Device authentication with seal and verification

By programming IoT devices with RoT information during production, the method addresses the inefficiencies of existing authentication methods, reducing manufacturing time and costs while ensuring secure and reliable device verification.

JP7581553B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-12NAGRAVISION SA
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024047633
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-11-23
Filing Date
2024-03-25
Publication Date
2024-11-12
Estimated Expiration
2039-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing IoT device authentication methods require specific processing during manufacturing, leading to longer and more expensive production processes.

Method used

A method where a device's Root of Trust (RoT) is programmed with device information during production, allowing authentication without additional manufacturing steps, enabling versatile design and secure communication.

Benefits of technology

This approach reduces manufacturing time and costs by allowing authentication post-production, while ensuring secure and reliable device verification, preventing attacks like ligid, non-legit, clone, and clone RoT threats.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

To minimize influence on a production flow by a communication device (1).SOLUTION: A communication device comprises: a base point RoT(2) of reliability which is configured to provide a safe environment for storing secret information and safely share data; a memory which is configured to safely share data and be controlled by the base point RoT(2), the memory being configured to save device information on a communication device (1) in the memory when the communication device (1) is manufactured (101); and a processor which is configured to provide information associated with the RoT(2) to a system (10) and provide device information saved in the memory to the system (10).SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates generally to authentication devices, and more particularly to Internet of Things (IoT) devices that include a Root-of-Trust (RoT) and can be authenticated by a security owner's system. [Background technology]

[0002] The IoT is a network of physical devices, appliances, or items embedded with electronics and software that allow these objects to exchange data without human interaction.

[0003] ITU-T Y.2060 defines IoT as a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting physical and virtual things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.

[0004] The "thing" in the term "IoT" can be considered to be a physical thing in the physical world, or a virtual thing in the information world, that can be identified and integrated into a communication network.

[0005] By this definition, a physical thing exists in the physical world and can be sensed, acted upon, and connected to. Examples of physical things include the environment, industrial robots, physical objects, electrical equipment, etc. By this definition, a virtual thing exists in the world of information and can be stored, processed, and accessed. Examples of virtual things include multimedia content and application software.

[0006] Under ITU-T Y.2060, an IoT device is considered to be a piece of equipment with the mandatory functionality of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage, and / or data processing.

[0007] IoT devices typically communicate with other devices using a communication network via a gateway, a communication network without a gateway, or directly without a communication network. A combination of communication scenarios is also possible, for example a device can communicate with other devices using a local network (i.e., a network that provides local connectivity between devices and between devices and a gateway, such as an ad-hoc network) and a communication network via a local network gateway.

[0008] The communications network can also transport data captured by IoT devices to applications and other devices, and can transport instructions from applications to devices. Communication networks generally provide facilities for reliable and efficient data transfer. IoT network infrastructure can be realized over existing networks, such as traditional TCP / IP-based networks, and / or evolving networks, such as Next Generation Networks (NGNs).

[0009] IoT devices can be built around integrated circuits, for example in the form of a system on a chip (SoC). Such SoCs may include a Root of Trust (RoT), a set of hardware-based capabilities that are always trusted by the device and provide strong protection for device credentials and software.

[0010] The RoT is typically implemented in an integrated secure element. It is possible that the RoT is not embedded in the device's SoC and is not implemented in the device's integrated secure element. The RoT is generally more trustworthy than the trusted execution environment (TEE).

[0011] The RoT can securely share data with other devices on-chip. The RoT provides a secure environment to create, store and use secrets on behalf of client applications running within the SoC and on different host CPUs. The RoT can consist of security modules, cryptographic cores, etc.

[0012] IoT devices can be connected to specific systems that require strong authentication of the connected device, for example, to activate certain functions. Such authentication typically relies on a unique per device secret embedded in the device that is used to set up a strong cryptographic authentication protocol between the device and the system, which may for example be an IoT platform.

