Certification management methods, devices, electronic equipment and storage media
By embedding TPM or TPCM chips in smart network interface cards (NICs) and using them as trusted roots for measurement and communication, the security authentication problem of servers and network access devices is solved, system costs are reduced, and security authentication requirements are met.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202310703570.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-06-13
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-06-13
AI Technical Summary
In the current technology, there is no effective solution for how to effectively authenticate the security of servers and network access devices, resulting in unmet security requirements, while the deployment of security chips increases costs.
By embedding TPM or TPCM chips in smart network interface cards (NICs) and using them as trusted roots for measurement and communication, the authentication requirements for servers are reduced, and the deployment of security chips in servers is avoided.
This achieves the goal of meeting security authentication requirements without increasing server costs, thereby reducing the overall security authentication cost of the system.
Smart Images

Figure CN116743458B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to an authentication management method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium. Background Technology
[0002] Cloud computing requires a large number of servers, which can connect to the network and interact with data through dedicated network access devices. A core requirement of cloud computing is security, namely ensuring the security and trustworthiness of servers and network access devices.
[0003] There is currently no effective solution for authenticating the security of servers and network access devices. Summary of the Invention
[0004] This application provides an authentication management method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium to reduce authentication costs while meeting authentication requirements.
[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide an authentication management method, which is applied to a device performing authentication and may specifically include:
[0006] Based on the trigger command, the specified component is measured.
[0007] If the measurement results are reliable, communicate with the device to be certified to receive the measured feature values of the device to be certified.
[0008] The received test feature values of the device to be authenticated are measured.
[0009] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide an authentication management method, which is applied to a device to be authenticated and may specifically include:
[0010] Based on the trigger command, listen for notifications sent by the device performing the authentication; the notification is used to indicate that the device performing the authentication is trustworthy.
[0011] Upon receiving the notification, the calculated test feature value of the device to be certified is sent to the device performing the certification.
[0012] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide an authentication management device, which may include:
[0013] The measurement module is used to measure specified components based on trigger commands;
[0014] The communication module is used to communicate with the device to be certified to receive the measured feature values of the device to be certified, provided that the measurement results are reliable.
[0015] The measurement module is also used to measure the received feature values to be measured.
[0016] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide an authentication management device, which may include:
[0017] The monitoring control module is used to listen for notifications sent by the device performing authentication based on trigger commands; the notifications are used to indicate that the device performing authentication is trustworthy.
[0018] The test feature value sending module is used to send the calculated test feature value of the device to be authenticated to the device performing authentication when a notification is received.
[0019] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the processor, when executing the computer program, implements the method described in any of the above-mentioned embodiments.
[0020] Sixthly, embodiments of this application provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0021] Compared with the prior art, this application has the following advantages:
[0022] According to the embodiments of this application, the device to be certified does not need to perform measurement locally. Instead, it sends the feature value to be measured to the device performing the certification, which has already performed local measurement. The device performing the certification then measures the device to be certified. Therefore, on the one hand, security requirements can be met through certification, and on the other hand, there is no need to deploy a security chip in the device to be certified, thereby reducing costs.
[0023] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application, it can be implemented according to the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more obvious and understandable, specific embodiments of this application are given below. Attached Figure Description
[0024] In the accompanying drawings, unless otherwise specified, the same reference numerals throughout the various drawings denote the same or similar parts or elements. These drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale. It should be understood that these drawings depict only some embodiments according to this application and should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application.
[0025] Figure 1 One of the scenario diagrams illustrating the authentication management method provided in this application;
[0026] Figure 2 The second scenario illustration of the authentication management method provided for this application;
[0027] Figure 3 This is one of the flowcharts of an authentication management method according to an embodiment of this application;
[0028] Figure 4 This is a second flowchart of an embodiment of the authentication management method of this application;
[0029] Figure 5 This is one of the structural block diagrams of an authentication management device according to an embodiment of this application;
[0030] Figure 6 This is a second structural block diagram of an authentication management device according to an embodiment of this application; and
[0031] Figure 7 This is a block diagram of an electronic device used to implement embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0032] In the following description, only certain exemplary embodiments are briefly described. As those skilled in the art will recognize, the described embodiments can be modified in various ways without departing from the concept or scope of this application. Therefore, the drawings and description are considered to be exemplary in nature and not restrictive.
