A general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture
By using a decentralized, dynamic, multi-redundant architecture for the flight control system, and leveraging fully interconnected communication links and fault isolation modules, the system dynamically elects the output master node and isolates faulty nodes. This solves the problem of centralized single-point failure risks and bus lock-up conflicts in existing flight control systems, thereby improving the reliability and stability of the aircraft under harsh operating conditions.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611439236.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-16
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing redundant flight control systems suffer from centralized single-point failure risks, master-slave failure switching delays, bus lock-up conflict risks, and poor adaptability, making it impossible to guarantee the flight reliability of aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-event rollover.
It adopts a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, which uses a fully interconnected communication link and fault isolation module between flight control nodes with consistent hardware configuration, combined with a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module to dynamically elect and output the master node, and forces the transmission path to be isolated to a high-impedance state in the event of a fault, thereby achieving silent fault isolation.
It improves the reliability and stability of the aircraft under harsh conditions, avoids centralized single point of failure, achieves zero-latency dynamic fault tolerance and extreme fault node isolation, and ensures the smoothness and reliability of flight control.
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Figure CN123113568A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of control technology for aerospace vehicles and high-end industrial unmanned aerial vehicles, and in particular to a general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. Background Technology
[0002] In high-reliability aircraft scenarios such as launch vehicles, missiles, and high-dynamic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), dual-redundant or triple-redundant flight control systems are widely used. However, most existing redundant flight control systems adopt a master-slave centralized architecture, relying on a fixed output master node or an external independent voting chip to complete redundancy management. This generally suffers from centralized single-point-of-failure risks, master-slave failure switching delays, bus lock-up conflict risks, and poor adaptability, making it impossible to guarantee the flight reliability of aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-event upsets.
[0003] Therefore, there is an urgent need for a universal flight control solution that is completely decentralized, supports dynamic redundancy configuration, and has hardware-level fault isolation, in order to improve the flight reliability of aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-event rollover, and to solve the problems of centralized single-point failure, master-slave failure switching delay, bus lock-up conflict risk, and poor adaptability of existing redundant flight control systems. Summary of the Invention
[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. By adopting a highly reliable flight control architecture that is completely decentralized, has completely consistent boards, supports dynamic multi-level redundancy, and has a high-resistance isolation defense line, the flight reliability of the aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-event rollover can be improved.
[0005] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solution: In a first aspect, this application provides a general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, the general flight control system comprising: at least two flight control nodes with identical hardware configurations, a fully interconnected communication link between nodes, an external bus interface, and a fault isolation module.
[0006] Each of the flight control nodes is equipped with a sensor module, which is used to collect aircraft attitude data and output it to the corresponding flight control node.
[0007] Each of the flight control nodes has no preset fixed master-slave identity, and the communication ports of each of the flight control nodes are respectively connected to the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes. The attitude data of the aircraft, as well as the attitude calculation data and node health score related data calculated based on the attitude data of the aircraft, are exchanged through the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes.
[0008] Each of the flight control nodes is also equipped with a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module. The cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module is used to dynamically vote from all the flight control nodes in each control cycle to elect the output master node that has the right to output to the external bus in the current control cycle, based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data and node health score related data reported by all the flight control nodes. The flight control node elected as the output master node is used to output the final flight control command.
[0009] The output terminals of each flight control node are connected to the external bus interface via the fault isolation module. The fault isolation module is used to force the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface to a high-impedance state and retain only the receiving path when the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a fault node, thereby achieving silent isolation of the physical bus of the fault node.
[0010] Secondly, this application provides a general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. The general flight control method is implemented based on the aforementioned general flight control system and includes the following steps: Each flight control node collects the corresponding aircraft attitude data.
[0011] Each flight control node calculates corresponding attitude calculation data and node health score related data based on the corresponding aircraft attitude data.
[0012] Each flight control node broadcasts its corresponding aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score-related data to the other flight control nodes through a fully interconnected inter-node communication link.
[0013] Within each control cycle, each flight control node dynamically elects an output master node from among all flight control nodes based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score data reported by all flight control nodes; the flight control node elected as the output master node outputs the final flight control command.
