In-service inspection methods for nuclear power plant pipelines, electronic equipment, and computer storage media

By identifying high-risk areas in nuclear power plant pipelines using risk prediction models and developing differentiated inspection plans, the problems of uneven sampling and reliance on manual experience in traditional inspection methods have been solved, achieving automated, efficient, and economical inspection results for in-service pipelines in nuclear power plants.

CN123070933APending Publication Date: 2026-11-10SHANGHAI NUCLEAR ENGINEERING RESEARCH & DESIGN INSTITUTE CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611298965.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-25
Publication Date
2026-11-10

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional methods for inspecting pipelines in nuclear power plants suffer from uneven sampling, reliance on manual experience leading to poor consistency in risk classification, low efficiency, difficulty in meeting standardized regulatory requirements, and lack of automation and engineering support.

Method used

High-risk areas are identified using a risk prediction model, and differentiated inspection plans are developed. The model identifies the degradation mechanism and risk assessment results of each inspection object, divides them into inspection clusters, and develops targeted inspection plans. Automated inspections are achieved by combining electronic devices and computer storage media.

Benefits of technology

It improves the reliability and economy of in-service inspection of nuclear power plant pipelines, reduces waste of inspection resources in low-risk areas, and lowers personnel radiation dose and costs.

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Abstract

This application provides an in-service inspection method, electronic device, and computer storage medium for nuclear power plant pipelines. The method includes: selecting a risk prediction area comprising multiple inspection objects from an inspection area; inputting the multiple inspection objects into a risk prediction model, running the risk prediction model, and outputting deterioration mechanisms and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively; dividing the multiple inspection objects into several inspection clusters based on the risk assessment results, wherein the inspection objects in each inspection cluster are physically continuous; determining the risk category of each inspection cluster based on the output of the risk prediction model, and formulating a first inspection plan based on the risk categories corresponding to the several inspection clusters respectively, including a first target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method; formulating a second inspection plan for the inspection area other than the risk prediction area, including a second target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method; and executing the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan, and generating inspection results.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application mainly relates to the field of nuclear power plant safety management technology, and in particular to an in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines, electronic equipment, and computer storage media. Background Technology

[0002] Nuclear power plant cooling systems and critical auxiliary pipelines operate under extreme conditions of high temperature, high pressure, strong radiation, and complex loads. During operation, these pipelines are prone to thermal fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, accelerated flow corrosion, and localized corrosion, making them vulnerable to damage and safety issues. A pipeline failure or leak can lead to unit shutdown or even radioactive leakage, resulting in severe safety accidents and economic losses. Therefore, regular in-service inspections of nuclear power plant pipelines are a crucial aspect of safe operation and maintenance.

[0003] Traditional in-service inspections of nuclear power plant pipelines typically employ a fixed sampling inspection model, such as periodically sampling 25% of the pipeline system for in-service inspection. However, this fixed sampling in-service inspection method has the following drawbacks: (1) it may sample a large number of low-risk welds for inspection, while insufficient inspection of pipelines in high-risk and vulnerable areas; (2) it relies on manual experience to judge pipeline risks, resulting in poor consistency and low efficiency in pipeline risk classification; (3) it lacks quantitative risk assessment, making it difficult to meet standardized regulatory requirements, such as NRC RG1.174 / RG1.178 and other regulatory requirements.

[0004] In addition, the existing in-service inspection process of nuclear power plants is still dominated by expert experience judgment and manual record keeping, lacking standardized, automated and engineerable in-service inspection procedures. This not only results in low application efficiency, high personnel costs and risk errors, but also makes it difficult to adapt to the in-service inspection needs of pipelines throughout their entire life cycle. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The technical problem to be solved by this application is to provide an in-service inspection method, electronic equipment and computer storage medium for nuclear power plant pipelines, which can realize automated and systematic in-service inspection of nuclear power plant pipelines, and improve the reliability and economy of in-service inspection of nuclear power plant pipelines.

[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides an in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines, comprising: selecting a risk prediction area from an inspection area, the risk prediction area including multiple inspection objects; inputting the multiple inspection objects into a risk prediction model, running the risk prediction model, and outputting deterioration mechanisms and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively; dividing the multiple inspection objects into several inspection clusters according to the risk assessment results of the risk prediction model, wherein the inspection objects in each inspection cluster are physically continuous; determining the risk category of each inspection cluster according to the output of the risk prediction model, and formulating a first inspection plan according to the risk categories corresponding to the multiple inspection clusters respectively, the first inspection plan including a first target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method; formulating a second inspection plan for inspection areas other than the risk prediction area, the second inspection plan including a second target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method; and executing the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan, and generating inspection results.

[0007] In one embodiment of this application, the step of selecting a risk prediction area from the inspection area includes: determining the safety level of multiple inspection objects within the inspection area according to safety classification requirements, wherein the safety level includes nuclear safety level 1, nuclear safety level 2, nuclear safety level 3 and non-nuclear safety level; dividing the inspection area into multiple candidate areas according to the safety level of the multiple inspection objects; and selecting a portion of the candidate areas as the risk prediction area according to inspection requirements.