[0033] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, the relevant technologies of the embodiments of this application are described below. The following relevant technologies are optional solutions and can be combined with the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application in any way, and all of them fall within the protection scope of the embodiments of this application.
[0034] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an application scenario for implementing the method of this application embodiment. The network access device can be a smart network interface card (NIC). Typically, one smart NIC can communicate with multiple servers, enabling each server to access the network and interact with data through the smart NIC. Figure 1 In, CN0 to CN n It can be used to represent n servers, where n is a positive integer.
[0035] exist Figure 1In this system, a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip or a Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) chip is embedded in the smart network interface card (NIC) to ensure its security. TPM is an international standard for secure cryptographic processors that integrates encryption keys into the device through a dedicated microcontroller to protect the hardware. TPCM, as a domestically developed and controllable trusted node, embeds a root of trust, adding root of trust control functionality to the TPM to achieve proactive control and measurement based on cryptography. The TPCM chip can boot before the central processing unit (CPU) and verify the Basic Input / Output System (BIOS), enabling TPCM to actively control the entire device. This changes the traditional view of TPM chips as passive devices. The measurement process of the TPM or TPCM chip can include running the relevant programs of the TPM or TPCM chip after booting to complete the measurement of the smart NIC.
[0036] In servers, security chips are typically used to ensure security. Security chips are used for all intentions and purposes inaccessible from outside the computer ecosystem, protecting data and applications and helping to build trust throughout the software ecosystem. Security chips in servers can communicate with the BMC (Browser Control Center) in the smart network interface card (NIC) to mutually assure each other of trust. Figure 1 In the example shown, a TPM chip or TPCM chip needs to be deployed in the smart network interface card (NIC), and a security chip needs to be deployed in each server to achieve security verification for the entire system. This will increase the cost to some extent.
[0037] In this regard, combined with Figure 2 As shown, costs can be reduced by upgrading the entire system's authentication process. Specifically, a TPM chip or TPCM chip is embedded in the smart network interface card (NIC). The smart NIC's trustworthiness is achieved through the measurement performed by the TPM or TPCM chip. Thus, the smart NIC can act as a root of trust (ROT). The smart NIC sends its trustworthiness results to each server via its Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). The server receives the results from the smart NIC's BMC through its own BMC, allowing the server to calculate its target feature value. The calculated target feature value is then sent to the smart NIC's BMC via the server's BMC. On the smart NIC side, the target feature value of the server is measured. If the measurement result shows that the target feature value matches the pre-stored trusted feature value, the server's authentication is successful.
[0038] Therefore, through the above authentication process, a trusted smart network interface card (NIC) serves as the root of trust. Information is transmitted via communication between the NIC's Base Code Center (BMC) and the server's BMC. This includes the NIC transmitting its own verification results to the server, and the server transmitting the target feature value to the NIC. Finally, the NIC measures the target feature value to complete the server authentication. Thus, the authentication process can be achieved without deploying a security chip in the server. Since the entire system typically consists of smart NICs and multiple servers, eliminating the need for security chips in each server reduces the overall system cost while ensuring security.
[0039] This application provides an authentication management method, such as... Figure 3 The diagram shown is a flowchart of an authentication management method according to an embodiment of this application. This method can be applied to a device performing authentication, and the method may specifically include:
[0040] Step S301: Measure the specified component based on the trigger command.
[0041] The executing entity in the current embodiment can be a device that performs authentication. (If compared...) Figure 2 In this context, a smart network interface card (NIC) can be used as the device performing authentication, and a server as the device to be authenticated. A single smart NIC can connect to multiple servers simultaneously, providing network services to all connected servers. Furthermore, in other scenarios, the device performing authentication and the device to be authenticated may be other electronic devices, depending on the specific scenario.
[0042] Based on trigger commands, specific components of the device performing authentication can be measured. Trigger commands can be generated upon detecting the device's power-on, generated at regular intervals, or generated upon receiving information about a component update from the device to be authenticated. Taking a power-on trigger command as an example, in response to the trigger command, components in the device performing authentication are started one by one according to a pre-configured startup process. For example, combined with... Figure 2 As shown, based on trigger instructions, the programmable logic device (CPLD) of the authentication device controls the power-on of the measurement components according to the pre-configured power-on sequence.