[0013] These device-unique secrets are typically protected in a RoT, which is typically provisioned during manufacturing of the SoC or secure element. The system authenticates the RoT secret embedded in the device. To authenticate a device, the system needs to securely bind a unique per-RoT ​​secret to the device.

[0014] There are various solutions such as Merlin Pairing or TVkey's Device Sealing secure message. Merlin Pairing uses a unique key set at manufacture. Secure messaging TVkey uses an asymmetric unique key set during chip manufacturing.

[0015] A drawback of existing solutions is that they require specific processing during device manufacturing. Using such conventional techniques, the manufacture of devices is longer and more expensive, significantly impacting the overall production flow of such devices. Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0016] A drawback of existing solutions is that they require specific processing during the manufacturing of the devices, which using such conventional techniques makes the manufacturing of the devices longer and more expensive, significantly impacting the overall production flow of such devices. [Means for solving the problem]

[0017] The present invention solves the above problems existing in the prior art.

[0018] According to an aspect of the invention, a method is proposed by which a device can be programmed and authenticated by the system. A memory managed by the device's root of trust RoT can receive device information about the device during the production of the device.

[0019] A device can be bootstrapped into the system and information can be provided to the RoT and programmed device information for authenticating the RoT with the system's cryptographic protocols. This results in a binding between the authenticated RoT and device information known to the system, which can be used to verify the device origin of the device and the binding can be verified by the system.

[0020] In this way, certain processing steps during the manufacture of the device can be avoided. That is, the device is programmed and authenticated by the system, saving time during manufacturing.

[0021] In an embodiment, a device may have one or more SoCs, and the RoT may manage the programming of device information for each SoC. The device information may also relate to the SoC(s) and the device. When related to a device, the information may relate to a module, a CPU, or an application, for example.

[0022] One party can provide the device and another party can own the device, so you can have a module manufacturer and a module / device owner. Therefore, there is a need to manage the programming of the module and the owner of the module in which it is embedded, but not necessarily on a separate SoC.

[0023] This way, the device design is more versatile and authentication can be performed for different SoCs only by using the device's RoT.

[0024] In an embodiment, the RoT need not be embedded in any of the device's SoCs. In this way, device design and production becomes more versatile.

[0025] In an embodiment, the RoT may agree upon a dedicated binding key with each SoC in a device during production of the device, which may be used to cryptographically bind the RoT and the device. In this way, the RoT and the device can be cryptographically bound to each other. The key agreement utilizes Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which can be a cryptographic challenge with advanced secrecy.

[0026] In an embodiment, the device key may be used to encrypt communications between the device and the RoT. In this way, the device and the RoT can send and receive information to each other in a secure manner.

[0027] In an embodiment, programming of device information may be done in a persistent manner. In this way, device information is persistently stored on the device and cannot be easily lost.

[0028] In an embodiment, the RoT may be configured to bootstrap a system only once. In this way, bootstrap into the system occurs only once, so that a particular bootstrap does not create a conflict with a previously executed bootstrap, further limiting the amount of unnecessary communication between the system and devices.

[0029] In an embodiment, the method may further comprise reporting information regarding device production of the RoT to the security owner. In this way, detailed information about the device production of a particular RoT placed on a particular device is available to the security owner.

[0030] In an embodiment, verifying device production of a device may include verifying whether a bootstrapped RoT was reported during production of the device. In this way, the origin of the device can be easily verified by the security owner.

[0031] In an embodiment, verification may be forced during bootstrap of a device into the system. In this way, when the system authenticates the device, the system performs verification of the device information, which improves the authentication process.

[0032] In an embodiment, validation may occur after reported information regarding device production is received by the system. In this way, the validation process is less dependent on the time that the reported information regarding device production is received by the system. In an embodiment, the bootstrap information and the reported information regarding device production may be reported to the security owner of the RoT.

