Method and apparatus for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for loudspeakers

Abstract

Method (100) for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker (200) comprising: arranging (102) a chip (300), in particular a radio-frequency identification chip (RFID chip) or near-field communication chip (NFC chip) attached to the loudspeaker (200); writing (104) the chip (300) with at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200); determining (106) a dynamic parameter (306), in particular by means of an encryption (VE), depending on at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) and depending on at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300) by means of the chip (300);Generating (108) a server request (308), in particular in the form of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), depending on the dynamic parameter (306), depending on the at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200), and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300), using the chip (300); and evaluating (114) the server request (308) by a server (400), in particular by means of a decryption (VD), to determine whether the server request (308) is consistent and the loudspeaker (200) is an original.

Description

[0001] The invention relates to a method and a device that enable anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker, as well as a loudspeaker that includes this anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0002] The existence of counterfeit and unauthorized copies or illegally acquired products, especially stolen products (hereinafter collectively referred to as counterfeits or fake products), is well-known in all markets, including the loudspeaker sector. However, it is often impossible to detect these counterfeits. In particular, for a user, such as an end consumer, these counterfeits are often indistinguishable from genuine products. Counterfeit loudspeakers are also found in the rental industry, where loudspeakers frequently change hands, and renters have an interest in obtaining genuine loudspeakers.

[0003] Therefore, anti-counterfeiting measures are desirable that make it more difficult to counterfeit loudspeakers and profitably market these counterfeits, and that allow, especially for the end consumer, to verify the authenticity of the loudspeaker.

[0004] This is achieved by a loudspeaker, a method and a device according to the independent claims.

[0005] The method for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker comprises: arranging a chip, in particular a radio-frequency identification chip or near-field communication chip, on the loudspeaker; programming the chip with at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker; determining a dynamic parameter, in particular by means of encryption, depending on at least one static parameter of the chip, depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker and depending on at least one dynamic parameter of the chip;a generating of a server request, in particular a uniform resource locator, depending on the dynamic parameter, depending on the at least one static parameter of the chip, depending on the at least one static parameter of the loudspeaker and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter of the chip, by means of the chip; and an evaluation of the server request by a server, in particular by means of decryption, to determine whether the server request is consistent and the loudspeaker is an original.

[0006] The dynamic parameter, which is determined based on factors including the chip's dynamic parameter, is a dynamically changing identifier that cannot be replicated without in-depth knowledge of how the dynamic parameter is determined. This makes counterfeiting the chip more difficult and improves anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0007] The further interdependence of the loudspeaker's product-specific parameter and the chip's static parameter in determining the dynamic parameter results in a unique and unambiguous assignment of the loudspeaker to the chip. This further complicates counterfeiting and improves the loudspeaker's anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0008] By generating the server request, all parameters required to verify the speaker's authenticity are efficiently and easily provided. The server's evaluation of the request allows for analysis, particularly decryption, that is performed remotely from the chip and any device reading the chip. This means that no information about the method used to determine the dynamic parameter, especially encryption and / or decryption, needs to be shared with the chip or the reading device. This further enhances and secures the counterfeit protection.

[0009] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker is or includes a loudspeaker article number and / or a loudspeaker serial number and / or a loudspeaker production parameter.

[0010] These types of parameters uniquely characterize the loudspeaker and are created and used during the loudspeaker's production process, for example, for internal identification. Furthermore, these parameters contain information about the loudspeaker that is also of interest to users, particularly end consumers, intermediaries, rental companies, or repair shops. Such information might include, for example, a production date, manufacturing tolerances, or quality control results. This further enhances counterfeit protection, as these parameters allow for unambiguous identification of the loudspeaker, enabling, for instance, the detection of stolen or removed chips that have been installed in counterfeit loudspeakers.

[0011] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one static parameter of the chip is or includes a serial number of the chip, for example a Unique Identification Number, which is in particular a predetermined and / or unique serial number.

[0012] The serial number enables a unique identification of the chip, thereby improving protection against counterfeiting and making it more secure.