[0043] The component performing the measurement can be a TPM chip or a TPCM chip. The measurement process may include running the relevant programs on the TPM chip or TPCM chip. First, using the TPM chip or TPCM chip as the root of trust, the components or applications included in the device performing authentication are measured step-by-step according to the boot process. For example, the BIOS (corresponding to BIOSFLASH in the diagram) can be measured first. If the measurement result is trustworthy, the System-on-Chips (SoC) can be measured, and if the measurement result is trustworthy, the BMC can be measured. This process continues until the trust transfer is completed. All measurement values are faithfully recorded in the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) inside the TPM chip or TPCM chip. Correspondingly, the programmable logic device can perform power-on control sequentially based on the measurement order.
[0044] Step S302: If the measurement result is reliable, communicate with the device to be certified to receive the measured feature value of the device to be certified.
[0045] After all verifications are completed and reliable measurement results are obtained, the entire device performing the authentication can be considered a root of trust. Therefore, the device performing the authentication can communicate with the device to be authenticated. The purpose of this communication is to obtain the target feature value of the device to be authenticated. For example, the communication process may include: the device performing the authentication sending information indicating that its measurement result is reliable to the device to be authenticated via point-to-point communication or broadcast communication. Upon receiving the notification, the device to be authenticated can calculate its own target feature value.
[0046] Taking a server as an example, the device to be authenticated typically contains multiple components. Some of these components have questionable trustworthiness, while others are known trusted components. The known trusted components do not require measurement, while the components with questionable trustworthiness do. Typically, components like the BIOS and BMC are considered to have questionable trustworthiness. The feature value to be measured can be the result of a hash operation on the identifier or other features of the components with questionable trustworthiness. For example, the hash algorithm could be SHA-1, SHA256, or SM3. Finally, the device to be authenticated sends the hash result as a notification to the device performing the authentication, completing communication between them so that the device performing the authentication receives the feature value to be measured from the device to be authenticated.
[0047] Step S303: Measure the received test feature values of the device to be authenticated.
[0048] Measuring the received test feature value of the device to be authenticated can be achieved by comparing the test feature value with a trusted feature value. The trusted feature value can be pre-stored or obtained from a trusted third-party organization. If obtained from a third-party organization, the trusted feature value can be asymmetric encrypted data to enhance security. For example, the third-party organization can encrypt the trusted feature value using a public key, and the device performing the authentication can decrypt it using its private key after receiving the encrypted trusted feature value to obtain the data. Therefore, the received test feature value of the device to be authenticated can be measured based on the trusted feature value to obtain the measurement result.
[0049] The measurement results can be credible or untrustworthy, and corresponding responses can be taken based on the different results. For example, if the measurement result is credible, the server can be notified to start normally; conversely, if the measurement result is untrustworthy, an alarm or further authentication processing is required.
[0050] Through this process, the device to be certified does not need to perform measurement locally. Instead, it sends the feature values to be measured to the device performing the certification, which has already performed local measurement. The device performing the certification then measures the device to be certified. On the one hand, security requirements can be met through certification; on the other hand, there is no need to deploy a security chip in the device to be certified, thereby reducing costs.
[0051] In one implementation, the step S301 involving measuring the characteristic value of the received device to be authenticated may include:
[0052] Step S3011: Obtain the trusted feature value of the device to be authenticated; the trusted feature value is pre-stored.
[0053] Before measurement, pre-stored trusted feature values need to be obtained as a measurement reference. Trusted feature values can be pre-stored in the device performing the authentication. A trusted feature value can be the feature value of the device to be authenticated in a trusted state. A trusted state can be the feature value calculated during the device's initial operation; the feature value calculated when the device is first deployed to the data center; the feature value calculated when the application is first installed on the device, etc. In other words, a trusted state corresponds to a state where no attack has occurred.
[0054] Step S3012: Compare the feature value to be measured with the reliable feature value to perform a measurement.
