A process safety controller

The electronic process safety controller addresses the inefficiencies of pneumatic systems by providing override protection and stable control signal management, ensuring safe operation of pipelines.

GB2706110APending Publication Date: 2026-11-11COMEX LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
GB2026012878
Authority / Receiving Office
GB · GB
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-06-02
Publication Date
2026-11-11

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing pipeline control systems lack effective override protection against primary control failures, leading to potential breaches of safe operating limits, and existing solutions like pneumatic controllers are wasteful, environmentally harmful, and resource-constrained.

Method used

An electronic process safety controller with configurable hardware-based circuitry that isolates and generates control signals to manage process variables, providing override protection and avoiding sudden changes, with optional features for intrinsically safe operation and manual control.

Benefits of technology

The electronic process safety controller effectively mitigates primary control failures, maintaining pipeline variables within safe limits without the drawbacks of pneumatic systems, ensuring reliable and efficient operation.

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Abstract

A process safety controller 27 controls a variable in a pipeline 15 via a final element (e.g. valve) 13. A first controller 11 sends a first control signal for the actuator 13. The process safety cont
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Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION 5 Embodiments of the present invention relate to a process safety controller. In particular, they relate to a process safety controller configured to provide override protection in the event of fault or failure of primary control. 10 BACKGROUND A pipeline is a system of pipes for long-distance transportation of a liquid or gas. For the integrity of the pipes and to maintain security of supply to downstream networks, variables such as pressure, temperature, level and flow of the medium conveyed by the pipelines must not breach safe operating 15 limits (SOL). These process variables are monitored and controlled by a primary control system. Potential failure of or faults in a primary control system must be mitigated by some form of override protection - that is, a system which overrides the control output from the primary control system to protect against SOL breaches. 20 Existing solutions tend to provide crude control over the process variables and have a host of other specific issues. For example, in the field of gas networks, the override protection has been provided by pneumatic 25 controllers. The pneumatic controllers siphon off some of the supply to analyse and then vent the residual gas. They are therefore wasteful and environmentally harmful. They also occupy a large footprint and use excessive pipework. Furthermore, knowledge and resources for this specialised field of pneumatic control has declined to the point where it is no longer practically available and training is practically unobtainable. Spares are extremely limited, if at all available. Therefore, a 30 consequential failure of a system or its individual components could prove catastrophic, resulting in financial loss and reputational impact. BRIEF SUMMARY 35 According to some aspects, there is provided the subject-matter of the independent claims. Some further aspects are defined in the dependent claims. While the examples of the disclosure and optional features are described separately, it is to be understood that their provision in all possible combinations and permutations is contained within the 40 disclosure. It is to be understood that various examples of the disclosure can comprise any or all the features described in respect of other examples of the disclosure, and vice versa. Also, it is to be appreciated that any one or more or all the features, in any combination, may be implemented by / comprised in / performable by an apparatus, a method, and / or instructions as desired, and as appropriate. The description of a function should additionally be considered to also disclose any means suitable for performing that function. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS For a better understanding of various examples of embodiments of the present invention reference will now be made by way of example only to the accompanying drawings in which: FIG 1 illustrates an example of a process safety controller; and FIGs 2-11 illustrate examples of optional additional electronic circuitry that may be included in the process safety controller. DETAILED DESCRIPTION In overview, an electronic process safety controller is provided with electronic circuitry configured to receive a first final element control signal from an external source, such as the primary control system; electronic circuitry configured to generate a second final element control signal configured to cause the process variable to move towards a process variable set-point; and electronic circuitry configured to select the first final element control signal when the received reading of the process variable is between a first (HIGH / HIGH) and a second (LOW / LOW) threshold and select the second process variable control signal when the received reading of the process variable is above the first (HIGH / HIGH) threshold or below the second (LOW / LOW) threshold. Because of the control signal selection circuitry, the process safety controller can isolate a control signal output by a primary control system and supply a new control signal to a final element, such as a valve or heat exchanger, to accurately control the process variable, such as pressure, temperature, level and flow, in the pipeline to a set-point. Therefore, the process safety controller provides an improved option for override protection to mitigate failed control by a primary control system which leads to the process variable exceeding the HIGH / HIGH or LOW / LOW thresholds. The process safety controller is a particularly appealing alternative to pneumatic controllers as it suffers from none of the aforementioned issues with said controllers. The process safety controller uses electronic circuitry to provide a configurable hardware-based solution as opposed to a purely programmable software-based solution. Programmable softwarebased solutions, which may be implemented within a single programmable logic controller for example, are required to undergo a safety integrity level (SIL) assessment, which is time consuming and complex and thus inefficient to operate in the context of, for example, a large-scale network. By providing a configurable hardware-based solution, the process safety controller is classified as a layer of protection and therefore does need a SIL assessment in order to be compliant with IGEM / TD / 13 (edition 3). The process safety controller also has electronic circuitry configured to