Email Security Analysis

By revealing hidden qualities in emails and using CSS and HTML-style tags to make them visible, the problem of difficult identification of email filtering systems in the prior art is solved, and the accuracy and user security of email filtering are improved.

CN113518987BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-15MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LLC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202080017951.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2019-03-01
Filing Date
2020-02-24
Publication Date
2024-11-15
Estimated Expiration
2040-02-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing email filtering system cannot perfectly identify spam and malicious emails, resulting in benign emails being misclassified or malicious emails not being discovered in time, increasing the risks to users and systems.

Method used

Help users quickly identify suspiciousness of emails by identifying and changing hidden traits in cascading style sheets (CSS) and HTML-style tags, including exposing hidden traits using additional analytics such as links or virus analysis. .

Benefits of technology

Effectively help users identify and avoid fraudulent emails, improve the accuracy of email filtering, reduce misclassification and misdiagnosis, and educate users to identify potential dangerous characteristics.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The technology described herein visibly describes hidden message characteristics to help users determine whether an email is authentic or fraudulent. Hidden message characteristics are revealed by identifying and changing attributes that prevent the hidden characteristics from being displayed in the drawn message. Junk messages, phishing messages, and messages that include or link to malicious programs (e.g., malware, ransomware) are examples of harmful messages that may harm recipients. These messages typically rely on deception to filter systems via email and trick users into taking action on the content in the message. Deception typically involves including hidden characteristics in a message that fools an automatic filtering system. The technology described herein shows visible characteristics to users by including visible characteristics in a drawn version of the message.
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Description

Background Art

[0001] Email is a widely used communication tool that provides a fast and inexpensive way of communication between individuals and groups. Spam emails, phishing emails, and emails that include or link to malicious programs (e.g., malware, ransomware) pose an increasing risk to users, companies, and computing devices. Efforts have been made by users to use filtering systems to identify harmful and / or malicious emails before the emails are received. The filtering system can classify emails using natural language processing or other mechanisms. Currently, no email filtering system is perfect. Some benign emails are misclassified as junk, while other junk emails arrive in the user's inbox. When an email is classified as benign, there is a small possibility that the email is actually malicious. When an email is classified as malicious, there is a small possibility that the email is actually benign. In an enterprise environment, some emails are isolated instead of delivering the email to a junk folder. Emails in the quarantine folder can be evaluated by an administrator or other person. However, this is usually a manual evaluation, which is time-consuming and error-prone. Summary of the invention

[0002] This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described in the Detailed Description below. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used alone as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

[0003] The technology described herein visibly depicts hidden message characteristics to help users determine whether an email is authentic or fraudulent. Hidden message characteristics are revealed by identifying and changing attributes (e.g., Cascading Style Sheets ("CSS") and HTML style tags) that prevent the hidden characteristics from being displayed in the rendered message. Additional analysis, such as link or virus analysis, can be provided to assist the user. Identifying the hidden characteristics helps an expert quickly determine that an email contains suspicious characteristics by only viewing the modified email. The technology can also help everyday users avoid becoming victims of fraud. Over time, the use of the technology described herein can educate users by helping them identify hidden characteristics of emails that should be avoided.

[0004] Electronic messages or documents, including short message service (SMS), multimedia message service (MMS), instant messaging (IM), email, social network messages, web pages, and even ordinary electronic documents, are susceptible to manipulation that may cause the message to harm the recipient. Spam messages, phishing messages, and messages containing or linked to malicious programs (e.g., malware, ransomware) are examples of harmful messages that may harm the recipient. These messages often rely on deception to filter systems via email and trick users into taking action on the content in the message. Deception often involves including hidden features in the message that fool the automatic filtering system. If these hidden features are visible to the user, the deceptive nature of the message will be obvious. The technology described herein shows visible features to the user by including the visible features in the drawn version of the message. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0005] Aspects of the present invention are described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0006] Figure 1 is a block diagram of an example operating environment suitable for implementing aspects of the technology;

[0007] Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating a message with hidden content hidden when the message appears according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0008] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating a message having hidden content visible when the message appears in accordance with aspects of the technology described herein; in accordance with aspects of the technology described herein;

[0009] Figure 4 is a diagram illustrating a URL verification report according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0010] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating counterfeit reporting according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0011] Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating a subject line inspection report according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0012] Figure 7 is a diagram illustrating an email content report according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0013] Figure 8 is a diagram illustrating a message having hidden content visible when the message appears according to aspects of the technology described herein; according to aspects of the technology described herein;

[0014] Figures 9 to 11A flow chart depicting a method for revealing hidden message attributes according to aspects of the present technology; and

[0015] Fig.12 is a block diagram of an exemplary computing environment suitable for implementing aspects of the present technology. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0016] The subject matter of aspects of the present technology is specifically described herein to meet statutory requirements. However, the description itself is not intended to limit the scope of this patent. On the contrary, the inventors have contemplated that the claimed subject matter may also be implemented in other ways to include different steps or combinations of steps similar to the steps described in this document in combination with other existing or future technologies. In addition, although the terms "step" and / or "frame" may be used herein to imply different elements of the method employed, these terms should not be interpreted as implying any particular order among or between the various steps disclosed herein, unless and except when the order of the individual steps is explicitly described.

