Data processing systems, methods, media, and electronic devices based on multi-domain isolation
By allocating independent communication channels for each functional domain in the integrated circuit and performing domain authentication, the problem of resource waste and increased costs caused by redundant configuration of hardware security circuits is solved, achieving secure isolation of multi-functional domains and reducing hardware costs.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611316657.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-27
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In automotive electronic and electrical architecture, the redundant configuration of hardware safety circuits in multi-functional domains leads to a waste of hardware resources and increased costs. Existing technologies cannot effectively solve the problem of redundant hardware resource configuration.
By allocating independent communication channels for each functional domain in the integrated circuit, and having the access control circuit perform domain authentication for each access request, legitimate requests are passed to the same hardware security circuit for decryption and cryptographic operations, thus achieving secure isolation of multi-functional domains and preventing unauthorized cross-domain access.
Without increasing additional hardware costs, it ensures strong isolation and security of key resources in each functional domain, reduces hardware costs, and improves the overall security of the system and the independence of key resources.
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Figure CN123116362A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This disclosure relates to the field of chip security technology, and in particular to a data processing system, method, medium and electronic device based on multi-domain isolation. Background Technology
[0002] In recent years, automotive electronic and electrical architecture has been evolving from a distributed to a centralized approach. Against this technological backdrop, domain processors and system-on-chips (SoCs) have become the mainstream technologies. A single SoC chip needs to integrate and run operating systems corresponding to multiple functional domains simultaneously, such as operating systems for the autonomous driving domain and operating systems for the smart cockpit domain.
[0003] Currently, each functional domain is configured with an independent hardware security module (HSM), enabling each domain to independently perform strict key management and other operations. However, while this approach ensures the security of each domain, it leads to redundant hardware resource configuration and increased costs. Summary of the Invention
[0004] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this disclosure provides a data processing system, method, medium, and electronic device based on multi-domain isolation, thereby resolving the issues of redundant configuration of multi-domain hardware resources and increased costs.
[0005] The first aspect of this disclosure provides a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, comprising: multiple communication channels, an access control circuit, and a hardware security circuit, wherein the multiple communication channels correspond to multiple functional domains; the access control circuit is configured to acquire a memory access request sent by a hardware unit in a first functional domain through the first communication channel, wherein the memory access request includes a target memory access address, the first functional domain is any one of the multiple functional domains, and the first communication channel is the communication channel corresponding to the first functional domain; the access control circuit is further configured to determine a target address range corresponding to the first functional domain based on the correspondence between the multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges; the access control circuit is further configured to transmit the memory access request to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel in response to the target memory access address being within the target address range; and the hardware security circuit is configured to perform a decryption operation in response to the memory access request, decrypting the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0006] A second aspect of this disclosure provides a data processing method based on multi-domain isolation, comprising: The system acquires a memory access request sent by a hardware unit in a first functional domain through a first communication channel. The memory access request includes a target memory access address. The first functional domain can be any one of multiple functional domains, and the first communication channel is the communication channel corresponding to the first functional domain. Based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges, the system determines the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain. In response to the target memory access address being within the target address range, the system transmits the memory access request to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel. In response to the memory access request, the system performs a decryption operation to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0007] A third aspect of this disclosure provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program for performing the data processing method based on multi-domain isolation provided in the first aspect embodiment.
[0008] A fourth aspect of this disclosure provides an electronic device, the electronic device comprising: A processor; a memory for storing processor-executable instructions; the processor for reading executable instructions from the memory and executing the instructions to implement the multi-domain isolation-based data processing method provided in the first aspect embodiment.
[0009] This disclosure provides a data processing system, method, medium, and electronic device based on multi-domain isolation. The system includes multiple communication channels, an access control circuit, and a hardware security circuit. The multiple communication channels correspond to multiple functional domains, and each functional domain establishes a communication connection with the access control circuit through these channels. By allocating an independent communication channel for each functional domain within the integrated circuit, a first functional domain sends a memory access request to the access control circuit through a first communication channel. The access control circuit verifies the memory access request based on the target address range corresponding to the functional domain, allowing only legitimate access requests to be passed to the hardware security circuit for decryption. This achieves strong isolation access control for multiple functional domains using a single hardware security circuit. This disclosure eliminates the need for separate hardware security circuits for each functional domain, significantly reducing hardware costs. Simultaneously, hardware-level access control ensures the security and independence of key resources for each functional domain. Attached Figure Description
[0010] Figure 1 This is a hardware system block diagram of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating how a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation accesses memory data, provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 3This is a flowchart illustrating step S240 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating step S243 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating step S2432 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided as an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating the creation of a key in a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, provided by an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure. Figure 7 This is a flowchart of step S620 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the data processing system based on multi-domain isolation after decryption, provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 9 This is a flowchart of a data processing method based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 10 This is a structural diagram of a data processing apparatus based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure; Figure 11 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure. Detailed Implementation
[0011] To explain this disclosure, exemplary embodiments of the disclosure will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the disclosure, and not all of them. It should be understood that the disclosure is not limited to exemplary embodiments.
[0012] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement, numerical expressions, and values of the components and steps set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of this disclosure.
[0013] Application Overview As automotive electronic and electrical architectures rapidly evolve from traditional distributed to highly centralized systems, on-board integrated circuits (SoCs) are gradually becoming the core hardware platform supporting collaborative computing across multiple functional domains. Under the technological trend of cockpit-driver integration, a single integrated circuit needs to simultaneously run operating systems corresponding to multiple functional domains, such as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI), and safety island functional domains. These operating systems differ significantly in functional safety levels (e.g., ISO 26262 ASIL-D), data security levels (e.g., GB / T35273), and real-time requirements. Therefore, integrated circuits need to ensure the isolation of key resources between different functional domains to prevent unauthorized cross-domain access that could lead to key leakage.