[0033] In this way, the security owner can determine the device production information that corresponds to the bootstrap information of the device, i.e., the security owner can determine which authenticated device a produced device belongs to.

[0034] In an embodiment, the information about the RoT may consist of the public id of the RoT. The minimum information reported is the public identifier of the RoT. The other information is optional. Therefore, if a type of RoT is shared by different device owners with different device production sites, each device owner with a different production site can report the public identifier of the RoT embedded in their device and therefore cannot claim the RoT of other devices.

[0035] If one RoT type is only used by one device owner, no security reporting is required, otherwise per-device owner RoT public id reporting is mandatory for security. In this way, it is possible to determine the specific RoT to be placed on a particular device.

[0036] According to another aspect of the invention, a device is proposed which may comprise a processor configured to carry out the steps of the method according to any of the described embodiments.

[0037] According to another aspect of the invention, a device is proposed which may comprise an integrated circuit configured to carry out the steps of the method according to any of the described embodiments.

[0038] In an embodiment, the device may be an Internet of Things device.

[0039] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer program product is proposed, which may be implemented on a computer-readable non-transitory storage medium, where the computer program product may include computer-executable instructions which, when executed by a processor, may cause the processor to perform the steps of the method according to any of the described embodiments.

[0040] According to another aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable non-transitory storage medium is proposed, comprising computer-executable instructions which, when executed by a processor, may cause the processor to perform the steps of the method according to any of the above embodiments.

[0041] According to another aspect of the invention, a root of trust RoT (2) is provided, the root of trust RoT (2) being configured to provide a secure environment for storing secret information and to share data securely; a memory controlled by said origin RoT (2), configured to store device information of the communication device (1) during manufacture (101) of the communication device (1) in said memory; and a processor configured to provide information about the RoT (2) to the system (10) and to provide device information stored in the memory to the system (10).

[0042] According to another aspect of the present invention, the communication device (1) has one or more system-on-chip SoCs (3), and the RoT (2) manages the programming of device information for each SoC (3).

[0043] According to another aspect of the invention, the communication device is characterized in that the RoT (2) is not embedded in any of the SoCs (3) of the communication device (1).

[0044] According to another aspect of the invention, a communications device is characterized in that the RoT (2) is configured to agree upon a dedicated binding key with each SoC (3) of the communications device (1) during device production (101) for use in cryptographically binding the RoT (2) and the communications device (1).

[0045] According to another aspect of the invention, a communication device is characterized in that a device key is configured to be used to encrypt communication between the communication device (1) and the RoT (2).

[0046] According to another aspect of the invention, the communication device is characterized in that the RoT (2) is configured to bootstrap into the system (10) only once.

[0047] According to another aspect of the invention, there is provided a communication device, characterized in that the information regarding the RoT (2) consists of the public id of the RoT (2).

[0048] Embodiments are, by way of example, described below with reference to the accompanying schematic drawings in which corresponding reference symbols indicate corresponding parts, and in which: FIG. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0049] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of a device production, authentication and validation process. [Diagram 2]FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of a device in which a RoT is embedded in a SoC. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a device in which the RoT is not embedded in the SoC. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example embodiment of a device having multiple SoCs. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a device production, authentication and validation process where no production information is sent by the device manufacturer to the security owner. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0050] Although reference is made to client devices in the examples below, it will be understood that the disclosure is not limited to application to client devices.

[0051] FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the production, authentication and validation process of a device 1 .

[0052] The security owner 11 provides the RoT public id and the RoT key 200 to the RoT2 during the production 100 of the RoT, after which they can program 201 the RoT2. The RoT public id is an example of information about the RoT 2 that can later be exchanged with the system 10 to which the device 1 connects. This can be used to identify the particular RoT deployed on device 1. The RoT key may be, for example, an example of a cryptographic key used to cryptographically bind the RoT 2 and the device 1 or the system 10.

