Hardware Trust Root IoT Full Lifecycle Quantum Security Management System and Method
By combining physical non-cloning capabilities, quantum random number generation, and post-quantum cryptography, blockchain enables trusted management of IoT devices throughout their entire lifecycle, solving the problems of device keys being copied by software and cross-domain identity recognition, and providing full lifecycle security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611295165.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-08-25
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
In existing technologies, the hardware root of trust for IoT devices fails to integrate physical non-cloning functionality with post-quantum cryptography. Device keys can be copied by software, lifecycle management is incomplete, and cross-domain identity mutual recognition lacks a decentralized trust infrastructure.
The IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system, which adopts hardware root of trust, combines physical non-cloning function, quantum random number generation and post-quantum cryptography, and realizes trusted management of the entire lifecycle through blockchain, including secure operation in the manufacturing, deployment, operation and maintenance and disposal stages.
It enables autonomous generation of device keys and prevents software copying, provides security management covering the entire lifecycle, solves the decentralization problem of cross-domain identity mutual recognition, and provides hardware-level adaptive security protection.
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Figure CN123122809A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the field of Internet of Things (IoT) security technology, and in particular to a quantum security management system, method, device, and storage medium for the entire lifecycle of IoT devices based on physical non-cloning functionality, quantum random numbers, and post-quantum cryptography. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of IoT technology, massive numbers of IoT devices are being widely used in smart cities, industrial internet, intelligent transportation, and other fields. The security, reliability, and full lifecycle management capabilities of these devices have become key factors restricting the large-scale deployment of IoT. IoT devices are typically deployed in unattended or physically accessible open environments. Throughout their entire lifecycle, from chip manufacturing and shipping to field deployment, long-term maintenance, and eventual disposal, they face various security threats such as device cloning, identity forgery, firmware tampering, key leakage, and quantum computing attacks. How to establish and maintain trusted anchors at each stage of the device's lifecycle to ensure the authenticity of the device's identity, the security of its keys, and the traceability of its status is a core issue that urgently needs to be addressed in the field of IoT security.
[0003] According to the applicant, researchers have explored combining technologies such as quantum-resistant cryptography, physical non-cloning capabilities, and quantum random numbers with IoT security from different technical perspectives, but the existing solutions known to the applicant each have their limitations.
[0004] Regarding device lifecycle management, one proposed solution combines quantum key distribution with blockchain. This involves negotiating and generating a shared quantum key to encrypt and transmit digital resources, recording the ciphertext and metadata on the blockchain, and using machine learning to analyze historical access behavior to dynamically adjust resource allocation strategies. However, this solution manages digital resources such as documents, images, and audio / video. Its "lifecycle" refers to the process from encryption, transmission, decryption to access optimization, not the entire process of the physical hardware of the IoT device from chip manufacturing to physical obsolescence. Digital resources and physical devices have fundamentally different security requirements: digital resources focus on transmission confidentiality and access control, while physical devices also need to address hardware-level security operations such as identity injection during chip manufacturing, ownership transfer during deployment, firmware security upgrades and behavior measurement during maintenance, and secure erasure during obsolescence.
[0005] Regarding quantum-resistant identity authentication, one known scheme utilizes a lattice-based chameleon hash function and a short integer problem to construct a two-way authentication protocol. This protocol supports device tracking and revocation through blockchain-based notarization, achieving quantum-resistant anonymity authentication for IoT devices in mobile scenarios. While this scheme offers high cryptographic security, its scope primarily focuses on the device registration, authentication, tracking, and revocation stages. It fails to address how to inseparably bind the device's identity to the chip's physical characteristics during manufacturing, the secure transfer of ownership during deployment, the continuous behavioral measurement and dynamic authorization during operation and maintenance, or the secure erasure during disposal. In other words, this scheme solves the problem of how devices are authenticated during use, but it doesn't address how devices are given a trusted identity during manufacturing or how they are securely erased upon disposal.
[0006] Regarding hardware trust roots, one known solution proposes fusing a static pre-built quantum entropy source with a dynamic real-time quantum entropy source into a single secure chip. This achieves hardware-level binding of device identity and session keys through the collaborative work of the two entropy sources, supporting both basic service and fused binding operation modes. This effectively solves the problem of key duplication caused by the separation of device identity and keys. However, while this solution achieves innovative fusion of quantum entropy sources at the chip level, it does not deeply integrate quantum entropy sources with post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Its key distribution and authentication processes still rely on traditional encryption methods, posing security vulnerabilities under quantum computing attacks. Furthermore, it does not utilize blockchain as the infrastructure for synchronizing device state throughout its entire lifecycle and enabling cross-domain mutual recognition. Another commercial solution integrates physical non-cloning functionality with a quantum random number generator into the same secure chip to generate device keys, but it also fails to address device lifecycle state management, ownership transfer, and cross-domain identity mutual recognition.