[0017] The technology described herein visibly depicts hidden message characteristics to help users determine whether an email is authentic or fraudulent. Hidden message characteristics are revealed by identifying and changing attributes (e.g., Cascading Style Sheets ("CSS") and HTML style tags) that prevent the hidden characteristics from being displayed in the drawn message. Additional analysis can be provided to expose additional hidden characteristics, such as link or virus analysis. Identifying hidden characteristics helps experts quickly determine that an email contains suspicious characteristics by only viewing the modified email. The technology can also help everyday users avoid becoming victims of fraud. Over time, the use of the technology described herein can educate users by helping them identify hidden characteristics of emails that should be avoided.

[0018] Electronic messages or documents, including short message service (SMS), multimedia message service (MMS), instant messaging (IM), email, social network messages, web pages, and even ordinary electronic documents, are susceptible to manipulation that may cause the message to harm the recipient. Spam messages, phishing messages, and messages that include or link to malicious programs (e.g., malware, ransomware) are examples of harmful messages that may harm the recipient. These messages often rely on deception to filter systems via email and trick users into taking action on the content in the message. Deception often involves including hidden features in the message encoding that fool automatic filtering systems. If these hidden features are visible to the user, the deceptive nature of the message will be obvious. The technology described herein shows the hidden features to the user by including them in the drawn version of the message.

[0019] Hidden features include hidden content. In order to prevent detection by the filtering system, but to fool the filtering system, the sender can change the message encoding to include content (e.g., words, letters, symbols) in the body text, subject line text, link descriptions, email addresses, and other parts that are not visible to the user when drawn. For example, some filters look at keywords or word strings within the message content to classify the message as spam. The sender hides these words or character strings from the filter by including words or characters between the letters of the words to prevent the filter from identifying the words in the message content. Styles are used to make these extra symbols or words invisible to the user, so the drawn message text looks normal to the user. The present technology identifies hidden content within the message encoding and changes the style associated with the hidden content to make the hidden content visible to the user. Hidden content can also be displayed using visible features, which indicate that it was previously hidden. For example, hidden content can be displayed using strikethrough, a color different from other text, a font different from other text, a different font size, etc.

[0020] Hidden features can also include deceptive links and attachments. These hidden features can be exposed by presenting link analysis or document analysis to the user.

[0021] The techniques described herein can be automatically applied to emails in a junk folder or quarantine folder. Alternatively, a "show hidden traits" button can trigger a view of the hidden traits. The hidden traits button can activate a view of the hidden traits for the entire message or only a portion of the message. For example, an email message can have different buttons associated with the message body, subject line, address line(s), etc.

[0022] A message includes a message encoding. The message encoding includes message content and style instructions. Drawing the message encoding results in drawn content. The drawn content is the content that appears when the message is output for display. The message encoding may include style instructions that are not drawn, but define how the message content appears when drawn. The message content includes text or images that are visible to the user if associated with appropriate style instructions when drawn. Hidden content is message content (e.g., text, image) associated with style instructions that obscure its visibility to the user when drawn. Obscure visibility occurs when the text color matches or nearly matches the background color, when the text font is smaller than adjacent text by more than a threshold percentage, when the text font is below a threshold size, and the like. Style instructions are not hidden content because they are not intended to appear in the drawn content. Hidden content is a characteristic of a hidden quality in a message.

[0023] After briefly describing an overview of various aspects of the technology described herein, an exemplary operating environment in which aspects of the technology described herein can be implemented is described below. Figure 1 , a block diagram of an operating environment 100 in which some aspects of the present disclosure can be adopted is provided. It should be understood that this and other arrangements described herein are set forth only as examples. Other arrangements and elements (e.g., machines, interfaces, functions, groups of orders and functions, etc.) can be used in addition to or in place of those shown, and for clarity, some elements can be completely omitted. In addition, many elements described herein are functional entities, which can be implemented as discrete or distributed components or in combination with other components, and can be implemented in any suitable combination and position. The various functions described herein as being performed by entities can be implemented by hardware, firmware and / or software. For example, some functions can be implemented by a processor that executes instructions stored in a memory. In addition, these components, the functions performed by these components, or the services implemented by these components can be implemented at a suitable (multiple) abstraction layer (such as an operating system layer, an application layer, a hardware layer, etc. of a (multiple) computing system). Alternatively or additionally, the functions of these components and / or the aspects of the technology described herein can be performed at least in part by one or more hardware logic components. For example, but not limitation, illustrative types of hardware logic components that may be used include field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), application specific standard products (ASSPs), systems on a chip (SOCs), complex programmable logic devices (CPLDs), etc. Additionally, although functionality is described herein with respect to specific components shown in operating environment 100, it is contemplated that the functionality of these components may be shared or distributed across other components in some aspects.

[0024] Among other components not shown, operating environment 100 includes a hidden trait exposure system 115 that receives a message, such as email 110, analyzes the message to identify hidden traits, and generates a CSS box tree 150 with a changed message encoding that makes the hidden traits visible within a drawn message 151. It should be understood that Figure 1 The illustrated operating environment 100 is an example of one suitable operating environment. Figure 1 Each of the systems shown can be implemented via any type of computing device, such as in conjunction with Fig.12 The computing device 1200 described herein can communicate with each other via a network, which can include, but is not limited to, a local area network (LAN) and / or a wide area network (WAN). In an exemplary implementation, the WAN includes the Internet and / or a cellular network, as well as any of a variety of possible public and / or private networks.

