Detect attacks using leaked credentials via internal network monitoring
Identifying attacks that leak certificates through internal network monitoring and intelligent feeding, actively or passively verifying user certificates, and updating certificates in advance, solving the problems of network attack identification and defense in the existing technology, improving network security and efficiency.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202110862666.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2016-06-30
- Filing Date
- 2017-06-27
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2037-06-27
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively identify and defend against cyber attacks through leaking certificates, which leads to the network being vulnerable to attacks, and defense measures consume a lot of manpower and computing resources, which easily leads to false positives and weakened security.
Through internal network monitoring and intelligent feeding, knowledge of leaked certificates is leveraged to identify whether login attempts are part of an attack, and to actively or passively verify the vulnerability of user certificates, updating the certificate in advance to prevent attacks.
It improves the efficiency and accuracy of the system to identify attacks before an attack occurs, enhances the security and reliability of the network, and reduces false positives and human resource consumption.
Smart Images

Figure CN113553558B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] This application is a divisional application of an invention patent application with an application date of June 27, 2017, application number 201780040928.4, and invention name “Detecting attacks using leaked certificates via internal network monitoring”. Background Art
[0002] When a malicious party gains access to a first system, they will often exploit the poor security practices of legitimate users to gain access to additional systems. For example, a user may use a password on a social media system and reuse that password on a work system, thus allowing the malicious party to access both systems if one account name is compromised if the malicious party is able to link the user's account name on both systems. Lists of user credentials (usernames, passwords, domains, etc.) are hosted by malicious parties for sale to each other and can be used directly to gain access to systems, build password dictionaries, or provide a starting point for a targeted brute force attack (e.g., when a user changes their password by incrementing a number: password1, password2, password3, etc.).
[0003] Network administrators often set operational security policies that recommend or require users to use different passwords than they use in other systems, change passwords frequently, and not reuse passwords within their networks, yet their networks are still subject to attacks that use credentials that are compromised because users ignore, forget, or circumvent these policies. Even when individual users are not vulnerable to these attacks because they follow good operational security policies, the network itself must handle these attacks because malicious parties test the network for vulnerability due to poorly chosen or exposed credentials, a test that can be indistinguishable from benign login errors (e.g., when a legitimate user mistypes a password, or forgets to update a password in a system that automatically attempts to log into the network).
[0004] To defend against attacks, administrators need to identify a collection of one or more login attempts as malicious and take steps to protect the network, which may include: locking accounts, limiting account access, blocking ports, applying access control lists (ACLs) (e.g., whitelists or blacklists for sets of IP addresses), marking accounts for manual review, etc. Identifying attacks as malicious and protecting the network can require significant human and computing resources and may result in false positives; requiring additional human and computing resources to undo security measures. If false positives are returned too frequently, it will eventually lead to weakened network security because users will bypass security and ignore good security practices out of frustration. Summary of the invention
[0005] This summary is provided to introduce some concepts in a simplified form that are further described in the detailed description below. This summary is not intended to identify all features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to limit the scope of the claimed subject matter.
[0006] Systems and methods are provided herein for protecting a first network from compromise of credentials exposed from a second network via internal network monitoring. The systems and methods of the present disclosure are operable to determine whether a login attempt is part of an attack based on knowledge of leaked credentials from a third-party system and monitoring of the internal network. Security devices are deployed in the network to monitor traversing authentication traffic and use a smart feed 180 including leaked credentials used by a malicious party to identify authentication traffic sent as part of an attack and determine when a user's credentials are vulnerable and should therefore be updated.
[0007] By enabling administrators to more easily identify attacks before an actual attack begins, as well as credential vulnerable users, the present disclosure solves computer-centric problems and improves the efficiency, reliability, and security of the systems themselves.
[0008] The details of one or more aspects are set forth in the following drawings and descriptions. Other features and advantages will be apparent from a reading of the following specific embodiments and a review of the associated drawings. It should be understood that the following specific embodiments are illustrative only and not restrictive; the proper scope of the present disclosure is defined by the claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0009] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this disclosure, illustrate various aspects of the disclosure. In the drawings:
[0010] Figure 1A An example environment is shown in which authorization requests from various requesting devices are handled by the system;
[0011] Figure 1B An example smart feed is shown;
[0012] Figure 2 An example authentication protocol execution is shown;
[0013] Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating the general stages involved in an example method for proactively verifying user credentials to defend a vulnerable account;
[0014] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating the general stages involved in an example method for passively verifying user credentials to identify attacks using exposed credentials;
[0015] Figure 5is a block diagram illustrating the physical components of a computing device that may be used to practice the examples; and
[0016] Fig. 6A and Figure 6B is a block diagram of a mobile computing device that can be used to practice various aspects. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0017] The following detailed description refers to the accompanying drawings. Whenever possible, the same reference numerals are used in the drawings and the following description to refer to the same or similar elements. Although various aspects of the present disclosure can be described, modifications, adaptations and other implementations are possible. For example, the elements shown in the drawings can be replaced, added or modified, and the methods described herein can be modified by replacing, reordering or adding stages to the disclosed methods. Therefore, the following specific embodiments do not limit the present disclosure, on the contrary, the proper scope of the present disclosure is defined by the appended claims. Examples can take the form of hardware implementations or complete software implementations or combined software and hardware implementations. Therefore, the following specific embodiments should not be considered to have a limiting meaning.
[0018] Brute force attacks attempt to gain access to accounts hosted by a system by trying several different passwords in succession until access is gained, while targeted attacks (which can be constructed as a brute force attack as a first attempt) use a known or suspected set of credentials to gain unauthorized access. In order to increase the chances of the correct password being tried before the system implements security measures, a malicious party can use a password dictionary or targeted passwords to increase their chances of finding the correct password for an account. A password dictionary consists of known good passwords from leaked credentials of several users, and these passwords can be sorted based on frequency so that the most popular known good passwords are tried earlier in the attack than less popular known good passwords or random passwords. Targeted passwords are passwords based on leaked credentials from a third-party system that the malicious party links (or attempts to link) to an account on the attacked system. For example, if a malicious party learns that a username "johndoe123" uses the password "password1" to access a first domain "domainA.com", the malicious party can search for the same person's username on a second domain "domainB.com" and use the password from "domainA.com" as the basis for the targeted password. A malicious party may try the base password and its variations (e.g., "password," "password2," "PASSWORD1") as a targeted password in a vertical brute force attack against one account, may try the targeted password in a horizontal brute force attack against multiple suspicious accounts hosted in a second domain (e.g., "johndoe123," "johndoe," "doe.john"), or may attempt both vertical and horizontal brute force attacks; multiple passwords may be tried against several known or suspicious account names in a domain. Because users often reuse passwords between domains, a targeted password from a compromised domain can be used to gain access to a domain that has not yet been compromised.
