Method for optimized allocation of movement authority for a rail vehicle / train

Abstract

The present invention is based on the objective of providing a method for the optimized granting of movement authority for a train into a target section secured by a target point, with which a high level of safety and at the same time high flexibility in track use can be achieved without significant additional investment and / or engineering requirements. This objective is achieved according to the invention by a method for the optimized granting of movement authority for a train (2) whose entry into a target section (6) secured by a target point (4) and located upstream of this target point (4) in the direction of travel of the train (2) is imminent, comprising the following method steps: a) communicating the length of the train (2) to a train control system that also covers this track section (6);b) Provision of an overrun path (10) downstream of the destination point (4) by the control system and the interlocking system; and c) Initiation by the control system and granting of a movement authority for the train (2) authorizing entry into the destination section (6) by the interlocking system / RBC, if: c1) the length of the train (2) and a safety space (8) reserved for this train are shorter than the destination section (6); and c2) a preceding train (12) that initially occupied the destination section (6) has left this destination section (6) but may still be in the overrun path (10) downstream of the destination point (4), or the overrun path (10) downstream of the destination point (4) is still blocked by another route or another train.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a method for the optimized granting of a movement authority for a train.

[0002] The trackside signaling systems (interlocking, RBC, and in some cases, control technology) must ensure both signal-safe operation and smooth operational flow for rail traffic, while optimally supporting operational processes. Capacity (throughput) demands have increased both before and since the introduction of electronic signaling systems and will continue to rise due to societal developments. At the same time, there is a growing demand for more cost-effective and less complex solutions (due to cost pressures on infrastructure operators).

[0003] For orientation, the Figure 1 provides an overview of the current structure of security systems and also shows how a possible simplified structure for the future could be designed.

[0004] There are several versions of electronic, trackside signaling systems from various manufacturers. With regard to SBB (an infrastructure operator with one of the highest train densities in European rail transport), these are the following: 1. Siemens: Simis ® interlocking system < W CH + Trainguard ® RBC < 200 RBC + Iltis ® control system < 2. Thales: Elektra II interlocking system + Thales RBC + Iltis ® control system <

[0005] These interlocking systems are based either on the original track plan principle (Simis ®< W CH) or on the original locking plan principle (Elektra II), although due to the possibilities in the electronic systems and the tools for their provision, the implementation of these principles no longer takes place in pure form.

[0006] Both approaches share the common feature that every possible shunting and train movement is handled via route instances. A route is defined as the ordered set of all relevant instances of switches, track sections, etc., which form the path from a possible starting point to the next possible destination.

[0007] This applies in particular to the control technology and the central part of the interlocking system (component IIC / OMC in Simis®< W CH) or to the entire interlocking system (Elektra II). The RBCs of both manufacturers follow similar principles, but in each case rely on reliable information from the respective interlocking system, which in turn is determined on the basis of the aforementioned route instances.

[0008] The number of route instances and their combinations (multiple consecutive routes) constitutes a significant portion of the signaling system's data. The route data of these instances must be consistent with the underlying external infrastructure, as it defines the continuity and uninterrupted nature of routes and thus carries safety responsibility (SIL 4). Therefore, in addition to individual elements such as turnouts, etc., this data must be consistently maintained and checked for completeness and accuracy in every case of modifications and expansions.

[0009] In previous capacity increases (both with ETCS L0 or L1LS and with ETCS L2), the approach taken was to introduce even more track sections by subdividing them with further start and destination elements (optical signals or ETCS stop signals / ETCS location signals, abbreviated EHS / ESS).

[0010] This results in a significantly higher number of signals and route instances and their combinations, and negatively impacts the manageability of this data.

[0011] Ideas for ETCS Level 3, especially Hybrid Level 3, go a step further and attempt, in some approaches, to determine the optimal length of these and even more additional track instances (Virtual Subsectioning, Virtual Block). However, these approaches often use the improvement of the headway between two trains, particularly at higher speeds, as the sole criterion. A full moving block according to ETCS Level 3 is hardly considered an added value in this area, given the focus on operating at absolute braking distance, and the risks associated with operating at relative braking distance at high speeds are still deemed too high. What these approaches lack, however, is the development and provision of new criteria for optimal operation (including train sequence, timetable, and energy consumption) at moderate speeds in complex, congested areas.