[0008] In one embodiment of this application, the steps of inputting multiple inspection objects into a risk prediction model, running the risk prediction model, and outputting degradation mechanisms and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively include: setting parameters of the risk prediction model; calculating the conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively; determining the failure consequences of the multiple inspection objects based on the conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively; identifying and outputting the degradation mechanisms of the multiple inspection objects based on the design parameters and operating conditions of the multiple inspection objects; determining the failure probability of the multiple inspection objects based on the degradation mechanisms; and outputting the failure probability and the failure consequences as the risk assessment results.

[0009] In one embodiment of this application, the step of setting the parameters of the risk prediction model includes: setting the parameters of the risk prediction model according to the nuclear safety regulatory library, wherein the parameters include the thermal fatigue threshold of carbon steel, the thermal fatigue threshold of stainless steel, the flow-accelerated corrosion sensitive temperature range, the high-consequence condition core damage probability threshold, and the high-fracture probability frequency range.

[0010] In one embodiment of this application, the steps of determining the risk category of each inspection cluster based on the output of the risk prediction model, and formulating a first inspection plan based on the risk categories corresponding to the plurality of inspection clusters respectively, include: constructing a risk matrix based on the failure consequences and failure probabilities of the inspection objects in the plurality of inspection clusters; determining the risk category of each inspection cluster based on the risk matrix, and determining the inspection requirements corresponding to each inspection cluster based on the risk category; determining the first target inspection object in the risk prediction region based on the inspection requirements; and formulating an inspection method for the first target inspection object based on the degradation mechanism of the first target inspection object, based on a pre-established correspondence between degradation mechanisms and inspection methods, as the first inspection plan.

[0011] In one embodiment of this application, the step of developing a second inspection plan for inspection areas other than the risk-aware area includes: determining the second target inspection object and the corresponding inspection method according to the inspection requirements and inspection methods specified in the general standard inspection procedure, as the second inspection plan.

[0012] In one embodiment of this application, before executing the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan, the in-service inspection method for the nuclear power plant pipeline further includes: obtaining the core damage probability and early release probability of the original inspection plan; calculating the changes in the core damage probability and early release probability of the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan compared to the original inspection plan based on the output of the risk prediction model; and adjusting the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan based on the changes.

[0013] In one embodiment of this application, the step of generating inspection results includes: establishing a three-level document system, including: establishing a first document, which includes the inspection object, the output of the risk prediction model, the first target inspection object, and the second target inspection object; establishing a second document, which includes work records of executing the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan; and establishing a third document, which includes in-service inspection declaration documents.

[0014] This application also proposes an electronic device comprising: a memory for storing instructions executable by a processor; and a processor for executing the instructions to implement the method described above.

[0015] This application also proposes a computer storage medium storing computer program code that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described above.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, this application has the following advantages: (1) This application identifies the deterioration mechanism and risk quantification assessment results of each inspection object in the risk prediction area through a risk prediction model, so that in the subsequent process of developing an inspection plan, inspection resources can be concentrated in high-risk and serious consequences areas based on the identification results of the risk prediction model, thereby timely detection of risks and improving the reliability of in-service inspection of nuclear power plant pipelines. (2) By developing differentiated inspection plans for areas with and without known risks, this application can improve the targeting of inspections, avoid over-inspection in low-risk areas, and maintain a high proportion of random inspections in high-risk areas. This improves the reliability of pipeline in-service inspections while reducing costs and personnel radiation doses, thus enhancing the economic efficiency of in-service inspections. Attached Figure Description

[0017] The accompanying drawings are included to provide a further understanding of this application; they are incorporated into and constitute a part of this application. The drawings illustrate embodiments of this application and, together with this specification, serve to explain the principles of this application. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a schematic flowchart of an in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for selecting a risk-predicting area according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for operating a risk prediction model according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for developing a first inspection plan according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a risk matrix according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for establishing a three-level document system according to an embodiment of this application; Figure 7 This is another embodiment of the in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines in this application. Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the additional steps included on top of the above. Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application.

[0018] Reference numerals: Electronic device 500, internal communication bus 501, processor 502, read-only memory 503, random access memory 504, communication port 505, hard disk 506. Detailed Implementation

[0019] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely some examples or embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, these drawings can be applied to other similar scenarios without creative effort. Unless obvious from the context or otherwise specified, the same reference numerals in the drawings represent the same structures or operations.

[0020] As indicated in this application and claims, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the words "a," "an," "an," and / or "the" are not specifically singular and may include plural forms. Generally speaking, the terms "comprising" and "including" only indicate the inclusion of explicitly identified steps and elements, which do not constitute an exclusive list, and the method or apparatus may also include other steps or elements.