[0019] Thus, a security device is provided that uses knowledge of a set of credentials (e.g., targeted pairs of usernames and passwords) to monitor authorization attempts that include compromised credentials, and can alert users when their credentials are vulnerable to attack via targeted passwords. By providing administrators with the ability to more easily identify attacks and vulnerable users, the present disclosure solves computer-centric problems and improves the efficiency and reliability of the systems themselves involved in granting and receiving authorizations.
[0020] As a matter of good security practice, messages carrying authorization requests (e.g., login attempts) should not contain plaintext passwords (including text, biometric scans, voiceprint data, and other access granting data), but instead should typically carry passwords in an encrypted format. Security devices that monitor network traffic can be used to passively determine whether a login attempt uses credentials exposed from one or more other networks, regardless of whether the username is valid for a given network, and therefore indicate that an attack is in progress. The security device can also be operated to actively test accounts to determine whether they are vulnerable to attack via exposed credentials and should therefore be prevented proactively (or retroactively, if surreptitiously attacked before discovery). For security and maintenance purposes, the security device does not need to know the active password (which the user can change periodically). The security device can monitor the results of authentication requests to provide users and administrators with greater security and reliability to detect attacks that would otherwise go unnoticed.
[0021] Figure 1A An example environment 100 is shown in which authorization requests from various requesting devices are handled by the system. As shown, one or more authorization seeking devices (ASDs) 110 attempt to gain access to accounts or physical / virtual machines (typically accounts) hosted within a network 170. The ASD 110 is connected to the network 170 via a gateway 120 that communicates with an authentication server 130. The authentication server 130 handles the authorization or rejection of login attempts carried in the authentication business. An intelligent feed 180 is provided to the network 170 from the intelligent service 160 and is passed to the security device center (SDC) 140 via the gateway 120, and the SDC 140 monitors the authorization business between the ASD 110 and the authentication server 130 to determine whether the business indicates an attack. In addition, the SDC 140 checks the authentication credentials for the network 170 to identify vulnerable accounts and alerts the authentication server 130 to the attack or vulnerable accounts. Although not shown, those skilled in the art will appreciate that various servers and intermediaries in a distributed network may be located between the ASD 110 and the gateway 120 to route messages between users and the network 170. It will also be appreciated that although some components of the example environment 100 are shown separately, in various aspects, multiple copies of these components may be deployed, for example, for load balancing purposes, redundancy, or to provide multiple services.
[0022] ASD 110 illustrates a variety of computing systems, including but not limited to desktop computer systems, wired and wireless computing systems, mobile computing systems (e.g., mobile phones, netbooks, tablet or slate computers, notebook computers, and laptop computers), handheld devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, minicomputers, printers, and mainframe computers. Figure 5 , Fig. 6A and Figure 6B The hardware of these computing systems is discussed in more detail. In various aspects, ASD 110 is accessed locally and / or by a network, which may include the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a private distributed network for an entity (e.g., a company, a university, a government agency), a wireless ad hoc network, a virtual private network (VPN), or other direct data link (e.g., a Bluetooth connection, a direct wired link). For example, a malicious party may control ASD 110 directly or through a network as part of a "botnet" via a malicious program (e.g., a virus) to perform a brute force attack from multiple ASDs 110, which may be accomplished without the knowledge or consent of the owner of the device. In another example, ASD 110 may be a computing device used by a legitimate user seeking to access an account, who may make one or more attempts to access the account.
[0023] The gateway 120 is a hardware device such as a network switch or a software service that links the ASD 110 from an external network (e.g., the Internet) to the authentication server 130 through a network 170 (e.g., an intranet). In various aspects, the gateway 120 can provide a firewall and can regulate the flow of communication traffic in and out of the local network 170. In some aspects, the gateway 120 forwards messages from the ASD 110 (and other devices on the internal network) to the authentication server 130, and can mirror ports so that messages sent to the authentication server 130 are also forwarded to the SDC 140. The gateway 120 also forwards messages from the authentication server 130 to the ASD 110 and handles communications from the smart server 160. In other aspects, the gateway 120 is a device that passively eavesdrops on the network traffic flowing through the device for authentication, and consumes (rather than proxying) the authentication. Although not shown, in optional aspects, the SDC 140 can communicate back with the smart server 160, in which case these communications are also forwarded by the gateway 120.
[0024] Authentication server 130 receives authentication requests from ASD 110 and determines whether to grant access to an account served by network 170. In various aspects, authentication server 130 may be a physical machine or VM that processes authentication requests for network 170 and acts as a domain controller. Authentication server 130 may use various authentication protocols (including, but not limited to, PAP (Password Authentication Protocol), CHAP (Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol), EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol), Kerberos, or AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) Architecture protocols) to allow users to access one or more systems within network 170. Example interactions according to authentication protocols Figure 2Depending on the criteria used, the number of protected systems in network 170, and the user account settings, successful presentation of authentication parameters will grant ASD 110 access to one or more systems protected by authentication server 130 at the appropriate permission level for the associated user.
