Abnormality monitoring device and abnormality monitoring method

The abnormality monitoring device and method address the challenge of distinguishing between operator errors and cyber attacks in remote control systems by analyzing operation and control logs, facilitating effective countermeasures for enhanced safety.

JP7595079B2Active Publication Date: 2024-12-05PANASONIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CORP OF AMERICA
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022546911
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-09-01
Filing Date
2021-07-08
Publication Date
2024-12-05
Estimated Expiration
2041-07-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In remote control systems for mobility, it is difficult to determine whether an abnormal frame detected on a network within a vehicle is caused by an operator's abnormal operation or a cyber attack, as existing methods like Patent Document 1 cannot identify the cause of abnormalities.

Method used

An abnormality monitoring device and method that collects operation and control logs, compares them for abnormalities, and identifies the attack source through a log analysis process, implementing countermeasures based on the identified cause.

Benefits of technology

Enables accurate identification of the cause of abnormalities in mobility systems, allowing for effective countermeasures against cyber attacks and operator errors, enhancing safety in remote control systems.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

This abnormality monitoring device (10) is an abnormality monitoring device in a remote operation system for remotely operating a mobility device, the abnormality monitoring device comprising: a log collection unit (102) that collects an operation log, which is a history of operation commands from an operation device that remotely operates the mobility device, and collects a control log, which is a history of control commands from a control device installed on the mobility device; an abnormality detection unit (104) that detects whether there is an abnormality in the mobility device or not on the basis of at least one of the operation log and the control log; an attack source determination unit (105) that, in a case where the abnormality detection unit (104) has detected an abnormality, specifies an attack source causing the abnormality in the mobility device, from among a plurality of attack sources, in accordance with a result of comparing the operation log and the control log; and an abnormality notification unit (106) that makes a notification for executing a countermeasure in accordance with the attack source specified by the attack source determination unit (105).
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates to an abnormality monitoring device and an abnormality monitoring method for monitoring an abnormality in a remote operation system capable of remotely operating mobility. [Background technology]

[0002] In recent years, the introduction of autonomous mobility such as self-driving vehicles is expected to resolve the driver shortage and realize a society with zero accidents. However, door-to-door autonomous driving is required for home delivery applications, and driving on not only highways or public roads but also small paths or gravel roads is required, so building a system for autonomous mobility is difficult.

[0003] Until fully autonomous mobility becomes a reality, a remote control system has been proposed in which an operator remotely controls the mobility depending on where the mobility is moving.

[0004] In a remote control system, when a mobility malfunctions and causes a property damage or personal injury accident, it is necessary to analyze the cause of the accident. As a method for detecting cyber attacks, which are one of the causes of accidents, for example, Patent Document 1 discloses a method for detecting anomalies by monitoring frames flowing on a network within a vehicle. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0005] [Patent Document 1] Patent No. 5664799 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0006] However, in the case of a remote control system, there is a problem in that it is not possible to determine whether an abnormal frame detected on a network within a mobility (for example, within a vehicle) is an abnormal frame caused by an abnormal operation by an operator or an abnormal frame caused by a cyber attack. In other words, if the technology of Patent Document 1 is used in a remote control system, it may not be possible to identify the cause of the abnormality.

[0007] Therefore, the present disclosure provides an abnormality monitoring device and an abnormality monitoring method that can identify the cause of an abnormality in mobility. [Means for solving the problem]

[0008] In order to solve the above problems, an abnormality monitoring device according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is an abnormality monitoring device in a remote operation system for remotely operating mobility, and includes a log collection unit that collects an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device that remotely operates the mobility, and collects a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a control device mounted on the mobility, an abnormality detection unit that detects whether or not the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log, an attack source identification unit that, when the abnormality is detected by the abnormality detection unit, identifies from multiple attack sources the attack source that caused the abnormality in the mobility, depending on a comparison result between the operation log and the control log, and an abnormality notification unit that issues a notification to implement countermeasures according to the attack source identified by the attack source identification unit.

[0009] In order to solve the above problems, an abnormality monitoring method according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is an abnormality monitoring method in a remote operation system for remotely operating a mobility, and includes a log collection step of collecting an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device mounted on the mobility that remotely operates the mobility, and collecting a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a vehicle control device; an abnormality detection step of detecting whether or not the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log; an attack source identification step of, if the presence of the abnormality is detected in the abnormality detection step, identifying an attack source that indicates the cause of the abnormality in the mobility from among multiple attack sources depending on a comparison result between the operation log and the control log; and an abnormality notification step of issuing a notification to implement countermeasures according to the attack source identified in the attack source identification step. Effect of the Invention

[0010] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, it is possible to realize an abnormality monitoring device and an abnormality monitoring method capable of identifying the cause of an abnormality in mobility. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0011] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a vehicle remote control system according to an embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the abnormality monitoring device according to the embodiment. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the vehicle operation device according to the embodiment. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the vehicle control device according to the embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of an operation log according to the embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of a control log according to the embodiment. [Figure 7] FIG. 7 is a diagram showing an example of a position log according to the embodiment. [Figure 8] FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of a log according to the embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating an example of anomaly detection rule according to the embodiment. [Figure 10] FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating an example of an attack source determination rule according to the embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of anomaly countermeasure rule according to the embodiment. [Figure 12] FIG. 12 is a diagram showing a processing sequence of vehicle remote control in the embodiment. [Figure 13] FIG. 13 is a diagram showing a processing sequence of log collection in the embodiment. [Figure 14] FIG. 14 is a diagram showing a processing sequence from anomaly detection to anomaly countermeasure in the embodiment. [Figure 15] FIG. 15 is a flowchart of the abnormality detection process according to the embodiment. [Figure 16] FIG. 16 is a flowchart of the attack source determination process according to the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0012] (Background to this disclosure) As described in the "Background Art" section, until fully autonomous mobility is realized, a remote operation system has been proposed in which an operator remotely controls (remotely operates) the mobility depending on the location of the mobility. Even after fully autonomous mobility is realized, it is expected that the autonomous driving of the mobility will be determined to be dangerous in the event of a malfunction or cyber attack, so a remote operation system for remotely operating the mobility may be required.

[0013] Possible causes of accidents in remote control systems include physical attacks on mobility, abnormal operation by operators, and cyber attacks.

[0014] A physical attack on mobility is, for example, an attack in which a malicious third party physically approaches the mobility and overturns the mobility. An abnormal operation by an operator is, for example, an attack in which a malicious operator overturns the mobility. A cyber attack is, for example, an attack in which an attacker spoofs communication between the mobility and the operator and overturns the mobility. Note that the content of the attack is not limited to overturning the mobility.

[0015] Although the technology of Patent Document 1 can determine the presence or absence of an abnormality, it may not be possible to identify the cause of the abnormality. Therefore, the inventors of the present application have conducted extensive research into an abnormality monitoring device and an abnormality monitoring method that can identify the cause of an abnormality in a remote control system, and have devised the following abnormality monitoring device and an abnormality monitoring method.

[0016] Specifically, the inventors of the present application discovered that in a remote operation system, an anomaly monitoring device can collect and compare mobility control logs and operator operation logs to determine whether the cause of an anomaly is a cyber attack or abnormal operation by the operator, and have devised the anomaly monitoring device and anomaly monitoring method described below.

[0017] An abnormality monitoring device according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is an abnormality monitoring device in a remote operation system for remotely operating mobility, and includes a log collection unit that collects an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device that remotely operates the mobility, and collects a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a control device mounted on the mobility, an abnormality detection unit that detects whether the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log, an attack source identification unit that, when the abnormality is detected by the abnormality detection unit, identifies from multiple attack sources the attack source that caused the abnormality in the mobility based on a comparison result between the operation log and the control log, and an abnormality notification unit that issues a notification to implement countermeasures according to the attack source identified by the attack source identification unit.

[0018] This allows the anomaly monitoring device to identify an attack source corresponding to an anomaly in mobility, for example, a cause of the anomaly in mobility, from among multiple attack sources based on a comparison result between the operation log and the vehicle log. Therefore, according to one aspect of the present disclosure, an anomaly monitoring device capable of identifying the cause of an anomaly in mobility can be realized. In addition, by taking measures according to the cause of the anomaly in response to a notification from the anomaly notification unit, attacks can be effectively suppressed.

