Secure computation system, secure computation server device, secure computation method, and secure computation program

The secure computation system addresses inefficiencies in secure computation by using shared permutations and comparison verification to ensure correct value determination, enabling secure and efficient calculations even with unauthorized participants, achieving Guaranteed Output Delivery in the standard model.

JP7582337B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-13NEC CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022575036
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-01-18
Publication Date
2024-11-13
Estimated Expiration
2041-01-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing secure computation systems face inefficiencies in maintaining the secrecy of size comparison results during sorting operations, leading to high communication costs, and there is a need for achieving Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) in a standard model rather than the random oracle model.

Method used

A secure computation system utilizing five secure computation server devices, each connected via a network, employs shared permutations and comparison verification units to perform mini-shuffles, ensuring correct value determination even with unauthorized participants, without relying on hash functions, thus achieving GOD in the standard model.

Benefits of technology

The system ensures correct calculations can be performed without stopping processing, even with unauthorized participants, by using shared permutations and comparison verification to determine correct values, reducing communication costs and achieving Guaranteed Output Delivery in the standard model.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Individual secure computing servers in a secure computing system comprise: a local shuffle unit that, using shared substitution shared by four out of five secure computing servers, calculates a value following substitution of the share of the one other secure computing server of the five secure computing servers, and transmits the value following share substitution to the one other secure computing server; a comparison verification unit that compares the presumably identical values received from at least three of the four secure computing servers, and adopts as the correct substitute the value that is the same for at least two of the secure computing servers; and a shuffle combining unit that combines minishuffles relative to five combinations of four secure computing servers selected from among the five secure computing servers, the minishuffles being formed using the shared substitution shared by the four secure computing servers, and the substitution adopted by the comparison verification unit.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a secure computation system, a secure computation server device, a secure computation method, and a secure computation program. [Background technology]

[0002] In recent years, research and development of a technology called secure computation has been actively conducted. Secure computation is one of the technologies that executes a predetermined process while keeping the computation process and its results secret from third parties. One representative technology in secure computation is multi-party computation. In multi-party computation, data to be kept secret is distributed across multiple servers (secure computation server devices), and any computation is performed on the data while maintaining the data in a secret state. The data distributed across each secure computation server device is called a share. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, when the term "secure computation" is used, it means multi-party computation.

[0003] In such secure computation, it is common to implement not only the four arithmetic operations but also computation protocols for specific purposes. One of the computation protocols for specific purposes is the shuffle protocol. If there is a shuffle protocol in the secure computation protocol, for example, sorting of shares can be performed efficiently.

[0004] Sorting is a process of rearranging shares based on a magnitude comparison of values ​​that are kept secret as shares, but the results of the magnitude comparison must also be kept secret. For example, the information resulting from comparing the value of the share with the value of the share at placement location j indirectly contains information on the value of the share with array numbers i and j, and if this information is leaked, security issues will arise. Therefore, sorting must be performed while keeping the results of the magnitude comparison secret, but performing calculations while keeping the results of the magnitude comparison secret is inefficient (high communication costs).

[0005] On the other hand, if shuffling is performed before sorting, the relationship between the array number and the share value is lost, so there is no need to keep the results of the magnitude comparison secret. This eliminates the need for inefficient calculations that would be required to keep the results of the magnitude comparison secret, and improves the efficiency of sorting. In this way, there are great benefits to implementing a shuffle protocol in a secure computation protocol. [Prior art documents] [Non-patent literature]

[0006] [Non-Patent Document 1] Byali, M., Chaudhari, H., Patra, A., & Suresh, A. (2020). FLASH: fast and robust framework for privacy-preserving machine learning. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2020(2), 459-480. Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0007] The disclosures of the above-mentioned prior art documents are incorporated herein by reference. The following analysis has been carried out by the present inventors.