[0025] Email 110 is one type of message that can be analyzed by hidden trait exposure system 115. Aspects of the technology described herein are not limited to use with email. Hidden trait exposure system 115 can analyze short message service (SMS) messages, multimedia message service (MMS) messages, instant message (IM) messages, emails, social network messages, web pages, ordinary electronic documents, etc. Although not limited to emails, emails will be used as exemplary messages throughout. Figures 1 to 8 Description of where hidden qualities can be exposed by the techniques described herein.

[0026] The email 110 includes a title 111, a body 112, and other content 113. The title 111 includes routing information for the email 110. The routing information may include a sender, a recipient, a date, and a subject. The title includes a key: value pair. Some of the most commonly used key: value pairs include, start, end, copy (cc), blind copy (bcc), date, and subject headers. The title information also includes routing information for the email. The routing information may include a send timestamp and a receive timestamp for all mail transfer agents (MTAs) that have received and sent messages. In other words, any time a message is passed from one user to another (e.g., when a message is sent or forwarded), the message is date / time stamped by the MTA. Some title information may be displayed to the user via an email program. Different email clients may choose to display key fields and / or different values ​​within a field. For example, the "start" and "subject" fields are usually displayed.

[0027] The body of an email 112 is the main part of an email message. It contains the text and images of the message. Although some email standards may not distinguish between the body and the title, as used herein, the body of an email is different from its title 111. A message may contain multiple versions of the same text, for example, with and without the format of a hypertext markup language (HTML). In one aspect, the body is encoded according to the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) type standard.

[0028] Other content 113 may include attachments or other content not included in title 111 or body 112. Attachments may include different types of files, including images, audio, documents, spreadsheets, presentations, and the like.

[0029] Hidden trait exposure system 115 identifies hidden traits in a message and displays the hidden traits to a user. Hidden trait exposure system 115 includes MIME HTML presentation parser 120, attachment analysis component 130, title analysis component 132, link analysis component 134, subject line analysis component 136, body text analysis component 138, hidden content converter 140, watch list 142, and fake engine 144. Hidden trait exposure system 115 generates CSS box tree 150, which can be processed by a computing device to generate a drawn message 152.

[0030] The MIME HTML presentation parser 120 receives the email 110 and generates a CSS box tree 150. The CSS box tree 150 includes a series of CSS boxes. Each CSS box may have a display size property and contain a content element, such as text. Each CSS box may have a CSS display style that controls how the text or other content element is displayed. The presentation parser 120 calls other components of the hidden feature exposure system 115 to show the hidden features of the email 110 so that the hidden features are visible within the drawn message 152. The presentation parser 120 includes an HTML DOM (Document Object Model) parser 122, a CSS parser 124, and a rendering engine 126.

[0031] HTML DOM parser 122 reads the HTML code of email 110 and builds DOM. DOM is a tree structure, and each node in the structure is an object representing a part of the email content. Each branch of the tree ends with a node, and each node contains an object. DOM methods allow programmatic access to the tree; using them, people can change the structure, style or content of the email. In particular, CSS parser 124 and rendering engine 126 can modify DOM. The HTML encoding in the email can include the email title and body text. In some emails, the HTML of the email can include style instructions for the body text, but CSS is more commonly used to assign style instructions. HTML DOM parser 122 can send body text, title text and style to other components, such as hidden content converter 140 for analysis.

[0032] CSS parser 124 parses CSS styles within email 110. CSS styles can be inline, embedded, or linked. CSS styles within emails are an example of style instructions. CSS styles are associated with CSS boxes.

[0033] The rendering engine 126 can execute Java code associated with the email 110. The Java code can change the CSS styles associated with different elements by changing the styles associated with a single CSS box. Once the HTML DOM parser 122, the CSS parser 124, and the rendering engine 126 have completed their tasks, a preliminary CSS box tree is constructed (not shown). If there is hidden content in the message, the preliminary CSS box tree will not display the hidden content. The preliminary CSS box tree includes CSS boxes with styles specified by the email sender. In one aspect, the preliminary CSS box tree is constructed to fully evaluate the email 110 for hidden qualities. For example, since the CSS styles associated with different elements may change through the parsing process, it is advisable to fully parse the message and then evaluate the results for hidden qualities. The preliminary CSS box tree is processed by one or more other components in the system to identify hidden qualities and generate a CSS box tree 150, which will display the identified hidden qualities. In addition, other hidden qualities can be displayed in a report that is displayed together with the message in an interface generated separately from the CSS box tree 150. Thus, hidden traits can be displayed by modifying the styles associated with the CSS box or displayed in a separate report.

[0034] The attachment analysis component 130 analyzes files attached to messages for hidden traits, such as viruses. The attachment analysis may include scanning the attachment for viruses and then presenting the scan results in a report. The report may warn of viruses or indicate that no viruses were found.

[0035] The title analysis component 132 can identify suspicious character scripts mixed in the title and visually expose it if present.

