Detection of LTM switch failure

By generating and verifying the NCC value at UE and network nodes, LTM switch failures due to corrupted NCC values are prevented, ensuring reliable wireless communication through RRC reconfiguration or re-establishment.

WO2026234321A1PCT designated stage Publication Date: 2026-11-12NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES OY
View PDF 0 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/FI2026/050190
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2025-05-07
Filing Date
2026-04-10
Publication Date
2026-11-12

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In wireless communication networks, the transmission of a plain-text Next Hop Chaining Counter (NCC) value can be corrupted by a fake base station, leading to an LTM switch failure due to a mismatch in security keys, which is not detected by the network, causing continuous failure recovery issues.

Method used

Implementing mechanisms for the UE and network nodes to generate and verify the NCC value, detect LTM switch failures, and initiate appropriate recovery procedures, such as RRC reconfiguration or re-establishment, to ensure secure communication.

Benefits of technology

Prevents LTM switch failures by ensuring valid security key generation and detection of NCC value mismatches, thereby maintaining reliable communication and reducing network downtime.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure FI2026050190_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
    Figure FI2026050190_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

Disclosed is a wireless communication device, network node and methods arranged for handling a mismatch caused by an altered NCC value, i.e. corrupted NCC value, received from the user equipment. Disclosed is a wireless communication deployment scenario for handling an LTM switch failure caused by invalid security messaging due to a corrupted NCC value.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

[0001] DETECTION OF LTM SWITCH FAILURE

[0002] TECHNICAL FIELD

[0003] The following example embodiments relate to information technology and to wireless communication.

[0004] BACKGROUND

[0005] Information technology has an ever-growing impact on our society. In wireless communications networks, such as in 5G networks, during the mobility a small interruption time for user equipment is important for providing reliable communication. In present cellular network technologies, a corrupted NCC value received from the user equipment may cause an NCC value mismatch resulting to an LTM switch failure.

[0006] SUMMARY

[0007] According to some aspects, there is provided the subject matter of the independent claims. Some further aspects are defined in the dependent claims.

[0008] BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0009] In the following, various example embodiments will be described in greater detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which

[0010] FIG. 1 illustrates an example of a wireless communication network;

[0011] FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;

[0012] FIG. 3 illustrates another example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;

[0013] FIG. 4 illustrates a third example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;

[0014] FIG. 5 illustrates a fourth example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;

[0015] FIG. 6 illustrates an example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication preparation scenario;

[0016] FIG. 7 illustrates an example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;

[0017] FIG. 8 illustrates another example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling;FIG. 9 illustrates an example of an apparatus comprising means for performing one or more of the example embodiments described above;

[0018] FIG. 10 illustrates an example of an apparatus comprising means for performing one or more of the example embodiments described above.

[0019] DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] The scope of protection sought for various example embodiments is set out by the claims. The example embodiments and features, if any, described in this specification that do not fall under the scope of the claims are to be interpreted as examples useful for understanding various embodiments.

[0021] The following embodiments are exemplifying. Although the specification may refer to “an”, “one”, or “some” embodiment(s) in several locations of the text, this does not necessarily mean that each reference is made to the same embodiment(s), or that a particular feature only applies to a single embodiment. Single features of different embodiments may also be combined to provide other embodiments within the scope of the claims. Furthermore, the words "comprising" and "including" should be understood as not limiting the described embodiments to consist of only those features that have been mentioned, and such embodiments may also contain features that have not been specifically mentioned. Reference numbers, in the description and / or in the claims, serve to illustrate the embodiments with reference to the drawings, without limiting the embodiments to these examples only.

[0022] Further, it should be appreciated that, as used herein, the terms “the at least one” and “the one or more” mean “any one of the at least one” and “any one of the one or more”, respectively. Furthermore, as used herein, “at least one of the following: ” and “at least one of ” and similar wording, where the list of two or more elements are joined by “and” or “or”, mean at least any one of the elements, or at least any two or more of the elements, or at least all the elements.

[0023] Some example embodiments described herein may be implemented in a wireless communication network comprising a radio access network based on one or more of the following radio access technologies (RATs): global system for mobile communications (GSM) or any other second generation (2G) radio access technology, universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS, 3G) based on basic wideband-code division multiple access (W-CDMA), high-speed packet access (HSPA), long term evolution (LTE), LTE-Advanced, fourth generation (4G), fifth generation (5G), 5G new radio (NR), 5G-Advanced (i.e., 3GPP NR Rel-18 and beyond), sixth generation (6G), or seventh generation (7G). Some examples of radio access networks include the universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) radio access network (UTRAN), the evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRA), or the next generation radio access network (NG-RAN). The wireless communication network may further comprise a core network, and some example embodiments may also be applied to network functions of the core network.FIG. 1 depicts an example of a simplified wireless communication network showing some physical and logical entities. The connections shown in FIG. 1 may be physical connections or logical connections. It is apparent to a person skilled in the art that the wireless communication network may also comprise other physical and logical entities than those shown in FIG. 1.

[0024] The example embodiments described herein are not, however, restricted to the wireless communication network given as an example but a person skilled in the art may apply the example embodiments described herein to other wireless communication networks provided with necessary properties.

[0025] The example wireless communication network shown in FIG. 1 includes a radio access network (RAN) and a core network 110.

[0026] FIG. 1 shows user equipment (UE) 100, 102 configured to be in a wireless connection on one or more communication channels in a radio cell with an access node 104 of a radio access network.

[0027] The access node 104 may comprise a computing device configured to control the radio resources of the access node 104 and to be in a wireless connection with one or more UEs 100, 102. The access node 104 may also be referred to as a base station, a base transceiver station (BTS), an access point, a cell site, a network node, a radio access network node, a RAN node, or a network device.

[0028] The access node 104 may be, for example, an evolved NodeB (abbreviated as eNB oreNodeB), or a next generation evolved NodeB (abbreviated as ng-eNB), or a next generation NodeB (abbreviated as gNB or gNodeB), providing the radio cell. The access node 104 may include or be coupled to transceivers. From the transceivers of the access node 104, a connection may be provided to an antenna unit that establishes a bi-directional radio link to one or more UEs 100, 102. The antenna unit may comprise an antenna or antenna element, or a plurality of antennas or antenna elements.