[0008] Incidentally, even among technologies generally referred to as secure computation, the degree of security achieved varies. For example, assume that a cheater is among the participants of a multi-party secure computation. In that case, a secure computation technology that can detect the presence of a cheater and interrupt the process is more secure than a secure computation technology that can obtain correct computation results without interrupting the process even if a cheater is present. Secure computation that satisfies the latter level of security is called Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD), and examples of secure computation that achieve this are known (for example, see Non-Patent Document 1).

[0009] In addition, when evaluating the security of secure computation, not only the achievable security effect but also the prerequisites are important. A typical prerequisite is the random oracle model or random oracle assumption of the hash function.

[0010] A hash function is a function that returns a unique output for an input, but is configured so that it is difficult to infer the input from the output. Although it is said that it is difficult to infer the input from the output, it cannot be guaranteed that it is absolutely impossible. Therefore, when evaluating security, security is evaluated on the premise that the hash function used has no vulnerabilities. Security under this premise is called "secure in a random oracle model" or "secure under the random oracle assumption." The security of secure computation in Non-Patent Document 1 is "secure in a random oracle model."

[0011] On the other hand, the antonym of "secure in the random oracle model" is "secure in the standard model." In other words, even if it is possible to infer the input from the output of a hash function, this in itself does not lead to a vulnerability in the secret computation. Naturally, if the level of security that can be achieved is the same, security in the standard model can achieve a higher level of security than security in the random oracle model. Therefore, it is desirable for the shuffle protocol to achieve Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) in the standard model.

[0012] In view of the above-mentioned problems, an object of the present invention is to provide a secure computation system, a secure computation server device, a secure computation method, and a secure computation program that contribute to bit conversion that achieves Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) in the standard model. [Means for solving the problem]

[0013] In a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure computation system having five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, wherein each of the secure computation server devices includes a local shuffle unit that calculates a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a shared permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the secure computation server devices; a comparison verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices and adopts one where at least two or more are the same as a correct permutation; and a shuffle combination unit that combines mini-shuffles constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit for five combinations selecting four of the five secure computation server devices.

[0014] In a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure computation server device, the secure computation server device being one of five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, the secure computation server device comprising: a local shuffle unit that calculates a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a shared permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices; a comparison verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices and adopts a permutation in which at least two or more are the same as a correct permutation; and a shuffle combination unit that combines mini-shuffles constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit for five combinations selecting four of the five secure computation server devices.

[0015] In a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure computation method using five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, in which each of the secure computation server devices calculates a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a shared permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices, transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the secure computation server devices, compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, adopts a permutation in which at least two or more are the same as a correct permutation, and synthesizes a mini-shuffle constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations selecting four of the five secure computation server devices.

[0016] In a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure computation program for causing five or more secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network to perform secure computation, the secure computation program calculating a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a shared permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices, transmitting the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices, comparing values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, adopting a permutation in which at least two or more are the same as a correct permutation, and synthesizing a mini-shuffle formed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations that select four of the five secure computation server devices. This program can be recorded in a computer-readable storage medium. The storage medium can be a non-transient one such as a semiconductor memory, a hard disk, a magnetic recording medium, or an optical recording medium. The present invention can also be embodied as a computer program product. Effect of the Invention

[0017] According to each aspect of the present invention, it is possible to provide a secure computation system, a secure computation server device, a secure computation method, and a secure computation program that contribute to bit conversion that achieves Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) in the standard model. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0018] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a secure computing system according to the first embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the secure computation server device in the first embodiment. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing an outline of the procedure of the secure computation method. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a secure computing system according to the second embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a secure computation server device in the second embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of the hardware configuration of a secure computation server device. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0019] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the embodiment described below. In addition, in each drawing, the same or corresponding elements are appropriately assigned the same reference numerals. Furthermore, it should be noted that the drawings are schematic, and the dimensional relationship of each element, the ratio of each element, etc. may differ from the actual ones. There may also be parts in which the dimensional relationship and ratio differ between the drawings.

[0020] [First embodiment] A secure computation system and a secure computation server device according to a first embodiment will be described below with reference to Figures 1 and 2. The first embodiment is an embodiment that describes only the basic concept of the present invention.

