Quality assurance system and quality assurance method
The quality assurance system employs a blockchain to record and verify measurement values and function information, addressing the cost and time issues of conventional methods by determining tampering without needing evidence at each node, ensuring reliable and efficient measurement value assurance.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2024/003117
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-17
- Filing Date
- 2024-01-31
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-21
AI Technical Summary
Conventional methods for ensuring the quality and reliability of measurement values passing through multiple nodes are costly and time-consuming, as they require obtaining evidence at each node, which increases with the number of relaying nodes.
A quality assurance system that uses a blockchain to record measurement values and function information, allowing the system to determine if tampering has occurred by comparing calculated and recorded values, thereby reducing the need for evidence collection at each node.
This approach ensures the reliability of measurement values while reducing costs and time, and allows for improved expandability and accuracy in determining tampering, especially for environmental value evaluations.
Smart Images

Figure JP2024003117_21112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Quality assurance system and method
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a quality assurance system and a quality assurance method.
[0002] There are known techniques for improving the reliability of recording measurement values, etc. Patent Literature 1 describes a technique for recording data related to carbon emissions, etc., using a blockchain platform.
[0003] Special Publication No. 2021-510223
[0004] Data such as measurement values can be utilized via nodes, which are multiple devices, etc. Values passing through each node may be subject to tampering. Conventionally, to guarantee the quality (or reliability) of the final value, for example, evidence of the value output from each node has been obtained. Obtaining evidence at each node is costly and time-consuming.
[0005] The present disclosure provides a technique that allows for quality assurance of values.
[0006] A quality assurance system according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device that outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node, a group of nodes that relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value, and a blockchain system that records information about the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to the operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain and determines whether or not the group of nodes has been tampered with using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information about the function.
[0007] A quality assurance method according to one aspect of the present disclosure is executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system. The quality assurance method includes the steps of: outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device; relaying a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node by the node group, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and recording, by the blockchain system, information on the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to the operation in the node group on the blockchain, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0008] In the quality assurance system or quality assurance method, a first measurement value and a second measurement value are measured for a physical quantity of a measurement node. Information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function is recorded on a blockchain. This ensures the reliability of the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. Then, the presence or absence of tampering in the node group is determined using the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. This enables quality assurance of the value of the second measurement value that passes through the node group.
[0009] The function information may be a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the node group. The blockchain system may use the first measurement value and the composite function to calculate an estimate of the final value, and compare the final value with the estimate of the final value to determine whether tampering has occurred. In this case, by substituting the first measurement value into the composite function, an estimate of the final value after passing through the node group is calculated. By comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value, whether tampering has occurred in the node group is determined. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the value.
[0010] The function information may be an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the node group. The blockchain system may use the final value and the inverse function to calculate an estimate of the second measurement value, and compare the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. In this case, by substituting the final value for the inverse function of the composite function, an estimate of the second measurement value before passing through the node group is calculated. The estimate of the first measurement value is compared with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the values.
[0011] The blockchain system may further use a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The final value may have an error due to passing through the node group. In contrast, the first measurement value does not pass through the node group, so the error tends to be smaller than the final value and can be considered negligible. Using the predetermined threshold to determine whether or not tampering has occurred improves the accuracy of determining whether or not tampering has occurred.
[0012] The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be values that evaluate environmental value. The values that evaluate environmental value require reliability and may be relayed and utilized at various nodes. According to the quality assurance system of the present disclosure, quality assurance of the values that evaluate environmental value can be performed in a simple manner.
[0013] The measuring device may output a first measurement value via a first route. The node group may relay a second measurement value via a second route different from the first route. In this case, the first measurement value and the second measurement value are linked by branching into the first route and the second route. This ensures the independence of the first measurement value and the second measurement value. As a result, the reliability of the determination of whether or not tampering has occurred can be improved.
[0014] According to the present disclosure, it is possible to provide a technology that enables quality assurance of values.
[0015] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an example of an application of a quality assurance system. FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of value relaying. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not tampering has occurred using a composite function. FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not tampering has occurred using an inverse function of a composite function. FIG. 5 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the operation of the quality assurance system. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration related to the quality assurance system.