[0013] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one dynamic parameter of the chip is or includes a read counter of the chip, which characterizes a number of readouts of the chip.

[0014] The read counter changes each time the chip is read, which also means the dynamic parameter changes with each read. Using the read counter simplifies the implementation of anti-counterfeiting measures and simultaneously improves their security, as the same server request or dynamic parameter is not provided for each read.

[0015] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip can be written using a key unique to each chip and is written using a writing device coupled to the server, wherein the unique key is encrypted using a uniform key and the server has access to both the unique key and the uniform key.

[0016] This further improves the speaker's anti-counterfeiting protection, as each chip requires its own key to be written to it. Encrypting the individual key, for example using a key-wrapping method, further enhances the security of the anti-counterfeiting protection. Since only the server has access to the keys, the likelihood of them being compromised is also reduced.

[0017] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip is arranged on or in a housing of the loudspeaker, in particular in a space that is at least partially bounded by a housing wall of the housing.

[0018] The placement of the chip on or inside the housing does not impair the function of the speaker.

[0019] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the installation space, which is at least partially limited by the housing wall, is a recess originating from an inner wall of the housing.

[0020] This allows the chip to be positioned in a location on the speaker that is inaccessible, or only accessible with considerable effort, when the speaker is assembled. Furthermore, recessing the chip saves space and protects it from external influences. This type of chip placement is also inconspicuous, further enhancing the speaker's counterfeit protection.

[0021] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip, which is located in the installation space at least partially limited by the housing wall of the housing, is sealed, in particular by means of a coating, a sealant, a coating or epoxy resin.

[0022] This makes removing the chip more difficult and, for example, impossible without damaging it, thus improving the speaker's anti-counterfeiting protection. The chip can also be concealed within the housing in a way that is not visible to third parties.

[0023] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the procedure includes the provision of a result by the server depending on the evaluation of the server request, wherein the result characterizes at least one property of the loudspeaker, in particular the authenticity of the loudspeaker and / or production data and / or a reported theft of the loudspeaker.

[0024] Providing the result does not reveal any information about the method of anti-counterfeiting, but only the information relevant to a user regarding the speaker's characteristics. Thus, the anti-counterfeiting protection for the speaker is further improved.

[0025] Preferably, the method comprises reading the chip using an end device, in particular a mobile end device; providing the server request to the server by the end device; wherein the result is provided to the end device.

[0026] This allows the user to independently verify the authenticity of the speaker at any time and in any location, without any further action or tools, and in particular to retrieve further information about the speaker. Thus, a simple and quick check of the speaker to determine whether it is a counterfeit or an original is possible.

[0027] The device comprises: a chip, in particular a radio-frequency identification chip or near-field communication chip, arranged on the loudspeaker; wherein the chip is described by at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker; wherein the chip is configured to provide a dynamic parameter, in particular by means of encryption, depending on at least one static parameter of the chip, depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker, and depending on at least one dynamic parameter of the chip; wherein the chip is configured to generate a server request, in particular in the form of a uniform resource locator, depending on the dynamic parameter, depending on the at least one static parameter of the chip, depending on the at least one static parameter of the loudspeaker, and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter of the chip;a server that is trained to evaluate the server request, in particular by means of decryption, to determine whether the server request is consistent and whether the speaker is an original;

[0028] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one static product-specific parameter of the loudspeaker is a loudspeaker article number and / or a loudspeaker serial number and / or a loudspeaker production parameter.

[0029] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one static parameter of the chip is a predefined serial number of the chip, for example a Unique Identification Number.

[0030] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that at least one dynamic parameter of the chip is a read counter of the chip, which characterizes a number of readouts of the chip.

[0031] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip can be written to using a key unique to each chip, and a writing device coupled to the server is designed to write to the chip using the key unique to each chip, wherein the individual key is encrypted in particular using a uniform key, and the server has access to the individual key and the uniform key.

[0032] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip is arranged on or in a housing of the loudspeaker, in particular in a space that is at least partially bounded by a housing wall of the housing.

