Data processing method and apparatus based on trusted execution environment, device, and medium

By performing key hosting and signature processing in a trusted execution environment, the key security problem in the centralized key hosting solution is solved, the reliability of business signatures and key security is improved, and the business is on-chain reliability.

WO2024221849A9PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-28TENCENT TECHNOLOGY (SHENZHEN) CO LTD
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2023/131626
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-04-27
Filing Date
2023-11-14
Publication Date
2024-11-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing centralized key custody scheme has security problems during key storage and use, especially when illegal users access the hosting device, which can easily lead to key loss and it is difficult to ensure the legality and security of the key.

Method used

Using a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, the data is encrypted and the authentication is carried out by remote authentication between the resource management client and the key custody client, key interaction processing is used to obtain the communication key, and the data is encrypted and the authentication is successful. After that, the signature process is carried out to ensure the security of key sharding and the reliability of business signatures.

Benefits of technology

It improves the security and reliability of keys in the business signature process, prevents illegal leakage of keys, ensures the security of keys when third-party hosting devices are lost due to equipment, and ensures the reliability of business on-chain through threshold signature policies.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN2023131626_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
    Figure CN2023131626_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present application provides a data processing method and apparatus based on a trusted execution environment, a device, and a medium. The method comprises: when remote authentication performed by a resource management client on a key escrow client succeeds, sending, to the key escrow client, object data encryption information obtained by encryption on the basis of a first communication key and a service to be signed, so that the key escrow client performs remote signature processing on said service by using an escrowed key fragment when the key escrow client obtains object access data information obtained by decryption on the basis of the first communication key; when remote service signature information returned by the key escrow client is received, acquiring a first key fragment on the basis of the object access data information, and performing local signature processing on said service to obtain local service signature information; and writing said service into a blockchain on the basis of the remote service signature information and the local service signature information. By using the present application, the security of key storage and the reliability of service on-chain can be ensured.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Data processing method, device, equipment and medium based on trusted execution environment

[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the China Patent Office on April 27, 2023, with application number 202310479511.5 and application name “Data processing method, device, equipment and medium based on trusted execution environment”, all contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment, a computer device, a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program product. Background Art

[0003] Currently, for business terminals (e.g., user terminals) integrated with resource management clients, the key storage solutions adopted are mostly centralized key hosting solutions. Specifically, the centralized key hosting solution means that business objects (e.g., user A and user B) store their own keys in a single point (or centralized) in the corresponding hosting device of a third-party custodian through the corresponding business terminal (e.g., user terminal).

[0004] The inventors have found in practice that for the above-mentioned centralized key hosting solution, when a business object (for example, user A) needs to use its own key (for example, key Y) to sign the business (for example, business Tx1) it currently obtains, when user A accesses the resource management client, it can directly use the key (for example, key Y) of user A stored in the hosting device to sign the business, and return the business signature information obtained after the business signature to the resource management client accessed by user A. Since the hosting device is used to store the keys of different users at a single point (or centrally), when an illegal user illegally accesses the hosting device, it will cause the keys stored at a single point (or centrally) in the hosting device to be lost in batches. In this case, the resource management client accessed by user A will find it difficult to determine whether the key of user A used in the signing process of business Tx1 is a legitimate key. In other words, the currently used centralized key hosting solution is difficult to ensure the security of user keys hosted by a third party.

[0005] Summary of the Invention

[0006] The embodiments of the present application provide a data processing method, apparatus, device, and medium based on a trusted execution environment, which can ensure the security of key shards used in the business signing process, thereby improving the reliability of business on-chain.

[0007] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, the method being executed by a resource management client, the method comprising:

[0008] When a business object accesses a resource management client through object access data information, remote authentication is performed on a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment. When remote authentication is successful, a first communication key obtained through key exchange processing with the key escrow client is obtained, and the object access data information is encrypted using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information.

[0009] Upon obtaining the business to be signed sent by the business object, the object data encryption information and the business to be signed are sent to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed, so that the key escrow client uses the first communication key to decrypt the object data encryption information to obtain object access data information, and authenticates the business object based on the object access data information. When the authentication is successful, the key escrow client uses the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to perform remote signing processing on the business to be signed, thereby obtaining business remote signature information of the business to be signed;

[0010] Upon receiving the business remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, the first key shard of the business object is obtained based on the object access data information, and the first key shard is used to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed, thereby obtaining the business local signature information of the business to be signed;

[0011] Based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed is determined. When the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0012] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, which is executed by a key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment. The method includes:

[0013] Receiving object data encryption information and the business to be signed, sent by the resource management client based on a first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed; the object data encryption information is obtained by the resource management client encrypting the object access data information using a first communication key; the first communication key is obtained by the resource management client performing remote authentication on the key escrow client and exchanging keys with the key escrow client when the remote authentication is successful; the object access data information is entered when the business object accesses the resource management client;

[0014] Decrypting the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, authenticating the business object based on the object access data information, and when the authentication is successful, remotely signing the business to be signed using the escrow key shard stored by the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information of the business to be signed;

[0015] The business remote signature information is sent to the resource management client, so that the resource management client obtains the first key shard of the business object based on the object access data information, and uses the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed, and obtains the business local signature information of the business to be signed. The resource management client determines the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node.

[0016] In one aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment, the device running on a resource management client, including:

[0017] a remote authentication module configured to remotely authenticate a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment when a business object accesses a resource management client through object access data information; upon successful remote authentication, obtain a first communication key obtained through key exchange processing with the key escrow client; and encrypt the object access data information using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information;

[0018] a service sending module configured to, upon acquiring a service to be signed sent by a service object, send the object data encryption information and the service to be signed to a key escrow client based on a first threshold signature policy corresponding to the service to be signed, so that the key escrow client decrypts the object data encryption information based on a first communication key to obtain object access data information, authenticates the service object based on the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, remotely signs the service to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain service remote signature information for the service to be signed;

[0019] The local signature processing module is configured to, upon receiving the remote signature information of the service returned by the key escrow client, decrypt the service object using the object access data information to obtain the first key fragment of the service object, and perform local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key fragment to obtain the service local signature information of the service to be signed;

[0020] The business on-chain module is used to determine the first cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0021] In one aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment. The device runs on a key escrow client, which is deployed in the trusted execution environment and includes:

[0022] The service receiving module is configured to receive object data encryption information and the service to be signed, sent by the resource management client based on a first threshold signature policy corresponding to the service to be signed; the object data encryption information is obtained by the resource management client encrypting the object access data information using a first communication key; the first communication key is obtained by the resource management client performing remote authentication on a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment, and when the remote authentication is successful, through key exchange processing with the key escrow client; the object access data information is entered when the service object accesses the resource management client;

[0023] a remote signature processing module, configured to decrypt the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, authenticate the service object based on the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, perform remote signature processing on the service to be signed using the escrow key shard stored by the key escrow client to obtain service remote signature information of the service to be signed;

[0024] The remote signature information sending module is used to send the business remote signature information to the resource management client, so that the resource management client decrypts the object access data information to obtain the first key shard of the business object, and uses the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed to obtain the business local signature information of the business to be signed. The resource management client determines the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is regarded as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node.

[0025] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer device, including a memory and a processor, the memory being connected to the processor, the memory being used to store a computer program, and the processor being used to call the computer program so that the computer device executes the data processing method based on a trusted execution environment in the embodiment of the present application.

[0026] On the one hand, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. The computer program is suitable for being loaded and executed by a processor, so that a computer device with a processor executes the data processing method based on a trusted execution environment in the embodiment of the present application.

[0027] According to one aspect of the present application, a computer program product or computer program is provided, the computer program product or computer program including computer instructions stored in a computer-readable storage medium. A processor of a computer device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium and executes the computer instructions, causing the computer device to perform a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment.

[0028] In an embodiment of the present application, when a business object accesses a resource management client through object access data information, the resource management client can remotely authenticate a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment. When remote authentication is successful, the resource management client obtains a first communication key obtained through key exchange processing with the key escrow client, and encrypts the object access data information using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information. Therefore, it can be seen that the resource management client includes a first key shard, that is, the first key shard can be stored on the resource management client. When the resource management client obtains a business to be signed sent by the business object, the resource management client can send the object data encryption information and the business to be signed to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed, so that the key escrow client decrypts the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, and authenticates the business object based on the object access data information. When authentication is successful, the key escrow client remotely signs the business to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information for the business to be signed. Therefore, it can be seen that the key escrow client stores the escrow key shard. That is to say, the embodiments of the present application ensure the security of key storage by deploying key shards on different client terminals (for example, the first key shard can be stored on the resource management client, and the managed key shard can be stored on the key managed client deployed in the trusted execution environment). In addition, upon receiving the remote business signature information returned by the key escrow client, the resource management client can obtain the first key shard of the business object based on the object access data information, and use the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed, thereby obtaining the business local signature information of the business to be signed. As can be seen, in the embodiment of the present application, different key shards deployed on different client terminals (for example, the first key shard stored in the resource management client and the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client) can be used for joint signing during the business signing process, thereby improving the reliability of the business signature. In addition, by deploying the key escrow client in a trusted execution environment, the embodiment of the present application can fundamentally solve the problem of illegal leakage of the escrow key shard caused by the loss of the key escrow device held by the third-party escrow party. Based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed is determined. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written to the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node writes the signed business to the blockchain.It can be seen that by using the threshold signature strategy (here refers to a strategy in which users and third-party custodians can jointly participate in collaborative signing), the current business (i.e., the business to be signed) can be determined as a signed business based on multiple signature information reaching the cumulative signature threshold (for example, 2). The signed business can then be written to the blockchain through the blockchain node to ensure the reliability of the business on-chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a system architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0030] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of a data interaction scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0031] FIG3 is a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0032] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a scenario for performing remote authentication provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0033] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of a scenario of a user registration process provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0034] FIG6 is an interactive sequence diagram for developing, reviewing, and installing a resource management client according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0035] FIG7 is an interactive sequence diagram of developing, reviewing, installing, and remotely authenticating a trusted application according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0036] FIG8 is a flow chart of a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment provided by the present application;

[0037] FIG9 is an interactive flow chart of remote authentication provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0038] FIG10 is a schematic diagram of a scenario for performing multi-party threshold signature according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0039] FIG11 is a schematic diagram of a scenario for searching for signature record flow information provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0040] FIG12 is a flow chart of a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0041] FIG13 is a schematic structural diagram of a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment provided by the present application;

[0042] FIG14 is a schematic structural diagram of a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment provided by the present application;

[0043] FIG15 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer device provided by the present application;

[0044] FIG16 is a schematic diagram of a data processing system based on a trusted execution environment provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] 1. Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): A trusted execution environment is a secure area on a computing platform that can be constructed through software and / or hardware methods to ensure that the code and data loaded in the secure area are protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity. The goal of a trusted execution environment is to ensure that a task is executed as expected, to ensure the security and integrity of the initial state of the task, as well as the security and integrity of the running state. In fact, a trusted execution environment can be understood as a technology based on hardware protection of data and algorithms. It is an isolated environment for processors and memory. Only the central processing unit (CPU) can access applications in the trusted execution environment. Access to the trusted execution environment by other layers (such as other hardware, kernels, other applications, etc.) will be blocked by the CPU. In the embodiments of the present application, applications deployed and running in a trusted execution environment may be collectively referred to as trusted clients (or trusted applications).

[0046] The server for providing key escrow services and the server for providing signature record query services both run in a trusted execution environment (TEE). The server for providing key escrow services and the server for providing signature record query services involved in the embodiments of the present application can be the same server or different servers, and will not be limited here.

[0047] Taking the example of a server that provides key escrow services and a server that provides signature record query services being the same server, in this embodiment of the application, the server that provides key escrow services and the server that provides signature record query services may be collectively referred to as a business service device. Trusted clients (i.e., trusted applications) deployed in the trusted execution environment (i.e., TEE) of the same business service device may include at least a key escrow client and a logging client.

[0048] A key escrow client can be used to provide key escrow services. For example, through the key escrow service provided by the key escrow client, a portion of a key shard (also referred to as a local key shard, for example, the local key shard here can specifically be an escrow key shard) requested for escrow by a business object (e.g., user A) is stored in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client to ensure the storage security of the portion of the key shard (i.e., the escrow key shard) stored in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client. In an embodiment of the present application, in a business service device, the trusted escrow memory allocated for a business object (e.g., user A) for storing escrow key shards can be referred to as a user-private area for this business object (e.g., user A). The escrow key shards stored in the user-private area are visible only to the CPU used to access the key escrow client and are invisible to the key escrow object (i.e., the third-party escrow party) corresponding to the business service device. This means that the escrow key shard itself cannot be called by any other process or any software other than the CPU that can access the key escrow client. In other words, the escrow key shards stored in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client can resist being snooped or modified by any other software (for example, privileged software OS (Operating System), BIOS (Basic Input Output System), VMM (Virtual Machine Manager), etc.), thus fundamentally ensuring the security and reliability of the escrow key shards stored in the trusted execution environment.

[0049] The logging client can be used to provide a signature record query service. For example, through the signature record query service provided by the logging client, it can be queried whether there is the flow information after the business service device signs a certain business (for example, Tx1). In the embodiment of the present application, the flow information after the business signature is performed on a certain business (for example, Tx1) by the logging client can be collectively referred to as signature record flow information (or business log). The so-called flow information refers to: a list or record that records all business activities within a period of time; for example, the above-mentioned signature record flow information refers to a list or record that records the business signature process for the business (for example, Tx1). In one implementation, the logging client can store the signature record flow information through the trusted log memory therein. It can be understood that the business service device can provide a signature self-certification function through the signature record flow information (or business log) for a certain business (for example, Tx1) stored in the trusted log memory of the logging client. The signature self-certification function here can be understood as follows: if the signature record flow information (or business log) of this business (for example, Tx1) exists in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key custody object (that is, the third-party custodian) to which the business service device belongs has indeed performed business signature processing on the business (for example, Tx1) through the above-mentioned custody key shard (that is, the third-party custodian participated in the signature of this business); conversely, if the signature record flow information (or business log) of this business (for example, Tx1) does not exist in the trusted log memory, it can be determined that the key custody object (that is, the third-party custodian) corresponding to the business service device has not performed business signature processing on the business (for example, Tx1) through the above-mentioned custody key shard (that is, the third-party custodian did not participate in the signature of this business). Similarly, the signature record flow information stored in the trusted log memory of the logging client can also resist being snooped or modified by any other software (for example, privileged software OS (Operating System), BIOS (Basic Input Output System), VMM (Virtual Machine Manager), etc.). This can fundamentally ensure the security and reliability of the signature record flow information stored in the trusted execution environment, thereby providing the above-mentioned third-party custodian with an effective signature self-certification function through the secure and reliable signature record flow information.

[0050] In the embodiments of the present application, the execution environment in which the above-mentioned trusted client runs may be collectively referred to as a trusted execution environment or TEE environment.

[0051] 2. Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX): This is a security-related instruction set extension built into 6th-generation and later Intel CPUs. It allows specific memory regions (such as the trusted escrow memory or trusted logging memory) to be set as user-private areas, also known as enclaves. The contents of an enclave (such as the escrow key shards or the signature record flow) are protected and cannot be accessed by any process outside the enclave, including those running at higher privilege levels, such as the virtual machine manager (VMM), BIOS, and operating system. SGX provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) for user applications. Developers can execute the protected code of their applications (such as the key escrow client or logging client) within an SGX enclave, thereby improving the runtime security of the application.