[0055] Taking the device to be authenticated as a server as an example, common attack behaviors can include stealing private data stored on the server; hijacking the server, rendering at least one component in the server inoperable, etc. Attacks on servers can be carried out through actions such as maliciously implanting infected components, installing unauthorized components, and replacing normal updates with counterfeit components that can bypass any existing protection mechanisms during automatic component updates. Therefore, if the comparison result of the tested feature value and the trusted feature value is consistent, it indicates that the measurement component on the server has not been attacked, and the server is trustworthy. Conversely, if the comparison result of the tested feature value and the trusted feature value is inconsistent, it indicates that the server has most likely been attacked and is untrustworthy.
[0056] In one implementation, the step S302 involving communicating with the device to be authenticated to receive the test feature value of the device to be authenticated may include:
[0057] Step S3021: Control the first baseboard management controller to send a notification to the second baseboard management controller. The first baseboard management controller is the baseboard management controller of the device performing the authentication, and the second baseboard management controller is the baseboard management controller of the device to be authenticated. The notification is used to characterize the trustworthiness of the device performing the authentication.
[0058] After all verifications are completed and a reliable measurement result is obtained, the device performing the authentication can be considered trustworthy. Therefore, the device performing the authentication can be considered a root of trust. Inside the device performing the authentication, it communicates with the BMC via a TPM chip or TPCM chip to send the reliable measurement result to the BMC. The BMC within the device performing the authentication can be referred to as the first BMC (First Baseboard Management Controller).
[0059] The first BMC can act as a communication bridge between the device performing the authentication and the device to be authenticated, sending notifications indicating the trustworthiness of the device performing the authentication to the BMC of the device to be authenticated. To distinguish it from the first BMC in the device performing the authentication, the BMC in the device to be authenticated can be referred to as the second BMC (Second Baseboard Management Controller). For example, the first BMC and the second BMC can communicate via serial port connection, USB connection, or similar means.
[0060] Step S3022: The feature value received by the first baseboard management controller is used as the test feature value of the device to be certified. The test feature value is sent by the device to be certified in response to the notification.
[0061] In one scenario, the device to be authenticated and the device performing the authentication can receive trigger commands simultaneously. Based on this, after the device to be authenticated starts up according to the trigger command, the programmable logic device (PLC) within it can prioritize starting the second BMC (Browser Control Center) according to a pre-configured power-on sequence. Once the second BMC receives a notification from the first BMC indicating that the device performing the authentication is trustworthy, it can use this notification as a start command to initiate the main control unit of the device to be authenticated to calculate the characteristic values of components whose trustworthiness is pending. There can be one or more components whose trustworthiness is pending. For example, the second BMC, the BIOS, etc., can all be components whose trustworthiness is pending.
[0062] The feature value to be tested can be the result of a hash operation on the feature code or identifier of a component whose trustworthiness is yet to be determined. Ultimately, the device to be authenticated will send the hash operation result as a notification response to the device performing the authentication. The first BMC of the device performing the authentication will use the feature value received from the second BMC as the feature value to be tested for the device to be authenticated.
[0063] In one implementation, the process of sending a notification to the second substrate management controller and receiving a feature value is executed by controlling the first substrate management controller in a trusted execution environment.
[0064] The first Business Execution Environment (BMC) can include a Rich Execution Environment (REE) and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The REE is an open environment vulnerable to malware attacks, such as the theft of sensitive data, abuse of digital rights management, and misuse of mobile payments. The TEE can include a general-purpose secure kernel, a Trusted User Interface (TUI), and its own operating system. The TEE is an independent runtime environment running outside of the general operating system. The TUI provides a secure interface for trusted applications and users within the TEE, enabling communication between the first and second BMCs. The TEE provides security services to the REE while remaining isolated from it; that is, the REE and its applications cannot directly access the hardware and software resources of the TEE. Trusted applications can execute within the TEE, providing a reliable runtime environment for the REE. End-to-end security is ensured through protection of confidentiality and integrity, and control of data access permissions. Furthermore, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) can run in parallel with a Rich Execution Environment (REE). The TEE can interact with the REE through a secure Application Programming Interface (API).
[0065] Therefore, when the first baseboard management controller sends a notification to the second baseboard management controller, the notification can be sent within the trusted execution environment of the first baseboard management controller, thereby ensuring data security.
[0066] In one implementation, it may further include:
[0067] If the measurement result of the feature value to be tested is reliable, send the authentication pass information to the device to be authenticated.