[0053] The security owner 11 can also provide information about the RoT2 at the time of device production 101. Information about the RoT2 is either permanently programmed into the RoT2 or provided in a memory unit managed by the RoT2.

[0054] During device production 101, device information regarding the particular device 1 on which the RoT 2 is placed may be sealed 202 into the RoT 2 or into a secure memory unit 4 managed by the RoT 2. This secure memory unit 4 may be part of the RoT 2 or may be a separate memory unit 4. Sealing consists of permanently programming the device information into the RoT2 or into a secure memory unit 4 managed by the RoT2.

[0055] Device information for a particular device 1 may include, but is not limited to, manufacturer information, model information, brand information, version and serial numbers, and an abstract identifier for the device, typically in the form of a Universal Unique Identifier (UUID).

[0056] 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a device 1 with a RoT 2 embedded in a SoC 3. A secure memory unit 4 managed by the RoT 2 in this embodiment is depicted outside the RoT 2, but may be part of the RoT 2.

[0057] FIG. 3 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of device 1 in which RoT 2 is not embedded in SoC 3. The RoT 2 may be part of the device 1 or may be external to the device 1.

[0058] In the embodiment of FIG. 3, the communication 30 between the RoT 2 and the SoC 3 needs to be secured, for example by encrypting the communication. To enable this encrypted communication 30, the RoT2 can typically agree, by mutual authentication, to use a unique key for each device using a key agreement cryptographic protocol, for example during a sealing procedure.

[0059] This device key is stored on device 1 and is used to cryptographically bind RoT2 and device 1. Examples of methods for encrypting communications between RoT2 and device 1 include a standard or proprietary public key based secure channel with mutual authentication between RoT2 and device 1. Mutual authentication may occur at the time of manufacture and the shared negotiated secret may be programmed into both the memory of RoT2 and the memory of device 1.

[0060] The production facility of device 1 may then report 204 to the security owner 11 a list of information about the RoT 2, for example the RoT public id, to be used in device production of device 1.

[0061] This information can later be used to verify that the RoT2 bootstrapped into the system 10 was reported and therefore produced by the production facility. This information can be included, for example, in a production log, which can include, for example, device information together with the RoT public id, or device serial number together with the RoT public id.

[0062] The produced device 1 may then be bootstrapped into the system 10 . This may be done immediately after device production 101 or after the device 1 has been sold to a consumer.

[0063] In this way, bootstrapping and authenticating the device 1 and the RoT2 of device 1 is performed separately from the production process 100, 101, thus minimizing the impact on the production flow of the device.

[0064] When device 1 is bootstrapped into system 10 , it may provide 205 information about the RoT 2 , such as the RoT public id, type or version number, to system 10 along with the device information sealed during the sealing process 202 .

[0065] Device information may be defined by the device manufacturer, for example, brand and type. The device information may be a unique identifier defined by the system 10 and returned to the device manufacturer.

[0066] The transmission of this information can be performed in a secure manner, for example using a standard or proprietary secure channel based on a pre-shared secret. For example, a secure channel can be set up using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is explained in more detail below.

[0067] After device 1 is asked to initialize the secure link, it generates a random key pair consisting of a private part of the key, ie, the personal device key, and a public part of the key, ie, the public device key.

[0068] This is usually a random key pair. A personal device key may be a nonce, a number or a bit string that can be used only once for cryptographic purposes. The public device key can be calculated based on the private device key, usually in a more secure part of device 1.

[0069] Device 1 sends its public device key to system 10 . This transmission may be done directly via a secure part of the device 1 or via another, less secure part of the device 1 . The device 1 may also transmit its unique ID to the system 10 .

[0070] The system 10 may check this unique ID belonging to the device 1 to verify the identity of the device 1 attempting to establish a secure link with the system 10 and to verify that the unique ID belongs to an actual produced chip. Additionally, device 1 may sign its transmissions with a signature, which can be used for authentication, non-repudiation, and to verify that a message has not been altered after it has been sent.