[0036] The header analysis component 132 can identify spoofing in the header and visually expose it if present. Spoofing occurs when a sender attempts to fool a recipient into thinking that a message is from an entity other than the sender. The header analysis component 132 can use a spoofing engine 144 to detect spoofing.

[0037] The title analysis component 132 can check the consistency of the P1 address and the P2 address, and visually describe any consistency issues. An email includes both a P1 from address and a P2 from address. The P1 address is the address that email clients and other computers use to route email messages. The P2 address is the address shown to the user on the "from" box of an email. Ideally, the P2 address and the P1 address should be consistent. When they are inconsistent, the P1 address can be displayed together with the P2 address and an explanation of the inconsistency. For example, if the P1 address is help@microsoft.com (possibly with additional IP address information) and the P2 address is help@microsoft.com, then the P1 and P2 addresses are consistent. If the addresses of P1 and P2 differ by only one letter, the two are inconsistent.

[0038] The header analysis component 132 can check the consistency of the sender address and the reply address. The sender address and the reply address can be specified separately in the email. As with the P1 and P2 addresses, inconsistencies may indicate junk email. Any inconsistencies can be displayed visually, for example, by displaying the reply address with an explanation next to the "from" address.

[0039] The header analysis component 132 can check for spoofing of the sender address. The header analysis component 132 can use the spoofing engine 144 to detect sender spoofing.

[0040] The header analysis component 132 can reveal the email authentication status. Emails can be authenticated using a variety of different methods, such as SPF (Sender Policy Framework), DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail), and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). These email authentication standards are in addition to SMTP (the basic protocol for sending emails), and most modern email systems support them.

[0041] The header analysis component 132 can reveal the sender client IP address (ie, received from address) and display it in a map showing the sender IP geographic location and location reputation and reputation of the client IP address. The client IP is the IP address of the device that sent the email.

[0042] The header analysis component 132 can reveal the IP address connected in the header and display the geographic location associated with the client IP address on a map. The map shows the sender's client IP geographic location and the reputation of the location. The map can also show an indication of the reputation of the IP. The connected IP address is the last device IP linked to the receiving email server. The connected IP address is associated with a routing station (such as a mail server) between the original starting IP address and the recipient IP address. As described above, these may be forged. If a known sender of an email jumps from an IP location that is different from a previously stable email sending path, it is highly suspicious. By showing IP addresses outside the stable email sending path in different colors, this jumping activity can be visually highlighted.

[0043] The header analysis component 132 can reveal whether the sender is a known sender or an unknown sender. A known sender can be in an address book for a user, a company, or an address that the user has previously sent emails to. The header analysis component 132 will reveal if the sender is sending from a new client IP or if it is a new connection IP for a known sender.

[0044] The header analysis component 132 can determine whether the email was sent from a known domain. Different factors can be used to determine whether the domain is known. If the inbox has not received emails from the domain before, the domain may be unknown. If the entity (such as, a company associated with the email address) has not received emails from the domain before, the domain may be unknown. If the email was sent from an unknown domain, the header analysis component 132 can report.

[0045] The link analysis component 134 analyzes the links in the message for hidden qualities.

[0046] The link analysis component 134 can compare the linked URL with multiple available URL blocking agents to see if it is listed as a bad URL. If the URL is on the blocking list, a warning message can be provided. In addition to the warning, the link analysis component 134 can display the redirect URL (if any) and check the domain name query service (whois) status pointing to the redirect URL and expose it visually.

[0047] The link analysis component 134 can check for spoofing in the URL and expose it visually. The link analysis component 134 can check the IP reputation of the URL host and expose it visually in a report or other indication. If the link is in URL format, the link analysis component 134 can determine whether the URL is consistent with the link text and expose it visually in the message.

[0048] The link analysis component 134 can display the URL text so that the user can notice any strange formatting, IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) shenanigans, and visually expose shenanigans or formatting issues.

[0049] The link analysis component 134 can apply URL machine learning prediction and show the results. Machine learning can take many forms. In one aspect, a classification mechanism is used to determine whether a URL is safe. Machine learning can be trained using manually labeled "safe" URLs and "unsafe" URLs.

[0050] The subject line analysis component 136 analyzes the subject line for various characteristics that may indicate that the email is spam. In one aspect, the subject line analysis component 136 can perform a similarity analysis using natural language processing to determine whether the subject line content is similar to subject lines in previously identified spam emails. The subject line analysis component 136 can also check for spoofing using the spoofing engine 144. A notification can be provided to alert the user that the subject line is similar to a subject line in a spam email.

[0051] The body text analysis component 138 analyzes the message body for hidden qualities that may indicate that the email is spam. The body text analysis component 138 can identify suspicious character script mixes, such as mixing Latin characters and Cyrillic characters, mixing letters from different languages ​​or different alphabet sets. The body text analysis component 138 can reveal the script mix by showing Latin characters in one color and Cyrillic characters in another color.

[0052] The body text analysis component 138 can check for impersonation and expose it visually through reporting.In one aspect, entities listed in the body text of a message that do not match an entity associated with the sender of the message are visually distinguished to highlight the difference.