[0068] Successful authentication information can be used to power on and start the device to be authenticated. For example, if the device performing the authentication is a smart network interface card (NIC) and the device to be authenticated is a server, once the smart NIC confirms that the server has passed trusted identity authentication, the server can power on and start, and then connect to the network through the smart NIC. For instance, the server can establish a data transmission channel with computing nodes providing services in the network through the smart NIC, and transmit data based on the data transmission channel to achieve the purpose of the server accessing the network and interacting with data.
[0069] In one implementation, it may further include:
[0070] If the measurement result of the feature value to be tested is unreliable, determine the reason for the unreliability; the reasons for unreliability include unreliability caused by changes in components in the device to be certified, or unreliability caused by the illegitimacy of the device to be certified.
[0071] If the measured feature value of the device to be certified is inconsistent with the trusted feature value, it indicates that the measurement result of the measured feature value is untrustworthy. There may be various reasons for this untrustworthiness, such as an attack on the device, changes to components within the device, or failure to update stored trusted feature values in a timely manner. Therefore, an early warning action can be initiated when the measurement result of the measured feature value is untrustworthy.
[0072] Warning actions may include sending an unreliable measurement result to the device to be certified, and refusing or cutting off communication with the device. Furthermore, warning actions may also include determining the reason for the unreliability of the measurement of the device to be certified. The reason for unreliability may be due to changes in components within the device to be certified, or due to the device being illegitimate. The determination of the reason for unreliability can be achieved by parsing and analyzing the logs of the device to be certified.
[0073] In one implementation, determining the cause of unreliability may include:
[0074] Identify change records for specified components in the device to be certified;
[0075] Based on the change records, determine the reasons for the lack of credibility.
[0076] The specified component in the device to be authenticated can be a component whose trustworthiness is pending. Change records for the specified component are typically recorded in the logs of the device to be authenticated. These logs can be obtained through communication with the device to be authenticated. Once the logs are obtained, they can be parsed to query the change records for the specified component.
[0077] If the query result indicates a change to a specified component, communication with the device to be authenticated can confirm whether the change was initiated by a server operator. For example, a query for a specified component change can be sent to the device to be authenticated. If the query confirms that the change was initiated by a server operator, the reason for untrustworthiness can be determined as a component change in the device to be authenticated. This allows for updating the trust feature value, thus preventing erroneous authentication in subsequent attempts.
[0078] Conversely, if the response to the query indicates that the change of the specified component was not an active change by the server operator, or if no information related to the change of the specified component is detected in the logs of the device to be authenticated, it can be determined that the reason for the untrustworthiness is that the device to be authenticated is illegitimate.
[0079] This application provides an authentication management method, such as... Figure 4 The diagram shown is a flowchart of an authentication management method according to an embodiment of this application. This method can be applied to a device to be authenticated, and the method may specifically include:
[0080] Step S401: Based on the trigger command, listen for the notification sent by the device performing the authentication; the notification is used to indicate that the device performing the authentication is trustworthy.
[0081] The executing entity in the current embodiment can be the device to be authenticated. If compared... Figure 2 In this context, a smart network interface card (NIC) can be used as the device performing authentication, and a server as the device to be authenticated. A single smart NIC can connect to multiple servers simultaneously, providing network services to all connected servers.
[0082] The trigger command can be generated when the device to be authenticated powers on, or it can be generated at regular intervals, or it can be generated after the device to be authenticated undergoes a component update. Taking a power-on trigger command as an example, in response to the trigger command, the programmable logic device (PLD) can be powered on first. Subsequently, the PLD controls the power-on of the listening component according to a pre-configured power-on sequence to listen for notifications sent by the device performing the authentication. The notification can be used to characterize whether the device performing the authentication is trusted; that is, a notification will only be sent to the device to be authenticated if the device performing the authentication is a trusted device.
[0083] Step S402: Upon receiving the notification, the calculated test feature value of the device to be certified is sent to the device performing the certification.