[0014] When the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a faulty node, the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface is forcibly set to a high-impedance state, and only the receiving path is retained, thereby achieving silent isolation of the physical bus of the faulty node.
[0015] According to the specific embodiments provided in this application, this application has the following technical effects: This application provides a general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. The system employs a highly reliable flight control architecture that is completely decentralized, with identical boards, supports dynamic multi-level redundancy, and possesses a high-resistance isolation defense. First, by setting at least two flight control nodes with identical hardware configurations, each flight control node does not have a pre-defined fixed master-slave identity. Instead, a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module dynamically elects the output master node in each control cycle, avoiding the single-point-of-failure risk of a fixed master-slave architecture. The output master node's identity is dynamically updated with each control cycle and is not pre-fixed. Second, each flight control node is equipped with an independent sensor module. Through a fully interconnected communication link, each flight control node exchanges aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score-related data. This provides a complete cross-node comparison data source for the cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module within each flight control node, supporting distributed independent voting elections and achieving decentralized voting without relying on external centralized voting devices. Furthermore, the cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module uses the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score data reported by all flight control nodes as the voting basis. Each control cycle, a new output master node is elected to gain the right to output to the external bus. The elected output master node outputs the final flight control commands. This allows for dynamic determination of the command output subject based on the real-time status of each node, enabling timely identification of nodes with abnormal status and the removal of their external output permissions. Moreover, the fault isolation module can force the transmission path of flight control nodes that are not elected as output master nodes or are identified as faulty nodes to a high-impedance state, while retaining only the receiving path. This achieves silent bus isolation of faulty nodes at the physical level, preventing unelected or faulty nodes from interfering with the external bus. Isolated nodes can still maintain data reception and continuously receive interactive data from other nodes in the link. In addition, the output terminals of each flight control node are connected to the external bus interface via a fault isolation module. The fault isolation module isolates the transmission path of a single flight control node, realizing independent management and control of the bus output path of each flight control node. A single flight control node failure will not directly disrupt the overall working state of the external bus, thereby improving the flight reliability and stability of the aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-particle rollover. Attached Figure Description
[0016] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0017] Figure 1A schematic diagram of the core architecture of a general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture is provided for an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the hardware composition of a complete general-purpose flight control system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the decentralized fully interconnected triangular topology and private peripheral bus connection relationship based on M-LVDS provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 A microsecond-level timing diagram within a single control cycle provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a bus high-impedance anti-collision isolation hardware circuit based on a hardware watchdog chip provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the state machine process for the power-on cold start stage provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the workflow of a single control cycle in flight operation state provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 8 This is a flowchart illustrating a general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, provided as an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0018] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0019] This application provides a general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. It adopts a highly reliable flight control architecture that is completely decentralized, with completely consistent boards, supports dynamic multi-level redundancy, and has a high-resistance state (High-Z) isolation defense line. It not only supports flexible redundancy configuration, but also achieves breakthrough real-time data synchronization and dynamic output weight voting for each control cycle, ensuring extreme smoothness and absolute reliability throughout the flight, and improving the flight reliability of the aircraft under harsh conditions such as vibration, radiation, and single-event rollover.
[0020] To make the above-mentioned objectives, features and advantages of this application more apparent and understandable, the application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0021] like Figure 1As shown in the embodiments of this application, a general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture is proposed. The general flight control system includes: at least two flight control nodes with identical hardware configurations, a full mesh communication link between nodes, an external bus interface, and a fault isolation module.
[0022] Each of the flight control nodes is equipped with a sensor module, which is used to collect aircraft attitude data and output it to the corresponding flight control node.
[0023] Each of the flight control nodes has no preset fixed master-slave identity, and the communication ports of each of the flight control nodes are respectively connected to the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes. The attitude data of the aircraft, as well as the attitude calculation data and node health score related data calculated based on the attitude data of the aircraft, are exchanged through the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes.