[0019] Also, for example, the anomaly detection unit may further detect the presence or absence of anomalies in each of the operation log and the control log based on a first rule, and the attack source identification unit may further identify the attack source as a first attack source when the operation log and the control log do not match, and identify the attack source as a second attack source different from the first attack source when anomalies are detected in both the operation log and the control log.

[0020] This allows the abnormality monitoring device to determine that the case where the operation log and the vehicle log do not match and the case where an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log are different attack sources (a first attack source and a second attack source). For example, when the operation log and the vehicle log do not match, it is highly likely that the operation command of the operator has been tampered with on the communication path between the operation device and the control device and executed by the mobility. Also, for example, when an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log, it is highly likely that a malicious operator has input an abnormal operation command and an abnormal control command has been executed by the mobility. Therefore, the abnormality monitoring device can appropriately identify the cause of the abnormality in the mobility in the case where the operation log and the vehicle log do not match and the case where an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log.

[0021] Also, for example, the log collection unit may further collect a location log, which is a history of location information of the mobility, from the control device, the first rule may further include information regarding abnormalities in the location log, the anomaly detection unit may detect abnormalities in each of the operation log, the control log, and the location log based on the first rule, and the attack source identification unit may identify the attack source as a third attack source different from the first attack source and the second attack source when only the location log is abnormal.

[0022] As a result, when an abnormality is not detected in both the operation log and the control log, and an abnormality is detected only in the position log, the abnormality monitoring device can determine that there is another attack source (a third attack source). For example, when an abnormality is detected only in the position log, there is a high possibility that a third party has physically approached the mobility and caused the abnormality in the mobility. Therefore, when an abnormality is detected only in the position log among the operation log, control log, and position log, the abnormality monitoring device can appropriately identify the cause of the abnormality in the mobility.

[0023] Also, for example, the first attack source includes the insertion of a malicious operation command in a communication path between the operating device and the control device, the second attack source includes the transmission of a malicious operation command by an operator using the operating device, and the third attack source includes a physical attack on the mobility by a third party, and the abnormality notification unit may stop a remote control function of the control device when it is determined that the first attack source is present, revoke the operator's access authority to the operating device when it is determined that the second attack source is present, and issue a notification to issue a warning to those around the control device when it is determined that the third attack source is present.

[0024] This allows the anomaly monitoring device to select and execute an effective countermeasure method according to the determined attack source. Specifically, for a first attack source (communication path), the anomaly monitoring device can effectively suppress attacks via the communication path by stopping the remote control function of the mobility (one example of a countermeasure against the first attack source). Furthermore, for a second attack source (operator), the anomaly monitoring device can effectively suppress attacks by the operator by revoking the operator's access authority to the operation device (one example of a countermeasure against the second attack source). Furthermore, for a third attack source (close range), the anomaly monitoring device can effectively suppress attacks from malicious third parties in close range of the mobility by issuing a warning to those around the control device using an alarm or the like (one example of a countermeasure against the third attack source).

[0025] Also, for example, the log collection unit may further collect a hash value of the operation log and a hash value of the control log, and the anomaly detection unit may detect an anomaly when the hash value of the operation log and the hash value of the control log do not match.

[0026] This makes it possible to determine whether the operation log and the vehicle log match by comparing the hash values. In other words, the amount of processing required for the determination process can be reduced. Therefore, the amount of processing in the abnormality monitoring device can be reduced, and the operation log and the vehicle log can be compared efficiently.

[0027] Furthermore, for example, the first rule may include information indicating that the control log contains an abnormality when the operation log and the control log do not match.

[0028] As a result, when the operation log and the control log do not match, the anomaly monitoring device can identify, based on the first rule, that the control log out of the operation log and the control log is abnormal.

[0029] Also, for example, the first rule may include information indicating that the position log contains an abnormality when the position log includes information indicating a change in position information that is different from that of the control log.

[0030] As a result, based on the first rule, when the position log contains information indicating a change in position information that differs from that of the control log, the abnormality monitoring device can identify that the position log is abnormal among the operation log, control log, and position log.

[0031] Also, for example, the attack source identification unit may identify the attack source that caused the mobility abnormality based on the operation log and the control log and a second rule, and the second rule may include: if the operation command and the control command at the same time do not match, the attack source is the communication path between the operation device and the control device; and if an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log, the attack source is an operator using the operation device.

[0032] This enables the attack source identification unit to easily identify the attack source based on the second rule.

[0033] In addition, in order to solve the above-mentioned problems, an abnormality monitoring method according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is an abnormality monitoring method in a remote operation system for remotely operating a mobility, and includes a log collection step of collecting an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device mounted on the mobility that remotely operates the mobility, and collecting a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a vehicle control device; an abnormality detection step of detecting whether or not the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log; an attack source identification step of, if the presence of the abnormality is detected in the abnormality detection step, identifying an attack source indicating the cause of the abnormality in the mobility from among multiple attack sources depending on a comparison result between the operation log and the control log; and an abnormality notification step of issuing a notification to implement countermeasures according to the attack source identified in the attack source identification step.

[0034] This provides the same effects as the above-mentioned abnormality monitoring device.

[0035] These general or specific aspects may be realized as a system, a method, an integrated circuit, a computer program, or a recording medium such as a computer-readable CD-ROM, or may be realized as any combination of the system, method, integrated circuit, computer program, or recording medium.

[0036] An anomaly detection device according to an embodiment will be described below with reference to the drawings. Each of the embodiments shown here shows a specific example of the present disclosure. Therefore, the numerical values, components, the arrangement and connection of the components, and the steps and the order of the steps as processing elements shown in the following embodiments are merely examples and do not limit the present disclosure. Among the components in the following embodiments, those not described in the independent claims are components that can be added arbitrarily.

[0037] In addition, each figure is a schematic diagram and is not necessarily illustrated precisely. Therefore, for example, the scales and the like do not necessarily match in each figure. In addition, in each figure, substantially the same configuration is given the same reference numeral, and duplicated explanations are omitted or simplified.

[0038] In addition, in this specification, terms indicating relationships between elements such as the same and identical, as well as numerical values ​​and numerical ranges, are not expressions that only indicate a strict meaning, but are expressions that also include a substantially equivalent range, for example, a difference of about a few percent (e.g., about 10%).

[0039] (Embodiment) [Overall configuration of vehicle remote control system] 1 is a diagram showing an overall configuration of a vehicle remote control system according to the present embodiment. In the present embodiment, a vehicle 40, which is an example of mobility, will be used for explanation. The vehicle 40 is, for example, electrically powered.

[0040] 1, the vehicle remote operation system includes an abnormality monitoring device 10, a vehicle operation device 20, and a vehicle control device 30. The vehicle remote operation system is a system for remotely operating (remotely controlling) a vehicle 40 (an example of mobility), and is an example of a remote operation system capable of remote operation.

[0041] The abnormality monitoring device 10, the vehicle operation device 20, and the vehicle control device 30 are connected via an external network such as the Internet. Here, the connection to the external network may be wired or wireless, and the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 may be connected via a local area network such as a 5G network or radio wireless without going through an external network.

[0042] The abnormality monitoring device 10 is a device that monitors abnormalities in the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30, and monitors abnormalities by collecting an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from the vehicle operation device 20, and a control log, which is a history of control commands, and a position log, which is a history of position information of the vehicle 40, from the vehicle control device 30. The vehicle control device 30 is a vehicle control device mounted on the vehicle 40 that is to be remotely operated by the vehicle operation device 20.

[0043] Here, the abnormality monitoring device 10 may monitor a plurality of vehicle operation devices 20 and a plurality of vehicle control devices 30. In other words, the number of vehicle operation devices 20 and vehicle control devices 30 included in the vehicle remote control system is not particularly limited.

[0044] In addition, monitoring for abnormalities includes determining whether or not there is an abnormality. In addition, collecting an operation log means acquiring an operation log from the vehicle operation device 20, and collecting a control log and a position log means acquiring a control log and a position log from the vehicle control device 30.

[0045] The vehicle operation device 20 is a remote operation device that allows an operator to remotely operate the vehicle 40, and receives input of an operation command from the operator and transmits the operation command to the vehicle control device 30. Here, the vehicle operation device 20 may remotely operate a plurality of vehicles 40 (a plurality of vehicle control devices 30).