[0033] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the installation space, which is at least partially limited by the housing wall, is a recess originating from an inner wall of the housing.

[0034] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the chip, which is located in the installation space at least partially limited by the housing wall of the housing, is sealed, in particular by means of a paint, a sealant, a coating or epoxy resin.

[0035] An advantageous example is characterized by the fact that the server is trained to provide a result depending on the evaluated server request, the result being at least one property of the loudspeaker, in particular the authenticity of the loudspeaker and / or production data and / or a reported theft of the loudspeaker.

[0036] An advantageous example is characterized in that the device comprises an end device, in particular a mobile end device, which is configured to read the chip; wherein the end device is configured to provide the server request to the server; and the server is configured to provide the result to the end device.

[0037] The loudspeaker includes the device and is designed to perform the procedure as described above.

[0038] Further advantageous embodiments will become apparent from the drawing and the following description. The drawing shows: Fig. 1 a schematic representation of a device for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker; Fig. 2 a schematic representation of an embodiment of the device; Fig. 3 a schematic cross-sectional view of the loudspeaker; Fig.4. A flowchart of a procedure for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker; Fig. 5 an excerpt of an embodiment of the method.

[0039] The Fig. Figure 1 shows, by way of example, a device 700, in a schematic representation, and process steps of a method 100, in a block diagram, for providing anti-counterfeiting protection for a loudspeaker 200.

[0040] The device 700 comprises a chip 300, in particular a radio-frequency identification chip (RFID chip) or near-field communication chip (NFC chip), which is arranged on the loudspeaker 200 102. The chip 300 is described with at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 104.

[0041] The chip 300 is designed to determine a dynamic parameter 306, in particular by means of an encryption VE, depending on at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300, depending on at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and depending on at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300 106.

[0042] The encryption VE, for example, is a symmetric or asymmetric encryption method, wherein the at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300, the at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and the at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300 represent input variables of the encryption method and the dynamic parameter 306 represents an output variable of the encryption method.

[0043] It may be provided that each individual chip 300 from a multitude of chips determines the dynamic parameter 306 by means of an individual and, in particular, unique key.

[0044] The at least one dynamic parameter 304 of chip 300 causes the dynamic parameter 306 to also exhibit dynamic behavior and change. This significantly hinders the copying of the VE encryption using statistical methods, thereby improving counterfeit protection.

[0045] The chip 300 is also designed to generate a server request 308, in particular in the form of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), depending on the dynamic parameter 306, depending on the at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300, depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300 108.

[0046] In this example, server request 308 consists of a base address 310, the dynamic parameter 306, at least one static parameter 302 of chip 300, at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of loudspeaker 200, and at least one dynamic parameter 304 of chip 300. This server request 308 enables simple communication with a server 400, which has the base address 310, and additionally provides data required for the process in the form of parameters 306, 304, 302, and 202. In this example, server 400 is operated by a manufacturer of loudspeaker 200.

[0047] It can be provided that the chip 300, in particular exclusively, can be written to using a key WK that is unique to each chip 300 and is written to using a write device 402 coupled to the server 400. 104 In the example, the unique key WK is encrypted using a uniform key MK, in particular using a Kye wrapping method. The server 400 has access to the unique key WK and the uniform key MK. It can be provided that the ERP database manages at least the unique key WK and the server 400 manages the uniform key MK. The unique key WK is unique for each chip 300 among the multitude of chips and can be assigned to the chip 300, for example, using at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300.The individual key WK can be called the writing key and the uniform key MK the master key.

[0048] The writing device 402 can be, in particular, a smartphone or laptop, as a specially designed terminal device. This terminal device includes, for example, software specifically intended for writing 104. This software is preferably only available to the manufacturer of the loudspeaker 200.

