Intelligent equipment security and high-efficiency authentication method based on alliance chain

Abstract

The invention discloses an alliance chain-based safe and efficient authentication method for intelligent equipment, which comprises the following steps that: 1, a registration mechanism generates a challenge set and sends the challenge set to sensor equipment, the sensor equipment calculates a response by utilizing PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) and maps the response into an elliptic curve group element, and final information is stored on an alliance chain; step 2, the sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, message integrity and identity verification are ensured by using Fiat-Shamir heuristic conversion, and the generated proof is sent to the edge device; and step 3, the edge device verifies the identity of the sensor device and the legality of the message by using the received pseudonym and proof, and after verification succeeds, the edge device adds the pseudonym into a used list and records a verification result into an alliance chain so as to ensure data transparency and non-tampering property. According to the invention, the security of equipment authentication is enhanced, and the method is suitable for scenes requiring high security and privacy protection, such as the industrial Internet of Things.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of industrial Internet of Things communication security, relates to a device authentication method, and specifically to the field of industrial Internet of Things communication security. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the Industrial Internet of Things, more and more devices are connected to the network for data exchange and communication. However, the existing device authentication methods mainly rely on centralized trust institutions, which have problems such as single point failure, fragile centralized trust, and vulnerability to attacks. In particular, as the scale of the network expands, traditional authentication methods cannot meet the needs of device identity authentication in large-scale, distributed environments.

[0003] Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a non-copyable function based on the hardware characteristics of the device, which can provide a unique identity for the device, making it more secure and resistant to attacks during the authentication process. However, the existing PUF technology still has problems such as data transmission security risks and low authentication efficiency in practical applications.

[0004] In order to improve the authentication efficiency and security of smart devices, alliance chain technology, as a decentralized distributed ledger, can provide a transparent, secure, and tamper-proof recording mechanism for device authentication. However, relying solely on alliance chain technology for device authentication is still unable to effectively deal with network attacks and data leaks. There is an urgent need to provide a safe and effective smart device authentication method. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the problems existing in the existing smart device authentication process, such as the fragility of the centralized trust mechanism, insufficient data transmission security, and low authentication efficiency, the present invention provides a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on the alliance chain. This method combines the decentralized recording function of the alliance chain, the uniqueness and non-replicability of PUF, and the privacy protection characteristics of zero-knowledge proof to achieve efficient authentication of device identity, enhance data privacy protection during communication, and improve the security and anti-attack capability of the authentication process.

[0006] The objective of the present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0007] A secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain, which realizes device identity authentication and secure communication through three stages: initialization stage, signature generation stage and identity authentication stage, and specifically includes the following steps:

[0008] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0009] The registration authority generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the consortium chain.

[0010] Step 2: Signature generation phase:

[0011] The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device;

[0012] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0013] The edge device uses the received pseudonym and certificate to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result in the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and immutability.

[0014] A secure and efficient authentication system for smart devices based on a consortium chain for implementing the above method includes a registration agency, a sensor device, an edge device, and a consortium chain, wherein:

[0015] The registration authority is responsible for generating a random number sequence and a challenge set, assisting the sensor device in completing identity authentication, and allocating a unique device identifier and mapping it to an elliptic curve element to ensure the uniqueness of the device identity and the integrity of the data;

[0016] The sensor device generates a response using a physical unclonable function, matches a challenge set, and securely communicates with an edge device through zero-knowledge proof to protect identity privacy;

[0017] The edge device receives the pseudonym, message and certificate sent by the sensor device, verifies the device identity and message integrity, and records the verification result on the alliance chain to ensure that the data is transparent and cannot be tampered with;

[0018] The alliance chain serves as a distributed data storage platform, records and verifies data, prevents data tampering and forgery, and improves system security.

[0019] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0020] 1. Combining PUF, hash algorithm and elliptic curve cryptography, a unique device identifier is generated and mapped to the elliptic curve group element, which enhances the anti-attack capability of device authentication and defends against physical cloning attacks and reverse engineering.

[0021] 2. Use zk-SNARKs to construct non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, so that devices can efficiently complete identity authentication without leaking sensitive information, improving the privacy and efficiency of authentication and meeting the high security requirements in distributed environments.

[0022] 3. Distributed storage and multi-party verification of device authentication information are achieved through the alliance chain, ensuring the transparency and credibility of the authentication process, providing a decentralized and secure solution for large-scale device management in the Industrial Internet of Things.

[0023] 4. Enhanced the security of device authentication, suitable for scenarios such as industrial Internet of Things that require high security and privacy protection. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] Figure 1 The flowchart is a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain.

