Hybrid cryptographic communication methods and systems for power communication networks

By employing a hybrid cryptographic communication method in the power communication network, combining national cryptographic algorithms and quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, dynamically scheduling encryption strategies, generating shared secrets and performing layered encryption, the problem that traditional algorithms cannot resist quantum computing attacks is solved, and reliable transmission and security of power business data are achieved.

CN123122812APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17北京电科智芯科技有限公司
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611308155.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-26
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing power communication networks, traditional national cryptographic algorithms cannot resist quantum computing attacks. Quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes have large ciphertext or key sizes, making it difficult to dynamically balance security and efficiency on resource-constrained power Internet of Things (IoT) terminals.

Method used

A hybrid cryptographic communication method is adopted, combining first-class cryptographic algorithms (such as the national cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4) and quantum-resistant second-class cryptographic algorithms (such as CNTR, CTRU, and Kyber). The encryption strategy is dynamically scheduled through business type identifiers and resource-related information, and a hybrid key negotiation process is executed to generate a shared secret and a session key, thereby realizing layered encryption operations.

Benefits of technology

It improves the reliability and security of power business data transmission in power communication networks, adapts to quantum computing threats, and reduces the computing overhead of resource-constrained terminals.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication method and system for power communication networks, relating to the field of power communication technology. The method is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator; the method includes: parsing the service type identifier of the power service data to be processed and obtaining resource-related information; determining an encryption strategy from a cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and resource-related information, the encryption strategy including a combination of first-type and second-type cryptographic algorithms; performing a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generating a session key based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data; and performing layered encryption operations on the power service data using the session key based on the encryption strategy and sending it to the responder to realize the transmission of power service data. This improves the reliability of power service data transmission in power communication networks.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments described in this specification relate to the field of power communication technology, specifically to a hybrid cryptographic communication method and system for power communication networks. Background Technology

[0002] As a critical infrastructure, the power system's communication network carries a large amount of control commands and status monitoring data. Currently, the power industry has gradually promoted cryptographic application schemes based on national cryptographic algorithms such as SM2 / SM3 / SM4. However, traditional national cryptographic algorithms (such as SM2) are based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which cannot resist quantum computing attacks and faces long-term security threats. Existing quantum-resistant cryptography (PQC) schemes such as Kyber suffer from large ciphertext sizes, and NTRU suffers from large key sizes, highlighting the contradiction with the limited resources of power IoT terminals (whose available memory is often less than 64KB, and some less than 16KB). Existing schemes struggle to dynamically balance security and efficiency.

[0003] To address the aforementioned issues, there is an urgent need to provide a hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks, in order to at least improve the reliability of power business data transmission in power communication networks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, various embodiments of this specification aim to provide a hybrid cryptographic communication method and system for power communication networks, so as to at least improve the reliability of power business data transmission in power communication networks.

[0005] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network, the power communication network including multiple communication terminals, each communication terminal being configured with a cryptographic algorithm library, the cryptographic algorithm library including a first type of cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second type of cryptographic algorithm; the method is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator; the method includes: parsing the service type identifier of the power service data to be processed, and obtaining resource-related information; determining an encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and the resource-related information, wherein the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm; performing a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generating a session key based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data; and performing layered encryption on the power service data using the session key based on the encryption strategy, and sending it to the responder to realize the power service data transmission.

[0006] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network, the power communication network including multiple communication terminals, each communication terminal being configured with a cryptographic algorithm library, the cryptographic algorithm library including a first type of cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second type of cryptographic algorithm; the method is applied to any communication terminal acting as a responder; the method includes: receiving a handshake request sent by an initiator, wherein the handshake request carries an algorithm identifier of an encryption strategy; wherein the encryption strategy is determined by the initiator from its cryptographic algorithm library based on a service type identifier and resource-related information, the service type identifier being obtained by parsing power service data to be processed, and the encryption strategy including a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm; performing a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the responder and the initiator, and generating a session key based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data; and performing a layered decryption operation on the power service data received from the initiator using the session key based on the encryption strategy to realize the transmission of power service data.

[0007] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication system for a power communication network. The power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each configured with a cryptographic algorithm library. The cryptographic algorithm library includes a first type of cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second type of cryptographic algorithm. The system is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator. The system includes: a service awareness module, used to parse the service type identifier of the power service data to be processed and obtain resource-related information; a dynamic scheduling module, used to determine an encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and the resource-related information, wherein the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm; a hybrid encryption engine, used to execute a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption strategy, generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generate a session key based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data; and, based on the encryption strategy, perform layered encryption operations on the power service data using the session key and send it to the responder to realize power service data transmission.

[0008] In the various embodiments provided in this specification, the power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each configured with a cryptographic algorithm library. This library includes a first-class cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second-class cryptographic algorithm. The initiator parses the service type identifier of the power service data to be processed and obtains resource-related information. Then, based on the service type identifier and resource-related information, it determines an encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library. This encryption strategy includes a combination of the first-class and second-class cryptographic algorithms. Next, a hybrid key negotiation process is executed according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder. A session key is then generated based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data. Finally, based on the encryption strategy, the session key is used to perform layered encryption on the power service data, which is then sent to the responder, thus realizing the transmission of power service data. This improves the reliability of power service data transmission in the power communication network. Attached Figure Description

[0009] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the hybrid cryptographic communication system architecture of some communication terminals provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks provided in the embodiments of this specification. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the session key negotiation process provided in the implementation method of this specification; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the layered encryption data structure for power business data provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 5 This is a timing diagram of the dynamic algorithm switching provided in the implementation method of this specification; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a variation of the encryption strategy based on the policy model output provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram illustrating another variation of the encryption strategy based on the policy model output provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the dynamic switching between CTRU and CNTR dual modes in the encryption strategy provided in the embodiments of this specification; Figure 9 A schematic diagram of a communication terminal provided for an embodiment of this specification. Detailed Implementation

[0010] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the solutions described in this specification, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this specification will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this specification, and not all of them. Based on the embodiments in this specification, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this specification.

[0011] This specification provides an example application scenario of a hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks. A power communication network, also known as a power communication system or power system, may include multiple communication terminals.

[0012] In this scenario example, the power communication network can be: the station control layer network in the substation automation system, the remote communication network between the distribution master station and the terminal in the distribution Internet of Things, the wide area network between the dispatch center and the power plant in the dispatch data network, and the monitoring network inside the power plant, etc.

[0013] In this scenario example, a communication terminal can refer to a node device in a power communication network that has the ability to send and receive data. For example, multiple communication terminals may include a data acquisition master station, a distribution master station, an IoT master station, a regional gateway, and a service terminal. Furthermore, service terminals may include smart meters, RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), DTUs (Data Terminal Units), wireless sensors, and telemetry terminals. The hardware resource capabilities of each communication terminal may vary. Some terminals (such as distribution master stations and regional gateways) have sufficient available memory (greater than 128KB RAM) and a high-performance CPU, some terminals (such as smart meters, RTUs, and DTUs) have moderate available memory (32KB to 64KB RAM) and a medium-performance MCU, and some terminals (such as wireless sensors and telemetry terminals) have extremely limited available memory (less than 16KB RAM) and use low-power MCUs.

