A method for self-destructing data of autonomous vehicles
By monitoring the status of autonomous vehicles in real time and setting multiple trigger conditions, signal verification and authorization verification are performed to generate differentiated destruction strategies. This solves the problem of accurate destruction of autonomous vehicle data in extreme scenarios and improves the accuracy of data self-destruction and resource utilization efficiency.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611359114.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-03
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-10
AI Technical Summary
Existing data security protection solutions for autonomous vehicles cannot accurately destroy core mission data in extreme scenarios, leading to data leakage or waste of storage resources.
By monitoring the status of unmanned vehicles in real time, setting and verifying various trigger conditions, generating differentiated destruction strategies based on data classification and risk assessment, and choosing logical or physical self-destruction methods to destroy data.
It improves the accuracy of data self-destruction decisions, avoids misoperation and waste of storage resources, and ensures the complete destruction of core data under extreme threats.
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Figure CN123069464A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of data processing technology, and in particular to a method for self-destruction of data from unmanned vehicles. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of autonomous driving technology, unmanned vehicles (UAVs) have been widely applied in high-value and highly sensitive mission scenarios such as reconnaissance, logistics transportation, and scientific research. During mission execution, UAVs accumulate a large amount of sensitive information in their onboard storage devices, including mission planning data, navigation path data, environmental perception data, user identity information, location trajectories, and system operation logs. Existing data security protection solutions for UAVs mainly focus on communication link encryption, access control, and remote locking. These solutions can provide a certain level of data protection under normal operating conditions.
[0003] In extreme scenarios where autonomous vehicles encounter communication signal interruptions or loss, suffer unauthorized external intrusion and tampering, deviate from authorized areas, experience severe damage to critical hardware components, or receive emergency self-destruct commands, existing solutions all assume that external communication links remain available and the onboard control system remains in normal working order. When communication is completely interrupted or the control system has been taken over by an intruder, remote locking and encryption methods will be ineffective. Existing solutions use a uniform destruction method for all data, failing to classify data according to mission criticality and privacy sensitivity. This results in core mission data potentially being overwritten by software without physical destruction, leading to data leaks; or ordinary data being unnecessarily physically destroyed, wasting storage hardware, and the accuracy of destruction decisions is insufficient. Summary of the Invention
[0004] Based on the above analysis, the embodiments of the present invention aim to provide a self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data, in order to solve the problems of insufficient accuracy of existing destruction decisions, resulting in waste of storage resources and leakage of core mission data.
[0005] This invention provides a method for self-destruction of autonomous vehicle data, including: Real-time monitoring of the autonomous vehicle's operating status to obtain status monitoring data; Based on the status monitoring data, determine whether the triggering conditions for data self-destruction are met; the triggering conditions include communication abnormality triggering conditions, illegal access triggering conditions, geographical location deviation triggering conditions, emergency command triggering conditions, and hardware abnormality triggering conditions. If any triggering condition is met, the triggering condition is verified. If the verification is successful, the current operating status parameters and current task configuration file of the unmanned vehicle are obtained. Based on the current task configuration file, the stored data of the unmanned vehicle is classified to obtain the data classification result; Based on the current operating status parameters, assess the security risk level of various types of stored data to obtain risk assessment results; Based on the data classification results and the risk assessment results, a data priority division result is generated; Based on the triggering conditions and the data priority division results, a target destruction method is selected, and data destruction operations are performed on the storage medium according to the target destruction method.
[0006] Furthermore, the verification of the triggering condition includes: Obtain the trigger signal corresponding to the satisfied trigger condition, and perform a signal verification operation on the trigger signal; If the signal verification passes, the current motion state data of the unmanned vehicle is obtained, and the motion state consistency verification is performed on the trigger signal based on the current motion state data. If the motion state consistency verification passes, then the advanced permission verification information is obtained, and authorization verification is performed on the advanced permission verification information; If the authorization verification passes, the trigger condition verification is considered to have passed.
[0007] Furthermore, the step of classifying the stored data of the autonomous vehicle according to the current task configuration file to obtain data classification results includes: From the current task configuration file, identify task planning data, navigation path data, and perception decision data related to the current task, and mark them as core task data; Identify and mark stored data that includes user identity information, location trajectories, and operation logs as sensitive privacy data; The remaining data in the autonomous vehicle's storage data, excluding the core mission data and the sensitive privacy data, is marked as ordinary operational data.
[0008] Furthermore, the step of assessing the security risk level of various types of stored data based on the current operating status parameters to obtain risk assessment results includes: Extract the risk coefficient of the vehicle's current environment, communication link availability, and hardware health from the current operating status parameters; Based on the risk coefficient, determine the first risk level corresponding to the core task data; Based on the risk coefficient and the availability of the communication link, a second risk level is determined for the sensitive privacy data; Based on the risk coefficient, the availability of the communication link, and the hardware health, the third risk level corresponding to the normal operating data is determined.
[0009] Further, generating data priority allocation results based on the data classification results and the risk assessment results includes: Based on the data classification results, basic priority coefficients are assigned to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data, respectively. Based on the risk assessment results, risk weight coefficients are assigned to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operational data, respectively. Based on the basic priority coefficient and the risk weight coefficient, calculate the comprehensive priority score for the core task data, the sensitive privacy data and the ordinary operation data respectively; The data priority division results are generated by sorting the data from high to low based on the comprehensive priority scores.
[0010] Further, the step of selecting the target destruction method based on the triggering condition and the data priority division result includes: Extract the data category to which the highest priority data belongs from the data priority classification results; Based on the triggering conditions and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs, the target destruction method is selected, including: When the triggering condition is the hardware abnormality triggering condition, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the communication abnormality triggering condition or the geographical location offset triggering condition, and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs is the core task data, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the communication abnormality triggering condition or the geographical location offset triggering condition, and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs is the sensitive privacy data or the ordinary operation data, the logical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the illegal access triggering condition or the emergency instruction triggering condition, both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are selected as the target destruction method, and the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are executed sequentially.