[0014] Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are core hardware units in integrated circuits, responsible for key generation, secure storage, and encryption operations. They possess security features such as tamper resistance and side-channel attack protection, serving as the fundamental support for achieving secure isolation between functional domains. However, in multi-domain converged architectures, to achieve isolation between functional domains, integrated circuits are configured with multiple hardware security modules, each corresponding to a different functional domain. When accessing data, each functional domain uses its corresponding hardware security module to complete key generation, storage, and encryption / decryption operations, thereby ensuring the security of keys across domains through physical isolation. However, since multiple hardware security modules perform the same function within the integrated circuit, this redundant configuration consumes a significant amount of integrated circuit area, increasing the design and manufacturing costs.
[0015] Based on the above-mentioned technical problems, the cryptographic management scheme based on multi-domain isolation proposed in this disclosure provides independent, hardware-isolated communication channels for each functional domain in the integrated circuit. The access control circuit performs domain authentication on each access request and transmits the legitimate request to the same hardware security circuit for decryption and cryptographic operations. This achieves independent security protection for multiple functional domains on the hardware security circuit, thereby ensuring strong isolation and security of key resources for each functional domain without increasing additional hardware costs.
[0016] Exemplary System Figure 1 This is a hardware system block diagram of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0017] The system framework provided in the embodiments of this disclosure is described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0018] like Figure 1 As shown, a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation can run on an integrated circuit, such as a System-on-a-Chip (SoC). The system includes multiple processors 110, multiple communication channels, an access control circuit 120, and a hardware security circuit 130. Each processor 110 corresponds to a communication channel, and each communication channel corresponds to a functional domain. Processors 110 in different functional domains carry their respective operating systems and application loads. Multiple functional domains establish communication connections with the access control circuit 120 through multiple communication channels.
[0019] In some examples, multiple functional domains may include ADAS functional domain, IVI functional domain, safety island functional domain, and instrument functional domain, etc. Each functional domain corresponds to a processor 110, which may be a central processing unit (CPU) or a microcontroller unit (MCU). For example, the processor 110 corresponding to the ADAS functional domain, IVI functional domain, and instrument functional domain is a CPU, while the processor 110 corresponding to the safety island functional domain is an MCU.
[0020] Each functional domain's processor 110 is connected to the access control circuit 120 via its own dedicated communication channel. The communication channel includes a dedicated Mailbox register for memory-mapped I / O (MMIO), a dedicated DMA (Direct Memory Access) channel, and a dedicated interrupt line. The communication channels of different functional domains are independent of each other. Their corresponding channel resources (such as MMIO address ranges, DMA channel numbers, and interrupt numbers) are pre-configured during system initialization by the binding strategy in the access filter list (AFL) of the access control circuit 120 and cannot be changed during normal system operation.
[0021] In some examples, access control circuitry 120 may include a firewall module and a System Memory Management Unit (SMMU). The firewall module protects the Mailbox registers and shared memory regions of each communication channel. Based on a pre-defined binding policy in the AFL, the firewall module performs address range verification on memory access requests initiated by processors 110 of each functional domain, allowing only processors 110 of that functional domain to access the memory address range and shared memory region of the corresponding communication channel, and rejecting unauthorized cross-domain access requests. The SMMU then isolates DMA channel access. Each DMA channel is configured to access only the shared memory region of its own functional domain. The SMMU has a built-in translation table that stores the correspondence between DMA channels and the memory of the functional domain. This translation table ensures that DMA channels cannot access the memory of other functional domains, thus guaranteeing physical isolation of communication channels between functional domains at the hardware level.
[0022] In some examples, the system includes a Hardware Security Module (HSM) 130, which is shared by the functional domains. Internally, the HSM 130 establishes independent processing channels and storage resources for each functional domain, including dedicated interrupt handling channels, dedicated bus identification channels, dedicated key storage partitions, and dedicated context processing logic.
[0023] For example, processor 110 in domain A (ADAS domain) communicates with the HSM via Channel_1. The resource configuration corresponding to Channel_1 is: Mailbox_1 address range 0x1000-0x10FF, shared memory_A address range 0x2000-0x2FFF, DMA channel 1, interrupt number 32. Processors 110 from other domains cannot access any resources of Channel_1. Processor 110 in domain B (IVI domain) communicates with the HSM via Channel_2. The resource configuration corresponding to Channel_2 is: Mailbox_2 address range 0x1100-0x11FF, shared memory_2 address range 0x3000-0x3FFF, DMA channel 2, interrupt number 33. Processors 110 from other domains cannot access any resources of Channel_2, thereby ensuring the independence and security of communication between each functional domain and the HSM.
[0024] In some examples, the hardware security circuit 130 includes an interrupt controller, which includes a domain resolver and a context builder. The domain resolver can identify the corresponding initiating functional domain based on the received interrupt signal, and the context builder is used to construct the correspondence between the communication channel corresponding to each functional domain and the key of each functional domain, so as to avoid the situation of keys being mixed between different functional domains.
[0025] In some examples, the interrupt controller communicates with the access controller to verify access requests based on the mapping between the communication channels and keys for each functional domain stored in the context builder. If verification passes, the access controller allows the hardware security circuitry to invoke the key for the corresponding functional domain to perform decryption; if verification fails, the access controller rejects the access request to invoke the key.
[0026] The hardware security circuit 130 includes multiple key storage partitions, each storing only the key for the corresponding functional domain, such as... Figure 1 As shown, key storage partition 1 is used to store keys for the ADAS domain, key storage partition 2 is used to store keys for the security island functional domain, key storage partition 3 is used to store keys for the IVI functional domain, and key storage partition 4 is used to store keys for the instrument functional domain.