[0021] Unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement, numerical expressions, and values ​​of the components and steps described in these embodiments do not limit the scope of this application. It should also be understood that, for ease of description, the dimensions of the various parts shown in the drawings are not drawn to actual scale. Techniques, methods, and devices known to those skilled in the art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, such techniques, methods, and devices should be considered part of the specification. In all examples shown and discussed herein, any specific values ​​should be interpreted as merely exemplary and not as limitations. Therefore, other examples of exemplary embodiments may have different values. It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following drawings denote similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, it need not be further discussed in subsequent drawings.

[0022] Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of terms such as "first" and "second" to define components is merely for the purpose of distinguishing the corresponding components. Unless otherwise stated, these terms have no special meaning and therefore should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of this application. In addition, although the terminology used in this application is selected from commonly known and used terms, some terms mentioned in this application's specification may have been chosen by the applicant according to his or her judgment, and their detailed meanings are explained in the relevant sections of this description. Moreover, this application should be understood not only through the actual terms used, but also through the meaning implied by each term.

[0023] It should be understood that when a component is referred to as "on another component," "connected to another component," "coupled to another component," or "in contact with another component," it can be directly on, connected to, coupled to, or in contact with that other component, or there may be an intervening component. In contrast, when a component is referred to as "directly on another component," "directly connected to," "directly coupled to," or "directly in contact with" another component, there is no intervening component. Similarly, when a first component is referred to as "electrically contacting" or "electrically coupled to" a second component, there is an electrical path between the first and second components that allows current to flow. This electrical path may include capacitors, coupled inductors, and / or other components that allow current to flow, even if there is no direct contact between the conductive components.

[0024] Flowcharts are used in this application to illustrate the operations performed by the system according to embodiments of this application. It should be understood that the preceding or following operations are not necessarily performed in exact order. Instead, various steps can be processed in reverse order or simultaneously. Furthermore, other operations may be added to these processes, or one or more steps may be removed from these processes.

[0025] This application proposes an in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines. It develops differentiated first and second inspection plans for different inspection areas and targets. Within a risk-predictable area, a risk prediction model is used to identify the risk quantification assessment results of each inspection target, and the first inspection plan is formulated based on these results. It should be noted that the pipeline in this application refers to a broad pipeline system, including hollow pipes, fittings, connecting accessories, and welded joints; for ease of explanation, these will be collectively referred to as pipelines below. The inspection target refers to the pipelines to be inspected within the inspection area; the target inspection target refers to the pipeline selected and actually inspected during the in-service inspection operation. The technical solution of this application can concentrate inspection resources in high-risk, high-consequence areas, thereby improving the reliability and economy of in-service inspection of nuclear power plant pipelines.

[0026] The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines of this application will be described below through specific embodiments.

[0027] refer to Figure 1 The diagram illustrates a flow chart of an in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines according to one embodiment. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines includes... Figure 1 Steps S110 to S160 are described in detail below.

[0028] In step S110, a risk prediction area is selected from the inspection area, and the risk prediction area includes multiple inspection objects.

[0029] Specifically, the inspection area refers to the area covering critical piping systems within the entire nuclear power plant. These critical piping systems require in-service inspection to ensure the normal operation of the nuclear power plant. For example, in this step, one can choose from three methods to determine the risk prediction area: full-scope application, single-system application, or partial-scope application. Full-scope application means selecting the entire area as the risk prediction area; single-system application means selecting the area containing a single piping system within the inspection area as the risk prediction area; and partial-scope application means selecting a specific local area as the risk prediction area.

[0030] In some embodiments, the step of selecting a risk-predictable area further includes, as follows: Figure 2 Steps S111 to S113 are shown.

[0031] In step S111, the safety levels of multiple inspection objects within the inspection area are determined according to safety classification requirements. These safety levels include nuclear safety level 1, nuclear safety level 2, nuclear safety level 3, and non-nuclear safety level. It can be understood that the safety levels of pipelines differ between different systems, equipment, or modules within a nuclear power plant. In specific implementation, according to the nuclear safety guideline "Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components of Nuclear Power Plants" (HAD102 / 03-2025), pipelines are classified into nuclear safety level 1, nuclear safety level 2, nuclear safety level 3, and non-nuclear safety level.

[0032] In step S112, the inspection area is divided into multiple candidate areas based on the safety levels of the multiple inspection objects. In specific implementation, based on the safety level of each inspection object (including nuclear safety level 1, nuclear safety level 2, nuclear safety level 3, and non-nuclear safety level), the inspection area is divided into multiple first areas covering nuclear safety level 1 inspection objects, multiple second areas covering nuclear safety level 2 inspection objects, multiple third areas covering nuclear safety level 3 inspection objects, and multiple fourth areas covering non-nuclear safety level inspection objects.