[0011] Further, the step of performing data destruction operation on the storage medium according to the target destruction method includes: When the target destruction method is the logical self-destruct method, a random number generator is called to obtain a random number sequence, and multiple data overwrite operations are performed on the sensitive storage area in the storage medium according to the random number sequence. When the target destruction method is the physical self-destruction method, a start signal is sent to the built-in heating element to control the built-in heating element to perform a high-temperature burn-out operation on the memory chip; When the target destruction method includes both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method, the multiple data overwrite operations are executed first, followed by the high-temperature burn-out operation.
[0012] Further, the step of sorting the data according to the comprehensive priority score from high to low to generate the data priority division result includes: According to the comprehensive priority score from high to low, the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data are sorted to obtain a sorted data category sequence; Extract the comprehensive priority score and storage address information corresponding to each data category in the sorted data category sequence; Based on the sorted data category sequence, the comprehensive priority score, and the storage address information, a data priority mapping table is generated, which includes data category priority sorting, comprehensive priority score of each data category, and storage address range corresponding to each data category, as the data priority division result.
[0013] Further, the step of extracting the data category to which the highest priority data belongs from the data priority division result includes: Read the data category priority sorting from the data priority mapping table; Based on the priority of the data categories, the data category that ranks first is determined as the candidate data category; Obtain the comprehensive priority score corresponding to the candidate data category, and compare the comprehensive priority score with the preset highest priority score threshold; If the overall priority score reaches the preset highest priority score threshold, then the candidate data category is determined to be the data category to which the highest priority data belongs.
[0014] Furthermore, the step of sending a start signal to the built-in heating element to control the built-in heating element to perform a high-temperature burn-out operation on the memory chip includes: Obtain the chip identification information of each of the multiple storage chips included in the storage medium of the unmanned vehicle; Based on the data priority classification results, the data categories stored in each storage chip are determined, and the proportion of data belonging to the core task data or the sensitive privacy data in each storage chip is calculated. Storage chips whose data volume ratio exceeds a preset ratio threshold are marked as chips to be destroyed. Based on the physical arrangement of the chips to be destroyed, a heating start sequence is generated. In the heating start sequence, the start priority of the chips to be destroyed located in the central region of the storage medium is higher than that of the chips to be destroyed located in the edge region. According to the heating start sequence, start signals are sent sequentially to the built-in heating elements corresponding to each chip to be destroyed.
[0015] Compared with the prior art, the present invention can achieve at least one of the following beneficial effects: 1. This invention sets multiple trigger conditions. If any trigger condition is met, the trigger condition is verified. The verification specifically includes three levels: signal verification, motion state consistency verification, and authorization verification. Only when the trigger signal simultaneously meets the requirements of signal verification, motion state consistency verification, and authorization verification is the subsequent data destruction process allowed. This effectively avoids false triggering caused by sensor noise, positioning drift, or instantaneous communication fluctuations, improves the accuracy of data self-destruction decisions, and reduces the risk of task interruption and data loss due to misoperation.
[0016] 2. This invention selects a target destruction method based on the triggering conditions and the data priority classification results. The triggering conditions include five types: communication anomaly, unauthorized access, geographical location deviation, emergency command, and hardware anomaly. The data priority classification results are generated based on the data classification results and risk assessment results. Different types of triggering conditions combined with different priority data categories correspond to different destruction method selection rules, realizing a differentiated destruction strategy for different threat types and data importance. This ensures the complete destruction of core data under extreme threats while avoiding the waste of storage resources caused by unnecessary physical damage.
[0017] In this invention, the above-described technical solutions can be combined with each other to achieve more preferred combinations. Other features and advantages of this invention will be set forth in the following description, and some advantages may become apparent from the description or be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of this invention can be realized and obtained from what is particularly pointed out in the description and drawings. Attached Figure Description
[0018] The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the invention. Throughout the drawings, the same reference numerals denote the same parts. Figure 1 is a schematic flowchart of a self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0019] Preferred embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form part of this application and are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to illustrate the principles of the present invention, but are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.
[0020] S1. Monitor the operating status of the unmanned vehicle in real time to obtain status monitoring data; based on the status monitoring data, determine whether the triggering conditions for data self-destruction are met; Triggering conditions include communication anomaly triggering conditions, unauthorized access triggering conditions, geographical location deviation triggering conditions, emergency command triggering conditions, and hardware anomaly triggering conditions.
[0021] To determine the triggering conditions for communication anomalies, it is necessary to collect communication link quality parameters between the unmanned vehicle and the remote control terminal, including the signal received strength indicator (SWIFT), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and consecutive packet loss count. These parameters can be obtained in real time through the unmanned vehicle's communication module. The communication module uses a cellular network communication module or a satellite communication terminal. This module integrates an RF transceiver and a baseband processor, enabling it to measure and record the SWIFT and SNR with the base station in real time. The consecutive packet loss count is obtained through the acknowledgment and retransmission mechanism in the communication protocol stack. When the sending end sends a data packet and does not receive an acknowledgment response from the receiving end within a preset timeout period, the data packet is counted as a packet loss. The consecutive packet loss count is the total number of consecutive packet losses that have occurred before the current time point. The above communication quality parameters are read and recorded from the register of the communication module every second. When the SWIFT of the communication link is continuously lower than a preset signal strength threshold for a duration exceeding a preset time threshold, the communication anomaly triggering condition is determined to be met. The signal strength threshold can be set to -90dBm, and the time threshold can be set to 30 seconds.
[0022] For unauthorized access triggering conditions, security module log data is collected from the autonomous vehicle, including login attempt records, interface access records, and system call records. This security module log data is collected in real time through the autonomous vehicle's onboard computing platform. By hooking the system call table and the entry function of the network protocol stack, all external requests attempting to access the autonomous vehicle's control system are intercepted and recorded. When a physical interface plugging / unplugging event or a wireless interface scanning request is detected, the event's timestamp, source address, and access type are recorded. When a login attempt is detected, the username attempted, source IP address, and login result are recorded. When an unauthorized external device attempts to access the autonomous vehicle's control system through a physical or wireless interface, or when repeated failed login attempts exceed a preset number, the unauthorized access triggering condition is determined to be met.