[0052] SGX can be used to provide the following features: 1) Confidentiality and integrity, meaning that the code and data within the enclave can be protected from intrusion or modification by any other software, including privileged software such as the OS, BIOS, and VMM. 2) Remote attestation, which refers to the process of mutual certification between the enclave and a third party not on the SGX platform. In the embodiments of this application, remote attestation refers to the process of verifying that an application's enclave runtime environment has SGX hardware protection capabilities and that the protected code and data of the application have not been tampered with. After remote attestation is completed, the application's own key (e.g., the communication key obtained through key exchange during the remote attestation process), identity information, and other sensitive data are provided to the enclave. In the embodiments of this application, key exchange refers to key negotiation, which is the process of negotiating a common key between two (or more) parties. 3) Minimizing the attack surface, meaning that the CPU boundary is the trust boundary of SGX. SGX only trusts data within the CPU boundary, and data is encrypted once it leaves the CPU. Thus, for business service devices deployed with the above-mentioned trusted execution environment, data stored in the enclave is encrypted and invisible even to the third-party key custodian of the business service device itself.

[0053] 3. Blockchain: Blockchain is a new application model for computer technologies such as distributed data storage, peer-to-peer transmission, consensus mechanisms, and encryption algorithms. Blockchain is essentially a decentralized database, a series of data blocks generated using cryptographic methods. Each data block contains information about a batch of network transactions, which is used to verify the validity of this information (to prevent counterfeiting) and generate the next block. Blockchain can include the underlying blockchain platform, the platform product and service layer, and the application service layer. The blockchain consists of a series of blocks that are connected in chronological order. Once a new block is added to the blockchain, it cannot be removed. The block records the data packaged and submitted by the blockchain nodes in the blockchain system.

[0054] The embodiment of the present application can utilize the decentralized, traceable, and tamper-proof characteristics of the blockchain to send the aggregated signature information obtained after multi-party signatures for a certain business (for example, Tx1) and the multi-party signed business (for example, Tx1) to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node can perform signature verification through the aggregated signature information, and after the signature verification is passed, add the business (for example, Tx1) as a legitimate business to the business pool, so that the business (for example, Tx1) can be packaged into the target block in the business pool later, and the packaged target block can be linked to the blockchain maintained by the blockchain node.

[0055] Illustratively, when acquiring object access data information, object registration data information, business to be signed, and signature record flow information of a business object (i.e., a user), an embodiment of the present application may display a prompt interface or pop-up window. The prompt interface or pop-up window is used to prompt the user that object access data information, object registration data information, business to be signed, and signature record flow information, etc. are currently being collected. Only after the user issues a confirmation operation on the prompt interface or pop-up window, the relevant steps for data acquisition are started, otherwise the process ends.

[0056] All data collected or acquired by the embodiments of this application (such as object access data information of business objects, object registration data information, business to be signed, and signature record flow information, etc.) is collected or acquired with the consent and authorization of the corresponding business objects (such as the aforementioned user A). In other words, when the embodiments of this application are applied to specific products or technologies, the user's separate permission or consent is required, and the collection, use, and processing of relevant data must comply with relevant laws, regulations, and standards.

[0057] Please refer to Figure 1, which is a schematic diagram of a system architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 1, the system architecture may include a business service cluster 100a, a first business terminal 100b, a second business terminal cluster 100c, and a blockchain network 100d.

[0058] Among them, the business service cluster 100a may include one or more key hosting devices, and the one or more key hosting devices can be used to store the same hosting key shards. The number of key hosting devices in the business service cluster 100a will not be limited here. As shown in Figure 1, the multiple key hosting devices in the business service cluster 100a may include key hosting device 110a, key hosting device 110b,..., key hosting device 110n. Each key hosting device (such as key hosting device 110a, key hosting device 110b,..., key hosting device 110n) can be connected to the first business terminal 100b shown in Figure 1 through a network connection, so that data can be exchanged with the first business terminal 100b through the network connection to achieve multi-party collaborative signature for a current business.

[0059] A key escrow device (for example, key escrow device 110a) selected in the business service cluster 100a can be used as the above-mentioned business service device, and the key escrow device provides the above-mentioned key escrow service and the above-mentioned signature record query service. In addition, other key escrow devices (for example, key escrow device 110b, ..., key escrow device 110n) in the business service cluster 100a except the business service device (i.e., key escrow device 110a) can be used as backup key escrow devices.

[0060] The service priority of the business service device involved in the embodiments of the present application is higher than the service priority of the backup key escrow device. The so-called service priority can be understood as the order in which different key escrow devices provide services. The key escrow device with a higher service priority will have priority in data interaction with the business object, so that the key escrow device with a higher service priority will have priority in providing services to the business object. To avoid the single point of failure of a single key escrow device (for example, the key escrow device 110a shown in Figure 1), the embodiments of the present application propose that the escrow key shards can be securely and reliably backed up and stored by one or more backup key escrow devices running in a trusted execution environment. In other words, the escrow key shards stored in the key escrow client running in the TEE of the business service device are consistent with the escrow key shards stored in the key escrow client running in the TEE of the backup key escrow device. Therefore, when the key escrow device selected in the business service cluster 100a (for example, the key escrow device 110a) is used as the above-mentioned business service device, the business service device can interact with the first business terminal 100b based on the above-mentioned service priority priority.

[0061] For example, when the trusted execution environment deployed in the current business service device (for example, the key escrow device 110a) is a secure execution environment, and the key escrow client deployed in the secure execution environment is a trusted client, the first business signature request sent by the business object (for example, user A) for the current business (i.e., the business to be signed) is received preferentially through the key escrow client running in the current business service device (for example, the key escrow device 110a). The first business signature request can be sent by the business object (for example, user A) through the resource management client running in the first business terminal 100b. In this way, when the key escrow client is offline due to a single point of failure (e.g., the device is offline or lost) in the key escrow device 110a, the business service cluster 100a can continue to select a backup key escrow device (e.g., the key escrow device 110b shown in Figure 1) from the aforementioned backup key escrow devices (e.g., the key escrow device 110b, ..., the key escrow device 110n) as a new business service device. When the trusted execution environment deployed in the new business service device is a secure execution environment and the key escrow client deployed in the secure execution environment is a trusted client, the business service cluster 100a can obtain the first business signature request resent by the aforementioned business object (e.g., user A).

[0062] In the embodiment of the present application, the first business terminal 100b shown in Figure 1 may be referred to as an online terminal or an online device. The application client running in the online terminal (or online device) may specifically be the above-mentioned resource management client. The resource management client here may also be referred to as a resource client. The resource client can be used to implement resource management business functions and can achieve communication connections with decentralized application clients based on the resource management business functions. The resource management business functions here may include but are not limited to: resource transfer functions, resource query functions, resource destruction functions, etc., and the embodiment of the present application is not limited to this. In one or more implementation methods, the decentralized application can be the application that initiates the above-mentioned business to be signed. It should be understood that the decentralized application associated with the business object involved here can be integrated with the resource management client (i.e., resource client) and run on the same business terminal (e.g., the above-mentioned first business terminal 100b), or can run on different business terminals, and this will not be limited here.

[0063] In one or more implementations, a resource client (i.e., a resource management client) may also be a tool for managing and storing user digital resources. For example, digital resources may be transferred to other accounts based on the resource client, or digital resources may be received from other accounts based on the resource client. The resource client may be a hardware device or a software program. It should be understood that the role played by the service terminals corresponding to the other resource clients in the second service terminal cluster 100c is similar to that of the first service terminal 100b shown in FIG1 above, and will not be further described here.

[0064] The second service terminal cluster 100c may include one or more second service terminals, which may be service terminals associated with the aforementioned service object (e.g., user A). In this embodiment of the present application, one or more second service terminals deployed in the second service terminal cluster may be collectively referred to as offline terminals. The number of second service terminals (i.e., offline terminals or offline devices) deployed in the second service terminal cluster 100c is not limited. As shown in Figure 1, the multiple second service terminals (i.e., offline terminals or offline devices) in the second service terminal cluster 100c may include a second service terminal 120a, a second service terminal 120b, ..., and a second service terminal 120n.

[0065] When all the key hosting devices deployed in the business service cluster 100a are unavailable, a second business terminal (i.e., an offline terminal) among the second business terminal 120a, the second business terminal 120b, ..., the second business terminal 120n shown in Figure 1 can interact with the first business terminal 100b (i.e., an online terminal) shown in Figure 1 through a wireless or wired connection to realize another multi-party collaborative signature for a current business.

[0066] As shown in FIG1 , blockchain network 100d may include multiple blockchain nodes (i.e., consensus nodes participating in bookkeeping on the blockchain). The number of blockchain nodes in blockchain network 100d is not limited here. As shown in FIG1 , the multiple blockchain nodes in blockchain network 100d may specifically include blockchain node 11a, blockchain node 11b, blockchain node 11c, and blockchain node 11d. As shown in FIG1 , first business terminal 100b may establish network connections with blockchain nodes 11a, 11b, 11c, and 11d, so that when first business terminal 100b is connected to blockchain network 100d, it can interact with a particular blockchain node in blockchain network 100d. For example, first business terminal 100b may use a multi-party threshold signature to write the aforementioned business object request and signed transaction to the blockchain maintained by these blockchain nodes. Multi-party threshold signatures can be considered equivalent to multi-party collaborative signatures, specifically referring to the collaborative signature process of two or more different devices during the transaction signing process. Schematically, the multi-party threshold signature (or multi-party collaborative signature) method involved in the embodiment of the present application specifically refers to the fact that in the process of business signing, two key shards deployed in different devices can be used to collaboratively implement business signatures. For example, the current business can be signed by a local key shard (i.e., a managed key shard) stored by a key escrow client in a trusted execution environment deployed in a business service device (e.g., the above-mentioned key escrow device 110a) to obtain the business signature information of the business (e.g., business signature information 1), and the current business can be signed by another local key shard (i.e., an online key shard) encrypted and stored in an online terminal (i.e., the first business terminal 100b) to obtain another business signature information of the business (e.g., business signature information 2). At this time, the online device involved in the embodiment of the present application (i.e., the first business terminal 100b) can write the current business to the blockchain shown in Figure 1 based on the collected business signature information (i.e., the aforementioned business signature information 1 and business signature information 2) signed by the application clients in different devices. Specifically, the blockchain may be blockchain 11e maintained by a blockchain node deployed in blockchain network 100d. A threshold signature policy refers to a multi-party threshold signature policy. This threshold signature policy can be used to indicate how to perform multi-party collaborative signatures. For example, the threshold signature policy can indicate a cumulative signature threshold, which indicates how many signatures are required for a business signature, that is, how many key shards are required for a collaborative signature. In the embodiments of the present application, the threshold signature policy refers to a policy in which users and third-party custodians can jointly participate in collaborative signatures.

[0067] The blockchain network 100d in the embodiment of the present application can be a layered structure or a single-layer structure, and the specific structure of the blockchain network 100d will not be limited here.

[0068] In an embodiment of the present application, when the business service device is unavailable (for example, a service failure occurs) and the key escrow client is in an offline state (that is, the key escrow client stops providing key escrow services), business signatures can be collaboratively implemented by deploying two other key shards in different devices (for example, an online device and an offline device).

[0069] For ease of understanding, in this embodiment of the present application, the aforementioned first service terminal 100b (i.e., an online terminal or online device) and each second service terminal (i.e., an offline terminal or offline device) in the second service terminal cluster 100c are collectively referred to as service terminals associated with the service object. When the first service terminal (i.e., an online terminal or online device) is lost, this embodiment of the present application can select a second service terminal from the second service terminal cluster 100c as a new first service terminal (i.e., a new online terminal), thereby enabling data exchange with the key escrow device selected from the aforementioned service cluster as a service device.

[0070] In the embodiments of the present application, the business terminals integrated with the resource management client may include: smart phones, tablet computers, laptop computers, desktop computers, wearable devices (such as smart watches and smart bracelets), smart home devices, head-mounted devices, smart cars, and other smart terminals. The business service device integrated with the key escrow client may be an independent physical server, or a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers. It may also be a cloud server that provides basic cloud computing services such as cloud services, cloud databases, cloud computing, cloud functions, cloud storage, network services, cloud communications, middleware services, domain name services, security services, CDN, and big data and artificial intelligence platforms.

[0071] Please refer to Figure 2, which is a schematic diagram of a data interaction scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application. The user terminal 20a shown in Figure 2 can be the online device in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above. The user terminal 20a is integrated with a resource management client, which is used to store the local key shard (e.g., key shard A1) of user A (i.e., the business object) shown in Figure 2. Similarly, the business service device 20b shown in Figure 2 can be the business service device integrated with the key escrow client and logging client in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above.

[0072] As shown in Figure 2, when user A executes step S11 shown in Figure 1 through a decentralized application, a business on-chain request for a certain business (for example, business Tx1 shown in Figure 2) can be initiated to the resource management client shown in Figure 2. The user terminal 20a can obtain the business Tx1 initiated by user A from the received business on-chain request, use the business Tx1 as the business to be signed (i.e., the business to be signed), and execute step S12 shown in Figure 2 to send a remote authentication request to the business service device 20b shown in Figure 2. When the user terminal 20a confirms that the remote authentication of the business service device 20b is completed (i.e., the remote authentication is successful), step S13 can be executed. At this time, the user terminal 20a can encrypt the object access data information (e.g., the user password) using the communication key L1 (i.e., the first communication key) to send the encrypted object data encryption information and the business to be signed Tx1 to the business service device 20b. Among them, the communication key L1 can be obtained by the key exchange process between the user terminal 20a and the business service device 20b during the remote authentication process. The object access data information is obtained by user terminal 20a when accessing the resource management client. When the business server decrypts the object access data information (e.g., the user password) using the communication key L1 (i.e., the first communication key), it can authorize user A to obtain a local key shard (e.g., key shard B1 shown in FIG. 2 ) from the trusted escrow memory corresponding to the key escrow client using the decrypted object access data information (e.g., the user password) and execute step S14 shown in FIG. 2 . At this point, business service device 20b can use key shard B1 to sign the to-be-signed business Tx1, obtain business signature information 1 for the to-be-signed business Tx1, and return this business signature information 1 to user terminal 20a by executing step S15.

[0073] As shown in FIG2 , a logging client is deployed in the trusted execution environment of service server 20b. After the key escrow client in service server 20b uses key shard B1 to sign the signed service Tx1, the logging client can sign the signature information 1 generated during the service signing process to obtain a signature flow, and add the signature flow to the trusted log memory corresponding to the logging client. This allows the signature flow stored in the trusted log memory to subsequently determine whether the third-party escrow party corresponding to service server 20b actually participated in the service signing of the service Tx1. In other words, the third-party escrow party can use the recorded signature flow to prove its innocence (i.e., the legitimacy and validity of the signature). User terminal 20a can obtain another local key (e.g., key shard A1 shown in FIG2 ) stored by the resource management client based on the object access data information (e.g., the facial information of user A), and use key shard A1 to sign the service Tx1 to obtain the service signature information 2 of the service Tx1. In the embodiment of the present application, in the first threshold signature strategy, the business signature information (for example, the business signature information 1 shown in FIG2 ) obtained by signing the key shard B1 by the key escrow client in the business service device 20b is collectively referred to as business remote signature information. Similarly, in the embodiment of the present application, another business signature information (for example, the business signature information 2 shown in FIG2 ) obtained by signing the key shard A1 by the resource management client in the user terminal 20a is collectively referred to as business local signature information. That is, in the first threshold signature strategy, the business signature executed by the resource management client using the key shard it saves is called business local signature information, and the business signature executed by the remote key escrow client relative to the resource client using the key shard it saves is called business remote signature information.