[0012] However, to increase throughput in a railway station, for example, current technology and regulations require complex system design and engineering combined with the use of additional signaling systems, be it with optical signaling or ETCS stop / location signals (EHS / ESS) at ETCS Level 2 and additional track vacancy detection sections, axle counters and / or track loops.

[0013] Newer technologies for train tracking (GNSS, etc.), comprehensive Train Integrity Monitoring Systems (TIMS) across heterogeneous fleets, and higher information density (e.g., frequency of Train Position Reports) using FRMCS instead of GSM-R are still far from being ready for widespread implementation of ETCS Level 3 on the railway network. Only these systems would eliminate the need for additional axle counters and the excessive use of ETCS stop / location signals. GB689093A discloses a signaling system in which a succession of trains can travel in close succession on the same track in the same direction.The system detects whether an overrun track is occupied and whether a train occupying this overrun track is unable or unlikely to enter the track in the opposite direction to a train accepting clearance for the track ending at the signal with the overrun track, and sets the signal for this track to proceed.

[0014] Therefore, there is a lack of reasonable interim solutions until sufficient maturity is achieved with lower investment and / or engineering requirements.

[0015] The present invention therefore aims to provide a method for the optimized granting of a movement authority for a train into a target section secured with a target point, with which a high level of safety and at the same time a high flexibility in track use can be achieved without significant additional investment and / or engineering requirements.

[0016] This problem is solved according to the invention by a method for the optimized granting of a movement authority for a train, according to claim 1.

[0017] In this way, it is possible for the train to enter the target section even if a preceding train has already left the target section but is still within the originally fixed overrun path, or if the overrun path is still blocked by another route or another train. This increases capacity by exploiting the fact that a train, including its preceding safety zone, is shorter than the target section, does not actually proceed to the original stopping point within that target section. Instead, due to the shortened End-of-Authority (EoA) signaled on the onboard unit's display, it must stop well before the original stopping point at the end of the target section, provided this is operationally efficient for station management.

[0018] In other words, this means that a train entering the target section does not use its entire length, but only the front portion as viewed in the direction of travel, up to the point where the train is safely and completely within the target section. In contrast to the current application, where the Movement Authority (MA) statically sets the End of Action (EoA) at the target point / signal (EHS / ESS) or a suitable Supervised Location (SvL) there or beyond the target point, this method now dynamically sets the EoA according to operational needs. Shorter trains therefore use the front portion of the target section up to the end of the dynamically granted EoA and, as a benefit of the present invention, may enter the target section earlier than a longer train (train length including its forward clearance), which would use the entire length of the target section.This allows valuable seconds (approximately 4 to 8 seconds) to be gained in the train frequency when shorter trains enter stations. With a headway of 120 seconds, this equates to a time saving of about 5% without having to invest in additional safety hardware.

[0019] According to the invention, the movement authority granted to the train for entering the target section is assigned a target value (End of Authority), which, viewed in the direction of travel and calculated from the beginning of the target section, essentially corresponds to the length of the train and the safety zone reserved for that train. The corresponding End of Authority (EoA), dynamically determined as a new target point, is dynamically displayed to the train driver on the onboard unit display and monitored to ensure compliance with the intended, dynamically determined stopping point, now retracted in the direction of travel. It is certainly advantageous to incorporate the current braking distance of the train and / or the length of the required overrun distance when determining the length of the safety zone.

[0020] Typically, to ensure the necessary safety, it may still be necessary to secure the target section and, optionally, the overrun path with track vacancy detection systems. Such track vacancy detection systems already play a safety-relevant role in the statically generated end-of-arrival (EoA) at the target point of the target section.

[0021] In a suitable manner, a unique train instance addressable by the control system can be formed from the position of the train and the identity of the onboard unit, for which the Movement Authority is initiated, the target value of the Movement Authority is output to the interlocking system, and after the route has been secured accordingly, this Movement Authority is then executed by a Radio Block Center and transmitted to the train (i.e., its onboard unit).

