processor 401 can be configured to perform the following steps via a computer program: S1: The QR code center generates a random group password, writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control, and configures an initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control broadcasts the group password to the anti-theft device. S2: The decoding remote control performs nonlinear operations based on the group password, identity identifier, and current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and sends an unlock command containing the identity identifier, timestamp value, and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device. The timestamp value increases after each transmission. In the nonlinear operation, the current timestamp value is also used as a parameter to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter to determine the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter to generate a dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value. S3: The anti-theft device that obtains the unlock command queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, performs incremental verification on the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. After the verification is successful, the unlocking action is executed. The anti-theft device stores the group password and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls.

[0084] It should be noted that the specific examples in this embodiment can refer to the examples described in the above embodiments and optional implementations, and will not be repeated here.

[0085] Generally, various embodiments can be implemented in hardware or dedicated circuitry, software, logic, or any combination thereof. Some aspects of the invention can be implemented in hardware, while others can be implemented by firmware or software executed by a controller, microprocessor, or other computing device, but the invention is not limited thereto. Although various aspects of the invention may be shown and described as block diagrams, flowcharts, or using some other graphical representation, it should be understood that, by way of non-limiting example, these blocks, apparatuses, systems, techniques, or methods described herein can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, dedicated circuitry or logic, general-purpose hardware or controllers or other computing devices, or some combination thereof.

[0086] Embodiments of the present invention can be implemented by computer software, which may be executable by a data processor of a mobile device, such as a processor entity, or by hardware, or by a combination of software and hardware. Computer software or programs (also referred to as program products), including software routines, applets, and / or macros, can be stored in any device-readable data storage medium, and they include program instructions for performing specific tasks. A computer program product may include one or more computer-executable components configured to perform embodiments when the program is run. One or more computer-executable components may be at least one piece of software code or a portion thereof. Additionally, it should be noted that any block in the logical flow of the figures may represent a program step, or interconnected logical circuitry, blocks and functions, or a combination of program steps and logical circuitry, blocks and functions. The software may be stored on physical media such as memory chips or blocks of storage implemented within a processor, magnetic media such as hard disks or floppy disks, and optical media such as, for example, DVDs and their data variants, CDs, etc. The physical medium is a non-transient medium.

[0087] Those skilled in the art should understand that the technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments have been described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0088] The above embodiments are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and their descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, but they should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration, characterized in that, include: The QR code center is used to generate random group passwords and write them to the super remote control and the decoding remote control, while also configuring the initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control is used to obtain the group password and broadcast it to surrounding anti-theft devices that are listening within a preset range. At least one decoding remote control, wherein each decoding remote control has a unique identifier and a corresponding timestamp value, used to perform nonlinear operations based on the group password, the identifier and the current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and send an unlocking command containing the identifier, timestamp value, instruction code and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device, with the timestamp value increasing after each transmission; The anti-theft device stores group passwords and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls. Upon receiving an unlock command, it queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, increments and verifies the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. In nonlinear operations, the current timestamp value serves as a parameter for determining the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter for the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter for generating the dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value.

2. The near-field unidirectional anti-cracking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The group password and timestamp value are used to perform nonlinear coupling operations to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic map. The number of iterations is used to control the iteration of the chaotic map to obtain a chaotic sequence. The timestamp value and identity identifier are used to determine the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence and extract authentication data from the chaotic sequence. Dynamic replacement rules are generated based on the group password and timestamp value. The authentication data is nonlinearly transformed using the dynamic replacement rules and combined with the timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature.

3. The near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to claim 2, characterized in that, Using the group password as the initial parameter for the chaotic map and the timestamp value as the driving parameter, the number of iterations for the chaotic map is determined according to the following formula: IterCnt = HMAC(K, C) mod Range + BaseIter; Where HMAC is a hash-based message authentication code function, Range is the range of iterations, BaseIter is the minimum number of iterations required to ensure the chaotic map fully enters the chaotic state, IterCnt is the number of iterations of the chaotic map, K is the group key, and C is the current timestamp value.

4. The near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence is determined according to the low bits of the timestamp value and the low bits of the identity identifier. The chaotic sequence is unaligned and truncated from the dynamic truncation position to obtain the authentication data. Using the group password as the seed and the timestamp value as the second driving parameter, a multi-level chaotic system is driven to generate a dynamic S-box. The authentication data is nonlinearly replaced using the dynamic S-box and combined with the timestamp value by displacement or shift to obtain the dynamic authentication signature.

5. The near-field unidirectional anti-cracking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to claim 1, characterized in that, If the current timestamp value is monotonically increasing compared to the historical timestamp value stored in the current decoding remote control, the verification passes; otherwise, the unlock command is discarded.

6. The near-field unidirectional anti-cracking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to claim 1, characterized in that, The decryption signature is calculated based on the group password, identity identifier, timestamp value, and instruction code in the unlock command, using the same non-linear operation as the remote control used for decoding. If the decryption signature is the same as the dynamic authentication signature, it is a valid instruction, the historical timestamp value is updated, and the unlocking action corresponding to the instruction code is executed.

7. The near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to claim 1, characterized in that, The QR code center writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control via a wired communication interface.

8. The near-field unidirectional anti-hacking system based on timestamp-driven dynamic coupling chaotic iteration according to claim 1, characterized in that, The super remote control broadcasts a group password to nearby anti-theft devices that are listening via near-field wireless communication. The wireless communication adopts near-field communication mode and adjusts the communication preamble length, carrier frequency, and transmission power according to the timestamp value.

9. A near-field one-way anti-cracking method based on timestamp-dynamically coupled chaotic iteration, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1: The QR code center generates a random group password, writes the group password into the super remote control and the decoding remote control, and configures an initial timestamp value for the decoding remote control. The super remote control broadcasts the group password to the anti-theft device. S2: The decoding remote control performs nonlinear operations based on the group password, identity identifier, and current timestamp value to generate a dynamic authentication signature, and sends an unlock command containing the identity identifier, timestamp value, and dynamic authentication signature to the anti-theft device. The timestamp value increases after each transmission. In the nonlinear operation, the current timestamp value is also used as a parameter to determine the number of iterations of the chaotic mapping, a parameter to determine the dynamic truncation position of the chaotic sequence, and a parameter to generate a dynamic S-box, so as to generate a dynamic authentication signature based on the change of the timestamp value. S3: The anti-theft device that obtains the unlock command queries the corresponding historical timestamp value based on the identity identifier, performs incremental verification on the current timestamp value, and performs legality verification based on the dynamic authentication signature. After the verification is successful, the unlocking action is executed. The anti-theft device stores the group password and a mapping table of identity identifiers and historical timestamp values ​​corresponding to multiple decoding remote controls.

10. An electronic device comprising a memory and a processor, characterized in that, The memory stores a computer program, and the processor is configured to run the computer program to execute the near-field one-way anti-cracking method based on timestamp dynamic coupling chaotic iteration as described in claim 9.

Images