[0029] The wireless connection (e.g., radio link) from a UE 100, 102 to the access node 104 may be called uplink (UL) or reverse link, and the wireless connection (e.g., radio link) from the access node 104 to the UE 100, 102 may be called downlink (DL) or forward link. A UE 100 may also communicate directly with another UE 102, and vice versa, via a wireless connection generally referred to as a sidelink (SL). It should be appreciated that the access node 104 or its functionalities may be implemented by using any node, host, server, access point or other entity suitable for providing such functionalities.

[0030] The radio access network may comprise more than one access node 104, in which case the access nodes may also be configured to communicate with one another over wired or wireless links. These links between access nodes may be used for sending and / or receiving control plane signaling and also for routing data from one access node to another access node.The access node 104 may further be connected to a core network (CN) 110. The core network 110 may comprise an evolved packet core (EPC) network and / or a 5thgeneration core network (5GC). The EPC may comprise network entities, such as a serving gateway (S-GW for routing and forwarding data packets), a packet data network gateway (P-GW) for providing connectivity of UEs to external packet data networks, and / or a mobility management entity (MME). The 5GC may comprise one or more network functions, such as at least one of: a user plane function (UPF), an access and mobility management function (AMF), a location management function (LMF), and / or a session management function (SMF).

[0031] The illustrated UE 100, 102 is one type of an apparatus to which resources on the air interface may be allocated and assigned. The UE 100, 102 may also be called a wireless communication device, a subscriber unit, a mobile station, a remote terminal, an access terminal, a user terminal, a terminal device, or a user device, just to mention but a few names. The UE 100, 102 may be a computing device operating with or without a subscriber identification module (SIM), including, but not limited to, the following types of computing devices: a mobile phone, a smartphone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a handset, a computing device comprising a wireless modem (e.g., an alarm or measurement device, etc.), a laptop computer, a desktop computer, a tablet, a game console, a notebook, a multimedia device, a reduced capability (RedCap) device, a wearable device (e.g., a watch, earphones or eyeglasses) with radio parts, a household appliance with radio parts, a sensor comprising a wireless modem, or a computing device comprising a wireless modem integrated in a vehicle or in a house.

[0032] The wireless communication network may also be able to support the usage of cloud services. For example, at least part of core network operations may be carried out as a cloud service (this is depicted in FIG. 1 by “cloud” 114). The UE 100, 102 may also utilize the cloud 114. In some applications, the computation for a given UE may be carried out in the cloud 114 or in another UE.

[0033] In one embodiment, an access node 104 may comprise: a radio unit (RU) 103 comprising a radio transceiver (TRX), i.e. , a transmitter (Tx) and a receiver (Rx); one or more distributed units (DUs) 105 that may be used for the so-called Layer 1 (L1) processing and real-time Layer 2 (L2) processing; and a central unit (CU) 108 (also known as a centralized unit) that may be used for non-real-time L2 and Layer 3 (L3) processing. The CU 108 may be connected to the one or more DUs 105 for example via an F1 interface. Such an embodiment of the access node 104 may enable the centralization of CUs relative to the cell sites and DUs, whereas DUs may be more distributed and may even remain at cell sites. The CU and DU together may also be referred to as baseband or a baseband unit (BBU). The CU and DU may also be comprised in a radio access point (RAP).

[0034] The CU 108 may be a logical node hosting radio resource control (RRC), service data adaptation protocol (SDAP) and / or packet data convergence protocol (PDCP), of the NR protocol stack foran access node 104. The CU 108 may comprise a control plane (CU-CP), which may be a logical node hosting the RRC and the control plane part of the PDCP protocol of the NR protocol stack for the access node 104. The CU 108 may further comprise a user plane (CU-UP), which may be a logical node hosting the user plane part of the PDCP protocol and the SDAP protocol of the CU for the access node 104.

[0035] The DU 105 may be a logical node hosting radio link control (RLC), medium access control (MAC) and / or physical (PHY) layers of the NR protocol stack for the access node 104. The operations of the DU 105 may be at least partly controlled by the CU 108. It should also be understood that the distribution of functions between the DU 105 and the CU 108 may vary depending on the implementation.

[0036] Cloud computing systems may also be used to provide the CU 108 and / or DU 105. A CU provided by a cloud computing system may be referred to as a virtualized CU (vCU). In addition to the vCU, there may also be a virtualized DU (vDU) provided by a cloud computing system. Furthermore, there may also be a combination, where the DU may be implemented on so-called bare metal solutions, for example application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or customer-specific standard product (CSSP) system-on-a-chip (SoC).

[0037] Edge cloud may be brought into the radio access network by utilizing network function virtualization (NFV) and software defined networking (SDN). Using edge cloud may mean access node operations to be carried out, at least partly, in a computing system operationally coupled to a remote radio head (RRH) or a radio unit (RU) 103 of an access node 104. It is also possible that access node operations may be performed on a distributed computing system or a cloud computing system located at the access node 104. Application of cloud RAN architecture enables RAN real-time functions being carried out at the radio access network (e.g., in a DU 105), and non-real-time functions being carried out in a centralized manner (e.g., in a CU 108).

[0038] A 5G wireless communication network (“5G network”) may also comprise a non-terrestrial communication network, such as a satellite communication network, to enhance or complement the coverage of the 5G radio access network. For example, satellite communication may support the transfer of data between the 5G radio access network and the core network 110, enabling more extensive network coverage. Possible use cases may include: providing service continuity for machine-to-machine (M2M) or Internet of Things (loT) devices or for passengers on board of vehicles, or ensuring service availability for critical communications, and future railway, maritime, or aeronautical communications. Satellite communication may utilize geostationary earth orbit (GEO) satellite systems, or low earth orbit (LEO) satellite systems, such as mega-constellations (i.e., systems in which hundreds of (nano)satellites are deployed). Alternatively, the satellites may be an airborne devices, such as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or a high-altitude platform system (HAPS). A given satellite 106 may provide communication services on Earth via one or more satellitebeams. The one or more satellite beams create one or more cells over a given service area that may be bounded by the field of view of the satellite 106.