[0027] The hardware security circuit 130 includes an electronic fuse for programming the root key of the hardware security circuit 130. The root key is the basic key of the hardware security circuit 130, and the domain root key, i.e., the decryption key, can be derived from it for each functional domain. The domain root key can be randomly generated based on random numbers to ensure the security of the domain root key.
[0028] The hardware security circuit 130 includes an encryption engine, which is used to encrypt the memory data that the functional domain can access using the key corresponding to the functional domain, thereby preventing other functional domains from illegally accessing the memory data corresponding to this functional domain and causing data leakage.
[0029] The communication process of the system provided in the embodiments of this disclosure is illustrated below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0030] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the access to memory data in a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure. For example... Figure 2 As shown, the system is configured to perform the following steps: S210: Obtain the memory access request sent by the hardware unit in the first functional domain through the first communication channel.
[0031] In this embodiment, the execution entity is the system's access control circuit, the hardware unit in the first functional domain is the processor corresponding to the first functional domain, the first functional domain can be any one of multiple functional domains, and the first communication channel is the communication channel corresponding to the first functional domain. The processor in any functional domain can send a memory access request through the corresponding communication channel. The memory access request is used to characterize the functional domain's cryptographic operation requirements for the hardware security circuit. Each functional domain generates a memory access request when it needs to perform cryptographic operations on the target memory data to be accessed.
[0032] Cryptographic operations include, but are not limited to, performing cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, signing, and signature verification on target memory data. A memory access request contains the target memory access address, which is the access address corresponding to the target memory data. The target memory access address is used to locate the memory region where the memory data for which the cryptographic operation needs to be performed is located.
[0033] In some examples, when the first functional domain generates a memory access request, it can write the memory access request to the Mailbox register corresponding to the first communication channel of the first functional domain, trigger the DMA channel to start, so as to facilitate the subsequent transfer of target memory data, and send an interrupt signal to the access control circuit through the interrupt line to notify the access control circuit that there is a memory access request sent by the first functional domain to be processed.
[0034] S220: Based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges, determine the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain.
[0035] In this embodiment, the execution entity is the system's access control circuit. Each functional domain corresponds to a memory address range. The memory address ranges corresponding to multiple functional domains are different from each other, wherein the target address range is the memory address range that the first functional domain is allowed to access.
[0036] In some examples, the system can pre-configure the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges through the AFL. After receiving a memory access request from the first functional domain, the access control circuit can identify that the request comes from the first functional domain in the integrated circuit. Then, based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges stored in the AFL, it determines the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain.
[0037] S230: In response to the target memory access address being within the target address range, the memory access request is transmitted to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel.
[0038] In this embodiment, the execution entity is the system's access control circuit. In some examples, the access control circuit can verify whether the target memory access address is within the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain through the firewall module. If the target memory access address is within the target address range, it indicates that the memory access request is legitimate, and the access control circuit transmits the memory access request to the hardware security circuit.
[0039] In some examples, if the target memory access address is not within the target address range, it means that the memory access request generated by the first functional domain is attempting to access a memory region that does not correspond to this functional domain. The access control circuit will reject the memory access request and return access exception information to the first functional domain to prevent unauthorized cross-domain access from occurring.
[0040] S240: In response to a memory access request, a decryption operation is performed to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0041] In this embodiment, the execution entity is the system's hardware security circuit. Upon receiving a memory access request, the hardware security circuit performs a decryption operation in response to the memory access request. It locates the encrypted data based on the target memory access address and decrypts the encrypted data stored at the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit using the decryption key of the first functional domain.
[0042] In some examples, the hardware security circuit may include a key management unit. The key management unit manages and invokes key partitions corresponding to each functional domain. Each key partition corresponds to a decryption key for each functional domain. Thus, after the hardware security circuit receives a memory access request, it determines the target key based on the source functional domain of the memory access request and performs a decryption operation on the encrypted data to be accessed by the memory access request.
[0043] For example, after the hardware security circuit receives a memory access request sent by the ADAS domain, since the memory access request has been verified as a legitimate access by the access control module, the hardware security circuit can perform source analysis on the memory access request to determine that the source functional domain of the memory access request is the ADAS domain. Then, the hardware security circuit uses the key management unit to call the decryption key of the ADAS domain from the key partition corresponding to the ADAS domain to perform a decryption operation on the target memory access address and obtain the decrypted target memory data.
[0044] To ensure isolation between functional domains, each functional domain uses a unique decryption key. This prevents the leakage of a key in one functional domain from affecting key access in other functional domains, achieving multi-domain isolation at the key level and further enhancing the security of key storage and cryptographic operations. Each functional domain uses its own independent decryption key, preventing key mixing. Even if a security risk occurs in a single functional domain, it will not spread to other functional domains, ensuring the isolated security of multi-domain cryptographic management throughout the system.
[0045] In some examples, the security of decryption keys for different functional domains can be determined based on the security requirements of each functional domain. For example, for sensitive functional domains with higher security requirements, hardware encryption storage can be used to store their decryption keys, while additional security protection mechanisms such as key fragmentation storage and two-way verification can be added. For ordinary functional domains with lower security requirements, a lightweight encryption storage method can be used to balance security and operating efficiency.
[0046] After decrypting the encrypted data, the hardware security circuit writes the target memory data back to the shared memory area of the first functional domain through the first communication channel, and sends a notification signal indicating that decryption is complete to the first functional domain through the interrupt line.
[0047] In response to the notification signal, the first functional domain reads the decrypted target memory data from the shared memory area into the local cache through the first communication channel, thereby completing the access to the target memory data and satisfying the cryptographic operation requirements of the first functional domain when accessing the target memory data.
