Apparatus for mitigating real-time security threat using zero trust architecture

The real-time security threat blocking device addresses latency and synchronization issues in distributed Zero Trust architectures by enabling direct information sharing between PDPs, ensuring consistent and rapid access decisions and enhanced security across branches.

KR103046616B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-11REPUBLIC OF KOREADEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM ADMINISTATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020250038558
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-03-26
Publication Date
2026-11-11
Estimated Expiration
2045-03-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Centralized Zero Trust architectures face challenges in geographically distributed environments due to network latency, traffic bottlenecks, and delays in real-time information synchronization between Policy Decision Points (PDPs), leading to inconsistent access decisions and potential security vulnerabilities.

Method used

A real-time security threat blocking device utilizing a zero-trust architecture that enables direct information sharing between PDPs through a PDP data receiving module, policy engine, dynamic access decision module, emergency situation determination module, and PDP data packaging/transmission module to ensure rapid propagation of access decisions and trust information across distributed branches.

Benefits of technology

Ensures consistent access decisions and maintains security standards across various regions by preventing incorrect access permissions due to network delays, thereby enhancing security and performance in distributed zero-trust structures.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to a real-time security threat blocking device utilizing a zero-trust architecture, and may include a PDP data receiving module for receiving PDP data, a first PDP composed of a policy engine that performs access decisions and a policy manager that performs security policies in conjunction with the policy engine, a dynamic access decision module that determines whether to access first based on received PDP data before performing a final access decision in the first PDP, an emergency situation determination module that determines an emergency situation by analyzing data collected from an external source and data generated in the PDP, a PDP data packaging / transmission module that packages and transmits data to be transmitted to a second PDP when an emergency situation occurs, and a policy execution manager that executes the access decision of the policy engine to allow or block access to resources.
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Description

Technology Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a real-time security threat blocking device utilizing a zero-trust architecture, and specifically, to a device that minimizes security threats through real-time data sharing between Policy Decision Points (PDPs), dynamic access decisions, machine learning-based threat prediction, and automation of emergency response. Background Technology

[0002] The following descriptions are intended to aid in understanding the technical significance of the invention and are not based on the premise that they were publicly known prior to the filing. Therefore, the fact that a description is included in the background technology of the invention should not be regarded as publicly known technology in itself.

[0003] Traditional network security models operated by distinguishing between internal and external networks, designating the internal network as a trusted zone, and controlling access from the external network to the internal network. This traditional security model, known as Perimeter-Based Security, utilized technologies such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS / IPS), and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to establish security boundaries between the inside and outside of the network and control access. However, due to changes in the IT environment—such as cloud computing, remote work environments, and the increase in mobile devices—the boundary between internal and external networks has become blurred. Furthermore, as instances of internal users directly accessing external cloud services have increased, the limitations of existing security models have begun to become apparent.

[0004] The biggest problem with traditional security models is that they regard the internal network as a trusted environment. Users with access to the internal network can freely access internal resources without security verification, and there is a lack of control mechanisms against malicious code infiltrating the network or malicious activities by insiders. In particular, since attackers who infiltrate the internal network possess the same privileges as internal users, there is a risk that they can access the company's key assets without additional verification. Consequently, security threats such as account hijacking, insider threats, and Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks are on the rise, and a new security model is required to effectively block these threats.

[0005] The Zero Trust model is a security paradigm that performs continuous verification on all access requests, regardless of whether they originate from an internal or external network. Based on the principle of "trusting no one," Zero Trust applies strict access controls without granting trust to any users, devices, or applications. To achieve this, security technologies such as continuous authentication, least privilege, and the application of granular access policies are utilized.

[0006] Zero Trust Architecture is structured around Policy Decision Points (PDPs) and Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs). When an access request occurs, the PDP collects various information to determine whether access is permitted, and the PEP allows or blocks access based on the PDP's decision. The PDP applies access policies by analyzing diverse data, such as user identity, device status, network environment, and security events. To maintain policy consistency, it utilizes a centralized database or a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system to store and manage access history.

[0007] However, a centralized Zero Trust architecture has limitations in geographically distributed environments, such as multinational corporations. Specifically, since all access requests are processed by a central PDP, network latency and traffic bottlenecks may occur, and the central PDP may not be able to adequately reflect regional security requirements. Furthermore, in a centralized model, there may be instances where PDPs fail to share security data in real time, potentially leading to delays in real-time response to security events.

[0008] Although a distributed zero-trust architecture has been proposed to address these issues, delays in real-time information synchronization between PDPs at headquarters and branch offices can lead to security vulnerabilities where users blocked from access at headquarters are granted access at branch offices. To resolve this problem, real-time information synchronization is required to enable the real-time sharing of trust information and access decision data between PDPs. The problem to be solved

[0009] The present invention aims to rapidly prevent the spread to other regions by directly sharing information (access decisions, session policies, trust information, etc.) generated by each PDP in a distributed zero-trust structure among PDPs, thereby propagating information about the accessing entity in real time in the event of an internal intrusion.