[0024] The attitude calculation data is independently calculated by each flight control node based on locally collected aircraft attitude data, including aircraft Euler angles, attitude quaternions, body angular velocity, body acceleration, estimated altitude, estimated velocity, and attitude calculation confidence. The node health score-related data includes internal node observation indicators and node health score output values used to calculate the health score. The internal node observation indicators include SoC watchdog feeding status, sensor data anomaly markers, inter-node communication link failure status, control cycle timing offset, failure silence status markers, and external bus interface failure markers. The node health score output value is the node confidence level score obtained based on the quantification of observation indicators and the corresponding fault marker bits.
[0025] Each flight control node is also equipped with a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module. This module, within each control cycle, dynamically elects an output master node from all flight control nodes based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score data reported by all flight control nodes. The elected output master node outputs the final flight control command. This final flight control command, after being elected through decentralized dynamic voting within the control cycle, is the only valid flight control output issued by the output master node to drive the aircraft's actuators.
[0026] The output terminals of each flight control node are connected to the external bus interface via the fault isolation module. The fault isolation module is used to force the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface to a high-impedance state and retain only the receiving path when the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a fault node, thereby achieving silent isolation of the physical bus of the fault node.
[0027] In this system, each flight control node does not have a fixed master-slave identity (i.e., the master and slave flight control nodes are not pre-set). Instead, the output master node is determined by a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module through dynamic voting election. Combined with the fault isolation function of the fault isolation module, only the flight control node that is elected as the output master node and is not faulty outputs the final flight control command. This ensures that only one node outputs the control command in each control cycle, avoiding bus conflicts caused by multiple nodes outputting simultaneously. The output subject is dynamically determined with each cycle, and there is no need to pre-set the master and slave nodes.
[0028] In this embodiment, each flight control node independently executes voting and election logic locally within each control cycle. It combines attitude calculation data reported by other flight control nodes with node health score data from each flight control node to conduct voting. The specific logic of the voting and election is as follows: 1) The node health score is used as the voting weight; the higher the health score, the higher the voting weight of the corresponding flight control node; 2) A consistency comparison is performed on the attitude calculation results output by each flight control node; 3) Based on the weight and data consistency, a master output node is elected; 4) The elected master output node is responsible for outputting the final flight control commands; 5) Faulty nodes with a health score below a preset threshold are directly stripped of their voting and election rights, achieving fault isolation.
[0029] As an optional implementation, the cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module is further used to: determine the fault of each flight control node based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data and node health score related data reported by each flight control node, and obtain the fault node determination result.
[0030] As an optional implementation, the fully interconnected communication link between nodes is a one-way point-to-point fully interconnected topology, and each flight control node is configured with an independent one-way transceiver channel.
[0031] The inter-node fully interconnected communication link reuses the synchronization effective signal as the global synchronization trigger signal. The output master node outputs the synchronization trigger edge, and the other flight control nodes capture the synchronization trigger edge, synchronously triggering the sensor modules corresponding to each flight control node to perform data sampling, thereby realizing multi-node hardware-level sampling phase alignment.
[0032] As an optional implementation, the general flight control system further includes a power-on cold start consensus election module, which is configured in each of the flight control nodes.
[0033] The power-on cold start consensus election module is used to conduct multiple rounds of voting to elect the initial output master node during the power-on phase by exchanging negotiation messages among the flight control nodes. When a tie deadlock occurs in the voting election, the module reads the unalterable hardware unique identifier (such as DNA or serial number) built into the main control chip of each flight control node as the final decision basis, and selects the output master node according to the hardware unique identifier.
[0034] As an optional implementation, the fault isolation module includes a hardware watchdog chip.
[0035] The hardware watchdog chip is used to receive the watchdog feed signal output by each flight control node. When a flight control node experiences a program crash and fails to output the watchdog feed signal on time, the hardware watchdog chip outputs a reset signal to reset the corresponding flight control node's program and forcibly switches the transmission path of the corresponding flight control node connected to the external bus interface into a high-impedance state. After the corresponding flight control node completes the program reset, it re-participates in the dynamic voting election.