[0016] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the drawings, the same elements are designated by the same reference numerals, and duplicated explanations will be omitted.
[0017] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an example of application of a quality assurance system 1. The quality assurance system 1 of the present disclosure performs quality assurance on the measurement values of a measurement target. Values for which quality assurance is performed include, but are not limited to, values for evaluating environmental value or values used by an IoT (Internet of Things) platform. Measurement values include, but are not limited to, current, voltage, power, vibration, rotation speed, or temperature. Values for evaluating environmental value include, but are not limited to, CO 2 , methane, greenhouse gas emissions, etc., but are not limited to these. An example in which the quality assurance system 1 is applied to a situation in which quality assurance of a measured value of electric current is performed will be described below.
[0018] The quality assurance system 1 includes a measurement node 2, a first measuring device 3 (measurement device), a node group 4, and a blockchain system 5. The quality assurance system 1 includes a first route R1 and a second route R2 that start from the measurement node 2 and end at the blockchain system 5. The first route R1 and the second route R2 are different from each other. The first measuring device 3 is located on the first route R1. The node group 4 is located on the second route R2. Some or all of the measurement node 2, the first measuring device 3, and the node group 4 may be managed by different organizations.
[0019] The measurement node 2 is a device to be measured. The measurement node 2 outputs a physical quantity. In one example, the measurement node 2 is a solar panel. In this case, the measurement node 2 outputs a current or the like. The measurement node 2 may be under lock and key management.
[0020] The first measuring device 3 is a device that measures a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The first measuring device 3 has, for example, a sensor function that measures the physical quantity, a conversion function that converts the measurement value into digital data, and an output function that outputs the measurement value converted into digital data. The first measuring device 3 outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. For example, the first measuring device 3 converts a current value, which is analog data measured at the measurement node 2, into digital data and outputs it as a first measurement value. The first measuring device 3 transmits the first measurement value to the blockchain system 5. The first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value via a first path. The first measuring device 3 may have a tamper-proof function. The tamper-proof function may be realized by a meter approved for a specific industry.
[0021] The node group 4 relays second measurement values obtained as a result of measuring physical quantities related to the measurement nodes 2, and outputs final values obtained as a result of performing at least one calculation on the second measurement values. The configuration of the node group 4 is not limited. The node group 4 includes, for example, a second measuring device 6, a conversion module 7, an edge device 8, and clouds 9 and 10. The node group 4 relays the second measurement values via a second route R2. The node group 4 may include a node that does not perform a calculation on the second measurement values during relay. A node that does not perform a calculation may be considered as a node that performs a calculation using a function that does not change the value. The relay order in the node group 4 may be predetermined. The node group 4 transmits information about functions related to calculations in the node group 4 to the blockchain system 5. The calculations may include, for example, a calculation to calculate power [kW] from current [A], a calculation to calculate the amount of power "kWh" from power [kW], or a calculation to calculate CO₂ using the amount of power [kWh] and a predetermined coefficient. 2 Examples include, but are not limited to, calculations to determine emissions.
[0022] The second measuring device 6 is a device that measures a physical quantity of the measurement node 2. For example, the second measuring device 6 is a current sensor. The second measuring device 6 outputs a current value, which is analog data obtained by measuring the measurement node 2, as a second measured value. The second measured value may be a value measured under the same conditions as the first measured value.
[0023] The conversion module 7 is a device that converts the second measurement value, which is analog data, into digital data. The conversion module 7 relays between the second measuring device 6 and the edge device 8. The conversion module 7 functions as an interface that converts protocols between the second measuring device 6 and the edge device 8. The conversion module 7 may be incorporated into the second measuring device 6.
[0024] The edge device 8 is a device that relays the second measurement value to the cloud 9. The edge device 8 may process the second measurement value into a predetermined format. The type of edge device is not limited. For example, the edge device 8 may be a personal computer. The edge device 8 may also be a high-function mobile phone (smartphone), a tablet terminal, a wearable terminal, or the like.