[0025] The SDC 140 receives the intelligence feed 180 from the intelligence service 160 and the certificate from the authentication server 130 to monitor the authentication traffic sent to the authentication server 130 through the gateway 120 to thereby determine whether the communication represents an attack and whether the certificate is vulnerable to attack. In some aspects, the SDC 140 is operated on a device having a unique MAC and IP address that is separate from other devices in the network 170 and receives a copy of the messages forwarded from the gateway 120 to the authentication server 130 via the remote network monitoring (RMON) or switch monitoring (SMON) specifications, port mirroring, or similar forwarding schemes. In other aspects, the SDC 140 acts as a device that intercepts all network traffic bound to the authentication server 130 (having the same MAC and IP address or a unique address) and forwards the communication to the authentication server 130 or passively taps and listens to the transmission medium over which the communication is sent to the authentication server 130. In other aspects, SDC 140 is operated as a virtual machine or process on a hardware device providing authentication server 130 , and can thereby passively share communications received at devices addressed to authentication server 130 .
[0026] SDC 140 will implement Figure 3 and Figure 4 One or more methods discussed in greater detail to determine whether a login attempt constitutes part of an attack or whether one or more accounts are vulnerable to a targeted password attack, and to communicate that determination to administrators of the network 170 and, optionally, the authentication server 130, to protect the account / network or to cause the account / network to remain in its normal operating mode (or to remove active security precautions).
[0027] Smart service 160 is shown as a service external to network 170 that provides smart feed 180 for use by SDC 140 to determine when exposed credentials impact accounts of network 170. In alternative aspects, smart service 160 can be implemented internal to network 170 to pull smart feed 180 from an external source.
[0028] The smart feed 180 includes a list of exposed credentials that the SDC 140 will use, in conjunction with the credentials of its network 170, to identify vulnerable accounts and ongoing attacks. For example, when passwords and usernames for domain A (e.g., a first website) are exposed in a data breach, these credentials can be collected by the smart service 160 and passed to domain B (e.g., a second website) to prevent potential targeted password attacks. Example smart feed 180 in Figure 1B . It will be appreciated that in various aspects, the credentials may be stored in a table or character depiction list. The exposed credentials may be collected from the same source used by the malicious party to publish and / or sell the exposed credentials, or they may be provided by a service affected by the data breach (e.g., website A from the above example may communicate the exposed credentials to the smart service 160). In various aspects, the smart feed 180 will include, but is not limited to: username, password, username / password pair from the name of the domain from which it was exposed, secret question and its answer (e.g., a question used to authorize a password reset when the user forgets the password), contact information (e.g., an email account used to register the username), secondary authentication contact information (e.g., a phone number for multi-factor authentication), profile information (e.g., a posting name from a social media site, location, employer information, etc.), the last n passwords used, etc., which may be used in conjunction with the present disclosure (e.g., testing the last n passwords used for exposure as well as the current password that was exposed).
[0029] In various aspects, the smart service 160 can provide the smart feed 180 on a push model or a pull model (or a combination of both). In a push model, the smart service 160 can send the smart feed 180 to the SDC 140 periodically (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly), or whenever the smart service 160 learns of a new data breach or collects additional exposed certificates. In a pull model, the SDC 140 can issue a request to the smart service 160 to send the smart feed 180, and the smart service 160 will respond by sending the smart feed 180 or sending an indication that the SDC 140 already has the latest smart feed 180 (i.e., no changes have been made since the last send). The smart feed 180 can be provided as a complete list or as an addendum; only newly learned exposed certificates are sent or changes to the list of exposed certificates are indicated.
[0030] As will be appreciated, each domain may use a variety of account names, and may include other identifiers (which may be exposed in a data breach and therefore included in the smart feed 180), and may differ between domains. For example, a user named "John Doe" may have an email address "John.Doe.CEO@domainA.com", an internal domain name "JDoe123", and a password "passWord1" in domain A, and an email address "jd_home@domainB.com" and a password "Password2" in domain B. If a certificate for domain B has been exposed, a malicious party may attempt to log into domain A using the exposed certificate by attempting to change the domain portion of the address from the certificate from domain A to domain B (e.g., attempting to log in via "jd_home@domainA.com" and "Password2"). SDC 140 will receive login attempts from malicious parties and may filter out authentication requests for email addresses that do not exist in a valid domain, for example, if the email address of "jd_home" does not exist in domain A, then an authentication request for "jd_home@domainA.com" may be filtered out from further processing, but an authentication request for "John.Doe.CEO" that does exist in domain A may be further processed.
[0031] When the network 170 authenticates internally using an in-domain username, such as "JDoe123" from the example above, when the SDC 140 receives an email address or other out-of-domain username, it will attempt to convert the out-of-domain username to an in-domain username. Because it is a convention that a given organization links out-of-domain and in-domain usernames for that organization, and because not all organizations use the same convention when linking these usernames, in order for the SDC 140 to operate in multiple domains, it is operable to query the Active Directory to convert between in-domain and out-of-domain names. The Active Directory may be managed as part of the authentication server 130, or as a separate machine used by the authentication server 130 to manage the network 170 domains and the accounts therein. The SDC 140 may query the authentication server 130's Active Directory to determine whether the account name (in-domain or out-of-domain) provided in the authentication request is served by the authentication server 130, and if it is determined that the username is valid for the authentication server 130, attempt to resolve the provided username to an in-domain username. In some aspects, the SDC 140 will query the Active Directory via LDAP (Lightweight Data Access Protocol), or a similar query against a specific domain or GC (Global Catalog), or a similar query against multiple domains within the Active Directory to resolve the provided out-of-domain username to an in-domain username. For example, when an authentication request from Domain A provides a username of "John.Doe.CEO@domainA.com", the SDC 140 will check whether this is a valid account served by the authentication server 130, and then query the Active Directory to determine that Domain A internally employs the username of "JDoe123" for this account.
[0032] In additional aspects, when the smart feed 180 includes additional identification information or usernames (e.g., multi-factor authentication, setup email), the SDC 140 will also attempt to convert these usernames to usernames for their domains. For example, if John Doe is registered as user "JD_9000" in domain C, and provided his domain A email "John.Doe.CEO@domainA.com" when registering in domain C, and if the credentials from domain C are exposed and communicated to the SDC 140 via the smart feed 180, then the SDC 140 can attempt to match both "JD_9000@domainA.com" (adding the local domain name to the in-domain username of the other domain) and "John.Doe.CEO@domainA.com" (using the exposed registered email address and using / replacing domain A as its domain) to the usernames for its domains. Continuing with the example, if domain A does not provide such email, "JD_9000@domainA.com" will be filtered out, but "John.Doe.CEO@domainA.com" will be retained for further processing and will resolve to domain A's in-domain username "JDoe123".