[0010] In addition, the present invention aims to make consistent access decisions in a distributed zero-trust structure by rapidly sharing information generated from the PDP, thereby ensuring that the same security standards are maintained across various regions or branches.

[0011] In addition, the present invention aims to simultaneously guarantee security and performance by preventing incorrect access permission based on information delayed due to network delay.

[0012] However, the technical problem that this embodiment aims to solve is not limited to the technical problem described above, and other technical problems may exist. means of solving the problem

[0013] A real-time security threat blocking device utilizing a zero-trust architecture according to an embodiment of the present invention may include: a PDP data receiving module for receiving PDP data; a first PDP composed of a policy engine that performs an access decision and a policy manager that performs a security policy in conjunction with the policy engine; a dynamic access decision module that determines whether to access first based on the received PDP data before performing a final access decision in the first PDP; an emergency situation determination module that determines an emergency situation by analyzing data collected from an external source and data generated in the PDP; a PDP data packaging / transmission module that packages and transmits data to be transmitted to a second PDP when an emergency situation occurs; and a policy execution manager that executes the access decision of the policy engine to allow or block access to a resource.

[0014] According to one embodiment, the PDP data receiving module can convert the received PDP data into data that can be immediately utilized by the policy engine through integrity verification, decoding, and data cleaning.

[0015] According to one embodiment, the access decision may be based on at least one of data received from a PDP data receiving module, trust information of the accessing principal, network status, past access history, and a security policy set by a policy manager.

[0016] According to one embodiment, a policy manager can create, modify, distribute, and apply security policies.

[0017] According to one embodiment, the emergency situation determination module may determine an emergency situation if any one of the following applies: when a specific user's trust score is lower than a predefined threshold, when a potential security threat is detected, or when the user reaches a predefined situation.

[0018] According to one embodiment, a policy manager may execute measures to block user access or require additional authentication based on a predefined policy.

[0019] According to one embodiment, the emergency situation determination module can share information regarding the emergency situation with the second PDP through the PDP data packaging / transmission module when an emergency situation occurs.

[0020] According to one embodiment, the PDP data packaging / transmission module may additionally include a function to encrypt the transmitted data and verify data integrity.

[0021] According to one embodiment, it may further include a response module that automatically executes a predefined response scenario when an emergency occurs.

[0022] According to one embodiment, it may further include a machine learning module that predicts potential threats and responds in advance based on past security event data.

[0023] According to one embodiment, the first PDP and the second PDP can share the generated information in real time. Effects of the invention

[0024] According to the present invention, in a distributed zero-trust structure, by directly sharing information (access decisions, session policies, trust information, etc.) generated by each PDP among PDPs, information regarding the accessing entity is propagated in real time in the event of an internal intrusion incident, thereby rapidly preventing the spread to other regions.

[0025] In addition, according to the present invention, by rapidly sharing information generated from the PDP, consistent access decisions can be made in a distributed zero-trust structure, thereby enabling the same security standards to be maintained across various regions or branches.

[0026] In addition, according to the present invention, security and performance can be simultaneously guaranteed by preventing incorrect access permission based on information delayed due to network delay. Brief explanation of the drawing

[0027] Figure 1 is a diagram showing an access control policy for realizing a zero-trust architecture in an enterprise network. Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating a basic scenario for zero-trust-based resource access. Figure 3 is an example block diagram showing a zero trust established by a multinational corporation with branches in various countries around the world. Figure 4 is an example block diagram showing a zero trust of a distributed structure. FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a method of sharing information generated in a PDP through a SIEM that adds a channel for sharing information between other PDPs in one embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a real-time security threat blocking device according to another embodiment of the present invention. Specific details for implementing the invention

[0028] Embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below with reference to the attached drawings so that those skilled in the art can easily implement the invention. Since the present invention is susceptible to various modifications and may have various embodiments, specific embodiments are illustrated in the drawings and described in detail in the description. However, this is not intended to limit the present invention to specific embodiments, and it should be understood that it includes all modifications, equivalents, and substitutions that fall within the spirit and scope of the invention.

[0029] To clearly explain the present invention, parts unrelated to the description have been omitted from the drawings, and similar parts throughout the specification have been given similar reference numerals. Furthermore, while describing with reference to the drawings, even components indicated by the same name may have different drawing numbers depending on the drawing, and drawing numbers are provided merely for the convenience of explanation; the concept, feature, function, or effect of each component is not to be interpreted restrictively by the corresponding drawing number.

[0030] Similar reference numerals are used for similar components when describing each drawing. Terms such as "first," "second," etc., may be used to describe various components, but said components should not be limited by said terms. These terms are used solely for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another. For example, without departing from the scope of the present invention, the first component may be named the second component, and similarly, the second component may be named the first component. The term "and / or" includes a combination of a plurality of related described items or any of a plurality of related described items.

[0031] Unless otherwise defined, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as generally understood by those skilled in the art to which this invention pertains.