[0025] The clouds 9 and 10 are any combination of computers available via a network. For example, the clouds 9 and 10 are computer systems used by multiple organizations. Multiple nodes (e.g., clouds) may exist between the clouds 9 and 10. The organization using the cloud 9 may be different from the organization using the cloud 10.
[0026] The blockchain system 5 is a computer system composed of multiple nodes. For example, the blockchain system 5 shares a ledger on the blockchain. The blockchain system 5 publishes transaction information as transaction information. The blockchain system 5 verifies the validity of the transaction information. The nodes in the blockchain system 5 are different from the individual nodes in the node group 4.
[0027] The blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on the function related to the calculation in the node group 4 on the blockchain. The blockchain system 5 may record the function information in advance. The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and the function information. The blockchain system 5 may record the tampering information, which is the determination result, on the blockchain or may output it to an external system. The tampering information may be represented by, for example, 1 or 0.
[0028] Terminal 11 is a node that constitutes blockchain system 5. Terminal 11 displays the tampering information recorded in blockchain system 5 on a display device. Terminal 11 may select and display a message based on the tampering information. For example, a message saying "Tampering has been detected" may be displayed on the display device of terminal 11. Terminal 11 may also be a computer device of an external system.
[0029] FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of value relay. FIG. 2 shows an example in which a value "x" is relayed by multiple nodes, and a value "y" is ultimately output. In FIG. 2, a start node ux and relay nodes u1, u2, and uy are arranged in this order. One or more relay nodes may exist between relay node u2 and relay node uy. The start node ux corresponds to measurement node 2, for example. Relay nodes u1, u2, and uy correspond to node group 4, for example. A function corresponds to each of relay nodes u1, u2, and uy.
[0030] The start node ux outputs a physical quantity "x." The relay node u1 acquires "x" from the start node ux as an input value. For example, the relay node u1 acquires the measured value "x" of the start node ux as an input value. The relay node u1 uses the function "f1(x)" to output the calculation result "u1." The relay node u2 acquires "u1" from the relay node u1 as an input value. The relay node u2 uses the function "f2(u1)" to output the calculation result "u2." In this way, the value is relayed and the calculation is performed. The value during the relay can also be called a relay value. The relay node uy acquires "un," the calculation result of the previous relay node in the order, as an input value. The relay node uy uses the function "fn+1(un)" to output the calculation result "y." y is the final value that is finally output.
[0031] Here, the calculation result "y" can be expressed by a composite function, which is a function obtained by combining multiple functions. The composite function is a function obtained by combining functions in the order of the relay nodes u1, u2, and uy. For example, the composite function can be expressed by the following formula: y = fn+1(un) = fn+1(fn(...f2(f1(x)))...) = F(x) ... (1)
[0032] In equation (1), F(x) is as follows: F(x)=fn+1(fn(...f2(f1(x)))...)
[0033] The inverse function of equation (1) can be expressed by the following equation: x=F -1 (y) ... (2)
[0034] Formula (1), which is a composite function, can calculate an estimated value of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may record formula (1) as function information. Formula (2), which is an inverse function of the composite function, can calculate an estimated value of the second measurement value before it is relayed. The blockchain system 5 may record formula (2) as function information.
[0035] 3 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not data has been tampered with using a composite function. The blockchain system 5 acquires a first measurement value x1 from a first measuring device 3. The first measurement value x1 is a measurement value of the measurement node 2 by the first measuring device 3. The blockchain system 5 acquires a final value y and a composite function F(x) as function information from the node group 4. The composite function F(x) is a function expressed by equation (1). The blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value x1, the final value y, and the composite function F(x) on the blockchain.
[0036] The blockchain system 5 calculates an estimated value y' of the final value y using the first measured value x1 and the composite function F(x). For example, the blockchain system 5 calculates an estimated value y' of the final value y by substituting the first measured value x1 into the composite function F(x).