[0033] When the SDC 140 resolves a username from the smart feed 180 to a username in its domain, the SDC 140 may actively attempt to gain access to internal accounts using the exposed password credentials from the smart feed 180, and may passively monitor for authentication attempts using the exposed credentials. Actively attempting to authenticate a user via an exposed password helps improve the security of the network 170 by protecting the accounts of vulnerable users before an attack is launched against the vulnerable user's account, or discovering by other methods whether the account has been subject to a targeted attack. Passive reading of authentication attempts allows for the discovery of brute force attacks that may not be noticed in frequency or volume based detection schemes. Authentication attempts in these brute force attacks may target accounts served or not served by the network 170, and may be detected based on a username, password, or username / password pair used in one or more authentication requests that matches a credential provided in the smart feed 180.
[0034] In various aspects, the network 170 may choose to report attack statistics back to the external smart service 160 to improve the security of additional networks. These reports may be sent periodically as batch reports to protect account anonymity, with the batch reports covering a set amount of time (e.g., daily, weekly, monthly) or a set number of authentication requests (e.g., batches of n authentication requests). Reports may include, but are not limited to, statistics related to the percentage or number of valid email addresses seen in authentication requests, the percentage or number of valid passwords seen in authentication requests, or the percentage or number of invalid certificates used uniquely. The batch reports may identify, or may be linked by the smart service 160 to, a given smart feed 180, or data breaches that affect a smart feed 180, so that additional precautions can be taken against sets of certificates known to be used by malicious parties to attack active networks.
[0035] Figure 2 An example authentication protocol execution 200 is shown. Various authentication protocols may allow for a single sign-on (SSO) experience in which a user only actively authenticates (i.e., provides a password) once, even when accessing multiple services or accessing a single service via different sessions (e.g., closing and reopening the program used to access the service), or may need to reauthenticate each time the user attempts to access a service.
[0036] For example, the Kerberos protocol allows for an SSO experience where a user provides a domain name, account name, and password to access a local computing device 210 (which may also be an ASD 110) and subsequently access one or more network services 230 (e.g., an email service, a file management system, a VM). The computing device 210 will authenticate the credentials provided by the user to a key domain controller (KDC) 220 by sending a timestamp (of the current time of the authentication request) encrypted using a key derived from the user's password to the KDC 220. The KDC 220 will decrypt the message using a copy of the key derived from its user's password stored on the authentication server 130, and verify the user's identity by verifying that the timestamp is relevant (e.g., given potential network latency, the unencrypted time is a time that is likely to match the login request). If the timestamp is relevant, the KDC 220 transmits a ticket granting ticket (TGT) to the computing device 210, which is an identifier that enables the computing device 210 to request access to the network service 230 without re-providing the user's credentials (e.g., domain name, account name, password).
[0037] Once a TGT is granted to a user on computing device 210, and until the TGT expires, each time computing device 210 attempts to access a network service 230, it will identify itself to domain controller 221 (resident in KDC 220) using the TGT. Domain controller 221 will provide the computing device with an access ticket for the specific network service 230 that the user is attempting to contact via ticket granting service 222. The user will then provide the access ticket to network service 230 via computing device 210. Because the access ticket has been verified by ticket granting service 222, network service 230 will authorize the user's access and establish a connection between computing device 210 and network service 230 without the user having to re-enter credentials.
[0038] The NTLM (Networked LAN Management) protocol is another authentication protocol that uses credentials of a domain name, account name, and password (or a one-way hash thereof) to support login via a challenge / response model. Rather than sending a user's password between the computing device 210 and the network service 230 to which it seeks access, the computing device 210 must perform computations to prove that it has access to the protected credentials.
[0039] Under NTLM version 1 (NTLMv1), the network service 230 authenticates the user by sending an eight-byte random number as a challenge to the computing device 210. The computing device 210 will perform operations using this eight-byte random number and a hash value of the user's password. In various aspects, the user can also initiate a challenge to the network service 230. The user will return a 24-byte result to the network service 230 (and optionally return its own challenge), which will verify whether the client has calculated the correct result and should therefore be granted access to the network service 230.
[0040] In more detail, the response to the challenge under NTLMv1 is calculated by deriving a 16-byte key from the user's password (hash), which can be done according to the LM hash algorithm or the NT hash algorithm, which is then padded with null values to reach a size of 21 bytes. The padded hash is then split into three (seven bytes), which is used to create three keys for the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm. Each of the keys is then used to encrypt the challenge via DES (in electronic password-based mode), which results in three eight-byte ciphertexts that are concatenated into a 24-byte response.
[0041] NTLM version 2 (NTLMv2) builds on NTLMv1 to provide additional security and enhances NTLMv1 to employ a 128-bit key space, where the term "key space" is understood to refer to the set of possible valid keys for a given encryption algorithm used by the protocol. NTLMv2 allows existing domain controllers from the previous NTLMv1 mechanism to continue to be used. NTLMv2 adds additional client challenges to the responses, which are hashed and transmitted to the network service 230 to grant or deny access to the user.
[0042] As will be appreciated, despite the Figure 2 The Kerberos and NTLM protocols are discussed in detail, but other authentication protocols may be used, or variations may be made to the protocols presented. Figure 2 The protocols discussed in are given as non-limiting examples to introduce the operations and terminology involved in example aspects for authentication in the present disclosure. Other protocols using various encryption algorithms may be used without departing from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.
[0043] Figure 3 is a flow chart illustrating the general stages involved in an example method 300 for proactively verifying user credentials to defend vulnerable accounts independent of network traffic. The method 300 begins at operation 310, where a smart feed 180 is received. The smart feed 180 includes credentials from a domain that have been exposed (e.g., in a data breach) and can be used by a malicious party in an attack. The credentials include one or more user identifiers (e.g., email address, account name, personal name, social security number) and an exposed password, but in various aspects, additional information (e.g., security questions and answers) may also be included. In some aspects, the method 300 may be initiated in response to receiving the smart feed 180. However, in other aspects, the method 300 may be initiated in response to a user updating a password or periodically (e.g., monthly, weekly) by the network 170, in which case the method 300 may begin at operation 320 and will use data from the previously received smart feed 180.