receive a reading of the process variable from a process variable sensing element; electronic circuitry configured to determine if the received reading of the process variable is above a first value; and electronic circuitry configured to select, as the process variable set-point, a second (HIGH) value when the received reading of the process variable is above the first value and select, as the process variable set-point, a third (LOW) value if the received reading of the process variable is below the first value. The HIGH and LOW set-points can be set close to the HIGH / HIGH and LOW / LOW thresholds so that when the override begins, a sudden, large change to the process variable isn’t commanded avoiding damage or stress to downstream pipes. This contrasts strongly with systems providing override protection based on a single set-point which would necessarily be either a large step from both thresholds or a very large step from one of the thresholds. The HIGH / HIGH threshold and LOW / LOW threshold may be set in consideration of the SOL. This does not necessarily mean that they exactly correspond to the SOL. Particularly if they are set at or near the SOL, however, it can be advantageous to set the HIGH set-point lower than the HIGH / HIGH threshold and the LOW set-point higher than the LOW / LOW threshold in order to ensure that the process variable is maintained within SOL when override protection is active. The risk of damage or stress to downstream pipes can be further reduced with the optional addition of electronic circuitry configured to limit a rate of change to the output control signal. Said electronic circuitry may be configured to ramp the output control signal from the current state of the final element to the selected second final element control signal over a configurable time period, either by open- or closed-loop control. The process safety controller will be located in a safe area and may be made suitable for controlling a final element located in a hazardous or non-safe area by adding intrinsically safe (such as ATEX Ex i or Ex ia or future intrinsically safe standards) barriers to the electronic circuitry configured to receive the first final element control signal and / or the electronic circuitry configured to output a control signal based on the selected final element control signal to the final element. If the primary control system also uses intrinsically safe barriers, the current loops used to transmit signals between the primary control system and process safety controller would be powered by conflicting power supplies. To enable communication between the primary control system and process safety controller in such circumstances, the electronic circuitry configured to receive the first final element control signal can comprise a loop powered isolator. Said loop powered isolator is configured to isolate the two intrinsically safe barriers and is configured to be powered by the intrinsically safe barrier at the output of the primary control system (primary control system intrinsically safe barrier) to read the first final element control signal and powered by the intrinsically safe barrier comprised in the electronic circuitry configured to receive the first final element control signal (process safety controller intrinsically safe barrier) to re-generate the first final element control signal. For further communication, for example of the current state of the final element, a further loop powered isolator can be provided. Said further loop powered isolator is configured to isolate the two intrinsically safe barriers and is configured to be powered by the process safety controller intrinsically safe barrier to read a signal indicative of a current state of the final element and powered by the primary control system intrinsically safe barrier to re-generate the signal indicative of the current state of the final element. In the event of failed control by the primary control system, it can be advantageous to avoid handing back control to the primary control system until the failure has been investigated and resolved. This can be achieved with the optional addition of electronic circuitry configured to latch selection of the second final element control signal. Said electronic circuitry may involve a self-holding relay so that in the event of power loss to the process safety controller, the first final element control signal is able to pass through to the final element to avoid there being no control. To provide a failsafe in case of a failure in the primary control system or the process safety controller, a manual control option in respect of the final element may be desirable. This can be achieved with the optional addition of a first user interface element to the process safety controller which is configured to enable manual control of a third final element control signal, for example as may be generated by a signal generator. A second user interface element may be added which is configured to enable switching of the output control signal applied to the final element to a control signal based on the third final element control signal. To accommodate bi-directional flow in the pipeline, the electronic circuitry configured to receive a reading of the process variable may optionally receive a first reading of the process variable from a first process variable sensing element located upstream of the final element and receive a second reading of the process variable from a second process variable sensing element located downstream of the final element. Said electronic circuitry may be configured to select, as the reading of the process variable communicated to the other electronic circuitry comprised in the process safety controller, a highest reading between the first reading and the second reading. In the event of a fault developing in the process safety controller, it may be advantageous to return control to the primary control system. To that end, the process safety controller can comprise electronic circuitry configured to detect a fault in the process safety controller and electronic circuitry configured to switch the output control signal to the final element to the first final element control signal in response to detection of the fault. To enable smoother transfer of control back to the primary control system when override is no longer required, for example by adjusting the first final element control signal to match or track the output of the process safety controller before transfer of control to ensure a “bumpless” changeover and so that the final element does not enact rapid, excessive changes to the process variable, the primary control system may use information about the output or internal state of the process safety controller. To this end, the process safety controller can comprise electronic circuitry configured to output to the other controller one or more of: a signal indicative of selection of the second final element control signal; a signal indicative of switching of the output control signal applied to the final element to a control signal based on a third