[0023] For the location offset trigger condition, the current location coordinates of the unmanned vehicle are collected in real time through the global navigation satellite system receiver on the unmanned vehicle, such as GPS, BeiDou, and GLONASS. The current location coordinates are compared with the preset authorized area boundary. When the unmanned vehicle's current position is detected to be outside the authorized area, the location offset trigger condition is determined to be met.
[0024] The emergency command trigger condition refers to the condition being met when the autonomous vehicle receives a remote command including a preset emergency self-destruct code. After receiving a data frame from the remote control terminal, the autonomous vehicle's communication module parses the command type field in the frame header to determine if the field contains the preset emergency self-destruct command code.
[0025] To trigger hardware anomalies, it is necessary to collect operational status parameters of the autonomous vehicle's hardware components, including the error count of the memory chip, temperature sensor readings, and the stability index of the power module's output voltage. The error count of the memory chip is read from the status register of the memory controller, which uses a controller chip supporting SMART self-monitoring and analysis reporting technology to monitor the error correction code records of the memory chip in real time and count the number of errors. The temperature sensor uses a PN junction temperature sensor integrated inside the memory chip package, reading its digital temperature value at a 1-second cycle via the I2C bus. The power module's output voltage stability index is obtained by sampling the power module's output voltage value at a 100-millisecond cycle using an analog-to-digital converter and calculating the standard deviation of the most recent 10 samples as the output voltage stability index. When the uncorrectable error count of the memory chip exceeds a preset threshold, the temperature of a critical component exceeds its safe operating range, or the power module's output voltage fluctuation exceeds a preset range, the hardware anomaly trigger condition is determined to be met.
[0026] Furthermore, when multiple triggering conditions are met simultaneously, one of the met triggering conditions is selected as the currently active triggering condition according to a preset priority order. The preset priority order from high to low is as follows: emergency instruction triggering condition, hardware abnormality triggering condition, illegal access triggering condition, geographical location offset triggering condition, and communication abnormality triggering condition.
[0027] Emergency command triggering conditions have the highest priority, representing direct mandatory commands from the remote control terminal, and must be responded to first under all circumstances. Next are hardware anomaly triggering conditions; hardware failures may prevent the logical self-destruct mechanism from executing properly and require priority handling. When multiple triggering conditions are met simultaneously, the highest priority triggering condition is selected as the current triggering condition. If an emergency command triggering condition is among the simultaneously met triggering conditions, then regardless of the other triggering conditions, the emergency command triggering condition is selected first.
[0028] S2. If any triggering condition is met, the triggering condition is verified. If the verification is successful, the current operating status parameters and current task configuration file of the unmanned vehicle are obtained. Further, verifying the triggering condition includes: S21. Obtain the trigger signal corresponding to the satisfied trigger condition, and perform a signal verification operation on the trigger signal; When a trigger condition is met, data destruction is not performed immediately. Instead, verification is performed first to prevent false triggering. First, the trigger signal corresponding to the met trigger condition is obtained. The trigger signal refers to the original data source that caused the trigger condition to be determined as met. For example, for a communication anomaly trigger condition, the trigger signal is a sequence of quality parameters of the communication link; for an unauthorized access trigger condition, the trigger signal is an alarm data packet generated by the intrusion detection system; for a geographic location offset trigger condition, the trigger signal is the position coordinates output by the global navigation satellite system receiver; for an emergency command trigger condition, the trigger signal is the received remote command data frame; and for a hardware anomaly trigger condition, the trigger signal is the error status code output by the hardware monitoring module.
[0029] Signal verification refers to verifying the integrity and authenticity of a trigger signal. In scenarios where the trigger signal is in the form of a data stream, such as a sequence of communication quality parameters or a remote command data frame, the sender of the trigger signal calculates a digital signature for the message body of the signal using the private key in an asymmetric encryption algorithm before sending the signal, and appends this digital signature to the signal for transmission. The receiver's verification operation uses the public key paired with the sender's private key to decrypt the digital signature, obtaining the first hash value after decryption. Simultaneously, the verification operation calculates a second hash value for the message body of the received signal using the same hash algorithm as the sender. When the first hash value and the second hash value are equal, it indicates that the trigger signal source is trustworthy and the content has not been tampered with during transmission; in this case, the signal verification result is successful. When the first hash value and the second hash value are not equal, it indicates that the trigger signal source is untrustworthy or the content has been tampered with; in this case, the signal verification result is unsuccessful. The hash algorithm can be the SHA-256 standard hash algorithm.
[0030] For scenarios where the trigger signal is in the form of sensor readings, such as position coordinates output by a Global Navigation Satellite System receiver or error status codes output by a hardware monitoring module, the signal verification operation is performed by checking the physical reasonableness of the sensor readings. Specifically, it checks whether the sensor readings fall within a preset physical reasonable range. For example, whether the longitude value of the position coordinates is within the range of -180 degrees to 180 degrees, the latitude value is within the range of -90 degrees to 90 degrees, and the temperature reading is within the sensor's measurement range of -40 degrees Celsius to 125 degrees Celsius. When the sensor reading falls within the preset physical reasonable range, the signal verification result is considered passed; otherwise, it is considered failed. If the signal verification result is passed, the motion state consistency verification continues.