[0084] When the listening component of the device to be authenticated receives a notification, the main control component can calculate the test feature value of the device. Taking a server as an example, a server typically contains multiple components. Some of these components have questionable trustworthiness, while others are known trusted components. The known trusted components do not require measurement, while the components with questionable trustworthiness do. Generally, important components such as the BIOS and BMC are components with questionable trustworthiness. The test feature value can be the result of a hash operation on the identifier or other characteristics of the components with questionable trustworthiness. For example, the hash algorithm can be SHA-1, SHA256, SM3, etc. The device to be authenticated sends the hash operation result as a notification response to the device performing the authentication. Finally, the device performing the authentication completes the authentication of the device by measuring the test feature value.
[0085] Through the above process, the device to be certified does not need to perform measurement locally. Instead, it sends the feature values to be measured to the device performing the certification, which has already performed local measurement. The device performing the certification then measures the device to be certified. This satisfies the certification requirements on the one hand, and eliminates the need to deploy a security chip in the device to be certified on the other, thereby reducing costs.
[0086] In one implementation, the listening to the notification sent by the device performing the authentication in step S401 and the listening and sending of the feature value to be tested in step S402 are performed by the baseboard management controller controlling the device to be authenticated in a trusted execution environment.
[0087] In the current implementation, the device performing the monitoring can be a BMC (Browser Control Center). The programmable logic device (PLC) of the device to be authenticated controls the power-on sequence, first starting the BMC, and then powering on the BIOS (corresponding to the BIOSFLASH in the diagram) after the BMC is running normally, completing the operating system boot. In the current implementation, after the BMC starts, monitoring can be performed in a trusted execution environment until a notification is received from the device performing the authentication, indicating that the device performing the authentication is trusted. Figure 2 As shown, in Figure 2 In this configuration, a multiplexer (MUX) connects the CPU and the BIOS (corresponding to the BIOSFLASH in the diagram). The multiplexer enables the CPU to read-only access to the BIOS. Alternatively, it can enable read-only access to the BIOS by the CPU until the device to be authenticated is successfully authenticated. Furthermore, the multiplexer can also be connected between the BMC and the BIOS to allow the BMC to access the BIOS within a trusted execution environment.
[0088] Upon receiving the notification, the calculated test characteristic value of the device to be authenticated is sent to the device performing the authentication. This sending process also takes place within a trusted execution environment. Therefore, both the sending and receiving processes occur within a trusted execution environment, ensuring that the received and sent information is not tampered with.
[0089] Corresponding to the application scenarios and methods provided in the embodiments of this application, the embodiments of this application also provide an authentication management device. For example... Figure 5 The diagram shown is a structural block diagram of an authentication management device according to an embodiment of this application. The authentication management device may include:
[0090] The measurement module 501 is used to measure a specified component based on a trigger command;
[0091] The communication module 502 is used to communicate with the device to be certified to receive the measured feature value of the device to be certified, provided that the measurement result is reliable.
[0092] The measurement module 501 is also used to measure the received feature values to be measured.
[0093] In one embodiment, the measurement module 501 may include:
[0094] The trusted feature value acquisition submodule is used to acquire the trusted feature value of the device to be authenticated; the trusted feature value is pre-stored.
[0095] The comparison submodule is used to compare the feature value to be measured with a reliable feature value for measurement.
[0096] In one embodiment, the communication module 502 may include:
[0097] The notification sending control submodule is used to control the first baseboard management controller to send a notification to the second baseboard management controller. The first baseboard management controller is the baseboard management controller of the device performing the authentication, and the second baseboard management controller is the baseboard management controller of the device to be authenticated. The notification is used to characterize the trustworthiness of the device performing the authentication.
[0098] The feature value receiving submodule is used to take the feature value received by the first baseboard management controller as the feature value to be tested of the device to be certified. The feature value is sent by the device to be certified in response to the notification.
[0099] In one implementation, the process of sending a notification to the second substrate management controller and receiving a feature value is executed by controlling the first substrate management controller in a trusted execution environment.
[0100] In one implementation, the communication module 502 can also be used for:
[0101] If the measurement result of the feature value to be tested is reliable, send the authentication pass information to the device to be authenticated.
[0102] In one embodiment, it may further include: an unreliability cause determination module, which is used to determine the cause of unreliability when the measurement result of the feature value to be measured is unreliable; the cause of unreliability includes unreliability caused by component changes in the device to be certified, or unreliability caused by the illegitimacy of the device to be certified.