process variable control signal derived from manual control; and a signal indicative of a detected fault in the process safety controller. FIG 1 illustrates an example of a process safety controller 1 according to embodiments of the current invention. The process safety controller 1 comprises an electric panel 3 with a power supply 5, for example a 24V DC supply. The power is divided to various, but not necessarily all, components comprised in the process safety controller 1. The process safety controller 1 may comprise a mix of powered and unpowered components. The process safety controller 1 has at least one electrical input 7 which is configured to receive a first final element control signal 9 from another controller 11 of the primary control system. The first final element control signal 9 is an electrical signal which is indicative of an instruction to a final element 13 on how to adjust a process variable in the pipeline 15 in accordance with primary control. The first final element control signal 9 may therefore be called more descriptively the primary control signal 9. The primary control signal 9 may be an analog electrical signal such as, for example, a 420mA current signal where the generated current is set depending on the control to be applied to the final element 13, for example the degree to which a valve in the pipeline 15 should be closed. The other controller 11 may be a remote terminal unit (RTU) or a programmable logic controller (PLC) or any other suitable controller. The final element 13 may be a valve configured to control one or more of pressure, level, or flow of the supply in the pipeline 15. The final element 13 may alternatively be configured to control a temperature of the supply in the pipeline 15. It could be a valve configured to modulate the flow of a heating medium such as steam or a cooling medium such as water through a heat exchanger. It could also be an electric heater or cooler, for example. The aforementioned valves may be pneumatically or electronically actuatable. The process safety controller 1 is connected in series between the other controller 11 and the final element 13. Therefore, for the primary control signal 9 to be applied to the final element 13, it must pass through the process safety controller 1. This provides the opportunity for, in certain circumstances, the process safety controller 1 to isolate the primary control signal 9 and generate an override control signal 17 which may instead be applied to the final element 13. The same or a different electrical input 7 is configured to receive a process variable signal 21 from a process variable sensing element 19. The process variable signal 21 is an electrical signal which is indicative of a reading of the process variable in the pipeline 15. The process variable signal 21 may be an analog electrical signal such as, for example, a 4-20mA current signal where the generated current is set depending on the process variable in the pipeline 15. The process variable sensing element 19 may be a pressure sensor or transmitter, a temperature sensor or transmitter, a level sensor or transmitter, or a flow sensor or transmitter. The process variable sensing element 19 may be independent of a process variable sensing element used by the other controller 11. The process variable signal 21 is therefore independent of the process variable signal used by the other controller 11. Alternatively, the process variable sensing element 19 may be shared by the process safety controller 1 and the other controller 11 and they may both receive the same process variable signal 21. A controller 23 with a control algorithm 25 has a power supply from the panel (24V DC) and is configured to generate a second final element control signal 17. The second final element control signal 17 is another electrical signal which is indicative of an instruction to the final element 13 on how to adjust a process variable in the pipeline 15 according to override protection. The second final element control signal 17 may therefore be called more descriptively the override control signal 17. In some but not necessarily all embodiments, the second final element control signal 17 may be subject to further signal conditioning before it becomes the override control signal 17. The override control signal 17 may be an analog electrical signal such as, for example, a 4-20mA current signal where the generated current is set depending on the control to be applied to the final element 13, for example the degree to which a valve in the pipeline 15 should be closed. The controller 23 continuously calculates an error representing the difference between the process variable and a process variable set-point. The control algorithm 25 is configured to correct this error by reducing the difference to zero. The control algorithm 25 may apply a correction based on between one and three control terms. For example the control algorithm 25 may apply a correction based on proportional, integral, or derivative terms or their combination. The controller 23 may therefore be a proportional controller, a proportional-integral (PI) controller, proportional-derivative (PD) controller, or a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller. The controller 23 may be implemented as controller circuitry. The controller 23 may be implemented in hardware alone, have certain aspects in software including firmware alone or can be a combination of hardware and software (including firmware). A relay 27 is provided. The relay 27 uses a coil 29 or other suitable means to control a switch 31. The primary control signal 9 is applied to a normally closed contact of the switch 31. The override control signal 17 is applied to a normally open contact of the switch 31. The common contact of the switch 31 is connected directly or indirectly to an electrical output 33 of the process safety controller 1. Energising the coil 29 causes the normally open contact to be connected to the common contact. Therefore, the relay 27 is configured to switch responsibility for control of the final element 13 to the override control signal 17 and may therefore be called more descriptively the override relay 27. The electrical output 33 of the process safety controller 1 is connectable to the final element 13 so as to apply to the final element 13 whichever of the primary control signal 9 and override control signal 17 passes the override relay 27. Though not shown in FIG 1, one or more signal splitters are used to reproduce the process variable signal 21 to be applied as inputs to multiple components. Besides the controller 23, at least some of said components are trip amplifiers (trip amps) 35, 39, 43 or any other electronic circuitry, such as a PLC, suitable for receiving an analog input signal and activating one or more digital signals when the analog signal crosses a configured set-point (trip value) 37, 41, 45. It will be appreciated that the functions subsequently described as being performed by trip amps 35, 39, 43 will be performed, mutatis mutandis, by the other suitable electronic circuitry