[0007] Regarding the technical integration at the signature level, one known scheme proposes combining the shared key generated through quantum key distribution negotiation with the derived key seed generated by a physically non-cloning function, and introducing location and timing information as additional input to generate a dynamic root key and derive classical signature key pairs and post-quantum signature key pairs. Then, based on a hierarchical security strategy, a pure classical signature, a hybrid signature, or a pure post-quantum signature is selected. This type of scheme addresses the digital signature problem of messages, but its quantum root key relies on offline pre-configuration via a quantum key distribution channel or trusted initialization. The device cannot autonomously generate quantum entropy key materials based on its on-chip resources. Furthermore, it does not extend this integration to other critical stages throughout the device's lifecycle, nor does it address the unified policy management of blockchain-based evidence storage and cryptographic service platforms.
[0008] In summary, the applicant's existing technologies have shortcomings on three levels. First, at the hardware root of trust level: the physical unclonable function is decoupled from post-quantum cryptography; device keys can still be copied by software even without a physical chip, and existing entropy source solutions or reliance on offline distributed quantum keys prevent devices from autonomously bootstrapping. Second, at the lifecycle coverage level: existing solutions only focus on network access authentication or operational authentication, leaving security gaps in identity injection during manufacturing and secure cleanup during disposal. Third, at the cross-domain trust level: existing solutions rely on centralized certificate authorities, creating trust silos and single points of failure risks in multi-vendor, multi-carrier environments.
[0009] Therefore, a systematic and trustworthy management solution is needed, which takes the physical hardware state machine of IoT devices as the main line, integrates physical non-cloning function, quantum random number generation and post-quantum cryptography into a unified hardware trust root foundation, and uses blockchain as a decentralized identity management infrastructure to cover all aspects of identity injection in the manufacturing stage, ownership transfer in the deployment stage, behavior measurement and dynamic key update in the operation and maintenance stage, and secure erasure in the scrapping stage. Summary of the Invention
[0010] The purpose of this invention is to provide a hardware root of trust IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system and method to solve the following problems in the prior art: physical non-cloning function, quantum random number generation and post-quantum cryptography technology have not been integrated into a unified hardware root of trust foundation, and device keys can be copied by software; device identity authentication and key management do not cover all stages of the entire lifecycle from manufacturing, deployment, operation and maintenance to disposal; and there is a lack of decentralized trust infrastructure for cross-domain identity mutual recognition and security status synchronization of devices.
[0011] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a hardware root of trust IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system, comprising: The Internet of Things (IoT) device, as a system terminal node, is configured with at least a physically unclonable functional unit, a quantum random number generator unit, and a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit; A cryptographic service platform, which communicates with the IoT device, is used to provide cryptographic policy configuration, key management and authentication services at different lifecycle stages of the IoT device. A blockchain node, communicating with the cryptographic service platform, is used to issue and manage device identity certificates for the IoT devices, and to store identity credentials and status information generated by the IoT devices at each stage of their lifecycle. The lifecycle phases include the manufacturing phase, deployment phase, operation and maintenance phase, and obsolescence phase; During the manufacturing phase, the IoT device uses its built-in physically unclonable functional unit and quantum random number generator unit to generate a device root key and initial identity credentials, and submits the initial identity credentials to the blockchain node through the cryptographic service platform.
[0012] In one optional implementation, the physically unclonable functional unit is an SRAM PUF, and the original response is processed by a fuzzy extractor using code offset construction and BCH error correction code to output the first key material; the quantum random number generator unit is an on-chip circuit based on semiconductor quantum noise, and outputs the second key material compressed and extracted by a Toeplitz hash or SHA-3 entropy extractor; the cryptographic mixing function is HKDF, which generates the device root key using the first key material as salt and the second key material as input key material, and derives the initial identity credential and the seeds of each subsequent quantum key pair according to different information parameters.