[0039] It is obvious for a person skilled in the art that the access node 104 depicted in FIG. 1 is just an example of a part of a radio access network, and in practice the radio access network may comprise a plurality of access nodes 104, the UEs 100, 102 may have access to a plurality of radio cells, and the radio access network may also comprise other apparatuses, such as physical layer relay access nodes or other entities. At least one of the access nodes may be a Home eNodeB or a Home gNodeB. A Home gNodeB or a Home eNodeB is a type of access node that may be used to provide indoor coverage inside a home, office, or other indoor environment.

[0040] Some example embodiments are described below using principles and terminology of 5G radio access technology without limiting the example embodiments to 5G radio access technology, however.

[0041] 3GPP has introduced L1 / L2-triggered mobility (LTM), also called lower-layer triggered mobility in the literature, which aims to reduce interruption time during handover. LTM is a procedure in which a gNB receives Layer 1 (L1) measurement report(s) from a UE and, based on the measurement reports, the gNB issues a cell switch command signaled via a medium access control, MAC, control element (MAC CE) to the UE, thus triggering the LTM cell switch to a target candidate cell. The cell switch command indicates an LTM candidate configuration that the gNB previously prepared and provided to the UE through RRC signaling. One or more other LTM candidate configurations may also be prepared as further candidates for the LTM cell switch. Then the UE switches to the target configuration according to the cell switch command.

[0042] In the 3GPP specifications, a model for a handover key chaining and the concept of a next hop chaining counter (NCC) have been specified. During a handover, the network uses the NCC to track the key derivation chain.

[0043] NCC is used to take a decision to derive a horizontal key or vertical key. If the NCC value is the same as the previously received NCC value UE performs horizontal key derivation. If NCC is different UE performs vertical key derivation method. For both horizontal and vertical key derivation the physical cell identity (PCI) and DL frequency is used. Horizontal derivation makes use of the previous key that is already used once. Vertical key derivation does a refresh through use of new next hop (NH). The vertical key generation is used to separate key space of each radio access network node, RAN node. The NH value is provided to the RAN node by the access and mobility management function (AMF) and UE generates the NH by its own.

[0044] In the 3GPP specifications, it has been specified that for security handling at inter-CU LTM procedure the new NCC value is shared towards the UE with the cell switch command. In accordance with the 3GPP specifications, the NCC value shall be shared in cell switch command in plain text and no furthersecurity for MAC CE is considered.

[0045] As the NCC value is sent as plain-text it is possible that NCC value can be altered by a fake base station. Since the NCC value is now corrupted, this will lead to mismatch in the keys used by UE and target node for the RRC Reconfiguration complete message. As the change is not visible to the candidate node it may fail in decoding the RRC Reconfiguration complete message.

[0046] Consequently, the UE will end up detecting a situation of an LTM switch failure and trigger failure recovery via re-establishment or LTM-Recovery. However, the network will not know about the cause of the failure and therefore the failure situation may continue.

[0047] FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. In the presented example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling, the UE receives 301 over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value. The received 301 cell switch command may be an LTM cell switch command. However, as the NCC value is sent as plain-text it is possible that NCC value can be altered, i.e. corrupted, e.g. by a fake base station.

[0048] After receiving, the UE generates 302, based on an NCC value, for use in communication. In a case the NCC value received with the cell switch command is unaltered, the generated security key is a valid security key. However, in a case of the NCC value having been altered e.g. by a fake base station, also the generated security key is an invalid security key.

[0049] Thereafter, the UE generates 303 a RRC reconfiguration complete message based on the generated security key. In a case of a valid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is a valid message. However, in a case of an invalid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is an invalid message.

[0050] After generating, at the UE, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is sent 304 to the target node. In the presented example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e. corrupted. Therefore, the target node cannot read or decode the RRC reconfiguration complete message sent 304 by the UE and will drop the message. As the UE lower layer will not receive any response to any data sent, this leads to the UE detecting 305 an LTM switch failure happening due to NCC value corruption or modification.

[0051] After detecting an LTM switch failure, the UE will send 306 an RRC Reconfiguration complete message with the NCC value to the network. The UE may send 306 said RRC Reconfiguration complete message e.g. to the source node or to a selected target node. Upon receiving the RRC Reconfigurationcomplete message with the used NCC value, the source node can the analyze the situation and take appropriate action to resolve the situation.

[0052] FIG. 3 illustrates another example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. In the presented another example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling, the network node sends 401 over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch to the UE, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value. The sent 401 cell switch command may be an LTM cell switch command (this can be inter-CU LTM cell switch command or an intra-CU LTM cell switch command in all the embodiments). However, as the NCC value is sent as plain-text it is possible that NCC value with the UE can be altered, i.e. corrupted, e.g. by a fake base station. In the UE, the corrupted NCC value may be utilized in generating an invalid security key and in generating an invalid RRC reconfiguration complete message.

[0053] Thereafter, at the network node, a RRC reconfiguration complete message is received 402 with (or comprising) the used NCC value from the UE. In the presented another example embodiment, the used NCC value received from UE is based on an altered, i.e. corrupted NCC value. After receiving 402 the RRC Reconfiguration complete message with the used NCC value, the network node compares 403, whether the received 402 NCC value matches with the NCC value sent 401 in the cell switch command.

[0054] In the presented another example embodiment, the network node detects 404 a mismatch of the compared NCC values. After detecting a mismatch of the compared NCC values, the communication, the network node may then initiate 405 an RRC reconfiguration procedure with the UE. In an embodiment, the RRC reconfiguration procedure is initiated 405 by communicating the valid NCC value to the user equipment. In another embodiment, the RRC reconfiguration procedure is initiated 405 by generating a valid security key and communicating the valid security key to the user equipment. In yet another embodiment, the RRC reconfiguration procedure initiation 405 also comprises refreshing the security key at the UE either by using the valid key at present or a new key generation through intra-cell handover.

[0055] FIG. 4 illustrates a third example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. In the presented third example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling, the UE receives 301 over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value. The received 301 cell switch command may be an LTM cell switch command. However, as the NCC value is sent as plaintext it is possible that NCC value can be altered, i.e. corrupted, e.g. by a fake base station.After receiving, the UE generates 302, based on an NCC value, for use in communication. In a case the NCC value received with the cell switch command is unaltered, the generated security key is a valid security key. However, in a case of the NCC value having been altered e.g. by a fake base station, also the generated security key is an invalid security key.