[0014] In this scenario example, any communication terminal in the power communication network can act as the initiator, and another communication terminal can act as the responder. The initiator can communicate with the responder. The communication data carried by the power communication network, or in other words, the power service data transmitted between the initiator and the responder, can include real-time control commands, batch monitoring data, and configuration management information, etc. Of course, it is understood that, depending on the actual situation, the power service data can also include other types of data.

[0015] For example, when the distribution master station sends a control command to the smart meter, the distribution master station acts as the initiator and the smart meter as the responder; when the smart meter reports monitoring data to the distribution master station, the smart meter acts as the initiator and the distribution master station as the responder. The roles of initiator and responder are defined in the communication process and are determined in each communication session. Any communication terminal can act as either an initiator or a responder in different communication sessions.

[0016] In this scenario example, each communication terminal is configured with a cryptographic algorithm library. This library is a collection of algorithms configured within each terminal, and may contain algorithm programs or parameters required for cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, signing, signature verification, hashing, key derivation, key encapsulation, and decapsulation. Furthermore, the cryptographic algorithm library can be stored as software in the storage unit of each communication terminal, or it can be embedded as firmware in the terminal's cryptographic chip or security element. Each communication terminal is pre-configured with a corresponding version of the cryptographic algorithm library based on its own resource level; for example, a communication terminal with sufficient resources is configured with a full version of the cryptographic algorithm library, while a communication terminal with limited resources is configured with a lightweight version.

[0017] Furthermore, the cryptographic algorithm library includes Class I cryptographic algorithms and Quantum-resistant Class II cryptographic algorithms. Class I cryptographic algorithms can be national cryptographic algorithms used for identity authentication, data integrity protection, or data confidentiality protection. Quantum-resistant Class II cryptographic algorithms are post-quantum cryptographic algorithms capable of resisting quantum computing attacks. These algorithms are constructed based on mathematical problems of lattice-based cryptography, which are difficult to solve in polynomial time on both classical and quantum computers.

[0018] For example, in the cryptographic algorithm library, the first type of cryptographic algorithm includes at least one national cryptographic algorithm, and the second type of cryptographic algorithm includes at least one post-quantum cryptographic algorithm.

[0019] For example, the first category of cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library may include at least one of the following national cryptographic algorithms: SM2, SM3, and SM4. SM2 refers to the SM2 elliptic curve public-key cryptography algorithm, SM3 refers to the SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm, and SM4 refers to the SM4 block symmetric encryption algorithm. Of course, the first category of cryptographic algorithms may also include other national cryptographic algorithms or non-national cryptographic algorithms, such as SM1, SM7, and the Zu Chongzhi Cipher (ZUC). As an example, SM2 can be implemented according to the GB / T 32918 standard, the SM3 algorithm can be implemented according to the GB / T 32905 standard, and the SM4 algorithm can be implemented according to the GB / T 32907 standard.

[0020] For example, the second type of cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library may include at least one of the following post-quantum cryptographic algorithms: CNTR, CTRU, and Kyber. CTRU is a key encapsulation algorithm based on the NTRU lattice, CNTR (Compact NTRU) is a compact key encapsulation algorithm based on the NTRU lattice, and Kyber, also known as CRYSTALS-Kyber, is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem in lattice theory.

[0021] CNTR is a parameter-optimized and structure-compressed variant of NTRU lattice cryptography, characterized by its small ciphertext size and high computational efficiency. CTRU, another NTRU lattice variant algorithm, can be used as a parallel alternative to CNTR. Kyber is a quantum-resistant key encapsulation mechanism (ML-KEM) standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for compatibility with external systems that do not support NTRU architectures. Compared to Kyber, CNTR has a smaller ciphertext size (approximately 12% smaller) and higher computational efficiency (approximately 2 to 3 times faster), with an error probability as low as 2. -230 (Compared to Kyber's 2) -164 10 lower 66 (Times) Suitable for resource-constrained power communication networks, such as the deployment of communication terminals for the power Internet of Things.

[0022] For example, any Chinese national cryptographic algorithm and / or any post-quantum cryptographic algorithm may each include or correspond to at least one security level information. For example, the security level information, i.e., the encryption security level, taking the Chinese national cryptographic algorithm SM4 as an example, may include two security levels: SM4-128 and SM4-256, with SM4-256 having a higher security strength than SM4-128. Taking the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm CNTR as another example, it may include three security levels: CNTR-512, CNTR-768, and CNTR-1024. These three security levels correspond to different polynomial ring dimensions; the higher the security level, the greater the quantum security strength, but the required computational resources and transmission bandwidth also increase accordingly. Similarly, other Chinese national cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library, such as SM2 and SM3, and other post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, such as CNTR and Kyber, also have at least one security level to address different encryption requirements.

[0023] For example, the first category of cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library includes SM2, which can be used for authentication between communicating parties, such as signing and verifying signatures; SM3, which can be used for key derivation; and SM4, which can be used for encryption and decryption of power business data. Of course, depending on the actual situation, other national cryptographic algorithms besides SM2 can be used for authentication between communicating parties, not limited to SM2. Similarly, key derivation and encryption / decryption of power business data are not limited to SM3 and SM4. The second category of cryptographic algorithms, CNTR / CTRU / Kyber, can be used for encapsulation and decapsulation of quantum-resistant shared secrets.

[0024] In this scenario example, any communication terminal in the power communication network can be pre-classified into at least one resource level. A higher resource level indicates a higher upper limit for the corresponding communication terminal's resources. This upper limit is determined based on at least one of the communication terminal's maximum CPU computing power, maximum memory, and maximum supported channel bandwidth.

[0025] For example, the pre-defined resource levels may include a first resource level, a second resource level, and / or a third resource level. The first, second, and third resource levels decrease sequentially and correspond to Class I (Type I), Class II (Type II), and Class III (Type III) terminals among multiple communication terminals, respectively. Specifically, Class I, Class II, and Class III terminals refer to three types of communication terminals with sufficient resources, moderate resources, and limited resources, respectively. Class I terminals have the highest terminal resource limit, Class II terminals have a moderate terminal resource limit, and Class III terminals have the lowest terminal resource limit. For example, a Class I terminal may include a power distribution master station and area gateway with a maximum memory greater than 128KB and configured with a high-performance CPU; a Class II terminal may include smart meters, RTUs, and DTUs with a maximum memory of 32KB to 64KB and configured with a medium-performance MCU; and a Class III terminal may include wireless sensors and telemetry terminals with a maximum memory less than 16KB and configured with a low-power MCU.

[0026] For example, a type of terminal can preferentially select CNTR-1024 / CNTR-768 as the target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and its strength level for encapsulation / decapsulation in the encryption strategy. The session key reuse information in the encryption strategy limits the generation of one session key in a single hybrid key negotiation process, thereby achieving complete resistance to quantum hybrid negotiation, i.e., one-time pad. A type of terminal can preferentially select CNTR-768 (high bandwidth) / CNTR-768 (narrowband). The session key reuse information in the encryption strategy limits the generation of multiple session keys in a single hybrid key negotiation process, thus realizing a session key reuse mechanism, i.e., one negotiation, multiple uses. A type of terminal can achieve encrypted transmission based on a pre-shared quantum key pool and an edge gateway proxy.