[0013] In one optional implementation, during the deployment phase, the IoT device and the cryptographic service platform perform post-quantum two-way authentication; the authentication pseudonym generated by the device has a cryptographic binding relationship with the response of the physically unclonable functional unit: during the manufacturing phase, the hash value of the first key material and the device's unique identifier, i.e., the first verification value, and the hash value of the first key material preset fragment and the device's unique identifier, i.e., the binding commitment, are stored on the blockchain; during the deployment phase, the authentication pseudonym is generated using the preset fragment, the random challenge value, and the hash value of the device's unique identifier, and the authentication pseudonym is signed by the post-quantum private key as part of the message to be signed, and the preset fragment is encapsulated with the platform's public key and sent with the signature; after the platform verifies the signature, it reviews the authentication pseudonym and compares it with the on-chain binding commitment.
[0014] In one optional implementation, the post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit executes the ML-KEM key encapsulation algorithm and the ML-DSA digital signature algorithm, preferably the ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 parameter sets; ML-KEM is used for session key encapsulation during deployment and operation and maintenance phases, and ML-DSA is used for identity signing and transaction signing at each stage.
[0015] In one optional implementation, during the operation and maintenance phase, the IoT device regenerates the device root key according to a preset strategy: the first key material output by the physically unclonable functional unit remains unchanged under the same challenge, which is used to identify the continuity of the device identity; the quantum random number generator unit outputs a completely new second key material each time, so that the new root key is independent of the historical root key, realizing forward refresh of the key.
[0016] In one optional implementation, the cryptographic service platform calculates a trust score based on the deviation between device behavior measurement data and historical behavior baselines established by sliding time windows. The trust score is a weighted deduction result of the deviation of each measurement dimension. When the score is lower than a first threshold, enhanced authentication is triggered by adding a physical non-cloning function verification factor. When it is lower than a second threshold, permission downgrade is performed. When it is lower than a third threshold for multiple consecutive periods, a forced key update is triggered and the abnormal event is recorded on the blockchain for evidence storage.
[0017] In one optional implementation, during the scrapping phase, the key material is overwritten at least three times and then read back for verification using multiple sets of true random numbers generated by a quantum random number generator unit; the blockchain node is a consortium blockchain node, and the consensus mechanism adopts a practical Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm; the device identity certificate serves as a cross-domain trust anchor, and the target domain cryptographic service platform independently verifies the authenticity of the device identity and its current lifecycle status by querying the blockchain ledger, without relying on a centralized certificate authority in the source domain.
[0018] Secondly, the present invention provides a hardware root of trust Internet of Things full lifecycle quantum security management method, covering four stages: manufacturing, deployment, operation and maintenance and disposal, with each stage performing the corresponding operations described in the first aspect above.
[0019] Thirdly, the present invention provides an Internet of Things (IoT) device, including a physically unclonable functional unit, a quantum random number generator unit, a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit, a secure storage unit, and a lifecycle management control unit, wherein the lifecycle management control unit is configured to perform the steps of the method described in the second aspect above.
[0020] Fourthly, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method described in the second aspect above.
[0021] Fifthly, the present invention provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method described in the second aspect above.
[0022] Compared with the prior art, the technological advancements and beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: (1) The physical non-cloning function response and quantum random number are jointly generated by a cryptographic mixing function to generate the device root key, so that the root key depends on both the physical uniqueness of the chip and the true randomness of quantum, thereby resisting the dual attacks of physical cloning and software copying. Moreover, the device can bootstrap the key system autonomously without relying on the offline distributed quantum key.
[0023] (2) The authentication pseudonym and the physical non-cloning function response are cryptographically bound through the mechanism of "on-chain binding commitment + challenge related hash + encapsulated fragment verification", which makes the temporary identity certificate inseparable from the physical hardware of the device and the binding relationship can be independently verified by the platform, thereby preventing certificate replay and software cloned devices from impersonating legitimate devices.
[0024] (3) The four stages of state transitions—manufacturing, deployment, operation and maintenance, and scrapping—are all recorded on the blockchain, making the state transitions tamper-proof and traceable throughout the entire process, forming a complete and trustworthy audit chain from the entire life cycle of the equipment, filling the systemic gap in the full life cycle security management.
[0025] (4) The device identity certificate issued by the consortium blockchain serves as a cross-domain trust anchor, enabling the target domain to complete device identity verification without establishing bilateral trust with the source domain, fundamentally solving the trust silos and single point of failure problems in multi-operator and multi-vendor environments.
[0026] (5) During the operation and maintenance phase, the trust scoring and hierarchical handling based on the deviation weighted model enable the device permissions to converge dynamically with the degree of abnormal behavior, and the enhanced authentication introduces a physical non-clonable function verification factor to form a hardware-level adaptive security protection closed loop.