[0021] Fig. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of a functional configuration of a secure computation system according to the first embodiment. As shown in Fig. 1, the secure computation system 100 according to the first embodiment includes a first secure computation server device 100_0, a second secure computation server device 100_1, a third secure computation server device 100_2, a fourth secure computation server device 100_3, and a fifth secure computation server device 100_4. The first secure computation server device 100_0, the second secure computation server device 100_1, the third secure computation server device 100_2, the fourth secure computation server device 100_3, and the fifth secure computation server device 100_4 are each connected to each other via a network so as to be able to communicate with each other.

[0022] In a secure computation system 100 having first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), a target share can be calculated for a value input to any of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) without the input or values ​​of the calculation process being known, and the calculation results can be distributed and stored among the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0023] Furthermore, in a secure computation system 100 having first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), a target share can be calculated for the shares stored in a distributed manner among the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) without revealing the values ​​of the calculation process, and the calculation result can be stored in a distributed manner among the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0024] The shares of the above calculation results may be restored by transmitting and receiving the shares to and from the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_0 to 100_4. Alternatively, the shares may be decrypted by transmitting them to an external device other than the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_0 to 100_4.

[0025] Furthermore, in the secure computation system 100 having the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), even if one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is operated by an unauthorized person, correct secure computation can be continued without stopping processing.

[0026] For example, as described above, even if one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is operated by an unauthorized person, the following configuration can be adopted as a share configuration that allows correct secure computation to continue without stopping processing.

[0027] Coset ring Z of order n n element x∈Z n The coset ring Z of n The above shares (hereinafter sometimes referred to as arithmetic shares) are defined as follows, where m is an integer equal to or greater than 2, and n=2. m In other words, the quotient class ring Z of order 2 2 is the coset ring Z of order n. n Distinguish from.

[0028] Coset ring Z of order n n element x∈Z n of x = x 0 + x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 mod n and each participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is distributed and holds [x] i would be written as follows: [x] i = (x i , x i+1 , x i+2 , x i+3 ), where x 4+1 = x 0

[0029] On the other hand, the quotient class ring Z of order 2 2 element x∈Z 2 The coset ring Z of 2 The above shares (hereafter sometimes called logical shares) are the coset ring Z n This is the same definition as for n=2 in the above share, but the notation is the coset ring Z n Distinguish it from [x] B Specifically, it is defined as follows:

[0030] Coset ring Z of order 2 2 element x∈Z 2 is broken down as follows. Note that the + in a circle represents an exclusive OR.

[0031]

number

[0032] And each participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is distributed and holds [x] B i would be written as follows: [x] B i = (x i , x i+1 , x i+2 , x i+3 ), where x 4+1 = x 0

[0033] In this way, each participant P i Share [x] held by (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 0 , [x] 1 , [x] 2 , [x] 3 , [x] 4 Then, each participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is the share [x] held by the 0 , [x] 1 , [x] 2 , [x] 3 , [x] 4 On the other hand, participant P i This method realizes secret sharing in which at least two people can combine their shares of (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) to recover x. This secret sharing scheme is called the 2-out-of-5 replicated secret sharing scheme.

[0034] Here, the situation where shuffling is used is a situation where each participant holds the array of shares constructed as described above in a distributed manner. That is, each component x of the array of length M is j is decomposed into shares as follows, and each participant P i(i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) are distributed and held.

[0035]

number

[0036] However, in the secure computation of this secret sharing scheme, not only when restoring x but also when shuffling positions in the array, a situation occurs in which each participant receives the value of a sub-share that it does not hold directly or indirectly from another participant. This is because it is necessary to shuffle positions in the array while maintaining the value indicated by the share held by each participant through secret sharing. Moreover, each participant needs to maintain the value indicated by the share even after the position in the array is changed without knowing the value indicated by the share held by itself.