[0027] For example, the edge gateway agent for the three types of terminals can be deployed in the vicinity of the three types of terminals.

[0028] In this scenario example, please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a hybrid cryptographic communication system architecture for some communication terminals is shown. This architecture may include an application layer, a security service layer, and a support layer. The application layer is used to implement real-time control commands, batch monitoring data, management configuration data, and secure access authentication management. The security service layer includes a service awareness module, a hybrid encryption engine, a dynamic scheduling module, and a key management module. The support layer includes a communication interface module and a system status monitoring module. For example, the communication interface module may include an application interface and a communication module. The application interface may include an encryption interface, a decryption interface, a signature interface, and a signature verification interface. The communication module may include protocols such as 698, 104, and 103, and may also include protocols such as IEC 61850, Modbus, MQTT, SSAL, SSL, or other protocols.

[0029] For example, the service awareness module can receive power service data and output a service type identifier. The dynamic scheduling module connects the service awareness module and the system status monitoring module, and dynamically adjusts the encryption strategy (i.e., the encryption policy) based on the service type identifier and the load status monitored by the system status monitoring module. The hybrid encryption engine can execute the encryption policy. The hybrid encryption engine may include: an SM2 unit (signature / verification), an SM3 unit (hash / KDF), an SM4-128 / 256 unit (encryption / decryption, with optimization markers, e.g., using SIMD instruction set parallel optimization), a PQC unit (such as CNTR, CTRU, Kyber, used for key encapsulation / decapsulation, which can be implemented using bit slicing optimization), and a key management module, which supports the hybrid encryption engine and is responsible for the storage, updating, and lifecycle management of symmetric, asymmetric, and quantum-resistant keys.

[0030] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks. Please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network provided in this specification. This embodiment provides the method operation steps shown in the flowchart, but based on conventional or non-inventive methods, more or fewer operation steps may be included. The order of steps listed in the embodiment is merely one possible execution order among many, and does not represent the only possible execution order. In actual system or server product execution, the method can be executed sequentially as shown in the embodiment or in parallel (e.g., in a parallel processor or multi-threaded processing environment). This hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network can be applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator in a power communication network, specifically as follows... Figure 2 As shown, the hybrid cryptographic communication method may include the following steps.

[0031] Step S210: Parse the business type identifier of the power business data to be processed, and obtain resource-related information.

[0032] Power business data refers to business-related information exchanged between communication terminals during the operation of the power communication network, or business-related information collected by the communication terminals. For example, power business data may include real-time control commands (such as circuit breaker tripping commands and telemetry measurement commands), batch monitoring data (such as electrical quantity measurements such as voltage, current, and power, and sequence of events (SOE) records), and configuration management information (such as parameter downloading and time synchronization commands).

[0033] A service type identifier is an identification information used to distinguish the type or category of different power service data. Different service types have different requirements for security, real-time performance, and reliability. The service type identifier can be in the form of a string, a numeric code, or an enumerated value. For example, the service type identifier can be set to CTRL_CMD to represent real-time control commands, MONITOR_DATA to represent batch monitoring data, and CONFIG_MGMT to represent configuration management information.

[0034] Resource-related information is a set of information used to describe the resource status of a communication terminal. This information includes the terminal's resource level and current resource status. The resource level is a classification of the communication terminal based on a pre-assessed resource level (e.g., first, second, and third resource levels, corresponding to first, second, and third-class terminals, respectively), reflecting the terminal's maximum hardware resource capabilities. Resource status information is dynamically changing, including CPU load (e.g., light load, medium load, heavy load), available memory (e.g., the percentage or absolute value of currently remaining RAM), and channel quality (e.g., signal-to-noise ratio, packet loss rate).

[0035] For example, the responder can also be determined based on the power service data to be processed, or the responder can be determined directly. The responder is a communication terminal in the power communication network corresponding to the initiator, capable of receiving data sent by the initiator and performing corresponding processing.

[0036] As an example, resource-related information can be determined based on the resource level and resource status information of the initiator, or it can be determined based on the resource level and resource status information of both the initiator and the responder, taking the smaller of the two.

[0037] Step S220: Based on the business type identifier and resource-related information, determine the encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library, wherein the encryption strategy includes the combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm.

[0038] In some cases, the cryptographic algorithm library may include at least one of the following national cryptographic algorithms: SM2, SM3, and SM4 (Chinese national cryptographic algorithms); and at least one of the following post-quantum cryptographic algorithms: CNTR, CTRU, and Kyber (post-quantum cryptographic algorithms). In this case, based on the business type identifier and resource-related information, a target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and its strength level can be selected from the post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in the library, and a target national cryptographic algorithm and its strength level can be selected from the national cryptographic algorithms in the library. These can then be combined to obtain an encryption strategy. That is to say, the encryption strategy may include a combination of the target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and its strength level, and at least one target national cryptographic algorithm and its strength level.

[0039] In this embodiment, by using different service type identifiers, resource levels, and current resource status information, the corresponding encryption strategy can be determined from the cryptographic algorithm library. In this way, by combining and using the appropriate first-class cryptographic algorithm and the second-class cryptographic algorithm, a balance between transmission reliability and efficiency under the current communication conditions can be achieved.

[0040] Step S230: Perform a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption policy, generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generate a session key based on the shared secret combined with the service type identifier of the power business data.

[0041] A hybrid key agreement process is the process by which an initiator and responder establish a shared secret through interactive messages. This process integrates a first-class cryptographic algorithm (e.g., SM2) for signature verification to achieve authentication, and a second-class cryptographic algorithm (e.g., CNTR) for key encapsulation / decapsulation. This allows for the reliable establishment of a shared secret between the communicating parties even under the threat of quantum computing attacks. The shared secret is used to derive a session key; therefore, the hybrid key agreement process can also be called a session key agreement process.

[0042] Among them, the shared secret is confidential data jointly owned by the initiator and the responder, obtained through a hybrid key negotiation process.

[0043] In this embodiment, the shared secret is the direct output of the encapsulation / decapsulation operation of the second type of cryptographic algorithm in the encryption strategy. The length of the shared secret depends on the specific parameters (such as strength level information) of the second type of cryptographic algorithm used. As an example, the shared secret encapsulated by CNTR-512 is 256 bits long, the shared secret encapsulated by CNTR-768 is 384 bits long, and the shared secret encapsulated by CNTR-1024 is 512 bits long.

[0044] For example, the shared secret itself is not directly used to encrypt power business data. Instead, it is used in conjunction with the business type identifier of the power business data as the input seed for the key derivation function to generate the session key used for actual encryption and decryption. Thus, since the session key also depends on the business type identifier and other parameters, even if the shared secret is leaked at some point, an attacker cannot directly decrypt historical power business data.

[0045] In this embodiment, the encryption strategy may further include session key reuse information. This session key reuse information includes the number of session keys generated in a single hybrid key negotiation process; in other words, it limits the number of session keys generated in a single hybrid key negotiation process. Specifically, after executing a single hybrid key negotiation process and generating a shared secret, a specified number of session keys are generated based on the shared secret combined with the service type identifier of the power business data. This specified number is greater than or equal to one.