in embodiments which use such other suitable electronic circuitry. A first trip amp 35 has a power supply from the panel (24V DC) and is configured to close an internal contact to let said power flow through to an output when the process variable exceeds a first trip value 37. That first trip value 37 represents a first (HIGH / HIGH) threshold. This is an upper limit on the process variable at which primary control by the other controller 11 is deemed to be working correctly. Once the HIGH / HIGH threshold is exceeded, the primary control is deemed to have failed and should be overridden. The first trip amp 35 is therefore responsible for triggering HIGH / HIGH override protection. Its output is connected to the coil 29 in the override relay 27 and therefore when power flows through to the output, the override relay 27 is energised, the primary control signal 9 is isolated at the override relay 27, and the override control signal 17 is applied to the final element 13. A second trip amp 39 has a power supply from the panel (24V DC) and is configured to close an internal contact to let said power flow through to an output when the process variable exceeds a second trip value 41. That second trip value 41 represents a second (LOW / LOW) threshold. This is a lower limit on the process variable at which primary control by the other controller 11 is deemed to be working correctly. Once the LOW / LOW threshold is breached, the primary control is deemed to have failed and should be overridden. The second trip amp 39 is therefore responsible for triggering LOW / LOW override protection. Its output is also connected to the coil 29 in the override relay 27 and therefore when power flows through to the output, the override relay 27 is energised, the primary control signal 9 is isolated at the override relay 27, and the override control signal 17 is applied to the final element 13. In the example of FIG 1 a third trip amp 43 is shown. This third trip amp 43 has a power supply from the panel (24V DC) and is configured to close an internal contact to let said power flow through to an output when the process variable exceeds a third trip value 45. However, one of the first or second trip amps 35, 39 may have multiple internal contacts with different trip values and associated outputs so a separate third trip amp is not essential. A third contact with the third trip value 45 and a third distinct output is however to be provided by one means or another. The third trip value 45 is intermediate to the HIGH / HIGH and LOW / LOW thresholds. If the process variable exceeds this third trip value 45, a digital input is supplied via the third output to a set-point selector 47 which is configured to select the process variable set-point used to produce the error signal (difference between the process variable and process-variable set-point) which the control algorithm 25 in the controller 23 attempts to correct (reduce to zero). The set-point selector 47 may be integrated into the controller 23 or may be a separate component. Receipt of the digital input causes a contact (or software alternative) within the set-point selector 47 to be closed. When the contact is closed, a first (HIGH) value 49 is selected as the process variable set-point. When the contact is open, a second (LOW) value 51 is selected as the process variable set-point. By way of a non-limiting illustrative example, where the process variable is a pressure of the supply, the HIGH / HIGH threshold may be set at 74Bar, the HIGH process variable set-point may be set at 73Bar, the third trip value may be set at 50Bar, the LOW process variable set-point may be set at 47Bar, and the LOW / LOW threshold may be set at 45Bar. When pressure exceeds the HIGH process variable set-point, the controller 23 starts to reduce its output internally, but this output does not go to the final element 13 yet. When pressure exceeds the HIGH / HIGH threshold, then the controller 23 output is applied to the final element 13. When pressure exceeds the LOW process variable set-point, the controller 23 starts to increase its output internally, but this output does not go to the final element 13 yet. When pressure exceeds the LOW / LOW threshold, then the controller 23 output is applied to the final element 13. When pressure passes across the third trip value (increasing) the process variable set-point changes to the HIGH value. When pressure passes across the third trip value (decreasing) the process variable set-point changes to the LOW value. No controller 23 output gets to the final element 13 until either the HIGH / HIGH or LOW / LOW thresholds are exceeded. FIG 2 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1. The additional electronic circuitry is configured to limit a rate of change of the control signal applied to the final element. A slew rate limiter 53 is connected to the output of the override relay 27. That is, the slew rate limiter 53 is connected in series with the common contact of the switch 31 in the override relay 27. The slew rate limiter 53 limits the rate of change at its own output. Accordingly, when the override relay 27 switches between the primary and override control signals 9, 17, the step change between their respective values is smoothed out, ramping up or down over a defined period of time (ramp time) or at a defined slew rate (ramp rate). For example, if the primary control signal 9 is at 6mA and the override control signal 17 is at 18mA, rather than a step change from 6 to 18 mA, the output of the slew rate limiter 53 ramps from 6mA up to 18mA over a longer period, for example 15 or 20 minutes. The ramp rate or ramp time may be configurable. The ramp rate or ramp time may be user configurable. The ramp rate or ramp time may be programmable. The ramp rate or ramp time may be adjusted by a damping setting in a signal conditioner or programmable logic controller functioning as the slew rate limiter 53. The slew rate limiter 53 may alternatively be implemented fully in hardware with, for example, a resistor-capacitor filter. A variable resistor may be used for configuring the ramp rate. In the example of FIG 2, the slew rate limiter 53 may be configured to limit the rate of change at its own output through open-loop control. In some examples, such as the example illustrated in FIG 3, the slew rate limiter 53 is configured to receive a reference input and to compare the output of the override relay 27 to that reference input. When the slew rate limiter 53 determines that the output of the override relay 27 is different to the reference input, it is configured to ramp its output from the reference input up or down to match the output of the override relay 27 at either the ramp rate or over the ramp time as described above. In the example of FIG 3, the reference input is provided by a signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13. Accordingly, the slew rate limiter 53 is configured to ramp the control signal applied to the final element 13 from the current state of the final element 13 to the output of the override relay 27 at either the