[0103] In one implementation, the unreliable cause determination module may include:
[0104] The Change Record Determination Submodule is used to determine the change records of specified components in the device to be certified;
[0105] The Untrusted Reason Determination submodule is used to determine the reasons for untrust based on the change log.
[0106] Corresponding to the application scenarios and methods provided in the embodiments of this application, the embodiments of this application also provide an authentication management device. For example... Figure 6 The diagram shown is a structural block diagram of an authentication management device according to an embodiment of this application, which may include:
[0107] The monitoring control module 601 is used to monitor the notifications sent by the device performing the authentication based on the trigger command; the notification is used to indicate that the device performing the authentication is trusted.
[0108] The test feature value sending module 602 is used to send the calculated test feature value of the device to be authenticated to the device performing authentication when a notification is received.
[0109] In one implementation, the listening for notifications and the sending of the characteristics to be tested are performed by the baseboard management controller that controls the device to be authenticated within a trusted execution environment.
[0110] The functions of each module in each device in the embodiments of this application can be found in the corresponding description in the above method, and they have corresponding beneficial effects, which will not be repeated here.
[0111] Figure 7 This is a block diagram of an electronic device used to implement embodiments of this application. For example... Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device includes a memory 710 and a processor 720. The memory 710 stores a computer program that can run on the processor 720. When the processor 720 executes the computer program, it implements the method described in the above embodiments. The number of memories 710 and processors 720 can be one or more.
[0112] The electronic device also includes:
[0113] The communication interface 730 is used to communicate with external devices and perform data exchange and transmission.
[0114] If the memory 710, processor 720, and communication interface 730 are implemented independently, they can be interconnected via a bus to communicate with each other. This bus can be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. This bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 7 The bus is represented by a single thick line, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
[0115] Optionally, in a specific implementation, if the memory 710, processor 720, and communication interface 730 are integrated on a single chip, then the memory 710, processor 720, and communication interface 730 can communicate with each other through an internal interface.
[0116] This application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method provided in this application.
[0117] This application also provides a chip, which includes a processor for calling and executing instructions stored in a memory, causing a communication device with the chip installed to perform the method provided in this application.
[0118] This application also provides a chip, including: an input interface, an output interface, a processor, and a memory. The input interface, output interface, processor, and memory are connected through an internal connection path. The processor is used to execute code in the memory. When the code is executed, the processor is used to execute the method provided in the application embodiment.
[0119] It should be understood that the aforementioned processor can be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. General-purpose processors can be microprocessors or any conventional processor. It is worth noting that the processor can be a processor supporting the Advanced Reduced Instruction Set Computing (ARM) architecture.
[0120] Further, optionally, the aforementioned memory may include read-only memory and random access memory. The memory may be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM), which serves as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of RAM are available. Examples include Static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), Enhanced Synchronous DRAM (ESDRAM), Synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), and Direct Rambus RAM (DRRAM).
[0121] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented in software, it can be implemented, in whole or in part, as a computer program product. A computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions according to this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transferred from one computer-readable storage medium to another.
[0122] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of this application. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of those different embodiments or examples.
[0123] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature. In the description of this application, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.
[0124] Any process or method described in the flowchart or otherwise herein can be understood as representing a module, segment, or portion of code comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing a particular logical function or process. Furthermore, the scope of the preferred embodiments of this application includes additional implementations in which functions may be performed not in the order shown or discussed, including substantially simultaneously or in reverse order depending on the functionality involved.
[0125] The logic and / or steps described in the flowchart or otherwise herein, for example, can be considered as a sequenced list of executable instructions for implementing logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus or device (such as a computer-based system, a processor-included system or other system that can fetch and execute instructions from, an instruction execution system, apparatus or device).
[0126] It should be understood that various parts of this application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented using software or firmware stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. All or part of the steps of the methods in the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware, the program being stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which, when executed, includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiments.
[0127] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into a single processing module, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into a single module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. If the integrated module is implemented as a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it can also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. This storage medium can be a read-only memory, a disk, or an optical disk, etc.