[0046] For example, after executing a single hybrid key negotiation process and generating a specified number of session keys, the generated session keys can be stored in a session key pool for subsequent calls and to facilitate the full lifecycle management of the session keys. The session key pool is a data structure used to store session keys. The session key pool can be implemented as an array, linked list, or hash table, and stored in the memory or secure storage area of ​​the communication terminal. For instance, when a single hybrid key negotiation process generates 10 session keys, these 10 session keys are stored in the session key pool according to their corresponding generation order or counter value order, with each session key associated with a unique index number (e.g., 0x01 to 0x0A).

[0047] Step S240: Based on the encryption strategy, perform layered encryption on the power business data using the session key and send it to the responder to realize the transmission of power business data.

[0048] In this embodiment, session keys can be sequentially obtained from the session key pool. When all session keys in the pool are used up, or when all active session keys are used up, or when the session key pool does not meet specific conditions (e.g., preset counting rules, preset time rules), the communicating parties need to re-execute the hybrid key negotiation process to generate a new shared secret and a new session key, which is then stored in the session key pool. Each communication uses one session key, thus supporting a "one-time negotiation, multiple uses" session key reuse strategy through multiple session keys in the session key pool. Furthermore, when the key reuse information limits the generation of only one session key per hybrid key negotiation process, a fully quantum-resistant one-time pad session key strategy is supported.

[0049] In this way, providing multiple session keys for multiple communications after a single hybrid key negotiation process can reduce the frequency of hybrid key negotiation and reduce the computational overhead of the communication terminal.

[0050] In this embodiment, layered encryption operation refers to a process of encrypting power business data at multiple levels. The session key can be used for any level of encryption in this communication's layered encryption operation.

[0051] In this embodiment, the responder participates in the hybrid key negotiation process, jointly negotiating a shared secret with the initiator. After receiving data sent by the initiator through layered encryption, the responder can perform layered decryption.

[0052] In the above implementation, the initiator sequentially executes the following steps: service type identifier resolution, resource-related information acquisition, encryption strategy determination, hybrid key negotiation, session key generation, layered encryption operation, and data transmission. Upon receiving the data, the responder performs corresponding layered decryption operations to reconstruct the original power service data. Throughout the transmission process, the confidentiality of the power service data is protected by multi-layered encryption through layered encryption operations; quantum-resistant security, or quantum-resistant reliability, is provided by the encapsulation / decapsulation of the second type of cryptographic algorithm; and service isolation is guaranteed by the session key derived from the service type identifier. Through the synergistic effect of these multiple security mechanisms, secure and reliable transmission of power service data in the power communication network can be achieved.

[0053] In some implementations, in step S220, the encryption strategy may include a combination of a target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and its strength level, and at least one target national cryptographic algorithm and its strength level.

[0054] For example, at least one target national cryptographic algorithm in the encryption strategy can be used for signing and verification when performing a hybrid key negotiation process, as a key derivation function, and for performing layered encryption operations.

[0055] As an example, the target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm can be CNTR-768, and the selected target national cryptographic algorithm can include SM2 for signature authentication, SM3 for key derivation, and SM4-256 for encrypting power business data. That is, in the encryption strategy, the first type of cryptographic algorithm can use SM2 for signature authentication, SM3 for key derivation, and SM4-256 for encrypting power business data; the second type of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm can be CNTR-768. Of course, it is understood that the selection and combination of the target national cryptographic algorithms for signature authentication, key derivation, and power business data encryption can be determined based on the actual situation.

[0056] As another example, at least one target national cryptographic algorithm in the encryption strategy may only include the target national cryptographic algorithm used for layered encryption operations, while the national cryptographic algorithms used for signing and verification during the execution of the hybrid key negotiation process and the national cryptographic algorithms used as key derivation functions may be pre-configured in each communication terminal initialization phase or other phases. It should be understood that the national cryptographic algorithms and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms described in the embodiments of this specification implicitly include their corresponding strength levels (security levels). For example, SM4-128 and SM4-256, although both using SM4, have different security levels and should be considered separately.

[0057] In some implementations, the session key reuse information of the encryption strategy may also include the method for determining the active session key.

[0058] The active session key is the session key selected from the session key pool at the current communication time. For example, if the session key pool stores 10 session keys, denoted as Key_01 to Key_10, the session key selected at the current communication time according to a preset determination method is the active session key. For instance, if the current communication time is the transmission time of the 150th instruction, and the preset counting rule is that instructions 1 to 100 use Key_01, and instructions 101 to 200 use Key_02, then the current active session key is Key_02. Similarly, if the current system time is 12:30, and the preset time rule is that Key_01 is used from 0:00 to 6:00, Key_02 from 6:00 to 12:00, and Key_03 from 12:00 to 18:00, then the current active session key is Key_03. By determining the active session key, the session key used for the current layered encryption operation can be uniquely identified in the session key pool. This allows the initiator and responder to use the same session key to perform encryption and decryption operations, reducing the possibility of decryption failure due to session key asynchrony. It also eliminates the need for frequent re-execution of hybrid key negotiation, significantly improving system efficiency.

[0059] In some implementations, the initiator maintains an initiator private key and a responder public key, while the responder maintains a responder private key and an initiator public key. The initiator's private and public keys are generated by the initiator using a specified national cryptographic algorithm for signature authentication, and the responder's private and public keys are generated by the responder using the same specified national cryptographic algorithm for signature authentication.

[0060] For example, both the initiator's private key and the responder's public key are pre-configured in the initiator's secure storage area, such as in the initiator's cryptographic chip or secure element. The initiator's private key may be generated and written during the initiator's initialization phase, and the responder's public key is distributed to the initiator by the responder offline or via a digital certificate. Similarly, both the responder's private key and the initiator's public key are pre-configured in the responder's secure storage area, such as in the responder's cryptographic chip or secure element. The responder's private key may be generated and written during the responder's initialization phase, and the initiator's public key is distributed to the responder by the initiator offline or via a digital certificate.

[0061] In this embodiment, step S230, which involves performing a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, may include the following steps S310-S340.

[0062] Step S310: Generate a temporary first key pair (pk, sk) based on the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm, including a first temporary public key pk and a first temporary private key sk.

[0063] Step S320: Use the initiator's private key to sign the first temporary public key pk to obtain the first signature information sign_A.

[0064] Step S330: Send the first temporary public key pk and the first signature information sign_A to the responder, so that the responder: verifies the first signature information sign_A based on the initiator's public key, and after successful verification, encapsulates the first temporary public key pk using the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm to obtain ciphertext ct, calls the responder's private key to sign the ciphertext ct to obtain the second signature information sign_B, and sends the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B to the initiator.

[0065] Step S340: Receive the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B sent by the responder, verify the second signature information sign_B using the responder's public key, and after successful verification, use the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm in combination with the first temporary private key sk to decapsulate the ciphertext ct to obtain the shared secret.

[0066] The following examples illustrate the use of the national cryptographic algorithm SM2 for signature authentication, the national cryptographic algorithm SM3 as the key derivation function, and the target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm CNTR in the encryption strategy for key encapsulation / decapsulation. Please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 3 The initiator maintains its SM2 private key (sk_sm2_A) and the responder's SM2 public key, while the responder maintains its SM2 private key (sk_sm2_B) and the initiator's SM2 public key. The hybrid key negotiation process is as follows: 1. The initiator generates a temporary first key pair (pk, sk) based on the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm CNTR; calls the initiator's SM2 private key (sk_sm2_A) as a signing certificate to sign the first temporary public key pk, and obtains the first signature information sign_A; and sends the first temporary public key pk and the first signature information sign_A to the responder.