[0074] The user terminal 20a performs an aggregate signature on the business signature information 1 and the business signature information 2, and sends the obtained aggregate signature information C1 and the signed business Tx1 to the blockchain node on the blockchain shown in Figure 2 by executing step S17, so that the blockchain node verifies the signature of the aggregate signature information C1 using the global shared public key (also referred to as the global aggregate public key). When the signature verification is successful, the blockchain node executes S18 to write the signed business Tx1 to the blockchain shown in Figure 1. The blockchain can specifically be the blockchain 11e maintained by the blockchain node deployed in the blockchain network 100d. Among them, the global shared public key (i.e., the global aggregate public key) is obtained by performing an aggregate calculation on the public key carried in the business remote signature information and the public key carried in the business local signature information.

[0075] In the embodiments of the present application, the facial (or other biometric) recognition technology involved, when the above embodiments of the present application are applied to specific products or technologies, the collection, use and processing of relevant data (for example, facial information and user passwords) should comply with relevant laws and regulations. It can be understood that before collecting facial information, the embodiments of the present application will inform the information processing rules and seek the separate consent of the business object (for example, user A shown in Figure 2 above), and strictly process facial information in accordance with the requirements of laws and regulations and personal information processing rules, and take technical measures to ensure the security of relevant data.

[0076] In the embodiment of the present application, the resource management client in the user terminal 20a remotely authenticates the key hosting client, and the specific process of the user terminal 20a obtaining the signature information 1 and the signature information 2 can be found in the description of the corresponding embodiments of Figures 3-12.

[0077] Referring to FIG. 3 , an embodiment of the present application provides a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment. This method can be executed by a resource management client, which can be integrated and run in a first service terminal. The first service terminal can specifically be first service terminal 100b in the embodiment corresponding to FIG. As shown in FIG. 3 , the method can include at least steps S101 through S104.

[0078] Step S101: When a business object accesses a resource management client through object access data information, remote authentication is performed on a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment. If remote authentication is successful, a first communication key obtained through key exchange processing with the key escrow client is obtained, and the object access data information is encrypted using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information.

[0079] Since the resource management client is integrated and runs on the first service terminal, the resource management client performs the following steps S101 to S104, which can be equivalently described as the first service terminal performing the steps S101 to S104.

[0080] The specific process of the first service terminal performing step S101 may be as follows: the first service terminal may obtain object access data information of the service object through the resource management client; and when determining, based on the object access data information, that the service object has access rights to access the resource management client, the first service terminal may allow the service object to access the resource management client based on the access rights. That is, the first service terminal may respond to the service object's request to access the resource management client based on the access rights. It is understandable that the object access data information here may include access password information entered by the service object (i.e., a user, such as user A) when accessing the resource management client. The first service terminal may remotely authenticate a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment through the resource management client to obtain a remote authentication result. The first service terminal may determine that the remote authentication is successful when the remote authentication result indicates that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment. When the remote authentication is successful, the first service terminal may obtain a first communication key obtained through key exchange between the resource management client and the key escrow client during the remote authentication. That is, the first communication key is obtained through key exchange between the resource management client and the key escrow client when the remote authentication of the key escrow client is successful. The access password information in the object access data information is encrypted using the first communication key, so that the encrypted access password information is used as the object data encryption information of the business object.

[0081] Among them, the object access data information includes the access password information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client (for example, business character strings such as user passwords); in one or more possible implementation methods, the object access data information may also include other data information in addition to the access password information (for example, business character strings such as user passwords), for example, access biometric information (for example, biometric information such as facial information or fingerprint information). The specific data information contained in the object access data information will not be limited here.

[0082] It can be seen from this that the embodiment of the present application can access the resource management client through a single-factor access strategy (i.e., any one of the aforementioned business character strings such as user passwords and facial information) during the process of accessing the resource management client. Of course, to ensure the security of client access, the embodiment of the present application can also collaboratively access the resource management client through a two-factor access strategy (i.e., the aforementioned business character strings such as user passwords and facial information). For ease of understanding, the embodiment of the present application takes the access strategy used to access the resource management client as a two-factor access strategy as an example. In this way, when the user logs in to the resource management client by entering the user password and scanning the face, the key hosting client deployed in the trusted execution environment can be remotely authenticated through the resource management client.

[0083] Please refer to Figure 4, which is a schematic diagram of a scenario for remote authentication provided by an embodiment of the present application. The user terminal 40a shown in Figure 4 is a first business terminal, and a resource management client is integrated and running in the user terminal 40a. The user A corresponding to the user terminal 40a is the above-mentioned business object, and the client access page shown in Figure 4 is a visual access page provided by the resource management client. As shown in Figure 4, user A can enter the user password of user A (for example, AABBCC) in the user password entry area based on the access prompt information displayed on the client access page (for example, please enter the user password and facial information), and can call the camera of the user terminal 40a by triggering the facial information collection area to collect the facial image of user A and display the collected facial image of user A in the facial information collection area. In the embodiment of the present application, the user password (for example, AABBCC) and the facial image of user A displayed on the client access interface can be collectively referred to as the object access data information entered by user A. Illustratively, in an embodiment of the present application, when the resource management client responds to a trigger operation (e.g., a confirmation operation) of user A (i.e., a business object) on the client access interface, the user password (e.g., AABBCC) entered by user A and the facial information extracted from the facial image of user A may be collectively referred to as object access data information.

[0084] When the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) obtains the object access data information entered by the business object (i.e., user A shown in Figure 4), it can search for object registration data information that matches the object access data information in the registration business database associated with the resource management client to obtain a data information search result.

[0085] In one implementation, the user password (e.g., AABBCC) entered on the client access interface may be collectively referred to as access password information, and the facial image entered on the client access interface for extracting the facial information of user A may be collectively referred to as access biometric information. Specifically, when the object access data information obtained by user terminal 40a (i.e., the first service terminal) includes access password information (e.g., AABBCC) and access biometric information (e.g., a facial image containing user A's facial information collected during access), user terminal 40a can search the registration service database associated with the resource management client for registration password information (e.g., AABBCC) that matches the access password information, and search the registration database for registration biometric information that matches the access biometric information (e.g., a facial image containing user A's facial information collected during registration). If the data information search result indicates that object registration data information matching the object access data information has been found, user terminal 40a (i.e., the first service terminal) can determine that the service object is a registered object with access rights, and can then allow the service object to access the resource management client as the service object, i.e., user terminal 40a responds to the service object's request to access the resource management client. In addition, the data information search result can include a successful information search result or an unsuccessful information search result. If the registration password information that matches the access password information is found in the business database, and the registration biometric information that matches the access biometric information is found, it is determined that the object registration data information that matches the object access data information is found in the registration business database, and a successful information search result can be generated. Optionally, in an embodiment of the present application, if the registration password information that matches the access password information is not found in the business database, or the registration biometric information that matches the access biometric information is not found, it is determined that the object registration data information that matches the object access data information is not found in the registration business database, and a failed information search result can be generated.

[0086] When the data information search result indicates that object registration data information matching the object access data information has been found, user terminal 40a can determine that the business object is a registered object with access rights and allow the business object, as a registered object, to access the resource management client. The user terminal 40a can then execute step S41 shown in FIG. 4 to send a remote authentication request Q11 shown in FIG. 4 to the business service device 40b deployed with the trusted execution environment 200a shown in FIG. Business server 40b can execute step S42 shown in FIG. 4 to generate a remotely hosted authentication signature report P11 corresponding to the local verification report based on the remote authentication request Q11, and can then return the remotely hosted authentication signature report P11 to user terminal 40a in step S43.

[0087] The user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) may execute step S44 and send a remote review report acquisition request Q12 to the trusted application review platform 40c. It should be understood that the trusted application review platform involved in the embodiment of the present application may pre-process the key escrow client uploaded by the development terminal through multiple review agencies (i.e., perform a task review). If the multi-party review is passed, the key escrow client uploaded by the development terminal is published to the business platform corresponding to the trusted application review platform. At the same time, the embodiment of the present application may also generate a remote escrow review and certification report for the published key escrow client after the multi-party review is passed. In this way, for the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) shown in Figure 4, the remote hosting review and certification report obtained after multiple audit agencies conduct task reviews on the key hosting client can be obtained from the trusted application audit platform 40c, and then the key report parameters in the obtained remote hosting review and certification report can be compared with the key report parameters in the remote hosting authentication signature report. When the parameter comparison is successful, it is determined that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, and a remote authentication result is generated. The remote authentication result is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

[0088] When remote authentication succeeds, the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first service terminal) can obtain the first communication key obtained through key interaction processing with the key hosting client during the aforementioned remote authentication process, and use the first communication key to encrypt the object access data information (for example, the aforementioned access password information) to use the encrypted access password information as the object data encryption information, so that step S102 can be executed subsequently.

[0089] Optionally, for the above-mentioned single-factor access strategy, if the object access data information entered by user A on the client access page only includes the access biometric information entered by user A when accessing the resource management client, then at this time, the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) can also obtain the first communication key obtained by the key interaction processing between the key hosting client and the key hosting client in the aforementioned remote authentication process when the remote authentication is successful, and encrypt the object access data information (for example, the aforementioned access biometric information) through the first communication key, so as to use the encrypted access biometric information as another object data encryption information, so that step S102 can be executed subsequently.

[0090] Optionally, the embodiment of the present application can also determine that the business object is an unregistered object when the above-mentioned data information search result indicates that the object registration data information that matches the object access data information is not found, and then generate an access failure prompt message, and can display the access failure prompt message on the client access page shown in Figure 4 above (for example, the user password is entered incorrectly or the facial image does not match, etc.).

[0091] In one implementation, the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) remotely authenticates the key hosting client deployed in the trusted execution environment through the resource management client. The specific process of obtaining the remote authentication result can be described as: the first business terminal can be used to generate a first random number for remote authentication, and generate a first communication key pair for data communication, using the first random number and the first communication public key in the first communication key pair as request parameters, generating a first remote authentication request based on the request parameters, and sending the first remote authentication request to the key hosting client deployed; the key hosting client can generate a second communication key pair based on the first remote authentication request, using the second communication public key in the second communication key pair and the first random number in the received remote authentication request as report parameters, and generating a local verification report carrying the report parameters; the local verification report is used to indicate the local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment, perform local verification on the local verification report, and when the local verification is successful, generate a remote hosting authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report. The first business terminal can receive the remote hosting authentication signature report returned by the local platform authentication signature component, and can obtain the hosting environment authentication report provided by the remote authentication server. When the remote hosting authentication signature report is determined to be a valid authentication report based on the hosting environment authentication report, the trusted execution environment is determined to be a secure execution environment; from the trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client, obtain the remote hosting review authentication report obtained after multiple audit agencies conduct task reviews on the key hosting client; the first business terminal can compare the key report parameters in the remote hosting review authentication report with the key report parameters in the remote hosting authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, determine that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, and generate a remote authentication result, which is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

[0092] The first remote authentication request involved in the embodiment of the present application is the remote authentication request initiated by the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) when successfully accessing the resource management client. For ease of understanding, the embodiment of the present application may collectively refer to the other remote authentication request initiated by the user terminal 40a (i.e., the first business terminal) when registering the resource management client as a second remote authentication request. In the embodiment of the present application, the process of a business object (e.g., user A) accessing the resource management client is referred to as the user access phase, and the process of a business object registering the resource management client in the user terminal 40a is referred to as the user registration phase. Please refer to Figure 5, which is a scenario diagram of a user registration process provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 5, when a business object (e.g., user A) downloads and installs the resource management client from the application market through the first business terminal; and the business service device can run the key hosting client uploaded by the development terminal; at this time, the user A can register the resource management client and execute step S51 shown in Figure 5 to enter the face and user password on the client registration page displayed by the first business terminal. This means that for the first service terminal, the facial image containing the face and the user password entered by the user A can be obtained through the resource management client, and the obtained facial image containing the face and the user key can be collectively referred to as the aforementioned registration object data information.

[0093] The facial image containing the face in the registration object data information may be referred to as the registration biometric information of user A, and the user password in the registration object information may be referred to as the access password information entered by user A. Upon obtaining the registration object data information entered by user A, the resource management client may store the registration object data information in a registration service database associated with the resource management client. Thus, when user A subsequently accesses the resource management client using the face and user password, the face and user password currently entered by user A during the access phase may be compared with the face and user password historically stored in the registration service database for user A during the registration phase. If the comparison is consistent, user A may be determined to be a registered object with access rights to the resource management client, thereby allowing user A to access the resource management client.

[0094] Among them, the registration service database can be a database for locally storing registration object data information existing in the first service terminal. In one or more implementable methods, the registration service database can also be another database for encrypting and storing the registration object data information existing in other devices independent of the first service terminal (for example, the background service device of the resource management client). For example, in order to ensure the security of the encrypted stored registration object data information, the embodiment of the present application can also store the hash value of the registration object data information calculated by the facial image containing the face and the user password in the background service device. In this way, when user A accesses the resource management client through the facial image containing the face and the user password, the hash value of the access object data information newly calculated by the currently acquired facial image containing the face and the user password can be compared with the hash value of the registration object data information remembered by the historical calculation. When the hash values ​​are consistent, access to the resource client is quickly achieved.

[0095] Furthermore, the first business terminal can execute step S52 to remotely authenticate the trusted execution environment deployed in the business service device shown in Figure 5 through the resource management client shown in Figure 5. When the remote authentication is successful, the current communication key (i.e., the second communication key) is obtained through the key interaction processing between the resource management client and the key hosting client during the remote authentication process.

[0096] In the embodiment of the present application, the communication key obtained by user A during the user registration phase through the key interaction between the resource management client and the key escrow client may be referred to as the second communication key, and the new communication key obtained by user A during the user access phase through the key interaction between the resource management client and the key escrow client may be referred to as the first communication key. In other words, in the process of data interaction between the resource management client and the key escrow client, the embodiment of the present application may ensure the security and reliability of data transmission during the data interaction process through the communication key obtained through real-time key interaction, thereby improving the access security of the user A (i.e., the business object) authorized to access the escrow key shard through the key escrow client in the business service device. In the embodiment of the present application, even for the third-party escrow party corresponding to the key escrow client, it does not have the access right to directly access the escrow key shard through the key escrow client, thereby ensuring the reliability and security of the escrow key shard stored in the trusted execution environment.

[0097] In an embodiment of the present application, user A can trigger remote authentication of the resource management client each time he accesses the resource management client to ensure the environmental security of the trusted execution environment running in the business service device and the application security of the key hosting client running in the trusted execution environment.

[0098] As shown in FIG5 , during the user registration phase, the first service terminal can extract facial information from the acquired facial image containing a face and execute step S53 shown in FIG5 . Specifically, at this point, the first service terminal can generate a symmetric key for the user registration phase (i.e., a registration symmetric key) based on the extracted facial information of user A. This symmetric key (i.e., the registration symmetric key) is then used to encrypt the local key shard (i.e., the first key shard, which can specifically be the aforementioned online key shard) generated by the resource management client. The encrypted first encryption key shard and the registration symmetric key are then stored together in the resource management memory of the resource management client. Thus, when the first service terminal subsequently performs multi-party threshold signatures with the service service device, a new symmetric key (i.e., the access symmetric key) can be generated using the newly acquired facial information during the current access to the resource management client. Furthermore, when the registration symmetric key and the access symmetric key are consistent (or match), the access symmetric key can be used to decrypt the first key shard, thereby performing the multi-party threshold signature step in step S103 below.

[0099] Since the service signature strategy involved in the embodiment of the present application is a threshold signature strategy, as shown in Figure 5, the first service terminal can also perform step S54 during the user registration phase, encrypting the user password entered by user A during the user registration phase using the communication key (i.e., the second communication key) and sending the encrypted user password to the service server. At this time, the service service device can decrypt the user password sent by the resource management client using the communication key (i.e., the second communication key) and store the calculated hash value of the user password in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client when performing step S55. In this way, in the subsequent user access phase, when the service service device decrypts the user password using the new communication key (i.e., the first communication key), it can compare the hash value of the user password recalculated during the user access phase with the hash value of the user password calculated historically during the user registration phase. If the comparison is consistent, it can be determined that the remote identity authentication (i.e., remote information authentication) of user A (i.e., the service object) is completed. Then, if the remote identity authentication (i.e., remote information authentication) is successful, user A can be authorized to call the key escrow shard to perform service signature.