[0046] The vehicle control device 30 is a control device for controlling the vehicle 40 in response to operation commands from the vehicle operation device 20 , and receives the operation commands from the vehicle operation device 20 and executes them on the vehicle 40 .

[0047] The control command is a command that controls the vehicle 40, and includes, for example, an operation command executed in the vehicle 40. Hereinafter, the control command refers to an operation command executed in the vehicle 40.

[0048] [Configuration of abnormality monitoring device 10] Fig. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of an abnormality monitoring device 10 in this embodiment. The abnormality monitoring device 10 is a device used in a vehicle remote control system as shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 2, the abnormality monitoring device 10 includes a communication unit 101, a log collection unit 102, a log storage unit 103, an abnormality detection unit 104, an attack source determination unit 105, and an abnormality notification unit 106.

[0049] The communication unit 101 communicates with the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 via an external network. The communication unit 101 includes, for example, a communication circuit (communication module).

[0050] The log collection unit 102 receives an operation log from the vehicle operation device 20 via the communication unit 101, and receives a control log and a position log from the vehicle control device 30 via the communication unit 101. It is sufficient that the log collection unit 102 receives at least the operation log and the control log. For example, it can be said that the log collection unit 102 collects an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from the vehicle operation device 20 that remotely operates the vehicle 40, and collects a control log, which is a history of control commands, from the vehicle control device 30 mounted on the vehicle 40. Hereinafter, an example in which the log collection unit 102 collects an operation log, a control log, and a position log will be described.

[0051] The log collection unit 102 collects, for example, an operation log, a control log, and a position log for the same period. Note that the operation log, the control log, and the position log are collected, for example, periodically, but the collection timing is not particularly limited.

[0052] The log storage unit 103 stores the received operation log, control log, and position log. The log storage unit 103 is realized by a semiconductor memory or the like, but is not limited to this.

[0053] The abnormality detection unit 104 detects whether or not there is an abnormality in the vehicle 40 based on at least one of the operation log and the control log. For example, the abnormality detection unit 104 may detect whether or not there is an abnormality in the vehicle 40 based on at least the operation log and the control log. In this embodiment, the abnormality detection unit 104 detects an abnormality in the vehicle 40 based on an abnormality detection rule, the operation log, the control log, and the position log. The abnormality detection rule and the abnormality detection method will be described in detail later.

[0054] When an abnormality is detected by the anomaly detection unit 104, the attack source determination unit 105 determines the source of the attack based on the comparison result between the operation log and the control log. For example, based on the comparison result, the attack source determination unit 105 identifies the attack source for the abnormality of the current vehicle 40 from among multiple attack sources (multiple candidate attack sources). For example, the attack source determination unit 105 identifies the attack source based on an abnormality means determination rule. The attack source determination unit 105 is an example of an attack source identification unit. The abnormality means determination rule and the attack source determination method will be described in detail later.

[0055] For example, when an abnormality is detected by the anomaly detection unit 104, the attack source determination unit 105 may identify the attack source that caused the abnormality according to at least the difference between the operation log and the control log. Furthermore, for example, when an abnormality is detected by the anomaly detection unit 104, the attack source determination unit 105 may acquire an abnormality log indicating the type of log that is assumed to include the abnormality among the operation log and the control log, and identify the attack source that indicates the cause of the abnormality in the vehicle 40 according to the acquired abnormality log.

[0056] The attack source is information for identifying the cause of an attack, and is information regarding the cause of an abnormality in the vehicle 40. The attack source is information including the location (e.g., a communication path or a short distance from the vehicle 40) of the attack (e.g., command tampering, physical attack, etc.) that caused the abnormality in the vehicle 40, the entity that caused the abnormality in the vehicle 40 (e.g., an operator, a third party, etc.), and the like.

[0057] The abnormality notification unit 106 notifies at least one of the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 to implement measures according to the attack source identified by the attack source determination unit 105. For example, when an abnormality is detected, the abnormality notification unit 106 notifies the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 of information including the attack source. Furthermore, if a driver is on board the vehicle 40, the abnormality notification unit 106 may notify the driver of the abnormality, or may notify a security guard near the vehicle 40 of the abnormality.

[0058] [Configuration of vehicle operation device 20] Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of vehicle operation device 20 in this embodiment. In Fig. 3, vehicle operation device 20 includes a communication unit 201, an operation command input unit 202, an operation command transmission unit 203, an operation log storage unit 204, an operation log transmission unit 205, and an abnormality countermeasure unit 206. Vehicle operation device 20 is an example of an operation device.

[0059] The communication unit 201 communicates with the abnormality monitoring device 10 and the vehicle control device 30 via an external network. The communication unit 201 includes, for example, a communication circuit (communication module).

[0060] The operation command input unit 202 accepts input of an operation command instructing control of the vehicle 40 from an operator in charge of remotely operating the vehicle 40. Here, the operation command may be input using a keyboard, a mouse, or a gaming controller, or may be input by voice. The operation command input unit 202 is realized by a keyboard, a mouse, a gaming controller, a touch panel, a microphone, or the like.

[0061] The operation command transmission unit 203 transmits the input operation command to the vehicle control device 30 via the communication unit 201 .

[0062] The operation log storage unit 204 stores the history of operation commands as an operation log. The operation log will be described in detail later. The operation log storage unit 204 is realized by a semiconductor memory or the like, but is not limited to this.

[0063] The operation log transmission unit 205 transmits the operation log to the anomaly monitoring device 10 via the communication unit 201 .

[0064] The abnormality countermeasure unit 206 receives the attack source determined from the abnormality monitoring device 10, and implements countermeasures based on the received attack source and abnormality countermeasure rules that indicate countermeasures for each attack source. The abnormality countermeasure unit 206 determines the countermeasure to be implemented in the vehicle operation device 20, for example. The abnormality countermeasure rules will be described later in detail.

[0065] The vehicle operation device 20 may previously store information (e.g., identification information) for identifying the abnormality monitoring device 10 that transmits the operation log. When the vehicle 40 to be controlled is determined, the vehicle operation device 20 may transmit information for identifying the vehicle 40 or the vehicle control device 30 mounted on the vehicle 40 to the abnormality monitoring device 10.

[0066] [Configuration of vehicle control device 30] Fig. 4 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the vehicle control device 30 in this embodiment. In Fig. 4, the vehicle control device 30 includes a communication unit 301, an operation command receiving unit 302, a vehicle control unit 303, a control log storage unit 304, a position log storage unit 305, a control log transmission unit 306, a position log transmission unit 307, and an abnormality countermeasure unit 308. The vehicle control device 30 is an example of a control device.

[0067] The communication unit 301 communicates with the abnormality monitoring device 10 and the vehicle operation device 20 via an external network. The communication unit 301 includes, for example, a communication circuit (communication module).

[0068] The operation command receiving unit 302 receives an operation command from the abnormality monitoring device 10 via the communication unit 301 .

[0069] The vehicle control unit 303 controls the vehicle 40 based on the operation command. The vehicle control unit 303 further acquires position information during vehicle control from a GPS (Global Positioning System) or the like. The control command will be described in detail later.

[0070] The control log storage unit 304 stores the history of the control commands as a control log. The control log will be described in detail later. The control log storage unit 304 is realized by a semiconductor memory or the like, but is not limited to this.

[0071] The position log storage unit 305 stores the history of the position information of the vehicle 40 as a position log. The position log will be described in detail later. The position log storage unit 305 is realized by a semiconductor memory or the like, but is not limited to this.

[0072] The control log transmission unit 306 transmits the control log to the anomaly monitoring device 10 via the communication unit 301 .

[0073] The position log transmission unit 307 transmits the position log to the anomaly monitoring device 10 via the communication unit 301 .

[0074] The abnormality countermeasure unit 308 receives the attack source determined from the abnormality monitoring device 10, and implements countermeasures based on the received attack source and abnormality countermeasure rules that indicate countermeasures for each attack source. The abnormality countermeasure unit 308 determines the countermeasures to be implemented in the vehicle control device 30, for example. The abnormality countermeasure rules will be described in detail later.

[0075] [Example of operation log] 5 is a diagram showing an example of an operation log in this embodiment. The operation log shown in FIG.