[0049] The following is an example of the writing process 104 of chip 300. Chip 300 provides the static parameter 302 of the chip 118 to the writing device 402. Using this parameter 302, the writing device 402 retrieves the corresponding individual key WK from the server 400 via a data exchange 120 in order to write to chip 300. The at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 is provided to the writing device 402 by the server 400, for example, by an enterprise resource planning (ERP) database 406 connected to the server 400, or manually entered into the writing device 402. Subsequently, the writing device 402 writes to chip 300 with the at least one product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200.

[0050] In the example, at least one static, product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 is a part number of the loudspeaker 200 and / or a serial number of the loudspeaker 200 and / or a production parameter of the loudspeaker 200. These types of parameters specify the loudspeaker 200, in particular directly, unambiguously, and uniquely, and can be provided by the ERP database 406.

[0051] In an exemplary embodiment, the at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300 is a read counter of the chip 300, which characterizes the number of reads of the chip 300. This can also be referred to as a tap counter. When the chip 300 is read, in particular by means of the terminal device 600, the read counter is incremented. As a result, the at least one dynamic parameter 304 changes for each read of the chip 300, and consequently, so does the dynamic parameter 306. It is conceivable that the at least one dynamic parameter of the chip 300 could alternatively or additionally be a date and / or a current time.

[0052] In one embodiment, the at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300 is a serial number of the chip 300, which is preferably predetermined and / or unique, for example a Unique Identification Number (UID). The UID typically identifies an individual chip uniquely and is preferably unchangeable. The static parameter 302 of the chip 300 is predetermined, in particular by a manufacturer of the chip 300, or is determined at the latest during the programming process 104 of the chip 300.

[0053] The Fig. Figure 2 shows, by way of example, the device 700, in a schematic representation, and the process steps of the method 100, in a block diagram, for providing the anti-counterfeiting protection for the loudspeaker 200.

[0054] The device 700 comprises the server 400, which is configured to evaluate the server request 308, in particular by means of a decryption VD 114, to determine whether the server request 308 is consistent and whether the loudspeaker 200 is an original. The server 400 has knowledge of the encryption VE in the form of the corresponding decryption VD; this can, for example, be a key, in particular for each individual chip 300 from the multitude of chips, an individual and unique key. This key can also be referred to as a verification key.

[0055] Server 400 evaluates server request 308 using the decryption function VD, specifically the parameters 306, 304, 302, and 202, to determine its internal consistency. For example, after decrypting the dynamic parameter 306 using VD, server 400 checks whether the resulting static parameter 302 of chip 300, the static product-specific parameter 202 of speaker 200, and the dynamic parameter 304 of chip 300 correspond to the parameters 202, 302, and 304 provided by server request 308. If they do, the server request is consistent and speaker 200 is genuine. If server request 308 is inconsistent, the speaker 200 is counterfeit, or the server request has been corrupted or manipulated.

[0056] Furthermore, it may be provided that the server 400, for example via the ERP database 406, checks during the evaluation 114 of the server request 308 whether at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300 are identified as belonging together.

[0057] Furthermore, it is conceivable that the decryption VD, for example by the ERP database 406, is provided after the server 400 has knowledge of the chip 300 to be evaluated through the server request 308, for example through the transmitted static parameter 302 of the chip 300.

[0058] In one embodiment, the server 400 is configured to provide a result 404 depending on the evaluation 114 of the server request 116, wherein the result 404 characterizes at least one property 404a...404d of the loudspeaker 200, in particular an authenticity 404a, 404b of the loudspeaker and / or production data 404d and / or a reported theft 404c of the loudspeaker 200.

[0059] After evaluating server request 308 (114), server 400 has knowledge of the authenticity of speaker 200, in particular whether speaker 200 is an original or a fake.

[0060] In the example, the device 700 comprises an end device 600, in particular a mobile end device, which is configured to read the chip 300 110. The end device 600 is also configured to provide the server request 308 to the server 400 112, wherein the server 400 is configured to provide the result 404 to the end device 600 116. The result 404 is displayed to a user on the end device 600 in the form of properties 404a...404d, so that the user receives information about the properties 404a...404d of the loudspeaker 200.