[0031] S22. If the signal verification passes, the current motion state data of the unmanned vehicle is obtained, and the motion state consistency verification of the trigger signal is performed based on the current motion state data. Motion state consistency verification refers to verifying whether a trigger signal is consistent at the physical motion level based on the current motion state data of the autonomous vehicle, thereby determining whether the trigger signal is a genuine abnormal event, rather than a deceptive signal or caused by sensor malfunction. The current motion state data of the autonomous vehicle includes its current speed, current acceleration, current rate of change of heading angle, and wheel speeds of each wheel. This motion state data is acquired in real time through the inertial measurement unit and wheel speed sensors onboard the autonomous vehicle. Motion state consistency verification employs different verification rules depending on the type of trigger condition, as detailed below: 1. Communication anomaly triggering conditions In scenarios where autonomous vehicles travel at high speeds, communication signals may experience brief fluctuations due to the Doppler effect or base station switching, but abnormal patterns such as complete loss or continuous deterioration will not occur. Motion state consistency verification correlates the timing of the trigger signal generation with the current speed of the autonomous vehicle: when the current speed of the autonomous vehicle exceeds a preset high-speed threshold, and the rate of decrease of the signal reception strength indicator value in the trigger signal exceeds a preset rate of decrease threshold, the communication quality degradation is considered to match the high-speed movement scenario, and the motion state consistency verification passes. When the current speed of the autonomous vehicle is below a preset low-speed threshold, but the trigger signal indicates severe communication link deterioration, the trigger signal is considered to be inconsistent with the physical motion state and may be a deceptive signal; the motion state consistency verification fails. The high-speed threshold can be set to 60 km / h, and the low-speed threshold can be set to 10 km / h.
[0032] 2. Unauthorized access triggering conditions When an autonomous vehicle is in motion, physical interface access attempts by external devices typically occur when the vehicle is stationary, while wireless interface scanning requests may occur while the vehicle is in motion. Motion state consistency verification correlates the timing of the trigger signal generation with the vehicle's current speed and door status: when the vehicle's current speed is zero and the door is closed, the illegal physical interface access attempt is legitimate, and the motion state consistency verification passes; when the vehicle's current speed is greater than zero and the door status is unknown, the illegal physical interface access attempt does not match the vehicle's motion state, and the motion state consistency verification fails.
[0033] 3. Geographic location offset triggering conditions The change in the autonomous vehicle's position coordinates within a unit of time should not exceed the maximum displacement corresponding to the speed limit. Motion state consistency verification is based on the above physical constraints: the position coordinates at the current moment and the position coordinates at the previous moment are obtained from the trigger signal, and the geographical distance difference between the two is calculated to obtain the measured displacement; simultaneously, based on the current vehicle speed and heading angle in the autonomous vehicle's current motion state data, the theoretically maximum displacement that can be reached within the same time interval is calculated; when the measured displacement is less than or equal to the maximum displacement, it indicates that the change in position coordinates is within the allowable range of physical motion, and the motion state consistency verification passes; when the measured displacement is greater than the maximum displacement, it indicates that the change in position coordinates exceeds the maximum displacement corresponding to the physical speed limit, suggesting that the position coordinates may be a forged deception signal, and the motion state consistency verification fails.
[0034] 4. Emergency Command Triggering Conditions Emergency self-destruct commands are the highest-level external commands, and their authenticity verification primarily relies on digital signatures and dynamic passwords. Motion state consistency verification passes when the timing of the trigger signal's reception matches the current task phase; for example, an emergency command received during task execution may have physical legitimacy, but receiving the command before the task has started or after it has ended may indicate an anomaly, in which case motion state consistency verification fails. Current task phase information is extracted from the current task configuration file.
[0035] 5. Hardware anomaly triggering conditions Hardware anomalies are typically related to physical wear and tear and usage intensity. When an autonomous vehicle travels at high speeds for extended periods or on bumpy roads, the probability of the memory chip's temperature rising to the trigger temperature threshold increases. Motion state consistency verification correlates the generation of this trigger signal with the autonomous vehicle's cumulative driving time and current road conditions: if the current road condition is bumpy and the cumulative driving time exceeds a preset time threshold, the hardware temperature anomaly is physically plausible, and the motion state consistency verification passes; if the current road condition is smooth and the cumulative driving time is short, but the trigger signal indicates that the memory chip temperature exceeds the threshold, it may be a sensor false alarm, and the motion state consistency verification fails.
[0036] S23. If the motion state consistency verification passes, then obtain the advanced permission verification information and perform authorization verification on the advanced permission verification information; if the authorization verification passes, then determine that the trigger condition verification passes.
[0037] Authorization verification refers to obtaining and verifying advanced permission verification information, which is a dynamic password issued by the remote control terminal. Specifically, the autonomous vehicle sends a verification request to the remote control terminal. The remote control terminal generates a dynamic password based on a preset time synchronization algorithm and a shared key, and sends it to the autonomous vehicle. Upon receiving the dynamic password, the remote control terminal compares it with the dynamic password calculated locally using the same algorithm and shared key. When the received dynamic password completely matches the locally calculated dynamic password, the authorization verification result is successful; when they do not match, the authorization verification result is unsuccessful.
[0038] S3. Based on the current task configuration file, classify the stored data of the unmanned vehicle to obtain the data classification result; The current task configuration file is a description file of the task currently being executed by the autonomous vehicle, including information such as task type, task area, task route, and task priority. Further, the storage data of the autonomous vehicle is categorized as follows: From the current task configuration file, identify and mark the task planning data, navigation path data, and perception decision data related to the current task as core task data. Task planning data refers to files describing task objectives, steps, and constraints, such as a list of inspection points in an inspection task or a sequence of delivery addresses in a logistics task. Navigation path data refers to files describing the autonomous vehicle's driving path, including waypoint coordinates and the sequence of trajectory points output by the path planning algorithm. Perception decision data refers to environmental perception data collected by the autonomous vehicle during operation using sensors such as LiDAR, cameras, and millimeter-wave radar, as well as decision records based on this data, such as obstacle detection results and path planning decision logs. The identified task planning data, navigation path data, and perception decision data are then marked as core task data.