[0027] (6) The post-quantum cryptographic algorithm is solidified into the hardware acceleration unit of the device, so that the device has the mathematical basis to resist quantum computing attacks from the manufacturing stage, and ensures long-term cryptographic security throughout the entire life cycle of the device. Attached Figure Description
[0028] Figure 1 This is a structural diagram of the IoT device full lifecycle quantum security management system provided in this embodiment of the invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the PUF and QRNG joint key generation principle provided in the embodiments of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the IoT device full lifecycle quantum security management system provided in this embodiment of the invention; Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the IoT device authentication and on-chain process provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0029] This invention proposes a full lifecycle security solution for IoT devices that combines Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), Quantum Random Number Generation (QRNG), Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), and blockchain technology. The system architecture consists of IoT devices with PUF, QRNG, and PQC acceleration units, a cryptographic service platform, and blockchain nodes. The core logic of this invention includes: In the manufacturing stage, a root key for the device is generated using a hybrid of PUF (Physically Unique) and QRNG (Quantum True Randomness) and stored on the blockchain. In the deployment stage, post-quantum two-way authentication is performed, verifying the physical entity of the device through the binding relationship between the "authentication pseudonym" and the PUF response, thus completing the ownership transfer. In the operation and maintenance stage, a trust score is calculated based on behavioral metrics, and permissions are dynamically adjusted; the key is periodically refreshed using QRNG (forward security). In the disposal stage, the key is repeatedly overwritten and erased using true random numbers generated by QRNG, and then marked as disposed of on the blockchain.
[0030] This invention is based on the trust root construction dimension to achieve dual entropy source fusion, combining chip physical features (PUF) with quantum true random numbers (QRNG), which prevents both physical cloning and software copying, and does not rely on offline distributed quantum keys.
[0031] This invention is based on the entire life cycle and achieves closed-loop management, covering the entire chain from chip manufacturing to physical disposal. In particular, the secure erasure in the disposal stage fills the gap in existing technology.
[0032] This invention achieves decentralized trust based on cross-domain mutual recognition, and uses consortium blockchains as trust anchors to solve the "trust island" problem in multi-vendor and multi-operator environments without relying on centralized CAs.
[0033] This invention achieves hardware acceleration based on the dimension of quantum resistance, solidifies post-quantum algorithms such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and ensures long-term security from a mathematical perspective.
[0034] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this invention without inventive effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.
[0035] Example 1; refer to Figure 1The IoT device lifecycle security management system in this embodiment includes an IoT device 100, a cryptographic service platform 110, a blockchain node 120, and an IoT device management domain 130. The IoT terminal device is a resource-constrained IoT terminal device, such as a smart meter, industrial sensor, smart home controller, or vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication unit. The IoT terminal device has a built-in security module, which integrates the following units: a lifecycle management control unit 101, which serves as the control core of the security module, is used to schedule each unit and perform corresponding security operations according to the current lifecycle stage of the IoT terminal device; a physically unclonable function unit 102 is implemented using SRAM PUF based on the initial power-on value of static random access memory, and outputs stable first key material after reading the initial power-on value of SRAM in a specific address range and processing it through a fuzzy extractor; a quantum random number generator unit 103 is implemented using an on-chip QRNG circuit based on semiconductor quantum noise, and is used to output truly random second key material; a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit 104 is a hardware coprocessor configured to execute lattice-based key encapsulation algorithm and lattice-based digital signature algorithm; a secure storage unit 105 is used to store sensitive materials such as the device root key, post-quantum key pairs, and identity credentials; and a communication unit 106 is used for communication between the IoT devices.
[0036] The quantum random number generator unit is implemented using an on-chip QRNG circuit based on photon counting quantum noise. Alternatively, a quantum entropy source based on single-photon path selection or vacuum fluctuations can be used. The original noise sequence undergoes online health testing, including repeat count testing and adaptive scaling testing, for real-time monitoring. It is then processed by a Toeplitz hash entropy extractor (or other lightweight extractors as alternatives), and after compression extraction, the output random number has a minimum entropy rate of no less than 0.99 bits / bit.
[0037] The post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit is a hardware coprocessor configured to execute the lattice-based key encapsulation algorithm ML-KEM and the lattice-based digital signature algorithm ML-DSA. This embodiment selects the ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 parameter sets, corresponding to NIST Level 3 security strength, balancing security with key and signature size overhead on resource-constrained terminals. In scenarios with higher security requirements, the ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87 parameter sets can be used. ML-KEM is used for session key encapsulation during deployment and maintenance phases, while ML-DSA is used for identity and transaction signing at each lifecycle stage.