[0061] The terminal 600 is a device designed to read the chip 300, for example, an NFC-enabled or RFID-enabled smartphone. This makes it possible to verify the authenticity of the speaker 200 not only for a limited group of users, but is available to any user who possesses a suitable terminal, in particular an NFC-enabled and / or RFID-enabled smartphone.

[0062] The following is a schematic example for illustration, showing the structure of server request 308 and the parameters 202, 302, 304, 306. Base address 310: https: / / manufacturer.com Article number 202: an=1234 Serial number 202: sn=1000 Serial number 302 of chip 300: uid=A1B2C3 Readout counter 304 of chip 300: c=0003 Dynamic parameter 306: dp=A37BG983NLD

[0063] For these parameters 202, 302, 304, 306, for example, a server request 308 results from: https: / / marken.com / ?an=1234 / ?sn=1000 / ?uid=A1B2C3 / ?c=0003 / ? dp=A37BG983NLD For a first readout of chip 300. For a second readout of chip 300, the dynamic parameter 304 of chip 300 changes to the read counter: Readout counter 304 of chip 300: c=0004 and the dynamic parameter 306 due to the encryption VE to: Dynamic parameter 306: dp=J5HG4PL896F.

[0064] The server request for the second readout is therefore: https: / / hersteller.com / ?an=1234 / ?sn=1000 / ?uid=A1B2C3 / ?c=0003 / ?dp=J5HG4PL896F.

[0065] In the example, the server 400, in particular the ERP database 406, is known to which at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300 is assigned to which at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200.

[0066] It can be provided that the server 400, in particular the ERP database 406, has access to further data specific to each individual loudspeaker 200, which can be identified, for example, by the static product-specific parameter 202. This further data includes, for example, production-related data such as a production date and place of manufacture, or data on the results of a test or measurement procedure. Based on this data, it is also possible to identify an individual loudspeaker 200, for example, by means of a verification measurement of this data. This allows for the verification of a first, for example, counterfeit loudspeaker to determine whether a chip belonging to an original second loudspeaker has been removed and attached to the first counterfeit loudspeaker.It may be intended that the further data will only be provided, at least in part, within the context of maintenance and / or repair work.

[0067] The Fig. Figure 3 shows a schematic sectional view of a housing 204 of the loudspeaker 200.

[0068] In one embodiment of the device 700, the chip 300 is arranged on or in the housing 204 of the loudspeaker 200, in particular in a space 206 which is at least partially limited by a housing wall of the housing 204.

[0069] The installation space 206, which is at least partially limited by the housing wall, is, for example, a recess extending from an inner wall 208 of the housing 204.

[0070] The inner wall 208 of the housing is not visible when the loudspeaker is assembled and is inaccessible to a user. This protects the chip 300 and makes its removal more difficult, but it can still be read and written, particularly by the terminal 600 and the write device 402. This improves the anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0071] It may be provided that the chip 300, located in the installation space 206 which is at least partially bounded by the housing wall of the housing 204, is sealed, in particular by means of a coating and / or a sealant and / or a coating and / or epoxy resin. This further complicates the removal of the chip 300 and improves the protection against counterfeiting.

[0072] The chip 300 can be sealed, for example, by filling the recess with the aforementioned means or a combination thereof. It is also conceivable that a chip 300 arranged on a surface of the housing 204 can be sealed by coating it with the aforementioned means or a combination thereof.

[0073] It is conceivable that the chip 300 is sealed in such a way that it cannot be separated from the loudspeaker 200 without destruction. This may involve the destruction of the chip 300 and / or the loudspeaker 200, in particular the housing 204.

[0074] The Fig. Figure 4 shows a flowchart of procedure 100 for providing the anti-counterfeiting protection of the loudspeaker 200.

[0075] The method 100 comprises arranging 102 of the chip 300, in particular a radio-frequency identification chip (RFID chip) or near-field communication chip (NFC chip) on the loudspeaker 200 and writing 104 of the chip 300 with at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200.