[0056] Thereafter, the UE generates 303 a RRC reconfiguration complete message based on the generated security key. In a case of a valid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is a valid message. However, in a case of an invalid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is an invalid message.

[0057] After generating, at the UE, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is sent 304 to the target node. In the presented third example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e. corrupted. Therefore, the target node cannot read or decode the RRC reconfiguration complete message sent 304 by the UE and will drop the message. As the UE lower layer will not receive any response to any data sent, this leads to the UE detecting 305 an LTM switch failure happening due to NCC value corruption or modification.

[0058] In the presented third example embodiment, after detecting an LTM switch failure, the UE selects 311 a target node for an RRC re-establishment. After the UE has selected 311 the target node for an RRC re-establishment, the UE sends 312 an RRC re-establishment request message with the NCC value to the target node. Upon receiving the RRC re-establishment request message with the used NCC value, the target node can then analyze the situation and take appropriate action to resolve the situation, such as initiating an RRC reconfiguration procedure with the UE as explained in connection of step 405 above.

[0059] In another embodiment, the UE sends 312 the used NCC value in an RRC re-establishment complete message, instead or in addition to the sending 312 an RRC re-establishment request message, to the selected target node. It may be thus said that the UE sends the NCC in step 312 in or during an RRC reestablishment procedure.

[0060] FIG. 5 illustrates a fourth example embodiment of a flow diagram of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. In the presented fourth example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling, the network node receives 501, an RRC re-establishment request message with the used NCC value from the UE. In the presented fourth example embodiment, the used NCC value received from UE is based on an altered, i.e. corrupted NCC value.

[0061] Thereafter, the network node fetches 502 the security context with the NCC value shared in the cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to the UE. After receiving 501 the RRC reestablishment request message with the used NCC value, the network node compares 503 whether thereceived 501 NCC value matches with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command obtained via the fetching step of 502. In an embodiment, the node receiving the message during the re-establishment is the source node. The source node is already aware of the NCC the source node itself sent in the cell switching command. In such case, step 502 need not take place.

[0062] In the presented fourth example embodiment, the network node detects 504 a mismatch of the compared NCC values. After detecting a mismatch of the compared NCC values, the network node restores 505 the network security or refreshes 505 the network security with a new security. In this restoring / refreshing step the network reconfigures the LTM candidates considering a threat to inter-cu LTM and / or generate a new security key for use or provides a valid NCC value for use. After restoring / refreshing, the network node will then initiate 506 an RRC re-establishment procedure.

[0063] FIG. 6 illustrates an example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication preparation scenario. In the presented example embodiment of a wireless communication preparation scenario, the UE sends 901 an L3 measurement report to the S-DU of the source node, which L3 measurement report is then forwarded 902 to the S-CU of the source node. Based on the L3 measurement report provided by the UE to the S-DU / CU, the S-CU of the source node makes a decision 903 for LTM preparation.

[0064] Thereafter, the S-CU of the source node sends 904 a handover request to the T-CU of the target node. The S-CU of the source node may also send 905 handover requests also to the T-CUs of other potential target nodes. Consequently, the S-CU of the source node then receives 906 a handover request acknowledgement sent from the T-CU of the target node. Likewise, the S-CU of the source node may then receive 907 handover request acknowledgements sent from the T-CUs of other potential target nodes.

[0065] As a next step, the S-CU of the source node sends 908 a UE context modification request message with an NCC value to the S-DU of the source node. Consequently, the S-CU of the source node then receives 909 a UE context modification response message sent from the S-DU of the source node.

[0066] After this, the LTM configuration update procedure 910 is started. Firstly, the S-CU of the source node generates 911 RRC reconfiguration.

[0067] Thereafter, the S-CU of the source node sends 912 a DL RRC transfer message with the generated RRC reconfiguration to the S-DU of the source node. As a next step, the S-DU of the source node sends 913 an RRC reconfiguration message to the UE. Consequently, the UE sends 914 an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the S-DU of the source node. Thereafter, the S-DU of the source node sends 915 an UL RRC message transfer message with the RRC reconfiguration completion report to the S-CU of the source node. This completes the preparation scenario according to the presented example embodiment of FIG. 6.FIG. 7 illustrates an example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. The presented example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario of FIG. 7 takes place after the example embodiment of preparation scenario presented in FIG. 6. In the presented example embodimentof a wireless communication deployment scenario, the user data is shared 916 in the network, e.g. between the UE, the S-DU of the source node and the S-CU of the source node. In a different example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario, the user data may also be shared in the network between the UE, the S-DU of the source node, the S-CU of the source node and between other user plane functions, UPFs.

[0068] In the presented example embodiment of a wireless communication preparation scenario, the UE sends 917 an L1 measurement report to the S-DU of the source node. Based on the L1 measurement report provided by the UE to the S-DU, the S-DU of the source node makes 918 an LTM trigger decision. Thereafter, the S-DU of the source node sends 919 an LTM cell switch command message with an NCC value to the UE. After this, the S-DU of the source node sends 920 a cell switch notification message to the S-CU of the source node. As a next step, the S-CU of the source node sends 921 a cell switch notification message to the T-CU of the target node. In a following step, the T-CU of the target node sends 922 a cell switch notification message to the T-DU of the target node.

[0069] As a next step, the UE generates, based on an NCC value, a security key for use in communication. In a case the NCC value received with the cell switch command is unaltered, the generated security key is a valid security key. However, in a case of the NCC value having been altered e.g. by a fake base station, also the generated security key is an invalid security key. In the presented example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e. corrupted. Consequently, in the presented example embodiment, a wrong security key is generated 923 based on a wrong NCC value received.

[0070] Thereafter, the UE generates, based on the generated security key, a RRC reconfiguration complete message. In a case of a valid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is a valid message. However, in a case of an invalid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is an invalid message. After generating, the UE sends the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message 924 to the T-DU of the target node, said RRC reconfiguration complete message being forwarded to the T-CU of the target node.