[0036] As an optional implementation, the sensor module includes multiple sets of inertial measurement units (IMUs), and each set of inertial measurement units within the same sensor module has an independent power supply, realizing sensor-level redundancy within a single node.
[0037] Specifically, each flight control node integrates a triple-redundant, temperature-controlled inertial measurement unit (IMU). These three IMUs are housed within a vibration-damped, temperature-controlled metal chamber, achieving sensor-level redundancy within a single node. The flight control nodes are interconnected via custom-designed, cross-shielded cables.
[0038] As an optional implementation, the fully interconnected communication link between nodes adopts an M-LVDS (Multi-Point Low Voltage Differential Signaling) differential unidirectional communication link, with a dedicated shielded cable configured between every two flight control nodes, and the receiving end of each flight control node is configured with a matching terminating resistor.
[0039] This application's embodiments employ a decentralized M-LVDS fully interconnected communication and hard synchronization mechanism. For multi-machine redundant configurations, a fully interconnected pure unidirectional isolation topology based on M-LVDS is constructed, as follows: (1) Physically isolated link: Taking three flight control nodes as an example, the three flight control nodes are flight control node A, flight control node B and flight control node C. Each pair of flight control node A, flight control node B and flight control node C is allocated an independent unidirectional M-LVDS transceiver pin. The receiving end is matched with a fixed terminating resistor and the transmitting end is normally open, which completely eliminates half-duplex bus conflict and reflection oscillation.
[0040] (2) Effective bit hard synchronization technology: Abandoning the independent global clock line, the data valid pin (VALID) in the M-LVDS source synchronization data link is used as a global hard synchronization pulse. At the beginning of the cycle, the current output master node pulls the VALID pin high, and the other backup nodes capture the edge and immediately trigger the local FPGA to perform alignment sampling of the internal IMU array and other sensors, realizing hardware-level phase synchronization without a central host.
[0041] In practical applications, such as Figure 2 As shown, the entire general-purpose flight control system hardware adopts a modular design structure, including a power supply module, sensor module, flight control computer, multi-redundant flight control communication interface M-LVDS module, and bus interface module. The flight control computer uses the Zynq-7020 SoC main control chip as its core, dividing the PS-side ARM processing system and PL-side FPGA programmable logic. The PL-side integrates hard synchronization and cycle-by-cycle voting logic, fail-silent control, and high-impedance isolation logic. The sensor module has a triple-redundant IMU module bay, with three IMUs having independent power supplies and arranged in the thermostat compartment. It also connects to GNSS, dual barometers, and electronic compass peripheral sensors. Flight control nodes rely on dedicated cross-shielded cables to achieve unidirectional full interconnection of M-LVDS, and the M-LVDS link reuses the VALID pin as a synchronization pulse. The external bus interface is configured with an independent watchdog chip and isolation logic to achieve high-impedance isolation defense for interfaces such as CAN, RS-422, and RS-232, fully reflecting the electrical connections and signal flow between various hardware modules.
[0042] In this embodiment, the flight control node is also externally connected to sensors such as an electronic compass, GNSS, and dual barometers. The dual barometers refer to two independent barometer devices configured on a single flight control node. The barometers measure the ambient atmospheric pressure and convert it into the observed relative or absolute altitude of the aircraft. The dual barometers achieve redundancy in altitude sensing within a single node, with the two barometer measurements within the same node mutually verifying each other, suppressing altitude measurement errors caused by the failure of a single barometer. The electronic compass is a heading measurement sensor used to detect the geomagnetic field to obtain the aircraft's heading observation data. It outputs raw heading measurement data to the flight control node via an SPI interface. The flight control node performs multi-sensor fusion calculations on the heading data output by the electronic compass, IMU inertial measurement data, GNSS positioning data, and barometric altitude data to obtain the complete attitude information of the aircraft.