[0076] The method 100 also includes providing 106 the dynamic parameter 306, in particular by means of the encryption VE, depending on the at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300, depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300 by means of the chip 300.

[0077] The method 100 further comprises generating 108 the server request 308, in particular in the form of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL), depending on the dynamic parameter 306, depending on the at least one static parameter 302 of the chip 300, depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter 202 of the loudspeaker 200 and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter 304 of the chip 300, by means of the chip 300.

[0078] The procedure further includes an evaluation 114 of server request 308 by server 400, in particular by means of decryption VD, to determine whether server request 308 is consistent and speaker 200 is an original.

[0079] It may be provided that the procedure 100 includes a provision 116 of the result 404 by the server 400 depending on the evaluation 114 of the server request 308, wherein the result 404 characterizes at least one property 404a...404d of the loudspeaker 200, in particular the authenticity 404a, 404b of the loudspeaker and / or production data 404d and / or a reported theft 404c of the loudspeaker 200.

[0080] The Fig. Figure 5 shows a flowchart with steps of an embodiment of method 100. It can be provided that method 100 includes reading 110 of the chip 300 by means of the terminal device 600, in particular a mobile terminal device, and providing 112 of the server request 306 to the server 400 by the terminal device 600. In this embodiment, the result 404 is provided to the terminal device 600 by the server 400 116.

[0081] The Fig. 4 and Fig.Figure 5 represents an example of procedure 100 and not a fixed sequence or a fixed start or end point for procedure 100. It is conceivable that individual steps of procedure 100 could be performed in a swapped or reversed order. QUOTES INCLUDED IN THE DESCRIPTION

[0000] This list of documents cited by the applicant was automatically generated and is included solely for the reader's convenience. The list is not part of the German patent or utility model application. The DPMA accepts no liability for any errors or omissions. Cited non-patent literature

[0000] https: / / marken.com / ?an=1234 / ?sn=1000 / ?uid=A1B2C3 / ?c=0003 / ? dp=A37BG983NLD

[0063] https: / / marken.com / ?an=1234 / ?sn=1000 / ?uid=A1B2C3 / ?c=0003 / ? dp=J5HG4PL896F

[0064]