[0037] The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value y with the estimated value y' of the final value y. For example, the blockchain system 5 may determine that no tampering has occurred if there is no difference between the final value y and the estimated value y' of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may also determine that tampering has occurred if there is a difference between the final value y and the estimated value y' of the final value y.
[0038] The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The method for determining the predetermined threshold θ is not limited. For example, the predetermined threshold θ may be determined based on an error in the node group 4. When passing through the node group 4, an error may occur due to factors such as the performance or environment of each node. The predetermined threshold θ may be determined to allow for such an error. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using the following formula: |F(x)-y|<θ ... (3)
[0039] The blockchain system 5 may determine that there is no tampering when the condition of formula (3) is satisfied. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there is tampering when the condition of formula (3) is not satisfied.
[0040] 4 is a schematic diagram showing an example of a process for determining whether or not tampering has occurred using the inverse function of a composite function. The blockchain system 5 acquires a first measurement value x1 from a first measuring device 3. The blockchain system 5 acquires a final value y and an inverse function F of the composite function as function information. -1 (y) is obtained from node group 4. The inverse function F of the composite function -1 (y) is the function shown in Equation (2). The blockchain system 5 calculates the inverse function F of the composite function using the first measurement value x1, the final value y, and -1 (y) is recorded on the blockchain.
[0041] The blockchain system 5 calculates the final value y and the inverse function F of the composite function. -1 (y) to calculate the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The second measurement value x2 is a measurement value of the measurement node 2 by a measurement device (e.g., the second measurement device 6) of the node group 4. For example, the blockchain system 5 calculates the inverse function F of the composite function -1 The final value y is substituted into (y) to calculate the estimated value x2' of the second measured value x2.
[0042] The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the first measured value x1 with the estimated value x2' of the second measured value x2. For example, the blockchain system 5 may determine that no tampering has occurred if there is no difference between the first measured value x1 and the estimated value x2' of the second measured value x2. The blockchain system 5 may also determine that tampering has occurred if there is a difference between the first measured value x1 and the estimated value x2' of the second measured value x2.
[0043] The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The blockchain system 5 may use the following formula to determine whether or not tampering has occurred: |F -1 (y)-x1|<θ...(4)
[0044] The blockchain system 5 may determine that there is no tampering when the condition of formula (4) is satisfied. The blockchain system 5 may determine that there is tampering when the condition of formula (4) is not satisfied.
[0045] [Operation of Quality Assurance System] An example of an operation method (quality assurance method) by the quality assurance system 1 will be described with reference to Fig. 5. Fig. 5 is a sequence diagram showing an example of the operation of the quality assurance system 1. In Fig. 5, the blockchain system 5 will be described assuming that information on functions related to operations in the node group 4 is recorded in advance.
[0046] In step S1, the measurement node 2 outputs a physical quantity. For example, the measurement node 2 outputs "x" as a current value.
[0047] In step S2, the first measuring instrument 3 acquires a first measurement value. For example, the first measuring instrument 3 acquires a first measurement value x1 obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The first measurement value x1 corresponds to “x” of the current value output by the measurement node 2.
[0048] In step S3, the node group 4 acquires a second measurement value. For example, the second measuring device 6 acquires a second measurement value x2 obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2. The second measurement value x2 corresponds to “x” of the current value output by the measurement node 2.
[0049] In step S4, the first measuring device 3 outputs a first measurement value. For example, the first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value x1 to the blockchain system 5. The first measuring device 3 outputs the first measurement value x1 via the first route R1.
[0050] In step S5, the node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2. The node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2 via the second route R2. The node group 4 relays the second measurement value x2 and calculates a final value y obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value x2.
[0051] In step S6, the node group 4 outputs the final value y. For example, the node group 4 outputs the final value y to the blockchain system 5.
[0052] In step S7, the blockchain system 5 records various information on the blockchain. For example, the blockchain system 5 records the first measurement value x1 and the final value y on the blockchain. Here, information on functions related to the calculations in the node group 4 is pre-recorded on the blockchain.
[0053] In step S8, the blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and information on the function.