[0100] In one or more possible implementations, the embodiments of the present application can also directly maintain the user password in the trusted managed memory of the key managed client located in the trusted execution environment. In this way, the registration password information (for example, the user password) stored in the trusted managed memory of the key managed client can be used to perform remote information authentication on the access password information in the obtained object access data information, and when the remote information authentication is successful, the authorized business object calls the managed key shard.

[0101] The specific process of the business object (for example, user A) in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 5 above downloading and installing the resource management client from the application market through the first business terminal can be seen in Figure 6, which is an interactive sequence diagram for the development, review and installation of the resource management client provided in the embodiment of the present application. It can be understood that the resource management application P1 shown in Figure 6 can be a resource management client integrated and running in the first business terminal shown in Figure 5 above. In addition, the business terminal shown in Figure 6 can specifically be the first business terminal shown in Figure 5 above.

[0102] When a developer (e.g., developer K1) completes program development for a resource management application P1 (i.e., a resource management client) through the development terminal shown in FIG6 , step S61 shown in FIG6 can be executed to upload the resource management application P1 (i.e., the resource management client) to the application review platform shown in FIG6 . When uploading the resource management application P1, step S62 can be simultaneously executed to select multiple review agencies (e.g., review agency H1, review agency H2, and review agency H3) to conduct application reviews of the application functions of the resource management application P1. The development terminal can initiate a review request to the application review platform shown in FIG6 based on the selected review agencies and the described application functions of the resource management application P1.

[0103] When the application review platform receives the review request, it can execute step S63 to extract and receive the review task from the review request. This means that at this time, the application review platform can issue the review instruction for the application function of the resource management application P1 to the selected multiple review agencies (for example, review agency H1, review agency H2 and review agency H3) based on the review task. In this way, for each of the multiple review agencies, it can execute step S64 upon receiving the review instruction to conduct an application review of the application function of the resource management application P1, and when the review is completed, it can execute step S65 shown in Figure 6 to upload the currently reviewed resource management application P1 and the review certification report (referred to as the certification report) to the application review platform.

[0104] When executing step S66, the application review platform can collect the review and certification reports (referred to as certification reports) returned by the selected multiple review agencies for the resource management application P1, and can obtain from each collected certification report whether the cumulative review score of the key review dimensions (for example, whether the application data is complete, whether the application function meets the review indicators, etc.) reaches the review threshold. When the cumulative review score of the key review dimensions in each certification report reaches the review threshold, it is confirmed that the review has passed, and the resource management application P1 that has passed the review can be published on the review platform.

[0105] The application review platform can notify the development terminal to execute step S67, which downloads the approved resource management application P1 and its certification report. The development terminal can then execute step S68, shown in Figure 6, to upload the approved resource management application P1 to the application market. Subsequently, when a business entity (e.g., User A) needs to use the resource management application P1, step S69 can be executed to download the resource management application P1 from the application market.

[0106] To ensure the application security of the resource management application P1 currently downloaded to the business terminal, as shown in Figure 6, the business terminal can execute step S70 before integrating the resource management application P1 into the business terminal (i.e., the first business terminal) to obtain the certification report issued for the resource management application P1 from the application review platform. The business terminal can further execute step S71 and use the resource management application P1 downloaded from the application market as the resource management application to be compared (for example, resource management application P1'). At this time, the business terminal can check whether the application parameters of the resource management application to be compared (for example, resource management application P1') (for example, the ND5 file used to describe the application name of the resource management application P1', the application version of the resource management application P1', and the developer information) are consistent with the application parameters of the resource management application P1 that actually participated in the review recorded in the obtained certification report. If they are consistent, it can be determined that the resource management application P1 currently downloaded to the business terminal (i.e., the first business terminal) has application security, thereby allowing the application program of the resource management application P1 to be integrated and installed on the business terminal, so that the above steps S101-step S104 can continue to be executed. On the contrary, when the application parameters of the currently downloaded resource management application P1 (i.e., the resource management application to be compared (for example, resource management application P1')) are inconsistent with the application parameters of the resource management application P1 actually participating in the review, it is determined that the resource management application P1 currently downloaded to the business terminal (i.e., the first business terminal) does not have application security, and risk warning information can be generated to remind the user that the currently downloaded resource management application P1 has installation risks.

[0107] The certification pass report is a review and certification pass report obtained based on the one-time operation corresponding to the aforementioned steps S61-S67, that is, the embodiment of the present application can perform a one-time application review operation on the currently developed resource management application P1. When the review is passed, the development terminal is allowed to download the resource management application P1 and its certification pass report from the application review platform.

[0108] In the embodiment corresponding to FIG5 , the third-party custodian (e.g., custodian user B) can receive the trusted application uploaded by the development terminal through the business server and run the application function services provided by the trusted application on the business server. It is understood that the trusted application here specifically includes, but is not limited to, the key escrow client and logging client in the embodiment corresponding to FIG2 .

[0109] Figure 7 is an interactive sequence diagram for developing, reviewing, installing, and remotely authenticating a trusted application, as provided in an embodiment of the present application. For ease of understanding, this embodiment of the present application uses the example of a trusted application P1 shown in Figure 7, which can be a key escrow client integrated and running in the business service device shown in Figure 5, to illustrate the specific process of developing, reviewing, installing, and remotely authenticating the key escrow client.

[0110] When a developer (for example, developer K2) completes the program development of the trusted application P2 (for example, a key escrow client) through the development terminal shown in Figure 7, step B11 shown in Figure 7 can be executed to upload the trusted application P2 (for example, a key escrow client) to the trusted application review platform shown in Figure 7.

[0111] To facilitate distinction, in the embodiments of the present application, applications that need to be deployed and run in a trusted execution environment may be collectively referred to as trusted applications, and audit platforms used to perform application audits on trusted applications may be collectively referred to as trusted application audit platforms (for example, the audit platform for performing application audits on trusted application P2 (for example, a key escrow client) shown in FIG7 ). Similarly, in the embodiments of the present application, applications that do not need to be deployed and run in a trusted execution environment may be collectively referred to as ordinary applications, and audit platforms used to perform application audits on ordinary applications may be collectively referred to as application audit platforms (for example, the audit platform for performing application audits on resource management client P1 shown in FIG6 above).

[0112] As shown in Figure 7, when uploading the trusted application P2 (for example, the key escrow client), the development terminal can execute step B12 to select multiple review agencies (for example, review agency H3, review agency H4 and review agency H5) to conduct application reviews on the application functions of the trusted application P2 (for example, the key escrow client). At this time, the development terminal can initiate a trusted review request to the trusted application review platform shown in Figure 7 based on the selected review agencies and the described application functions of the trusted application P2 (for example, the key escrow client).

[0113] When the trusted application review platform obtains the trusted review request, it may execute step B13 to extract and receive the review task from the trusted review request. This means that the trusted application review platform can issue a review instruction for conducting an application review on the application function of the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) to a selected plurality of review agencies (e.g., review agency H3, review agency H4, and review agency H5) based on the review task. In this way, for each of the multiple review agencies, step B14 can be executed upon receiving the review instruction to conduct an application review on the application function of the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client), and when the review is completed, step B15 shown in Figure 7 can be executed to send the currently reviewed trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) to a target service node deployed with a trusted execution environment on the cloud (or a public trusted execution environment on the cloud), so that the target service node can compile the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) in the trusted execution environment on the cloud, and thus, when the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) is successfully compiled in the trusted execution environment on the cloud, the target service node can receive the remote authentication initiated by the review structure for the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) running in the trusted execution environment on the cloud during the application review phase.

[0114] This means that for each review agency, it will obtain its own remote authentication report for remote authentication of the trusted application P2 (for example, the key hosting client) during the application review stage. The remote authentication report here is a remote authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report obtained after the local verification report generated by the trusted application P2 is locally verified by the remote authentication signature component in the same trusted execution environment as the trusted application P2. In this way, when each review agency obtains the cloud trusted environment authentication report provided by the remote authentication server for the cloud trusted execution environment, it can determine that the remote authentication signature report is a valid authentication report based on the cloud trusted environment authentication report, and then determine that the trusted application P2 compiled in the cloud trusted execution environment is a trusted application through the remote authentication signature report as a valid report (i.e., the remote authentication report shown in Figure 7).

[0115] When the trusted application P2 is the aforementioned key escrow client, the remote authentication signature report may specifically be a remote escrow authentication signature report. Alternatively, when the trusted application P2 is the aforementioned logging client, the remote authentication signature report may specifically be a remote logging authentication signature report.

[0116] As shown in Figure 7, the trusted application audit platform can further execute step B16 to obtain the currently compiled trusted application P2 and the remote authentication report associated with each audit agency from the trusted execution environment in which the trusted application P2 is compiled. In this way, the trusted application audit platform can collect the remote authentication reports returned by the selected multiple audit agencies for the trusted P1 when executing step B17, and can obtain from each collected remote authentication report whether the cumulative evaluation score of the key evaluation dimension (for example, whether the trusted application data is complete, whether the trusted application function meets the evaluation indicators, etc.) reaches the evaluation threshold, and then can confirm that the audit is passed when the cumulative evaluation score of the key evaluation dimension in each remote authentication report reaches the evaluation threshold, and publish the remote authentication pass report of the trusted application P2 that has passed the audit on the trusted audit platform.

[0117] The trusted application review platform can notify the development terminal to execute step B18, that is, it can notify the development terminal to download the trusted application P2 that has passed the review. The development terminal can execute step B19 shown in Figure 7 to upload the currently reviewed trusted application P2 to the business server deployed with the trusted execution environment, so that the application function service of the trusted application P2 can be integrated and run in the business server deployed with the trusted execution environment. In this way, when a certain business object (for example, the aforementioned user A) needs to use a business terminal integrated with the resource management application P1 to execute a multi-party threshold signature, step B20 shown in Figure 7 can be executed to remotely authenticate the trusted application P2 running in the trusted execution environment of the business server through the resource management application P1 to obtain a remote authentication signature report returned by the business server.

[0118] To ensure the application security and environmental security of the trusted application P2 currently running on the business server, the business terminal can obtain the remote authentication pass report issued for the trusted application P2 from the trusted application audit platform through the resource management application P1 in step B21. For example, when the trusted application P2 is a key escrow client, the business terminal can obtain the remote escrow review and certification report obtained by multiple audit agencies after conducting a task review on the key escrow client from the trusted application audit platform through the resource management client P1. The business terminal can execute step B22 to compare the key report parameters of the remote authentication pass report (for example, the remote escrow review and certification report obtained by reviewing the key escrow client) with the key report parameters in the remote escrow authentication signature report obtained by the current remote authentication, and when the parameter comparison is successful, it is determined that the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment is a trusted client.

[0119] Step S102: When a business to be signed sent by a business object is obtained, the object data encryption information and the business to be signed are sent to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed, so that the key escrow client decrypts the object access data information based on the first communication key, authenticates the business object using the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, remotely signs the business to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information for the business to be signed;

[0120] Step S103: upon receiving the service remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, obtaining the first key shard of the service object based on the object access data information, and performing local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key shard to obtain service local signature information of the service to be signed;

[0121] Among them, the resource management memory of the resource management client stores the first encryption key fragment corresponding to the registration symmetric key and the first key fragment; the registration symmetric key is generated by the registration biometric information provided by the business object when registering the resource management client; the first encryption key fragment is obtained by encrypting the first key fragment with the registration symmetric key when the business object is a registered object. The specific process of the first business terminal executing step S103 through the resource management client can be described as follows: when the first business terminal receives the business remote signature information returned by the key hosting client, based on the online fragment encryption policy in the object registration policy, The access biometric information provided by the business object when accessing the resource management client is obtained from the query data information; the first business terminal can generate an access symmetric key through the access biometric information, and can obtain the registration symmetric key and the first encryption key fragment from the resource management memory; the first business terminal can, when determining that the registration symmetric key matches the access symmetric key, decrypt the first encryption key fragment through the access registration key that matches the registration symmetric key, and restore the first key fragment corresponding to the first encryption key fragment; the first business terminal can perform local signature processing on the to-be-signed business through the first key fragment, and obtain the business local signature information of the to-be-signed business.

[0122] Among them, the first user terminal uses the first key shard to sign the service to be signed to obtain the specific process of local signature information of the service. Please refer to the description of the specific process of obtaining signature information 2 in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 2 above, which will not be repeated here.

[0123] Step S104: Based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, determine the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed. When the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, treat the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and send the signed business to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0124] Specifically, the first business terminal can accumulate the first signature quantity of the business remote signature information and the business local signature information based on the first threshold signature strategy, and use the accumulated first signature quantity as the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed; when the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature strategy, the first business terminal aggregates the business remote signature information and the business local signature information based on the first threshold signature strategy to obtain the first aggregate signature information of the business to be signed, and uses the business to be signed as the signed business to be written into the blockchain based on the first aggregate signature information; the first business terminal can send the signed business and the first aggregate signature information to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node performs aggregate signature verification on the signed business based on the global aggregate public key carried in the first aggregate signature information, and when the aggregate signature verification is successful, writes the signed business into the blockchain maintained by the blockchain node; the global aggregate public key is obtained by aggregating the public key carried in the remote signature information and the public key carried in the local signature information.

[0125] Thus, it can be seen that the embodiment of the present application can ensure the security of key storage by deploying key shards on different client terminals (for example, the first key shard can be encrypted and stored on the resource management client, and the escrow key shard can be stored on the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment), thereby improving the reliability of business signatures during the business signing process. For example, the embodiment of the present application can solve the problem of illegal leakage of escrow key shards caused by the loss of the key escrow device held by the third-party escrow party by deploying the key escrow client in the trusted execution environment. By encrypting and storing the key shards in writing, the phenomenon of illegal leakage of the first key shard caused by the loss of the business terminal held by the user can also be prevented. In addition, the embodiment of the present application can determine the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain. In other words, the embodiment of the present application uses a threshold signature strategy (here refers to a strategy in which users and third-party custodians can jointly participate in collaborative signing) and can rely on multiple signature information reaching a cumulative signature threshold (for example, 2) to determine the current business (i.e., the business to be signed) as a signed business. The signed business can then be written to the blockchain through the blockchain node to ensure the reliability of the business on the chain.

[0126] Please refer to Figure 8, which is a flowchart illustrating a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment provided by this application. As shown in Figure 8, this method can be executed by a resource management client, which can be integrated and run in a first service terminal. The first service terminal can specifically be first service terminal 100b in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above. As shown in Figure 8, this method can include at least steps S201-S211.

[0127] Step S201: Obtain object access data information of a business object. When it is determined based on the object access data information that the business object has access rights to access a resource management client, respond to the business object's request to access the resource management client based on the access rights. The object access data information includes access password information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client.

[0128] Step S202: remotely authenticate the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment to obtain a remote authentication result.