[0032] Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted as having meanings consistent with their meanings in the context of the relevant technology, and should not be interpreted in an ideal or overly formal sense unless explicitly defined in this application.

[0033] Throughout the specification, when a part is described as being "connected" to another part, this includes not only cases where they are "directly connected" but also cases where they are "electrically connected" with other elements interposed between them. Furthermore, when a part is described as "comprising" a certain component, this means that, unless specifically stated otherwise, it does not exclude other components but rather allows for the inclusion of additional components; it should be understood that this does not preclude the existence or addition of one or more other features, numbers, steps, actions, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

[0034] In this specification, "part" or "module" means software or hardware components such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). However, "part" or "module" is not limited to hardware and software. "Part" or "module" may be configured to reside in an addressable storage medium or configured to run on one or more processors. Thus, by example, "part" or "module" includes components such as software components, object-oriented software components, class components, and task components, as well as processes, functions, attributes, procedures, subroutines, segments of program code, drivers, firmware, microcode, circuits, data, databases, data structures, tables, arrays, and variables. The components and functions provided within the "part" or "module" may be combined into a smaller number of components and "parts" or "modules," or separated into additional components and "parts" or "modules."

[0035] A real-time security threat blocking device utilizing a zero-trust architecture according to the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings.

[0036] Figure 1 is a diagram showing an access control policy for realizing a zero-trust architecture in an enterprise network.

[0037] As illustrated in FIG. 1, the space where access control policies are determined is defined as the Control Plane (110), where criteria for establishing and applying security policies are determined. On the other hand, the space where access subjects access corporate resources as a result of policy implementation is called the Data Plane (120), where access requests are actually processed. Organic interaction between each element is required so that the access policy determined in the Control Plane (110) can be consistently implemented in the Data Plane.

[0038] A Policy Decision Point (PDP: 111) evaluates access requests and makes a final decision, and may be composed of a Policy Engine (PE: 112) and a Policy Administrator (PA: 113). The Policy Engine (112) can collect various information, including recent history information of an access subject (122), from external sources to calculate trustworthiness and, based on this, decide whether to allow access to the resource (123) requested by the subject (122). The Policy Administrator (113) can manage the execution of the policy determined by the Policy Engine (112) in the data area. These two modules may be configured individually or integrated and implemented as a single service. Resources (123) may be defined as a concept including all data, applications, and network services within the system.

[0039] A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP: 121) can receive a request from a subject (122) to access a resource (123) and forward it to a policy manager (113) to request a policy evaluation. Subsequently, based on the access decision result received from the policy manager (113), it can perform the task of allowing, blocking, or terminating changes between the subject (122) and the resource (123). A basic scenario for accessing a resource (123) within an organization in such a zero-trust architecture is illustrated in FIG. 2.

[0040] Referring to Fig. 2,

[0041] 1. When a subject requests access to a resource through the client system,

[0042] 2. The PEP receives this and transmits information related to the access request to the PDP (PA), and

[0043] 3. PDP(PA) forwards the access request to PDP(PE) for evaluation.

[0044] 4. The PDP (PE) collects various information such as user identity, client status, network environment, and SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) information to calculate trust and review access policies. It decides whether to allow or deny access by considering trust and resource sensitivity, and if access is allowed, it also creates a session control policy and transmits it to the PDP (PA) (113).

[0045] 5. PDP(PA) transmits the access decision result and session control policy received from PDP(PE) to PEP(121).

[0046] 6. PEP executes resource access allow / deny based on the received access decision result, and applies session control policies when allowed.

[0047] 7. The reliability and access decisions calculated by PDP(PE) are stored in SIEM or a separate public DB and utilized for audit and security analysis.

[0048] 8. The PDP (PE) collects information from external systems at regular intervals or requests information if necessary to recalculate the reliability, and based on this, decides to deny access in case of policy violation or failure to meet the reliability threshold, and transmits this to the PDP (PA).

[0049] 9. PDP(PA) transmits the changed decision to PEP, and

[0050] 10. PEP terminates the session and blocks resource access based on the new decision received.

[0051] 11. Access decisions and policy changes are recorded in a SIEM or a separate public DB to ensure traceability and are used for security analysis.

[0052] Figure 3 is an example block diagram showing a zero trust established by a multinational corporation with branches in various countries around the world.

[0053] As illustrated in Fig. 3, when a multinational corporation with branches worldwide establishes a security system based on a zero-trust architecture, log management methods utilizing a centralized PDP, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), or a public database (DB) can lead to various limitations. In particular, if all access requests are processed by a centralized PDP, network traffic may concentrate in specific sections, causing bottlenecks and degrading network response speeds. Additionally, network latency may result in security policies failing to be based on the latest information.

[0054] In such an environment, there is a higher likelihood that the PDP will fail to reflect the latest information regarding the accessing entity and make inaccurate access decisions. For example, even if a specific user is blocked for suspicious access in one region, if this information is not shared immediately, there is a possibility that the same user may be allowed access in another region. This implies that if real-time information synchronization does not occur in a distributed environment, it is difficult to rapidly detect and block security threats.