[0037] Even when bit conversion is performed, a situation may arise in which each participant receives a sub-share value that it does not hold directly or indirectly from other participants, and if a fraudster is among the other participants, a different value may be sent instead of the value that the participant actually wanted to receive. This may result in a secret computation being performed based on an incorrect value, resulting in an incorrect computation result, or in the computation itself not being able to be performed correctly at all.

[0038] For such a purpose, in the secure computation system 100 of this embodiment, first to fifth secure computation server apparatuses 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) include a local shuffle unit 101_i, a comparison verification unit 102_i, and a shuffle synthesis unit 103_i, as shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the secure computation server apparatus in the first embodiment.

[0039] The local shuffle unit 101_i uses the share permutation shared by four of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4) to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4), and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the secure computation server devices. Then, the comparison verification unit 102_i compares the permuted values ​​of the shares that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts the permutation in which at least two or more are the same as the correct permutation. The shuffle synthesis unit 103_i synthesizes mini-shuffles constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit 102_i for five combinations selecting four secure computation server devices from the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0040] In this manner, in the secure computation system 100 of this embodiment, four of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4) permute the positions of their own sub-shares using a permute that is completed by the device itself, and perform the permute for the remaining one secure computation server device instead. The remaining one secure computation server device receives the sub-shares permuted by the other four secure computation server devices from these four secure computation server devices, and at this time, it compares the permuted values ​​of the shares that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts the permute that has at least two or more identical values ​​as the correct permute, thereby forming a mini-shuffle in the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4).

[0041] It should be noted here that since the above four secure computation server devices are permuted within their own devices, they know how the positions in the share array have been permuted, but since the remaining secure computation server device receives the result of the permutation, it does not know how the permutation has been performed. Therefore, if the mini-shuffles configured in this way are all combined for the five combinations of selecting four secure computation server devices from the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4), a permutation (shuffle) that cannot be traced by any of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4) is configured.

[0042] If this embodiment is considered as a secure computation method, it can be understood as follows: Fig. 3 is a flow chart showing an outline of the procedure of the secure computation method.

[0043] As shown in FIG. 3, the secure computation method according to this embodiment includes a local shuffle step (S11), a comparison and verification step (S12), and a shuffle and combine step (S13). In the local shuffle step (S11), a post-permutation value of a share in another one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4) is calculated using a shared permutation shared by four of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0,1,2,3,4), and the post-permutation value of the share is transmitted to the other one of the secure computation server devices. Then, in the comparison and verification step (S12), the post-permutation values ​​of the shares received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices that should be the same value are compared, and a permutation in which at least two or more are the same is adopted as a correct permutation. Finally, in the shuffle synthesis step (S13), mini-shuffles constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit 102_i are synthesized for five combinations selecting four secure computation server devices from the first to fifth secure computation server devices 100_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0044] In this way, the secure computation system 100 and the secure computation method of this embodiment receive received values ​​that should be the same from at least three other participants, and adopt the received value where at least two or more are the same as the correct value, so that the correct value can be determined even if a fraudster is among the other participants. That is, Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) is realized, which can obtain correct computation without stopping the process even if a fraudster is among the participants. In addition, since the above process does not use a hash function in the first place, Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD) is realized in the standard model.

[0045] The first embodiment described above is an embodiment that describes only the basic concept of the present invention. The second embodiment described below is an application of the above-described concept to a practical embodiment.

[0046] [Second embodiment] Hereinafter, the secure computation system and the secure computation server device according to the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIGS.

[0047] Fig. 4 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a secure computation system according to the second embodiment. As shown in Fig. 4, the secure computation system 200 according to the second embodiment includes a first secure computation server device 200_0, a second secure computation server device 200_1, a third secure computation server device 200_2, a fourth secure computation server device 200_3, and a fifth secure computation server device 200_4. The first secure computation server device 200_0, the second secure computation server device 200_1, the third secure computation server device 200_2, the fourth secure computation server device 200_3, and the fifth secure computation server device 200_4 are each connected to each other via a network so as to be able to communicate with each other.