[0129] Specifically, the first business terminal can generate a first random number for remote authentication through the resource management client, and when generating a first communication key pair for data communication, use the first random number and the first communication public key in the first communication key pair as request parameters, and generate a first remote authentication request based on the request parameters; the first business terminal can send the first remote authentication request to the key hosting client, so that the key hosting client generates a second communication key pair based on the first remote authentication request, uses the second communication public key in the second communication key pair and the first random number in the received remote authentication request as report parameters, and generates a local verification report carrying the report parameters; the local verification report is used to indicate a local platform authentication signature component associated with a trusted execution environment, locally verify the local verification report, and when the local verification is successful, generate a remote hosting authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report; further, the first business terminal The terminal can receive the remote hosting authentication signature report returned by the local platform authentication signature component, obtain the hosting environment authentication report provided by the remote authentication server, and when the remote hosting authentication signature report is determined to be a valid authentication report based on the hosting environment authentication report, determine that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment, and obtain the remote hosting review authentication report obtained after multiple audit agencies conduct task reviews on the key hosting client from the trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client; the first business terminal can compare the key report parameters in the remote hosting review authentication report with the key report parameters in the remote hosting authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, determine that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, and generate a remote authentication result, which is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

[0130] For easier understanding, please refer to Figure 9, which is an interactive flow chart for performing remote authentication according to an embodiment of the present application. The service terminal shown in Figure 9 may be the first service terminal described above, and the service terminal shown in Figure 9 may have a resource management client P1 integrated therein. Similarly, the key escrow device shown in Figure 9 may be the service service device deployed with a trusted execution environment described above, and the trusted application P2 running in the key escrow device may specifically be the key escrow client described above.

[0131] Specifically, before the resource management client P1 performs a multi-party threshold signature through the trusted application P2 (for example, the key escrow client), the business terminal can execute step C11 shown in Figure 9. That is, at this time, the business terminal shown in Figure 9 can generate a random number (that is, the aforementioned first random number) through the resource management client, and at the same time generate a communication key pair A1 (that is, the aforementioned first communication key pair) for data communication, and use the public key (that is, the first communication public key) and the random number (that is, the aforementioned first random number) of the communication key pair A1 (that is, the aforementioned first communication key pair) as request parameters, so as to initiate a remote authentication request (that is, the aforementioned first remote authentication request) to the trusted application P2 (for example, the key escrow client) deployed in the key escrow device shown in Figure 9 through the ordinary application shown in Figure 9.

[0132] As shown in FIG9 , the ordinary application can execute step C12 to pass the request parameters in the received remote attestation request to the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) deployed in the trusted execution environment. At this point, the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) deployed in the trusted execution environment can generate another communication key pair (e.g., communication key pair B1) for data communication based on the received request parameters (i.e., the aforementioned first communication public key and the first random number). The public key of the communication key pair B1 (i.e., the second communication public key) and the received random number (i.e., the first random parameter) can be used as report parameters. Furthermore, the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) can call the SGX EREPORT instruction to create a REPORT (i.e., a locally verified report containing the report parameters) that can be locally verified (without calling the IAS) by the current platform QE (i.e., the remote attestation signing component shown in FIG9 , which is located on the same platform as the trusted execution environment).

[0133] When executing step C13, the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) may pass the REPORT (i.e., the local verification report carrying the report parameters) to the QE (i.e., the remote authentication signature component located on the same platform as the trusted execution environment as shown in FIG9 ) through the common application. Specifically, as shown in FIG9 , the common application may receive the REPORT (i.e., the local verification report carrying the report parameters) transmitted by the trusted application P2 (e.g., the key escrow client) when executing step C13, and forward the REPORT (i.e., the local verification report carrying the report parameters) to the QE (i.e., the remote authentication signature component located on the same platform as the trusted execution environment as shown in FIG9 ) through step C14.

[0134] QE (i.e., the remote authentication signature component shown in FIG9 ) can call EGETKEY to obtain the REPORT KEY (i.e., the key report parameter in the local verification report), and can use the obtained key report parameter to implement local verification of the REPORT. Thus, the local verification result can be used to determine whether the trusted execution environment where the trusted application P2 is located is running on the same platform as the QE. If the local verification result indicates that the local verification is successful, the QE (i.e., the remote authentication signature component shown in FIG9 ) can use the platform private key unique to this platform to sign the REPORT to obtain a Quote (i.e., a remote authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report can be obtained, for example, a remotely hosted authentication signature report).

[0135] QE (i.e., the remote authentication signature component shown in FIG9 ) can forward the Quote (i.e., the remote authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report can be obtained, for example, the remote hosted authentication signature report can be specifically forwarded) to the common application shown in FIG9 through step C15. Further, the common application can return the received Quote (i.e., the remote authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report can be obtained, for example, the remote hosted authentication signature report can be specifically forwarded) to the business terminal shown in FIG9 when executing step C16. At this time, the business terminal can call the remote authentication server shown in FIG9 through the resource management client P1 to verify whether the remote hosted authentication signature report is a valid authentication report through the environment authentication report (e.g., the above-mentioned hosted environment authentication report) provided by the remote authentication server.

[0136] The remote authentication server involved in the embodiment of the present application can specifically be an Intel remote authentication server (Intel Attestation Service, IAS) for verifying the validity of the remote authentication signature report. In other words, the embodiment of the present application can help the business terminal through the remote authentication server to further determine that the trusted execution environment deployed in the key escrow device is a secure execution environment when the remote authentication signature report is determined to be a valid authentication report, so that the remote review authentication report (for example, specifically the remote escrow review authentication report) obtained from the trusted application audit platform can be compared with the remote authentication signature report currently regarded as a valid authentication report, and then, if the comparison is successful, it can be determined that the key escrow client deployed in the secure execution environment is a trusted client.

[0137] In the interactive process diagram provided in FIG9 above, the resource management client P1 in the business terminal and the trusted application P2 (for example, the key hosting client) deployed in the trusted execution environment can both combine their own private keys and the other party's public key to calculate the same and symmetric communication key (for example, the first communication key mentioned above), so that the subsequent communication encryption process can be carried out using the communication key calculated in real time during the authentication process.

[0138] The embodiment of the present application can ensure that the environment participating in the authentication (for example, the above-mentioned trusted execution environment on the cloud) is the same as the actual running environment of the application during the key interaction processing of the communication key (i.e., the first communication key). Because other environments do not participate in the key interaction processing, they cannot calculate the communication key, and naturally cannot decrypt the communication content transmitted when the business terminal and the key hosting device communicate data. In addition, it can be understood that since the Quote (i.e., the remote authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report) contains a random number generated in real time (i.e., the aforementioned first random number), it can ensure that the trusted application P2 cannot use an outdated local authentication report to bypass the remote authentication, thereby ensuring the real-time nature of the remote authentication to a certain extent, and ensuring the environmental security of the current running environment of the trusted application P2.

[0139] The parameter comparison involved in the business terminal through the resource management client P1 can specifically be to check whether the application signer in the remote authentication signature report is consistent with the application signer in the remote review and certification report when participating in the review. If they are consistent, it can be ensured that the trusted application P2 is developed by the expected developer, thereby preventing unexpected third parties from illegally obtaining the key hosting device and defrauding the information stored in the trusted application P2. In addition, the parameter comparison involved in the embodiment of the present application can also specifically be to check whether the application measurement value for the trusted application P2 in the remote authentication signature report is consistent with the application signer of the trusted application P2 in the remote review and certification report when participating in the review. If they are consistent, it is determined that the trusted application P2 deployed in the trusted execution environment is a trusted application. It can be understood that in remote authentication, the application measurement value of the trusted application P2 is calculated in real time by the Intel SGX CPU based on the application of the trusted application P2 running in the trusted execution environment. It cannot be tampered with and is a unique mark of an application. Therefore, before the business terminal calls the trusted application P2 through the resource management client, it can determine whether this value meets expectations, and then call the trusted application P2 if this value meets expectations, thereby effectively preventing the call of tampered applications.

[0140] Step S203, when the remote authentication result indicates that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, determining that the remote authentication is successful;

[0141] In order to ensure the security and reliability of the key escrow client stored in the trusted execution environment, it is necessary to verify the environmental security of the trusted execution environment storing the key escrow client through the threshold signature policy before the resource management client and the key escrow client perform multi-party threshold signing. Then, while ensuring that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment, it is possible to verify whether the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment is a trusted client. Therefore, when the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and the key escrow client is a trusted client, it is determined that the remote authentication is successful, and multi-party threshold signature can be implemented through the first threshold signature policy in the threshold signature policy. That is, the embodiment of the present application can further perform the following steps S204-step S205 based on the first threshold signature policy.

[0142] Optionally, embodiments of the present application may also determine that remote authentication has failed when, through remote authentication, it is determined that the trusted execution environment is a non-secure execution environment, or when the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment but the key escrow client is a non-trusted client. When remote authentication fails, the first service terminal of the integrated resource management client may determine that the key escrow client is in an unavailable state, and may further notify the service service device to stop using the unavailable key escrow client to provide key escrow services. Thus, when the key escrow client stops providing key escrow services (i.e., a service failure occurs in the service service device), to ensure the normal execution of the service signature, embodiments of the present application may also obtain a second threshold signature policy from the threshold signature policy (i.e., implementing multi-party threshold signatures using multiple service terminals associated with the service object (e.g., the online key shards stored in the first service terminal and the offline key shards stored in the second service terminal)). In this case, embodiments of the present application may further perform the following steps S206-S209 based on the second threshold signature policy.

[0143] Step S204: When remote authentication succeeds, a first communication key obtained through key interaction with the key escrow client is obtained, and the object access data information is encrypted using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information;

[0144] Step S205: Upon obtaining the business to be signed sent by the business object, the object data encryption information and the business to be signed are sent to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed, so that the key escrow client decrypts the object access data information based on the first communication key, authenticates the business object using the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, remotely signs the business to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information for the business to be signed.

[0145] Step S206: Upon receiving the service remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, the first key shard of the service object is obtained based on the object access data information, and the first key shard is used to perform local signature processing on the service to be signed, thereby obtaining service local signature information of the service to be signed.

[0146] Step S207: Based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, determine the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed. When the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, treat the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and send the signed business to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0147] The specific implementation of steps S204 to S207 can refer to the description of steps S101 to S104 in the embodiment corresponding to FIG3 , and will not be further described here.

[0148] Step S208: When remote authentication fails, it is determined that the key escrow client is currently offline. Upon receiving the business to be signed sent by the business object, the business signature data code of the business to be signed displayed on the second business terminal is obtained based on the second threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed. The business signature data code is generated by the second business terminal for the first type of signature information of the business to be signed. The first type of signature information is obtained by the second business terminal performing a first signature process on the business to be signed using the second key shard.

[0149] Step S209: parsing the acquired business signature data code to obtain the first type of signature information carried in the business signature data code;

[0150] Step S210: Perform a second signature process on the service to be signed using the first key shard to obtain second-type signature information of the service to be signed;

[0151] Step S211: Based on the first type of signature information and the second type of signature information, determine the second cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed. When the second cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the second threshold signature policy, treat the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and send the signed business to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0152] For ease of understanding, please further refer to Figure 10, which is a schematic diagram of a scenario for performing multi-party threshold signatures provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 10, when the first business terminal determines that the key escrow client integrated in the business service device is unavailable due to a single point of failure in the business service device, the multi-party threshold signature can be performed using the first business terminal and the second business terminal shown in Figure 10. It is understood that the first business terminal in this case can be the online terminal described above, and the second business terminal here can be the offline terminal described above.

[0153] Specifically, as shown in Figure 10, user A may execute step S81 to send the service Tx1 to be signed to the second service terminal shown in Figure 10. It is understandable that, at the same time, the first service terminal may also receive the service Tx1 initiated by user A.

[0154] For the second business terminal, which is currently an offline terminal, when obtaining the business Tx1, step S82 can be executed to call the offline key shard stored in the second business terminal (that is, the second key shard, for example, the key shard A2 stored by the resource management client shown in Figure 10) to sign the business Tx1, and the signature information 3 obtained by the business signature can be called the first type of signature information of the business to be signed.

[0155] Since the second business terminal is an offline terminal (i.e., a user terminal not connected to the network), when the second terminal obtains signature information 3 (i.e., the first type of signature information) through signing, it can generate the business signature data code of the business Tx1 based on the signature information 3 (i.e., the first type of signature information) (for example, a QR code carrying the business Tx1 and signature information 3 can be generated). At this time, the second business terminal can further execute step S83 to present the QR code of the business Tx1 and signature information 3 to the first business terminal.

[0156] The first service terminal may execute step S84. If the first service terminal is an online terminal, it may invoke the camera function of the online terminal to scan the QR code presented by the second service terminal to obtain signature information 3 carried in the QR code. The first service terminal may also use the service Tx1 carried in the scanned QR code as the service to be compared, and then perform a service comparison between the service to be compared and the service Tx1 initiated by user A. If the services are consistent, the validity and reliability of the signature information 3 (i.e., the first type of signature information) sent by the second service terminal can be ensured.

[0157] When executing step S84, the first business terminal can use the key shard A1 (i.e., the online key shard) stored by the resource management client to sign the received business Tx1 to obtain the signature information 2 (i.e., the second type of signature information) shown in Figure 10. It can be understood that for the first business terminal, the number of signatures of the signature information (e.g., signature information 3 and signature information 2) obtained in the second threshold signature strategy can be accumulated, and the accumulated number of signatures can be used as the second cumulative signature number of the business to be signed. When the second cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the second threshold signature strategy, the business Tx1 can be used as a signed business to be written to the blockchain, and the signature information 3 and signature information 2 can be aggregated and signed. The signature information obtained by the aggregate signature can be collectively referred to as aggregate signature information (i.e., the second aggregate signature information, for example, the aggregate signature information C2 shown in Figure 10). The first business terminal can execute step S85 through the resource management client to send the aggregate signature information C2 and the business Tx1 as the signed business to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node can perform aggregate signature verification on the business Tx1 as the current signed business based on the global aggregate public key (i.e., the above-mentioned global shared public key) carried in the second aggregate signature information, and when the aggregate signature verification is successful, the business Tx1 as the current signed business is written to the blockchain maintained by the blockchain node. The global aggregate public key here (i.e., the above-mentioned global shared public key) can be obtained by aggregating the public key carried in the first type of signature information and the public key carried in the second type of signature information. The global aggregate public key in the first aggregate signature information aggregated based on the first threshold signature strategy is consistent with the global aggregate public key in the second aggregate signature information aggregated based on the second threshold signature strategy. In other words, in the embodiment of the present application, when the signing terminals participating in the multi-party threshold signature include: the first business terminal, the second business terminal, and the business service device, the multi-party threshold signature can be implemented by key sharding stored in any two terminal devices, which will not be repeated here.

[0158] Optionally, an embodiment of the present application may also deploy a logging client independent of the key escrow client in a trusted execution environment, and when the logging client is a trusted client, when the logging client obtains the business remote signature information sent by the key escrow client, it may generate signature record flow information corresponding to the business remote signature information based on the log signature key of the logging client, and add the signature record flow information to the trusted log memory corresponding to the logging client; in this way, an embodiment of the present application may further perform the following steps: the first business terminal may obtain a remote log review certification report obtained after a task review by multiple audit agencies on the logging client from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client, and generate a first signature query request based on the log signature key carried in the remote log review authentication report, and the first signature query request is used to perform a signature query on the signature business; the first signature query request carries the log signature key. The first business terminal can send a first signature query request to the log recording client, so that the log recording client searches for signature record flow information in the trusted log memory based on the log signature key carried in the first signature query request; the first business terminal can receive the first search result returned by the log recording client through the resource management client; if the first search result indicates the signature record flow information found in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key escrow client participates in the remote signature processing of the signature business under the first threshold signature policy.

[0159] Please refer to Figure 11, which is a schematic diagram of a scenario for searching signature record flow information provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 11, a business object (for example, the aforementioned user A) can query the signature record of a certain business (for example, business Tx1 shown in Figure 11) through the first business terminal when executing step S91. At this time, when the first business terminal obtains the signature record query request of the signature record of the user A for the business Tx1, it can execute step S92, and display and provide the signature record query function through the client display page provided by the resource management client. At this time, the first business terminal can remotely authenticate the logging client deployed in the trusted execution environment through the resource management client, and when the remote authentication is successful, execute step S93 shown in Figure 11 to regularly pull the latest business signature record from the business service device where the logging client is deployed (for example, every 5 minutes). In this way, when the business service device returns the most recent business signature record to the first business terminal, the first business terminal can further execute step S94, that is, it can query whether the signature record of the business Tx1 is stored in the received business signature records. If so, the signature record of the business Tx1 can be displayed on the client display page shown in Figure 11.