ramp rate or over the ramp time as described above. This therefore provides closed-loop control over the rate of change to the control signal applied to the final element 13 in contrast to the open-loop control in the example of FIG 2. Though not shown in FIG 3, the electrical input 7 is, in such examples, configured to receive the signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 from the final element 13. Another example alternative to the open-loop control of FIG 2 is to include, for example, a PI or PID controller (distinct from controller 23) which receives the second final element control signal 17 as a set-point and a current state of the final element 13 as a process variable (distinct from the process variable of the supply in the pipeline 15) and the integral term is configured or configurable to ramp the override control signal 17, provided as an output, from the current state of the final element 13 to the second final element control signal 17 over a configured or configurable period of time. FIG 4 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 or 3. The process safety controller 1 is configured to enable the signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 to bypass the skew rate limiter 53, or any other electronic circuitry configured to provide closed-loop control over the rate of change to the control signal applied to the final element 13, and pass from the electrical input 7 to the electrical output 33 so that it may be communicated to the other controller 11 in the event of loss of power to the process safety controller 1. This ensures that the other control 11 receives the current state of the final element 13 in the event of power loss to the process safety controller 1. The other controller 11 can be configured to use the current state of the final element 13 to generate the primary control signal 9, thus it is important to ensure that the other control 11 receives the current state of the final element 13 even in the event of power loss to the process safety controller 1. To this end, a further relay 117 is provided. The further relay 117 uses a coil 119 or other suitable means to control a switch 121. The signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 is applied to a common contact of the switch 121. The normally open contact of the switch 121 is connected to the skew rate limiter 53 or other electronic circuitry configured to provide closed-loop control over the rate of change to the control signal applied to the final element 13. The normally closed contact of the switch 121 is connected to the electrical output 33. The coil 119 is connected to the power supply 5 such that the coil 119 is and remains energised while there is healthy power supply to the process safety controller 1. While the coil 119 is energised, the switch 121 is opened and the signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 is directed through the switch 121 from the electrical input 7 to the skew rate limiter 53 or other electronic circuitry configured to provide closed-loop control over the rate of change to the control signal applied to the final element 13. In the event of power loss to the process safety controller 1, the coil 119 deenergises and the switch 121 closes, directing the signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 from the electrical input 7 to the electrical output 33, bypassing the skew rate limiter 53 or other electronic circuitry configured to provide closed-loop control over the rate of change to the control signal applied to the final element 13. FIG 5 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 4. The process safety controller 1 is not intrinsically safe. The power supply 5 (24V DC) is too powerful. It is not acceptable for low energy, intrinsically safe signals to interact with the high energy process safety controller 1 directly. Energy which can reach a hazardous area in which the other controller 11 providing the primary control signal 9 and the final element 13 may be located can never be enough to create a spark. If the other controller 11 is providing the primary control signal 9 to a final element 13 located in the hazardous area it may output the primary control signal 9 as a low energy, intrinsically safe signal. It will therefore have an intrinsically safe barrier 57 connected to its electrical output 59 to ensure that the output primary control signal’s energy is below the relevant ignition energy and is therefore intrinsically safe. The intrinsically safe barrier 57 will use the power supply 61 of the other controller 11 to transfer the primary control signal value across the barrier 57 and to re-generate the primary control signal 9 as an isolated, low energy, intrinsically safe signal. The current loop used to transmit this isolated, low energy, intrinsically safe signal is therefore a powered loop, powered by the power supply 61 for the other controller 11 via the intrinsically safe barrier 57. As has been described the primary control signal 9 is then routed into the process safety controller 1 where it may pass through to the final element 13 or be isolated and replaced by the override control signal 17. An intrinsically safe barrier 63 is connected to the electrical input 7 of the process safety controller 1 to ensure that the intrinsically safe primary control signal 9 is isolated from the high energy components of the process safety controller 1 on the other side of the barrier 63. The intrinsically safe barrier 63 isolates the received intrinsically safe primary control signal 9 on one side of the barrier 63 and reads and transfers the value of the primary control signal across to the other side where the signal value is used to re-generate the primary control signal 9 at higher, non-intrinsically safe, energy levels using the power supply 5 from the panel 3. The current loop used to receive the intrinsically safe primary control signal is therefore a powered loop, powered by the power supply 5 for the panel 3 via the intrinsically safe barrier 63. A loop powered isolator 65 is connected between the electrical input 7 and the intrinsically safe barrier 63 to enable the primary control signal 9 to be communicated between two intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63 without conflict from respective power supplies 5, 59. The loop powered isolator 65 is configured to isolate the two intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63, and respective powered current loops, from one another. The loop powered isolator 65 reads the primary control signal from the transmit current loop, transfers the signal value internally, and re-generates the primary control signal 9 in the receive current loop. The power required to read and transfer the signal value is drawn from the transmit current loop and the power required to re-generate the primary control signal 9 is drawn from the receive current loop. If the final element 13 is specifically an intrinsically safe final element (as opposed to, for example, an flame-proof (Ex d) or increased safety Ex e) or combined (Ex de) final