[0071] In the presented example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e. corrupted. Therefore, the T-CU of the target node cannot read or decode the RRC reconfiguration complete message sent by the UE and will drop 925 the message. As the UE lower layer will not receive any response to any data sent, this leads to the UE detecting 926 an LTM switch failurehappening due to NCC value corruption or modification. Upon detecting an LTM switch failure, the UE will then send 927 an RRC reconfiguration complete message with the NCC value to the T-DU of the source node, said RRC reconfiguration complete message being forwarded to the S-CU of the source node.

[0072] Upon receiving the RRC reconfiguration complete message with the NCC value, the S-CU of the source node detects 928 a mismatch of the NCC values as it knows the NCC value the S-CU sent in step 908 to the S-DU, analyses the situation and takes appropriate action to resolve the situation. The S-CU of the source node may e.g. disable the communication and / or initiate an RRC reconfiguration procedure.

[0073] The S-CU of the source node (orT-CU of the target node in some embodiments) may e.g. send an RRC reconfiguration message in following cases: reconfiguring the LTM configuration, possible disabling inter-CU LTM, so that NCC value is not needed to be sent in cell switch by limiting intra-CU LTM; sharing the current security information, including a correct NCC value to continue with existing network security; and refreshing the network security with a new key with an intra-cell handover procedure.

[0074] FIG. 8 illustrates an example embodiment of a message sequence chart of a wireless communication deployment scenario utilising communication security handling. The presented example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario of FIG. 8 takes place after the example embodiment of preparation scenario presented in FIG. 6. In the presented example embodimentof a wireless communication deployment scenario, the user data is shared 916 in the network, e.g. between the UE, the S-DU of the source node and the S-CU of the source node. In a different example embodiment of a wireless communication deployment scenario, the user data may also be shared in the network between the UE, the S-DU of the source node, the S-CU of the source node and between other user plane functions, UPFs.

[0075] In the presented example embodiment of a wireless communication preparation scenario, the UE sends 917 an L1 measurement report to the S-DU of the source node. Based on the L1 measurement report provided by the UE to the S-DU, the S-DU of the source node makes 918 an LTM trigger decision. Thereafter, the S-DU of the source node sends 919 an LTM cell switch command message with an NCC value to the UE. After this, the S-DU of the source node sends 920 a cell switch notification message to the S-CU of the source node. As a next step, the S-CU of the source node sends 921 a cell switch notification message to the T-CU of the target node. In a following step, the T-CU of the target node sends 922 a cell switch notification message to the T-DU of the target node.

[0076] As a next step, the UE generates, based on an NCC value, a security key for use in communication. In a case the NCC value received with the cell switch command is unaltered, the generated security key is a valid security key. However, in a case of the NCC value having been altered e.g. by a fake base station, also the generated security key is an invalid security key. In the presented example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e.corrupted. Consequently, in the presented example embodiment, a wrong security key is generated 923 based on a wrong NCC value received.

[0077] Thereafter, the UE generates, based on the generated security key, a RRC reconfiguration complete message. In a case of a valid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is a valid message. However, in a case of an invalid security key, the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message is an invalid message. After generating, the UE sends the generated RRC reconfiguration complete message 924 to the T-DU of the target node, said RRC reconfiguration complete message being forwarded to the T-CU of the target node.

[0078] In the presented example embodiment, the NCC value received by the UE with the cell switch command has been altered, i.e. corrupted. Therefore, the T-CU of the target node cannot read or decode the RRC reconfiguration complete message sent by the UE and will drop 925 the message. This may lead to the UE detecting 929 an LTM switch failure happening due to NCC value corruption or modification. Upon detecting an LTM switch failure, the UE will then send 930 an RRC re-establishment request message with the NCC value to the T-DU of the target node, said RRC re-establishment request message being forwarded to the T-CU of the target node. In another embodiment, the UE includes the NCC value in a RRC reestablishment complete message sent to the T-DU of the target node which forwards the message to the T-CU of the target node. In another embodiment, the RRC re-establishment message (either request or complete message) is sent to another network node, i.e. generally to the network.

[0079] Upon receiving the NCC value in an RRC re-establishment request message or in an RRC reestablishment complete message, the T-CU of the target node detects 931 a mismatch of the NCC values, analyses the situation and takes appropriate action to resolve the situation. The T-CU of the target node may e.g. disable the communication and / or initiate an RRC re-establishment procedure.

[0080] According to an aspect, there is provided a device comprising: at least one processor, and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the device at least to: receive, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; generate a security key utilizing the received NCC value; generate a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key; send, over a wireless network connection, the RCC reconfiguration complete message to the target node; detect an LTM switch failure; and send, over a wireless network connection, an RRC reconfiguration complete message comprising the received NCC value to the network.

[0081] According to an aspect, there is provided a network node comprising: at least one processor, and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause thenetwork node at least to: send to a user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; receive from the user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message comprising a NCC value; compare the NCC value received in the RRC reconfiguration complete message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; and upon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, initiate an RRC reconfiguration procedure with the user equipment.

[0082] According to an aspect, there is provided a method, comprising: receiving, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; generating a security key utilizing the received NCC value; generating a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key; sending, over a wireless network connection, a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message to the target node; detecting an LTM switch failure; and sending, over a wireless network connection, a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message comprising the received NCC value to the network.

[0083] According to an aspect, there is provided a method, comprising: sending to a user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; receiving from the user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message comprising a NCC value; comparing the NCC value received in the RRC reconfiguration complete message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; and upon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, initiating an RRC reconfiguration procedure with the user equipment.

[0084] According to an aspect, there is provided a device comprising: at least one processor, and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the device at least to: receive, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; generate a security key utilizing the received NCC value; generate a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key; send, over a wireless network connection, an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the target node; detect an LTM switch failure; select a target node for RRC re-establishment; and send, over a wireless network connection, a message to the selected target node during an RRC re-establishment procedure, the message comprising the received NCC value.

[0085] According to an aspect, there is provided a network node comprising: at least one processor, and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause thenetwork node at least to: receive from a user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a message during a radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment procedure, the message comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; fetch the security context shared in a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a NCC value and having been sent to the user equipment by the source node; compare the NCC value received in the message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; and upon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, restore or refresh the network security and initiate an RRC re-establishment procedure.