[0053] The body analysis component 138 can check the content risk level by identifying requests known to be made by spammers, such as requests for credential changes, requests for funds transfers, requests for ransom, requests for users to download files, requests for users to access attachments, etc. When text making these types of requests is included in the body text, a warning can be provided, especially when other threats are shown. The text containing the request can also be visually highlighted in a different color, font size, etc.

[0054] The body text analysis component 138 can generate a report indicating the frequency of similar content observed in other emails. If the email contains content similar to known bad emails, then the report can indicate that the email is bad. If the body content is similar to benign bulk emails with different URL domains, then the report can indicate that the email is bad.

[0055] The body text analysis component 138 can determine and report that the text is actually an image. Spammers use images to display text because some junk email filters may not be able to analyze images. Text that may raise red flags to spam filters can be avoided by being located in an image. Any images in the message can be exposed by including a visible frame or border around the image.

[0056] Hidden content converter 140 identifies hidden text within the message text, and changes the style instructions associated with the hidden text so that when the message is output for display, the hidden text is visible. Hidden text is text that is invisible to the user when the message is output for display to the user. Text can be hidden in a variety of different ways, all of which can be identified by hidden content converter 140. For example, text can be associated with a small size font or a zero size font, the text color can match or be similar to the background color, the text can be blocked by an image, and the text can be marked as not using CSS display, etc. The similar color between the background and the text can be determined by determining the color distance and comparing the color distance with a threshold. Similarly, the small font size can be any font that is less than a specified threshold size.

[0057] Once the hidden text is identified, the display characteristics of the text drawn as hidden are changed by the hidden content converter 140 to make the text visible. For example, the font size can be increased to a size similar to other text in the message. Although the text size can match the size of nearby text, additional characteristics of the hidden text can be changed to indicate that it has been modified by the hidden content converter 140. For example, the converted text can be displayed with a strikethrough, a different color, italics, bold, highlighted with a different background color, or otherwise distinguished from other text that has not been converted.

[0058] Text can be transformed by associating the hidden text with different style instructions. Style instructions can take many forms. For example, style instructions for text can be provided through HTML attributes, CSS styles, and other means. Text can be transformed by replacing the original style instructions with new style instructions that draw the text as visible.

[0059] The impersonation engine 144 identifies message content (e.g., a substring within a suspicious string) that is visually similar to a famous, well-known, or otherwise legitimate mark, person, institution, or entity (hereinafter referred to as a "known entity") listed in the watch list 142. The impersonation engine 144 may use rules and / or artificial intelligence methods to identify messages or message content that attempt to impersonate a famous entity. For example, a message may include content that claims to be from a known entity, but the "from" email address does not match a known email address associated with the known entity. The impersonation engine 144 may include techniques for identifying known entities within the message content, despite the sender's attempt to obfuscate the known entity within the message encoding. For example, the sender may insert, delete, or replace some characters of the known entity, for example, replacing characters of legitimate text with Unicode characters that look visually similar to the original characters; prefixing, suffixing, including, or otherwise mixing legitimate text with other characters; and / or mixing the aforementioned impersonation methods. Substituting letters prevents the impersonation engine 144 from directly matching known entities. However, the counterfeit engine 144 can find those strings that, when drawn, resemble known entities, but may have characters added, deleted, or replaced. For example, in the first pass, any string containing "Microsoft" can be used as an example of exact inclusion. In the second pass, suspicious strings (such as "Microoooosoft", or "Microsoft") will be detected as instances of ambiguous inclusion, which can indicate impersonation.

[0060] When impersonation is detected, the user may be notified of the suspected impersonation through reporting as described elsewhere.

[0061] The operation of the hidden trait exposure system 115 is Figure 2-Figure 8 is shown in the figure. Figure 2 An example message 200 is shown with hidden features not displayed. The message includes a header portion 212, which includes a "to" line, a "from" line, a "cc" line, and a subject line. Security analysis 214 indicates that the message is from a trusted source. Body text 216 explains that Office 365 blocked a spam email, which can be reviewed by pressing a "review email" button 218. Figure 3-Figure 7 An additional interface that reveals the hidden nature of message 200 is shown.

[0062] Figure 3A message 200 with hidden text is shown in the updated body 316. It can be seen that the numbers 1 and 2 are inserted between words throughout the text to fool the spam filter. Previously, these numbers were hidden. The style associated with the hidden text is changed by the hidden trait exposure system 115 to make it visible. In this example, the hidden text is shown in a different color (yellow) than the adjacent text and is shown with a strikethrough to indicate that its visibility is caused by the hidden trait exposure system 115.

[0063] Figure 4 The hidden nature of the review button 218 is exposed through the URL verification report 400. As can be seen, the URL verification report 400 shows the linked URL 410 and the redirect URL 412 to which the user is redirected when the linked URL 410 is selected. The verification report 400 also provides a fake guide 414 and an indication that the URL is on one or more blacklists.

[0064] Figure 5 An impersonation report 500 is shown, such as may be generated by the impersonation engine 144. The impersonation report shows that the language script mixing occurs concurrently with other aspects of the report 512. The summary 510 indicates that the reply email address is different than the sender address.

[0065] Figure 6 A subject line inspection report 600 is shown, such as may be generated by subject line analysis component 136. Subject line inspection report 600 shows that requests to verify your email address are often found in junk emails.