[0055] Furthermore, each branch office often has to comply with different security environments and legal regulations. For instance, data protection laws in certain countries may restrict information sharing with external servers, while cloud-based access control may be impossible in some regions. However, a centralized PDP structure makes it difficult to reflect these regional security requirements and has the limitation that uniform security policies defined by headquarters are applied identically to all branches. Consequently, if the security requirements of a specific branch are not adequately reflected by the central PDP's policies, it becomes difficult to meet region-specific security needs, and constraints may arise in effectively applying security policies at the branch level.

[0056] Figure 4 is an example block diagram showing a zero trust of a distributed structure.

[0057] As illustrated in Fig. 4, a global security policy applicable to both the headquarters and branch offices is transmitted from the headquarters to each branch office for sharing, and a distributed zero-trust architecture can be applied in which access decisions are made separately for each branch office. In this structure, the Policy Decision Points (PDPs) of each branch office operate independently, thereby preventing traffic bottlenecks that occur in a centralized zero-trust structure. Additionally, local security policies reflecting the security environment and regulatory requirements of each region can be applied, enabling flexible security operations for each branch office. In this distributed structure, if operations are conducted such that headquarters employees access only headquarters resources and branch office employees access only their respective branch office resources, the same security policies as the existing centralized access control model can be maintained, and consistent security policy application is possible.

[0058] However, if headquarters employees need to access branch office resources, or if branch office employees need to access headquarters resources, a problem may arise where security policy consistency is not maintained if security information generated by the PDPs between headquarters and branches is not synchronized in real time. This may lead to a situation where different access decisions are made at headquarters and branches regarding the same user's access request.

[0059] For example, there may be a case where A is denied access to resources at the Seoul headquarters and immediately requests access to resources at the New York branch, where access is granted. While it is possible that different decisions were made due to differences in access policies between the two, it is also possible that access was granted because the information regarding A's access denial from the Seoul headquarters was not reflected when the New York branch made its decision.

[0060] The example below is a procedure for A, who works at the Seoul headquarters according to Fig. 4, to access resources located at the Seoul headquarters.

[0061] 1. When a request for access to Seoul resources is made through the client system,

[0062] 2. Seoul PEP receives this and transmits the access request information to Seoul PDP(PA), and

[0063] 3. Seoul PDP(PA) requests an evaluation of the access request from Seoul PDP(PE), and

[0064] 4. Seoul PDP (PE) collects user identity, recent access history, client status, network environment, SIEM information, etc. connected to Seoul PDP to calculate trustworthiness, evaluates access policies based on this, and transmits the access denial decision result to Seoul PDP (PA) because the trustworthiness score is below the threshold.

[0065] 5. Seoul PDP(PA) forwards the received access decision result to Seoul PEP, and 6. Seoul PEP forwards the resource access denial response to the user client.

[0066] 7. The reliability and access decision results calculated by Seoul PDP are stored in SIEM or a separate public DB and utilized for audit and security analysis.

[0067] The example below is a procedure for A, who works at the Seoul headquarters according to Fig. 4, to access resources located in New York.

[0068] 1. If A requests access to resources at the New York branch immediately after being denied access to resources in Seoul,

[0069] 2. The New York PEP receives this and forwards the access request information to the New York PDP (PA), and

[0070] 3. New York PDP(PA) transmits this to New York PDP(PE).

[0071] 4. The New York PDP (PE) collects user identity, recent access history, client status, network environment, SIEM information, etc., calculates trust level, and based on this, generates resource access policies and session policies and transmits them to the New York PDP (PA). Because recent information stating that access to resources in Seoul was denied is not reflected due to delay, the trust level exceeds the threshold, and thus access to New York resources is allowed.

[0072] 5. The New York PDP (PA) transmits access policies and / or session policies to the New York PEP, and

[0073] 6. The New York PEP creates a session between the client system and the New York resource based on the received policy.

[0074] 7. The New York PDP stores reliability and access decision information in the branch office SIEM or a separate DB.

[0075] To resolve the aforementioned issues, a method is required to share information generated by PDPs between the headquarters and branch offices in real time. Generally, since this information is stored through SIEM or shared databases, recent access history and trust levels can be shared by utilizing these resources. However, if the latest information is not shared in a timely manner due to network latency, data processing time, or system load, resource access decisions may become inconsistent, or there is a possibility that access posing security risks may be temporarily permitted.

[0076] Therefore, in situations requiring an urgent response, it is necessary to share information generated by a PDP with other PDPs in near real-time, separate from the storage of such information. This ensures that trust assessments and access decisions between the headquarters and branch offices are consistent. If this real-time synchronization is delayed, a security risk may arise, for example, where a user denied access at the headquarters is granted access at the branch office due to a delay in the reflection of the latest information.