element which may also be located in a hazardous area), the process safety controller 1 will output the internally selected final element control signal as a low energy, intrinsically safe signal. Although not shown in the FIGs, it will therefore have an intrinsically safe barrier connected to the electrical output 33 of the process safety controller 1 to ensure that the output control signal’s energy is below the relevant ignition energy and is therefore intrinsically safe. The intrinsically safe barrier will use the power supply 5 of the panel 3 to transfer the value of the control signal across the barrier and to re-generate the control signal as an isolated, low energy, intrinsically safe signal. If the final element 13 is a non-intrinsically safe final element (for example, an flame-proof (Ex d) or increased safety Ex e) or combined (Ex de) final element which may also be located in a hazardous area), the process safety controller 1 will output the internally selected final element control signal as a non-intrinsically safe signal (for example, an Ex d signal, a Ex e signal or a Ex de signal). In such cases, the process safety controller 1 will therefore not have an intrinsically safe barrier connected to the electrical output 33 of the process safety controller 1. The intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63 may be configured with multiple channels, which can be used with different signals. FIG 5 illustrates 2-channel intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63. Alternatively, multiple single-channel intrinsically safe barriers may be used. The illustrated 2-channel intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63 are also used to communicate a signal 55 indicative of a current state of the final element 13 from the process safety controller 1 to the other controller 11. For this purpose a further loop powered isolator 67 is provided. The further loop powered isolator 67 is connected between the electrical output 33 and the intrinsically safe barrier 63 to enable the primary control signal 9 to be communicated between two intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63 without conflict from respective power supplies 5, 59. The further loop powered isolator 67 is configured to isolate the two intrinsically safe barriers 57, 63, and respective powered current loops, from one another. The further loop powered isolator 67 reads the current state of the final element from the transmit current loop, transfers the signal value internally, and re-generates the signal 55 in the receive current loop. The power required to read and transfer the signal value is drawn from the transmit current loop and the power required to re-generate the signal 55 is drawn from the receive current loop. FIG 6 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 5. The additional electronic circuitry is configured to latch selection of the override control signal 17. Any latching relay may be used for this purpose. That is, any latching relay may be used to provide the override relay 27. The additional circuitry illustrated in FIG 6 is, however, specifically configured to produce a selfholding relay. A further switch 69 is provided within the override relay 27. The further switch 69 is connected to the power supply 5 in parallel with the first and second trip amps 35, 39. It is normally open and therefore the path for power to the coil 29 is via the first or second trip amp 35, 39. However, energising the coil 29 causes the further switch 69 to be closed. This causes a bridge to be created whereby power is provided to the coil 29 via the further switch 69. While power is provided to the coil 29, the further switch 69 remains closed. Therefore, even when the process variable no longer breaches the HIGH / HIGH and LOW / LOW thresholds, the coil 29 remains energised. While the coil 29 is energised, the primary control signal 9 is isolated and the override control signal 17 is applied to the final element 13. However, should there be power loss to the process safety controller 1, the coil 29 would deenergise regardless of the state of the further switch 69. Accordingly, in the event of power loss to the process safety controller 1, the normally closed contact in the other switch 31 in the override relay 27 would be re-connected to the common contact and the primary control signal 9 would therefore pass through the process safety controller 1 to the final element 13. A user interface element controlling a normally closed switch 71, such as a push-to-break switch, may be provided in the path comprising the further switch 69 within the override relay 27. This enables power to the coil 29 to be interrupted and the selection of the override control signal 17 manually unlatched. An alternative, as illustrated in FIG 7, is for the process safety controller 1 to comprise a receiver 73 configured to receive a signal indicative of a remote user request for unlatching and configured to output a digital signal to cause opening of a normally closed switch 75 provided in the path comprising the further switch 69 within the override relay 27. FIG 8 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 7. The additional electronic circuitry is configured to enable manual control of the final element 13, and therefore manual adjustment of the process variable in the pipeline 15. A current loop signal generator 77 is configured to generate a third final element control signal 79. The third final element control signal 79 is an electrical signal which is indicative of an instruction to a final element 13 on how to adjust a process variable in the pipeline 15. The third final element control signal 79 may be an analog electrical signal such as, for example, a 4-20mA current signal where the generated current is set depending on the control to be applied to the final element 13, for example the degree to which a valve in the pipeline 15 should be closed. The current loop signal generator 77 comprises a user interface element 81 such as, for example, a dial which enables a user to manually control the final element 13. For example, the user may set a value of a 4-20mA current signal which reflects the degree to which a valve in the pipeline 15 should be open e.g., 4mA being 0% (closed) and 20mA being 100% (open). The third final element control signal 79 may therefore be called more descriptively the manual control signal 79. The current loop signal generator 77 is connected to a first input contact of a switch 83. The output from the override relay 27 is connected to a second input contact of a switch 83. A common output contact of the switch 83 is connected, directly or indirectly, to the electrical output 33 of the process safety controller 1. The switch 83 therefore selects between the manual control signal 79 and whichever of the primary or override control signal 9, 17 is selected at the override relay 27. The switch 83 is therefore configured to select between manual and automatic control of the final element 13 and may therefore be called more descriptively the manual control switch 