[0160] The embodiment of the present application deploys the logging client in a trusted execution environment, and the signature flow of each business can be permanently saved by the logging client in the trusted execution environment, so that the signature information of these businesses stored in the trusted log memory of the logging client can be used to provide the third-party custodian with the possibility of self-proof. In this way, when the above-mentioned user A holds two pieces of keys through the corresponding business terminal, even if there is a third-party custodian without participation, the business signature can still be completed independently. It should be understood that the threshold signature strategy involved in the embodiment of the present application involves the use of threshold signature technology, which can ensure that any party involved in the key interaction process (for example, online devices, offline devices, business service devices) cannot infer the signing party from the signature. Therefore, in order to prevent the existence of a user denying that the current business was jointly committed by the custodian and the key thief, and the business signature was performed on the business used to transfer user assets, at this time, the signature flow of each business signature can be recorded by the logging client deployed in the trusted execution environment, and then the signature flow of each business can be recorded to help the third-party custodian achieve the possibility of self-proof.

[0161] In an embodiment of the present application, on the one hand, for the key hosting client deployed in the embodiment involved in the above-mentioned Figure 11, authentication can be used to ensure that only the user himself can use the local key shard stored in the trusted hosting memory of the key hosting client, that is, the third-party custodian itself does not have the authority to call the local key shard; on the other hand, for the logging client deployed in the embodiment involved in the above-mentioned Figure 11, the business log can be improved through the logging client, and the logging function program corresponding to the logging client must provide the following guarantees: 1) ensure that the signature of each business is recorded; 2) ensure that the business log of each business is never deleted; 3) provide a query interface to ensure that each query will return a query result, and the query result here can specifically include the query result of the signature flow of a certain business that does not exist and the query result of the signature flow of a certain business that exists.

[0162] To ensure the application security of the logging client in a trusted execution environment, the embodiment of the present application may further continue to perform the following steps: the first business terminal may receive a remote log authentication signature report sent by a local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment when performing remote authentication on the logging client; the first business terminal may obtain a log environment authentication report provided by a remote authentication server for the trusted execution environment, and when the log environment authentication report determines that the remote log authentication signature report is a valid authentication report, the trusted execution environment is determined to be a secure execution environment, and a remote log review authentication report obtained after a task review of the logging client by multiple auditing agencies is obtained from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client; the first business terminal may compare key report parameters in the remote log review authentication report with key report parameters in the remote log authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, the logging client is determined to be a trusted client deployed in a secure execution environment.

[0163] The embodiment of the present application can use the private key (i.e., log signature key) in the log signature key pair generated by the log recording client to sign and record the signature information generated by the key hosting client, so as to obtain the signature record flow information corresponding to the above-mentioned business remote signature information. It can be understood that since the log signature key is generated in the trusted execution environment (i.e., TEE), and the public key of the log signature key pair is reflected in the remote authentication report for the log recording client. Therefore, when the log function of the log recording client is completed in the TEE, and all operations provided by the log recording function are executed by a secure, deterministic, and immutable code logic that has been audited by multiple authoritative audit institutions (for example, multiple audit institutions selected in a one-time operation process), it can effectively avoid the phenomenon of the third-party custodian independently manipulating the query results. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish whether the third-party custodian did not participate in the signature or deliberately did not provide the business log. In other words, the security of trusted applications deployed in TEE has been audited by different auditing agencies. Therefore, when a user denies that a certain business (for example, the above-mentioned business Tx1) is jointly committed by a third-party custodian and a key thief, the evidence collector can query the business log recorded by the log recording client on the key custody device. If the business log of this business cannot be found, it means that the third-party custodian did not participate in the signature; on the contrary, if the business log of this business can be found and the user does not admit that he or she participated in the signature, it means that the user lost the user password due to his or her own reasons, and also lost the key shard used for business signing (for example, the first key shard mentioned above). This reversely deduce that this is not the responsibility of the third-party custodian, and this method can help the third-party custodian to prove its innocence.

[0164] It can be seen that the embodiment of the present application ensures the security of key storage by deploying key shards (i.e., local key shards, for example, online key shards, offline key shards, and managed key shards) on different devices respectively (for example, online key shards can be encrypted and stored on the first business terminal, managed key shards can be stored on the business service device deployed with a trusted execution environment, and offline key shards can be stored on the second business terminal). For example, the embodiment of the present application can ensure that each participant in the key interaction processing cannot directly obtain other local key shards except the local key shards stored by itself through the above-mentioned threshold signature strategy, so that different threshold signature strategies can be adopted according to actual needs in the business signature process to improve the reliability of the business signature. For example, the embodiment of the present application, by deploying the key escrow client in a trusted execution environment, can fundamentally solve the problem of illegal leakage of escrow key shards caused by the loss of the key escrow device held by the third-party escrow party. In addition, the embodiment of the present application can also prevent the illegal leakage of the first key shard caused by the loss of the business terminal held by the user by encrypting and storing the online key shards. Based on this, when the threshold signature policy is the first threshold signature policy, the first business terminal integrated with the resource management client involved in the embodiment of the present application can determine through the resource management client whether the cumulative number of signatures (i.e., the first cumulative number of signatures) of the currently collected business signature information (e.g., business remote signature information and business local signature information) reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy. Then, when the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed can be treated as a signed business to be written to the blockchain, and the signed business can be sent to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain to ensure the reliability of the business on the chain. Optionally, an embodiment of the present application stores offline key shards in a second business terminal independent of the first business terminal. In this way, when the key hosting client used to provide key hosting services is unavailable, multi-party threshold signing can still be continued through the online key shards stored in the first business terminal and the offline key shards stored in the second business terminal to ensure the normal execution of business signing for the business to be signed.

[0165] Please refer to Figure 12, which is a flow chart of a data processing method based on a trusted execution environment provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 12, the method can be jointly executed by a first business terminal integrated with a resource management client and a business service device deployed with a trusted execution environment. The first business terminal here can be the first business terminal 100b in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above, and the business service device here can run a key hosting client for providing key hosting services in the trusted execution environment. It should be understood that the business service device here can specifically be any key hosting device located in the business service cluster 100a in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above. As shown in Figure 12, the method can at least include steps S301-step S314.

[0166] Step S301: The first service terminal may obtain object access data information of the service object, and when determining based on the object access data information that the service object has access rights to access the resource management client, respond to the service object's request to access the resource management client based on the access rights.

[0167] Among them, the object access data information includes the access password information (for example, business character strings such as user passwords) entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client; it should be understood that in one or more possible implementations, the object access data information may also include access biometric information (for example, biometric information such as facial information or fingerprint information) in addition to the access password information (for example, business character strings such as user passwords). The specific type of the object access data information will not be limited here.

[0168] In step S302, the first service terminal may generate a first random number for remote authentication and a first communication key pair for data communication, use the first random number and the first communication public key in the first communication key pair as request parameters, and generate a first remote authentication request based on the request parameters.

[0169] Step S303: The first service terminal may send a first remote authentication request to a service service device integrated with a key escrow client.

[0170] In step S304, the key escrow client in the business service device may generate a second communication key pair based on the first remote authentication request, use the second communication public key in the second communication key pair and the first random number in the received remote authentication request as report parameters, and generate a local verification report carrying the report parameters;

[0171] In step S305, the key escrow client in the business server may send the local verification report to the local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment through the common application client in the business server, and may locally verify the local verification report through the local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment. When the local verification is successful, a remote escrow authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report is generated.

[0172] Step S306: The local platform authentication signature component in the business server may return the remote hosting authentication signature report to the first business terminal via the common application client;

[0173] In this way, the first service terminal may further perform the following step S307 upon receiving the remote hosting authentication signature report returned by the local platform authentication signature component.

[0174] In step S307, the first service terminal may obtain a hosting environment authentication report provided by the remote authentication server, and upon determining that the remote hosting authentication signature report is a valid authentication report based on the hosting environment authentication report, determine that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment. Furthermore, the first service terminal may obtain a remote hosting review authentication report obtained after a task review by multiple review agencies for the key hosting client from a trusted client review platform associated with the resource management client.

[0175] In step S308, the first service terminal may compare key report parameters in the remote escrow review and certification report with key report parameters in the remote escrow authentication signature report. If the parameter comparison is successful, the first service terminal determines that the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment and generates a remote authentication result. The remote authentication result is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and that the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

[0176] For the first business terminal, when the currently obtained remote authentication result indicates that the trusted execution environment deployed in the business service device is a secure execution environment, and the key hosting client running in the business service device is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, it can be determined that the remote authentication is successful, and then when the remote authentication is successful, the following step S309 can be executed.

[0177] Step S309: When remote authentication succeeds, the first service terminal may obtain a first communication key obtained through key exchange with the key escrow client, and encrypt the object access data information using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information.

[0178] Step S310: When the first service terminal obtains the to-be-signed service sent by the service object, it may send the object data encryption information and the to-be-signed service to the service service device corresponding to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the to-be-signed service.

[0179] For the business service device, the business service device may receive object data encryption information and the business to be signed sent by the first business terminal running the resource management client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed;

[0180] In step S311, the business service device may decrypt the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, and may authenticate the business object using the object access data information. If the authentication is successful, the business service device may remotely sign the business to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information for the business to be signed.

[0181] Step S312: The business service device may return the business remote signature information to the resource management client in the first business terminal through the key escrow client;

[0182] In step S313, upon receiving the remote signature information of the service returned by the key escrow client, the first service terminal may use the object access data information to decrypt and obtain the first key shard of the service object, and perform local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key shard to obtain the local signature information of the service to be signed.

[0183] In step S314, the first business terminal can determine the first cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0184] Among them, the specific implementation method of steps S301 to S308 can refer to the description of the specific process of remote authentication in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above. In addition, the specific implementation method of steps S309 to S314 can refer to the description of steps S101 to S104 in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be further described here.

[0185] It can be seen that the embodiment of the present application ensures the security of key storage by deploying key shards (i.e., local key shards, for example, online key shards, offline key shards, and managed key shards) on different devices respectively (for example, online key shards can be encrypted and stored on the first business terminal, managed key shards can be stored on the business service device deployed with a trusted execution environment, and offline key shards can be stored on the second business terminal). In this way, for any participant in the key interaction processing, it is impossible to directly reversely infer other local key shards stored in other devices, so that in the business signature process, different threshold signature strategies can be adopted according to actual needs to improve the reliability of the business signature. For example, by deploying the key escrow client in a trusted execution environment, the embodiment of the present application can ensure the environmental security of the trusted execution environment and the application security of the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment by performing remote authentication periodically or in real time, and can also fundamentally solve the problem of illegal leakage of escrow key fragments caused by the loss of the key escrow device held by the third-party escrow party; in addition, by encrypting and storing the online key fragments, the embodiment of the present application can also prevent the illegal leakage of the first key fragment caused by the loss of the business terminal held by the user; based on this, the embodiment of the present application involves an integrated resource management client that remotely authenticates the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment, and after the remote authentication is successful, it can proceed In one step, multi-party threshold signature can be performed through the online key sharding in the first business terminal and the managed key sharding in the business service device. That is, when the threshold signature policy is the first threshold signature policy, the embodiment of the present application can determine through the resource management client whether the cumulative signature quantity (that is, the first cumulative signature quantity) of the currently collected business signature information (for example, business remote signature information and business local signature information) reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy. Then, when the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed can be treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business can be sent to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain to ensure the reliability of the business on the chain.

[0186] Further, please refer to Figure 13, which is a structural diagram of a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment provided by the present application. The data processing device 1 based on the trusted execution environment can be a computer program (including program code) running on a computer device. For example, the data processing device 1 based on the trusted execution environment is an application software. The data processing device 1 based on the trusted execution environment can be used to execute the corresponding steps of the method provided in the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 13, the data processing device 1 based on the trusted execution environment can include a remote authentication module 11, a business sending module 12, a local signature processing module 13 and a business on-chain module 14;

[0187] The remote authentication module 11 is configured to remotely authenticate a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment when a business object accesses a resource management client through object access data information. Upon successful remote authentication, the module obtains a first communication key obtained through key exchange with the key escrow client, and encrypts the object access data information using the first communication key to obtain encrypted object data information.

[0188] The service sending module 12 is configured to, upon acquiring a service to be signed sent by a service object, send the object data encryption information and the service to be signed to the key escrow client based on a first threshold signature policy corresponding to the service to be signed, so that the key escrow client decrypts the information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, authenticates the service object using the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, remotely signs the service to be signed using the escrow key shard stored in the key escrow client to obtain service remote signature information for the service to be signed;

[0189] The local signature processing module 13 is configured to, upon receiving the remote signature information of the service returned by the key escrow client, obtain the first key shard of the service object based on the object access data information, and perform local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key shard to obtain the service local signature information of the service to be signed;

[0190] The business on-chain module 14 is used to determine the first cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0191] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the remote authentication module 11, the business sending module 12, the local signature processing module 13 and the business uplink module 14 can be found in the description of steps S101 to S104 in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be further described here.

[0192] Optionally, the device 1 further includes: a registration information search module 15 and a registration access module 16;

[0193] The registration information search module 15 is used to search for object registration data information that matches the object access data information in the registration service database associated with the resource management client when obtaining the object access data information entered by the business object, and obtain a data information search result;

[0194] The registration access module 16 determines that the business object is a registered object with access rights if the data information search result indicates that object registration data information matching the object access data information is found, and responds to the request of the business object access resource management client.

[0195] Optionally, the apparatus 1 further comprises: a prompt generating module 17;

[0196] The prompt generating module 17 is configured to determine that the business object is an unregistered object and generate access failure prompt information if the data information search result indicates that no object registration data information matching the object access data information is found.

[0197] The specific implementation of the registration information search module 15, the registration access module 16 and the prompt generation module 17 can be found in the description of the specific process of accessing the resource management client in the embodiment corresponding to FIG3 above, which will not be further described here.

[0198] The object registration data information includes the registration password information and registration biometric information entered by the business object when requesting to register the resource management client; the data information search result includes the information search success result or the information search failure result;

[0199] The registration information search module 15 includes: an access information acquisition unit 151, a search and matching unit 152, a first search determination unit 153, a second search determination unit 154 and a search result determination unit 155;

[0200] The access information acquisition unit 151 is used to obtain the object access data information entered by the business object when requesting access to the resource management client; the object access data information includes access password information and access biometric information;

[0201] a search and matching unit 152 configured to search a registration service database associated with the resource management client for registration password information that matches the access password information, and to search a registration database for registration biometric information that matches the access biometric information;

[0202] The first search and determination unit 153 is configured to generate a successful information search result if the registration password information matching the access password information and the registration biometric information matching the access biometric information are found in the service database;

[0203] The second search and determination unit 154 is configured to generate an information search failure result if the registration password information matching the access password information is not found in the service database, or the registration biometric information matching the access biometric information is not found;

[0204] The search result determining unit 155 is configured to use the information search success result or the information search failure result as the data information search result.

[0205] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the access information acquisition unit 151, the search matching unit 152, the first search determination unit 153, the second search determination unit 154 and the search result determination unit 155 can be found in the description of the specific process of obtaining the data information search results in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be further elaborated here.