[0066] Figure 7 An email content report 700 is shown, such as may be generated by the body text analysis component 138. The email content report 700 mentions that the content includes a fake security prompt 712. The content report 700 also indicates that the email is from a trusted sender 714. Hidden text explanation 716 explains that hidden text was discovered and is now shown in orange. In the impersonation report 718, it is indicated that the body email impersonates Office 365. Finally, a note 720 explains that the email impersonates the brand Microsoft, but is not from Microsoft.

[0067] Figure 8 8 is an example of a message 800 with exposed hidden text. The message includes a typical title 812 and a body 816. As can be seen, the body 816 includes text with a series of question marks in diamond-shaped boxes between words and letters. These question marks represent previously hidden qualities that are exposed by the techniques described herein. Exposing the hidden text can easily determine that this is a spam email.

[0068] Now go to Fig. 9 , a method 900 for revealing a hidden message quality of an electronic message is depicted. The method 900 may be performed by the hidden quality exposure system 115 and produce Figures 3 to 8 The results are shown.

[0069] At step 910, a message including a message encoding is received, the message encoding including text and style instructions defining display characteristics for the text. For example, the message may be an email in HTML format. However, implementation of the technology described herein is not limited to emails or HTML formatted emails.

[0070] At step 920 , the message encoding is parsed to construct a plurality of content boxes, each of which includes text elements and style instructions. Message parsing has been previously described with reference to at least presentation parser 120 .

[0071] At step 930, a first content box from a plurality of content boxes is determined to be a hidden feature by examining a first style instruction associated with the first content box. The hidden feature may be hidden text. Hidden text is text that is not visible to the user when the message is output for display to the user. Text can be hidden in a variety of different ways. For example, the text can be associated with a small size font or a zero size font, the text color can match or be similar to the background color, the text can be obscured by an image, etc. Similar colors between the background and the text can be determined by determining a color distance and comparing the color distance to a threshold. Similarly, a small font size can be any font that is smaller than a specified threshold size.

[0072] At step 940, in response to the determination of step 930, the first style instructions are replaced by second style instructions different from the first style instructions to create an updated first content box. The second style instructions make text elements in the updated first content box visible to the user when the message is drawn.

[0073] Once the hidden text is identified, the display characteristics of the text that is drawn as hidden are changed to make the text visible. For example, the font size may be increased to a size similar to that of other text in the message. While the text size may match the size of nearby text, additional characteristics of the hidden text may be changed to indicate that it has been modified. For example, the converted text may be displayed with a strikethrough, a different color, italics, bold, highlighted with a different background color, or otherwise distinguished from other text that has not been converted.

[0074] Text can be transformed by associating the hidden text with different style instructions. Style instructions can take many forms. For example, style instructions for text can be provided through HTML attributes, CSS styles, and other means. Text can be transformed by replacing the original style instructions with new style instructions that draw the text as visible.

[0075] At step 950, using the updated first content box, the message is drawn.

[0076] Now turn to Fig.10 , a method 1000 for revealing hidden message characteristics of an electronic message is described. The method 1000 may be performed by the hidden characteristic exposure system 115 and produce Figure 3-Figure 8 The results are shown.

[0077] At step 1010, a message is received. For example, the message may be an email in HTML format. However, implementation of the technology described herein is not limited to email or HTML format email.

[0078] At step 1020, user instructions for hidden features in the message are shown. The user instructions may be directed to portions of the message, such as the body text, title, or subject line. Alternatively, the user instructions may be directed to the entire message. Whether directed to a portion or the entire message, the user instructions may be directed to a specific hidden feature or to any hidden feature. For example, the user may be interested only in hidden text and images.

[0079] At step 1030, a first hidden quality of the message is automatically detected by analyzing style instructions associated with the message. The first hidden quality is hidden text associated with a native style instruction that prevents the hidden text from being visibly drawn when the message is output for display. Hidden text is text that is invisible to the user when the message is output for display to the user. Text can be hidden in a variety of different ways. For example, the text can be associated with a small size font or a zero size font, the text color can match or be similar to the background color, the text can be obscured by an image, etc. Similar colors between the background and the text can be determined by determining a color distance and comparing the color distance to a threshold. Similarly, a small font size can be any font that is smaller than a specified threshold size.

[0080] At step 1040, different style instructions are associated with the hidden text so that the hidden text is visible when the message is output for display. Once the hidden text is identified, the display characteristics of the text drawn as hidden are changed to make the text visible. For example, the font size can be increased to a size similar to other text in the message. Although the text size may match the size of nearby text, the additional characteristics of the hidden text can be changed to indicate that it has been modified. For example, the converted text can be displayed using strikethrough, different colors, italics, bold, highlighted using different background colors, or otherwise distinguished from other text that has not been converted.

[0081] Text can be transformed by associating the hidden text with different style instructions. Style instructions can take many forms. For example, style instructions for text can be provided through HTML attributes, CSS styles, and other means. Text can be transformed by replacing the original style instructions with new style instructions that draw the text as visible.

[0082] At step 1050, the message is output for display with the hidden text visible.

[0083] Now turn to Fig.11 , a method 1100 for revealing hidden message characteristics of an electronic message is described. The method 1100 may be performed by a hidden characteristic exposure system 115 and produce Figure 3-Figure 8 Results shown.