[0067] 2. The responder receives the first temporary public key pk and the first signature information sign_A, and verifies the first signature information sign_A based on the initiator's SM2 public key as the signature certificate. If the verification is successful, the process continues; otherwise, it terminates.

[0068] 3. After successful verification, the responder encapsulates the first temporary public key pk using the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm CNTR, i.e., CNTR.encaps(pk), to obtain the shared secret ss and ciphertext ct. The responder then uses its SM2 private key as a signing certificate to sign the ciphertext ct, obtaining the second signature information sign_B, and then sends the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B to the initiator.

[0069] 4. The initiator receives the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B sent by the responder, and uses the responder's SM2 public key as a signature certificate to verify the second signature information sign_B. If the verification is successful, the process continues; otherwise, it terminates. After successful verification, the initiator uses the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm CNTR in combination with the first temporary private key sk to decapsulate the ciphertext ct, i.e., CNTR.decaps(sk, ct) to obtain the shared secret ss.

[0070] The shared secret ss is obtained by both parties independently.

[0071] In some implementations, generating a session key based on a service type identifier derived from a shared secret combined with power business data may include: deriving the session key through a key derivation function based on the service type identifier and session key reuse information derived from the shared secret combined with power business data. For example, the key derivation function may be a national cryptographic algorithm selected in the encryption strategy for key derivation, or a national cryptographic algorithm pre-configured for key derivation during the communication terminal initialization phase or other phases. As an example, the key derivation function may be implemented using the national cryptographic algorithm SM3 or SM4. The session key is obtained independently by both parties and stored in their respective session key pools, enabling them to perform encryption and decryption operations independently.

[0072] For example, a session key can be obtained using the function `session_key = SM3_KDF(ss||service type identifier||counter, 256)`. Here, `session_key` is the generated symmetric session key, `SM3_KDF` is a key derivation function based on the SM3 national cryptographic algorithm, `ss` represents the shared secret, `||` represents the concatenation operator used to chain the components together, and `(..., 256)` is the function parameter specifying the output key length as 256 bits. The counter can be a random number, sequence number, or update counter used to ensure freshness and prevent replay attacks. This counter is related to session key reuse information and can be determined through hybrid key negotiation or pre-configured.

[0073] In some implementations, step S240, which involves performing layered encryption on power service data using a session key based on an encryption strategy, may include the following steps S410-440.

[0074] In some cases, after determining the encryption strategy and completing the hybrid key negotiation process to generate the session key, the processing and transmission of power business data can begin. Please refer to [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 4 , Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a layered encryption data structure for power business data is shown.

[0075] Step S410: Based on the specified power communication protocol, encapsulate the power service data to obtain multiple original power protocol messages, and sequentially traverse the multiple original power protocol messages as the current original power protocol message.

[0076] For example, the specified power communication protocol may be the 698 protocol, 104 protocol, 103 protocol, MQTT protocol, SSAL protocol, SSL protocol or other protocols, without limitation.

[0077] The original power protocol message serves as the innermost layer of layered encryption.

[0078] Step S420: If an active session key can be obtained from the session key pool, the current original power protocol message is encrypted at the application layer based on the target national cryptographic algorithm to obtain an application layer encrypted data packet.

[0079] For example, the target national cryptographic algorithm used for encrypting power business data can be SM4-256.

[0080] For example, the application layer encrypted data packet can also be determined by combining the application layer header and the integrity check value. The application layer header refers to the application layer control information. The integrity check value can be obtained based on SM3-HMAC.

[0081] Application-layer encryption is a field-level encryption with HMAC, using SM4-256 to encrypt the original power protocol message.

[0082] Application layer encryption serves as the second layer of layered encryption.

[0083] Step S430: Use the specified tunnel key to perform tunnel layer encryption on the application layer encrypted data packet to obtain the tunnel layer encrypted data packet.

[0084] For example, the tunnel key is independent of the session key, and the tunnel key can be derived from the shared secret ss through a key derivation function with a derivation label different from the session key.

[0085] For example, tunnel layer encryption can be applied to application layer encrypted data packets by incorporating a tunnel layer header. The tunnel layer header includes SPI, sequence number, algorithm identifier, etc. The entire application layer data is then encrypted using a tunnel key.

[0086] Tunnel layer encryption serves as the third layer of layered encryption.

[0087] Step S440: Based on the tunnel layer encrypted data packet, and combined with at least one of the IP header and TCP / UDP header, determine the network transport layer data packet.

[0088] The network transport layer serves as the outermost layer of layered encryption.

[0089] In some implementations, during power business data transmission, if a new encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the business type identifier and resource-related information, a switching control frame can be inserted at the boundary of the application layer encrypted data packet, the tunnel layer encrypted data packet, or the network transport layer data packet; starting from the switching control frame, a smooth switch is made to perform a hybrid key negotiation process and / or layered encryption operation with the new encryption strategy.

[0090] For example, please refer to Figure 5 , Figure 5The timing diagram for dynamic algorithm switching is shown. In normal mode (high-performance mode), the encryption strategies used for packets 1, 2, ..., n are CNTR / CTRU and SM4-256.

[0091] When transmitting packet n, if the CPU load exceeds 80% based on resource-related information, an algorithm switch is triggered. This is achieved by inserting a switch control frame as a switch instruction at the packet boundary, switching to a new encryption strategy. This allows for encryption strategy downgrading. At this point, switching to lightweight mode (low-power mode) is realized. In lightweight mode, packets n+1, n+2, ..., m employ the following new encryption strategies: CNTR / CTRU and SM4-128.

[0092] When transmitting packet m, if the CPU load is detected to be less than 60% based on resource-related information, an algorithm switch is triggered. This is achieved by inserting a switch control frame as a switch instruction at the packet boundary, switching to a new encryption strategy. This allows for an encryption strategy upgrade. At this point, the system can switch to normal mode. In normal mode, packets m+1, m+2, ..., q employ the following new encryption strategies: CNTR / CTRU and SM4-256.

[0093] In some implementations, at least one pre-defined resource level includes a first resource level, a second resource level, and / or a third resource level; the first resource level, the second resource level, and the third resource level decrease in descending order, and respectively correspond to a first-class terminal, a second-class terminal, and a third-class terminal among a plurality of communication terminals; When the initiator is a Class I or Class II terminal, the encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and resource-related information. This includes: querying a pre-configured policy mapping table based on the service type identifier, resource level, and at least one of CPU load, available memory, and channel quality to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy.

[0094] In some implementations, at least one pre-defined resource level includes a first resource level, a second resource level, and / or a third resource level; the first resource level, the second resource level, and the third resource level decrease in descending order, and respectively correspond to a first-class terminal, a second-class terminal, and a third-class terminal among a plurality of communication terminals; The three types of terminals are configured with edge gateway proxies, and the corresponding cryptographic algorithm libraries for the three types of terminals are configured in the edge gateway proxies. When the initiator is a type 3 terminal, the edge gateway proxy performs a hybrid key negotiation process with the edge gateway proxy of the responding type 1 terminal, type 2 terminal or other type 3 terminal to generate a session key and perform layered encryption operations.