[0048] The system provided in this disclosure verifies the functional domain origin of the target access address by the access control circuit, ensuring that only legitimate access requests from the correct functional domain can be transmitted to the hardware security circuit for decryption. This achieves strong isolation access control for multiple functional domains on a single hardware security circuit, avoids the security risks of cross-domain key access, and improves the overall security of the system.
[0049] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating step S240 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0050] See Figure 3 In the above Figure 2 Based on the illustrated embodiment, the hardware security circuit execution step S240 may include the following steps: S241: In response to a memory access request, generate the first interrupt signal.
[0051] The hardware security circuit includes an interrupt controller. Upon receiving a memory access request, the interrupt controller parses the request and generates a first interrupt signal. This first interrupt signal indicates that the hardware security circuit has recognized the memory access request and needs to perform a cryptographic operation. The corresponding functional domain needs to send an interrupt request to the corresponding key management unit so that the key management unit can prepare to process the memory access request. Different priority access requests correspond to different priority interrupt signals. Critical operation requests initiated by high-security functional domains are assigned higher-priority interrupts, ensuring that sensitive cryptographic operations are processed promptly and preventing high-priority operations from being blocked.
[0052] The first interrupt signal includes a first interrupt number, which is used to identify the functional domain from which the interrupt request originates, wherein different functional domains are assigned different interrupt numbers.
[0053] S242: Based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple interrupt numbers, determine the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number.
[0054] In some examples, the hardware security circuit pre-stores a mapping table between functional domains and interrupt numbers, representing the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple interrupt numbers. By querying this mapping table, the hardware security circuit determines the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple interrupt numbers, thereby completing the identification of the functional domain from which the access request originates.
[0055] For example, the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple interrupt numbers could be that the interrupt number corresponding to the ADAS functional domain is 32, the interrupt number corresponding to the IVI functional domain is 33, and the interrupt number corresponding to the safety island functional domain is 34. When the hardware safety circuit receives a memory access request, if it parses the memory access request and obtains the first interrupt number as 32, it can determine that the source functional domain of the memory access request is the ADAS functional domain; if it parses the memory access request and obtains the first interrupt number as 33, it can determine that the source functional domain of the memory access request is the IVI functional domain, and so on.
[0056] S243: In response to the fact that the first functional field is the same as the functional field corresponding to the first interrupt number, the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address is decrypted into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0057] In some examples, the hardware security circuit can verify whether the functional domain from which the interrupt number originates is consistent with the functional domain that sends the memory access request by comparing the first functional domain with the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number. When the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, it indicates that the interrupt source of the memory access request and the functional domain that sends the memory access request both point to the same functional domain, and the request source is consistent. This allows the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address to be decrypted into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0058] In other examples, if the first functional domain is different from the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, it means that the interrupt source of the memory access request is inconsistent with the functional domain that sent the memory access request, which poses a risk of forgery or cross-domain access. The hardware security circuit will reject the request and trigger a security alarm mechanism to prevent identity spoofing attacks and improve the security of data access.
[0059] The system provided in this disclosure improves access security in scenarios where multiple functional domains share hardware security circuits by verifying and comparing the first functional domain and the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, and only decrypting the encrypted data of the target memory access address when the two are consistent.
[0060] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating step S243 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0061] See Figure 4 In the above Figure 3 Based on the illustrated embodiment, the hardware security circuit execution step S243 may include the following steps: S2431: In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, combine the first interrupt number and the first channel identifier of the first communication channel to generate the second channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel.
[0062] In some examples, the hardware security circuitry uses multiple channel identifiers. These channel identifiers can be unique identifiers assigned by the integrated circuit's bus interface unit to each communication channel corresponding to a functional domain. Examples include Master IDs, strings, icons, or other forms of identification. Different functional domains correspond to different channel identifiers for their communication channels.
[0063] After the access control circuit verifies the validity of the memory access request, it sends the memory access request to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel. The hardware security circuit then receives the memory access request through the first communication channel to perform decryption.
[0064] In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, the hardware security circuit can combine the first interrupt number and the first channel identifier of the first communication channel as a whole identifier to characterize that the source functional domain of the memory access request and the first interrupt number generated when the hardware security circuit receives the memory access request originate from the same functional domain, thereby obtaining the second channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel.
[0065] S2432: Based on the second channel identifier, call the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0066] In some examples, after obtaining the second channel identifier by combination, the hardware security circuit uses the second channel identifier to locate the key partition corresponding to the first functional domain, calls the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain, and decrypts the encrypted data pointed to by the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit through the first communication channel using the first derived key.
[0067] The system provided in this disclosure combines a first interrupt number and a first channel identifier to obtain a second channel identifier, and uses the second channel identifier to locate a first derived key, thereby improving the confidentiality of key acquisition, preventing identity spoofing and unauthorized cross-domain access, and enhancing access security in multi-functional domain shared hardware security circuit scenarios.
[0068] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating step S2432 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, provided as an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0069] See Figure 5 In the above Figure 4 Based on the illustrated embodiment, the hardware security circuit executing step S2432 may include the following steps: S24321: Based on the key index of the first derived key, determine the channel identifier bound to the first derived key from the pre-stored key context.
[0070] In some examples, the key context is used to characterize the binding relationship between multiple derived keys and multiple channel identifiers, including the unique identifier of the derived key, the binding information between the derived key and the communication channel (such as hash identifier), random number, and timestamp data.
[0071] The memory access request also includes the key index of the first derived key. After receiving the memory access request, the hardware security circuit will parse the key index of the first derived key in the memory access request, which indicates that the memory access request needs to perform a decryption operation on the target memory data using the first derived key.