[0038] The cryptographic service platform is deployed on the edge computing nodes or cloud servers of the device owner or operator, and connects with various IoT terminal devices through IoT communication. It is used to provide cryptographic policy configuration, key management and authentication services at different life stages of IoT terminal devices.
[0039] The blockchain adopts a consortium blockchain architecture, jointly maintained by authorized nodes from multiple IoT device management domains, including device manufacturers, network operators, and industry regulators. Smart contracts for device identity management are deployed on the blockchain nodes, responsible for issuing and managing device identity certificates, and storing identity credentials and state transaction records generated by the device at each stage of its lifecycle.
[0040] refer to Figure 2 Upon initial power-up of the chip, the Physically Unclonable Functional Unit (PUFO) reads the chip's physical characteristic parameters, stabilizes them using a fuzz extractor, and outputs the first key material PUF response. Simultaneously, the Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) generates the second key material QRNG random numbers based on quantum physics processes.
[0041] The lifecycle management control unit inputs the first and second key materials into a cryptographic mixing function to generate the device root key. This device root key relies on both the physical characteristics of the chip and the true randomness of quantum physical processes, achieving an organic fusion of physical entropy and quantum entropy. The cryptographic mixing function can employ SHA-3 hash function, HMAC-based key derivation function, or HKDF key derivation function, etc. Subsequently, using the device root key as a seed, the initial device identity credential and the subsequent quantum key pair seed are derived through the key derivation function.
[0042] refer to Figure 3 The IoT terminal device submits its initial identity credentials to the blockchain node through a cryptographic service platform. After verifying the format validity of the initial identity credentials and the uniqueness of the device identifier, the device management smart contract on the blockchain node issues a device identity certificate and stores both the initial identity credentials and the device identity certificate in the blockchain ledger, returning an on-chain transaction identifier. The information submitted to the blockchain during the manufacturing phase also includes a first verification value and a binding commitment: the first verification value is the hash value of the first key material and the device's unique identifier, and the binding commitment is the hash value of a preset fragment of the first key material and the device's unique identifier.
[0043] When an IoT terminal device is first deployed to the target operating environment, it sends a network access request to the cryptographic service platform after powering on, and the network access request carries the transaction identifier obtained during the manufacturing stage.
[0044] The cryptographic service platform queries and retrieves the device identity certificate of the IoT terminal device from the blockchain node based on the transaction identifier, verifies the validity and uniqueness of the certificate, and confirms that the IoT terminal device has not been registered by other management domains. After successful verification, the cryptographic service platform generates a random challenge value and sends it to the IoT terminal device.
[0045] The IoT terminal device rereads the response of the physically unclonable functional unit, uses the auxiliary data stored in the manufacturing stage to recover the first key material through the fuzzy extractor reconstructing algorithm, and extracts its preset fragment, denoted as s; the authentication pseudonym is calculated using this fragment, the random challenge value, and the device's unique identifier; The PID for authentication pseudonym is calculated according to formula (1): PID = Hash (s ‖ C ‖ Device Unique Identifier) — Equation (1) Where Hash is the SHA-3 cryptographic hash function, || represents sequential concatenation, s is a preset fragment of the first key material, and C is a random challenge value issued by the cryptographic service platform.
[0046] The device concatenates the random challenge value, the authentication pseudonym, and the device's unique identifier into a message to be signed. The post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit then signs the message using the post-quantum digital signature private key, thus protecting the authentication pseudonym as a whole. Simultaneously, the device encapsulates the fragment s with the public key of the cryptographic service platform and returns it to the cryptographic service platform along with the signing result.
[0047] During verification by the cryptographic service platform, the validity of the signature is first verified using the post-quantum public key obtained from the blockchain. Then, the fragment 's' is decapsulated, and the pseudonym is recalculated according to the same rules and compared with the authentication pseudonym in the signature message. Furthermore, the hash value of fragment 's' and the device's unique identifier is calculated and compared with the binding commitment recorded on the blockchain during the manufacturing phase. If all three match, it confirms a cryptographic binding relationship between the authentication pseudonym and the device chip's physically unclonable functional response, completing the two-way authentication. Because fragment 's' is transmitted between the device and the platform only in encapsulated form, and the authentication pseudonym changes with each challenge value, even if an attacker copies the entire software state of the device, they cannot reconstruct the first key material and its fragments due to the lack of the original chip, and therefore cannot generate a verified authentication pseudonym. After successful authentication, the cryptographic service platform confirms the transfer of device ownership from the manufacturer to the device owner or operator, generates a deployment state transaction, and submits it to the blockchain node for record-keeping.