[0076] The operation log includes a time and an operation command. The operation command is an operation command for the vehicle 40 input by an operator via the operation command input unit 202. The time is the time when the operation command is transmitted by the operation command transmission unit 203.

[0077] The operation command is a command for moving or performing a special operation (e.g., a delivery task) of the vehicle 40. The operation command may, for example, be to move right, to move left, turn right, turn left, move forward, move backward, action A, action B, etc.

[0078] Move right, move left, turn right, turn left, move forward, and move backward are examples of commands that control the movement of the vehicle 40.

[0079] Action A and action B are examples of commands that control special operations of vehicle 40, such as opening the doors of vehicle 40, restarting the system of vehicle 40, or issuing a warning alert to anyone approaching vehicle 40.

[0080] Also, the operation command at time T8 has "(abnormal)" written in it, but this is to explain that the operation command, action B, contains an abnormality, and is not written in the actual operation log.

[0081] The anomaly detection unit 104 can detect an anomaly when action B is executed even though the operator is not given the authority to operate action B, for example, by acquiring and referring to the operation log. In this case, the anomaly monitoring device 10 pre-stores information about operations for which the operator is given the authority. Note that referring to includes, for example, comparing with a standard or the like.

[0082] Furthermore, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect, for example, an abnormality when action B is executed even though the operation condition of action B does not match the state of the vehicle 40. For example, when action B is opening the door of the vehicle 40 and the operation condition of action B is that the vehicle 40 is stopped, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect, as an abnormality, when the door of the vehicle 40 is opened while the vehicle 40 is traveling (an example of the state of the vehicle 40). In this case, the abnormality monitoring device 10 stores information on the operation condition for each action in advance. Furthermore, the abnormality monitoring device 10 acquires, for example, information indicating the current state of the vehicle 40 from the vehicle control device 30.

[0083] Furthermore, the anomaly detection unit 104 can detect, for example, a case where action B is executed even though the operator does not usually execute action B. In this case, the anomaly monitoring device 10 may store the operator's past operation log, and the anomaly detection unit 104 may detect an anomaly by comparing the past operation log with the current action B.

[0084] [Example of control log] 6 is a diagram showing an example of a control log in this embodiment. The control log shown in FIG.

[0085] The control log includes a time and a control command. The control command is an operation command received from an operator via the operation command receiving unit 302 and executed by the vehicle control unit 303. The time is the time when the control command was executed by the vehicle control unit 303.

[0086] The control command is a command that causes the vehicle 40 to move or perform a special operation (e.g., a delivery task). The control command may, for example, be to move right, move left, turn right, turn left, move forward, move backward, action A, action B, action C, or the like.

[0087] Move right, move left, turn right, turn left, move forward, and move backward are examples of commands that control the movement of the vehicle 40.

[0088] Action A, Action B, and Action C are commands that control special operations of the vehicle 40, such as opening the doors of the vehicle 40, restarting the system of the vehicle 40, or issuing a warning alert to anyone approaching the vehicle 40.

[0089] Moreover, although the control command at time T4 has "(abnormal)" written in it, this is for the purpose of explaining that the control command contains an abnormality, and is not written in the actual control log.

[0090] The abnormality detection unit 104 can detect, for example, by acquiring and referring to the control log, that an abnormality occurs when action C is executed despite the fact that the vehicle 40 is not given the authority to operate action C. In this case, the abnormality monitoring device 10 stores in advance information regarding operations for which the vehicle 40 is given the authority.

[0091] Furthermore, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect, for example, a case where action C is executed even though the control condition of action C does not match the state of the vehicle 40. In this case, the abnormality monitoring device 10 stores information on the control condition for each action in advance. Furthermore, the abnormality monitoring device 10 acquires information indicating the current state of the vehicle 40 from, for example, the vehicle control device 30.

[0092] Furthermore, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect, for example, a case where the action C is executed even though the vehicle 40 does not usually execute the action C. In this case, the abnormality monitoring device 10 may store a past control log of the vehicle 40, and the abnormality detection unit 104 may detect an abnormality by comparing the past control log with the current action C.

[0093] [Example of location log] 7 is a diagram showing an example of a position log in this embodiment. The position log shown in FIG.

[0094] The position log includes time and position information. The position information is obtained from a GPS or the like, and is the position information of the vehicle 40 when a control command is executed by the vehicle control unit 303. The time is the time when the position information is obtained.

[0095] The location information may be, for example, X, Y, Z, etc., where X represents latitude, Y represents longitude, and Z represents altitude. Note that the location information may be, for example, information indicating a relative positional relationship from a reference point.

[0096] Moreover, although the position information at time T6 includes the description (abnormal), this is for the purpose of explaining that the position information includes an abnormality, and is not included in the actual position information.

[0097] For example, by acquiring and referring to the position log, the abnormality detection unit 104 can see that the vehicle 40 has moved twice eastward between time T5 (position information "X, Y+1, Z") and time T6 (position information "X, Y+3, Z"). Here, when the vehicle 40 has moved twice in spite of the fact that it is difficult for the vehicle 40 to move twice in the period from time T6 to time T5 in terms of the running performance of the vehicle 40, the abnormality detection unit 104 can determine that the vehicle 40 has been moved at a speed exceeding the vehicle's performance by a third party and detect this as an abnormality. In this case, the abnormality monitoring device 10 stores information (for example, catalog values) on the running performance of the vehicle 40 equipped with the vehicle control device 30 in advance. For example, the abnormality monitoring device 10 may store the normal range of the running performance of the vehicle 40 (for example, the normal range of changes in speed, acceleration, and steering angle) or the normal range of running in response to a control command (for example, the normal range of speed or acceleration when moving forward).

[0098] Furthermore, the anomaly detection unit 104 may use the speed or acceleration of the vehicle 40 as a position log instead of or in addition to the position information. In this case, the vehicle control unit 303 acquires the speed or acceleration of the vehicle 40 from a speed sensor and an acceleration sensor, and stores the information as a position log in the position log storage unit 305. This allows the anomaly detection unit 104 to detect as an anomaly when a third party gives a physical impact to the vehicle 40. Note that the third party is a person other than the passengers and operator of the vehicle 40, but may also be another mobility (malicious mobility).

[0099] [Example of log] Fig. 8 is a diagram showing an example of a log in this embodiment. The logs shown in Fig. 8 are, for example, various logs collected by the abnormality monitoring device 10. The abnormality monitoring device 10 collects an operation log from the vehicle operation device 20, and collects a control log and a position log from the vehicle control device 30, and stores them in the log storage unit 103. The logs associate commands and position information transmitted or acquired during the same period (for example, times T1 to T8).

[0100] The log includes time, operation command, control command, and location information, as described in the example of an operation log (FIG. 5), the example of a control log (FIG. 6), and the example of a location log (FIG. 7), respectively.

[0101] In addition, since the transmission time of the operation command, the execution time of the control command, and the acquisition time of the location information are used as the respective times, the times of the operation command, the control command, and the location information do not completely match due to communication delays, etc. Therefore, taking into account communication delays, the times are rounded to 0.5 second units and treated as the same time. For example, an operation command and a control command that are 0.5 seconds apart in time are considered to be commands of the same time, for example, a control command corresponding to the operation command, and an abnormality is determined.

[0102] Here, 0.5 seconds is an example of a standard for rounding off the time, and is not limited to 0.5 seconds, and any predetermined standard for rounding off the time may be used.

[0103] Also, although there are cases where the log contains the notation (abnormal), this is to explain that the log contains an abnormality and is not included in the actual log.

[0104] The abnormality detection unit 104 is capable of detecting the abnormality described in the description of the example of an operation log by, for example, referring to the operation commands included in the log; it is capable of detecting the abnormality described in the description of the example of an operation log by, for example, referring to the control commands included in the log; and it is capable of detecting the abnormality described in the description of the example of an control log by, for example, referring to the position log included in the log.

[0105] Furthermore, by referring to the control command and the position information at the same time, if there is no change in the position information even though reverse is executed as a control command by the vehicle control unit 303, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect an abnormality that the vehicle 40 has been fixed by a third party. In other words, the abnormality detection unit 104 determines whether or not there is a contradiction between the control command and the position information at the same time, and if there is a contradiction, can detect an abnormality.