[0072] In order to perform verification on the key index of the first derived key, the hardware security circuit queries the channel identifier bound to the first derived key in the key context using the key index of the first derived key, thereby determining whether the channel identifier is the second channel identifier corresponding to the first functional domain.
[0073] S24322: In response to the fact that the second channel identifier and the channel identifier bound to the first derived key are the same, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional field is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0074] In some examples, the hardware security circuit can compare the second channel identifier with the channel identifier bound to the first derived key. If they are the same, it means that the first derived key specified in the memory access request matches the key bound to the second channel identifier, i.e., the verification is successful. The hardware security circuit can determine the target key area corresponding to the first functional domain in its own memory, and call the first derived key from the target key area to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0075] In another example, if the two differ, it indicates that the first derived key specified in the memory access request is inconsistent with the key bound to the second channel identifier. This suggests a potential security risk of key impersonation or misuse, resulting in verification failure. Hardware security circuitry can interrupt subsequent key acquisition processes, record security logs, and trigger corresponding security protection responses to prevent data leakage caused by unauthorized key access.
[0076] The system provided in this disclosure example ensures that the memory access request generated by the first functional domain can only carry the correct derived key and be sent to the hardware security circuit through the correct channel by comparing and verifying the second channel identifier with the channel identifier bound to the first derived key. This avoids the risk of illegal key access across channels and improves the security of the decryption operation process.
[0077] Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating the creation of a key in a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, provided by an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0078] See Figure 6 Before invoking the first derived key, the system provided in this disclosure also needs to create a key corresponding to each functional domain. Based on this, the multi-domain isolated data processing system provided in this disclosure is further configured to perform the following steps, including: S610: Based on the correspondence between the channel identifiers of multiple communication channels and multiple functional domains, a derivation algorithm is used to perform derivation processing on the root key corresponding to the hardware security circuit to obtain the domain root key corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains.
[0079] In some examples, the root key (Hardware Unique Key, HUK) corresponding to the hardware security circuit is a hardware-level unique key pre-programmed into the eFuse inside the integrated circuit, serving as the root of trust for the entire key hierarchy. The eFuse (electronic fuse) is a one-time programmable (OTP) non-volatile storage unit inside the integrated circuit, located in the hardware security circuit, and can permanently store the root key identifier corresponding to the root key after the root key is programmed.
[0080] In some examples, the hardware security circuit can generate a domain root key (Domain Hardware Unique Key, Domain HUK) for each functional domain based on the correspondence between channel identifiers of multiple communication channels and multiple functional domains. This key is used to perform the corresponding decryption operation. Specifically, the hardware security circuit can call the root key and use a derivation algorithm to perform derivation processing on the root key to obtain multiple domain root keys, each corresponding to a functional domain. Furthermore, the domain root keys can also perform other cryptographic operations, such as encryption, signing, and signature verification.
[0081] It should be noted that the root keys derived from each domain by the hardware security circuit are independent of each other at the hardware level. Even if the key of one functional domain is leaked, it will not affect the security of the keys of other functional domains, thus further strengthening the cryptographic security protection capability under multi-domain isolation.
[0082] S620: Establish the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers.
[0083] In some examples, after the domain root key is obtained by performing the derivation process, the hardware security circuit writes the generated domain root key into a pre-divided key storage partition that is accessible only to the corresponding functional domain. At the same time, it generates a unique identifier for the domain root key and binds the domain root key to the channel identifier corresponding to the corresponding functional domain, thereby establishing a binding relationship between the derivation keys corresponding to multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers.
[0084] S630: Store the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers in the key context.
[0085] After establishing the binding relationships between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers, the hardware security circuit can store the binding relationships in the key context. When a subsequent functional domain initiates a memory access request, the hardware security circuit can directly obtain the binding relationship from the key context and complete the key verification based on the binding relationship, without having to repeatedly derive the key. This ensures key security and improves the efficiency of subsequent access to the target memory data.
[0086] The system provided in this disclosure derives independent derived keys for each functional domain from a root key and binds and stores the derived keys with channel identifiers. This establishes multi-domain isolation security protection from the key generation stage. Combined with key identifier verification during subsequent access processes, it further enhances the security of password management in multi-domain scenarios and avoids the risk of key confusion or cross-domain access between different functional domains.
[0087] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of step S620 of a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0088] See Figure 7 The system provided in this disclosure performs step S620, which includes the following steps: S621: Encrypt multiple channel identifiers using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain multiple hash identifiers.
[0089] In some examples, when a memory access request indicates that a key creation operation is required, the hardware security circuitry performs a hash operation on multiple channel identifiers (including unique channel information such as interrupt number, bus identifier, and channel address) to obtain multiple hash identifiers.
[0090] In some examples, hash processing can employ a preset hash encryption algorithm, such as the Chinese national cryptographic algorithm SM3, SHA-256, or other algorithms with hash encryption capabilities, to ensure a strong binding between the hash identifier and the target channel identifier, and to prevent the channel identifier information corresponding to the target channel identifier from being deduced from the hash identifier, thereby improving the security of the hash identifier.
[0091] S622: Bind the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains to multiple hash identifiers to obtain the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers.
[0092] In some examples, the hardware security circuitry creates derived keys and corresponding key identifiers in key storage partitions corresponding to multiple functional domains based on hash identifiers, constructing a complete key context. The key context includes hash identifiers, random numbers, and timestamps corresponding to multiple channel identifiers.
[0093] The hardware security circuit can bind the derived keys corresponding to multiple functional domains to multiple hash identifiers according to the key context, thereby obtaining the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers. Each subsequent operation on the key must verify the binding relationship between the derived keys and channel identifiers in the key context. Only memory access requests from the correct communication channel can instruct the hardware security circuit to call and execute the corresponding cryptographic operation, such as encryption or decryption, through the corresponding derived key, thereby realizing a strong binding security mechanism between the key and the communication channel.