[0039] Data containing user identity information, location trajectories, and operation logs within the stored data is identified and marked as sensitive privacy data. All data files containing user-related information within the stored data are traversed to identify data including user identity information, location trajectories, and operation logs. User identity information includes user account information, authentication credentials, and personal data. Location trajectories refer to the sequence of location coordinates recorded by the autonomous vehicle during its historical operation, which may be related to the user's travel habits and privacy information. Operation logs record the historical history of user operations on the autonomous vehicle, such as remote control commands and parameter setting changes. All of the above data is marked as sensitive privacy data.
[0040] The remaining data in the autonomous vehicle's storage data, excluding the core task data and sensitive privacy data, is marked as ordinary operating data; ordinary operating data includes operating system files, basic applications, system configuration parameters, and general operating logs that do not include user identity information.
[0041] S4. Based on the current operating status parameters, assess the security risk level of various types of stored data and obtain the risk assessment results; Extract the risk coefficient of the vehicle's current environment, communication link availability, and hardware health from the current operating status parameters; The risk coefficient of the vehicle's current environment is used to quantify the level of safety threats in the current operating environment of the autonomous vehicle. Sensors such as cameras, LiDAR, and millimeter-wave radar onboard the autonomous vehicle collect perception data of the surrounding environment. Based on this perception data, target detection and scene classification are performed to identify the presence of suspicious personnel, vehicles, or obstacles. Simultaneously, combined with the autonomous vehicle's current geographical coordinates, the safety level label for the current location is retrieved from a pre-loaded electronic map. Geographical safety levels are divided into three levels: safe area, general area, and sensitive area, with preset base scores of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively. Finally, combined with current time information, it is determined whether the current location is within a preset high-risk period. High-risk periods include nighttime hours (22:00 to 5:00 the next day) and periods of severe weather. The formula for calculating the environmental risk coefficient is as follows:
[0042] in, This represents the environmental risk coefficient, with a value ranging from 0 to 1. The larger the value, the higher the environmental risk. This indicates the geographical location security level score, with values of 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8. This represents the threat level score detected based on sensor perception data. This score is mapped to a range of 0 to 1 after comparing the number of suspicious targets output by the target detection algorithm with a preset threshold. The score is 0.8 when a suspicious target is detected and 0.2 when no suspicious target is detected. This represents the risk score for a time period. The score is 1.0 if the current time is a high-risk period, and 0 otherwise. The score indicates the severity of the weather. The current weather conditions are obtained through the vehicle's onboard weather sensor. The score is 0 for sunny weather, 0.3 for light rain, 0.7 for heavy rain or snow, and 1.0 for fog or storm.
[0043] Communication link availability is calculated by extracting the signal received strength indicator (SWIFT), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and consecutive packet loss count from the current operating status parameters, normalizing each parameter, and then weighted and summing them. The formula for calculating communication link availability is as follows:
[0044] in, This indicates the availability of the communication link, with a value ranging from 0 to 1. The larger the value, the higher the communication quality. Indicates the signal reception strength indication value. This represents the upper threshold of the signal received strength indicator, such as -50dBm. The lower threshold value of the signal received strength indication, such as -100dBm; Indicates the signal-to-noise ratio. This indicates the upper threshold of the signal-to-noise ratio, such as 30dB; This indicates the consecutive packet loss count. This represents the maximum allowed value for consecutive packet loss counts, with a value of 10.
[0045] Hardware health is calculated by extracting the following parameters from the current operating status: the predicted percentage of remaining lifespan of the memory chip, the percentage of erase / write cycles used out of the total erase / write cycles, the uncorrectable error count of the memory controller, and the temperature readings of each key component. These parameters are then normalized and weighted summed. The result is shown in the following formula:
[0046] in, This indicates the health status of the hardware, with a value ranging from 0 to 1. The higher the value, the healthier the hardware. This represents the percentage of the remaining lifespan of the memory chip, calculated using the wear leveling algorithm built into the memory chip. Indicates the number of erase / write cycles used. This indicates the total number of erase / write cycles allowed, which can be read from the status register of the memory chip; Indicates the count of uncorrectable errors. Indicates the maximum allowable value for the count of uncorrectable errors, such as 5; This indicates the upper limit of the normal operating temperature of critical components, such as 85 degrees Celsius; Indicates the current temperature reading of key components; This indicates the critical failure temperature of a key component, such as 125 degrees Celsius.
[0047] For core mission data, its first risk level depends solely on the environmental risk coefficient and is determined according to the following segmentation rules: When When the risk level is greater than 0.7, the first risk level is classified as high risk; when the risk level is less than or equal to 0.4... When the value is ≤0.7, the first risk level is determined to be medium risk; when When the value is less than 0.4, the first risk level is determined to be low risk.
[0048] For sensitive privacy data, the second risk level depends on the environmental risk coefficient and the availability of the communication link, and is determined according to the following rules: When >0.5 and When the value is less than 0.3, the second risk level is classified as high risk; when... >0.5 and 0.3≤ When <0.7, or 0.3≤ ≤0.5 and When the risk level is less than 0.3, the second risk level is determined to be medium risk; otherwise, the second risk level is determined to be low risk.
[0049] For normal operational data, its third risk level depends on the environmental risk coefficient, communication link availability, and hardware health, and is determined according to the following rules: When <0.3 and When >0.4, or when <0.2 and When the value is greater than 0.5, the third risk level is classified as high risk; when 0.3 ≤ <0.7 and >0.5 and Acomm<0.5, or when <0.3 and Cenv≤0.4 and If the risk level is less than 0.5, the third risk level is determined to be medium risk; otherwise, the third risk level is determined to be low risk.
[0050] S5. Generate data priority division results based on the data classification results and the risk assessment results; S51. Based on the data classification results, assign basic priority coefficients to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data respectively; based on the risk assessment results, assign risk weight coefficients to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data respectively. Core task data directly impacts task success and is assigned the highest basic priority coefficient. Sensitive privacy data concerns user privacy and security and is assigned the second highest basic priority coefficient. Ordinary operational data has a relatively small impact on tasks and user privacy and is assigned the lowest basic priority coefficient. Typically, the basic priority coefficients for the three types of data can be set as follows: 0.9 for core task data, 0.6 for sensitive privacy data, and 0.3 for ordinary operational data.