[0106] The abnormality detection unit 104 can further determine whether the operator's operation command is being executed correctly in the vehicle 40 by referring to the operation command and the control command at the same time.

[0107] For example, the operation command at time T4 is to turn left, but the control command is action C. This indicates that the operation command has been tampered with by a malicious third party on the communication path from the transmission of the operation command to the execution of the control command, and action C has been executed in the vehicle 40. The abnormality detection unit 104 can detect an abnormality, for example, when the operation command and the control command do not match.

[0108] In this way, by acquiring the operation log, the control log, and the position log, the abnormality detection unit 104 can detect abnormalities that can be determined by a combination of two or more logs, in addition to abnormalities that can be determined by an operation command alone, an abnormality that can be determined by a control command alone, and an abnormality that can be determined by position information alone.

[0109] Furthermore, the operation log and the control log may further include a hash value. For example, the log collection unit 102 may collect a hash value of the operation log and a hash value of the control log. If the hash value is included, detailed detection such as detecting an input of an operation command that is not usually operated by an operator as an abnormality cannot be performed, but it is possible to determine whether the above-mentioned operation command and control command match. In other words, the presence or absence of an abnormality in the vehicle 40 can be determined by the hash value.

[0110] When acquiring logs as hash values, if detailed time information is included in the input of the hash function, the hash values ​​of the operation log and the control log will not match due to communication delays, so for example, a group of operation commands for one minute (for example, from 10:00 to 10:01) and a group of control commands for one minute (for example, from 10:00 to 10:01) are used as inputs to the hash function. For example, 0xABCD, which is the hash value of the group of operation commands acquired in the period D1 (T1-T8), and 0xEFGH, which is the hash value of the group of control commands acquired in the period D1, are acquired and stored. In the example of FIG. 8, the operation command and the control command do not match at time T4, so the hash value of the group of operation commands and the hash value of the group of control commands do not match.

[0111] In this case, the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 may store a common hash function in advance.

[0112] The abnormality monitoring device 10 may collect a first operation log including a hash value for the operation command in the first period from the vehicle operation device 20, collect a first control log including a hash value for the control command in the first period from the vehicle control device 30, and if the hash values ​​do not match (an example of a comparison result), further collect a second operation log including the operation command in the first period from the vehicle operation device 20, and collect a second control log including the control command in the first period from the vehicle control device 30. In this way, the abnormality monitoring device 10 may be configured to determine the presence or absence of an abnormality in the vehicle 40 using the first operation log and the first control log, and to identify an attack source indicating the cause of the abnormality using the second operation log and the second control log.

[0113] [Example of anomaly detection rules] Fig. 9 is a diagram showing an example of an anomaly detection rule in this embodiment. The anomaly detection rule shown in Fig. 9 is used when the anomaly monitoring device 10 detects an anomaly. For example, the anomaly detection rule is used when the anomaly detection unit 104 of the anomaly monitoring device 10 detects an anomaly using an operation log, a control log, and a position log.

[0114] An anomaly detection rule includes a number, a type, a rule, and an anomaly location. The number is an identification number of the anomaly detection rule, the type is the type of log used for anomaly detection, the rule is the condition for detecting an anomaly, and the anomaly location describes the type of log that is assumed to contain an anomaly when an anomaly is detected. The log shown in the anomaly location is an example of an anomaly log.

[0115] For example, the anomaly detection rule No. 1 describes a rule that detects an anomaly when an operation command and a control command at the same time do not match using the operation log and the control log, and determines that the control log contains an anomaly. The rules described in Fig. 9 are described as examples of rules for detecting anomalies described in the example of the operation log, the example of the control log, the example of the position log, and the example of the log, respectively.

[0116] In addition, for example, the abnormality detection rules numbered 2 to 4 include rules that detect an abnormality when an unauthorized operation command is entered in the operation log, the context (e.g., the state of vehicle 40) at the time of the operation command (when the operation command is executed) is different, or the operation command is different from usual behavior, and determine that the operation log contains an abnormality.

[0117] In addition, for example, the abnormality detection rules numbered 5 to 7 include rules that detect an abnormality in the control log when an unauthorized control command is input, the context (e.g., the state of vehicle 40) at the time of the control command (when the control command is executed) is different, or the control command is different from usual behavior, and determine that the control log contains an abnormality.

[0118] Also, for example, the anomaly detection rule number 8 describes a rule that detects an anomaly when the position log detects that the vehicle 40 has traveled a distance that exceeds the vehicle's performance, and determines that the position log contains an anomaly.

[0119] Also, for example, the anomaly detection rule numbered 9 describes a rule that uses the control log and position log to detect an anomaly when there is a change in position information that differs from the control command, and determines that the position log contains an anomaly.

[0120] In this way, by having the anomaly detection unit 104 hold the anomaly detection rules, it is possible to detect an anomaly in each of the operation log, the control log, and the position log.

[0121] The anomaly detection rule is an example of a first rule for detecting an anomaly in each of the operation log and the control log. In the present embodiment, the anomaly detection rule includes information regarding an anomaly in the position log.

[0122] In addition, the mismatch between the operation command and the control command at the same time includes the mismatch between the hash value of the operation log and the hash value of the control log. The abnormality detection unit 104 may detect an abnormality when the hash value of the operation log and the hash value of the control log do not match.

[0123] [An example of an attack source determination rule] Fig. 10 is a diagram showing an example of an attack source determination rule in this embodiment. The attack source determination rule shown in Fig. 10 is used when the anomaly monitoring device 10 performs an attack source determination. For example, the attack source determination rule is used to identify the attack source that caused an anomaly in the attack source determination unit 105 of the anomaly monitoring device 10.

[0124] An attack-source determination rule includes a number, a rule, and an attack source. The number is an identification number of the attack-source determination rule, the rule is a condition for determining the source of an attack, and the attack source describes the source of the attack to be determined.

[0125] For example, in the attack source determination rule No. 1, if an operation command and a control command at the same time do not match, the attack source is determined to be the communication path. If the operation command and the control command do not match, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is the communication path (an example of a first attack source) based on the attack source determination rule shown in FIG. 10, since there is a high possibility that the operator's operation command has been tampered with on the communication path between the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 and executed on the vehicle 40. The first attack source is an attack source when it is assumed that a malicious operation command has been inserted on the communication path between the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30. Note that the fact that an operation command and a control command at the same time do not match is an example of a comparison result between the operation log and the control log.

[0126] Also, for example, in the attack source determination rule No. 2, when an abnormality occurs in both the operation log and the control log, the attack source is determined to be the operator. When an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is the operator (an example of a second attack source) based on the attack source determination rule shown in FIG. 10, since it is highly likely that a malicious operator inputs an abnormal operation command and an abnormal control command is executed in the vehicle 40. The second attack source is an attack source when it is assumed that an operator using the vehicle operation device 20 has sent a malicious operation command. Note that the occurrence of an abnormality in both the operation log and the control log is an example of a comparison result between the operation log and the control log.

[0127] Also, for example, in the attack source determination rule numbered 3, when an abnormality occurs only in the position log, the attack source is determined to be nearby. When an abnormality is not detected in both the operation log and the control log, and an abnormality is detected only in the position log, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is nearby (an example of a third attack source) since it is highly likely that a third party has physically approached the vehicle 40 and caused an abnormality in the vehicle 40. The third attack source is an attack source when it is assumed that the vehicle control device 30 has been physically attacked. Note that when an abnormality is not detected in both the operation log and the control log, and an abnormality is detected only in the position log, this is an example of a comparison result between the operation log and the control log.

[0128] The attack source determination rule is a rule used to identify the source of an attack, and is an example of a second rule. The attack source determination rule includes information that can identify the source of an attack based on at least the operation log and the control log. For example, the attack source determination unit 105 identifies the source of an attack for an abnormality in the vehicle 40 based on the operation log, the control log, and the attack source determination rule. In this embodiment, the attack source determination rule further includes information that can identify the source of an attack based on an abnormality in the position log.