[0095] In some implementations, the edge gateway agent and / or a type of terminal are pre-deployed with a trained policy model, which may be a reinforcement learning model.

[0096] When the initiator is a type of terminal, the encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and resource-related information, including: inputting the service type identifier, target resource level, and at least one of CPU load, available memory, and channel quality into the strategy model to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy; When the initiator is a type 3 terminal, the encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and resource-related information. This includes: inputting the service type identifier, target resource level, and at least one of CPU load, available memory, and channel quality into the policy model through the corresponding edge gateway proxy to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy.

[0097] In some implementations, the three types of terminals and their corresponding edge gateway agents are configured with the same pre-shared quantum key pool, and the pre-shared quantum key pool is injected with at least one pre-shared quantum key; When the initiator is a type 3 terminal, the initiator and its corresponding edge gateway agent can transmit power service data based on any pre-shared quantum key, so that the edge gateway agent can: decrypt the power service data based on the pre-shared quantum key, and then the agent initiator and responder can perform a hybrid key negotiation process, layered encryption operation, and forward the data to the responder.

[0098] In some implementations, it is necessary to dynamically update the reinforcement learning-based policy model in order to achieve dynamic self-evolution of the encryption policy.

[0099] Specifically, the hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks may also include the following steps S510-S530.

[0100] Step S510: During the power business data transmission process, after processing a specified number of data packets, calculate the state-action-reward triplet once, and calculate the gradient update of the local policy model based on the triplet; where the state is the input of the policy model, the action is the output of the policy model, and the reward is the feedback score for executing the action.

[0101] Step S520: Upload the gradient update corresponding to the triple to the experience pool in the cloud, so that the gradient updates uploaded by each communication terminal in the cloud based on the experience pool can be periodically federated and averaged to generate new model parameters.

[0102] Step S530: Receive new model parameters from the cloud and update the local strategy model based on the new model parameters.

[0103] In some implementations, the reward can be determined using the following reward function: reward = α·Safety Gain β-delay penalty γ·Energy penalty; Where reward represents the reward, security gain represents the strength level of the current target quantum cryptography algorithm, delay penalty represents the time consumption of the current encryption strategy, and energy consumption penalty represents the current estimated CPU utilization. α, β, and γ are the weighting coefficients corresponding to the security gain, delay penalty, and energy consumption penalty, respectively.

[0104] For example, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 This illustrates a scenario where the encryption policy, based on the policy model output, is affected by resource-related information. In normal mode, the encryption policy uses a high-level CNTR (Content-Based Threat), where "high-level" refers to a higher security level. When resource scarcity is determined based on resource-related information, a degraded mode is entered. In degraded mode, the encryption policy uses a medium-level CNTR or CTRU (Content-Based Threat). When resource criticality is determined based on resource-related information, an emergency mode is entered. In emergency mode, the encryption policy uses a lightweight CTRU or an edge gateway proxy. When resource recovery is determined based on resource-related information, the system can upgrade from emergency mode to degraded mode or normal mode, or vice versa, depending on the specific circumstances.

[0105] For example, please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 This illustrates another scenario where the encryption policy based on the policy model output is affected by resource-related information. When the channel deteriorates, the CTRU mode is used; when the signal recovers, the CNTR mode is used.

[0106] In some implementations, please refer to Figure 8 , Figure 8 A schematic diagram of the dynamic dual-mode switching between the target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm CTRU and CNTR in the encryption strategy is shown.

[0107] If a session key update is required, the channel quality and service type identifier can be obtained. The channel quality is then used to determine whether the channel bandwidth is limited.

[0108] If the channel bandwidth is narrowband, CTRU can be selected, and the requirement for real-time performance can be determined based on the service type identifier. If real-time performance is required, CTRU-768 can be selected; otherwise, CTRU-1024 or CTRU-512 can be selected based on the data volume.

[0109] If the channel bandwidth is wideband, CNTR can be selected, and the requirement for real-time performance can be determined based on the service type identifier. If real-time performance is required, CTRU-768 can be selected; otherwise, CNTR-1024 can be selected.

[0110] After the target quantum cryptography algorithm is selected, the algorithm switch can be performed during key updates. A control frame is inserted to complete the switch and communication can continue.

[0111] As an example, session key update requirements can be determined based on session key pools or session key reuse information.

[0112] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network. This hybrid cryptographic communication method can be applied to any communication terminal that acts as a responder in the power communication network. The hybrid cryptographic communication method may include the following steps S610-S630.

[0113] Step S610: Receive a handshake request sent by the initiator, wherein the handshake request carries an algorithm identifier of the encryption strategy; wherein the encryption strategy is determined by the initiator from the initiator's cryptographic algorithm library based on the business type identifier and resource-related information, the business type identifier is obtained by parsing the power business data to be processed, and the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm.

[0114] Step S620: Perform a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption policy, generate a shared secret between the responder and the initiator, and generate a session key based on the shared secret combined with the service type identifier of the power business data.

[0115] Step S630: Based on the encryption strategy, use the session key to perform layered decryption operations on the power business data received from the initiator to realize the transmission of power business data.

[0116] The following is a specific example for illustration. Example 1: Communication between substation automation terminal and control master station.

[0117] This embodiment uses remote communication between a substation automation terminal (Class II terminal) and a dispatch control master station (Class I terminal) as the application scenario.

[0118] Step 1: Terminal resource classification and initialization.

[0119] Based on resource assessment, the substation automation terminal (RTU) has 48KB of available memory and a medium-performance MCU CPU, classifying it as a Class II terminal. This substation automation terminal is pre-configured with: an SM2 signature key pair for authentication, the CNTR-512 algorithm (for lightweight quantum-resistant encapsulation), and an SM4-256 symmetric encryption engine (implemented with bit slicing optimization).

[0120] Step 2: Real-time control command transmission.

[0121] When the master station sends a "circuit breaker trip" command to the terminal: The instruction was identified as a "high real-time control instruction" (delay requirement <10ms). According to the Class II terminal policy, a session key reuse mechanism is adopted; The terminal and the master station have established a session key pool through a CNTR-512 hybrid key negotiation during the initialization phase, and the active session key is currently used to encrypt command messages; The encrypted message is transmitted to the terminal via the 104 protocol.

[0122] Step 3: Session key update.

[0123] The session key is updated every 24 hours or after every 1000 instructions transmitted. Both parties perform lightweight hybrid key negotiation to derive a new SM4-256 session key; The key update process is performed during off-peak hours and does not affect real-time command transmission.

[0124] Example 2: Communication between power distribution IoT terminal and edge gateway.

[0125] This embodiment is applicable to resource-constrained wireless sensor terminals (Class III terminals).

[0126] Step 1: Lightweight initialization.

[0127] Based on resource assessment, the power distribution terminal has only 8KB of available memory and a low-power MCU CPU, classifying it as a Class III terminal. A pre-shared quantum key pool + edge gateway proxy mode will be adopted for it. The terminal stores only a small number of pre-shared keys (filled by the master station offline). Establish a lightweight encrypted channel with the edge gateway; Quantum-resistant key negotiation is handled by the edge gateway proxy.