[0025] Figure 2 This is a specific flow chart of a secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain.

[0026] Figure 3 This is the timing diagram of the initialization phase.

[0027] Figure 4 This is the timing diagram of the signature generation phase.

[0028] Figure 5 This is a timing diagram of the authentication phase. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0029] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but is not limited thereto. Any modification or equivalent replacement of the technical solution of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

[0030] The present invention provides a safe and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain. The method realizes the identity authentication and secure communication of the device through three stages: initialization stage, signature generation stage and identity authentication stage. In the initialization stage, the registration agency generates a random sequence and jointly generates a challenge set with the sensor device. The sensor device calculates the response using a physical unclonable function and maps it to an elliptic curve element, which is finally stored in the alliance chain to ensure the transparency and traceability of the data. In the signature generation stage, the sensor device independently generates a signature based on its pseudonym, message and PUF response, and generates a non-interactive proof through Fiat-Shamir transformation to ensure the integrity and identity authentication of the message. Finally, in the identity authentication stage, the edge device uses the received pseudonym, message and proof to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message, and records the verification result in the alliance chain to ensure the transparency and non-tamperability of the data.

[0031] like Figure 1 and Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps include:

[0032] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0033] This phase is completed by the registration agency and the sensor device. The registration agency generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the alliance chain. The timing diagram of the initialization phase is shown in the figure below. Figure 3 shown.

[0034] Step 11: Challenge set generation:

[0035] The registration authority selects n random numbers to form a random number sequence C = (C1, C2, ..., C n ), and sends C as a challenge set to the sensor.

[0036] Step 1 and 2: Sensor response calculation:

[0037] After receiving the challenge set C, the sensor uses PUF to calculate the response r i , and get the response set r = (r1, r2, ..., r n ).

[0038] Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element:

[0039] The sensor sends each PUF generated response r i Use hashing algorithm to map to elliptic curve group element: K i =H(r i ), and use the result K i Compute point P on the elliptic curvei =K i G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, and then P i Sent to the registration authority.

[0040] Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store:

[0041] The registration authority shall i Calculate pseudonym information AID i , get the pseudonym set AID = (AID1, AID2, ..., AID n ), and the information {ID Vi ,AID,P i} is stored in a secure storage area, where is the identity information of each sensor device, AID is the pseudonym set corresponding to the sensor device, P i It is AID i The corresponding elliptic curve point is then forwarded to the associated sensor using the pseudonym set AID. At the same time, the elliptic curve group element P i Information is stored in the consortium chain to ensure the transparency and verifiability of the data.

[0042] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0043] The sensor stores the received pseudonym set AID and the local challenge set C in a secure storage area.

[0044] Step 2: Signature generation phase:

[0045] This phase is completed independently by the sensor device. The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device. The timing diagram of the signature generation phase is shown in Figure 4 shown.

[0046] Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof:

[0047] The sensor generates a challenge value e and calculates a response value y: First, the sensor selects a security modulus N and an unused pseudonym AID i ,calculate and disclose v. Then, the sensor generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN, and concatenate x, v, and the message value M to be verified to generate the challenge value e = H(x||v||M), where H is a cryptographically secure hash function. After that, the sensor calculates the response value

[0048] Step 22: Transmit message and proof:

[0049] The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

[0050] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0051] This phase is completed independently by the edge device. The edge device uses the received pseudonym and proof to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result to the alliance chain to ensure data transparency and immutability. The timing diagram of the identity verification phase is shown in the figure below. Figure 5 shown.

[0052] Step 31: Pseudonym Verification:

[0053] The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the alliance chain? If the pseudonym has been used, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, proceed to step 32.

[0054] Step 32: Verify zero-knowledge proof:

[0055] The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e mod N and challenge value e'=H(x'|v|M'), then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equation holds, proceed to step 33 and the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0056] Step 33: Record verification results:

[0057] If the authentication is successful, the edge device will i It is added to the used list and recorded in the consortium chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; if the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

[0058] The present invention also provides a smart device secure and efficient authentication system based on a consortium chain for implementing the above method, the system comprising a registration agency, a sensor device, an edge device and a consortium chain, wherein:

[0059] The registration authority is the core control node of the system, responsible for generating random number sequences and challenge sets. Its main responsibility is to work with sensor devices during the system initialization phase to generate basic data for identity authentication. As a trust root, the registration authority assigns a unique identifier to each sensor device and maps it to an elliptic curve element to ensure the uniqueness of the device identity and the integrity of the data.