[0129] [Example of anomaly countermeasure rules] Fig. 11 is a diagram showing an example of an abnormality countermeasure rule in this embodiment. The abnormality countermeasure rule shown in Fig. 11 is used when the vehicle operation device 20 and the vehicle control device 30 take measures against an abnormality. For example, the abnormality detection rule is used to take (execute) measures against an abnormality in the abnormality countermeasure unit 206 of the vehicle operation device 20 and the abnormality countermeasure unit 308 of the vehicle control device 30.

[0130] The anomaly countermeasure rule includes an attack source and a rule. The attack source is the type of attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105 of the anomaly monitoring device 10, and the rule describes the contents to be implemented as a countermeasure against the corresponding attack source.

[0131] For example, when the source of an attack is a communication path, the abnormality countermeasure rule shown in Fig. 11 prevents the attack from being received by stopping the remote control function of the vehicle control device 30 mounted on the vehicle 40 (one example of a countermeasure against the first source of attack). The countermeasure against the first source of attack can be realized by the vehicle control unit 303 not accepting operation commands from the vehicle operation device 20.

[0132] Also, for example, when the source of an attack is an operator, the abnormality countermeasure rule shown in Fig. 11 suppresses attacks by revoking the operator's access authority to the vehicle operation device 20 (an example of a countermeasure against a second source of attack). The countermeasure against the second source of attack can be realized by the operation command input unit 202 not accepting operation commands from the operator.

[0133] 11, when the attack source is in the vicinity, an alarm or the like is used to warn the surroundings of the vehicle control device 30 (one example of a measure against a third attack source), thereby preventing the vehicle control device 30 from being attacked. The measure against the third attack source can be realized by the abnormality countermeasure unit 308 executing an alarm operation.

[0134] In this way, by using the anomaly countermeasure rule, at least one of the anomaly countermeasure units 206 and 308 can execute countermeasures according to the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105. This allows the anomaly countermeasure units 206 and 308 to take countermeasures according to the cause, making it possible to provide a safer autonomously-driving vehicle 40 (an example of autonomous driving mobility).

[0135] [Vehicle remote control processing sequence] Fig. 12 is a diagram showing a processing sequence of remotely controlling a vehicle in this embodiment. Specifically, Fig. 12 shows a processing sequence from when an operator inputs an operation command to when the vehicle 40 is controlled by a control command based on the operation command and then when position information is stored.

[0136] (S1201) The operation command input unit 202 of the vehicle operation device 20 accepts an input of an operation command from an operator, and transmits the input operation command to the operation command transmission unit 203.

[0137] (S1202) The operation command transmitting unit 203 of the vehicle operation device 20 transmits the received operation command to the operation command receiving unit 302, and stores in the operation log storage unit 204 the operation command and the time when the operation command was transmitted.

[0138] (S1203) The operation command receiving unit 302 of the vehicle control device 30 transmits the received operation command to the vehicle control unit 303.

[0139] (S1204) The vehicle control unit 303 of the vehicle control device 30 executes control of the vehicle 40 using the received operation command as a control command, and stores the executed control command and the time when the control command was executed in the control log memory unit 304.

[0140] (S1205) The vehicle control unit 303 of the vehicle control device 30 acquires position information of the vehicle 40 from a GPS or the like, and stores the position information and the time when the position information was acquired in the position log storage unit 305. The time when the position information is acquired may include the same time when the control command is executed. The position information may be acquired, for example, before and after the control command is executed, or may be acquired during the execution of the control command.

[0141] [Log collection processing sequence] Fig. 13 is a diagram showing a processing sequence of log collection in this embodiment. Specifically, Fig. 13 shows a processing sequence until the log collection unit 102 collects and stores an operation log, a control log, and a position log.

[0142] (S1301) The operation log transmission unit 205 transmits the operation log stored in the operation log storage unit 204 to the log collection unit 102.

[0143] (S1302) Log recorder 102 stores the received operation log in log storage unit 103.

[0144] (S1303) Control log transmission unit 306 transmits the control log stored in control log storage unit 304 to log collection unit 102.

[0145] (S1304) Log recorder 102 stores the received control log in log storage unit 103.

[0146] (S1305) The position log transmission unit 307 transmits the position log stored in the position log storage unit 305 to the log collection unit 102.

[0147] (S1306) Log recorder 102 stores the received position log in log storage unit 103.

[0148] Here, the operation log transmission unit 205, the control log transmission unit 306, and the position log transmission unit 307 may transmit logs to the log collection unit 102 periodically, may transmit logs according to the log storage capacity, or may transmit logs according to instructions from the log collection unit 102.

[0149] Furthermore, the log collection unit 102 may store the received operation log, control log, and position log in the log storage unit 103 in association with each other by time, as shown in FIG.

[0150] [Processing sequence from anomaly detection to anomaly countermeasures] Fig. 14 is a diagram showing a processing sequence from anomaly detection to anomaly countermeasure in this embodiment. Specifically, Fig. 14 shows a processing sequence from when the log collection unit 102 collects an operation log, a control log, and a position log, until when the anomaly detection unit 104 detects an anomaly, the attack source determination unit 105 determines the attack source, and the anomaly countermeasure unit 206 or the anomaly countermeasure unit 308 implements anomaly countermeasure.

[0151] (S1401) The abnormality detection unit 104 acquires the operation log, the control log, and the position log stored in the log storage unit 103.

[0152] (S1402) The anomaly detection unit 104 detects an anomaly based on an anomaly detection rule (see, for example, FIG. 8), the operation log, the control log, and the position log. When an anomaly is detected, the anomaly detection unit 104 notifies the attack source determination unit 105 of the detected anomaly. The anomaly detection unit 104 may notify the attack source determination unit 105 of at least one of which rule an anomaly has been detected and the location of the anomaly.

[0153] For example, when the anomaly detection unit 104 detects that an operation command and a control command at the same time do not match, the anomaly detection unit 104 may notify the attack source determination unit 105 of both the fact that an anomaly in which an operation command and a control command at the same time do not match has been detected and that the abnormality is in the control log. Details of the anomaly detection method will be described later.

[0154] (S1403) When the attack source determination unit 105 receives an abnormality, it acquires the operation log, the control log, and the position log stored in the log storage unit 103. Then, the attack source determination unit 105 determines the attack source using the attack source determination rules, and transmits the determined attack source to the abnormality notification unit 106. The attack source determination method will be described in detail later.

[0155] (S1404) The abnormality notification unit 106 transmits the occurrence of an abnormality and the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105 to the abnormality countermeasure unit 206 or the abnormality countermeasure unit 308. For example, when the attack source is a communication path or a short distance, the abnormality notification unit 106 transmits the occurrence of an abnormality and the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105 to the abnormality countermeasure unit 308, and when the attack source is an operator, the abnormality notification unit 106 transmits the occurrence of an abnormality and the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105 to the abnormality countermeasure unit 206. Note that the abnormality notification unit 106 may transmit the occurrence of an abnormality and the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105 to each of the abnormality countermeasure unit 206 and the abnormality countermeasure unit 308, regardless of the attack source determined by the attack source determination unit 105. In this way, the abnormality notification unit 106 can notify the operator that an abnormality has occurred on the communication path or in a short distance.

[0156] (S1405) The abnormality countermeasure unit 206 or the abnormality countermeasure unit 308 receives the attack source, and implements countermeasures according to the received attack source using the abnormality countermeasure rules.

[0157] [Flowchart of abnormality detection process] FIG. 15 is a flowchart of the abnormality detection process in this embodiment.

[0158] (S1501) Anomaly detection unit 104 acquires an operation log, a control log, and a position log from log storage unit 103, and executes step S1502. Step S1501 corresponds to step S1401 shown in FIG.

[0159] (S1502) The anomaly detection unit 104 determines whether or not an anomaly exists based on the log acquired in step S1501 and the anomaly detection rule. If an anomaly is detected in at least one of the operation log, the control log, and the position log (Yes in S1502), the anomaly detection unit 104 performs step S1503. If no anomaly is detected (No in S1502), the anomaly detection unit 104 ends the anomaly detection process. Details of the anomaly detection method are as described in the example of the anomaly detection rule.

[0160] (S1503) The anomaly detection unit 104 determines that an anomaly has occurred in the vehicle 40, notifies the attack source determination unit 105 of the anomaly, and ends the anomaly detection process.

[0161] It should be noted that steps S1502 and S1503 correspond to step S1402 shown in FIG.