[0086] According to an aspect, there is provided method, comprising: receiving, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; generating a security key utilizing the received NCC value; generating a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key; sending, over a wireless network connection, an RCC reconfiguration complete message to the target node; detecting an LTM switch failure; selecting a target node for radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment; and sending, over a wireless network connection, a message to the selected target node during an RRC re-establishment procedure, the message comprising the received NCC value.

[0087] According to an aspect, there is provided method, comprising: receiving from the user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a message during a radio resource control, RRC, reestablishment procedure, the message comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value; fetching the security context shared in a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a NCC value; comparing the NCC value received in the message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; and upon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, restoring or refreshing the network security and initiating an RRC re-establishment procedure.

[0088] FIG. 9 illustrates an example of an apparatus comprising means for performing one or more of the example embodiments described above. For example, the apparatus 9700 may be an apparatus such as, or comprising, or comprised in, a user equipment (UE) 100, 102. The user equipment may also be called a wireless communication device, a subscriber unit, a mobile station, a remote terminal, an access terminal, a user terminal, a terminal device, or a user device.

[0089] The apparatus 9700 may comprise a circuitry, a module or a chipset applicable for realizing one or more of the example embodiments described above. For example, the apparatus 9700 may comprise at least one processor 9710. The at least one processor 9710 interprets instructions (e.g., computer program instructions) and processes data. The at least one processor 9710 may comprise one or more programmable processors. The at least one processor 9710 may comprise programmable hardware with embedded firmware and may, alternatively or additionally, comprise one or more application-specific integrated circuits(ASICs). In an embodiment, the apparatus 9700 may comprise at least one processor, and at least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus to perform one or more of the example embodiments described above.

[0090] The at least one processor 9710 is coupled to at least one memory 9720. The at least one processor is configured to read and write data to and from the at least one memory 9720. The at least one memory 9720 may comprise one or more memory units. The memory units may be volatile or non-volatile. It is to be noted that there may be one or more units of non-volatile memory and one or more units of volatile memory or, alternatively, one or more units of non-volatile memory, or, alternatively, one or more units of volatile memory. Volatile memory may be for example random-access memory (RAM), dynamic randomaccess memory (DRAM) or synchronous dynamic random-access memory (SDRAM). Non-volatile memory may be for example read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), electronically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory, optical storage or magnetic storage. In general, memories may be referred to as non-transitory computer readable media. The term “non-transitory,” as used herein, is a limitation of the medium itself (i.e., tangible, not a signal) as opposed to a limitation on data storage persistency (e.g., RAM vs. ROM). The at least one memory 9720 stores computer readable instructions that are executed by the at least one processor 9710 to perform one or more of the example embodiments described above. For example, non-volatile memory stores the computer readable instructions, and the at least one processor 9710 executes the instructions using volatile memory for temporary storage of data and / or instructions. The computer readable instructions may refer to computer program code.

[0091] The computer readable instructions may have been pre-stored to the at least one memory 9720 or, alternatively or additionally, they may be received, by the apparatus, via an electromagnetic carrier signal and / or may be copied from a physical entity such as a computer program product. Execution of the computer readable instructions by the at least one processor 9710 causes the apparatus 9700 to perform one or more of the example embodiments described above. That is, the at least one processor and the at least one memory storing the instructions may provide the means for providing or causing the performance of any of the methods and / or blocks described above.

[0092] In the context of this document, a “memory” or “computer-readable media” or “computer-readable medium” may be any non-transitory media or medium or means that can contain, store, communicate, propagate or transport the instructions for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, such as a computer. The term “non-transitory,” as used herein, is a limitation of the medium itself (i.e., tangible, not a signal) as opposed to a limitation on data storage persistency (e.g., RAM vs. ROM).The apparatus 9700 may further comprise, or be connected to, an input unit 9730. The input unit 9730 may comprise one or more interfaces for receiving input. The one or more interfaces may comprise for example one or more temperature, motion and / or orientation sensors, one or more cameras, one or more accelerometers, one or more microphones, one or more buttons and / or one or more touch detection units. Further, the input unit 9730 may comprise an interface to which external devices may connect to.

[0093] The apparatus 9700 may also comprise an output unit 9740. The output unit may comprise or be connected to one or more displays capable of rendering visual content, such as a light emitting diode (LED) display, a liquid crystal display (LCD) and / or a liquid crystal on silicon (LCoS) display. The output unit 9740 may further comprise one or more audio outputs. The one or more audio outputs may be for example loudspeakers.

[0094] The apparatus 9700 further comprises a connectivity unit 9750. The connectivity unit 9750 enables wireless connectivity to one or more external devices. The connectivity unit 9750 comprises at least one transmitter and at least one receiver that may be integrated to the apparatus 9700 or that the apparatus 9700 may be connected to. The at least one transmitter comprises at least one transmission antenna, and the at least one receiver comprises at least one receiving antenna. The connectivity unit 9750 may comprise an integrated circuit or a set of integrated circuits that provide the wireless communication capability for the apparatus 9700. Alternatively, the wireless connectivity may be a hardwired application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The connectivity unit 9750 may also provide means for performing at least some of the blocks or functions of one or more example embodiments described above. The connectivity unit 9750 may comprise one or more components, such as: power amplifier, digital front end (DFE), analog-to-digital converter (ADC), digital-to-analog converter (DAC), frequency converter, (de)modulator, and / or encoder / decoder circuitries, controlled by the corresponding controlling units.

[0095] It is to be noted that the apparatus 9700 may further comprise various components not illustrated in FIG. 9. The various components may be hardware components and / or software components.

[0096] FIG. 10 illustrates an example of an apparatus 9800 comprising means for performing one or more of the example embodiments described above. For example, the apparatus 9800 may be an apparatus such as, or comprising, or comprised in, an access node 104 of a radio access network.

[0097] The apparatus 9800 may comprise, for example, a circuitry, a module or a chipset applicable for realizing one or more of the example embodiments described above. The apparatus 9800 may be an electronic device comprising one or more electronic circuitries. The apparatus 9800 may comprise a communication control circuitry 9810 such as at least one processor, and at least one memory 9820 storing instructions 9822 which, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the apparatus 9800 to carry out one or more of the example embodiments described above. Such instructions 9822 may, for example,include computer program code (software). The at least one processor and the at least one memory storing the instructions may provide the means for providing or causing the performance of any of the methods and / or blocks described above.