[0033] In step S113, based on the inspection requirements, a portion of the candidate areas is selected as risk prediction areas. Specifically, risk prediction areas are selected from the candidate areas according to any inspection requirement. Inspection requirements include: full-range application, which refers to selecting areas one through four covering pipelines at nuclear safety levels 1, 2, 3, and non-nuclear safety levels as risk prediction areas; single-system application, which refers to selecting the area containing a single pipeline system from nuclear safety levels 1, 2, 3, and non-nuclear safety levels as a risk prediction area; and partial-range application, which refers to selecting any area from areas one through four as a risk prediction area. Furthermore, multiple pipelines to be inspected are obtained as multiple inspection objects through the risk prediction areas.

[0034] In step S120, multiple inspection objects are input into the risk prediction model, the risk prediction model is run, and the deterioration mechanism and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects are output.

[0035] Specifically, the risk prediction model employs reliability analysis methods to analyze the failure modes, causes, and effects of each inspected object based on its operating conditions, and outputs corresponding degradation mechanisms and risk assessment results for each inspected object. For example, the risk prediction model uses Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to analyze and output degradation mechanisms and risk assessment results for each inspected object, where the risk assessment results include failure consequences and failure probability.

[0036] In some embodiments, step S120 further includes Figure 3 The steps S121 to S126 shown are used to obtain the degradation mechanism and risk assessment results corresponding to multiple inspection objects.

[0037] In step S121, the parameters of the risk prediction model are set. In practice, the parameters of the risk prediction model are localized based on the actual characteristics of nuclear power plants (including various reactor types such as CPA1000 and Hualong One). The adjustments are based on actual operating data of the nuclear power plant, differences in material systems, characteristics of the water chemistry environment, and regulatory requirements. For example, the degradation mechanism judgment threshold is recalibrated based on the actual temperature difference range of the secondary loop feedwater system of the nuclear power plant, the high-incidence temperature range of flow-accelerated corrosion, and experience with seawater pipeline corrosion. The rupture frequency ranges for high, medium, and low rupture probability categories are adjusted based on the actual situation that nuclear power plants are mainly pressurized water reactors and have more stringent controls on flow-accelerated corrosion. The consequence level thresholds are adjusted based on probabilistic safety assessment practices and the regulatory requirements of the Nuclear Safety Administration. Radiation protection constraint values ​​are adjusted according to the principle of "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) in nuclear safety regulations.

[0038] In some embodiments, parameters for the risk prediction model are set according to a nuclear safety regulatory library. These parameters include the thermal fatigue threshold for carbon steel, the thermal fatigue threshold for stainless steel, the flow-accelerated corrosion sensitive temperature range, the high-consequence condition core damage probability threshold, and the high-rupture probability frequency range. Specifically, the nuclear safety regulatory library pre-stores setting rules for parameters of in-service pipeline inspections. The parameters of the risk prediction model are set according to the setting rules in the nuclear safety regulatory library that correspond to the parameters of the risk prediction model.

[0039] As a non-limiting example, the thermal fatigue threshold for carbon steel is set to be no less than 80°C, the thermal fatigue threshold for stainless steel is set to be no less than 100°C, the flow-accelerated corrosion sensitivity temperature range is set to 90°C-200°C, and the high-consequence-condition core damage probability threshold is set to be no less than 5 × 10⁻⁶. -5 And set the high fracture probability frequency range to 2×10 -6 / pipeline segment·year-1×10 -3 / Section·Year.

[0040] In step S122, the conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability corresponding to each of the multiple inspected objects are calculated. Specifically, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model adapted for nuclear power plants can be used to calculate the specific values ​​of the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) and conditional large early release probability (CLERP) for each inspected object. For detailed calculation procedures, please refer to relevant technologies; they will not be elaborated here. The conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability represent the conditional probabilities that trigger core damage and large early radioactive release after the inspected object fails, respectively, and can be used to assess the consequences of the inspected object's failure.

[0041] In step S123, the failure consequences of multiple inspection objects are determined based on the conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability corresponding to each inspection object. Specifically, the failure consequences of each inspection object can be determined by looking up a table that maps the numerical ranges of the conditional core damage probability and conditional large early release probability to the failure consequences. The mapping table can be obtained from relevant nuclear power plant reports or set based on consequence impact groups and nuclear power plant configurations. The consequence impact groups include the initiating event impact group, the mitigation capability loss impact group, the combined impact group, and the containment performance impact group. The nuclear power plant configuration includes the operating configuration, the standby configuration, and the demand configuration.

[0042] Table 1 shows an exemplary mapping relationship between the numerical ranges of conditional core failure probability and conditional early release probability and the consequence level. Referring to Table 1, failure consequences are categorized into high, medium, and low levels. The CCDP value is 5 × 10⁻⁶. -5 The value of CLERP is 5 × 10 -6 The inspection object is used as an example for illustration. According to Table 1, the failure consequence of this inspection object is determined to be medium.

[0043] Table 1: An exemplary mapping relationship between the numerical range of conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability and failure consequences.

[0044]

[0045] In some embodiments, the failure consequences are categorized into four levels: high, medium, low, and none. In step S123, based on the conditional core damage probability and the conditional early release probability, the failure consequences of each inspected object are determined to be high, medium, low, or none.