[0077] FIG. 5 is a block diagram illustrating a method of sharing information generated in a PDP through a SIEM that adds a channel for sharing information between other PDPs in one embodiment of the present invention.

[0078] In Fig. 5, in addition to the PDP information sharing method using SIEM presented in Fig. 4, a direct information sharing channel between PDPs is added. Generally, information sharing methods utilizing SIEM or a public database (DB) are useful for centrally managing security events and maintaining consistency in access control policies. However, real-time synchronization is difficult with information sharing methods through SIEM or public DB due to issues such as network latency, data processing time, and system load. Consequently, trust evaluation and access decision data generated by PDPs may not be reflected in an up-to-date state, which may lead to delays in the application of security policies and security vulnerabilities.

[0079] In some embodiments, a method for synchronizing security data generated by PDPs in real time by utilizing direct information sharing channels between PDPs is additionally presented. Direct information sharing between PDPs may also utilize existing global policy sharing channels, thereby enabling the more rapid and consistent application of security policies in a distributed zero-trust environment. Through real-time data sharing between PDPs, security events occurring in a specific region can be immediately reflected in other PDPs, allowing all PDPs to make the same security decisions and thus maintaining consistency in security policies. Furthermore, it minimizes issues affecting trust assessments due to network latency and allows for rapid determination of access permissions by reflecting the latest security status.

[0080] For example, let's assume a scenario where A attempts to access resources at the Seoul headquarters but is denied because their trust level falls below a threshold, and then immediately attempts to access resources at the New York branch. In typical data sharing methods using SIEM or shared databases, there is a possibility that A's access denial history at the Seoul headquarters may not be immediately reflected in the New York branch's PDP due to network or data processing delays. In this case, the New York branch's PDP may fail to accurately assess A's trust level and allow access; this constitutes a security vulnerability arising from the fundamental limitations of centralized data sharing systems.

[0081] However, if the New York branch's PDP can directly receive and utilize the access denial history of A generated by the headquarters' PDP, the New York branch can immediately reflect this information in A's trustworthiness assessment. Through this, the New York branch's PDP can recognize A's low trustworthiness and block A's access by taking into account the access denial history from headquarters. Sharing information directly between PDPs in this way makes trustworthiness assessments more accurate and prevents security vulnerabilities that may arise from network latency.

[0082] The following scenarios can be considered as advantages of direct information sharing between PDPs.

[0083] 1. Scenario 1: When Salesperson A accesses the Headquarters / Branch System

[0084] ● 9:00 AM: Access to Seoul Headquarters System (510)

[0085] - Situation: Salesperson A accesses the company's intranet via a computer in their office at the Seoul headquarters.

[0086] - procedure:

[0087] If you request access to resources through an office computer,

[0088] . Seoul PEP (514) receives the access request and forwards it to Seoul PA (513).

[0089] . Seoul PA (513) forwards the access request to Seoul PE (512) to evaluate it, and

[0090] Seoul PE (512) calculates the trust level by collecting user identity, computer status, network environment, SIEM information, etc. The trust level is 85, and access is allowed because it is confirmed that the company computer is being used during normal business hours.

[0091] - Result: Seoul PDP (511) allows access and stores related reliability and access decision information.

[0092] ● 9:00 PM: Access New York Branch System (520)

[0093] - Situation: Salesperson A arrives at the New York branch for an overseas business trip and attempts to access the New York branch's system using a laptop.

[0094] - procedure:

[0095] When the New York PEP (524) receives an access request and forwards it to the New York PA (523),

[0096] . New York PA (523) forwards the access request to New York PE (524) to evaluate it.

[0097] The New York PE (524) receives A's reliability information (85 points) and policy information from the Seoul headquarters PDP (521). The New York PE (522) comprehensively evaluates additional information, including user identity, client status, and network environment, including the information, and allows access.

[0098] - Result: The PDP (521) of the New York branch allows access based on information received from the Seoul headquarters PDP (511) and additional information collected in New York.

[0099] ● 9:30 PM: Attempted to access Seoul Headquarters System (510) with the same account

[0100] - Situation: Someone attempted to access the Seoul headquarters system using Salesperson A's account

[0101] - procedure:

[0102] . Seoul PEP (514) receives the access request and forwards it to Seoul PA (513), and

[0103] . Seoul PA (513) forwards the access request to Seoul PE (512) to evaluate it.

[0104] Seoul PE (512) calculates the reliability using information received from New York PDP (521) and information collected from external sources, and detects when the reliability score has dropped sharply, and

[0105] The Seoul PDP (511) shares information about the rapidly declining reliability with the New York branch's PDP (520) in real time.

[0106] - Result: The PDP (520) of the New York branch immediately applied access restriction measures to enhance system security.

[0107] 2. Scenario 2: Multi-regional Data Center Access Attempt

[0108] ● 2:00 PM: Access to New York Data Center PDP (520) - Situation: Engineer A attempts to resolve a failure by accessing the system of the global data center.