[0048] In a secure computation system 200 having first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), a target share can be calculated for a value input to any of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) without the input or values ​​of the calculation process being known, and the calculation results can be distributed and stored among the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0049] Furthermore, in the secure computation system 200 having the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), even if one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is operated by an unauthorized person, correct secure computation can be continued without stopping processing.

[0050] Fig. 5 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a secure computation server device in the second embodiment. As shown in Fig. 5, in the secure computation system 200 of this embodiment, first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) include a local shuffle unit 201_i, a comparison verification unit 202_i, and a shuffle synthesis unit 203_i.

[0051] The local shuffle unit 201_i uses the share permutation shared by four of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0,1,2,3,4) to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0,1,2,3,4), and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the secure computation server devices. Then, the comparison verification unit 202_i compares the permuted values ​​of the shares that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts the permutation in which at least two or more are the same as the correct permutation. The shuffle synthesis unit 203_i synthesizes mini-shuffles constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit 202_i for five combinations selecting four secure computation server devices from the first to fifth secure computation server devices 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0052] The building blocks used to implement the bit conversion in this embodiment will now be described.

[0053] [Pseudo-random number generation and seed sharing] Pseudorandom function F n The relationship between the seed and the identifier is as follows: n is a binary operation defined for security parameter κ. F n :{0,1} κ ×{0,1} κ →{0,1} n On the other hand, seed i ∈{0,1} κ (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is a value appropriately shared by each secure computation server device 200_i, and an identifier vid∈{0, 1} κ is a public value such as a counter. Using these seeds and identifiers as input, a pseudorandom function F n generates pseudorandom numbers deterministically.

[0054] 5 seeds i ∈{0,1} κ (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is a set of data for each secure computation server 200_i. i, seed i+1, seed i+2, seed i+3 ), except for seed 4+1 = seed 0 That is, each secure computation server device 200_i receives all the seeds i Instead of storing the seed, the secure computation server device 200_i stores the seed i+4 The sharing of these seeds can be appropriately set by, for example, an administrator as a pre-setting in each secure computation server apparatus 200_i.

[0055] [Mask Creation] Here, participant P i+4 The remaining participants P i , P i+1 , P i+2 , P i+3 We create a pseudorandom number (correlated randomness) that can be deterministically calculated by the user, and use this as a mask when transmitting the permuted share, which will be described later.

[0056] First, participant P i+4 seed i+3 If we focus on the fact that the pseudorandom function F n Seed as input i+3 If we use the following pseudorandom numbers, they will satisfy the above conditions. k Participant P i+4 The remaining participants P i , P i+1 , P i+2 , P i+3 is deterministically computable for r k = F n(vid k , seed i+3 )-F n (vid k+1 , seed i+3 ) mod n

[0057] Also, the identifier vid k When the index k in is changed from k=0 to k=4, r k It is possible to create five of these. k The set of r is defined as follows. 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 is 0 +r 1 +r 2 +r 3 +r 4 It is easy to verify that =0. (r 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ) = CR(i+4, {vid k} 4 k=0 , seed i+3 )

[0058] The pseudorandom number r thus created 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 Participant P i+4 The remaining participants P i , P i+1 , P i+2 , P i+3 On the other hand, it is deterministic for participant P i+4 For each pseudorandom number r 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 cannot be eliminated, but all pseudorandom numbers r 0 , r1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 The sum is 0 when all the elements are in place, making them removable.

[0059] [Mini Shuffle Configuration] The mini-shuffle is configured as a process equivalent to the local shuffle step (S11) and comparison and verification step (S12) described in the first embodiment.