[0044] At operation 320, the account identifier from the smart feed 180 is attempted to be resolved by the SDC 140 for a given domain as a local account. For example, if the packet for the authentication request includes an email address or username as an account identifier, the SDC 140 may determine whether the email address or username exists in the active directory of accounts served by the network 170. In some aspects, this determination may include a query to the active directory in the network 170 to match an out-of-domain account identifier (e.g., an email address) with an in-domain account identifier (e.g., an internal username).
[0045] Then, the method 300 proceeds to decision 330, where it is determined whether the identifier resolves to a local account. When the identifier does not resolve to a local account, the method 300 can end. When the identifier does resolve to a local account, the method 300 proceeds to operation 340, where the exposed password received from the smart feed 180 is used to attempt to log in to the authentication server 130 or a virtual copy thereof (e.g., a honeypot system, a mirror).
[0046] In various aspects, the SDC 140 uses the exposed password from the intelligence feed 180 and, optionally, slight variations thereof to attempt to gain access to the implemented account at operation 340. The slight variations can be set by the administrator to try a specified number of versions in a targeted internal brute force attack of the password. The targeted internal brute force attack makes specific variations of the exposed password so that when the exposed password does not exactly match a user password in the domain but shares a common base, users who reuse a base password (which is vulnerable to the targeted attack) can be identified. For example, a particular change may specify that: characters representing numbers are replaced with different numeric characters (e.g., "1" is replaced by "2", then by "3", etc.); the case of alphabetic characters is adjusted, with uppercase letters replaced with lowercase letters and vice versa (e.g., "A" is replaced by "a", and "b" is replaced by "B"); special characters are cycled through (e.g., a password that requires at least one special character may have the "@", "#", "$", etc. replace the "!" special character); the accents of alphabetic characters are adjusted (e.g., "u" is replaced by , "ü", etc.); make cross-script substitutions (e.g., "b" is replaced with "β" or "β"); make letter / number substitutions based on known similar or suggestive shapes of characters (e.g., "0" is replaced with "o" or "O"; "3" is replaced with "e" or "E"; "4" is replaced with "a" or "A"; and vice versa). To illustrate, a password "password#1" can have slight variations, including but not limited to: "Password#1", "PASSWORD#1", "password#2", "password&1", "p4Ssw0rD$7", etc., which can be tried to log into the associated account. The administrator can set how many and what variations will be applied when trying to see if users are using a common base of passwords internally and passwords that have been exposed externally.
[0047] At decision 350, it is determined whether the login attempt for the given account is successful. When the login attempt is unsuccessful, the method 300 proceeds to operation 370, where an alert is generated. When one of the login attempts is successful, the method 300 proceeds to operation 360, where the given account is protected.
[0048] When the account is protected at operation 360, various security measures may be taken. For example, the account may be locked to prevent access from outside the ASD 110 (e.g., an on premise login may be required until the password can be changed), access to secure files or systems from the account may be restricted, the user may be contacted to change the password, the authentication server 130 may automatically reset the user's password, multi-factor authentication may be required, etc. The method 300 may then proceed to operation 370, and / or repeat from operation 320 as necessary, to proactively verify whether additional identifiers in the smart feed 180 put other accounts at risk.
[0049] When an alert is generated at operation 370, the administrator or user of the account to which the leaked credentials are resolved may be contacted. The alert may be sent as an email, text message, pager signal, network message, automated phone message, etc., so that other accounts used by the user outside of network 170 may be protected by the user, or additional security measures may be taken with respect to the exposed credentials. Method 300 may then end or repeat from operation 320 as needed to proactively verify whether additional identifiers in smart feed 180 put other accounts at risk.
[0050] Figure 4 4 is a flow chart illustrating the general stages involved in an example method 400 for passively verifying user credentials present in observed network traffic to identify attacks using exposed credentials. Method 400 begins at operation 410, where a smart feed 180 is received. Smart feed 180 includes credentials from a domain that have been exposed (e.g., in a data breach) and can be used by a malicious party in an attack. The credentials include one or more user identifiers (e.g., email address, account name, personal name, social security number) and an exposed password, but in various aspects, additional information (e.g., security questions and answers thereto) may also be included. Once smart feed 180 has initially been received, method 400 may then begin at operation 420 and use the smart feed 180 received from a previous execution of method 400.
[0051] At operation 420, an authentication request to the authentication server 130 is received by the gateway 120 of the network 170. In various aspects, the SDC 140 of the network passively monitors the received authentication request (e.g., via port forwarding) and attempts to decrypt the encrypted portion of the authentication request using one or more passwords from the smart feed 180 at operation 430. The authentication request will include a username (the username of the request) and an encrypted portion encrypted according to or based on the password.
[0052] In various aspects, more than one exposed password may be applied to each authentication attempt to attempt to decrypt the encrypted portion thereof. For example, a key array may be generated based on the passwords in the smart feed 180 to create n keys to attempt for the encrypted portion of each authentication request. In various aspects, the array may be constructed prior to an authentication attempt, or may be constructed (or added to) on the fly as the SDC 140 examines various authentication attempts utilizing various possible passwords. For example, when the smart feed 180 provides more than n passwords, the key array may rotate new passwords into the n-key array to replace the other passwords. Depending on the authorization protocol used, the keys in the key array may be passwords, hashes of passwords, or hashes of different values hashed from the passwords.
[0053] The key array is applied to the encrypted portion of the authentication request received at operation 420. The key comprising the key array is applied to the encrypted portion in succession to attempt to decrypt the portion. The portion in its possible decrypted state is used in decision 440 and decision 450 to determine, respectively, whether the compromised credentials of network 170 were used in the authentication request and whether authorization is granted to access network 170. When the portion "decrypted" by the compromised password applied in operation 430 is determined to have actually been decrypted with the compromised password, method 400 proceeds to decision 450 because it is determined that the credentials have been compromised, otherwise method 400 can end or be repeated from operation 430 using a different password from smart feed 180. The portion is determined to have been decrypted when the logical result is produced by the attempted password from smart feed 180 according to the authentication protocol used. For example, when a protocol (such as Kerberos) uses cryptographic timestamps, if the decrypted version produces a data set formatted as a timestamp that would be the likely time at which the authentication request was sent (e.g., the decrypted timestamp is relative to the time at which the message was received, taking into account network delays and differences in system clock synchronization), then that portion is determined to have been decrypted with a leaked credential.