[0109] - procedure:

[0110] The PEP (524) of the New York data center receives the initial access request and forwards it to the PA (523), and

[0111] PA (523) passes the access request to PE (522) to evaluate it.

[0112] PE (522) calculates a confidence score by collecting user identity, client status, network environment, SIEM information, etc.

[0113] PE (522) grants access and read / write permissions by giving a confidence score of 90 for emergency failure situations, normal authentication, and authorized client use.

[0114] - Result: Engineer A accesses the New York data center system (520) and begins the failure response.

[0115] ● 2:05 PM: Access to Paris Data Center PDP (530)

[0116] - Situation: Engineer A attempts to access the Paris data center system to troubleshoot a problem.

[0117] - procedure:

[0118] When the PEP (534) of the Paris data center receives an access request and forwards it to the PA (533),

[0119] PA (533) forwards the access request to EP (533) to evaluate it.

[0120] The Paris PDP (531) evaluates access based on information received directly from the New York PDP (521) (recent confidence score 90, failure response, granted authority level).

[0121] Allows rapid access so that Engineer A can continue to respond to the failure.

[0122] Afterwards, additional external source data is collected to determine whether to continue or change the access policy.

[0123] - Result: Engineer A quickly accesses the Paris data center system (530) and reduces the failure response time.

[0124] Frequent and large amounts of data shared between PDPs (511, 521, 531) can also act as a network load. Normally, there may be delays in access decisions, but information shared through SIEM or a shared DB can be utilized. Therefore, the present invention identifies emergency situations where delays in access decisions may act as security threats, and directly shares data between PDPs (511, 521, 531) only in such cases. The policy for determining emergency situations can be defined by the user by utilizing data generated by PDPs (511, 521, 531) (e.g., reliability, access decision results, etc.) and data collected from the outside by PDPs (511, 521, 531), and the following shows an example of an emergency situation determination policy.

[0125] ● Emergency Situation Assessment Policy

[0126] - Decreased reliability: When reliability drops below a predefined threshold

[0127] - Security Threat Detection: When potential security threats (vulnerability attacks, phishing attacks, abnormal behavior) occur

[0128] - System Failure: In the event of a system failure requiring immediate emergency recovery

[0129] Since excessive data sharing between PDPs can lead to network load, only essential data is selectively shared. The shared data consists of information generated or collected by the PE, and is necessary to make immediate access decisions based solely on received PDP data or to enable the PDP to make a final access decision later. Additionally, the shared data is transmitted in the form of serialized data packets in JSON format to optimize data processing speed.

[0130] ● Required shared data

[0131] - Guarantee secure communication

[0132] . mTLS protocol

[0133] Message-level encryption

[0134] - Shared data items:

[0135] . Access decision result (e.g., Allow, Deny)

[0136] . Reason for access decision (e.g., failure to meet trust requirements, policy violation)

[0137] . Policy Violation Information

[0138] . Access request details:

[0139] - Accessing entity,

[0140] - Access location,

[0141] - Access time,

[0142] - Access path,

[0143] - Type of resource to access (file, database, application, etc.)

[0144] Resource access permissions: Granted permission level

[0145] . Reliability Evaluation Information:

[0146] - Total confidence score

[0147] - Trust scores for accessing entities, clients, networks, and resources

[0149] When urgent measures are required, information received from other PDPs is used to first determine access and take security measures, and the access decision is made again by comprehensively analyzing the information received from other PDPs and data collected from external sources.

[0150] ● Dynamic Access Decision - Allow access first, then make final access decision (Temporary Allow -> Re-evaluation -> Policy Adjustment)

[0151] . Temporary Allowance Condition: When the access principal has a high confidence score received from other PDPs and the situation is urgent

[0152] . Re-evaluation and policy adjustment: The reliability is calculated using the data received from the PDP (511) and data collected from external sources, and the access policy is adjusted and applied based on this.

[0153] - Re-determine access after terminating a connected session (Connection termination -> Re-evaluation -> Policy adjustment)

[0154] . Immediate connection termination condition: If the principal receives a low trust rating from another PDP while connected to a resource (e.g., if the principal's account is compromised and an access request is made to another PDP)

[0155] . Re-evaluation and policy adjustment process: After termination, data received from other PDPs and data collected from external sources are comprehensively analyzed to re-determine resource access and adjust and apply policies.

[0156] When PE (512) at the headquarters receives an access request from PA (513), PE (512) evaluates the trustworthiness of the subject and reviews security policies to make a decision to allow or deny access. At this time, PE (512) stores data related to the access decision result in a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) or a public database (DB) so that it can be used for future security analysis and policy formulation.

[0157] However, if the emergency situation determination module determines that the access request is an emergency situation involving a security threat, the PE (512) is designed not merely to store the access decision, but to immediately transmit the information to another PDP to strengthen security response. To this end, the PE (512) selects security-sensitive information from data it generates itself or collects from external sources, creates an emergency data package, and transmits it to the branch office PDP (511).