[0051] When a data category is classified as high-risk, a first risk weight coefficient is assigned to it, with a value ranging from 0.8 to 0.9. When a data category is classified as medium-risk, a second risk weight coefficient is assigned to it, with a value ranging from 0.4 to 0.6. When a data category is classified as low-risk, a third risk weight coefficient is assigned to it, with a value ranging from 0.1 to 0.3. For example, when the first risk level of core task data is determined to be high-risk, its risk weight coefficient... The value is 0.85; when the second risk level of sensitive privacy data is determined to be medium risk, its risk weight coefficient is set to 0.85. The risk weight coefficient is 0.5; when the third risk level of ordinary operational data is determined to be low risk, its risk weight coefficient is... The value is 0.2.
[0052] S52. Calculate the comprehensive priority score for the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data respectively based on the basic priority coefficient and the risk weight coefficient; sort them from high to low according to the comprehensive priority score to generate the data priority division result.
[0053] The overall priority score is shown in the following formula:
[0054] in, This represents the comprehensive priority score of the i-th type of data, where i takes the values 1, 2, and 3, corresponding to core task data, sensitive privacy data, and ordinary operation data, respectively. This represents the basic priority coefficient for the i-th data type; This represents the risk weight coefficient for the i-th type of data; This represents the first weighting factor corresponding to the basic priority coefficient. This represents the second weighting factor corresponding to the risk weighting coefficient. The typical values for the first weighting factor α and the second weighting factor β are 0.5 and 0.5, respectively. In practical applications, the values of α and β can be adjusted according to the specific scenario. For example, the value of β can be increased in an extremely high-risk environment.
[0055] Based on the calculated comprehensive priority score, the three data categories are sorted in descending order to generate a data priority partitioning result. The data priority partitioning result is a sequence of data categories arranged from highest to lowest priority, with the data category at the top having the highest destruction priority. A data priority mapping table is generated based on this information. This table is a structured data table with three main fields: a data category field, recording the name of the data category; a priority ranking field, recording the sequence number of that data category in the sorted sequence; a comprehensive priority score field, recording the priority score value corresponding to that data category; and a storage address range field, recording the storage address range corresponding to that data category. The mapping table is then output as the data priority partitioning result.
[0056] S6. Based on the triggering conditions and the data priority division results, select the target destruction method and perform data destruction operation on the storage medium according to the target destruction method.
[0057] Data destruction methods include logical self-destruction and physical self-destruction. Logical self-destruction involves overwriting and erasing data on the storage medium using software, making the data unrecoverable while the storage medium itself remains intact. Physical self-destruction involves physically damaging the storage medium using hardware, causing irreversible structural damage and thus completely destroying the data.
[0058] Extract the data category to which the highest priority data belongs from the data priority classification results; determine the data category that ranks first as the candidate data category according to the data category priority, including: S61. Read the data category priority sorting in the data priority mapping table; determine the data category that ranks first as the candidate data category according to the data category priority sorting; Read the data category priority sorting field from the data priority mapping table. This field records the order of core task data, sensitive privacy data, and normal operation data according to their comprehensive priority scores, from highest to lowest. Based on the data category priority sorting, determine the data category that ranks first as the candidate data category. For example, if the sorting result is core task data, sensitive privacy data, and normal operation data, then the candidate data category is core task data.
[0059] S62. Obtain the comprehensive priority score corresponding to the candidate data category, and compare the comprehensive priority score with the preset highest priority score threshold; Obtain the overall priority score corresponding to the candidate data category, and compare this overall priority score with a preset highest priority score threshold. The preset highest priority score threshold is a pre-set value used to determine whether the overall priority of a certain data category meets the criteria for highest priority. The highest priority score threshold can be set to 0.7. Only data categories whose overall priority score reaches this threshold are identified as highest priority data.
[0060] S63. If the comprehensive priority score reaches the preset highest priority score threshold, then the candidate data category is determined to be the data category to which the highest priority data belongs.
[0061] If the overall priority score of the candidate data category does not reach the preset highest priority score threshold, it is determined that there is no highest priority data. In this case, the selection of the target destruction method will no longer be based on the differentiated judgment of the data category to which the highest priority data belongs, but will be directly processed according to the default rules: when the triggering condition is a communication abnormality triggering condition or a geographical location offset triggering condition, the logical self-destruction method will be directly selected as the target destruction method; when the triggering condition is an illegal access triggering condition or an emergency command triggering condition, both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method will be directly selected as the target destruction method; when the triggering condition is a hardware abnormality triggering condition, the physical self-destruction method will be directly selected as the target destruction method.
[0062] Further, based on the triggering conditions and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs, the target destruction method is selected, including: When the triggering condition is the hardware abnormality triggering condition, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; Physical self-destruction is achieved through high-temperature burn-out via an internal heating element. This element is a resistive heating layer or electrothermal film positioned close to the memory chip, coupled to it via a thermally conductive medium. When high-temperature burn-out is required, the autonomous vehicle's control module sends a start signal to the heating element, energizing it and generating Joule heat. The temperature of the heating element rapidly rises above the tolerance temperature of the memory chip's internal structure; typically, the target heating temperature can be set to 300 to 500 degrees Celsius, and the heating duration can be set to 3 to 10 seconds. Under the high temperature, the memory chip suffers irreversible structural damage, including wafer cracking, solder joint melting, and carbonization of the packaging material, resulting in the complete physical destruction of the data stored within the chip.