[0094] The complete target key creation process is described in detail below with an exemplary embodiment.
[0095] The first functional domain sends a memory access request to the access control circuit, wherein the memory access request indicates a key creation operation. After verifying the validity of the request, the access control circuit forwards the request to the hardware security circuit. The hardware security circuit generates a first interrupt signal, identifies the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, and verifies that the first functional domain is consistent with the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number. If they are consistent, the hardware security circuit performs hash processing on the target channel identifier to generate a hash identifier, and creates a target key, a target key identifier, and a key context based on the hash identifier. Then, the target key is stored in the key storage partition corresponding to the first functional domain, and the key creation is completed.
[0096] The system provided in this disclosure generates a bound hash identifier by hashing multiple channel identifiers, and binds a derived key based on the hash identifier, thereby improving the security of binding the derived key with the channel identifier and reducing the risk of channel identifier information leakage. At the same time, the system achieves complete storage and subsequent verification of the key binding relationship through the key context, thereby improving the security of key storage in multi-domain scenarios.
[0097] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the process after decryption in a data processing system based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0098] See Figure 8 After the system executes step S240, the following steps may also be included: S810: In response to the completion of the decryption operation, a second interrupt signal is generated.
[0099] In this embodiment, the execution entity is a hardware security circuit. Upon completion of the decryption operation, the hardware security circuit generates a second interrupt signal, which includes a second interrupt number. The second interrupt number identifies the first functional domain that initiated this memory access request.
[0100] S820: Sends the second interrupt number to the first functional domain through the first communication channel, so that the first functional domain can confirm that the decryption operation has been completed based on the second interrupt number and perform access to the decrypted target memory data.
[0101] In this embodiment, after the hardware security circuit generates the second interrupt number, it can send the second interrupt number to the first functional domain through the communication channel corresponding to the first functional domain, i.e., the first communication channel. After receiving the second interrupt number, the hardware unit in the first functional domain can confirm that the decryption operation has been completed based on the second interrupt number, access the decrypted target memory data, and return the target memory data to the requesting process corresponding to the first functional domain, thus completing the access process.
[0102] In some examples, the hardware security circuit automatically clears the temporary context information generated during the operation, including temporarily cached channel identifiers, key plaintexts and other sensitive data, at the same time as sending the second interrupt signal or after the completion notification, to prevent these sensitive data from being left behind and thus being obtained by other functional domains, thereby improving the security of the cryptographic operation process.
[0103] The system provided in this embodiment generates a second interrupt signal for the first functional domain through a hardware security circuit. This allows the first functional domain to directly confirm the completion of the decryption operation based on the second interrupt number, achieving accurate notification of decryption results between different functional domains and avoiding information confusion across functional domains. Simultaneously, the first functional domain can also access the decrypted target memory data promptly through the second interrupt number, improving the efficiency and timeliness of data access.
[0104] Exemplary methods Figure 9 This is a flowchart illustrating a data processing method based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure. This embodiment can be applied to electronic devices, such as... Figure 9 As shown, the method includes the following steps: S910: The electronic device obtains a memory access request sent by a hardware unit in the first functional domain through the first communication channel.
[0105] The memory access request includes the target memory access address, the first functional domain is any functional domain among multiple functional domains, and the first communication channel is the communication channel corresponding to the first functional domain.
[0106] S920: The electronic device determines the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple memory address ranges.
[0107] S930: In response to the target memory access address being within the target address range, the electronic device transmits the memory access request to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel.
[0108] S940: In response to a memory access request, the electronic device performs a decryption operation to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0109] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S910-S940 provided in this embodiment can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S210-S240 provided in the above exemplary system model, and will not be repeated here.
[0110] In some examples, step S940 may include the following steps: S941: In response to a memory access request, generates the first interrupt signal.
[0111] The first interrupt signal includes the first interrupt number.
[0112] S942: Based on the correspondence between multiple functional domains and multiple interrupt numbers, determine the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number.
[0113] Among them, the interrupt numbers corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains are different.
[0114] S943: In response to the fact that the first functional field is the same as the functional field corresponding to the first interrupt number, the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address is decrypted into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0115] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S941-S943 of the above exemplary embodiments of this disclosure can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S241-S243 of the above exemplary system embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0116] In some examples, step S943 may include the following steps: S9431: In response to the fact that the first functional field is the same as the functional field corresponding to the first interrupt number, the first interrupt number and the first channel identifier of the first communication channel are combined to generate the second channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel.
[0117] The first channel identifier is the pre-assigned channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel.
[0118] S9432: Based on the second channel identifier, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0119] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S9431-S9432 of the present invention can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S2431-S2432 of the above exemplary system description, which will not be repeated here.
[0120] In some examples, step S9432 may include the following steps: S94321: Based on the key index of the first derived key carried in the memory access request, determine the channel identifier bound to the first derived key from the pre-stored key context.
[0121] The key context is used to characterize the binding relationship between multiple derived keys and multiple channel identifiers.
[0122] S94322: In response to the fact that the second channel identifier and the channel identifier bound to the first derived key are the same, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional field is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
[0123] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S94321-S94322 of the present invention can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S24321-S24322 of the above exemplary system description, which will not be repeated here.
[0124] In some examples, step S94321 may include: S1010: Based on the correspondence between the channel identifiers of multiple communication channels and multiple functional domains, a derivation algorithm is used to perform derivation processing on the root key corresponding to the hardware security circuit to obtain the domain root key corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains.
[0125] Among them, multiple domain root keys are bound to multiple channel identifiers.