[0158] When the PA (513) at the branch office receives an access request, the PA (513) forwards it to the PE (512) to request a policy evaluation. In general, the PE (513) calculates the trust level based on data such as user identity, client status, network environment, and security events, and makes an access decision based on this. However, when the Dynamic Policy Engine (DPE) proposed in the present invention is applied, the branch office PE (512) performs an initial access decision by first analyzing security data transmitted in real time from the headquarters PDP (511).

[0159] Afterward, the branch PE (512) performs a final access decision by analyzing not only the data received from the headquarters PDP (511) but also additional external data sources collected independently. This allows for the resolution of network latency issues that may occur in centralized access control methods, while maintaining consistency in security policies between the headquarters and the branch. Additionally, if an urgent security threat is detected, blocking measures can be quickly taken based on real-time data sharing between the headquarters PDP (511) and the branch PDPs (521, 531) to effectively prevent the spread of the security threat.

[0160] The direct information sharing between PDPs (511, 521, 531) and the utilization of a dynamic policy engine (DPE) proposed in this invention overcome the limitations of existing static access control methods and provide an environment where security policies can be adjusted in real time. This enables a rapid response in the event of an emergency and maintains consistency in security policies through the synchronization of security data between the headquarters and branch offices.

[0161] FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a device for responding to cyber attacks and threats according to another embodiment of the present invention.

[0162] Referring to FIG. 6, a device (600) for responding to cyber attacks and threats may include a PDP data receiving module (610), a policy engine (620), a dynamic access decision module (621), a policy manager (630), an emergency repayment judgment module (640), a PDP data packaging / transmission module (650), a policy execution manager (660), a resource (670), an access subject (680), and a terminal (690).

[0163] The PDP data receiving module (610) can receive data transmitted from another PDP and transmit it to the policy engine (620).

[0164] In some embodiments, the PDP data receiving module (610) may include a function to convert data received from another PDP into a data that can be immediately utilized by the policy engine (620) through processes such as integrity verification, decoding, and data cleaning.

[0165] For example, consider a scenario where a specific user is blocked from accessing the headquarters PDP due to low trust, and then immediately attempts to access the branch PDP. If the PDP data receiving module (610) fails to receive the access denial information of A transmitted from the headquarters PDP in real time, the branch PDP is more likely to allow access without reflecting the latest information. However, if the PDP data receiving module (610) receives the security data transmitted from the headquarters PDP in real time and forwards it to the policy engine (620), the branch PDP can immediately reflect A's trust level and make an access denial decision based on this. This allows security threats to be managed consistently across multiple PDP domains, and enables rapid security response while maintaining consistency in access policies.

[0166] The policy engine (620) can make a final access decision by comprehensively analyzing data received from the PDP data receiving module (610), trust information of the access subject (680), network status, past access history, and security policies set by the policy manager (630). Unlike the existing static security policy application method, the policy engine (620) adjusts the security policy according to environmental changes and can automatically change access rights when specific conditions are met.

[0167] For example, if a specific user has successfully completed authentication in a secure network environment, the policy engine (620) may evaluate the user's trustworthiness highly and grant more flexible access rights. On the other hand, if the same user attempts to access from a terminal they have never used before, or if authentication fails multiple times in a row, the policy engine (620) may evaluate the user's trustworthiness low and require additional authentication or block access.

[0168] In some embodiments, the policy engine (620) may work in conjunction with the emergency situation determination module (640) to detect security threats in real time and apply stricter security policies to high-risk access requests. For example, if a specific user's access is blocked at the headquarters PDP and that user immediately makes the same access request at the branch office PDP, the policy engine (620) may recognize this as a potential security threat and immediately block access or require an additional authentication procedure. Through this, the policy engine (620) can overcome the limitations of existing static security policies and dynamically adjust security policies to suit the changing environment.

[0169] The emergency situation determination module (640) can detect security threats and determine emergency situations requiring immediate response by comprehensively analyzing data collected from external sources and data generated by the PDP. Specifically, the emergency situation determination module (640) can determine emergency situations by analyzing access request information collected from the PDP data receiving module (610), the trust score generated by the policy engine (620), network status, and security event data. For example, if the trust score of a specific user in the PDP (PE) (620) falls below a preset threshold or if simultaneous security threats are detected in a specific area, this is determined to be an emergency situation.

[0170] In some embodiments, the emergency situation determination module (640) can respond immediately when a specific pattern of security threat is detected. For example, if the same user attempts to access multiple resources (670) within a short period, it can be classified as an emergency situation by determining that this is abnormal behavior different from normal access requests. In this case, measures to block the user's access or require additional authentication can be automatically executed based on a policy predefined by the policy manager (630).

[0171] The emergency situation determination module (640) also includes a function to declare an emergency situation when specific conditions set by the administrator are met. For example, if a request for access to an important security system or confidential data is detected, access can be immediately blocked or a security warning can be generated according to security rules set in advance by the administrator. Through this, not only is the security policy automatically applied, but emergency response can also be operated without administrator intervention.