[0043] Figure 3 This paper illustrates a decentralized, fully interconnected triangular topology based on M-LVDS and the connection relationships of a private peripheral bus. Flight control node A, flight control node B, and flight control node C form a triangular unidirectional point-to-point fully interconnected network topology. Each flight control node has an independent TX transmit channel and RX receive channel. Unidirectional signal transmission between each flight control node is completed through a dedicated shielded cable. The receive RX pin of all healthy flight control nodes is configured to be normally open. The output side of each flight control node is uniformly connected to a private peripheral bus with high impedance capability, namely CAN and RS-422 peripheral buses. The sender, receiver, transmit zone, physical cable routing, and receive zone information of flight control nodes A, B, and C are shown in Table 1.
[0044] Table 1. Information on the sending zone, physical cable routing, and receiving zone between the sender and receiver.
[0045] In this context, shielded twisted-pair cable is used as the transmission medium for the fully interconnected communication link between nodes. The parallel double lines represent the physical cable body of the shielded twisted-pair cable, and the parallel double lines with arrows indicate the transmission direction of the differential signals on the cable.
[0046] This application's embodiments design a cold start consensus and identity allocation based on chip feature serial numbers. During the power-on cold start phase, the system does not rely on any external hard jumpers and dynamically elects the first output master node (i.e., the initial output master node) and allocates physical IDs through a software consensus algorithm. Specifically, this includes: (1) Flight control nodes broadcast negotiation messages containing their own health status to each other for multiple rounds of voting.
[0047] (2) Final Arbitration Mechanism (Fallback): When three consecutive rounds of voting result in a tie, the system automatically reads the unalterable hardware unique identifier inside the main control chip (such as Zynq SoC) as the final arbitration basis. The flight control node where the sequence number extreme point is located is confirmed as the first output master node, completely solving the election deadlock in the decentralized network.
[0048] This application's embodiment employs a cycle-by-cycle real-time synchronization and dynamic output voting mechanism, breaking through the limitation of the traditional flight control output master node holding the position indefinitely (i.e., always acting as the output master node). The system implements extremely high-frequency real-time dynamic power transfer throughout the entire flight, specifically including: (1) Real-time global data synchronization: In each control cycle of flight (such as 1ms or higher frequency), all healthy flight control nodes broadcast the bottom sensor data and attitude calculation matrix that were just sampled in this cycle to the other flight control nodes in real time through the M-LVDS dedicated line.
[0049] (2) Dynamic voting to determine output in each cycle: In each operating cycle, each flight control node independently performs cross-reconciliation and health scoring. The system's output right is not fixed, but is determined instantly based on the real-time voting results of the current cycle. If the current output master node experiences data divergence or timeout within any microsecond, the standby node will instantly calculate the new winner in the same cycle's voting, and the instructions for the next cycle will be directly issued by the newly winning flight control node, achieving zero-latency demotion takeover.
[0050] Figure 4 The microsecond-level timing diagram within a single control cycle (including hard synchronization triggering, sampling and calculation, real-time interactive synchronization, dynamic voting, and output actions) is shown. With a 1ms complete control cycle as the total duration and the horizontal axis as the time axis, it is divided into five timing stages: T0~T+50μs, T+50μs~T+350μs, T+350μs~T+500μs, T+500μs~T+700μs, and T+700μs~T+1ms. The working states of flight control node A, flight control node B, and flight control node C, as well as the timing of the valid VALID signal pulses, are also displayed. The complete timing flow is shown sequentially: hard synchronization sampling triggering, independent calculation by each node, real-time interactive synchronization of global data, independent real-time dynamic voting by each node, high-impedance isolation, and physical output. Simultaneously, the output master node with normal watchdog feeding, the standby / faulty node with stopped watchdog feeding, and the high-impedance switching behavior after watchdog overflow reset are distinguished, intuitively demonstrating the temporal relationship between cycle-by-cycle voting and hardware watchdog triggering high-impedance isolation.
[0051] In the embodiment of this application, within a typical control cycle (e.g., 1ms, 1000Hz) in flight mode, all flight control nodes execute the following real-time synchronization and dynamic voting closed-loop process: (1) Hard synchronization and array sampling (T0~T+50μs): The output master node that wins the vote in the previous cycle pulls the VALID line high through its M-LVDS transmission channel. After the other flight control nodes capture the edge, the three machines trigger their internal sensors to read within the same clock cycle to ensure that the physical sampling phase is absolutely consistent.