[0098] The processor is coupled to the memory 9820. The processor is configured to read and write data to and from the memory 9820. The memory 9820 may comprise one or more memory units. The memory units may be volatile or non-volatile. It is to be noted that there may be one or more units of non-volatile memory and one or more units of volatile memory or, alternatively, one or more units of non-volatile memory, or, alternatively, one or more units of volatile memory. Volatile memory may be for example random-access memory (RAM), dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) or synchronous dynamic random-access memory (SDRAM). Non-volatile memory may be for example read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), electronically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory, optical storage or magnetic storage. In general, memories may be referred to as non-transitory computer readable media. The term “non-transitory,” as used herein, is a limitation of the medium itself (i.e., tangible, not a signal) as opposed to a limitation on data storage persistency (e.g., RAM vs. ROM). The memory 9820 stores computer readable instructions that are executed by the processor. For example, non-volatile memory stores the computer readable instructions, and the processor executes the instructions using volatile memory for temporary storage of data and / or instructions.

[0099] The computer readable instructions may have been pre-stored to the memory 9820 or, alternatively or additionally, they may be received, by the apparatus, via an electromagnetic carrier signal and / or may be copied from a physical entity such as a computer program product. Execution of the computer readable instructions causes the apparatus 9800 to perform one or more of the functionalities described above.

[0100] The memory 9820 may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor-based memory devices, flash memory, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory and / or removable memory. The memory may comprise a configuration database for storing configuration data, such as a current neighbour cell list, and, in some example embodiments, structures of frames used in the detected neighbour cells.

[0101] The apparatus 9800 may further comprise or be connected to a communication interface 9830, such as a radio unit, comprising hardware and / or software for realizing communication connectivity with one or more wireless communication devices according to one or more communication protocols. The communication interface 9830 comprises at least one transmitter (Tx) and at least one receiver (Rx) that may be integrated to the apparatus 9800 or that the apparatus 9800 may be connected to. The communication interface 9830 may provide means for performing some of the blocks and / or functions (e.g., transmitting andreceiving) for one or more example embodiments described above. The communication interface 9830 may comprise one or more components, such as: power amplifier, digital front end (DFE), analog-to-digital converter (ADC), digital-to-analog converter (DAC), frequency converter, (de)modulator, and / or encoder / decoder circuitries, controlled by the corresponding controlling units.

[0102] The communication interface 9830 provides the apparatus with radio communication capabilities to communicate in the wireless communication network. The communication interface may, for example, provide a radio interface to one or more UEs 100, 102. The apparatus 9800 may further comprise or be connected to another interface towards a core network 110, such as the network coordinator apparatus or AMF, and / or to the access nodes 104 of the wireless communication network.

[0103] The apparatus 9800 may further comprise a scheduler 9840 that is configured to allocate radio resources. The scheduler 9840 may be configured along with the communication control circuitry 9810 or it may be separately configured.

[0104] It is to be noted that the apparatus 9800 may further comprise various components not illustrated in FIG. 10. The various components may be hardware components and / or software components.

[0105] The apparatus may be an any electronic device of any kind, such as, and not limited to, user equipments and other electronic devices that may require such a memory apparatus. The apparatus may may be any electrical device connectable to an access network and configurable to be in a wireless connection on one or more communication channels, including one or more control channels, with an access network component, e.g. an access network apparatus, providing a cell, for example. The physical link from the apparatus to the access network towards a core network is called an uplink or a reverse link and the physical link to the apparatus is called a downlink or a forward link. By way of example rather than limitation, the apparatus may referred to as a served apparatus, a downlink apparatus, a mobile apparatus, a terminal device, a communication device, a user equipment (UE), a subscriber station (SS), a portable subscriber station, a mobile station (MS), or an access terminal (AT). A non-limiting lists of examples of the apparatus, or what the apparatus may comprise or be comprised in, include a mobile phone, a cellular phone, a smart phone, a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) phone, a wireless local loop phone, a device using a wireless modem, a portable computer, a desktop computer, laptop-embedded equipment (LEE), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), a smart device, a multimedia device, an image capture terminal device, such as a digital camera, a gaming terminal device, a music storage and playback appliance, a drone, a vehicle, an automated guided vehicle, an autonomous connected vehicle, a vehicle-mounted wireless terminal device, a wireless endpoint, an internet of things device, an industrial internet of things device, a device operating in an industrial and / or an automated processing chain contexts, a consumer electronics device, a consumer internet of things device, a mobile robot, a mobile robot arm, a sensor, a surveillance camera, an eHealth related device, amedical monitoring device, a medical device, for example for remote surgery, a wearable device, such as a smart watch, a smart ring, a head-mounted display (HMD), an on-person device, etc. The apparatus may also be part of a group of apparatuses seen as one apparatus, i.e. one mobile apparatus, by the wireless network.

[0106] The apparatus may be any access network component of an access network. An access network domain may be based on any kind of an access network, such as a cellular access network, for example 5G network, 5G-Advanced network, 6G network, etc., a non-terrestrial network, a legacy cellular radio access network, for example 4G or older generation network, or a non-cellular access network, for example a wireless local area network, or any combination thereof. To provide the wireless access, the access network comprises access network components, such as access network apparatuses, or access devices. An access device component may provide one or more cells, possibly with different cell accessibility per a cell, but a cell is provided by one access device. However, there may be overlapping cells, for example a macro cell provided by an access device operating in co-operation of access nodes providing smaller cells, such as micro-, femto- or picocells, which overlap at least partly within the macro cell. There are a wide variety of access network components. A non-limiting lists of examples of the access network component, include different types of base stations, such as eNBs, gNBs, split gNBs, transmission-reception points, network-controlled repeaters, nodes operationally coupled to one or more remote radio heads, satellites, donor nodes in integrated access and backhaul (IAB), fixed IAB nodes, mobile IAB nodes mounted on vehicles, for example, etc. At least some of the apparatuses in the access network may provide an abstraction platform to separate abstractions of network functions from the processing hardware.