[0054] The blockchain system 5 may calculate an estimated value y' of the final value y using the first measurement value x1 and the composite function F(x). The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value y with the estimated value y' of the final value y. The blockchain system 5 may further determine whether or not tampering has occurred using a predetermined threshold θ. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using equation (3).
[0055] The blockchain system 5 calculates the final value y and the inverse function F of the composite function. -1 (y) may be used to calculate an estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value x1 with the estimated value x2' of the second measurement value x2. The blockchain system 5 may further use a predetermined threshold θ to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using equation (4).
[0056] In step S9, the blockchain system 5 outputs the presence or absence of tampering. For example, the blockchain system 5 may record the tampering presence / absence information, which is the determination result of the presence or absence of tampering, on the blockchain or may output it to an external system. For example, the terminal 11 constituting the blockchain system 5 may display the tampering presence / absence information recorded in the blockchain system 5 on a display device.
[0057] The quality assurance method is not limited to the examples in the above embodiment. For example, some of the steps (processes) described above may be omitted, or the steps may be performed in a different order. Furthermore, any two or more of the steps described above may be combined, or some of the steps may be modified or deleted. Alternatively, other steps may be performed in addition to the steps described above.
[0058] [Hardware Configuration] Fig. 6 is a diagram showing an example of a hardware configuration related to the quality assurance system 1. Fig. 6 shows a computer 100 functioning as a terminal 11. The computer 100 has a processor 101, a main memory unit 102, an auxiliary memory unit 103, a communication control unit 104, an input device 105, and an output device 106. The terminal 11 is made up of one or more computers 100 configured from this hardware and software such as a program.
[0059] When the terminal 11 is made up of multiple computers 100, these computers 100 may be connected locally or via a communication network such as the Internet or an intranet. This connection logically constitutes one terminal 11.
[0060] The processor 101 is a CPU (Central Processing Unit) that executes an operating system, application programs, etc. The main memory 102 is composed of a ROM (Read Only Memory) and a RAM (Random Access Memory). The auxiliary memory 103 is a storage medium composed of a hard disk, flash memory, etc. The auxiliary memory 103 generally stores a larger amount of data than the main memory 102. The communication control unit 104 is composed of a network card or a wireless communication module. At least a part of the communication function with other devices in the terminal 11 may be realized by the communication control unit 104. The input device 105 is composed of a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a microphone for voice input, etc. The output device 106 is composed of a display, a printer, etc.
[0061] The auxiliary storage unit 103 stores in advance a program 110 (quality assurance program) and data necessary for processing. The program 110 causes the computer 100 to execute each functional element of the terminal 11. The program 110 causes, for example, processing related to the above-mentioned quality assurance method to be executed in the computer 100. For example, the program 110 is read by the processor 101 or the main storage unit 102, and causes at least one of the processor 101, the main storage unit 102, the auxiliary storage unit 103, the communication control unit 104, the input device 105, and the output device 106 to operate. For example, the program 110 reads and writes data from and to the main storage unit 102 and the auxiliary storage unit 103.
[0062] The program 110 may be provided in the form of being recorded on a tangible storage medium such as a CD-ROM, a DVD-ROM, a semiconductor memory, etc. The program 110 may also be provided as a data signal via a communication network.
[0063] The computer devices that make up the edge device 8 and clouds 9 and 10, and each node that makes up the blockchain system 5 may also have the same hardware configuration as the terminal 11.
[0064] As described above, a quality assurance system 1 according to one aspect of the present disclosure includes a measurement node 2 to be measured, a measurement device (first measurement device 3) that outputs a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2, a node group 4 that relays a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value, and a blockchain system 5 that records information on the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to the operation in the node group on a blockchain and determines whether or not the node group 4 has been tampered with using the first measurement value, the final value, and the function information.