[0046] In step S124, the degradation mechanisms of multiple inspection objects are identified and output based on their design parameters and operating conditions. In some embodiments, degradation mechanisms include thermal fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, localized corrosion, flow-accelerated corrosion, and erosion cavitation. Stress corrosion cracking includes intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCCC), primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC), and external chloride stress corrosion cracking (ECSCC). Localized corrosion includes microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC), pitting corrosion, and crevice corrosion. Specifically, based on the degradation mechanism determination criteria—that is, the mapping relationship between the numerical range of design parameters and operating conditions and the degradation mechanism—the degradation mechanism corresponding to each inspection object is identified and output according to its design parameters and operating conditions.

[0047] In step S125, the failure probability of multiple inspection objects is determined based on the degradation mechanism. Specifically, the failure probability is categorized into three levels: high, medium, and low. Based on a pre-defined correspondence between degradation mechanisms and failure probabilities, the failure probability of each inspection object is determined according to its corresponding degradation mechanism.

[0048] In addition to quantifying CCDP and CLERP using the PSA model to determine the failure consequences of the inspected object, in some embodiments, the failure consequences of the inspected object can also be determined directly using a pre-defined lookup table of typical pipeline failure consequences in nuclear power plants. Table 2 is an exemplary lookup table of typical pipeline failure consequences in nuclear power plants.

[0049] Table 2: Lookup Table of Typical Pipeline Failure Consequences in Exemplary Nuclear Power Plants

[0050] In some embodiments, in addition to first determining the degradation mechanism and then determining the failure probability based on the degradation mechanism, the failure probability corresponding to each inspection object can also be determined directly by looking up a pre-defined degradation mechanism mapping table. The degradation mechanism mapping table includes the mapping relationship between design parameters and operating conditions and degradation mechanisms and corresponding failure probabilities.

[0051] Table 3 is an exemplary mapping table of nuclear power plant degradation mechanisms. Referring to Table 3, when the material of the object under inspection is austenitic stainless steel, the fluid medium is boron-containing primary loop water, and the operating temperature is >120°C, the degradation mechanism of the object under inspection can be identified as stress corrosion cracking, with a corresponding failure probability of medium. When the material of the object under inspection is carbon steel, the fluid medium is seawater / raw water, and the operating temperature is 30°C, the degradation mechanism of the object under inspection can be identified as microbial corrosion and pitting corrosion, with a corresponding failure probability of medium.

[0052] Table 3: Exemplary Nuclear Power Plant Deterioration Mechanism Mapping Table.

[0053]

[0054] In step S126, the probability of failure and the consequences of failure are output as risk assessment results.

[0055] Continue to refer to Figure 1 In step S130, based on the risk assessment results of the risk prediction model, multiple inspection objects are divided into several inspection clusters, wherein the inspection objects in each inspection cluster are continuous in physical space.

[0056] Specifically, a cluster of inspection objects that share the same risk assessment results and are physically contiguous is defined as an inspection cluster. The shared risk assessment results include the same failure consequences and the same probability of failure. Inspection objects within the same cluster are not physically separated from each other by inspection objects within other clusters; in other words, all inspection objects within the same cluster are located within the same work area.

[0057] In step S140, the risk category of each inspection cluster is determined based on the output of the risk prediction model, and a first inspection plan is formulated based on the risk categories corresponding to the several inspection clusters. The first inspection plan includes a first target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method.

[0058] Specifically, firstly, based on the risk assessment results of each inspection object within each inspection cluster, the risk category of each inspection cluster is determined, and the corresponding inspection requirements for each inspection cluster are determined based on the risk category. Then, based on the inspection requirements of each inspection cluster, the first target inspection object is determined, and a corresponding inspection method is formulated for the first target inspection object. In this way, this embodiment can formulate differentiated first inspection plans for the first target inspection object within the risk-predictable area, thereby improving the targeting of in-service inspections. The inspection requirements include sampling ratio requirements, used to constrain the number of first target inspection objects sampled. The inspection method refers to the actual technical means used in the in-service inspection process.

[0059] In some embodiments, the method for developing a first inspection plan for a plurality of inspection clusters includes Figure 4 The steps S141 to S144 shown are for developing a differentiated first inspection plan.

[0060] In step S141, a risk matrix is ​​constructed based on the failure consequences and failure probabilities of the inspection objects in several inspection clusters. Specifically, the number of failure consequence levels is determined as the first dimension value of the risk matrix, and the number of failure probability levels is determined as the second dimension value. A two-dimensional risk matrix is ​​constructed based on a preset mapping relationship between combinations of failure consequences and failure probabilities and risk categories. Each risk category corresponds to a preset inspection requirement; in other words, the risk matrix can represent the mapping relationship between combinations of failure consequences and failure probabilities and inspection requirements.