[0126] S1020: Establish the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers.
[0127] S1030: Store the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers in the key context.
[0128] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects of steps S1010-S1030 provided in the above exemplary embodiments of this disclosure can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects of steps S610-S630 in the above exemplary system embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0129] In other examples, step S1020 may include: S1021: Encrypt multiple channel identifiers using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain multiple hash identifiers.
[0130] S1022: Bind the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains to multiple hash identifiers to obtain the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and multiple channel identifiers.
[0131] The implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S1021-S1022 of the above exemplary embodiments of this disclosure can be found in the implementation methods and beneficial technical effects corresponding to steps S621-S622 of the above exemplary system embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0132] The beneficial technical effects corresponding to the exemplary embodiments of this method can be found in the corresponding beneficial technical effects of the exemplary system section above, and will not be repeated here.
[0133] Exemplary device Figure 10 This is a structural diagram of a data processing apparatus based on multi-domain isolation provided in an exemplary embodiment of this disclosure.
[0134] See Figure 10 The device 1000 includes at least one target processor 1010, an access control circuit 1020, and a hardware security circuit 1030. The target processor 1010 sends a memory access request to the access control circuit via a corresponding communication channel to access target memory data. Corresponding to the example shown in the system embodiment, the target processor 1010 can be a hardware unit in a first functional domain, i.e., a processor in the first functional domain. The target processor 1010 can be any of multiple processors, and the memory access request includes a target access address corresponding to the target memory data. The access control circuit 1020 determines a target address range based on the functional domain corresponding to the target processor 1010, and transmits the memory access request to the hardware security circuit in response to the target access address being within the target address range. The target address range is the range of memory addresses allowed to be accessed by the functional domain corresponding to the target processor 1010, and the address ranges corresponding to the multiple functional domains are different. The hardware security circuit 1030 performs a decryption operation on the target memory data based on the memory access request and the target access address. The target processor 1010 is also used to complete the decryption operation of the target memory data in response to the hardware security circuit 1030, and access the decrypted target memory data through the communication channel corresponding to the target processor 1010.
[0135] The beneficial technical effects corresponding to the exemplary embodiments of this device can be found in the corresponding beneficial technical effects of the exemplary methods and exemplary systems described above, and will not be repeated here.
[0136] Exemplary electronic devices Figure 11 This is a structural diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present disclosure.
[0137] like Figure 11 As shown, the electronic device 1100 includes at least one processor 1110 and a memory 1120.
[0138] The processor 1110 may be a central processing unit (CPU) or other form of processing unit with data processing capabilities and / or instruction execution capabilities, and may control other components in the electronic device 1100 to perform desired functions.
[0139] The memory 1120 may include one or more computer program products, which may include various forms of computer-readable storage media, such as volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. Volatile memory may include, for example, random access memory (RAM) and / or cache memory. Non-volatile memory may include, for example, read-only memory (ROM), hard disk, flash memory, etc. One or more computer program instructions may be stored on the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor 1110 may execute one or more computer program instructions to implement the multi-domain isolation-based data processing methods and / or other desired functions of the various embodiments of this disclosure described above.
[0140] In one example, the electronic device 1100 may also include an input device 1130 and an output device 1140, which are interconnected via a bus system and / or other forms of connection mechanism (not shown).
[0141] The input device 1130 may also include, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, etc.
[0142] The output device 1140 can output various information to the outside, including, for example, a display, a speaker, a printer, and a communication network and its connected remote output devices.
[0143] Of course, for the sake of simplicity, Figure 11 Only some of the components of the electronic device 1100 relevant to this disclosure are shown, omitting components such as buses, input / output interfaces, etc. In addition, the electronic device 1100 may include any other suitable components depending on the specific application.
[0144] Exemplary computer program products and computer-readable storage media In addition to the methods and apparatus described above, embodiments of this disclosure may also provide a computer program product, including computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the multi-domain isolation-based data processing methods of various embodiments of this disclosure described in the "Exemplary Methods" section above.
[0145] Computer program products can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages to perform the operations of embodiments of this disclosure. These programming languages include object-oriented programming languages such as Java and C++, as well as conventional procedural programming languages such as C or similar languages. The program code can be executed entirely on a user's computing device, partially on a user's computing device, as a standalone software package, partially on a user's computing device and partially on a remote computing device, or entirely on a remote computing device or server.
[0146] Furthermore, embodiments of this disclosure may also be computer-readable storage media storing computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the steps of the multi-domain isolation-based data processing methods of the various embodiments of this disclosure described in the "Exemplary Methods" section above.
[0147] Computer-readable storage media may take the form of any combination of one or more readable media. A readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. A readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, systems, apparatuses, or devices that are electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of readable storage media (a non-exhaustive list) include: electrical connections having one or more wires, portable disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fibers, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage devices, magnetic storage devices, or any suitable combination thereof.
[0148] The basic principles of this disclosure have been described above with reference to specific embodiments. However, the advantages, benefits, and effects mentioned in this disclosure are merely examples and not limitations, and should not be considered as essential features of each embodiment of this disclosure. Furthermore, the specific details disclosed above are for illustrative and facilitative purposes only, and are not limitations. These details do not limit the scope of this disclosure to the necessity of employing the aforementioned specific details for implementation.