[0054] At decision 450, it is determined whether the authorization attempt using the compromised credentials successfully grants access to the network 170. When authorization succeeds, the method 400 proceeds to operation 460 to secure the account to which authorization was granted, and when authorization fails, the method 400 proceeds to operation 470 to protect the network from possible attacks.
[0055] At operation 460, the account corresponding to the exposed credential is protected. Because the authorization request may be sent from a legitimate user who is unaware that the credential has been exposed from another network, protecting the account includes, but is not limited to, account-specific security measures: alerting an administrator or user to change a password, requiring an additional authentication factor (e.g., a secret question / answer challenge, issuing an access token to an auxiliary device), logging the user out of the account, automatically resetting the account password, limiting access to sensitive files / locations in the network, preventing remote access to the account, locking the account, and marking the account for management review. The method 400 then proceeds to operation 470.
[0056] At operation 470, the network 170 is secured against possible attacks. In various aspects, in response to an authentication request using leaked credentials that successfully or unsuccessfully grants access to the network, operation 470 is performed, and network-specific security measures that may be taken include, but are not limited to: implementing ACLs (e.g., blacklisting the IP address from which the authentication request was sent, activating a whitelist to allow only authentication requests from trusted IP addresses), blocking the port to which the authentication request was addressed, migrating the machine within the network or otherwise changing its IP address, requiring multi-factor authentication, and implementing additional packet filtering techniques. Method 400 may end after operation 470.
[0057] Smart Feed 180
[0058] Although the implementation has been described in the general context of program modules that execute with an application program running on an operating system on a computer, those skilled in the art will recognize that these aspects may also be implemented with other program modules. Typically, program modules include routines, programs, components, data structures, and other types of structures that perform specific tasks or implement specific abstract data types.
[0059] The various aspects and functions described herein may be operated via a variety of computing systems including, but not limited to, desktop computer systems, wired and wireless computing systems, mobile computing systems (e.g., mobile phones, netbooks, tablet or slate computers, notebook computers, and laptop computers), handheld devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, minicomputers, and mainframe computers.
[0060] In addition, according to one aspect, the various aspects and functions described herein operate on a distributed system (e.g., a cloud-based computing system) in which application functions, memory, data storage and retrieval, and various processing functions operate remotely from each other via a distributed computing network such as the Internet or an intranet. According to one aspect, the user interface and various types of information are displayed via an onboard computing device display or via a remote display unit associated with one or more computing devices. For example, the user interface and various types of information are displayed and interacted with on a wall surface onto which the user interface and various types of information are projected. Interaction with multiple computing systems of practical implementations includes keystroke input, touch screen input, voice or other audio input, gesture input, where the associated computing device is equipped with detection (e.g., camera) functionality for capturing and interpreting user gestures to control computing devices, etc.
[0061] Figure 5 , Fig. 6A and Figure 6B The and associated descriptions provide a discussion of various operating environments in which examples may be practiced. Figure 5 , Fig. 6A and Figure 6B Rather, the devices and systems shown and discussed are for purposes of example and explanation and are not intended to limit the wide variety of computing device configurations that may be used to practice the aspects described herein.
[0062] Figure 5 is a block diagram illustrating the physical components (i.e., hardware) of an example computing device 500 that may be used to practice the present disclosure. In a basic configuration, the computing device 500 includes at least one processing unit 502 and a system memory 504. According to one aspect, depending on the configuration and type of the computing device, the system memory 504 includes, but is not limited to, volatile storage (e.g., random access memory), non-volatile storage (e.g., read-only memory), flash memory, or any combination of such memories. According to one aspect, the system memory 504 includes an operating system 505 and one or more program modules 506 suitable for running software applications 550. According to one aspect, the system memory 504 includes an SDC controller for enabling the software applications 550 to employ the teachings of the present disclosure via stored instructions. For example, the operating system 505 is suitable for controlling the operation of the computing device 500. In addition, various aspects are practiced in conjunction with a graphics library, other operating systems, or any other application, and are not limited to any particular application or system. This basic configuration is described in detail in detail in detail. Figure 5 508. According to one aspect, computing device 500 has additional features or functionality. For example, according to one aspect, computing device 500 includes additional data storage devices (removable and / or non-removable), such as, for example, magnetic disks, optical disks, or tapes. Such additional storage devices may be used to store data. Figure 5 , illustrated by a removable storage device 509 and a non-removable storage device 510.
[0063] As described above, according to one aspect, a plurality of program modules and data files are stored in system memory 504. When executed on processing unit 502, program modules 506 perform processes including, but not limited to: Figure 3 and Figure 4 According to one aspect, other program modules are used according to examples and include applications such as email and contact applications, word processing applications, spreadsheet applications, database applications, slide presentation applications, drawing or computer-aided applications.
[0064] According to one aspect, the computing device 500 has one or more input devices 512, such as a keyboard, a mouse, a pen, a voice input device, a touch input device, etc. According to one aspect, it also includes (multiple) output devices 514, such as a display, a speaker, a printer, etc. The above devices are examples, and other devices can be used. According to one aspect, the computing device 500 includes one or more communication interfaces 516 that allow communication with other computing devices 518. Examples of suitable communication interfaces 516 include, but are not limited to, radio frequency (RF) transmitters, receivers, and / or transceiver circuits; universal serial bus (USB) ports, parallel and / or serial ports, and Ethernet ports.