[0060] Here, participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) for participant P i Using the permutation shared by (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), participant P 0 Instead, calculate the permutation of 0 Consider the example where you send

[0061] Participant P i Permutation σ shared by (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) 0 ∈S M is constructed as follows. As mentioned above, each participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is the seed i, seed i+1, seed i+2, seed i+3 ) In other words, each participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) is the seed i+4 In other words, participant P 0 is a seed 4 On the other hand, other participants P i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is the seed 4 So, the seed 4 Participant P was randomly generated using i Permutation σ shared by (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) 0 ∈S M Then, the substitution σ 0 ∈SM Participant P i For (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), it is possible to trace what substitutions have occurred, while for participant P 0 For this, it is an untraceable substitution.

[0062] Next, the substitution σ 0 ∈S M and the pseudorandom number r k Using this, participant P i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is participant P 0 Instead, calculate the permutation of 0 Note that, due to the secret sharing share configuration, i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and participant P 0 There is a share shared between participant P i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is participant P 0 Instead, it is possible to compute the permutation

[0063]

number

[0064] Here, in the above transmission, participant P 2 , P 3 , P 4 The same value is given to participant P 0and send to participant P 1 , P 3 , P 4 The same value is given to participant P 0 and send to participant P 1 , P 2 , P 4 The same value is given to participant P 0 and send to participant P 1 , P 2 , P 3 The same value is given to participant P 0 Note that the participant P 0 It is possible to compare the permuted values ​​of the shares received from the three participants, which should be the same value, and to adopt the permutation where at least two or more are the same as the correct one. In other words, it is possible to determine the correct value even if a cheater is among the other participants, and it is possible to obtain the correct calculation without stopping the process even if a cheater is among the other participants, realizing Guaranteed Output Delivery (GOD).

[0065] In addition, in the above transmission, participant P i The amount of communication can be reduced by transmitting a hash value using the hash function shared by participants P (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) as follows. First, one of the three participants converts the value to be transmitted using the hash function and sends the hash value to participant P. 0 On the other hand, the remaining two participants send the raw value instead of the hash value, and the participant P 0 Then, participant P converts it into a hash value using a hash function. 0 compares hash values ​​and uses the correct value if two or more match.

[0066] By carrying out the above process, participant P i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), while it is computable by participant P 0 For 0 ∈S M The corresponding shares can be constructed as follows:

[0067]

number

[0068] [Mini-shuffle synthesis] In the above mini-shuffle configuration, participant P i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) for participant P i Using the permutation shared by (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), participant P 0 Instead, calculate the permutation of 0 Consider an example where the message is sent to four participants P i and one participant P 0 The combination of can be changed. Then, it is possible to configure five mini-shuffles. In addition, each of the five mini-shuffles configured in this way is i This is an untraceable substitution for any of (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0069] Therefore, participant P i For (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) there is an untraceable permutation σ i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4)∈S M By combining all of these, all participants P i It is possible to construct a permutation σ (shuffle) that is untraceable for (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0070]

number

[0071] The communication cost of the shuffle configured as above is 5 rounds and 40 nm bits. The communication round number of one mini-shuffle is 1 round, the communication amount is 8 nm bits, and the mini-shuffle is performed 5 times, so the communication cost is as above.

[0072] [Hardware configuration example] Fig. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the hardware configuration of a secure computation server device. That is, the hardware configuration example shown in Fig. 6 is an example of the hardware configuration of the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). An information processing device (computer) employing the hardware configuration shown in Fig. 6 makes it possible to realize each function of the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) by executing the above-described secure computation method as a program.

[0073] However, the hardware configuration example shown in Fig. 6 is an example of a hardware configuration for realizing each function of the secure computation server apparatus 100_i, 200_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4), and is not intended to limit the hardware configuration of the secure computation server apparatus 100_i, 200_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The secure computation server apparatus 100_i, 200_i (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) may include hardware not shown in Fig. 6.

[0074] As shown in FIG. 6, the hardware configuration 10 that may be adopted by the secure computation server device 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 11, a main memory device 12, an auxiliary memory device 13, and an IF (Interface) section 14, which are interconnected, for example, by an internal bus.

[0075] The CPU 11 executes each command included in the secure computation program executed by the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4). The main storage device 12 is, for example, a RAM (Random Access Memory), and temporarily stores various programs such as the secure computation program executed by the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) for processing by the CPU 11.