[0060] The sensor device is a key node for data collection and processing. It uses a physical unclonable function to generate a unique response to match a predetermined set of challenges. In the signature generation phase, the sensor device generates a pseudonym and calculates a non-interactive proof to ensure the integrity of the message and the authentication of the device identity. In this process, the sensor device uses zero-knowledge proof technology to communicate securely with the edge device to protect the privacy of identity information.

[0061] The edge device is responsible for receiving the pseudonym, message and non-interactive proof sent by the sensor device during the authentication process, and performs authentication using the data in the alliance chain. By comparing the pseudonym and zero-knowledge proof, the edge device confirms the identity of the sensor device and the integrity of the message, and records the verification results on the alliance chain to ensure the transparency and immutability of the data.

[0062] The consortium chain in this method acts as a distributed, tamper-proof data storage platform to record all pseudonyms, elliptic curve elements and verification results. It not only provides the ability of public verification, but also prevents tampering and forgery of data during transmission by enhancing the overall security of the system.

[0063] Example:

[0064] In order to better illustrate the implementation process of the present invention, the following numerical example is given through the identity authentication of a smart sensor device in an industrial Internet of Things environment. The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0065] Step 1: Initialization phase:

[0066] Step 11: Challenge set generation:

[0067] Assume that the registration authority generates a random challenge value:

[0068] C1=11010101101000111010110010111100101010110010101100101110111001

[0070] And send the challenge value to the sensor device.

[0071] Step 1 and 2: Sensor response calculation:

[0072] After receiving the challenge value, the sensor device uses the physical unclonable function to calculate C1 and generate the corresponding response value r1:

[0073] r1=PUF(C1)=0111000010011011010011111100111000101111110110111010101100011

[0074] Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element:

[0075] Each response value r1 is hashed and mapped to an elliptic curve group element. Assuming the elliptic curve generator is G, the hash operation H converts the response value r1 into an element K1:

[0076] K1=H(r1)=d11e56df51afb31b483d831289c348ebe0d2897b7ba91f6a8b73a111a5248dca

[0077] Generate a point P1=K1·G on the elliptic curve for K1. Assuming G is a point (2,3) on the elliptic curve, we can calculate:

[0078] P1=(18917398067340506345137914529686948747050858794009997185804415506896096232130 0,283760971010107595177068717945304231205762881910149957787066232603441443481950)

[0079] Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store:

[0080] The registration authority generates the pseudonym AID1 based on the received P1 value:

[0081] AID1=ed7d983744c4a089fbedd5f82172b389d2fed973db1a28c9daa8025679dbd8ec

[0082] And the information {ID V1 ,AID1,P1} is stored in a secure storage area, and then the pseudonym AID1 is forwarded to the associated sensor. At the same time, the elliptic curve group element P1 information is stored in the alliance chain to ensure the transparency and verifiability of the data.

[0083] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0084] The sensor stores the received pseudonym AID1 list and the local challenge sequence C in a secure storage area.

[0085] Step 2: Signature generation phase

[0086] Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value:

[0087] The sensor stores the received pseudonym AID1 and the local challenge value C in a secure storage area.

[0088] Step 2: Signature generation phase

[0089] Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof:

[0090] The sensor selects a safety module N:

[0091] N=3157410750598435765977254268084123460611250916589237335909561901749767750915

[0093] calculate And make v public:

[0094] v=17686794539748756519311499251672453297113953217513008017795466288332165131661

[0096] The sensor then generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN:

[0097] ρ=14226760730585017878669889984793374049423355585462175182468397031929317015435

[0099] x=ρ 2 modN=22764840084337648721943153717646482018195936207597438869132503250776913771600

[0101] And concatenate x, v and the message value M to be verified to generate the challenge value e=H(x||v||M):

[0102] M=749282801977853085

[0103] e=H(x||v||M)=9616cbebce2520a6c2a5d0763dda1560e7ef7621a079be1a6443d408cfcfd0ba

[0104] Where H is a cryptographically secure hash function. Afterwards, the sensor calculates the response value y = ρ × AID1 e modN:

[0105] y=ρ×AID1 e modN=20747925581165124016469101175890185046753373088608554758111458588471681221980

[0106] Step 22: Transmit message and proof:

[0107] The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

[0108] Step 3: Identity verification phase:

[0109] Step 31: Pseudonym Verification:

[0110] The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the alliance chain? If the pseudonym has been used, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, proceed to step 32.