[0071] Upon receiving a transmission, the system 10 checks the parameters of the transmission, which means for example checking the signature or the unique ID sent by the device 1.

[0072] Next, the system 10 generates a key pair consisting of a private part of the key - the private server key - and a public part of the key - the public server key. This may be a random key pair. The private server key may be a nonce and the public server key may be calculated based on the private server key.

[0073] System 10 may then calculate a secure link key based on the public device key and the private server key. This secure link key may be used to secure the secure link formed between system 10 and device 1.

[0074] The system 10 sends the public server key to the device 1 when calculating the secure link key. This transmission can be via a less secure part of the device 1 or directly to a more secure part of the device 1. System 10 also transmits its server certificate, which is used to prove that the public server key sent via transmission is in fact owned by system 10 . Additionally, the system 10 may sign the transmission with the signature.

[0075] Upon receiving the transmission, device 1 checks the parameters of the transmission such as the signature, the server certificate, etc., and calculates a secure link key based on device 1's private key and the system 10's public key. Now both the device 1 and the system 10 agree on a secure link key. This key can then be used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted over the secure link between the device 1 and the system 10 .

[0076] The system 10 can authenticate the RoT2 using strong cryptographic authentication protocols and secrets. Examples of such protocols and secrets include TLS or DTLS PKI, RAW certificates, or PKI schemes using mutual authentication. In this way, the system 10 may verify whether the RoT2 can be trusted by the system 10. In this way, the security system may receive a binding between the trusted RoT secret and device information of device 1.

[0077] For example, if the system 10 authenticates that the sealing device 1 information and RoT information are data received from a cryptographically authenticated RoT2, then the RoT2 may be trusted. Bootstrapping 205 may be performed on the system only once, for example by RoT2.

[0078] The system 10 may then verify 206 whether the bootstrapped RoT2 was reported 204 by the production facility. This validation 206 may be forced during bootstrap 205 or may be performed after the production log is received by the system 10 .

[0079] In this way, the system 10 can verify that the RoT2 bootstrapped into the system 10 was actually produced by a production facility. This verification can be done by making certain measurements of the device's memory and verifying that they correspond to valid patterns for a device of the type that was bootstrapped.

[0080] The RoT secret can be used to authenticate the RoT2. Furthermore, the system 10 can use the device information of the device 1 to verify that the RoT 2 bootstrapped into the system 10 was in fact deployed to that particular device 1 . During this verification 206, the RoT public id may be used as a link between the device manufacturing information and, for example, the RoT secret, to verify that the RoT2 was reported by the production facility.

[0081] After verification 206, the unique bounding of RoT2 with device 1 may be reported as authenticated in the database of the system 10.

[0082] It is also possible that the production facility does not report the list of RoT public ids used in the production of device 2.

[0083] For example, the security owner of system 10 may already know the RoT public id since they have already provided it to RoT2. Additionally, the RoT public id may be reported in the field, for example during installation of device 1. The RoT public id can also be reported and verified by remote attestation in the field, for example by checking the memory footprint to match the device.

[0084] Bootstrap information from the bootstrap 205 and production information 204 may be reported to the RoT security owner 11 to verify consistency across all systems 10 using the RoT 2.

[0085] The above method therefore relies on trusting the device production facility to seal 202 the correct device information and to correctly report the production logs 204. This method can thwart many possible attacks.

[0086] First, it can defend against an attack called a "legitimate device upgrade." In this attack, a legitimate device 1 with a legitimate RoT 2 can pose as another legitimate device 1.

[0087] Typically, low-end device 1 attempts to bootstrap 205 as high-end device 1 . Since the device information is sealed 202 in the RoT 2 in a trusted environment and securely reported to the system during bootstrap 205, the low-end device 1 cannot pose as the high-end device 1 after production.