[0065] The term computer-readable media as used herein includes computer storage media devices and articles of manufacture. Computer storage media include volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer-readable instructions, data structures or program modules. System memory 504, removable storage device 509 and non-removable storage device 510 are all examples of computer storage media (i.e., memory storage devices). According to one aspect, computer storage media include RAM, ROM, electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage device, magnetic cassette, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage device or other magnetic storage device, or any other article that can be used to store information and can be accessed by computing device 500. According to one aspect, any such computer storage media is part of computing device 500. Computer storage media do not include carrier waves or other propagated data signals.
[0066] According to one aspect, communication media is embodied by computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and includes any information delivery media. According to one aspect, the term "modulated data signal" describes a signal that has one or more characteristics set or changed in a manner that enables information to be encoded in the signal. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media includes wired media such as a wired network or direct-wired connection, and wireless media such as acoustic, radio frequency (RF), infrared and other wireless media.
[0067] Fig. 6A and Figure 6B A mobile computing device 600 is shown that can be used to practice these aspects or can be used as an ASD 110, such as a mobile phone, a smart phone, a tablet personal computer, a laptop computer, etc. Fig. 6A , an example of a mobile computing device 600 for implementing these aspects is shown. In a basic configuration, the mobile computing device 600 is a handheld computer having both input elements and output elements. The mobile computing device 600 typically includes a display 605 and one or more input buttons 610 that allow a user to enter information into the mobile computing device 600. According to one aspect, the display 605 of the mobile computing device 600 is used as an input device (e.g., a touch screen display). If included, an optional side input element 615 allows further user input. According to one aspect, the side input element 615 is a rotary switch, a button, or any other type of manual input element. In an alternative example, the mobile computing device 600 includes more or fewer input elements. For example, in some examples, the display 605 may not be a touch screen. In an alternative example, the mobile computing device 600 is a portable telephone system, such as a cellular phone. According to one aspect, the mobile computing device 600 includes an optional keypad 635. According to one aspect, the optional keypad 635 is a physical keypad. According to another aspect, the optional keypad 635 is a "soft" keypad generated on the touch screen display. In various aspects, output elements include a display 605 for showing a graphical user interface (GUI), a visual indicator 620 (e.g., a light emitting diode), and / or an audio transducer 625 (e.g., a speaker). In some examples, the mobile computing device 600 incorporates a vibration transducer for providing tactile feedback to the user. In yet another example, the mobile computing device 600 incorporates a peripheral device port 640 for sending or receiving signals to or from an external device, such as an audio input (e.g., a microphone jack), an audio output (e.g., a headphone jack), and a video output (e.g., an HDMI port).
[0068] Figure 6B6 is a block diagram illustrating the architecture of one example of a mobile computing device. That is, the mobile computing device 600 incorporates a system (i.e., architecture) 602 used to implement some examples. In one example, the system 602 is implemented as a "smart phone" capable of running one or more applications (e.g., a browser, email, calendar, contact manager, messaging client, game, and media client / player). In some examples, the system 602 is integrated into a computing device, such as an integrated personal digital assistant (PDA) and wireless phone.
[0069] According to one aspect, one or more application programs 650 are loaded into the memory 662 and run on or in association with the operating system 664. Examples of application programs include a phone dialer program, an email program, a personal information management (PIM) program, a word processing program, a spreadsheet program, an Internet browser program, a messaging program, etc. According to one aspect, a client for accessing a network is loaded into the memory 662. The system 602 also includes a non-volatile storage area 668 within the memory 662. The non-volatile storage area 668 is used to store persistent information that should not be lost when the system 602 is powered off. The application programs 650 can use and store information in the non-volatile storage area 668, such as emails or other messages used by the email application. A synchronization application (not shown) also resides on the system 602 and is programmed to interact with a corresponding synchronization application residing on the host computer to synchronize the information stored in the non-volatile storage area 668 with the corresponding information stored at the host computer. It should be appreciated that other applications may be loaded into memory 662 and executed on mobile computing device 600 .
[0070] According to one aspect, the system 602 has a power source 670 implemented as one or more batteries. According to one aspect, the power source 670 also includes an external power source, such as an AC adapter or a powered docking station, to replenish or recharge the batteries.
[0071] According to one aspect, the system 602 includes a radio 672 that performs the functions of transmitting and receiving radio frequency communications. The radio 672 facilitates wireless connectivity between the system 602 and the "outside world" via a communications carrier or service provider. Transmissions to and from the radio 672 are performed under the control of the operating system 664. In other words, communications received by the radio 672 can be propagated to the application 650 via the operating system 664, and vice versa.
[0072] According to one aspect, visual indicator 620 is used to provide visual notification, and / or audio interface 674 is used to generate audible notification via audio transducer 625. In the example shown, visual indicator 620 is a light emitting diode (LED) and audio transducer 625 is a speaker. These devices can be directly coupled to power supply 670 so that when activated, they remain turned on for the duration indicated by the notification mechanism, even if processor 660 and other components may be turned off to save battery power. LED can be programmed to remain on indefinitely until the user takes action to indicate the power-on state of the device. Audio interface 674 is used to provide audible signals to the user and receive audible signals from the user. For example, in addition to being coupled to audio transducer 625, audio interface 674 can also be coupled to a microphone to receive audible input, such as to facilitate telephone conversations. According to one aspect, system 602 also includes a video interface 676 that enables the operation of vehicle-mounted camera 630 to record still images, video streams, etc.
[0073] According to one aspect, the mobile computing device 600 implementing the system 602 has additional features or functionality. For example, the mobile computing device 600 includes additional data storage devices (removable and / or non-removable), such as magnetic disks, optical disks, or tapes. Such additional storage devices may be used to store data in a manner that is convenient for the user to use. Figure 6B , shown by non-volatile storage area 668.
[0074] According to one aspect, data / information generated or captured by the mobile computing device 600 and stored via the system 602 is stored locally on the mobile computing device 600, as described above. According to another aspect, the data is stored on any number of storage media accessible by the device via the radio 672 or via a wired connection between the mobile computing device 600 and a separate computing device associated with the mobile computing device 600 (e.g., a server computer in a distributed computing network such as the Internet). It should be appreciated that such data / information can be accessed via the mobile computing device 600 via the radio 672 or via a distributed computing network. Similarly, according to one aspect, such data / information is readily transferred between computing devices for storage and use according to well-known data / information transmission and storage means, including email and collaborative data / information sharing systems.