[0107] Further, it should be noted that some of the components may be multi-domain components. For example, a device component may also provide services to other device components, i.e. operate also as an access network component, for example be a relay node, or a mobile IAB node, or a mobile termination part in an IAB node. Hence, herein term mobile apparatus is used for device components, or device component functionality in a multi-domain component and term access network apparatus is used for access network components or access network component functionality in a multi-domain component.

[0108] This definition of circuitry applies to all uses of this term in this application, including in any claims. As a further example, as used in this application, the term circuitry also covers an implementation of merely a hardware circuit or processor (or multiple processors) or portion of a hardware circuit or processor and its (or their) accompanying software and / or firmware. The term circuitry also covers, for example and if applicable to the particular claim element, a baseband integrated circuit or processor integrated circuit for a mobile device or a similar integrated circuit in server, a cellular network device, or other computing or network device.The techniques and methods described herein may be implemented by various means. For example, these techniques may be implemented in hardware (one or more devices), firmware (one or more devices), software (one or more modules), or combinations thereof. For a hardware implementation, the apparatus(es) of example embodiments may be implemented within one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), graphics processing units (GPUs), processors, controllers, micro-controllers, microprocessors, other electronic units designed to perform the functions described herein, or a combination thereof. For firmware or software, the implementation can be carried out through modules of at least one chipset (for example procedures, functions, and so on) that perform the functions described herein. The software codes may be stored in a memory unit and executed by processors. The memory unit may be implemented within the processor or externally to the processor. In the latter case, it can be communicatively coupled to the processor via various means, as is known in the art. Additionally, the components of the systems described herein may be rearranged and / or complemented by additional components in order to facilitate the achievements of the various aspects, etc., described with regard thereto, and they are not limited to the precise configurations set forth in the given figures, as will be appreciated by one skilled in the art.

[0109] Compared to the present network technologies, the proposed invention has the advantage that the mismatch caused by an altered NCC value, i.e. corrupted NCC value, can be handled in a simple and straightforward manner. The solution according to the present invention provides a feasible and optimized solution for handling of an NCC value mismatch. The solution according to the present invention provides a solution for handling an LTM switch failure caused by invalid security messaging due to a corrupted NCC value.

[0110] It will be obvious to a person skilled in the art that, as technology advances, the inventive concept may be implemented in various ways within the scope of the claims. The embodiments are not limited to the example embodiments described above, but may vary within the scope of the claims. Therefore, all words and expressions should be interpreted broadly, and they are intended to illustrate, not to restrict, the embodiments.

Claims

CLAIMS1. A device comprising:at least one processor, andat least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the device at least to:receive, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;generate a security key utilizing the received NCC value;generate a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key;send, over a wireless network connection, an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the target node;detect an LTM switch failure;select a target node for RRC re-establishment; andsend, over a wireless network connection, a message to the selected target node during an RRC re-establishment procedure, the message comprising the received NCC value.

2. The device according to claim 1, wherein the received NCC value to the selected target node during the RRC re-establishment procedure is sent in an RRC re-establishment request message or in an RRC re-establishment complete message.

3. The device according to claim 1 or claim 2, wherein said cell switch command is a lower layer triggered mobility, LTM, cell switch command, wherein said source node is a source gNodeB, and wherein said target node is a target gNodeB.

4. The device according to claim 1, claim 2 or claim 3, whereinthe device comprises or is comprised in a user equipment.

5. A network node comprising:at least one processor, andat least one memory storing instructions that, when executed by the at least one processor, cause the network node at least to:receive from a user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a message during a radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment procedure, the message comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;fetch the security context shared in a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a NCC value and having been sent to the user equipment by the source node;compare the NCC value received in the message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; andupon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, restore or refresh the network security and initiate an RRC re-establishment procedure.

6. The network node according to claim 5, wherein said cell switch command is a lower layer triggered mobility, LTM, cell switch command, and wherein said network node is a gNodeB.

7. The network node according to claim 5 or claim 6, wherein the NCC value received during the RRC re-establishment procedure is received in an RRC re-establishment request message or in an RRC re-establishment complete message.

8. A method, comprising:receiving, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;generating a security key utilizing the received NCC value;generating a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key;sending, over a wireless network connection, an RCC reconfiguration complete message to the target node;detecting an LTM switch failure;selecting a target node for radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment; andsending, over a wireless network connection, a message to the selected target node during an RRC re-establishment procedure, the message comprising the received NCC value.

9. A method, comprising:receiving from the user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a message during a radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment procedure, the message comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;fetching the security context shared in a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a NCC value;comparing the NCC value received in the message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; andupon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, restoring or refreshing the network security and initiating an RRC re-establishment procedure.

10. A computer readable medium comprising program instructions which, when executed by a device, cause the device to perform at least the following:receive, over a wireless network connection, a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;generate a security key utilizing the received NCC value;generate a radio resource control, RRC, reconfiguration complete message utilizing the generated security key;send, over a wireless network connection, an RRC reconfiguration complete message to the target node;detect an LTM switch failure;select a target node for radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment; andsend, over a wireless network connection, a message to the selected target node during an RRC re-establishment procedure, the message comprising the received NCC value.

11. The computer readable medium according to claim 10, wherein the computer readable medium is a non-transitory computer readable medium.

12. A computer program comprising instructions for causing a device to perform at least the method according to claim 8.

13. A device comprising at least means for performing the method according to claim 8.

14. A computer readable medium comprising program instructions which, when executed by a network node, cause the network node to perform at least the following:receive from the user equipment, over a wireless network connection, a message during a radio resource control, RRC, re-establishment procedure, the message comprising a next hop chaining counter, NCC, value;fetch the security context shared in a cell switch command for a cell switch from a source node to a target node, said cell switch command comprising a NCC value;compare the NCC value received in the message with the NCC value sent in the cell switch command; andupon a mismatch of the compared NCC values, restore or refresh the network security and initiate an RRC re-establishment procedure.

15. The computer readable medium according to claim 14, wherein the computer readable medium is a non-transitory computer readable medium.

16. A computer program comprising instructions for causing a network node to perform at least the method according to claim 9.

17. A network node comprising at least means for performing the method according to claim 9.