[0084] At step 1010, an electronic message is received. For example, the message may be an email in HTML format. However, implementation of the technology described herein is not limited to email or HTML email.

[0085] At step 1020, a first hidden quality of the message is automatically detected by analyzing style instructions associated with the electronic message. The first hidden quality is hidden text associated with native style instructions that prevent the hidden text from being visibly drawn when the message is output for display. Hidden text is text that is invisible to the user when the message is output for display to the user. Text can be hidden in a variety of different ways. For example, text can be associated with a small size font or a zero size font, the text color can match or be similar to the background color, the text can be obscured by an image, etc. Similar colors between the background and text can be determined by determining a color distance and comparing the color distance to a threshold. Similarly, a small font size can be any font that is smaller than a specified threshold size.

[0086] At step 1030, different style instructions are associated with the hidden text so that the hidden text is visible when the message is output for display. Once the hidden text is identified, it is drawn as the display characteristics of the hidden text are changed to make the text visible. For example, the font size can be increased to a size similar to other text in the message. Although the text size may match the size of nearby text, additional characteristics of the hidden text can be changed to indicate that it has been modified. For example, the converted text can be displayed using strikethrough, different colors, italics, bold, highlighted using different background colors, or otherwise distinguished from other text that has not been converted.

[0087] Text can be transformed by associating the hidden text with different style instructions. Style instructions can take many forms. For example, style instructions for text can be provided through HTML attributes, CSS styles, and other means. Text can be transformed by replacing the original style instructions with new style instructions that draw the text as visible.

[0088] At step 1040, the message is output for display with the hidden text visible.

[0089] refer to Fig.12 , computing device 1200 includes bus 1210 that directly or indirectly couples the following devices: memory 1212, one or more processors 1214, one or more display components 1216, one or more input / output (I / O) ports 1218, one or more I / O components 1220, and an illustrative power supply 1222. Bus 1210 represents what may be one or more buses (such as an address bus, a data bus, or a combination thereof). Although for clarity, Fig.12 The various blocks of the present invention are shown with lines, but in reality, these blocks represent logical components and not necessarily actual components. For example, a display component such as a display device may be considered an I / O component. The processor also has memory. The inventors of the present invention recognize that this is the nature of the art and reiterate that Fig.12 The diagrams are merely illustrations of exemplary computing devices that may be used in conjunction with one or more aspects of the present technology. Distinctions between categories such as "workstation," "server," "laptop," "handheld device," etc. are not made. As all of these are considered Fig.12 and references to “computing devices”.

[0090] The computing device 1200 typically includes a variety of computer-readable media. Computer-readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by the computing device 1200, and includes volatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media. By way of example and not limitation, computer-readable media can include computer storage media and communication media.

[0091] Computer storage media includes both volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information, such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tapes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store the desired information and can be accessed by the computing device 1200. Computer storage media itself does not contain signals.

[0092] Communication media typically embodies computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism and includes any information delivery media. The term "modulated data signal" means a signal, one or more of whose characteristics are set or changed in the manner of information encoded in the signal. As an example and not limitation, communication media include wired media, such as a wired network or a direct wired connection, and wireless media, such as acoustic, RF, infrared and other wireless media. Any combination of the above should also be included within the scope of computer readable media.

[0093] Memory 1212 includes computer storage media in the form of volatile and / or non-volatile memory. Memory may be removable, non-removable, or a combination thereof. Exemplary hardware devices include solid-state memory, hard drives, optical drives, and the like. Computing device 1200 includes one or more processors 1214 that read data from various entities such as memory 1212 or I / O components 1220. Presentation component(s) 1216 present data indications to a user or other device. Exemplary presentation components include display devices, speakers, printing components, vibrating components, and the like.

[0094] I / O ports 1218 allow computing device 1200 to be logically coupled to other devices, including I / O components 1220, some of which may be built-in. Exemplary components include microphones, joysticks, game pads, satellite dishes, scanners, printers, wireless devices, and the like.

[0095] Input / output component 1220 can provide a natural user interface (NUI) that processes air gestures, voice, or other physiological inputs generated by the user. In some instances, the input can be sent to an appropriate network element for further processing. NUI can implement any combination of voice recognition, touch and stylus recognition, facial recognition, biometrics, gesture recognition on and near the screen, air gestures, head and eye tracking, and touch recognition associated with the display on computing device 1200. Computing device 1200 can be equipped with a depth camera, such as a stereo camera system, an infrared camera system, an RGB camera system, and a combination thereof, for gesture detection and recognition. Additionally, computing device 1200 can be equipped with an accelerometer or gyroscope capable of detecting motion. The output of the accelerometer or gyroscope can be provided to the display of computing device 1200 to draw immersive augmented reality or virtual reality.