[0052] (2) Independent calculation (T+50μs~T+350μs): The SoC of each flight control node independently processes the local IMU data, runs Kalman filtering and control law, and generates the attitude quaternion and health score for this cycle.
[0053] (3) Global data real-time interaction and synchronization (T+350μs~T+500μs): Each flight control node, regardless of its primary or secondary status, immediately broadcasts the data of this cycle to the other two flight control nodes through its own dedicated M-LVDS transmission channel.
[0054] (4) Real-time dynamic voting (T+500μs~T+700μs): Each flight control node independently performs cross-comparison. Dynamic decision is made at this time: the system re-votes to determine the output master node for this cycle based on the three-party data at this moment. If the original output master node's data is scattered or missing in this cycle, the other two "healthy" flight control nodes will vote it out without any communication delay, and establish a new output master node within the same microsecond based on the health score.
[0055] (5) High-impedance isolation and physical output (T+700μs~T+1ms): The newly selected output master node immediately enables the transmission of its external interfaces such as CAN and RS-422 through the control pin, and sends flight commands to the actuator. The failed or faulty flight control node forces its external interface into a high-impedance state (silent listening) to ensure that the level control on the external private bus is transferred absolutely smoothly.
[0056] This application's embodiments design a hardware watchdog chip and a high-impedance isolated external output defense line. Combined with cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting results, an overall failure-silent defense line at the flight control node level is implemented for external interfaces (including CAN, RS-422, etc.). Specifically, this includes: (1) Hardware-level one-size-fits-all logic: Each flight controller motherboard introduces an external independent hardware watchdog chip. This ensures that the flight controller system can be reset and resume operation in a timely manner when it crashes or malfunctions at any time, while also ensuring that the bus of the problematic node in the system enters a high-impedance state and is disconnected from bus control.
[0057] (2) High-impedance takeover: When a flight control node wins the real-time vote in the current cycle, the Zynq SoC sends a watchdog signal normally and takes control of the physical bus output commands. The physical bus transmit port of the losing node in the real-time vote enters a high-impedance state, but the receive interface receives data normally. When a flight control node crashes or freezes, it cannot send a watchdog signal (the watchdog overflows naturally), and the watchdog outputs a low level to reset. All bus transceivers of the flight control node are instantly forced into an absolute high-impedance state, completely withdrawing from the bus contention, allowing the newly elected output master node to seamlessly write commands. The flight control node will automatically restart to recover.
[0058] Figure 5 This paper illustrates the principle of a bus high-impedance anti-collision isolation hardware circuit based on a hardware watchdog chip. It demonstrates the hardware connection relationship between the external independent hardware watchdog chip, the SoC, and the bus transceiver. The WDI pin of the external independent hardware watchdog chip receives the watchdog signal output by the SoC. The watchdog WDI reset output is connected to the nReset low-level reset pin of the SoC on one hand, and works with the SoC's GPIO to control the enable EN pin of the bus transceiver on the other hand. After the reset occurs, the SoC's GPIO pin enters a high-impedance state, and the bus transceiver automatically enters a high-impedance state. This reflects the hardware implementation mechanism of silently isolating the bus failure by relying on the independent hardware watchdog in the case of software crash failure.
[0059] Figure 6 The state machine process during the power-on cold start phase is shown, which includes: after the system is powered on, each node broadcasts a negotiation message carrying its own health status to conduct multiple rounds of voting to determine whether a unique winner is generated; if three consecutive rounds of voting result in a tie, the unique DNA sequence number of the SoC internal hardware is read, and the node with the extreme value of the sequence number is taken as the first output master node. After the output master node is assigned, the system enters flight operation.
[0060] Figure 7 The workflow of a single control cycle in flight operation is shown, specifically including: starting from the current control cycle T0, capturing hard synchronization pulses to trigger sampling, independently calculating and scoring health status, the M-LVDS link completing global data broadcast interaction, performing cross-comparison and real-time health status assessment, and re-voting; based on the voting results, the winning node controls the bus output commands, while the losing or faulty node is forced to switch to a physical high-impedance state, completes the work of the current control cycle, and waits for the next control cycle to be triggered. The complete software logic flow of power-on election and flight cycle-by-cycle voting is shown.