[0048] If authentication fails, the password service platform rejects the network access request and returns an error message to the IoT terminal device, terminating the process.
[0049] During operation and maintenance, IoT terminal devices trigger a key update process according to a preset strategy. The update strategy can be timed, such as executing every 24 hours, or event-triggered, such as triggering immediately upon detecting abnormal behavior. When an update is triggered, the IoT terminal device rereads the response of the physically unclonable functional unit and the output of the quantum random number generator unit, generating a new device root key according to the same cryptographic mixing function as in the manufacturing stage, thereby deriving a new post-quantum key pair. When regenerating the device root key, the first key material output by the physically unclonable functional unit under the same challenge remains unchanged, used to identify the continuity of the device identity. The cryptographic service platform can verify that the update request comes from the original device chip through the first verification value stored on the blockchain and the binding commitment. The quantum random number generator unit outputs a completely new second key material each time, making the new root key independent of the historical root key, achieving forward key refresh. The IoT terminal device submits the new public key and the corresponding new authentication pseudonym to the blockchain node through the cryptographic service platform, generating a key update transaction record.
[0050] Meanwhile, IoT terminal devices periodically report device behavior measurement data, including at least one of communication frequency, access resource type, and current geographical location information. In this embodiment, the trust score is calculated according to the following exemplary model: The cryptographic service platform establishes historical behavior baselines for each measurement dimension based on the reported data from the past 30 days; it calculates the deviation of each dimension for the current reported value, i.e., the normalized value of the difference between the current value and the baseline mean relative to the baseline standard deviation; the trust score is the weighted deduction result of the deviation of each dimension, where the sum of the weights of communication frequency, access resource type, and geographical location is 1. The platform handles the issue in stages according to preset thresholds: when the score is below the first threshold of 60, enhanced authentication is triggered, and challenge-response and authentication pseudonym binding verification are re-executed; when it is below the second threshold of 40, permission downgrade is performed; when it is below the third threshold of 30 for three consecutive periods, a forced key update is triggered and the abnormal event is recorded on the blockchain for evidence storage. The above window length, weights, and thresholds can all be adjusted by the cryptographic policy configuration.
[0051] When an IoT terminal device reaches its design lifespan or receives a mandatory disposal instruction, the lifecycle management control unit initiates a secure erasure process. The quantum random number generator unit generates multiple sets of truly random numbers, which are then used to overwrite the device root key, the post-quantum signature private key, and the initial identity credential in the secure storage unit bit by bit. After each overwrite is completed, the data is read and verified. Only after successful erasure is confirmed is the next overwrite performed, completing at least three overwrite operations to ensure the original key material is unrecoverable.
[0052] After the secure erasure is complete, the IoT terminal device submits a decommissioning mark transaction to the blockchain node through the cryptographic service platform. The device management smart contract on the blockchain node processes the transaction, updates the device identity certificate status to "decommissioned," and records the decommissioning timestamp in the ledger. Thereafter, the device identity certificate can no longer be used for any authentication operations.
[0053] refer to Figure 4 During the deployment phase of two-way authentication, the on-chain authentication process for IoT terminal devices is as follows: 1) When an IoT terminal device is first deployed to the target operating environment, it sends a network access request to the cryptographic service platform after powering on. The network access request carries the transaction identifier obtained during the manufacturing stage. 2) After receiving the network access request, the cryptographic service platform queries the blockchain node based on the transaction identifier and obtains the device identity certificate of the IoT terminal device; 3) After the blockchain node returns the device identity certificate, the cryptographic service platform verifies the validity and uniqueness of the certificate to confirm that the IoT terminal device has not been registered by other management domains; 4) After successful verification, the password service platform generates a random challenge value and sends the challenge value to the IoT terminal device; 5) After receiving the challenge value, the IoT terminal device rereads the response of the physically unclonable functional unit and restores the first key material, extracts the preset fragment s, and generates an authentication pseudonym using the hash value of s, the challenge value and the device's unique identifier; the challenge value, the authentication pseudonym and the device's unique identifier are used as a message to be signed, and the post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit signs it with the post-quantum private key, and the fragment s is encapsulated with the platform's public key and returned to the cryptographic service platform along with the signing result; 6) The IoT terminal device returns the signature result and authentication pseudonym to the cryptographic service platform; 7) The cryptographic service platform uses the post-quantum public key to verify the signature, decapsulates the fragment s, recalculates and verifies the authentication pseudonym, and compares the hash value of fragment s with the device's unique identifier with the on-chain binding commitment to verify the binding relationship between the authentication pseudonym and the physically clonable functional response. 8) Once the signature is valid and the binding relationship verification passes, the two-way authentication is complete. The cryptographic service platform confirms the transfer of device ownership from the manufacturer to the device owner or operator, generates a deployment status transaction, and submits the deployment status transaction to the blockchain node for notarization. After the blockchain node returns confirmation of notarization, the two-way authentication process ends. If authentication fails, the cryptographic service platform rejects the network access request and returns an error message to the IoT terminal device, terminating the process.