[0162] As described above, the abnormality detection unit 104 detects an abnormality in each of the operation log, the control log, and the position log based on an abnormality detection rule (for example, the abnormality detection rule shown in FIG. 9).

[0163] [Flowchart of attack source determination process] 16 is a diagram showing a flowchart of the attack source determination process in this embodiment. The process shown in FIG. 16 is executed when the determination is made in step S1503 in FIG.

[0164] (S1601) The attack source determination unit 105 acquires an operation log, a control log, and a position log, and executes step S1602.

[0165] (S1602) The attack source determination unit 105 determines whether the operation log and the control log match. The attack source determination unit 105 compares the operation log and the control log, and if they do not match (No in S1602), executes step S1603, and if they match (Yes in S1602), executes step S1605. Step S1602 is a determination as to whether or not the rule of number 1 shown in FIG. 10 is satisfied. Note that the operation log and the control log match (Yes in S1602) means that the condition of number 1 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is satisfied, and the operation log and the control log do not match (No in S1602) means that the condition of number 1 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is not satisfied.

[0166] (S1603) If the result in step S1602 is No, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is a first attack source that is a communication path, based on the attack source determination rules shown in Fig. 10. In other words, based on the determination result in step S1602 (an example of a comparison result), the attack source determination unit 105 identifies that the attack source is a communication path (first attack source) from among the multiple attack sources shown in the attack source determination rules shown in Fig. 10. Then, the attack source determination unit 105 transmits the determination result indicating that the result in step S1602 is No to the anomaly countermeasure unit 206 or the anomaly countermeasure unit 308. This makes it possible to carry out step S1604.

[0167] (S1604) When the anomaly countermeasure unit 206 or the anomaly countermeasure unit 308 receives the judgment result from the attack source judgment unit 105, it implements "stopping the remote control function of the vehicle control device 30" as a countermeasure against the first attack source based on the anomaly countermeasure rules shown in FIG. 11, and then terminates.

[0168] (S1605) If the result of step S1602 is Yes, the attack source determination unit 105 further determines whether or not both the operation log and the control log are abnormal. The attack source determination unit 105 checks whether or not there is an abnormality in the operation log and whether or not there is an abnormality in the control log, and if both the operation log and the control log are abnormal (Yes in S1605), it performs step S1606, and if both the operation log and the control log are not abnormal (No in S1605), it performs step S1608. Note that if both the operation log and the control log are abnormal (Yes in S1605), it means that the condition of number 2 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is satisfied, and if both the operation log and the control log are not abnormal (No in S1605), it means that the condition of number 2 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is not satisfied.

[0169] (S1606) If the result of step S1605 is Yes, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is a second attack source that is an operator. Then, the attack source determination unit 105 transmits a determination result indicating that the result of step S1605 is Yes to the anomaly countermeasure unit 206. This makes it possible to carry out step S1607.

[0170] (S1607) When the anomaly countermeasure unit 206 receives the judgment result from the attack source judgment unit 105, it implements "revoke the operator's access authority to the vehicle operation device 20" as a countermeasure against the second attack source based on the anomaly countermeasure rules shown in FIG. 11, and then terminates.

[0171] (S1608) If the result is No in step S1605, the attack source determination unit 105 further determines whether or not only the location log is abnormal. If only the location log is abnormal (Yes in S1608), the attack source determination unit 105 performs step S1609, and if only the location log is not abnormal (No in S1608), the attack source determination unit 105 ends the process. Note that only the location log being abnormal (determined as Yes in S1608) means that the condition of number 3 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is satisfied, and if only the location log is not abnormal (determined as No in S1608), it means that the condition of number 3 in the attack source determination rules shown in FIG. 10 is not satisfied.

[0172] (S1609) If the result of step S1608 is Yes, the attack source determination unit 105 determines that the attack source is a third attack source located in a short distance. Then, the attack source determination unit 105 transmits a determination result indicating that the result of step S1608 is Yes to the anomaly countermeasure unit 308. This makes it possible to carry out step S1610.

[0173] (S1610) When the anomaly countermeasure unit 308 receives the judgment result from the attack source judgment unit 105, it implements "issuing a warning to those around the vehicle control device 30" as a countermeasure against the third attack source based on the anomaly countermeasure rules shown in FIG. 11, and then ends the process.

[0174] It should be noted that steps S1601 to S1603, S1605, S1606, S1608, and S1609 correspond to step S1403 shown in Fig. 14. Also, steps S1604, S1607, and S1610 correspond to step S1405 shown in Fig. 14.

[0175] As described above, the attack source determination unit 105 identifies the attack source that caused the abnormality in the vehicle 40 as a first attack source from among the multiple attack sources when the operation log and the control log do not match, and identifies the attack source that caused the abnormality in the vehicle 40 as a second attack source different from the first attack source from among the multiple attack sources when abnormalities are detected in both the operation log and the control log. Also, the attack source determination unit 105 identifies the attack source that caused the abnormality in the vehicle 40 as a third attack source different from the first attack source and the second attack source from among the multiple attack sources when only the position log is abnormal.

[0176] At least one of the abnormality countermeasures units 206 and 308 may stop the remote control function of the vehicle control device 30 if it is determined to be a first source of attack, revoke the operator's access authority to the vehicle operation device 20 if it is determined to be a second source of attack, and issue a warning to those around the vehicle control device 30 if it is determined to be a third source of attack.

[0177] As a result, the anomaly monitoring device 10 can collect and compare the control log of the vehicle 40 and the operation log of the operator to determine whether the cause of the anomaly in the vehicle 40 is a cyber attack or an abnormal operation by the operator. Then, the anomaly monitoring device 10 can take effective measures according to the cause of the anomaly. Therefore, the anomaly monitoring device 10 can provide safer autonomous driving mobility.

[0178] It should be noted that the attack source determination unit 105 performs the determinations of steps S1602, S1605, and S1608 in this order, but the order is not limited to this.

[0179] (Other embodiments) As described above, the embodiment has been described as an example of the technology according to the present disclosure. However, the technology according to the present disclosure is not limited to this, and can be applied to an embodiment in which appropriate changes, substitutions, additions, omissions, etc. are made. For example, the following modified examples are also included in one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0180] (1) In the above embodiment, the security measures for automobiles have been described, but the scope of application is not limited to this. The present invention may be applied to any mobility such as construction machinery, agricultural machinery, ships, railways, and aircraft (e.g., airplanes, drones, etc.) in addition to automobiles. In other words, the mobility is not limited to vehicles including automobiles, but may be construction machinery, agricultural machinery, ships, railways, airplanes, etc. In addition, the mobility may be capable of fully automatic driving, or may be capable of switching between automatic driving and manual driving.

[0181] (2) Some or all of the components constituting each device in the above embodiments may be composed of one system LSI (Large Scale Integration). The system LSI is an ultra-multifunctional LSI manufactured by integrating a plurality of components on one chip, and specifically, is a computer system including a microprocessor, a ROM (Read Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), etc. A computer program is recorded in the RAM. The microprocessor operates according to the computer program, and the system LSI achieves its function. Each part of the components constituting each device may be individually integrated into one chip, or may be integrated into one chip to include some or all of the components. Although the system LSI is used here, it may be called an IC, an LSI, a super LSI, or an ultra LSI depending on the degree of integration. The method of integration is not limited to LSI, and may be realized by a dedicated circuit or a general-purpose processor. After LSI manufacturing, it is possible to use FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) that can be programmed, or reconfigurable processors that can reconfigure the connections and settings of circuit cells inside LSIs. Furthermore, if an integrated circuit technology that can replace LSIs emerges due to advances in semiconductor technology or other derived technologies, it is natural that such technology can be used to integrate functional blocks. The application of biotechnology is also a possibility.

[0182] (3) Some or all of the components constituting each of the above devices may be composed of an IC card or a standalone module that can be attached to each device. The IC card or module is a computer system composed of a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, etc. The IC card or module may include the above-mentioned ultra-multifunction LSI. The IC card or module achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to a computer program. This IC card or module may be tamper-resistant.