[0022] The aforementioned procedure is particularly suitable if the train protection of the target section and the overrun distance is implemented according to ETCS Level 2 or higher and the train protection system monitors its actual compliance by issuing the dynamically determined target value (EoA).

[0023] In a further advantageous embodiment of the present invention, it can be provided that both the target value for the target section and the dynamically shifted slip path are re-determined after the original slip path (10) is cleared, a new Movement Authority (MA) is determined accordingly, and compliance with it is monitored.

[0024] Further advantageous embodiments of the present invention can be found in the remaining dependent claims.

[0025] Preferred embodiments of the present invention are explained in more detail with reference to the attached drawings. These show: Figure 1 schematically represents the structure of existing railway safety systems and a future train-oriented safety logic operating with train instances; and Figure 2 schematically represents the effect of the inventive method on the granting of Movement Authority and its End of Authority.

[0026] As already discussed in the introductory description, the Figure 1 The schematic diagram shows the structure of existing railway signaling systems and a future train-oriented signaling logic operating with train-level control units. The operational level, with the control system (control level) and the interlocking system and Radio Block Centers (RBCs, from ETCS Level 2 and higher), is clearly recognizable in the solutions currently in use.

[0027] The inventive method for the optimized granting of a movement authority for a train 2, whose entry into a target section 6 is imminent, takes place primarily at the level of the operational control system, the interlocking, and the RBC (Rail-to-Cable Control). This target section 6 is secured by an entry signal 3 and a target signal 4 and, viewed in the direction of travel of the train 2 (see arrow on the symbol for train 2), lies before this target signal 4. For the granting of a movement authority (MA) for entry into the target section 6, the present invention requires that the control system knows the length of the train 2 and a safety space 8 to be reserved in front of the train. Furthermore, an overrun path 10 downstream of the target signal 4 is also known in the control system.

[0028] If the entry of train 2 into destination section 6 is imminent, the control system checks whether the conditions for issuing the Movement Authority and its endpoint, also known as the End of Authority (EoA), are met. The control system then initiates the Movement Authority for train 2, authorizing its entry into destination section 6, and the signal box / RBC then issues it when: c1) the length of train 2 and a protected area 6 reserved for this train are shorter than the secured target section 6; and c2) a preceding train 12, which initially still occupies the target section 6, has left this target section 6 but may still be in the overrun route 10 subordinate to the target signal 4, or the overrun route 10 subordinate to the target signal 4 is blocked by another route or another train.

[0029] As indicated by arrows 14, a key aspect of this invention is that the End of Authority (EoA) is now withdrawn from the target signal 4 far into the target section 6, depending on the length of train 2 and its safety zone 8. Therefore, there is never a risk that the distance between the two trains 2 and 12 could become too small. The leading train 12 departs, and the trailing train 2 must stop at the End of Authority (EoA) within the target section 6, for example, to service stations. This is represented by stopping at a sign T2 located at the target section 6 and at a braking curve 16, which is decisive for the permitted entry of train 2 into the target section 6 and whose compliance is monitored in the cab signaling system by the onboard unit of train 2.