[0063] The storage medium of autonomous vehicles typically consists of multiple storage chips. For example, a solid-state drive (SSD) comprises multiple NAND flash memory chips arranged on a circuit board in a specific physical configuration. The process involves retrieving the chip identification information of each storage chip within the storage medium. This chip identification information includes each chip's unique serial number, model number, capacity, and physical coordinates on the circuit board. This information is pre-recorded in the storage medium's configuration register during autonomous vehicle production and can be read through an interface provided by the storage controller. Based on the data priority allocation, the data categories stored in each storage chip are determined. Specifically, the storage address range of each storage chip is traversed and compared with the storage address ranges corresponding to each data category in the data priority mapping table to determine which categories of data are stored in each storage chip and the storage capacity occupied by each category.
[0064] The percentage of core task data or sensitive privacy data in each storage chip relative to its total storage capacity is calculated as follows: Data volume percentage. This percentage is calculated by dividing the sum of the storage capacity occupied by core task data and sensitive privacy data in a given storage chip by its total storage capacity. Storage chips with a data volume percentage exceeding a preset threshold are marked as chips to be destroyed. Typical preset threshold values are 30% or 50%, indicating that physical destruction of a storage chip is only warranted if it contains a sufficient amount of high-priority data. Storage chips with a data volume percentage below this threshold contain relatively little high-priority data and can be handled through logical self-destruction without physical destruction.
[0065] A heating start-up sequence is generated based on the physical arrangement of the chips to be destroyed. Memory chips are typically arranged in a grid pattern on a circuit board, divided into central and edge regions. Chips in the central region are less prone to heat dissipation during physical destruction, resulting in higher heating efficiency; while chips in the edge regions, closer to the circuit board edge, are more easily dissipated through conduction, leading to relatively lower heating efficiency. Therefore, in the heating start-up sequence, chips located in the central region of the storage medium have a higher start-up priority than those located in the edge regions. Specifically, the chips can be sorted in ascending order of their distance from the geometric center of the circuit board, with smaller distances resulting in higher start-up priority.
[0066] Finally, starting signals are sent sequentially to the built-in heating elements of each chip to be destroyed, according to the heating start sequence. Each chip to be destroyed is equipped with an independent built-in heating element, which is connected to the control module through an independent control circuit. Sending start signals sequentially avoids instantaneous power overload caused by activating all heating elements simultaneously, while ensuring that chips in the central area are heated and destroyed first.
[0067] Furthermore, physical self-destruction can also be achieved through operations such as high-voltage electrical breakdown. As an example, high-voltage electrical breakdown is achieved through a high-voltage pulse circuit, which is a boost discharge circuit connected to the power or data pins of the memory chip. When high-voltage electrical breakdown is required, the control module sends a discharge signal to the high-voltage pulse circuit, which boosts the on-board power supply voltage to a high voltage sufficient to break down the internal semiconductor structure of the memory chip; typically, the output voltage can be set to 20 to 30 volts. This high voltage is applied to the memory cell array inside the chip through the power pins, causing PN junction breakdown, metal interconnect melting, and oxide layer damage, resulting in irreversible physical damage to the memory cells.
[0068] When the triggering condition is the communication abnormality triggering condition or the geographical location offset triggering condition, and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs is the core task data, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is a communication anomaly or a geographical location deviation, the autonomous vehicle loses contact with the remote control terminal or has deviated from the authorized area. If the highest priority data belongs to the core mission data category, this data includes critical information such as mission planning, navigation paths, and perception decisions, which could easily lead to significant losses. Therefore, physical self-destruction is selected as the target destruction method.
[0069] If the highest priority data belongs to either sensitive privacy data or ordinary operational data, the leakage of sensitive privacy data, although involving user privacy, is relatively controllable, while the harm of ordinary operational data is even smaller. Therefore, logical self-destruction is selected as the target destruction method, and the destruction requirements can be met by software overwriting.
[0070] The logical self-destruct mechanism invokes a random number generator to obtain a random number sequence. Based on this sequence, multiple data overwrite operations are performed on sensitive storage areas in the storage medium. First, the sensitive storage areas to be destroyed are determined. Sensitive storage areas refer to the physical storage address ranges containing core task data and sensitive privacy data. Specifically, based on the file storage address information recorded in the data classification results, the storage address ranges occupied by core task data and sensitive privacy data are merged to obtain the sensitive storage areas to be destroyed. The random number generator in the autonomous vehicle's onboard system is then invoked to obtain a random number sequence. The random number generator can be a true random number generator based on hardware noise or a pseudo-random number generator conforming to cryptographic security standards, such as a random number generation algorithm recognized by the ANSI X9.31 standard or FIPS 140-2 standard. The length of the random number sequence should be sufficient to cover the entire sensitive storage area.
[0071] After obtaining the random number sequence, this sequence is written to the sensitive storage area as overwrite data, performing the first overwrite of the original data. After the first overwrite is complete, a new random number sequence is generated for a second overwrite. This overwrite operation is repeated multiple times, typically 3 to 7 times. The purpose of multiple overwrites is to prevent the original data from being recovered using advanced data recovery techniques such as magnetic residue analysis or electron microscopy. Each overwrite operation involves the entire storage capacity of the sensitive storage area, ensuring that every storage cell within this area is overwritten with new data.
[0072] When the triggering condition is the illegal access triggering condition or the emergency instruction triggering condition, both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are selected as the target destruction method, and the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are executed sequentially.
[0073] When the trigger condition is an illegal access trigger condition or an emergency command trigger condition, it indicates that the autonomous vehicle is under external intrusion attack or has received a remote forced destruction command, requiring the most thorough destruction method to ensure absolute safety. Therefore, both logical self-destruction and physical self-destruction methods are selected as the target destruction methods, and the two destruction methods are controlled to be executed sequentially. That is, the logical self-destruction method is executed first to overwrite the data with software, and then the physical self-destruction method is executed to physically destroy the storage medium, achieving dual protection.
[0074] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes of the methods described in the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium may be a disk, optical disk, read-only memory, or random access memory, etc.