[0206] The remote authentication module 11 includes an access authentication unit 111, a remote authentication unit 112, an authentication success determination unit 113 and an information encryption processing unit 114;

[0207] The access authentication unit 111 is configured to obtain object access data information of the business object and, upon determining based on the object access data information that the business object has access rights to access the resource management client, respond to the business object's request to access the resource management client based on the access rights; the object access data information includes the access password information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client;

[0208] The remote authentication unit 112 is used to remotely authenticate the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment through the resource management client to obtain a remote authentication result;

[0209] an authentication success determination unit 113, configured to determine that the remote authentication is successful when the remote authentication result indicates that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment;

[0210] The information encryption processing unit 114 is used to obtain the first communication key obtained by the key interaction processing between the key hosting client and the remote authentication when the remote authentication is successful, encrypt the access password information in the object access data information by using the first communication key, and use the encrypted access password information as the object data encryption information of the business object.

[0211] The object access data information includes the access biometric information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client;

[0212] The information encryption processing unit 114 is specifically configured to encrypt the access biometric information in the object access data information using the first communication key, and use the encrypted access biometric information as the object data encryption information of the business object.

[0213] The remote authentication unit 112 is specifically configured to generate a first random number for remote authentication and a first communication key pair for data communication, and to generate a first remote authentication request based on the request parameters using the first random number and the first communication public key in the first communication key pair as request parameters.

[0214] The remote authentication unit 112 is further specifically configured to send the first remote authentication request to the key escrow client, so that the key escrow client generates a second communication key pair based on the first remote authentication request, uses the second communication public key in the second communication key pair and the first random number in the received remote authentication request as report parameters, and generates a local verification report carrying the report parameters; the local verification report is used to indicate a local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment, performs local verification on the local verification report, and generates a remote escrow authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report when the local verification is successful;

[0215] The remote authentication unit 112 is further specifically configured to receive a remote hosting authentication signature report returned by the local platform authentication signature component, obtain a hosting environment authentication report provided by a remote authentication server, determine that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment when the remote hosting authentication signature report is determined to be a valid authentication report based on the hosting environment authentication report, and obtain a remote hosting review authentication report obtained after a task review by multiple review agencies for the key hosting client from a trusted client review platform associated with the resource management client;

[0216] The remote authentication unit 112 is also specifically used to compare the key report parameters in the remote hosting review and authentication report with the key report parameters in the remote hosting authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, it is determined that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, and a remote authentication result is generated. The remote authentication result is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment, and the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

[0217] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the access authentication unit 111, the remote authentication unit 112, the authentication success determination unit 113 and the information encryption processing unit 114 can refer to the description of the specific process of remote authentication in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be further described here.

[0218] The resource management memory of the resource management client stores a registration symmetric key and a first encryption key fragment corresponding to the first key fragment; the registration symmetric key is generated by registration biometric information provided by the business object when registering with the resource management client; the first encryption key fragment is obtained by encrypting the first key fragment using the registration symmetric key when the business object is a registered object;

[0219] The local signature processing module 13 includes: a biometric feature acquisition unit 131, an access key generation unit 132, a key fragment decryption unit 133 and a local signature information determination unit 134;

[0220] The biometric feature acquisition unit 131 is configured to, upon receiving the service remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, acquire the access biometric feature information provided by the service object when accessing the resource management client from the object access data information in accordance with the online shard encryption policy in the object registration policy;

[0221] an access key generation unit 132 for generating an access symmetric key by accessing the biometric information and obtaining the registration symmetric key and the first encryption key fragment from the resource management memory;

[0222] The key shard decryption unit 133 is configured to, when determining that the registration symmetric key matches the access symmetric key, decrypt the first encryption key shard using the access symmetric key that matches the registration symmetric key to restore the first key shard corresponding to the first encryption key shard;

[0223] The local signature information determining unit 134 is configured to perform local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key fragment to obtain service local signature information of the service to be signed.

[0224] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the biometric acquisition unit 131, the access key generation unit 132, the key fragment decryption unit 133 and the local signature information determination unit 134 can be found in the description of the specific process of obtaining the local signature information of the business in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be further described here.

[0225] The business on-chain module 14 includes: a signature quantity accumulation unit 141, an aggregate signature unit 142 and an aggregate signature sending unit 143;

[0226] The signature quantity accumulation unit 141 is configured to accumulate the number of signatures of the service remote signature information and the service local signature information based on the first threshold signature policy to obtain a first accumulated number of signatures for the service to be signed;

[0227] Aggregate signature unit 142 is configured to, when the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, aggregate the business remote signature information and the business local signature information based on the first threshold signature policy to obtain first aggregate signature information of the business to be signed, and use the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain based on the first aggregate signature information; the first aggregate signature information carries a global aggregate public key;

[0228] The aggregate signature sending unit 143 is used to send the signed business and the first aggregate signature information to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node verifies the aggregate signature of the signed business based on the global aggregate public key, and when the aggregate signature verification is successful, writes the signed business into the blockchain maintained by the blockchain node; the global aggregate public key is obtained by performing an aggregate calculation on the public key carried in the remote signature information and the public key carried in the local signature information.

[0229] Among them, the specific implementation of the signature quantity accumulation unit 141, the aggregate signature unit 142 and the aggregate signature sending unit 143 can refer to the description of the specific process of the aggregate signature in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 3 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0230] Optionally, a logging client independent of the key escrow client is deployed in the trusted execution environment; when the logging client is a trusted client, the logging client is configured to, upon obtaining the business remote signature information sent by the key escrow client, generate signature record flow information corresponding to the business remote signature information based on the log signature key, and add the signature record flow information to a trusted log memory corresponding to the logging client;

[0231] The device 1 further includes: a log review report acquisition module 18, a flow information search module 19, and a remote signature confirmation module 20;

[0232] The log review report acquisition module 18 is configured to obtain, from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client, a remote log review authentication report obtained after a task review conducted by multiple auditing agencies on the log recording client, and generate a first signature query request based on the log signature key carried in the remote log review authentication report. The first signature query request is used to perform a signature query on the signature service; the first signature query request carries the log signature key.

[0233] The log information search module 19 is configured to send the first signature query request to the log recording client, so that the log recording client searches for the signature record log information in the trusted log memory based on the log signature key carried in the first signature query request;

[0234] The remote signature confirmation module 20 is used to receive the first search result returned by the log recording client through the resource management client. If the first search result indicates the signature record flow information found in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key hosting client participated in the remote signature processing of the signature business when the first threshold signature strategy was used.

[0235] The device 1 further includes: a log authentication report acquisition module 21 and an execution environment confirmation module 22;

[0236] The log authentication report acquisition module 21 is used to receive a remote log authentication signature report sent by a local platform authentication signature component associated with a trusted execution environment when performing remote authentication on a logging client;

[0237] The execution environment confirmation module 22 is configured to obtain a log environment authentication report provided by a remote authentication server for the trusted execution environment, determine that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment when the log environment authentication report and the remote log authentication signature report are determined to be valid authentication reports, and obtain a remote log review authentication report obtained after a task review conducted by multiple auditing organizations on the logging client from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client;

[0238] The execution environment confirmation module 22 is further configured to compare key report parameters in the remote log review authentication report with key report parameters in the remote log authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, determine that the logging client is a trusted client deployed in a secure execution environment.

[0239] Among them, the specific implementation of the log authentication report acquisition module 21 and the execution environment confirmation module 22 can refer to the description of the specific process of remote authentication of the log recording client in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 8 above, and will not be further described here.

[0240] Optionally, the resource management client is integrated and runs on the first business terminal, and the business terminal associated with the business object includes a second business terminal; the second business terminal is an offline terminal independent of the first business terminal; the second business terminal is used to record the second key shard of the business object;

[0241] The device 1 further comprises: a data code acquisition module 23, an offline signature parsing module 24, a first key fragment decryption module 25 and a signature quantity accumulation module 26;

[0242] The data code acquisition module 23 is configured to, upon remote authentication failure, determine that the key escrow client is currently offline and, upon acquiring a to-be-signed service sent by the service object, acquire, based on the second threshold signature policy corresponding to the to-be-signed service, a service signature data code for the to-be-signed service displayed on the second service terminal. The service signature data code is generated by the second service terminal for the first type of signature information of the to-be-signed service. The first type of signature information is obtained by the second service terminal performing a first signature processing on the to-be-signed service using the second key shard.

[0243] The offline signature parsing module 24 is used to parse the acquired business signature data code to obtain the first type of signature information carried in the business signature data code;

[0244] The first key fragment decryption module 25 is configured to perform a second signature process on the service to be signed using the first key fragment obtained by decrypting the object access data information to obtain second type signature information of the service to be signed;

[0245] The signature quantity accumulation module 26 is used to determine the second cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed based on the first type of signature information and the second type of signature information. When the second cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the second threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

[0246] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the data code acquisition module 23, the offline signature parsing module 24, the first key fragment decryption module 25 and the signature quantity accumulation module 26 can be found in the description of steps S208 to S211 in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 8 above, and will not be further described here.

[0247] Optionally, the apparatus 1 further comprises: a signature query request generating module 27, a signature query request sending module 28 and a search result determining module 29;

[0248] The signature query request generating module 27 is configured to obtain, from a client audit platform associated with the resource management client, a remote log review authentication report obtained after a task review conducted by multiple auditing agencies on the log recording client, and generate a second signature query request based on the log signature key carried in the remote log review authentication report. The second signature query request is used to request a signature query for the service to be signed; the second signature query request carries the log signature key.

[0249] The signature query request sending module 28 is used to send the second signature query request to the logging client, so that the logging client searches the trusted log memory of the logging client for signature record flow information for the service to be signed based on the log signature key carried in the signature query request;

[0250] The search result determination module 29 is used to receive the second search result returned by the logging client through the resource management client. If the second search result indicates that the signature record flow information is not found in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key hosting client did not participate in the remote signature processing of the signature business under the second threshold signature policy.

[0251] Among them, the specific implementation methods of the signature query request generation module 27, the signature query request sending module 28 and the search result determination module 29 can be found in the description of the specific process of searching for signature record flow information in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 8 above, and will not be further described here.

[0252] Optionally, before the business object accesses the resource management client through the object access data information, the remote authentication module 11 is further configured to, when the business object is an unregistered object, register the object with the resource management client through the object registration data information provided by the business object, and after storing the object registration data information in the registration business database when the object registration is successful, remotely authenticate the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment through the resource management client, and when the remote authentication is successful, obtain a second communication key obtained through key interaction processing with the key escrow client;

[0253] The remote authentication module 11 is further configured to encrypt the registration password information in the object registration data information using the second communication key to obtain registration password encrypted information corresponding to the registration password information;

[0254] The remote authentication module 11 is also used to send the registration password encrypted information to the key hosting client, so that the key hosting client uses the second communication key obtained through key interaction processing with the resource management client to decrypt the registration key encrypted information, restore the registration password information, and store the restored registration password information in the trusted hosting memory of the key hosting client; the registration password information stored in the trusted hosting memory of the key hosting client is used to perform remote information authentication on the access password information in the obtained object access data information, and when the remote information authentication is successful, the authorized business object calls the hosting key shard.

[0255] The specific implementation method of obtaining the encrypted registration password information through the remote authentication module 11 can be found in the description of the encrypted registration password information in the embodiment corresponding to FIG3 , which will not be described in detail here. In addition, the description of the beneficial effects of adopting the same method will not be described in detail either.

[0256] Further, please refer to Figure 14, which is a structural diagram of a data processing device based on a trusted execution environment provided by the present application. The data processing device 2 based on the trusted execution environment can be a computer program (including program code) running in a computer device. For example, the data processing device 2 based on the trusted execution environment is an application software. The data processing device 2 based on the trusted execution environment can be used to execute the corresponding steps of the method provided in the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 14, the data processing device 2 based on the trusted execution environment can include: a business receiving module 100, a remote signature processing module 200 and a remote signature information sending module 300;

[0257] The service receiving module 100 is configured to receive encrypted object data and a service to be signed, sent by a resource management client based on a first threshold signature policy corresponding to the service to be signed. The encrypted object data is obtained by the resource management client encrypting the object access data using a first communication key. The first communication key is obtained by the resource management client performing remote authentication on a key escrow client deployed in a trusted execution environment, and when the remote authentication is successful, through key exchange between the resource management client and the key escrow client. The object access data is entered when the service object accesses the resource management client.

[0258] The remote signature processing module 200 is configured to decrypt the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain object access data information, authenticate the service object using the object access data information, and upon successful authentication, remotely sign the service to be signed using the escrow key shards stored in the key escrow client to obtain service remote signature information for the service to be signed;

[0259] The remote signature information sending module 300 is used to send the business remote signature information to the resource management client, so that the resource management client obtains the first key shard of the business object based on the object access data information, and uses the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed, and obtains the business local signature information of the business to be signed. The resource management client determines the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is treated as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node.

[0260] The specific implementations of the service receiving module 100, the remote signature processing module 200, and the remote signature information sending module 300 can be found in the description of the service service device in the embodiment corresponding to FIG10 , and will not be further elaborated here. Furthermore, the beneficial effects of employing the same method will not be further elaborated here.

[0261] Please refer to Figure 15, which is a structural diagram of a computer device provided by this application. As shown in Figure 15, the computer device 1000 may include: a processor 1001, a network interface 1004 and a memory 1005. In addition, the computer device 1000 may also include: a user interface 1003, and at least one communication bus 1002. Among them, the communication bus 1002 is used to realize the connection and communication between these components. Among them, the optional user interface 1003 may also include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface. The network interface 1004 may optionally include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface (such as a WI-FI interface). The memory 1005 may be a high-speed RAM memory or a non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage. The memory 1005 may optionally be at least one storage device located away from the aforementioned processor 1001. As shown in Figure 15, the memory 1005 as a computer storage medium may include an operating system, a network communication module, a user interface module and a device control application.

[0262] In the computer device 1000 shown in FIG15 , the network interface 1004 can provide network communication functions; the user interface 1003 is primarily used to provide an interface for user input; and the processor 1001 can be used to call the device control application stored in the memory 1005 to implement the methods described in the embodiments corresponding to FIG3 , FIG8 , or FIG12 , which are not described in detail here. Furthermore, the description of the beneficial effects of using the same methods is not repeated here.

[0263] In addition, it should be pointed out here that: the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, and the computer-readable storage medium stores the computer program executed by the data processing device 1 based on the trusted execution environment or the data processing device 2 based on the trusted execution environment mentioned above, and the computer program includes program instructions. When the processor executes the program instructions, it can execute the description of the data processing method based on the trusted execution environment in the embodiments corresponding to Figures 3, 8 or 12 above. Therefore, it will not be repeated here. In addition, the description of the beneficial effects of using the same method will not be repeated. For technical details not disclosed in the computer storage medium embodiments involved in this application, please refer to the description of the method embodiments of this application.

[0264] As an example, the above program instructions may be deployed on a computer device for execution, or deployed on multiple computer devices located at one location for execution, or executed on multiple computer devices distributed at multiple locations and interconnected by a communication network. Multiple computer devices distributed at multiple locations and interconnected by a communication network may constitute a blockchain consensus network.

[0265] The computer-readable storage medium can be the data processing device of the blockchain provided in any of the aforementioned embodiments, or the internal storage unit of the computer device, such as the hard disk or memory of the computer device. The computer-readable storage medium can also be an external storage device of the computer device, such as a plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, etc. equipped with the computer device. Furthermore, the computer-readable storage medium can also include both the internal storage unit of the computer device and an external storage device. The computer-readable storage medium is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by the computer device. The computer-readable storage medium can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is about to be output.

[0266] In addition, it should be noted that: the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product or computer program, which includes computer instructions, and the computer instructions are stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of the computer device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer instructions, so that the computer device executes the description of the above-mentioned data processing method based on the trusted execution environment in the corresponding embodiments of Figures 3, 8 or 12 above, and therefore, will not be repeated here. In addition, the description of the beneficial effects of adopting the same method will not be repeated. For technical details not disclosed in the computer-readable storage medium embodiment involved in this application, please refer to the description of the method embodiment of this application.