[0065] A quality assurance method according to one aspect of the present disclosure is executed by a quality assurance system 1 including a measurement node 2 to be measured, a measurement device (a first measurement device 3), a node group 4, and a blockchain system 5. The quality assurance method includes the steps of: outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 using the measurement device; relaying a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node 2 using the node group 4, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and recording, by the blockchain system 5, information on the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to the operation in the node group 4 on the blockchain, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4 using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
[0066] In the quality assurance system 1 or quality assurance method, a first measurement value and a second measurement value are measured for a physical quantity of a measurement node 2. Information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function is recorded on the blockchain. This ensures the reliability of the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. Then, the presence or absence of tampering in the node group 4 is determined using the information on the first measurement value, the final value, and the function. This enables quality assurance of the value of the second measurement value that passes through the node group 4.
[0067] In conventional methods, for example, when relaying data through multiple nodes, tasks such as obtaining evidence of the values relayed by the multiple nodes may be required. As the number of relaying nodes increases, the number of locations where tampering is possible increases. Therefore, as the number of relaying nodes increases, the cost and time required to obtain evidence also increase. In contrast, the quality assurance system 1 disclosed herein eliminates the need to obtain evidence in the node group 4, thereby suppressing increases in cost and time. Furthermore, even if a new node is added to the node group 4, it is sufficient to simply add information about the corresponding function. For example, if the relay order in the node group 4 is changed due to the addition of a new node, the blockchain system 5 simply records information about the function corresponding to the changed order. Therefore, the quality assurance system 1 disclosed herein is capable of improving scalability.
[0068] The function information is a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 calculates an estimate of the final value using the first measurement value and the composite function, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. In this case, by substituting the first measurement value into the composite function, an estimate of the final value after passing through the node group 4 is calculated. The presence or absence of tampering in the node group 4 is determined by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the value.
[0069] The function information is the inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the node group 4. The blockchain system 5 calculates an estimate of the second measurement value using the final value and the inverse function, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value. In this case, by substituting the final value for the inverse function of the composite function, an estimate of the second measurement value before passing through the node group 4 is calculated. The estimate of the first measurement value is compared with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group 4. This makes it possible to suppress an increase in calculation costs while ensuring quality assurance of the values.
[0070] The blockchain system 5 further uses a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group 4 to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. The final value may have an error due to passing through the node group 4. In contrast, the first measurement value does not pass through the node group 4, so the error tends to be smaller than the final value and can be considered negligible. Using a predetermined threshold to determine whether or not tampering has occurred improves the accuracy of determining whether or not tampering has occurred.
[0071] The first measurement value and the second measurement value are values that evaluate environmental value. The values that evaluate environmental value require reliability and can be relayed and utilized at various nodes. According to the quality assurance system 1 of the present disclosure, quality assurance of the values that evaluate environmental value can be performed in a simple manner.
[0072] The measuring device outputs a first measurement value via a first route. The node group 4 relays a second measurement value via a second route different from the first route. In this case, the first measurement value and the second measurement value are linked by branching into the first route and the second route. This ensures the independence of the first measurement value and the second measurement value. As a result, the reliability of the determination of whether or not data has been tampered with can be improved.
[0073] [Modifications] The present disclosure is not necessarily limited to the above-described embodiments, and various modifications are possible without departing from the gist of the present disclosure.
[0074] In the above embodiment, an example has been described in which the first measurement value and the second measurement value are current values, but this is not limited thereto. The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be a voltage value, a power value, a vibration value, a rotation speed, a temperature, or the like. The first measurement value and the second measurement value may be different from each other. In one example, the first measurement value may be a current value, and the second measurement value may be a vibration value. In this case, the blockchain system 5 may determine whether or not tampering has occurred using the composite function shown in Equation (1).
[0075] In the above embodiment, it has been explained that the error in the first measurement value tends to be smaller than that in the final value because it does not pass through the node group 4, and can be considered negligible. However, the error may also be taken into consideration. If the measuring device (first measuring device 3) has been calibrated, the error in the first measurement value is quantitatively determined. Therefore, the error in the first measurement value may be used to determine the predetermined threshold value θ shown in Equation (3) or Equation (4).
[0076] In the above embodiment, an example has been described in which the blockchain system 5 determines whether or not tampering has occurred by further using a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the node group 4, but this is not limiting. The predetermined threshold may be a threshold determined by a specific industry.