[0061] As a non-restrictive example, failure consequences include high, medium, low, and none, and failure probabilities include high, medium, and low. Based on the pre-defined mapping relationship between combinations of failure consequences and failure probabilities and risk categories, a system is constructed as follows: Figure 5 The risk matrix shown is 4×3. Risk categories include extremely high risk, high risk, medium-high risk, medium risk, low risk, and extremely low risk.

[0062] When the failure consequence is high and the failure probability is high, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as extremely high risk. The corresponding inspection requirement is that the number of inspection objects sampled should be no less than 30% of the total number of inspection objects in this risk category. When the failure consequence is high and the failure probability is medium, or the failure consequence is medium and the failure probability is high, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as high risk. The corresponding inspection requirement is that the number of inspection objects sampled should be no less than 25% of the total number of inspection objects in this risk category. When the failure consequence is high and the failure probability is low, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as medium-high risk. The corresponding inspection requirement is that the number of inspection objects sampled should be no less than 15% of the total number of inspection objects in this risk category. When the failure consequence is medium and the failure probability is medium, or the failure consequence is low and the failure probability is high, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as medium risk. The corresponding inspection requirement is that the number of inspection objects sampled should be no less than 10% of the total number of inspection objects in this risk category. When the failure consequence is medium and the failure probability is low, or the failure consequence is low and the failure probability is medium, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as low risk, and the corresponding inspection requirement is that the inspection objects of this risk category are exempt from volume inspection. When the failure consequence is low and the failure probability is low, or the failure consequence is none and the failure probability is low, the inspection objects in the inspection cluster are classified as extremely low risk, and the corresponding inspection requirement is that the inspection objects of this risk category are exempt from inspection.

[0063] In step S142, based on the risk matrix, the risk category of each inspection cluster is determined according to the failure consequences and failure probability of each inspection cluster, and the corresponding inspection requirements are determined according to the risk category. In specific implementation, based on the mapping relationship represented by the risk matrix, the risk category of the inspection object in each inspection cluster is determined according to the failure consequences and failure probability of each inspection cluster, and then the corresponding inspection requirements are determined.

[0064] In step S143, the first target inspection object of the risk prediction area is determined according to the inspection requirements. In specific implementation, target inspection objects that meet the sampling ratio requirements are selected from the inspection objects of each risk category to obtain the first target inspection object of the risk prediction area.

[0065] In some embodiments, during the process of determining the first target inspection object, the target inspection object can be selected according to three principles: degradation priority, accessibility priority, and verification priority. The degradation priority principle means prioritizing the selection of inspection objects with higher degradation sensitivity as target inspection objects; the accessibility priority principle means prioritizing the selection of inspection objects that are accessible to inspectors and have low irradiation levels as target inspection objects; and the verification priority principle means prioritizing the selection of inspection objects whose anomalies have been found in historical inspections as target inspection objects.

[0066] In step S144, based on the pre-established correspondence between degradation mechanisms and inspection methods, an inspection method for the first target inspection object is formulated according to the degradation mechanism of the first target inspection object, serving as the first inspection plan. Specifically, the pre-established correspondence between degradation mechanisms and inspection methods includes: when the degradation mechanism is thermal fatigue cracking, ultrasonic focusing or time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) technology is used for inspection; when the degradation mechanism is stress corrosion cracking, refracted longitudinal wave ultrasonic testing technology is used for inspection; when the degradation mechanism is flow-accelerated corrosion or microbial corrosion, ultrasonic thickness measurement or radiographic technology is used for inspection; and when the degradation mechanism is erosion cavitation, ultrasonic, radiographic, or visual inspection is used.

[0067] In some embodiments, the inspection methods and inspector qualifications in the first inspection plan are verified through accredited competence testing.

[0068] Continue to refer to Figure 1 In step S150, a second inspection plan is formulated for the inspection area other than the risk-foreseeable area. The second inspection plan includes a second target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method.

[0069] Specifically, for inspection targets in areas where risks are not known, a second target inspection target and corresponding inspection method can be developed using the inspection plan used by similar nuclear power plants, or a second target inspection target and corresponding inspection method can be developed based on general inspection requirements and methods. This application does not restrict the specific method for developing the second inspection plan.

[0070] In some embodiments, a second target inspection object and corresponding inspection method are determined according to the inspection requirements and methods specified in the general standard inspection procedures. For example, the general standard inspection procedures include the "In-Service Inspection Program" for nuclear power plants, which has been validated through long-term operation of nuclear power plants and can ensure the stability and compliance of routine inspection work.

[0071] In step S160, the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan are executed, and inspection results are generated. During the execution of the first and second inspection plans, the operators inspect the target objects according to the inspection methods specified in the plans. After completing the inspection of each target object, the inspection results are uploaded, including the object number, the obtained inspection data, and defect records.

[0072] In some embodiments, a three-tiered documentation system is established based on the inspection results to provide a basis for subsequent operation and maintenance work. (Reference) Figure 6 As shown, the methods for establishing a three-level document system include: Figure 6 Steps S161 to S163 are shown.