[0111] Step 32: Verify zero-knowledge proof:

[0112] The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e modN and challenge value e'=H(x'|v|M'):

[0113] x'=y 2 ×v -e modN=22764840084337648721943153717646482018195936207597438869132503250776913771600

[0114] e'=H(x'|v|M')=9616cbebce2520a6c2a5d0763dda1560e7ef7621a079be1a6443d408cfcfd0ba

[0115] Then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equality is established, proceed to step 33 and the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0116] Step 33: Record verification results:

[0117] If the verification is successful, the edge device adds AID1 to the used list and records it in the alliance chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; if the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

Claims

1. A secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain, characterized in that The method comprises the following steps: Step 1: Initialization phase: The registration authority generates a challenge set and sends it to the sensor device. The sensor device uses PUF to calculate the response and maps it to an elliptic curve group element. The final information is stored on the consortium chain. Step 2: Signature generation phase The sensor device generates a signature and constructs a zero-knowledge proof, ensures message integrity and authentication by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic transformation, and sends the generated proof to the edge device; Step 3: Identity verification phase: The edge device uses the received pseudonym and certificate to verify the identity of the sensor device and the legitimacy of the message. After successful verification, the edge device adds the pseudonym to the used list and records the verification result in the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and immutability.

2. According to claim 1, the method for secure and efficient authentication of smart devices based on alliance chain is characterized in that The specific steps of step one are as follows: Step 11: Challenge set generation: The registration authority selects n random numbers to form a random number sequence C = (C1, C2, ..., C n ), and send C as a challenge set to the sensor; Step 1 and 2: Sensor response calculation: After receiving the challenge set C, the sensor uses PUF to calculate the response r i , and get the response set r = (r1, r2, ..., r n ); Step 13: Map the key to the elliptic curve group element: The sensor sends each PUF generated response r i Use hashing algorithm to map to elliptic curve group element: K i =H(r i ), and use the result K i Compute point P on the elliptic curve i =K i G, where G is the base point of the elliptic curve, and then P i Send to the registration authority; Step 14: Generate pseudonyms and store: The registration authority shall, based on the received P i Calculate pseudonym information AID i , get the pseudonym set AID = (AID1, AID2, ..., AID n ) and the information Stored in a secure storage area, where is the identity information of each sensor device, AID is the pseudonym set corresponding to the sensor device, P i It is AID i The corresponding elliptic curve point, and then forward the pseudonym set AID to the associated sensor, and at the same time, the elliptic curve group element P i Information is stored in the consortium chain to ensure data transparency and verifiability; Step 15: Store pseudonym and challenge value: The sensor stores the received pseudonym set AID and the local challenge set C in a secure storage area.

3. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of step 2 are as follows: Step 21: Generate a signature and construct a zero-knowledge proof: The sensor generates a challenge value e and calculates a response value y; Step 22: Transmit message and proof: The sensor sends the message {AID i ,y,e,M} is sent to the edge device, where y is the zero-knowledge proof generated by the sensor.

4. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 3 is characterized in that The specific steps of step 21 are as follows: First, the sensor selects a security modulus N and an unused pseudonym AID i ,calculate and disclose v; then, the sensor generates a random number And calculate the commitment value x = ρ 2 modN, and concatenate x, v, and the message value M to be verified to generate a challenge value e = H(x||v‖M), where H is a cryptographically secure hash function; then, the sensor calculates the response value 5. The secure and efficient authentication method for smart devices based on alliance chain according to claim 1 is characterized in that The specific steps of step three are as follows: Step 31: Pseudonym Verification: The edge device checks the received pseudonymous AID i Is it in the used list of the alliance chain? If the pseudonym has been used, the edge device will reject the message; otherwise, proceed to step 32; Step 32: Verify zero-knowledge proof: The edge device uses the received message {y,e,M} to recalculate the committed value x'=y 2 ×v -e modN and challenge value e'=H(x'|v|M'), then check whether e' is equal to e. If the equation holds, proceed to step 33 and the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails; Step 33: Record verification results: If the authentication is successful, the edge device will i Add to the used list and record in the alliance chain to ensure that the record cannot be tampered with; If the verification fails, the edge device rejects the message.

6. A smart device secure and efficient authentication system based on alliance chain that implements the method described in any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The system includes a registration agency, a sensor device, an edge device, and a consortium chain, wherein: The registration authority is responsible for generating a random number sequence and a challenge set, assisting the sensor device in completing identity authentication, and allocating a unique device identifier and mapping it to an elliptic curve element to ensure the uniqueness of the device identity and the integrity of the data; The sensor device generates a response using a physical unclonable function, matches a challenge set, and securely communicates with an edge device through zero-knowledge proof to protect identity privacy; The edge device receives the pseudonym, message and certificate sent by the sensor device, verifies the device identity and message integrity, and records the verification result on the alliance chain to ensure that the data is transparent and cannot be tampered with; The alliance chain serves as a distributed data storage platform, records and verifies data, prevents data tampering and forgery, and improves system security.

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