[0061] This application provides a general flight control system and method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, which has the following technical advantages: (1) Zero dead zone and zero delay dynamic fault tolerance: The system adopts a cycle-by-cycle real-time synchronization and dynamic voting mechanism, which shortens the fault tolerance response time of the system to within a single control cycle (millisecond / microsecond level). The faulty flight control node is instantly deprived of its output right, and the flight actuator does not feel any command interruption or level conflict.
[0062] (2) Extreme fault prevention capability: The hardware watchdog forces the system to restart and restore and puts the external physical bus into a high impedance state, completely eliminating the risk of bus short circuit and collapse caused by faulty flight controller deadlock from the underlying physical circuit.
[0063] (3) Perfect engineering interchangeability and versatility: The bill of materials for the flight control PCB is completely unified. The system can adaptively reduce to single-machine operation or instantly upgrade to a dual-machine or triple-machine fully interconnected redundant network according to the actual mission cable connection situation.
[0064] (4) Microsecond-level synchronization and absolute consensus: Hard synchronization design and hardware unique identification code arbitration can solve the problems of underlying sampling timing skew and voting tie in decentralized distributed systems.
[0065] Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture corresponding to a general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture. The solution provided by this method is similar to the solution described above. Therefore, the specific limitations in the embodiments of the general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture provided below can be found in the limitations of the general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture described above, and will not be repeated here.
[0066] In one exemplary embodiment, such as Figure 8 As shown, a general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture is provided, which specifically includes the following steps: S1: Each flight control node collects the corresponding aircraft attitude data.
[0067] S2: Each flight control node calculates the corresponding attitude calculation data and node health score related data based on the corresponding aircraft attitude data.
[0068] S3: Each flight control node broadcasts its corresponding aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score-related data to the other flight control nodes through the fully interconnected inter-node communication link.
[0069] S4: In each control cycle, each flight control node dynamically elects an output master node that has the right to output to the external bus in the current control cycle based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data and node health score related data reported by all flight control nodes. The flight control node elected as the output master node outputs the final flight control command.
[0070] S5: When the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a faulty node, the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface is forcibly set to a high-impedance state, and only the receiving path is retained, so as to achieve silent isolation of the physical bus of the faulty node.
[0071] As an optional implementation, the general flight control method further includes: when a deadlock occurs due to a tie in the voting election, reading the unalterable hardware unique identifier built into the main control chip of each flight control node as the final decision basis, and selecting the output master node according to the hardware unique identifier.
[0072] As an optional implementation, the general flight control method further includes: receiving dog-feed signals output by each of the flight control nodes; when a flight control node experiences a program crash and fails to output the dog-feed signal on time, outputting a reset signal to the corresponding flight control node to reset the program of the corresponding flight control node, and forcibly switching the transmission path of the corresponding flight control node connected to the external bus interface into a high-impedance state; and after the corresponding flight control node completes the program reset, re-participating in the dynamic voting election.
[0073] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.
[0074] This document uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the above embodiments are only for the purpose of helping to understand the methods and core ideas of this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the ideas of this application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.
Claims
1. A general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, characterized in that, The general flight control system includes: at least two flight control nodes with identical hardware configurations, a fully interconnected communication link between nodes, an external bus interface, and a fault isolation module; Each of the flight control nodes is equipped with a sensor module, which is used to collect aircraft attitude data and output it to the corresponding flight control node; Each of the flight control nodes has no preset fixed master-slave identity, and the communication ports of each of the flight control nodes are respectively connected to the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes. The attitude data of the aircraft, as well as the attitude calculation data and node health score related data calculated based on the attitude data of the aircraft, are exchanged through the fully interconnected communication link between the nodes. Each of the flight control nodes is also configured with a cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module. The cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module is used to dynamically vote from all the flight control nodes in each control cycle to elect the output master node that has the right to output to the external bus in the current control cycle, based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data and node health score related data reported by all the flight control nodes. The flight control node elected as the output master node is used to output the final flight control command. The output terminals of each flight control node are connected to the external bus interface via the fault isolation module. The fault isolation module is used to force the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface to a high-impedance state and retain only the receiving path when the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a fault node, thereby achieving silent isolation of the physical bus of the fault node.