[0076] The auxiliary storage device 13 is, for example, a hard disk drive (HDD), and can store various programs such as a secure computation program executed by the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) in the medium to long term. Various programs such as a secure computation program can be provided as a program product recorded in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The auxiliary storage device 13 can be used to store various programs such as a secure computation program recorded in a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium in the medium to long term. The IF unit 14 provides an interface for input / output between the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

[0077] An information processing device employing the above-described hardware configuration 10 implements each function of the secure computation server devices 100_i, 200_i (i=0, 1, 2, 3, 4) by executing the above-described secure computation method as a program.

[0078] A part or all of the above-described embodiments can be described as, but is not limited to, the following supplementary notes. [Appendix 1] A secure computation system comprising five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, Each of the secure computation server devices a local shuffle unit that uses a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices, and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices; a comparison and verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts a value that is the same for at least two as a correct substitution; a shuffle synthesis unit that synthesizes mini-shuffles formed by using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison and verification unit, for five combinations that select four secure computation server devices out of the five secure computation server devices; A secure computing system. [Appendix 2] The secure computation system described in Appendix 1, wherein the mini-shuffle is deterministically generated using a seed held by the four secure computation server devices and an identifier held by the five secure computation server devices as input, and is masked by a pseudo-random number whose sum for the five secure computation server devices is zero. [Appendix 3] 3. The secure computation system according to claim 1, wherein the shared permutation is deterministically generated using a seed shared by the four secure computation server devices as an input. [Appendix 4] A secure computing system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the comparison verification unit determines that the hash values ​​of the replaced values ​​of the shares are identical, and determines that the received value is a correct value. [Appendix 5] One of five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, a local shuffle unit that uses a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices, and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices; a comparison and verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts a value that is the same for at least two as a correct substitution; a shuffle synthesis unit that synthesizes mini-shuffles formed by using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison and verification unit, for five combinations that select four secure computation server devices out of the five secure computation server devices; A secure computation server device comprising: [Appendix 6] A secure computation method using five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, comprising: Each of the secure computation server devices calculating a post-permutation value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices; Transmitting the replaced value of the share to the other one of the secure computation servers; comparing values ​​that should be the same and that are received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices; Those with at least two identical pairs are taken as correct substitutions, A secure computation method comprising: synthesizing a mini-shuffle constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations of selecting four of the five secure computation server devices. [Appendix 7] The secure computation method according to claim 6, wherein the mini-shuffle is deterministically generated using a seed held by the four secure computation server devices and an identifier held by the five secure computation server devices as input, and is masked by a pseudo-random number whose sum for the five secure computation server devices is zero. [Appendix 8] The secure computation method according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the shared permutation is deterministically generated using a seed shared by the four secure computation server devices as an input. [Appendix 9] A secure computation method according to any one of Supplementary Note 6 to Supplementary Note 8, wherein when determining that the value after the replacement of the share is correct, the determination is made by using the fact that the hash values ​​of the value after the replacement of the share are identical. [Appendix 10] A secure computation program for causing five or more secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network to perform secure computation, calculating a post-permutation value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices using a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices; Transmitting the replaced value of the share to the other one of the secure computation servers; comparing values ​​that should be the same and that are received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices; Those with at least two identical pairs are taken as correct substitutions, A secure computation program that synthesizes a mini-shuffle constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations that select four of the five secure computation server devices.