[0073] In step S161, a first document is created, which includes the inspection object, the output of the risk prediction model, the first target inspection object, and the second target inspection object.

[0074] In step S162, a second document is created, which includes work records of executing the first and second inspection plans. These work records include system configuration, analysis procedures, and on-site inspection records.

[0075] In step S163, a third document is created, which includes the in-service inspection declaration document. The in-service inspection declaration document includes the required permit application documents.

[0076] Figure 7 Another embodiment of the in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the additional steps included on top of the existing steps. (See reference) Figure 7 The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines in this embodiment includes, in addition to, Figure 1 Steps S110 to S160 in the process also include Figure 7 Steps S170 to S190 are performed before step S160.

[0077] In step S170, the core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) of the original inspection plan are obtained. The original inspection plan refers to the in-service inspection plan performed by the nuclear power plant before the formulation and execution of the first and second inspection plans. The core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) of the original inspection plan can be obtained through historical inspection records.

[0078] In step S180, based on the output of the risk prediction model, the changes in the core damage probability and early release probability of the first and second inspection plans compared to the original inspection plan are calculated. Specifically, based on the conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability corresponding to each inspection object obtained from the risk prediction model, the core damage probability and early release probability of the first and second inspection plans are calculated. The differences between the core damage probability and early release probability of the first and second inspection plans and the original inspection plan are calculated to obtain the changes in the core damage probability and early release probability after the original inspection plan is changed to the first and second inspection plans.

[0079] In step S190, the first and second inspection plans are adjusted based on the amount of change. Specifically, if the amount of change meets the standard, i.e., the change in the core damage probability does not exceed 1×102... -7The change in the probability of early-stage release of the system per year does not exceed 1×10. -8 If the system is in a per-year period, then there is no need to adjust the first and second inspection plans; proceed directly to step S160. If the change does not meet the standard, i.e., the change in the core damage probability exceeds 1×10⁻⁶, then... -7 The annual change in the probability of systemic or early-stage release exceeds 1×10-1. -8 If the system changes annually, the first and second inspection plans should be adjusted until the changes meet the standards. This can be achieved by increasing the number of target inspection objects or adjusting the inspection methods.

[0080] An embodiment of this application also proposes a method such as Figure 8 The electronic device 500 is shown. According to... Figure 8 The electronic device 500 may include an internal communication bus 501, a processor 502, a read-only memory (ROM) 503, a random access memory (RAM) 504, and a communication port 505. When used in a personal computer, the electronic device may also include a hard disk 506.

[0081] The internal communication bus 501 enables data communication between components of the electronic device 500. The processor 502 can perform judgments and issue prompts. In some embodiments, the processor 502 may consist of one or more processors. The communication port 505 enables data communication between the electronic device 500 and external devices. In some embodiments, the electronic device 500 can send and receive information and data from a network through the communication port 505.

[0082] Electronic device 500 may also include different forms of program storage units and data storage units, such as hard disk 506, read-only memory (ROM) 503, and random access memory (RAM) 504, capable of storing various data files used for computer processing and / or communication, as well as possible program instructions executed by processor 502. The processor executes these instructions to implement the main parts of the methods described above. The results of processor processing are transmitted to user equipment via a communication port and displayed on a user interface.

[0083] This application also proposes a computer-readable medium storing computer program code that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described above.

[0084] In addition, this application also proposes a computer program product, including computer program code, which, when executed by one or more processors, enables the implementation of the steps described above.

[0085] The basic concepts have been described above. Obviously, for those skilled in the art, the above disclosure is merely illustrative and does not constitute a limitation of this application. Although not explicitly stated herein, those skilled in the art may make various modifications, improvements, and corrections to this application. Such modifications, improvements, and corrections are suggested in this application, and therefore remain within the spirit and scope of the exemplary embodiments of this application.

[0086] Furthermore, this application uses specific terms to describe embodiments of the application. For example, "an embodiment," "one embodiment," and / or "some embodiments" refer to a particular feature, structure, or characteristic related to at least one embodiment of the application. Therefore, it should be emphasized and noted that "an embodiment," "one embodiment," or "an alternative embodiment" mentioned twice or more in different locations in this specification do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, certain features, structures, or characteristics in one or more embodiments of the application can be appropriately combined.

[0087] Similarly, it should be noted that, in order to simplify the description of the present application and thus aid in the understanding of one or more embodiments, the foregoing description of the embodiments of the present application sometimes combines multiple features into a single embodiment, drawing, or description thereof. However, this disclosure method does not imply that the subject matter of the present application requires more features than those mentioned in the claims. In fact, the embodiments contain fewer features than all the features of the single embodiments disclosed above.

[0088] In some embodiments, numbers describing the quantity of components and attributes are used. It should be understood that such numbers used in the description of embodiments are modified in some examples with the terms "approximately," "approximately," or "generally." Unless otherwise stated, "approximately," "approximately," or "generally" indicates that the numbers are allowed to vary by ±20%. Accordingly, in some embodiments, the numerical parameters used in the specification and claims are approximate values, which may be changed depending on the characteristics required by individual embodiments. In some embodiments, numerical parameters should take into account specified significant digits and employ a general method of digit reservation. Although the numerical ranges and parameters used to confirm their breadth of scope in some embodiments of this application are approximate values, in specific embodiments, such values ​​are set as precisely as feasible.