2. The general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The cycle-by-cycle dynamic voting module is also used to: determine the fault of each flight control node based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data and node health score related data reported by each flight control node, and obtain the fault node determination result.
3. The general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The fully interconnected communication link between nodes is a one-way point-to-point fully interconnected topology, and each flight control node is configured with an independent one-way transceiver channel. The inter-node fully interconnected communication link reuses the synchronization effective signal as the global synchronization trigger signal. The output master node outputs the synchronization trigger edge, and the other flight control nodes capture the synchronization trigger edge, synchronously triggering the sensor modules corresponding to each flight control node to perform data sampling, thereby realizing multi-node hardware-level sampling phase alignment.
4. The general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The general flight control system further includes a power-on cold start consensus election module, which is configured in each of the flight control nodes. The power-on cold start consensus election module is used to conduct multiple rounds of voting to elect the initial output master node during the power-on phase by exchanging negotiation messages among the flight control nodes. When a deadlock occurs in the voting election, the module reads the unalterable hardware unique identifier built into the main control chip of each flight control node as the final decision basis and selects the output master node based on the hardware unique identifier.
5. The general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The fault isolation module includes: a hardware watchdog chip; The hardware watchdog chip is used to receive the watchdog feed signal output by each flight control node. When a flight control node experiences a program crash and fails to output the watchdog feed signal on time, the hardware watchdog chip outputs a reset signal to reset the corresponding flight control node's program and forcibly switches the transmission path of the corresponding flight control node connected to the external bus interface into a high-impedance state. After the corresponding flight control node completes the program reset, it re-participates in the dynamic voting election.
6. The general flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The sensor module includes multiple sets of inertial measurement units. Each set of inertial measurement units within the same sensor module has an independent power supply, achieving sensor-level redundancy within a single node.
7. The general-purpose flight control system based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The fully interconnected communication link between the nodes adopts an M-LVDS differential unidirectional communication link. A dedicated shielded cable is configured between every two flight control nodes, and the receiving end of each flight control node is configured with a matching terminating resistor.
8. A general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture, characterized in that, The general flight control method is implemented based on the general flight control system according to any one of claims 1-7, and the general flight control method includes: Each flight control node collects the corresponding aircraft attitude data; Each flight control node calculates the corresponding attitude calculation data and node health score related data based on the corresponding aircraft attitude data; Each flight control node broadcasts its corresponding aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score-related data to the other flight control nodes through a fully interconnected inter-node communication link. Within each control cycle, each flight control node dynamically elects an output master node that has the right to output to the external bus in the current control cycle based on the aircraft attitude data, attitude calculation data, and node health score data reported by all flight control nodes. The flight control node elected as the output master node outputs the final flight control command. When the flight control node is not elected as the output master node or is determined to be a faulty node, the transmission path between the corresponding flight control node and the external bus interface is forcibly set to a high-impedance state, and only the receiving path is retained, thereby achieving silent isolation of the physical bus of the faulty node.
9. The general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 8, characterized in that, The general flight control method also includes: When a deadlock occurs due to a tie in the voting process, the unique, unalterable hardware identifier built into the main control chip of each flight control node is read as the final decision-making basis, and the output master node is selected based on the unique hardware identifier.
10. The general flight control method based on a decentralized dynamic multi-redundancy architecture according to claim 8, characterized in that, The general flight control method also includes: Receive the dog-feed signal output by each of the flight control nodes; When the flight control node experiences a program crash and fails to output the dog feed signal on time, a reset signal is output to the corresponding flight control node to reset the program and force the transmission path of the corresponding flight control node connected to the external bus interface to be switched to a high-impedance state. After the corresponding flight control node completes the program reset, it re-participates in the dynamic voting election.