[0030] The control system (e.g., RCS / TMS and Iltis®) thus makes a train-dependent and situational decision regarding how much the End of Authority (EoA) can be withdrawn relative to target signal 4. This decision is then transmitted to the interlocking system via a new control input with a parameter (e.g., a value of 150 for a 150m withdrawal) before the actual route setting (Z). This new control input (EoA Shift) is purely operational and therefore automatable. Incorrect values ​​(including the train length underlying this parameter) resulting in the withdrawal of the EoA only lead to operational limitations (e.g., too short or too late signal timing), but not to a safety-critical situation. Depending on the parameter value, the length or extent of the overrun distance (including extended clearance checks) for the immediately subsequent route setting to this target is adjusted, or the end of the overrun distance (including...) is...(extended clearance control) also withdrawn (see right arrow 14). The distance offset is communicated via the correspondingly extended interface from the interlocking to the RBC and from the RBC then to train 2. This means that, initially, only a shorter but earlier warning is transmitted to train 2, and this applies to mode FS (ETCS Level 2 Full Supervision) as well as OS (On-Sight) or LS (Limited Supervision) modes. This earlier transmission is important because, for issuing the warning, it is sufficient for the target section 6 to become clear (distance offset due to the withdrawal of the EoA > required length of the dynamically set overrun distance) instead of having to wait for the clearance in the area of ​​the original overrun distance 10 after the target signal 4, as is now the case in... Figure 2The diagram shows where the front of train 2 is already in target section 6 and the preceding train 12 has just left target section 6 but is still in overrun path 10 (Dpath). The removal of the obstacle (the preceding train 12 or another train blocking the overrun path clears overrun path 10) or the movement of the obstacle for train 2 is evaluated to extend the MA (Measurement of Action) to its maximum possible length, in order to subsequently generate a continuous MA for the continuation of train 2's journey.

[0031] The time savings achievable through the earlier granting of Movement Authority with the withdrawn End of Authority (EoA) dependent on the length of train 2 and its safety zone 8 are particularly significant on very short headways on busy lines, such as a suburban rail line. This procedure can also be implemented in Switzerland, for example, without modifications to the ETCS BL3 Release 2 specifications.

[0032] It should be noted that implementing this procedure requires even more consistent control of train 2 according to the cab signaling displayed on the onboard unit, as this means that not every Movement Authority (MA) now ends at an EHS / ESS, in this case, destination signal 4. Since, particularly in S-Bahn operations, the length of the train depends on the number of coupled units, operational stops can be indicated by signs T1 to T3 (e.g., for train lengths of 100 to 300 m), and possibly also T4 (400 m). However, it should also be noted that for some international trains (freight, EuroCity) due to their length, it will be necessary in most cases to extend the EoA to the original destination signal 4 or even further.

Claims

1. Method for optimised allocation of movement authority for a train (2), which is about to enter a target section (6) safeguarded by an end position (4) and located before this end position (4) viewed in the direction of travel of the train (2), comprising the following method steps: a) the length of the train (2) is announced to a control system for train dispatching that also covers this line section (6); b) an overlap (10) after the end position (4) is provided by the control system and interlocking; and c) a movement authority authorising the train (2) to enter the target section (6) is initiated by the control system and allocated by the interlocking / RBC, if: c1) the length of the train (2) and a safety margin (8) reserved for this train are shorter than the target section (6); and c2) a train (12) travelling ahead and at first still occupying the target section (6) has left this target section (6) but may still be located in the overlap (10) after the end position (4), or the overlap (10) after the end position (4) is still blocked by another route or another train, wherein c3) the movement authority (MA) allocated to the train (2) for entry into the target section (6) has a target value (EoA) that essentially corresponds to the length of the train (2) and the safety margin (8) reserved for this train (2) viewed in the direction of travel of the train (2) and calculated from the start of the target section (6).

2. Method according to claim 1, characterised in that the actual braking distance of the train (2) and / or the length of the required overlap are incorporated when determining the length of the safety margin (8) to the front.

3. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterised in that a distinct train instance that can be addressed by the control system is formed from the position of the train (2) and the identity of the on-board unit, to which the control system sends the movement authority (MA) and the now dynamically determined target value (EoA) of the movement authority (MA) executed by a radio block centre (RBC).

4. Method according to one of the preceding claims, characterised in that the train protection for the dynamically determined target value of the target section (6) and an overlap (10) dynamically shifted into the target section (6) is executed in accordance with ETCS Level 2 or higher.

5. Method according to claim 4, characterised in that the train protection monitors actual compliance by the train (2) by allocating the dynamically determined target value (EoA).

6. Method according to claim 4 or 5, characterised in that both the target value (EoA) of the target section (6) and the dynamically shifted overlap are redetermined after the original overlap (10) has been released, a new movement authority (MA) is determined and compliance with this new movement authority is monitored.

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