[0088] Secondly, it defends against what are known as "non-legit device" attacks. In this attack, a fake device 1 with a correct RoT2 can pose as the genuine device 1.

[0089] Typically, the bogus device 1 may bootstrap 205 into the genuine system 10 using a valid RoT2 of the system 10. A fake device 1 is detected during a verification step 206 when the system 10 detects, for example, that information about the bootstrapped RoT 2 of its RoT public id has not been reported 204 by a legitimate production facility 100, 101.

[0090] Third, it defends against an attack called "clone device." In this attack, a fake device 1 may use the RoT2 of the genuine device 1 if the RoT2 is outside the SoC3 of the device 1. During the sealing process 202, a unique per-device key is installed 203 on device 1, which may force an attacker to clone the private key.

[0091] Fourth, it also defends against an attack called "clone RoT." In this attack, the cloned RoT2 attempts to bootstrap into the system using the secrets of the genuine RoT2.205 Clonal RoT2s may be detected during the validation step 206 if a single RoT2 attempts multiple bootstraps 205.

[0092] The system may then reject the bootstrap 205 and tag the RoT2 for further investigation. In this way, the security owner can verify the integrity of a RoT2 by preventing cloning of a particular RoT2 by only checking the bootstrap once.

[0093] FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of a device 1 having multiple SoCs 3.

[0094] In this embodiment, the RoT 2 of the device 1 can manage multiple sealing processes with one or more production facilities. The above method also supports multiple SoCs 3 per device 1.

[0095] FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the production, authentication and validation process of a device 1 where no production information is sent to the security owner by the device manufacturer.

[0096] One advantage of the system 10 is that it remains functional and partially secure even when production information is partial or missing. A post-verification process 207 may be performed to authenticate a device 1 that has not been fully authenticated. This is particularly useful for systems 10 that manage a large number of devices 1 .

[0097] Such a post-mortem verification process 207 may, for example, include secure telemetry of device memory regions performed by the RoT 2. This is particularly efficient when the RoT 2 is integrated into the SoC 3.

[0098] One or more embodiments may be implemented as a computer program product for use with a computer system. The programs of the program product define the functions of the embodiments, including the methods, described herein and can be contained in a variety of computer-readable storage media.

[0099] The computer readable storage medium may be a non-transitory storage medium. Exemplary computer readable storage media include: (i) A non-writable storage medium on which information can be permanently stored (for example, a read-only memory device within a computer such as a CD-ROM disk that can be read by a CD-ROM drive, a ROM chip, or any type of solid-state non-volatile semiconductor memory); (ii) A writable storage medium on which alterable information may be stored, such as a hard disk drive or any type of solid-state random access semiconductor memory, including flash memory.

[0100] Two or more of the above embodiments may be combined in any suitable manner.

Claims

1. A root of trust RoT (2) configured to provide a secure environment for storing secret information and to share data securely; a memory controlled by said origin RoT (2), configured to store device information of the communication device (1) in said memory during manufacture (101) of the communication device (1); and a processor configured to provide information about the RoT (2) to the system (10) and to provide device information stored in the memory to the system (10).

2. The communication device described in Claim 1, characterized in that the communication device (1) has one or more system-on-chip SoCs (3), and the RoT (2) manages programming of device information for each SoC (3).

3. A communication device as described in claim 2, characterized in that the RoT (2) is not embedded in any of the SoCs (3) of the communication device (1).

4. The communications device of claim 3, characterized in that the RoT (2) is configured to agree a dedicated binding key with each SoC (3) of the communications device (1) during device production (101) for use in cryptographically binding the RoT (2) and the communications device (1).

5. A communication device as described in Claim 4, characterized in that it is configured so that a device key is used to encrypt communication between the communication device (1) and the RoT (2).

6. A communication device described in any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the RoT (2) is configured to bootstrap into the system (10) only once.

7. A communication device as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the information regarding the RoT (2) consists of the public id of the RoT (2).

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