[0267] Further, please refer to Figure 16, which is a schematic diagram of a data processing system based on a trusted execution environment provided in an embodiment of the present application. This data processing system 3 based on a trusted execution environment may include a first business terminal 3a and a business service device 3b. The first business terminal 3a may be the first business terminal 100b described in the embodiment corresponding to Figure 1 above, and the business service device 3b may be any key escrow device in the business service cluster 100a shown in Figure 1 above. These details will not be further described here. Furthermore, the beneficial effects of employing the same method will not be further elaborated.

[0268] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processes in the above-described method embodiments can be implemented by instructing related hardware through a computer program. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When executed, the program can include the processes in the above-described method embodiments. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), or a random access memory (RAM).

[0269] The above disclosure is only a preferred embodiment of the present application, and certainly cannot be used to limit the scope of rights of the present application. Therefore, equivalent changes made according to the claims of the present application are still within the scope covered by the present application.

Claims

1. A data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, It is characterized in that The method is executed by a resource management client, and the method includes: When the business object accesses the resource management client through the object access data information, remotely authenticate the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment, and when the remote authentication succeeds, obtain a first communication key obtained by performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client, and encrypt the object access data information through the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information; When the business to be signed sent by the business object is obtained, the object data encryption information and the business to be signed are sent to the key escrow client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed, so that the key escrow client uses the first communication key to decrypt the object data encryption information to obtain the object access data information, and authenticates the business object based on the object access data information, and when the identity authentication is successful, remotely sign the business to be signed using the escrow key fragment stored in the key escrow client to obtain the business remote signature information of the business to be signed; Upon receiving the service remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, obtaining the first key shard of the service object based on the object access data information, and performing local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key shard to obtain the service local signature information of the service to be signed; Based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, determine the first cumulative signature quantity of the business to be signed. When the first cumulative signature quantity reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, treat the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and send the signed business to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

2. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: When the object access data information entered by the business object is obtained, searching the registration data information of the object matching the object access data information in the registration business database associated with the resource management client to obtain the data information search result; If the data information search result indicates that object registration data information matching the object access data information is found, the business object is determined to be a registered object with access rights, and a request for the business object to access the resource management client is responded to.

3. The method according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: If the data information search result indicates that the object registration data information matching the object access data information is not found, the business object is determined to be an unregistered object, and access failure prompt information is generated.

4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, It is characterized in that The object registration data information includes the registration password information and the registration biometric information entered by the business object when requesting to register the resource management client; the data information search result includes an information search success result or an information search failure result; When the object access data information entered by the business object is obtained, searching the registration data information of the object matching the object access data information in the registration business database associated with the resource management client to obtain the data information search result includes: Acquire object access data information entered by the business object when requesting to access the resource management client, wherein the object access data information includes access password information and access biometric feature information; searching the registration service database for registration password information that matches the access password information, and searching the registration database for registration biometric information that matches the access biometric information; If the registration password information matching the access password information is found, and the registration biometric information matching the access biometric information is found, then the information search success result is generated; If no registration password information matching the access password information is found, or no registration password information matching the access biometric information is found If the registered biometric information is not present, a result of information search failure is generated.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, It is characterized in that When the business object accesses the resource management client through the object access data information, remote authentication is performed on the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment, and when the remote authentication is successful, a first communication key obtained by performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client is obtained, and the object access data information is encrypted by the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information, including: Obtaining object access data information of the business object, and when it is determined based on the object access data information that the business object has access rights to access the resource management client, responding to the business object's request to access the resource management client based on the access rights; the object access data information includes access password information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client; Performing remote authentication on a key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment to obtain a remote authentication result; When the remote authentication result indicates that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment, and the key escrow client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment, determining that the remote authentication is successful; When remote authentication succeeds, a first communication key obtained by performing key interaction processing with the key hosting client during the remote authentication is obtained, the access password information in the object access data information is encrypted by the first communication key, and the encrypted access password information is used as the object data encryption information of the business object.

6. The method according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The object access data information includes the access biometric information entered by the business object when accessing the resource management client; The step of encrypting the object access data information by using the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information includes: The access biometric information in the object access data information is encrypted using the first communication key, and the encrypted access biometric information is used as the object data encryption information of the business object.

7. The method according to claim 5 or 6, It is characterized in that The remote authentication of the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment to obtain a remote authentication result includes: generating a first random number for remote authentication and generating a first communication key pair for data communication; Using the first random number and the first communication public key in the first communication key pair as request parameters, and generating a first remote authentication request based on the request parameters; Sending the first remote authentication request to the key escrow client, so that the key escrow client generates a second communication key pair based on the first remote authentication request, and uses the second communication public key in the second communication key pair and the first random number in the received remote authentication request as report parameters to generate a local verification report carrying the report parameters; the local verification report is used to indicate a local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment, locally verify the local verification report, and when the local verification succeeds, generate a remote escrow authentication signature report corresponding to the local verification report; Receiving the remote hosting authentication signature report returned by the local platform authentication signature component, obtaining a hosting environment authentication report provided by a remote authentication server, and determining that the remote hosting authentication signature report is a valid authentication report based on the hosting environment authentication report, determining that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment; A remote hosting review and certification report is obtained from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client after multiple audit agencies have conducted a task review on the key hosting client; key report parameters in the remote hosting review and certification report are compared with key report parameters in the remote hosting authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, the key hosting client is determined to be a trusted client in the secure execution environment, and the remote authentication result is generated, wherein the remote authentication result is used to indicate that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment and that the key hosting client is a trusted client in the secure execution environment.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, It is characterized in that The resource management memory of the resource management client stores a registration symmetric key and a first encryption key fragment corresponding to the first key fragment; the registration symmetric key is generated by the registration biometric information provided by the business object when registering the resource management client; the first encryption key fragment is obtained by encrypting the first key fragment with the registration symmetric key when the business object is a registered object; The method of, upon receiving the remote signature information of the service returned by the key escrow client, acquiring the first key shard of the service object based on the object access data information, and using the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the service to be signed to obtain the service local signature information of the service to be signed, includes: Upon receiving the service remote signature information returned by the key escrow client, obtaining the access biometric information provided by the service object when accessing the resource management client from the object access data information according to the online shard encryption strategy in the object registration strategy; Generate an access symmetric key through the access biometric information, and obtain the registration symmetric key and the first encryption key fragment from the resource management memory; When it is determined that the registration symmetric key matches the access symmetric key, decrypting the first encryption key fragment by using the access registration key to restore the first key fragment corresponding to the first encryption key fragment; The first key fragment is used to perform local signature processing on the service to be signed to obtain service local signature information of the service to be signed.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, It is characterized in that The method of determining a first cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information, and when the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, treating the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and sending the signed business to the blockchain node includes: Accumulating the number of signatures for the remote signature information of the service and the local signature information of the service to obtain a first accumulated number of signatures for the service to be signed; When the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature strategy, the business remote signature information and the business local signature information are aggregated and signed based on the first threshold signature strategy to obtain the first aggregate signature information of the business to be signed, and the business to be signed is used as a signed business to be written into the blockchain based on the first aggregate signature information; the first aggregate signature information carries a global aggregate public key; The signed business and the first aggregate signature information are sent to the blockchain node, so that the blockchain node verifies the aggregate signature of the signed business based on the global aggregate public key, and when the aggregate signature verification is successful, the signed business is written into the blockchain maintained by the blockchain node; the global aggregate public key is obtained by performing an aggregate calculation on the public key carried in the business remote signature information and the public key carried in the business local signature information.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, It is characterized in that A logging client is deployed in the trusted execution environment, and the logging client is independent of the key escrow client; when the logging client is a trusted client, the logging client is used to generate signature record flow information corresponding to the business remote signature information based on a log signature key when acquiring the business remote signature information sent by the key escrow client, and add the signature record flow information to the trusted log memory corresponding to the logging client; The method further comprises: Obtaining, from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client, a remote log review authentication report obtained after a plurality of audit agencies have conducted a task review on the log recording client, and generating a first signature query request based on the log signature key carried in the remote log review authentication report, wherein the first signature query request is used to perform a signature query on the business to be signed; the first signature query request carries the log signature key; Sending the first signature query request to the log recording client, so that the log recording client searches for the signature record flow information in the trusted log memory based on the log signature key carried in the first signature query request; A first search result returned by the logging client is received through the resource management client; if the first search result indicates that the signature record flow information is found in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key escrow client participated in the remote signature processing of the to-be-signed business under the first threshold signature policy.

11. The method according to claim 10, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: When performing remote authentication on the logging client, receiving a remote log authentication signature report sent by a local platform authentication signature component associated with the trusted execution environment; Obtaining a log environment authentication report provided by a remote authentication server for the trusted execution environment, and determining that the trusted execution environment is a secure execution environment when the log environment authentication report and the remote log authentication signature report are valid authentication reports; Obtaining, from a trusted client audit platform associated with the resource management client, a remote log review certification report obtained after a plurality of audit agencies have conducted a task review on the log recording client; The key report parameters in the remote log review authentication report are compared with the key report parameters in the remote log authentication signature report, and when the parameter comparison is successful, it is determined that the logging client is a trusted client deployed in the secure execution environment.

12. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, It is characterized in that The resource management client is integrated and runs on the first service terminal, and the service terminal associated with the service object includes a second service terminal; the second service terminal is an offline terminal independent of the first service terminal; The second service terminal is used to record the second key fragment of the service object; The method further comprises: When remote authentication fails, it is determined that the key escrow client is currently in an offline state, and when the to-be-signed business sent by the business object is obtained, based on the second threshold signature policy corresponding to the to-be-signed business, the business signature data code of the to-be-signed business displayed on the second business terminal is obtained; the business signature data code is generated by the second business terminal for the first type of signature information of the to-be-signed business; the first type of signature information is obtained after the second business terminal performs a first signature processing on the to-be-signed business through the second key shard; Performing data parsing on the acquired business signature data code to obtain the first type of signature information carried in the business signature data code; Using the first key fragment to perform a second signature process on the service to be signed, to obtain second type signature information of the service to be signed; Based on the first type of signature information and the second type of signature information, determine the second cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed. When the second cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the second threshold signature policy, treat the business to be signed as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and send the signed business to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

13. The method according to claim 12, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: Obtaining, from a client audit platform associated with the resource management client, a remote log review authentication report obtained after a plurality of audit agencies have conducted a task review on the log recording client, and generating a second signature query request based on the log signature key carried in the remote log review authentication report, wherein the second signature query request is used to request a signature query for the business to be signed; the second signature query request carries the log signature key; Sending the second signature query request to the log recording client, so that the log recording client searches for signature record flow information for the service to be signed in the trusted log memory of the log recording client based on the log signature key carried in the signature query request; A second search result returned by the logging client is received through the resource management client; if the second search result indicates that the signature record flow information is not found in the trusted log memory, it is determined that the key escrow client does not participate in the remote signature processing of the business to be signed during the second threshold signature policy.

14. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, It is characterized in that Before the business object accesses the resource management client through the object access data information, the method further includes: If the business object is an unregistered object, register the object with the resource management client through the object registration data information provided by the business object, and when the object registration is successful, store the object registration data information in the registration business database, and perform remote authentication on the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment through the resource management client, and when the remote authentication is successful, obtain a second communication key obtained by performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client; Using the second communication key to encrypt the registration password information in the object registration data information to obtain the registration password encrypted information; The registration password encrypted information is sent to the key escrow client, so that the key escrow client uses the second communication key obtained through key interaction processing with the resource management client to decrypt the registration key encrypted information, restore the registration password information, and store the restored registration password information in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client; the registration password information stored in the trusted escrow memory of the key escrow client is used to perform remote information authentication on the access password information in the object access data information, and when the remote information authentication is successful, the business object is authorized to call the escrow key shard.

15. A data processing method based on a trusted execution environment, It is characterized in that The method is performed by a key escrow client, and the key escrow client is deployed in the trusted execution environment. The method includes: Receive object data encryption information and the business to be signed sent by the resource management client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the business to be signed; the object data encryption information is obtained after the resource management client encrypts the object access data information through the first communication key; the first communication key is obtained by the resource management client performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client when the resource management client remotely authenticates the key escrow client and the remote authentication is successful; the object access data information is entered when the business object accesses the resource management client; Decrypting the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain the object access data information, authenticating the business object based on the object access data information, and when the identity authentication is successful, remotely signing the business to be signed using the escrow key fragment stored in the key escrow client to obtain business remote signature information of the business to be signed; The business remote signature information is sent to the resource management client, so that the resource management client obtains the first key shard of the business object based on the object access data information, and uses the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed to obtain the business local signature information of the business to be signed, and the resource management client determines the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is used as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node.

16. A data processing device based on a trusted execution environment, It is characterized in that The device runs on a resource management client and includes: A remote authentication module, configured to perform remote authentication on a key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment when a business object accesses the resource management client through object access data information, and when remote authentication succeeds, obtain a first communication key obtained by performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client, and encrypt the object access data information through the first communication key to obtain object data encryption information; The service sending module is used to obtain the to-be-signed service sent by the service object, based on the first threshold corresponding to the to-be-signed service The value signature strategy sends the object data encryption information and the service to be signed to the key escrow client, so that the key escrow client decrypts the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain the object access data information, and authenticates the service object based on the object access data information, and when the identity authentication is successful, remotely signs the service to be signed using the escrow key fragment stored by the key escrow client to obtain the service remote signature information of the service to be signed; A local signature processing module is used to, upon receiving the remote signature information of the service returned by the key escrow client, decrypt the service object using the object access data information to obtain the first key fragment of the service object, and perform local signature processing on the service to be signed using the first key fragment to obtain the service local signature information of the service to be signed; The business on-chain module is used to determine a first cumulative number of signatures for the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative number of signatures reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is used as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node so that the blockchain node writes the signed business into the blockchain.

17. A data processing device based on a trusted execution environment, It is characterized in that The device runs on a key escrow client, and the key escrow client is deployed in the trusted execution environment, including: A service receiving module, used for receiving object data encryption information and the service to be signed sent by the resource management client based on the first threshold signature policy corresponding to the service to be signed; the object data encryption information is obtained after the resource management client encrypts the object access data information through the first communication key; the first communication key is obtained by the resource management client performing key interaction processing with the key escrow client when the resource management client remotely authenticates the key escrow client deployed in the trusted execution environment and the remote authentication is successful; the object access data information is entered when the service object accesses the resource management client; A remote signature processing module, configured to decrypt the object data encryption information based on the first communication key to obtain the object access data information, authenticate the business object based on the object access data information, and when the identity authentication is successful, perform remote signature processing on the business to be signed using the escrow key fragment stored by the key escrow client to obtain the business remote signature information of the business to be signed; A remote signature information sending module is used to send the business remote signature information to the resource management client, so that the resource management client decrypts the object access data information to obtain the first key shard of the business object, and uses the first key shard to perform local signature processing on the business to be signed to obtain the business local signature information of the business to be signed, and the resource management client determines the first cumulative signature number of the business to be signed based on the business remote signature information and the business local signature information. When the first cumulative signature number reaches the cumulative signature threshold indicated by the first threshold signature policy, the business to be signed is used as a signed business to be written into the blockchain, and the signed business is sent to the blockchain node.

18. A computer device, It is characterized in that including memory and processor; The memory is connected to the processor, the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call the computer program so that the computer device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 15.

19. A computer-readable storage medium, It is characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is suitable for being loaded and executed by a processor, so that a computer device having the processor executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 15.

20. A computer program product, It is characterized in that The method comprises a computer program / instruction, which implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 15 when executed by a processor.