[0075] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for self-destructing data of an unmanned vehicle, characterized in that, include: Real-time monitoring of the autonomous vehicle's operating status to obtain status monitoring data; Based on the status monitoring data, determine whether the triggering conditions for data self-destruction are met; The triggering conditions include communication abnormality triggering conditions, unauthorized access triggering conditions, geographical location deviation triggering conditions, emergency command triggering conditions, and hardware abnormality triggering conditions; If any triggering condition is met, the triggering condition is verified. If the verification is successful, the current operating status parameters and current task configuration file of the unmanned vehicle are obtained. Based on the current task configuration file, the stored data of the unmanned vehicle is classified to obtain the data classification result; Based on the current operating status parameters, assess the security risk level of various types of stored data to obtain risk assessment results; Based on the data classification results and the risk assessment results, a data priority division result is generated; Based on the triggering conditions and the data priority division results, a target destruction method is selected, and data destruction operations are performed on the storage medium according to the target destruction method.
2. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification of the triggering condition includes: Obtain the trigger signal corresponding to the satisfied trigger condition, and perform a signal verification operation on the trigger signal; If the signal verification passes, the current motion state data of the unmanned vehicle is obtained, and the motion state consistency verification is performed on the trigger signal based on the current motion state data. If the motion state consistency verification passes, then the advanced permission verification information is obtained, and authorization verification is performed on the advanced permission verification information; If the authorization verification passes, the trigger condition verification is considered to have passed.
3. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of classifying the stored data of the autonomous vehicle according to the current task configuration file to obtain data classification results includes: From the current task configuration file, identify task planning data, navigation path data, and perception decision data related to the current task, and mark them as core task data; Identify and mark stored data that includes user identity information, location trajectories, and operation logs as sensitive privacy data; The remaining data in the autonomous vehicle's storage data, excluding the core mission data and the sensitive privacy data, is marked as ordinary operational data.
4. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 3, characterized in that, The step of assessing the security risk level of various types of stored data based on the current operating status parameters to obtain risk assessment results includes: Extract the risk coefficient of the vehicle's current environment, communication link availability, and hardware health from the current operating status parameters; Based on the risk coefficient, determine the first risk level corresponding to the core task data; Based on the risk coefficient and the availability of the communication link, a second risk level is determined for the sensitive privacy data; Based on the risk coefficient, the availability of the communication link, and the hardware health, the third risk level corresponding to the normal operating data is determined.
5. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating data priority division results based on the data classification results and the risk assessment results includes: Based on the data classification results, basic priority coefficients are assigned to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data, respectively. Based on the risk assessment results, risk weight coefficients are assigned to the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operational data, respectively. Based on the basic priority coefficient and the risk weight coefficient, calculate the comprehensive priority score for the core task data, the sensitive privacy data and the ordinary operation data respectively; The data priority division results are generated by sorting the data from high to low based on the comprehensive priority scores.
6. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of selecting a target destruction method based on the triggering conditions and the data priority division results includes: Extract the data category to which the highest priority data belongs from the data priority classification results; Based on the triggering conditions and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs, the target destruction method is selected, including: When the triggering condition is the hardware abnormality triggering condition, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the communication abnormality triggering condition or the geographical location offset triggering condition, and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs is the core task data, the physical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the communication abnormality triggering condition or the geographical location offset triggering condition, and the data category to which the highest priority data belongs is the sensitive privacy data or the ordinary operation data, the logical self-destruction method is selected as the target destruction method; When the triggering condition is the illegal access triggering condition or the emergency instruction triggering condition, both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are selected as the target destruction method, and the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method are executed sequentially.
7. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of performing data destruction operations on the storage medium according to the target destruction method includes: When the target destruction method is the logical self-destruct method, a random number generator is called to obtain a random number sequence, and multiple data overwrite operations are performed on the sensitive storage area in the storage medium according to the random number sequence. When the target destruction method is the physical self-destruction method, a start signal is sent to the built-in heating element to control the built-in heating element to perform a high-temperature burn-out operation on the memory chip; When the target destruction method includes both the logical self-destruction method and the physical self-destruction method, the multiple data overwrite operations are executed first, followed by the high-temperature burn-out operation.
8. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of sorting the data according to the comprehensive priority score from high to low to generate the data priority division result includes: According to the comprehensive priority score from high to low, the core task data, the sensitive privacy data, and the ordinary operation data are sorted to obtain a sorted data category sequence; Extract the comprehensive priority score and storage address information corresponding to each data category in the sorted data category sequence; Based on the sorted data category sequence, the comprehensive priority score, and the storage address information, a data priority mapping table is generated, which includes data category priority sorting, comprehensive priority score of each data category, and storage address range corresponding to each data category, as the data priority division result.
9. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 8, characterized in that, Extracting the data category to which the highest priority data belongs from the data priority classification result includes: Read the data category priority sorting from the data priority mapping table; Based on the priority of the data categories, the data category that ranks first is determined as the candidate data category; Obtain the comprehensive priority score corresponding to the candidate data category, and compare the comprehensive priority score with the preset highest priority score threshold; If the overall priority score reaches the preset highest priority score threshold, then the candidate data category is determined to be the data category to which the highest priority data belongs.
10. The self-destruction method for unmanned vehicle data according to claim 7, characterized in that, Sending a start signal to the built-in heating element to control the built-in heating element to perform a high-temperature burn-out operation on the memory chip includes: Obtain the chip identification information of each of the multiple storage chips included in the storage medium of the unmanned vehicle; Based on the data priority classification results, the data categories stored in each storage chip are determined, and the proportion of data belonging to the core task data or the sensitive privacy data in each storage chip is calculated. Storage chips whose data volume ratio exceeds a preset ratio threshold are marked as chips to be destroyed. Based on the physical arrangement of the chips to be destroyed, a heating start sequence is generated. In the heating start sequence, the start priority of the chips to be destroyed located in the central region of the storage medium is higher than that of the chips to be destroyed located in the edge region. According to the heating start sequence, start signals are sent sequentially to the built-in heating elements corresponding to each chip to be destroyed.