[0172] In some embodiments, the emergency situation determination module (640) is linked with the PDP data packaging / transmission module (650) to enable immediate sharing of information to other PDPs when an emergency occurs. This allows security threats detected in one PDP to be reflected in real-time across the entire network, and enables consistent security policies to be applied across all PDPs.

[0173] Although the embodiments have been described above with reference to limited examples and drawings, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations from the description above. For example, suitable results can be achieved even if the described techniques are performed in a different order than described, and / or the components of the described system, structure, device, circuit, etc. are combined or assembled in a form different from described, or replaced or substituted by other components or equivalents.

[0174] Therefore, other implementations, other embodiments, and equivalents to the claims also fall within the scope of the claims set forth below. Explanation of the symbols

[0175] 110: Control Plane 111: Policy Decision Point (PDP) 112: Policy Engine (PE) 113: Policy Administrator (PA) 120: Data Plane 121: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 122: Access Subject 123: Resource 510: Seoul Headquarters System 511: Seoul Headquarters PDP 512: Seoul Headquarters Policy Engine (PE) 513: Policy Manager (PA) at Seoul Headquarters 514: Seoul Headquarters Policy Implementation Branch (PEP) 520: New York Branch System 521: New York Branch PDP 522: New York Branch Policy Engine (PE) 523: Policy Manager, New York Branch (PA) 524: New York Branch Policy Implementation Point (PEP) 530: Paris Data Center System 531: Paris Data Center PDP 532: Paris Data Center Policy Engine (PE) 533: Paris Data Center Policy Manager (PA) 534: Paris Data Center Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 600: Cyber ​​Attack and Threat Response System 610: PDP data receiving module 620: Policy Engine 621: Dynamic Access Decision Module 630: Policy Administrator 640: Emergency Situation Assessment Module 650: PDP Data Packaging / Transmission Module 660: Policy Enforcement Manager 670: Resource 680: Access Subject 690: Terminal

Claims

Claim 1 In a distributed zero-trust architecture comprising a first PDP and a second PDP deployed in different regions and each performing access decisions regarding resources, a Policy Decision Point (PDP) data receiving module that directly receives PDP data from the second PDP, the data including at least one of the access decision result actually performed by the second PDP regarding the same access subject, the reason for the access decision, and trust evaluation information; a first PDP composed of a policy engine that performs access decisions and a policy manager that performs security policies in conjunction with the policy engine; a dynamic access decision module that, before the first PDP performs a final access decision, if the PDP data directly received from the second PDP includes an access denial result for the same access subject or trust evaluation information below a preset threshold, applies the access decision result actually performed by the second PDP or the trust evaluation information calculated to the same access subject's access request to block the access first, and subsequently performs a final access decision after re-evaluating the trust of the same access subject based on both the PDP data and data collected by the first PDP from an external source; and the data collected from an external source and the An emergency situation determination module that analyzes data including at least one of an access decision result, an access decision reason, and reliability evaluation information generated in the first PDP, and determines whether an emergency situation has occurred in which a security threat may arise due to a delay in the access decision;A PDP data packaging / transmission module that, when determined by the emergency situation determination module that the emergency situation has not occurred, shares the PDP data generated in the first PDP through SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) or a public database and does not directly transmit it to the second PDP, and only when determined by the emergency situation determination module that the emergency situation has occurred, selects data necessary to prioritize blocking access by the same access subject or to perform a final access decision in the second PDP from the data generated or collected in the first PDP, packages the selected data into PDP data to be directly transmitted to the second PDP, and transmits it; A real-time security threat blocking device comprising: a policy execution manager that executes an access decision of the policy engine to allow or block access to a resource; wherein the PDP data receiving module converts the received PDP data into data that can be immediately utilized by the policy engine through integrity verification, decoding, and data cleaning; wherein the access decision is based on at least one of the received data from the PDP data receiving module, trust information of the accessing subject, network status, past access history, and a security policy set by the policy manager; and wherein the policy manager performs the creation, modification, distribution, and application of the security policy. Claim 2 delete Claim 3 delete Claim 4 delete Claim 5 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 1, wherein the emergency situation determination module determines an emergency situation if any one of the following applies: when a specific user's reliability score is lower than a predefined threshold, when a potential security threat is detected, and when the user reaches a predefined situation. Claim 6 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 5, wherein the policy manager executes measures to block the user's access or require additional authentication based on a predefined policy. Claim 7 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 5, wherein the emergency situation determination module shares information regarding the emergency situation with the second PDP through the PDP data packaging / transmission module when an emergency situation occurs. Claim 8 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 1, wherein the PDP data packaging / transmission module further includes a function to encrypt transmitted data and verify data integrity. Claim 9 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 1, further comprising a response module that automatically executes a predefined response scenario when an emergency situation occurs. Claim 10 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 1, further comprising a machine learning module that predicts potential threats and responds in advance based on past security event data. Claim 11 A real-time security threat blocking device according to claim 1, wherein the first PDP and the second PDP share generated information in real time.

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