[0077] When comparing the magnitude of two numbers, either of the two criteria "greater than or equal to" and "greater than" may be used, or either of the two criteria "less than or equal to" and "under".
[0078] [Note] The gist of the present disclosure is as follows. [1] A quality assurance system comprising: a measurement node to be measured; a measuring device that outputs a first measurement value obtained by measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node; a group of nodes that relays a second measurement value obtained by measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node and outputs a final value obtained by performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and a blockchain system that records information on the first measurement value, the final value, and a function related to the operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain and determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the group of nodes using the first measurement value, the final value, and the function information. [2] The quality assurance system described in [1], wherein the information on the function is a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the group of nodes, and the blockchain system calculates an estimate of the final value using the first measurement value and the composite function, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value. [3] The quality assurance system according to [1] or [2], wherein the function information is an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the group of nodes, and the blockchain system uses the final value and the inverse function to calculate an estimate of the second measurement value, and compares the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value to determine whether or not tampering has occurred. [4] The quality assurance system according to any of [1] to [3], wherein the blockchain system determines whether or not tampering has occurred by further using a predetermined threshold determined based on an error of the group of nodes. [5] The quality assurance system according to any of [1] to [4], wherein the first measurement value and the second measurement value are values that evaluate environmental value. [6] The quality assurance system according to any of [1] to [5], wherein the measuring device outputs the first measurement value via a first route, and the group of nodes relays the second measurement value via a second route different from the first route.[7] A quality assurance method executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system, the quality assurance method comprising: a step of outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device; a step of relaying a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node by the node group, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and a step of recording, by the blockchain system, the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the node group on a blockchain, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group using the first measurement value, the final value, and information on the function.
[0079] REFERENCE SIGNS LIST 1 Quality assurance system 2 Measurement node 3 First measurement device (measurement device) 4 Node group 5 Blockchain system 6 Second measurement device 7 Conversion module 8 Edge device 9 Cloud 10 Cloud 11 Terminal y Final value R1 First path R2 Second path x1 First measurement value x2 Second measurement value y' Estimated value x2' Estimated value θ Threshold
Claims
1. A quality assurance system comprising: a measurement node to be measured; a measurement device that outputs a first measurement value obtained by measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node; a group of nodes that relays a second measurement value obtained by measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node and outputs a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and a blockchain system that records the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the group of nodes on a blockchain, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred in the group of nodes using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
2. The quality assurance system of claim 1, wherein the function information is a composite function obtained by combining a plurality of functions used in the group of nodes, and the blockchain system uses the first measurement value and the composite function to calculate an estimate of the final value, and determines whether or not tampering has occurred by comparing the final value with the estimate of the final value.
3. The quality assurance system of claim 1, wherein the function information is an inverse function of a composite function obtained by combining multiple functions used in the group of nodes, and the blockchain system uses the final value and the inverse function to calculate an estimate of the second measurement value, and determines whether or not the tampering has occurred by comparing the first measurement value with the estimate of the second measurement value.
4. The quality assurance system of claim 1, wherein the blockchain system further uses a predetermined threshold determined based on the error of the group of nodes to determine whether or not tampering has occurred.
5. The quality assurance system according to claim 1, wherein the first measurement value and the second measurement value are values that evaluate environmental value.
6. The quality assurance system according to claim 1, wherein the measuring device outputs the first measurement value via a first route, and the group of nodes relays the second measurement value via a second route different from the first route.
7. A quality assurance method executed by a quality assurance system including a measurement node to be measured, a measurement device, a node group, and a blockchain system, comprising: a step of outputting a first measurement value obtained as a result of measuring a physical quantity related to the measurement node by the measurement device; a step of relaying a second measurement value obtained as a result of measuring the physical quantity related to the measurement node by the node group, and outputting a final value obtained as a result of performing at least one operation on the second measurement value; and a step of recording the first measurement value, the final value, and information on a function related to the operation in the node group on a blockchain by the blockchain system, and determining whether or not tampering has occurred in the node group using the first measurement value, the final value, and the information on the function.
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