[0079] The disclosures of the cited non-patent documents are incorporated herein by reference. Within the scope of the entire disclosure of the present invention (including the scope of claims), modifications and adjustments of the embodiments and examples are possible based on the basic technical ideas. Furthermore, within the scope of the entire disclosure of the present invention, various combinations and selections (including partial deletions) of various disclosed elements (including each element of each claim, each element of each embodiment or example, each element of each drawing, etc.) are possible. In other words, the present invention naturally includes various modifications and corrections that a person skilled in the art would be able to make according to the entire disclosure including the scope of claims and the technical ideas. In particular, with regard to the numerical ranges described in this document, any numerical value or small range included within the range should be interpreted as being specifically described even if not otherwise specified. Furthermore, the disclosures of the above cited documents, if necessary, in accordance with the spirit of the present invention, may be used in part or in whole in combination with the disclosures of this document as part of the disclosure of the present invention, and are deemed to be included in the disclosures of this application. [Explanation of symbols]

[0080] 100,200 Secure Calculation System 100_i, 200_i Secure computation server device 101_i, 201_i Local shuffle section 102_i, 202_i Comparison Verification Section 103_i, 203_i Shuffle synthesis section 10 Hardware Configuration 11 CPU(Central Processing Unit) 12 Main storage 13 Auxiliary storage device 14 IF (Interface) Section

Claims

1. A secure computation system including five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, Each of the secure computation server devices a local shuffle unit that uses a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices, and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices; a comparison and verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts a value that is the same for at least two of the four secure computation server devices as a correct substitution; a shuffle synthesis unit that synthesizes mini-shuffles formed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit, for five combinations of selecting four secure computation server devices out of the five secure computation server devices; A secure computing system.

2. 2. The secure computation system according to claim 1, wherein the mini-shuffle is deterministically generated using a seed held by the four secure computation server devices and an identifier held by the five secure computation server devices as input, and is masked by a pseudo-random number whose sum for the five secure computation server devices is zero.

3. 3. The secure computation system according to claim 1, wherein the shared permutation is deterministically generated using a seed shared by the four secure computation server devices as an input.

4. 4. The secure computing system according to claim 1, wherein the comparison and verification unit determines that the hash values ​​of the replaced values ​​of the shares are identical, and thereby determines that the received value is a correct value.

5. One of five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, a local shuffle unit that uses a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices to calculate a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices, and transmits the permuted value of the share to the other one of the five secure computation server devices; a comparison and verification unit that compares values ​​that should be the same value received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices, and adopts a value that is the same for at least two of the four secure computation server devices as a correct substitution; a shuffle synthesis unit that synthesizes mini-shuffles formed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the permutation adopted by the comparison verification unit, for five combinations of selecting four secure computation server devices out of the five secure computation server devices; A secure computation server device comprising:

6. A secure computation method using five secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network, comprising: Each of the secure computation server devices using a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices, a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices is calculated; Transmitting the replaced value of the share to the other one of the secure computation servers; comparing values ​​that should be the same and that are received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices; Those for which at least two or more are identical are taken as correct substitutions; A secure computation method comprising: synthesizing a mini-shuffle constructed using a shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations of selecting four of the five secure computation server devices.

7. 7. The secure computation method according to claim 6, wherein the mini-shuffle is deterministically generated using a seed held by the four secure computation server devices and an identifier held by the five secure computation server devices as input, and is masked by a pseudo-random number whose sum for the five secure computation server devices is zero.

8. 8. The secure computation method according to claim 6, wherein the shared permutation is deterministically generated using a seed shared by the four secure computation server devices as an input.

9. The secure computation method according to any one of claims 6 to 8, wherein when determining that the value after the replacement of the share is correct, the determination is made by using whether the hash values ​​of the value after the replacement of the share are identical.

10. A secure computation program for causing five or more secure computation server devices connected to each other via a network to perform secure computation, using a share permutation shared by four of the five secure computation server devices, a permuted value of a share in another one of the five secure computation server devices is calculated; Transmitting the replaced value of the share to the other one of the secure computation servers; comparing values ​​that should be the same and that are received from at least three or more of the four secure computation server devices; Those for which at least two or more are identical are taken as correct substitutions; A secure computation program that synthesizes a mini-shuffle constructed using the shared permutation shared by the four secure computation server devices and the adopted permutation for five combinations that select four of the five secure computation server devices.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Information processing device, secret computation method, and program

    WO2020165932A1