[0183] (4) As an aspect of the present disclosure, the method for detecting an anomaly may be a program (computer program) that is implemented by a computer, or may be a digital signal consisting of a computer program. As an aspect of the present disclosure, the method may be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium, such as a flexible disk, a hard disk, a CD-ROM, an MO, a DVD, a DVD-ROM, a DVD-RAM, a BD (Blu-ray (registered trademark) Disc), a semiconductor memory, or the like. Alternatively, the method may be a digital signal recorded on such a recording medium. As an aspect of the present disclosure, the computer program or the digital signal may be transmitted via a telecommunication line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network such as the Internet, data broadcasting, or the like. As an aspect of the present disclosure, a computer system having a microprocessor and a memory, in which the memory records the computer program, and the microprocessor operates according to the computer program. Alternatively, the method may be implemented by another independent computer system by recording the program or the digital signal on a recording medium and transferring it, or by transferring the program or the digital signal via a network, or the like.

[0184] (5) The division of functional blocks in the block diagram is an example, and multiple functional blocks may be realized as one functional block, one functional block may be divided into multiple blocks, or some functions may be moved to another functional block. Furthermore, the functions of multiple functional blocks having similar functions may be processed in parallel or in time-sharing by a single piece of hardware or software.

[0185] Furthermore, the vehicle monitoring device according to the above-described embodiments and the like may be realized as a single device, or may be realized by multiple devices. When the vehicle monitoring device is realized by multiple devices, the components of the vehicle monitoring device may be distributed in any manner among the multiple devices. When the vehicle monitoring device is realized by multiple devices, the communication method between the multiple devices is not particularly limited, and may be wireless communication or wired communication. Furthermore, wireless communication and wired communication may be combined between the devices.

[0186] Also, some of the functions of each component of the vehicle monitoring device may be possessed by at least one of the vehicle operation device and the vehicle control device. For example, the vehicle operation device may have a function of detecting an abnormality in an operation log. In this case, the vehicle operation device may store in advance information regarding operations for which the operator is authorized. Also, for example, the vehicle control device may have a function of detecting an abnormality in a control log. In this case, the vehicle control device may store in advance information (e.g., catalog values) regarding the driving performance of the vehicle in which the vehicle control device is installed.

[0187] The vehicle monitoring device may also have some of the functions of the components of at least one of the vehicle operation device and the vehicle control device. The vehicle monitoring device may have, for example, a function of determining the content of a countermeasure among the functions of the abnormality countermeasure units of the vehicle operation device and the vehicle control device. In other words, the vehicle monitoring device may determine the countermeasures against an abnormality to be taken by each of the abnormality operation device and the vehicle control device. In this case, the vehicle monitoring device may store abnormality countermeasure rules (for example, the abnormality countermeasure rules shown in FIG. 11) in advance.

[0188] (6) In addition, in the above embodiment, when one vehicle operation device controls multiple vehicle control devices (i.e., multiple vehicles), when the source of the attack is identified as an operator based on the operation log and the control log of at least one of the multiple vehicle control devices, the vehicle monitoring device may also revoke access authority to the vehicle operation device to remotely operate other vehicle control devices.

[0189] (7) In the above embodiment, the anomaly detection unit detects an anomaly (a log containing an anomaly) using an anomaly detection rule, but the method of detecting an anomaly is not limited to this. For example, the anomaly detection unit may detect an anomaly using a machine learning model that is trained to receive an operation log and a control log as input information and output an anomaly.

[0190] (8) The order in which each step is performed in the flowchart is merely an example for specifically explaining the present disclosure, and orders other than those described above may be used. Some of the steps may be performed simultaneously (in parallel) with other steps, or some of the steps may not be performed.

[0191] (9) In the above embodiment, the operation log and the control log include a hash value in addition to the command, but they may include only a hash value. This reduces the amount of communication required to collect the operation log and the vehicle log, and allows efficient comparison of the operation log and the vehicle log.

[0192] (10) In the above embodiment, the three attack sources are exemplified as "communication path", "operator" and "short distance", but other attack sources may be included. Also, the number of attack sources is not particularly limited as long as it is two or more.

[0193] (11) The scope of the present disclosure also includes configurations realized by combining the components and functions shown in the above embodiment and the above modified examples in any way. For example, as long as it does not deviate from the spirit of the present disclosure, the present disclosure may include configurations in which various modifications conceivable by a person skilled in the art are applied to the present embodiment, or configurations constructed by combining components in different embodiments. [Industrial Applicability]

[0194] The present disclosure is useful for a remote control system for remotely controlling mobility. [Explanation of symbols]

[0195] 10 Abnormality monitoring device 20 Vehicle operation device 30 Vehicle control device 40 vehicles 101 Communications Department 102 Log collection unit 103 Log storage unit 104 Anomaly detection unit 105 Attack source determination unit 106 Abnormality notification section 201 Communications Department 202 Operation command input section 203 Operation command transmission unit 204 Operation log storage unit 205 Operation log transmission unit 206 Abnormality Control Department 301 Communications Department 302 Operation command receiver 303 Vehicle control unit 304 Control log storage unit 305 Position log memory unit 306 Control log transmission unit 307 Location log transmission unit 308 Anomaly Prevention Department

Claims

1. An abnormality monitoring device in a remote operation system for remotely operating a mobility, comprising: a log collection unit that collects an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device that remotely operates the mobility, collects a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a control device mounted on the mobility, and collects a position log, which is a history of position information of the mobility, from the control device; an abnormality detection unit that detects whether or not the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log, and the position log; an attack source identification unit that, when the anomaly detection unit detects the presence of the anomaly, identifies an attack source that is the cause of the mobility anomaly from among a plurality of attack sources, according to a comparison result between the operation log and the control log and the presence or absence of an anomaly based on the position log; an abnormality notification unit that issues a notification to implement measures according to the attack source identified by the attack source identification unit, Abnormality monitoring device.

2. The anomaly detection unit further detects the presence or absence of an anomaly in each of the operation log and the control log based on a first rule; The attack source identification unit further identifies the attack source as a first attack source when the operation log and the control log do not match, and identifies the attack source as a second attack source different from the first attack source when an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log. The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 1 .

3. The first rule further includes information regarding anomalies in the location log, the anomaly detection unit detects an anomaly in each of the operation log, the control log, and the position log based on the first rule; the attack source identification unit identifies the attack source as a third attack source different from the first attack source and the second attack source when only the location log is abnormal; The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 2.

4. The first attack source includes a malicious operation command being inserted in a communication path between the operation device and the control device, the second attack source includes a malicious operation command sent by an operator using the operation device; The third source of attack includes a physical attack on the mobility by a third party; the abnormality notification unit stops a remote control function of the control device when it is determined that the first attack source is present, cancels the operator's access authority to the operation device when it is determined that the second attack source is present, and issues a notification to issue a warning to those around the control device when it is determined that the third attack source is present. The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 3.

5. The log collection unit further collects a hash value of the operation log and a hash value of the control log; the anomaly detection unit detects an anomaly when a hash value of the operation log and a hash value of the control log do not match. The abnormality monitoring device according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

6. the first rule includes information indicating that the control log contains an abnormality when the operation log and the control log do not match, The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 2 or 3.

7. The first rule includes information indicating that the position log includes an abnormality when the position log includes information indicating a change in position information different from that of the control log. The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 3.

8. the attack source identification unit identifies an attack source causing the mobility anomaly based on the operation log, the control log, and a second rule; and the second rule includes: if the operation command and the control command at the same time do not match, the source of the attack is a communication path between the operation device and the control device; and if an abnormality is detected in both the operation log and the control log, the source of the attack is an operator who uses the operation device. The abnormality monitoring device according to claim 1 .

9. A method for monitoring an abnormality in a remote operation system for remotely operating a mobility, comprising: a log collection step of collecting an operation log, which is a history of operation commands, from an operation device mounted on the mobility that remotely operates the mobility, collecting a control log, which is a history of control commands, from a vehicle control device, and collecting a position log, which is a history of position information of the mobility, from the vehicle control device; an anomaly detection step of detecting whether or not the mobility is abnormal based on at least one of the operation log and the control log, and the position log; an attack source identification step of identifying an attack source that causes the mobility anomaly from among a plurality of attack sources, according to a comparison result between the operation log and the control log and the presence or absence of an anomaly based on the position log, when the anomaly is detected in the anomaly detection step; an abnormality notification step of issuing a notification to implement measures according to the attack source identified by the attack source identification step, Anomaly monitoring method.

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