[0149] Various modifications and variations can be made to this disclosure without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Therefore, if such modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this disclosure and their equivalents, this disclosure is also intended to include such modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A data processing system based on multi-domain isolation, comprising: Multiple communication channels, access control circuits, and hardware security circuits, wherein the multiple communication channels correspond to multiple functional domains; The access control circuit is used to obtain a memory access request sent by a hardware unit in the first functional domain through a first communication channel, wherein the memory access request includes a target memory access address, the first functional domain is any functional domain among the plurality of functional domains, and the first communication channel is the communication channel among the plurality of communication channels corresponding to the first functional domain. The access control circuit is further configured to determine the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain based on the correspondence between the multiple functional domains and the multiple memory address ranges. The access control circuit is further configured to transmit the memory access request to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel in response to the target memory access address being within the target address range; The hardware security circuit is used to perform a decryption operation in response to the memory access request, decrypting the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
2. The system according to claim 1, wherein, The hardware security circuit is used for: In response to the memory access request, a first interrupt signal is generated, wherein the first interrupt signal includes a first interrupt number; Based on the correspondence between the multiple functional domains and the multiple interrupt numbers, the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number is determined, wherein the multiple functional domains each correspond to a different interrupt number; In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address is decrypted into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
3. The system according to claim 2, wherein, The hardware security circuit is used for: In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, the first interrupt number and the first channel identifier of the first communication channel are combined to generate the second channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel. The first channel identifier is a pre-allocated channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel. Based on the second channel identifier, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
4. The system according to claim 3, wherein, The memory access request also includes a key index of the first derived key, and the hardware security circuit is used for: Based on the key index of the first derived key, the channel identifier bound to the first derived key is determined from the pre-stored key context, wherein the key context is used to characterize the binding relationship between multiple derived keys and multiple channel identifiers; In response to the fact that the second channel identifier and the channel identifier bound to the first derived key are the same, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
5. The system according to claim 4, wherein, The hardware security circuit is also used for: Based on the correspondence between the channel identifiers of the multiple communication channels and the multiple functional domains, a derivation algorithm is used to perform derivation processing on the root key corresponding to the hardware security circuit to obtain the domain root key corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains; wherein, the multiple domain root keys and the multiple channel identifiers are bound together. Establish the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers; The binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers is stored in the key context.
6. The system according to claim 5, wherein, The hardware security circuit is used for: The multiple channel identifiers are encrypted using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain multiple hash identifiers; The derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains are bound to the multiple hash identifiers to obtain the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers.
7. The system according to claim 1, wherein, The hardware security circuit is also used for: In response to the completion of the decryption operation, a second interrupt signal is generated. The second interrupt signal includes a second interrupt number, which is used to identify the first functional domain that initiated this memory access request. The second interrupt number is sent to the first functional domain through the first communication channel, so that the first functional domain can confirm that the decryption operation has been completed based on the second interrupt number and perform access to the decrypted target memory data.
8. A data processing method based on multi-domain isolation, comprising: Obtain a memory access request sent by a hardware unit in a first functional domain through a first communication channel, wherein the memory access request includes a target memory access address, the first functional domain is any functional domain among the plurality of functional domains, the first communication channel is a communication channel among the plurality of communication channels corresponding to the first functional domain, and the plurality of communication channels correspond to the plurality of functional domains; Based on the correspondence between the multiple functional domains and the multiple memory address ranges, the target address range corresponding to the first functional domain is determined; In response to the target memory access address being within the target address range, the memory access request is transmitted to the hardware security circuit through the first communication channel; In response to the memory access request, a decryption operation is performed to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
9. The method according to claim 8, wherein, The step of performing a decryption operation in response to the memory access request, decrypting the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit, includes: In response to the memory access request, a first interrupt signal is generated, wherein the first interrupt signal includes a first interrupt number; Based on the correspondence between the multiple functional domains and the multiple interrupt numbers, the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number is determined, wherein the multiple functional domains each correspond to a different interrupt number; In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address is decrypted into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
10. The method according to claim 9, wherein, The step of decrypting the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data accessible by the hardware unit in response to the first functional domain being the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number includes: In response to the fact that the first functional domain is the same as the functional domain corresponding to the first interrupt number, the first interrupt number and the first channel identifier of the first communication channel are combined to generate the second channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel. The first channel identifier is a pre-allocated channel identifier corresponding to the first communication channel. Based on the second channel identifier, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
11. The method according to claim 10, wherein, The step of decrypting the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data accessible by the hardware unit by calling the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain based on the second channel identifier includes: Based on the key index of the first derived key carried in the memory access request, the channel identifier bound to the first derived key is determined from the pre-stored key context, wherein the key context is used to characterize the binding relationship between multiple derived keys and multiple channel identifiers; In response to the fact that the second channel identifier and the channel identifier bound to the first derived key are the same, the first derived key corresponding to the first functional domain is invoked to decrypt the encrypted data stored in the target memory access address into target memory data that can be accessed by the hardware unit.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein, Before determining the channel identifier bound to the first derived key from the pre-stored key context based on the key index of the first derived key carried in the memory access request, the method further includes: Based on the correspondence between the channel identifiers of the multiple communication channels and the multiple functional domains, a derivation algorithm is used to perform derivation processing on the root key corresponding to the hardware security circuit to obtain the domain root key corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains; wherein, the multiple domain root keys and the multiple channel identifiers are bound together. Establish the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers; The binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers is stored in the key context.
13. The method according to claim 12, wherein, The process of establishing the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers includes: The multiple channel identifiers are encrypted using a preset encryption algorithm to obtain multiple hash identifiers; The derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains are bound to the multiple hash identifiers to obtain the binding relationship between the derived keys corresponding to each of the multiple functional domains and the multiple channel identifiers.
14. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program for performing the data processing method based on multi-domain isolation as described in any one of claims 8-13.
15. An electronic device, the electronic device comprising: processor; Memory used to store the processor's executable instructions; The processor is configured to read the executable instructions from the memory and execute the instructions to implement the data processing method based on multi-domain isolation as described in any one of claims 8-13.