[0128] The above description is merely an exemplary embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various variations or substitutions within the technical scope described in this application, and these should all be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. An authentication management method, characterized in that, An authentication device is used to perform authentication, the authentication device communicating with multiple devices to be authenticated, each device to be authenticated being a physical device independent of the authentication device. The authentication device includes multiple components, including a component for performing metrics. The method includes: Based on the trigger command, the component that performs the execution measurement measures other specified components included in the device that performs the authentication. If the result of the measurement is reliable, the first baseboard management controller of the device performing the authentication communicates with the second baseboard management controller of the device to be authenticated to receive the test feature value of the device to be authenticated; The received feature values to be tested are measured so that the device to be authenticated can be authenticated without deploying a security chip.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The measurement of the received feature value to be measured includes: Obtain the trusted feature value of the device to be authenticated; the trusted feature value is pre-stored. The target feature value is compared with the trusted feature value for measurement.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of communicating with the device to be authenticated to receive the test feature value of the device to be authenticated includes: The first baseboard management controller sends a notification to the second baseboard management controller, the notification being used to characterize the trustworthiness of the device performing the authentication; The feature value received by the first baseboard management controller is used as the test feature value of the device to be certified, and the feature value is sent by the device to be certified in response to the notification.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process of sending a notification to the second substrate management controller and receiving the feature value is executed by controlling the first substrate management controller in a trusted execution environment.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, Also includes: If the measurement result of the feature value to be tested is reliable, then send authentication success information to the device to be authenticated.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that, Also includes: If the measurement result of the feature value to be measured is unreliable, determine the reason for the unreliability; The reasons for unreliability include unreliability due to changes in components of the device to be certified, or unreliability due to the illegitimacy of the device to be certified.
7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The reasons for determining the untrustworthiness include: Determine the change records of specified components in the device to be certified; Based on the change records, determine the reason for the unreliability.
8. An authentication management method, characterized in that, Applied to devices to be certified, including: Based on a trigger command, the system listens for notifications sent by the device performing the authentication. These notifications indicate that the device performing the authentication is trustworthy. The device performing the authentication communicates with multiple devices to be authenticated. Each device to be authenticated is a physical device independent of the device performing the authentication. The device performing the authentication includes multiple components, including a measurement component. This measurement component measures other specified components included in the device performing the authentication based on the trigger command, enabling the devices to be authenticated to achieve authentication without deploying a security chip. A trustworthy measurement result indicates that the device performing the authentication is trustworthy. Upon receiving the notification, the first baseboard management controller of the device performing the authentication communicates with the second baseboard management controller of the device to be authenticated to send the calculated test feature value of the device to be authenticated to the device performing the authentication.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The listening to the notification and the sending of the test feature value are performed by the baseboard management controller controlling the device to be authenticated in a trusted execution environment.
10. An authentication management device, characterized in that, An authentication device is used to perform authentication, which communicates with multiple devices to be authenticated. Each device to be authenticated is a physical device independent of the authentication device. The authentication device includes multiple components, including a component for performing metrics. The measurement module is used to measure other specified components included in the device performing the authentication, based on the trigger command and the component performing the measurement; A communication module is configured to, when the result of the measurement is reliable, communicate with a second baseboard management controller of the device to be certified through a first baseboard management controller of the device performing the certification to receive the test feature value of the device to be certified; The measurement module is also used to measure the received feature value to be tested, so that the device to be authenticated can be authenticated without deploying a security chip.
11. An authentication management device, characterized in that, Applied to devices to be certified, including: A monitoring control module is used to monitor notifications sent by the device performing authentication based on trigger commands. The notifications indicate that the device performing authentication is trustworthy. The device performing authentication communicates with multiple devices to be authenticated. Each device to be authenticated is a physical device independent of the device performing authentication. The device performing authentication includes multiple components, including a measurement component. This measurement component is used to measure other specified components included in the device performing authentication based on trigger commands, enabling the devices to be authenticated to achieve authentication without deploying a security chip. A trustworthy measurement result indicates that the device performing authentication is trustworthy. The test feature value sending module is used to communicate with the second baseboard management controller of the device to be certified through the first baseboard management controller of the device performing the certification, in order to send the calculated test feature value of the device to be certified to the device performing the certification, upon receiving the notification.
12. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory, wherein the processor, when executing the computer program, implements the method of any one of claims 1-9.
13. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method of any one of claims 1-9.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Method for controlling trusted startup and trusted platform control module
CN112231714A