[0075] For example, implementations are described above with reference to block diagrams and / or operational diagrams of methods, systems, and computer program products in various aspects. The functions / actions recorded in the boxes may not occur in the order shown in any flow chart. For example, two boxes shown in succession may actually be executed substantially simultaneously, or these boxes may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functions / actions involved.
[0076] The description and illustration of one or more examples provided in this application are not intended to limit or restrict the scope of the claims in any way. The various aspects, examples and details provided in this application are considered to be sufficient to convey ownership and enable others to make and use the best mode. Implementation should not be interpreted as being limited to any aspect, example or detail provided in this application. Whether shown and described in combination or individually, it is intended to selectively include or omit various features (structures and methods) to produce examples with specific feature sets. Description and illustration of the application have been provided, and those skilled in the art can envision variations, modifications and alternative examples that fall within the spirit of the broader aspects of the overall inventive concepts embodied in this application without departing from the broader scope of the present disclosure.
Claims
1. A method for securing a first network from attack, the method comprising: receiving, at a secure device hub within the domain of the first network, an intelligence feed from an intelligence service, the intelligence feed comprising an exposed username and an exposed password associated with the exposed username, wherein the exposed username and the exposed password are exposed outside the domain of a second network; determining, by the security device center, whether the exposed username matches an internal username existing in an active directory within the domain; Based on determining that the exposed username matches an internal username existing in the active directory, identifying a local account associated with the internal username and attempting, by the secure device center, to log into the local account using the exposed password; and Based on successfully logging into the local account, the local account is secured, wherein securing the local account includes locking the local account to prevent access.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein concluding that the identified local account is secure is based on determining that the exposed username is not found in the active directory. 3 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the local account is concluded to be secure based on an unsuccessful login to the local account.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the intelligence feed is received according to a pull model in response to the security device center sending a request to an intelligent service hosted outside the first network, wherein the intelligent service operates to collect the exposed usernames and the exposed passwords. 5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the intelligence feed is received according to a push model, wherein the intelligence feed is periodically received from an intelligence service hosted external to the first network.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein instead of using a username to secure the first network, the method uses one or more of: an email address, an account name, a personal name, and a social security number. The method of claim 1 , wherein the local account in the first network is secured by applying network-specific security procedures.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the network-specific security process comprises at least one of the following: Implement access control lists; Blocking ports; and Multi-factor authentication is required to access the local account.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein, instead of locking the local account to prevent access, securing the local account comprises at least one of: Restrict access to sensitive files and systems from said local accounts; Resetting a local password associated with the local account; contacting a user associated with the local account to change the local password; as well as The local account is marked for manual review.
10. An apparatus for securing a first network from attack, the apparatus comprising: at least one processor device; as well as a memory operatively connected to the at least one processor, the memory storing instructions that, when executed, cause the at least one processor device to: receiving, at a secure device center within a domain of a first network, an intelligence feed from an intelligence service, the intelligence feed comprising an exposed username and an exposed password associated with the exposed username, wherein the exposed username and the exposed password are exposed outside a domain of a second network; determining, by the security device center, whether the exposed username matches an internal username existing in an active directory within the domain; Based on determining that the exposed username matches an internal username existing in the active directory, identifying a local account associated with the internal username and attempting, by the secure device center, to log into the local account using the exposed password; and Based on successfully logging into the local account, the local account is secured, wherein securing the local account includes locking the local account to prevent access.
11. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein determining whether the exposed username matches an internal username provides for determining a match when the exposed username differs from the internal username by a slight variation.
12. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein instead of locking the local account to prevent access, securing the local account comprises at least one of: Restrict access to sensitive files and systems from said local accounts; Resetting a local password associated with the local account; contacting a user associated with the local account to change the local password; as well as The local account is marked for manual review.
13. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein the local account is secured by applying a network-specific security process, the network-specific security process comprising at least one of: Implement access control lists; Blocking ports; and Multi-factor authentication is required to access the local account.
14. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein the intelligence feed is received according to a pull model in response to the security device center sending a request to an intelligence service hosted outside the first network, wherein the intelligence service operates to collect the exposed usernames and the exposed passwords. The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the local account is concluded to be secure based on an unsuccessful login to the local account.
16. A computer-readable non-volatile storage medium device comprising computer-executable instructions that, when executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform a method comprising: receiving, at a secure device center within a first network, an intelligence feed from an intelligence service, the intelligence feed comprising an exposed username and an exposed password associated with the exposed username, wherein the exposed username and the exposed password are exposed in a second network; receiving, at the secure device center, an authentication request for accessing a local account at the first network, wherein the authentication request includes a username and an encrypted portion; attempting to decrypt the encrypted portion of the received authentication request by utilizing the received exposed password; upon successful decryption of the encrypted portion of the received authentication request, attempting to access the local account of the first network based on the decrypted portion of the received authentication request and the exposed password; securing the first network based on unsuccessful access to the first network, wherein securing the first network comprises blocking a port to which the authentication request is sent; as well as Based on successfully accessing the first network, the local account of the first network is secured, wherein securing the local account includes locking the local account to prevent access.
17. A computer-readable non-volatile storage medium device according to claim 16, wherein the intelligent feed is received according to a pull model in response to the security device center sending a request to an intelligent service hosted outside the first network, wherein the intelligent service operates to collect the exposed username and the exposed password.
18. The computer-readable non-volatile storage medium device of claim 16, wherein instead of locking the local account to prevent access, securing the local account comprises at least one of: Restrict access to sensitive files and systems from said local accounts; Resetting a local password associated with the local account; contacting a user associated with the local account to change the local password; as well as The local account is marked for manual review.
19. The computer-readable non-volatile storage medium device of claim 16, wherein the encrypted portion is determined to be successfully decrypted based on application of the exposed password to the encrypted portion generating a field formatted as a timestamp.
20. The computer-readable non-volatile storage medium device of claim 16, wherein instead of blocking the port to which the authentication request is sent, making the first network secure comprises at least one of: Implement access control lists; and Multi-factor authentication is required to access the local account.