Claims

[1] A method (100) for providing counterfeit protection for a loudspeaker (200) comprising: - arranging (102) a chip (300), in particular a radio frequency identification chip (RFID chip) or near field communication chip (NFC chip) on the loudspeaker (200); - writing (104) the chip (300) with at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200); - determining (106) a dynamic parameter (306), in particular by means of an encryption (VE), depending on at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) and depending on at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300) by means of the chip (300); - generating (108) a server request (308), in particular in the form of a uniform resource locator (URL), depending on the dynamic parameter (306), depending on the at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300), by means of the chip (300); and - evaluating (114) the server request (308) by a server (400), in particular by means of decryption (VD), to determine whether the server request (308) is consistent and the loudspeaker (200) is an original. [2] The method (100) according to claim 1, wherein the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) is an article number of the loudspeaker (200) and / or a serial number of the loudspeaker (200) and / or a production parameter of the loudspeaker (200). [3] The method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300) is a particular predetermined and / or unique serial number of the chip (300), for example a unique identification number (UID). [4] The method (100) according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300) is a readout counter of the chip (300) that characterizes a number of readouts of the chip (300). [5] The method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the chip (300) is writable by means of a key (WK) that is individual for a respective chip (300) and is written (104) by means of a writing device (402) coupled to the server (400), wherein the individual key (WK) is encrypted in particular by means of a uniform key (MK) and the server (400) has access to the individual key (WK) and the uniform key (MK). [6] The method (100) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the chip (300) is arranged (102) on or in a housing (204) of the loudspeaker (200), in particular in an installation space (206) delimited at least partially by a housing wall of the housing. [7] The method (100) according to claim 6, wherein the installation space (206) delimited at least partially by the housing wall is a recess extending from an inner wall (208) of the housing (204). [8] The method (100) according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the chip (300) arranged in the installation space (206) delimited at least partially by the housing wall of the housing (204) is sealed, in particular by means of a coating and / or a sealing compound and / or a coating and / or epoxy resin. [9] The method (100) according to one of the preceding claims comprising providing (116) a result (404) by the server (400) depending on the evaluation (114) of the server request (308), wherein the result (404) characterizes at least one property (404a...404d) of the loudspeaker (200), in particular an authenticity (404a, 404b) of the loudspeaker and / or production data (404d) and / or a reported theft (404c) of the loudspeaker (200). [10] The method (100) according to claim 9 comprising: - reading (110) the chip (300) by means of a terminal (600), in particular a mobile terminal and - Providing (112) the server request (306) for the server (400) by the terminal (600), wherein the result (404) is provided (116) to the terminal (600) by the server (400). [11] A device (700) for providing anti-counterfeit protection for a loudspeaker (200), comprising: - a chip (300), in particular a radio frequency identification chip (RFID chip) or near field communication chip (NFC chip), which is arranged on the loudspeaker (200); - wherein the chip (200) is described with at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200); - wherein the chip (200) is designed to determine (106) a dynamic parameter (306), in particular by means of an encryption (VE), depending on at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) and depending on at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300); - wherein the chip (300) is designed to generate (108) a server request (308), in particular in the form of a uniform resource locator (URL), depending on the dynamic parameter (306), depending on the at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300), depending on the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) and depending on the at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300); - a server (400) which is designed to evaluate (114) the server request (308), in particular by means of a decryption (VD), to determine whether the server request (308) is consistent and the loudspeaker (200) is an original. [12] The device (700) according to claim 11, wherein the at least one static product-specific parameter (202) of the loudspeaker (200) is an article number of the loudspeaker (200) and / or a serial number of the loudspeaker (200) and / or a production parameter of the loudspeaker (200). [13] The device (700) according to one of claims 11 or 12, wherein the at least one static parameter (302) of the chip (300) is a particular predetermined serial number of the chip (300), for example a Unique Identification Number (UID). [14] The device (700) according to any one of claims 10 to 12, wherein the at least one dynamic parameter (304) of the chip (300) is a read counter of the chip (300) that characterizes a number of reads of the chip (300). [15] The device (700) according to one of claims 10 to 13, wherein the chip (300) is writable by means of a key (WK) that is individual for a respective chip (300), and a writing device (402) coupled to the server (400) is designed to write (104) to the chip (300) by means of the key (WK) that is individual for the respective chip (300), wherein the individual key (WK) is encrypted in particular by means of a uniform key (MK), and the server (400) has access to the individual key (WK) and the uniform key (MK). [16] The device (700) according to one of claims 11 to 15, wherein the chip (300) is arranged on or in a housing (204) of the loudspeaker (200), in particular in an installation space (206) delimited at least partially by a housing wall of the housing (204). [17] The device (700) according to claim 16, wherein the installation space (206) delimited at least partially by the housing wall is a recess extending from an inner wall (208) of the housing (204). [18] The device (700) according to one of claims 11 to 17, wherein the chip (300) arranged in the installation space (206) delimited at least partially by the housing wall of the housing (204) is sealed, in particular by means of a coating and / or sealing compound and / or coating and / or epoxy resin. [19] The device (700) according to one of claims 11 to 18, wherein the server (400) is designed to provide a result (404) depending on the evaluated server request (308), wherein the result (404) characterizes at least one property (404a...404d) of the loudspeaker (200), in particular an authenticity (404a, 404b) of the loudspeaker (200) and / or production data (404d) and / or a reported theft (404c) of the loudspeaker (200). [20] The device (700) according to any one of claims 11 to 19, comprising: - a terminal (600), in particular a mobile terminal, which is designed to read (110) the chip (300); - wherein the terminal (600) is designed to provide (112) the server request (308) to the server (400); and - the server (400) is designed to provide the result (404) to the terminal (600) (116). [21] A loudspeaker (200) comprising the device (700) according to any one of claims 11 to 20 and adapted to carry out the method (100) according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

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