83. The manual control switch 83 can be a user-actuatable and has a user interface element 85 to enable said user actuation. FIG 9 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 8. The electrical input(s) 7 receives two process variable signals 21_1, 21_2 from two process variable sensing elements 19_1, 19_2 respectively - one located upstream of the final element 13 and one located downstream of the final element 13. These signals 21_1, 21_2 are input to a high signal selector 87. The high signal selector 87 is configured to receive the two process variable signals 21_1, 21_2 and select the one with the highest value and provide it as an output. The output of the high signal selector 87 is connected to the trip amps 35, 39, 43 and, directly or indirectly, to the controller 23. The output of the high signal selector 87 is used by respective trip amps 35, 39, 43 to determine whether the process variable exceeds respective trip values 37, 41, 45 and used by the controller 23 to calculate the error representing the difference between the process variable and a process variable set-point. The high signal selector 87 is therefore configured to select, as the reading of the process variable communicated to the other electronic circuitry comprised in the process safety controller 1, a highest reading between a reading indicated by an upstream process variable sensing element 21_1 and a reading indicated by a downstream process variable sensing element 21_2. FIG 10 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 9. The controller 23 and at least one of the trip amps 35, 39, 43 are configured to detect a fault and output a digital signal (i.e., provide power to an output) in the event of a fault. The controller 23 may be configured to detect an internal fault or a loss of power, for example. One or more of the trip amps 35, 39, 43 may be configured to detect an open circuit or an out-of-range process variable signal 21 indicative of the process variable sensing element 19 developing a fault. Said outputs 89, 91 are connected to a coil 95 in a relay 97, hereafter described as the system fault relay 97. In the event of a fault being detected by one of the trip amps 35, 39, 43 or the controller 23, the coil 95 in the system fault relay 97 is energised and opens a switch 99 in the system fault relay 97 to break the power supply to the coil 29 in the override relay 27. The switch 99 in the system fault relay 97 is therefore connected in series with the power supply 5 and the coil 29 in the override relay 27. Though not shown in FIG 10, the switch 95 in the system fault relay 97 is connected in series with the first and second trip amps 35, 39 and the further switch 69 of the override relay 27, if present, in order to ensure that the coil 29 in the override relay 27 is always deenergised in the event of a fault, regardless of the behaviour of other components. Accordingly, whenever a fault is detected, the control signal applied to the final element 13 is switched to (or maintained as) the primary control signal 9. The system fault relay 97 may be a latching relay or a self-holding relay. A user interface element controlling a normally closed switch 101, such as a push-to-break switch, can be connected in series with the coil 95 of the system fault relay 97 to enable system reset after a fault. A lamp 103 or other suitable warning device may be connected in series with the coil 95 of the system fault relay 97 to provide a warning that a fault has occurred. FIG 11 illustrates optional additional electronic circuitry for the process safety controller 1 of FIG 1, which is also compatible with the additional electronic circuitry illustrated in FIGs 2 to 10. The process safety controller 1 is configured to communicate internal state information to the other controller 11 responsible for the primary control of the final element 13. There is provided a first current loop 105 between the other controller 11 and the process safety controller 1 which comprises a switch 107 which is normally open. This switch 107 is configured to be closed by the coil 29 in the override relay 29 when energised. Current therefore flows through this first loop 105 when the override control signal 17 is selected at the override relay 27. The reception of a current signal at the other controller 11 via this first loop 105 therefore indicates that this selection has occurred and that override protection is in effect. There is provided a second current loop 109 between the other controller and the process safety controller 1 which comprises a switch 111 which is normally open. This switch 111 is configured to be closed in conjunction with the manual control switch 83. The manual control switch 83 may therefore be a double pole double throw switch. Current therefore flows through this second loop 109 when manual control of the final element 13 is selected at the manual control switch 83 and the control signal applied to the final element 13 is or is based on the manual control signal 79. The reception of a current signal at the other controller 11 via this second loop 109 therefore indicates that this selection has occurred and that manual control is in effect. There is provided a third current loop 113 between the other controller 11 and the process safety controller 1 which comprises a switch 115 which is normally open. This switch 115 is configured to be closed by the coil 95 in the system fault relay 97 when energised. Current therefore flows through this third loop 113 when a fault is detected within the process safety controller 1. The reception of a current signal at the other controller 11 via this third loop 113 therefore indicates that there is a detected fault in process safety controller 1. Said current loops 105, 109, 113 may comprise intrinsically safe barriers on either side and loop powered isolators to enable communication between the intrinsically safe barriers in a manner as described in relation to FIG 5 mutatis mutandis. Although embodiments of the present invention have been described in the preceding paragraphs with reference to various examples, it should be appreciated that modifications to the examples given can be made without departing from the scope of the invention as claimed. Features described in the preceding description may be used in combinations other than the combinations explicitly described. Although functions have been described with reference to certain features, those functions may be 5 performable by other features whether described or not. Although features have been described with reference to certain embodiments, those features may also be present in other embodiments whether described or not. 10 Whilst endeavoring in the foregoing specification to draw attention to those features of the invention believed to be of particular importance it should be understood that the Applicant claims protection in respect of any patentable feature or combination of features hereinbefore referred to and / or shown in the drawings whether or not particular emphasis has been placed thereon. 15 I / we claim:

Claims

1. A process safety controller configured to control a process variable in a pipeline via a finalelement configured to adjust the process variable in the pipeline, the process safety controller comprising:electronic circuitry configured to receive a first final element control signal from another controller;electronic circuitry configured to receive a reading of the process variable from a process variable sensing element;electronic circuitry configured to determine if the received reading of the process variable is above a first value;electronic circuitry configured to select, as a process variable set-point, a second value when the received reading of the process variable is above the first value and select, as the process variable set-point, a third value if the received reading of the process variable is below the first value, wherein the second value is higher than the first value and the third value is lower than the first value;electronic circuitry configured to generate a second final element control signal configured to cause the process variable to move towards the selected process variable set-point;electronic circuitry configured to select the first final element control signal when the received reading of the process variable is between a first and a second threshold and select the second process variable control signal when the received reading of the process variable is above the first threshold or below the second threshold; andelectronic circuitry configured to output a control signal, based on the selected final element control signal, to the final element.

2. The process safety controller of claim 1 wherein the process variable is a current value ofany one of: level, temperature, flow or pressure in the pipeline.

3. The process safety controller of claim 1 or claim 2 wherein process variable in the pipelineis a process variable of one or more fluids conveyed by the pipeline.

4. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the first threshold is higherthan second value and the second threshold is lower than the third value.

5. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises electronic circuitry configured to limit a rate of change to the output control signal at least when based on the second final element control signal.

6. The process safety controller of claim 6 wherein the electronic circuitry configured to limitthe rate of change to the output control signal comprises:electronic circuitry configured to receive a current state of the final element; andelectronic circuitry configured to ramp the output control signal from the current state to the second final element control signal over a configurable time period or at a configurable rate.

7. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the electronic circuitryconfigured to receive the first final element control signal comprises:a first intrinsically safe barrier; anda loop powered isolator,wherein the loop powered isolator is configured to isolate the first intrinsically safe barrier from a second intrinsically safe barrier at an output of the other controller and configured to be powered by the second intrinsically safe barrier to read the first final element control signal and powered by the first intrinsically safe barrier to re-generate the first final element control signal.

8. The process safety controller of claim 7 wherein the electronic circuitry configured toreceive the first final element control signal comprises:a further loop powered isolator,wherein the further loop powered isolator is configured to isolate the second intrinsically safe barrier from the first intrinsically safe barrier and configured to be powered by the first intrinsically safe barrier to read a signal indicative of a current state of the final element and powered by the second intrinsically safe barrier to re-generate the signal indicative of the current state of the final element.

9. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises electronic circuitry configured to latch selection of the second final element control signal.

10. The process safety controller of claim 9 wherein the process safety controller furthercomprises a user interface element configured to enable manual unlatching of the selection of the second final element control signal.

11. The process safety controller of claim 9 or claim 10 wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises electronic circuitry configured to receive a signal indicative of a user request for unlatching of the selection of the second final element control signal.

12. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises:a first user interface element configured to enable manual control of a third final element control signal; anda second user interface element configured to enable switching of the output control signal applied to the final element to a control signal based on the third final element control signal.

13. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the electronic circuitryconfigured to receive the reading of the process variable is configured to:receive a first reading of the process variable from a first process variable sensing element located upstream of the final element;receive a second reading of the process variable from a second process variable sensing element located downstream of the final element; andselect, as the reading of the process variable communicated to the other electronic circuitry comprised in the process safety controller, a highest reading between the first reading and the second reading.

14. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises:electronic circuitry configured to detect a fault in the process safety controller; andelectronic circuitry configured to switch the output control signal to the final element to the first final element control signal in response to detection of the fault.

15. The process safety controller of any preceding claim wherein the process safety controllerfurther comprises electronic circuitry configured to output to the other controller one or more of:a signal indicative of selection of the second final element control signal;a signal indicative of switching of the output control signal applied to the final element to a control signal based on a third process variable control signal derived from manual control; anda signal indicative of a detected fault in the process safety controller.

16. A system comprising: the process safety controller of any preceding claim; a final elementconfigured to adjust the process variable in the pipeline; and one or more process variable sensing elements.

17. The system of claim 16 further comprising another controller configured to provide the firstfinal element control signal.

Citation Information

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