[0054] The consortium blockchain is jointly maintained by authorized nodes in multiple IoT device management domains. When an IoT terminal device that has been deployed in the first management domain needs to roam to the second management domain, the cryptographic service platform of the second management domain retrieves the device identity certificate chain of the IoT terminal device stored on the consortium blockchain to obtain the device identity certificate issued during the manufacturing stage and the status transaction records of each stage.
[0055] The cryptographic service platform in the second management domain verifies the authenticity of the device identity certificate by checking the issuer's signature and confirms that the device is currently in a valid lifecycle state by checking the certificate status and obsolescence marker transaction records. All of these verification processes are completed independently by querying the blockchain ledger, without needing to establish communication or share keys with the centralized certificate authority in the first management domain, thus achieving decentralized cross-domain identity mutual recognition.
[0056] After successful cross-domain authentication, the cryptographic service platform in the second management domain and the IoT terminal device perform post-quantum two-way authentication. Once authentication is complete, the IoT terminal device re-enters the operation and maintenance phase in the second management domain, continuing to perform periodic key updates and behavior measurement reporting.
[0057] Example 2 Using smart meters as IoT devices, this invention is illustrated in specific applications in low-power, variable asset ownership scenarios. During the chip manufacturing stage, the smart meter completes the device root key generation and certificate issuance as described in Example 1. During deployment, the cryptographic service platform within the power grid company's operating area completes network access authentication and ownership confirmation. Considering the low-power constraints of smart meters, the reporting cycle for behavioral measurement data is set to 24 hours, the trust score calculation is performed on the edge-side cryptographic service platform, and the geographical location dimension in the deviation model uses the coordinates of the meter's registered area as the baseline. The key update strategy is set to be triggered periodically every 30 days. When the meter asset undergoes a transfer of operation and maintenance ownership between the power grid company and other companies, the cryptographic service platform in the receiving party's management domain independently completes identity verification and ownership transfer on the blockchain according to the cross-domain roaming process, without requiring online cooperation from the transferor's centralized system. The scrapping stage is executed according to the secure erasure process in Example 1 to prevent the extraction and misuse of key materials after meter dismantling and recycling.
[0058] It should be understood that the above embodiments are merely exemplary, and those skilled in the art can make various changes and substitutions based on the technical solutions of this invention and according to actual application needs.
[0059] In alternative implementations, the physically unclonable functional unit can be implemented using a PUF of the type such as a ring oscillator PUF or an arbiter PUF; the quantum random number generator unit can be implemented using a QRNG circuit based on different quantum physical processes; the key encapsulation algorithm and digital signature algorithm supported by the post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit can be other lattice-based or hash-based cryptographic algorithms; the blockchain can be other consortium blockchain platforms or private blockchains; and the IoT terminal device can be other IoT terminal devices with network communication capabilities.
[0060] The specific embodiments described above further illustrate the purpose, technical solution, and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above descriptions are merely specific embodiments of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A hardware-based root-of-trust IoT full-lifecycle quantum security management system, characterized in that, include: The Internet of Things (IoT) device, as a system terminal node, is configured with at least a physically unclonable functional unit, a quantum random number generator unit, and a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit; A cryptographic service platform, which communicates with the IoT device, is used to provide cryptographic policy configuration, key management, and authentication services. A blockchain node, communicating with the cryptographic service platform, is used to issue and manage device identity certificates for the IoT devices, and to store the status information of the IoT devices at each stage of their entire lifecycle. The entire lifecycle includes the manufacturing phase, deployment phase, operation and maintenance phase, and disposal phase; The device root key of the IoT device is jointly generated by the first key material generated by the physically unclonable functional unit and the second key material generated by the quantum random number generator unit through a cryptographic mixing function.
2. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The IoT device is an IoT terminal device with a built-in security module. The security module includes a physically unclonable functional unit, a quantum random number generator unit, a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit, a secure storage unit, and a lifecycle management control unit. The lifecycle management control unit is configured to call other units to perform corresponding security operations based on the current lifecycle stage of the IoT device.
3. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The IoT device generates an initial identity credential during the manufacturing stage and submits it to the blockchain node through the cryptographic service platform. The smart contract on the blockchain node issues the device identity certificate and stores it in the blockchain ledger.
4. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The physically unclonable functional unit is an SRAM PUF, whose original response is processed by a fuzz extractor and outputs the first key material; the quantum random number generator unit is an on-chip circuit based on semiconductor quantum noise, whose original noise sequence is compressed and extracted by an entropy extractor and outputs the second key material.
5. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the deployment phase, the IoT device and the cryptographic service platform perform post-quantum two-way authentication based on the post-quantum cryptographic acceleration unit. After successful authentication, ownership transfer is completed, and the deployment status is recorded on the blockchain.
6. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 5, characterized in that, In the post-quantum two-way authentication process, the authentication pseudonym generated by the IoT device is cryptographically bound to the response of the physically unclonable functional unit.
7. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The cryptographic binding relationship is verified in the following ways: During the manufacturing stage, a preset fragment of the first key material and the hash value of the device's unique identifier are used as a binding commitment and stored on the blockchain. During the deployment phase, the IoT device encapsulates the preset fragment with the public key of the cryptographic service platform and sends it to the cryptographic service platform. After decapsulation, the cryptographic service platform verifies the authentication pseudonym by reviewing it and comparing it with the binding commitment on the blockchain.
8. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit is configured to perform lattice-based key encapsulation algorithms and lattice-based digital signature algorithms.
9. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the operation and maintenance phase, the IoT device, according to a preset strategy, uses the unchanged first key material and the new second key material output by the quantum random number generator unit to regenerate the device root key and derive a new post-quantum key pair, and stores the new public key on the cryptographic service platform.
10. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the operation and maintenance phase, the cryptographic service platform is also used to: receive device behavior measurement data reported by the IoT device, and calculate the current trust score based on the device behavior measurement data and historical behavior baseline; When the trust score is lower than a preset threshold, enhanced authentication or permission downgrade is triggered.
11. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, During the obsolescence phase, the IoT device performs a secure erasure operation and submits an obsolescence mark transaction to the blockchain node through the cryptographic service platform.
12. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 11, characterized in that, The secure erasure operation includes: rewriting the key material in the secure storage unit multiple times with true random numbers generated by the quantum random number generator unit, and performing readback verification after each rewriting.
13. The hardware trust root IoT full lifecycle quantum security management system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The blockchain node is a consortium blockchain node, which is jointly maintained by authorized nodes from multiple IoT device management domains. The device identity certificate on the blockchain node serves as a cross-domain trust anchor, used to independently verify the authenticity of the IoT device's identity by the cryptographic service platform of the target domain when the IoT device roams.
14. A method for managing the entire lifecycle of a hardware root of trust Internet of Things (IoT) with quantum security, applied to the system described in any one of claims 1-13, characterized in that, The method covers the manufacturing, deployment, operation and maintenance, and disposal stages of IoT devices, including: During the manufacturing phase, IoT devices utilize their physically unclonable functional units and quantum random number generator units to generate a device root key, and generate initial identity credentials based on the device root key for on-chain storage. During the deployment phase, the IoT device and the cryptographic service platform perform post-quantum two-way authentication. After successful authentication, ownership transfer is completed and the data is uploaded to the blockchain. During the operation and maintenance phase, the IoT device updates the key according to a preset strategy and reports behavioral measurement data to the cryptographic service platform; During the obsolescence phase, the IoT device performs a secure erasure operation and submits an obsolescence marker transaction to the blockchain node.
15. An Internet of Things (IoT) device, characterized in that, include: The device comprises a physically unclonable functional unit, a quantum random number generator unit, a post-quantum cryptography acceleration unit, a secure storage unit, and a lifecycle management control unit; wherein the lifecycle management control unit is configured to perform the steps performed by the Internet of Things device in the method as described in claim 14.
16. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the method as described in claim 14.
17. A computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method as described in claim 14.