[0128] Step 2: Periodic data reporting.

[0129] After the terminal collects environmental monitoring data: Lightweight encryption using a pre-shared key (SM4-128-CTR mode). The encrypted data is sent to the edge gateway via a wireless network; After the edge gateway decrypts, it performs CNTR-768 hybrid key negotiation with the main station on behalf of the terminal to obtain the quantum-resistant session key; The edge gateway re-encrypts the data using the session key and forwards it to the main station.

[0130] Step 3: Exception handling.

[0131] When an abnormal event is detected (such as a sudden rise in equipment temperature) and needs to be reported urgently: The terminal switches to a higher encryption level and uses a high-quality key from the pre-shared key pool for encryption. The edge gateway prioritizes this event and forwards the encrypted data directly. The main station uses the corresponding pre-shared key for decryption to ensure low-latency processing of emergency events.

[0132] Example 3: Policy optimization based on reinforcement learning.

[0133] This embodiment is deployed on a regional gateway (Class I terminal) to demonstrate the policy self-evolution process.

[0134] Step 1: Model initialization.

[0135] Deploy a lightweight DQN (Deep Q Network) model as the policy model. The state space includes: service type, CPU load (5 levels), channel signal-to-noise ratio (3 levels), and historical attack frequency (3 levels). The action space includes: CNTR level (512 / 768 / 1024), the number of session key reuse information limits (1 / 10 / 100), and the number of SM4 rounds (16 / 24 / 32).

[0136] Step 2: Online learning.

[0137] During system operation, a state-action-reward triplet is recorded once for every 1000 data packets processed.

[0138] Step 3: Federated aggregation.

[0139] At the end of each month, each gateway uploads its local model gradients to the cloud. The cloud then performs federated average aggregation to generate an updated global model, which is then distributed to each gateway.

[0140] Step 4: Verify the effect.

[0141] After three months of operation, the system's average latency decreased by 15%, energy consumption decreased by 12%, and the security level remained stable, demonstrating that the reinforcement learning model effectively optimized the choice of encryption strategy.

[0142] This specification provides a hybrid cryptographic communication system for a power communication network. The power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each of which is equipped with a cryptographic algorithm library. The cryptographic algorithm library includes a first type of cryptographic algorithm and a second type of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm. The system is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator. The hybrid cryptographic communication system may include a service awareness module, a dynamic scheduling module, and a hybrid encryption engine.

[0143] The business awareness module is used to parse the business type identifier of the power business data to be processed and to obtain resource-related information; The dynamic scheduling module is used to determine the encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the business type identifier and resource-related information. The encryption strategy includes the combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm. The hybrid encryption engine is used to execute a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption policy, generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generate a session key based on the shared secret and the business type identifier of the power business data. Based on the encryption policy, the session key is used to perform layered encryption operations on the power business data and send it to the responder to realize the transmission of power business data.

[0144] The specific functions and effects of the hybrid cryptographic communication system can be explained by referring to other embodiments in this specification, and will not be repeated here. Each module in the hybrid cryptographic communication system can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. Each module can be embedded in hardware or independently of the processor in the communication terminal, or it can be stored in software in the memory of the communication terminal, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to each module.

[0145] This specification also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a computer, implements the hybrid cryptographic communication method for the power communication network in any of the above embodiments.

[0146] This specification also provides a computer program product containing instructions that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to implement the hybrid cryptographic communication method for the power communication network in any of the above embodiments.

[0147] This specification also provides a communication terminal, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, which, when executed by the processor, implements the hybrid cryptographic communication method of the power communication network in any of the above embodiments.

[0148] In some implementations, please refer to Figure 9 The internal structure diagram of this communication terminal can be shown as follows: Figure 9As shown, the communication terminal includes a processor, memory, and communication interface connected via a system bus. The processor provides computing and control capabilities. The memory includes a non-volatile storage medium and internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores the operating system and computer programs. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage medium. The communication interface is used for wired or wireless communication with external terminals; wireless communication can be achieved through Wi-Fi, carrier networks, NFC (Near Field Communication), or other technologies. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements a hybrid cryptographic communication method for the power communication network.

[0149] It is understood that the specific examples in this document are only intended to help those skilled in the art better understand the embodiments described herein, and are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.

[0150] It is understood that in the various embodiments described in this specification, the sequence number of each process does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments described in this specification.

[0151] It is understood that the various implementation methods described in this specification can be implemented individually or in combination, and the implementation methods in this specification are not limited in this respect.

[0152] Unless otherwise stated, all technical and scientific terms used in the embodiments of this specification have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. The terminology used in this specification is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of this specification. The term "and / or" as used in this specification includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items. The singular forms "a," "the," and "the" as used in the embodiments of this specification and the appended claims are also intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0153] It is understood that the processor in the embodiments of this specification can be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In implementation, each step of the above method embodiments can be completed by integrated logic circuits in the processor's hardware or by instructions in software form. The processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. It can implement or execute the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this specification. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the methods disclosed in the embodiments of this specification can be directly implemented by a hardware decoding processor, or by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software modules can reside in random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, or other mature storage media in the art. This storage medium is located in memory; the processor reads information from the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above methods.

[0154] It is understood that the memory in the embodiments of this specification may be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory may be random access memory (RAM). It should be noted that the memory in the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0155] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this specification.

[0156] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method implementations, and will not be repeated here.

[0157] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this specification, but the scope of protection of this invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this specification should be included within the scope of protection of this specification. Therefore, the scope of protection of this invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A hybrid cryptographic communication method for power communication networks, characterized in that, The power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each of which is configured with a cryptographic algorithm library, which includes a first-class cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second-class cryptographic algorithm; the method is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator; the method includes: Parse the business type identifier of the power business data to be processed, and obtain resource-related information; Based on the business type identifier and the resource-related information, an encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library, wherein the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm; A hybrid key negotiation process is executed according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and a session key is generated based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power business data. Based on the encryption strategy, the power business data is subjected to layered encryption using the session key and then sent to the responder to realize the transmission of power business data.

2. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first type of cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library includes at least one of the following national cryptographic algorithms: SM2, SM3, and SM4; the second type of cryptographic algorithms in the cryptographic algorithm library includes at least one of the following post-quantum cryptographic algorithms: CNTR, CTRU, and Kyber; CTRU is a key encapsulation algorithm based on the NTRU lattice, and CNTR is a compact key encapsulation algorithm based on the NTRU lattice; any national cryptographic algorithm and / or any post-quantum cryptographic algorithm includes at least one strength level information; The encryption strategy includes a combination of a target post-quantum cryptographic algorithm and its strength level and at least one target national cryptographic algorithm and its strength level, and also includes session key reuse information; wherein, the session key reuse information includes the number of session keys generated in a single hybrid key negotiation process, and the session keys generated by the encryption strategy are stored in a session key pool.

3. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The session key reuse information also includes the method for determining the active session key.

4. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The initiator maintains an initiator's private key and a responder's public key, and the responder maintains a responder's private key and an initiator's public key; The step of performing a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption policy to generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder includes: Based on the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm, a temporary first key pair (pk, sk) is generated, including a first temporary public key pk and a first temporary private key sk; The initiator's private key is used to sign the first temporary public key pk to obtain the first signature information sign_A; The first temporary public key pk and the first signature information sign_A are sent to the responder, so that the responder: verifies the first signature information sign_A based on the initiator's public key, and after successful verification, encapsulates the first temporary public key pk using the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm to obtain ciphertext ct, calls the responder's private key to sign the ciphertext ct to obtain the second signature information sign_B, and sends the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B to the initiator; The system receives the ciphertext ct and the second signature information sign_B sent by the responder, verifies the second signature information sign_B using the responder's public key, and after successful verification, decapsulates the ciphertext ct using the target post-quantum cryptography algorithm in combination with the first temporary private key sk to obtain the shared secret.

5. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The generation of a session key based on the shared secret combined with the service type identifier of the power business data includes: Based on the shared secret combined with the service type identifier and session key reuse information of the power business data, the session key is derived through a key derivation function.

6. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the encryption strategy, layered encryption operations are performed on the power service data using the session key, including: Based on the specified power communication protocol, the power service data is encapsulated to obtain multiple original power protocol messages, and the multiple original power protocol messages are sequentially traversed to become the current original power protocol message; If an active session key can be obtained from the session key pool, the current original power protocol message is encrypted at the application layer based on the target national cryptographic algorithm to obtain an application layer encrypted data packet. The application layer encrypted data packet is encrypted using a specified tunnel key to obtain a tunnel layer encrypted data packet.

7. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 6, characterized in that, During the power business data transmission process, if a new encryption strategy is determined from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the business type identifier and the resource-related information, a switching control frame is inserted at the boundary of the application layer encrypted data packet or the tunnel layer encrypted data packet. Starting from the switching control frame, a smooth switch is made to perform the hybrid key negotiation process and / or the layered encryption operation with the new encryption strategy.

8. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, In the power communication network, any of the communication terminals is pre-classified into at least one resource level, wherein a higher resource level indicates a higher upper limit of terminal resources for the corresponding communication terminal. The upper limit of terminal resources is determined based on at least one of the communication terminal's maximum CPU computing power, maximum memory, and maximum supported channel bandwidth. The resource-related information includes resource level, and also includes at least one of CPU load, available memory, and channel quality.

9. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The pre-defined resource level includes a first resource level, a second resource level, and / or a third resource level; the first resource level, the second resource level, and the third resource level decrease in descending order, and respectively correspond to a first-class terminal, a second-class terminal, and a third-class terminal among the plurality of communication terminals; When the initiator is a type I terminal or a type II terminal, the step of determining the encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and the resource-related information includes: querying a pre-configured policy mapping table to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy based on the service type identifier, the resource level, and at least one of the CPU load, the available memory, and the channel quality.

10. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The pre-defined resource level includes a first resource level, a second resource level, and / or a third resource level; the first resource level, the second resource level, and the third resource level decrease in descending order, and respectively correspond to a first-class terminal, a second-class terminal, and a third-class terminal among the plurality of communication terminals; The three types of terminals are configured with an edge gateway proxy, and the cryptographic algorithm library corresponding to the three types of terminals is configured in the edge gateway proxy; When the initiator is one of the three types of terminals, the hybrid key negotiation process is executed through the edge gateway proxy with the edge gateway proxy of the responding terminal (type 1, type 2, or other type 3 terminals) to generate the session key and the layered encryption operation.

11. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 10, characterized in that, The edge gateway proxy and / or the type of terminal are pre-deployed with a trained policy model; When the initiator is the type of terminal, the step of determining the encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and the resource-related information includes: inputting the service type identifier, the target resource level, and at least one of the CPU load, the available memory, and the channel quality into the strategy model to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy; When the initiator is one of the three types of terminals, the step of determining the encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the service type identifier and the resource-related information includes: inputting at least one of the service type identifier, the target resource level, the CPU load, the available memory, and the channel quality into the strategy model through the corresponding edge gateway proxy to obtain the corresponding encryption strategy.

12. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The three types of terminals and their corresponding edge gateway agents are configured with the same pre-shared quantum key pool, and the pre-shared quantum key pool is injected with at least one pre-shared quantum key. When the initiator is one of the three types of terminals, the initiator and its corresponding edge gateway agent can transmit power service data based on any of the pre-shared quantum keys, so that the edge gateway agent can: decrypt the power service data based on the pre-shared quantum key, and then act as an agent for the initiator and the responder to perform the hybrid key negotiation process, layered encryption operation and forward to the responder.

13. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 11, characterized in that, The method further includes: During the power business data transmission process, a state-action-reward triple is calculated once after processing a specified number of data packets, and the gradient update of the local policy model is calculated based on the triple; wherein, the state is the input of the policy model, the action is the output of the policy model, and the reward is the feedback score for performing the action; The gradient updates corresponding to the triples are uploaded to the experience pool in the cloud, so that the cloud performs periodic federated averaging aggregation of the gradient updates uploaded by each communication terminal in the experience pool to generate new model parameters. Receive the new model parameters sent from the cloud, and update the local strategy model based on the new model parameters.

14. The hybrid cryptographic communication method according to claim 13, characterized in that, The reward is determined using the following reward function: reward = α·Safety Gain β-delay penalty γ·Energy penalty; Among them, security gain represents the strength level of the current target post-quantum cryptography algorithm, delay penalty represents the time consumption of the current encryption strategy, and energy consumption penalty represents the current estimated CPU utilization. α, β, and γ are the weighting coefficients corresponding to the security gain, delay penalty, and energy consumption penalty, respectively.

15. A hybrid cryptographic communication method for a power communication network, characterized in that, The power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each of which is configured with a cryptographic algorithm library, which includes a first-class cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second-class cryptographic algorithm; the method is applied to any communication terminal acting as a responder; the method includes: The system receives a handshake request sent by the initiator, wherein the handshake request carries an algorithm identifier of an encryption strategy; wherein the encryption strategy is determined by the initiator from its cryptographic algorithm library based on a business type identifier and resource-related information, the business type identifier is obtained by parsing the power business data to be processed, and the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm. A hybrid key negotiation process is executed according to the encryption strategy to generate a shared secret between the responder and the initiator, and a session key is generated based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power business data. Based on the encryption strategy, the session key is used to perform layered decryption operations on the power business data received from the initiator, thereby realizing the transmission of power business data.

16. A hybrid cryptographic communication system for a power communication network, characterized in that, The power communication network includes multiple communication terminals, each configured with a cryptographic algorithm library, which includes a first-class cryptographic algorithm and a quantum-resistant second-class cryptographic algorithm; the system is applied to any communication terminal acting as the initiator; the system includes: The business awareness module is used to parse the business type identifier of the power business data to be processed and to obtain resource-related information; The dynamic scheduling module is used to determine an encryption strategy from the cryptographic algorithm library based on the business type identifier and the resource-related information, wherein the encryption strategy includes a combination of the first type of cryptographic algorithm and the second type of cryptographic algorithm; A hybrid encryption engine is used to execute a hybrid key negotiation process according to the encryption policy, generate a shared secret between the initiator and the responder, and generate a session key based on the shared secret and the service type identifier of the power service data; based on the encryption policy, the session key is used to perform layered encryption operations on the power service data and send it to the responder to realize the transmission of power service data.