[0096] Some aspects of the computing device 1200 may include one or more radio devices 1224 (or similar wireless communication components). The radio 1224 sends and receives radio or wireless communications. The computing device 1200 may be a wireless terminal suitable for receiving communications and media over various wireless networks. The computing device 1200 may communicate with other devices via wireless protocols such as code division multiple access (“CDMA”), global system for mobile (“GSM”), or time division multiple access (“TDMA”). Radio communications may be short-range connections, long-range connections, or a combination of both short-range and long-range wireless telecommunication connections. When we refer to “short” and “long” types of connections, we do not refer to the spatial relationship between two devices. Instead, we generally refer to short range and long range as different classifications or types of connections (i.e., primary and secondary connections). By way of example and not limitation, a short-range connection may include a connection to a device that provides access to a wireless communication network (e.g., a mobile hotspot). A connection such as a WLAN connection using the 802.11 protocol; a Bluetooth connection to another computing device is a second example of a short-range connection, or a near field communication connection. Long-range connections may include connections using, for example but not limited to, one or more of the following: CDMA, GPRS, GSM, TDMA, and 802.16 protocols.

[0097] Many different arrangements of the various components described, as well as components not shown, are possible without departing from the scope of the following claims. Aspects of the present technology have been described with illustrative, rather than restrictive, intent. Alternative aspects will become apparent to the reader of the present disclosure after and as a result of reading the present disclosure. Alternative ways of implementing the above may be accomplished without departing from the scope of the following claims. Certain features and sub-combinations are of utility and may be employed and considered within the scope of the claims without reference to other features and sub-combinations.

Claims

1. A method for revealing a hidden message attribute of an electronic message, comprising: receiving a message including a message encoding including text and style instructions defining display characteristics for the text; parsing the message encoding to construct a plurality of content boxes, each of the plurality of content boxes comprising a text element and a style instruction; determining that a first content box from the plurality of content boxes is a hidden quality by examining first style instructions associated with the first content box; Responsive to the determination, replacing the first style instructions with second style instructions different from the first style instructions to create an updated first content box, wherein the second style instructions cause the text element in the updated first content box to be visible to a user when the message is drawn; and The message is rendered using the updated first content box.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein determining that the first content box is a hidden property comprises: The first style directive is compared to a plurality of rules defining hidden content.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: One of the plurality of rules is that a font size in the first style instruction is smaller than a threshold size.

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein: One of the plurality of rules is that a text color in the first style instruction is within a threshold similarity to a background color of the first content box.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The second style instructions are selected to assign a font size to the text element in the first content box, the font size also being assigned to different text elements in one or more content boxes located adjacent to the first content box.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein: The second style instructions include a font color that is different from a second font color specified by a different style instruction associated with an adjacent context box.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The message also includes an image, and the method further includes determining image depicting text, and as a result of determining the image depicting text, adding a visible border around the image to show the user that the image is presented in the message.

8. A method for revealing a hidden message attribute of an electronic message, comprising: receiving the message; receiving a user instruction to display a hidden characteristic in the message; automatically detecting a first hidden quality of the message by analyzing style instructions associated with the message, wherein the first hidden quality is hidden text associated with native style instructions that prevent the hidden text from being visibly drawn when the message is output for display; associating different style instructions with the hidden text so that the hidden text is visible when the message is output for display; as well as The message is output for display with the hidden text visible.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein: The different display style causes the hidden text to be drawn with a strikethrough.

10. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: An impersonation assessment is performed on the message, and an impersonation report is output that describes any evidence of impersonation detected in the message.

11. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: A link evaluation is performed on the message, and a link report is output, the link report describing deceptive characteristics associated with the link.

12. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: Header analysis is performed on the header of the message and a header report is output, the header report describing suspicious scripts detected in the header.

13. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: parsing a message encoding associated with the message to construct a plurality of content boxes, each of the plurality of content boxes comprising text and style instructions; determining that a first content box from the plurality of content boxes is hidden by examining the style instructions associated with the first content box, wherein the first content box is associated with the hidden text; and The different style instructions are associated with the first content box.

14. The method according to claim 8, further comprising: An analysis is performed on a subject line of the message, and a subject line report is output that describes similarities between content in the subject line and subject line content from messages previously classified as spam.

15. The method according to claim 8, wherein: The different display style causes the hidden text to be drawn in a first color different from a second color assigned to text that is not determined to be hidden content.

16. One or more computer storage media, which, when executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform a method of displaying a hidden attribute in an electronic message, the method comprising: receiving the electronic message; automatically detecting a first hidden quality of the electronic message by analyzing style instructions associated with the electronic message, wherein the first hidden quality is hidden text associated with native style instructions that prevent the hidden text from being visibly drawn when the message is output for display; associating different style instructions with the hidden text so that the hidden text is visible when the message is output for display; as well as The message is output for display with the hidden text visible.

17. The medium of claim 16, further comprising: parsing a message encoding associated with the message to construct a plurality of content boxes, each of the plurality of content boxes comprising text and style instructions; determining that a first content box from the plurality of content boxes is hidden by examining the style instructions associated with the first content box, wherein the first content box is associated with the hidden text; and The different style instructions are associated with the first content box.

18. The medium of claim 17, wherein the different display styles cause the hidden text to be drawn in a first color different from a second color assigned to text that is not determined to be hidden content.

19. The medium of claim 16, further comprising: Header analysis is performed on the header of the message, and a header report is output, the header report describing the geographic location associated with the client IP address of the sender device.

20. The medium of claim 19, wherein the header report further describes the reputation of the geographic location and the reputation of the IP address.