[0089] Although this application has been described with reference to specific embodiments, those skilled in the art should recognize that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate this application, and various equivalent changes or substitutions can be made without departing from the spirit of this application. Therefore, any changes or modifications to the above embodiments within the essential spirit of this application will fall within the scope of the claims of this application.

Claims

1. A method for in-service inspection of pipelines in a nuclear power plant, characterized in that, include: Select a risk prediction area from the inspection area, wherein the risk prediction area includes multiple inspection objects; The multiple inspection objects are input into the risk prediction model, the risk prediction model is run, and the deterioration mechanism and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects are output respectively; Based on the risk assessment results of the risk prediction model, the multiple inspection objects are divided into several inspection clusters, wherein the inspection objects in each inspection cluster are continuous in physical space. Based on the output of the risk prediction model, the risk category of each inspection cluster is determined, and a first inspection plan is formulated according to the risk categories corresponding to the inspection clusters respectively. The first inspection plan includes a first target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method. A second inspection plan is developed for inspection areas other than the aforementioned risk-aware area. This second inspection plan includes a second target inspection object and a corresponding inspection method; and Execute the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan, and generate inspection results.

2. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The steps for selecting a risk-predictable area from the inspection area include: Based on safety classification requirements, the safety levels of multiple objects within the inspection area are determined, including nuclear safety level 1, nuclear safety level 2, nuclear safety level 3, and non-nuclear safety level. Based on the security levels of the multiple inspection objects, the inspection area is divided into multiple candidate areas; Based on the inspection requirements, a portion of the candidate areas is selected as the risk prediction area.

3. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The steps of inputting multiple inspection objects into a risk prediction model, running the risk prediction model, and outputting the degradation mechanism and risk assessment results corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively include: Set the parameters of the risk prediction model; Calculate the conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability corresponding to the plurality of inspection objects, respectively; The failure consequences of the multiple inspection objects are determined based on the conditional core damage probability and conditional early release probability corresponding to the multiple inspection objects respectively. Based on the design parameters and operating conditions of the multiple inspection objects, identify and output the degradation mechanism of the multiple inspection objects; Based on the aforementioned degradation mechanism, the failure probability of the plurality of inspected objects is determined; The probability of failure and the consequences of failure are output as the risk assessment results.

4. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The steps for setting the parameters of the risk prediction model include: setting the parameters of the risk prediction model according to the nuclear safety regulations library, wherein the parameters include the thermal fatigue threshold of carbon steel, the thermal fatigue threshold of stainless steel, the temperature range sensitive to flow-accelerated corrosion, the core damage probability threshold under high consequences conditions, and the frequency range of high rupture probability.

5. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 3, characterized in that, The steps of determining the risk category of each inspection cluster based on the output of the risk prediction model, and formulating a first inspection plan based on the risk categories corresponding to the inspection clusters respectively, include: Based on the failure consequences and failure probabilities of the inspected objects in the aforementioned inspection clusters, a risk matrix is ​​constructed. Based on the risk matrix, the risk category of each inspection cluster is determined according to the failure consequences and failure probability of each inspection cluster, and the inspection requirements corresponding to each inspection cluster are determined according to the risk category. Based on the inspection requirements, the first target inspection object in the risk prediction area is determined; Based on the pre-established correspondence between degradation mechanisms and inspection methods, an inspection method for the first target inspection object is formulated according to the degradation mechanism of the first target inspection object, which serves as the first inspection plan.

6. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The steps for developing a second inspection plan for inspection areas other than the aforementioned risk-aware areas include: Based on the inspection requirements and methods specified in the general standard inspection procedures, the second target inspection object and the corresponding inspection method are determined as the second inspection plan.

7. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Prior to the execution of the steps of the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan, the in-service inspection method for the nuclear power plant pipelines further includes: Obtain the core damage probability and early release probability of the original inspection plan; Based on the output of the risk prediction model, calculate the changes in the core damage probability and early release probability of the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan compared to the original inspection plan; Adjust the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan according to the amount of change.

8. The in-service inspection method for nuclear power plant pipelines as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The steps to generate the inspection results include: Establish a three-level document system, including: Establish a first document, which includes the inspection object, the output of the risk prediction model, the first target inspection object, and the second target inspection object; Create a second document, which includes work records of executing the first inspection plan and the second inspection plan; Establish a third document, which includes in-service inspection declaration documents.

9. An electronic device, comprising: Memory is used to store instructions that can be executed by the processor; as well as A processor for executing the instructions to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-8.

10. A computer storage medium storing computer program code, said computer program code implementing the method as claimed in any one of claims 1-8 when executed by a processor.