A secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol for multi-level diversity coding systems
By designing a secure multicast public key cryptography protocol in a multi-level diversity encoding system, using multi-prime multiplication to construct the modulus and 'obfuscation factor' design, the illegal channel access and traditional public key encryption scheme of 'dishonest' users are solved. The security vulnerabilities and inefficiency problems in the multicast system have achieved strict permission control and key management, improving the security and efficiency of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410365909.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-03-28
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-03-28
AI Technical Summary
In multi-level diversity encoding systems, the prior art is difficult to effectively prevent illegal channel access by ‘dishonest’ users and the problems of security vulnerabilities and inefficiency in the multicast system.
A secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol was designed to generate and distribute public and private keys through the trusted key management center, and use multiplicity to construct modulus, combined with the 'obfuscation factor' design to achieve strict channel Permission control and dynamic management of keys ensure that users cannot override decryption and reduce the frequency of key updates.
This protocol effectively prevents 'dishonest' users from over-authorizing access, realizes forward and backward security, reduces the overhead of key storage and updates, and improves the security and efficiency of the system.
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Figure CN118282731B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of network communication, and in particular to a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system. Background Art
[0002] Multilevel Diversity Coding Systems (MDCS) is an excellent system model for distributed, multi-channel communication scenarios and is widely used in the field of distributed storage and communication.
[0003] The predecessor of the multi-level diversity coding system is the Diversity Coding System (DCS), which is also an effective fault-tolerant measure for disk arrays and multi-channel communications: the information in the system is encoded into several data blocks and transmitted through different channels (or stored in distributed disks). In the event of partial channel interruption (or partial disk damage), the information can still be recovered from the surviving channel (or disk) data.
[0004] On this basis, the multi-level diversity coding system adds the level definition of the source and the destination, allowing the source to have different security levels. The source with a low security level must be decoded before the source with a high security level. Multiple sources are encoded by multiple encoders and then transmitted through multiple channels. The destinations in the multi-level diversity coding system also have different decoding levels. The sets of channels that destinations with different decoding levels have access to are also different, and the security level of the source that the destination can restore cannot be higher than its own decoding level. In the multi-level diversity coding system, the threshold confidentiality feature can also be added through the design of the coding scheme, so that when the number of channels that are eavesdropped on does not exceed a certain number (security threshold), the eavesdropper cannot use prior knowledge to crack the information or key, and the data transmitted in the channel will not leak any information.
[0005] Multi-level diversity coding systems can be divided into two types: symmetric and asymmetric. If there is complete symmetry in the multi-level diversity coding system, that is, all the destinations that can receive m channels can decode the source with a security level not greater than m, such a system is called a symmetric multi-level diversity coding system (Symmetric MDCS, SMDCS). Correspondingly, an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system (Asymmetric MDCS, AMDCS) can be regarded as a generalization of a symmetric multi-level diversity coding system, such as Figure 2 As shown in the figure: Assuming that there are L encoders in the system (the data encoded by each encoder is transmitted on different channels), at the destination, all possible S sets of receiving channels will be considered (without setting a safety threshold, S = 2 L-1), which means that the system can support up to S different source security levels. At this time, any two different receiving channel sets at the destination correspond to different source decoding levels. Through the design of the coding scheme, strict permission level restrictions can be implemented, that is, the information that can be decrypted by receiving S different channel sets corresponds to S different source security levels, and due to the limitation of the amount of information, unauthorized decryption is impossible.
[0006] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system is a more general system that includes the case of a symmetric system. When some information sources in the system are empty, the asymmetric system will degenerate into a symmetric system. Therefore, the coding scheme designed for the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system is also applicable to the symmetric system.
[0007] In 1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed the public key cryptography system, which is also regarded as one of the important signs of the formation of modern cryptography. Since its proposal, the public key cryptography system has been widely studied in theory and applied in cryptographic fields such as encryption, signature, and key agreement. There are two most common types of public key cryptography systems: one is based on the problem of large integer factorization, the most typical representative of which is the RSA public key cryptography system designed by cryptographers Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978; the other is based on the discrete logarithm problem, such as the ElGamal public key cryptography system and the elliptic curve public key cryptography system. Figure 3 The encryption and decryption algorithms of the public key cryptography system are public, and their security depends on the confidentiality of the private key. This is a breakthrough solution to the key distribution problem that has plagued countless cryptographers.
[0008] If the public key cryptography system is to be applied to the multicast system, the following is usually used: Figure 4 Centralized multicast key management scheme: The multicast system relies on a trusted control center (also called a group controller) to complete a series of operations such as key generation, distribution, and update.
[0009] The prior art has the following disadvantages:
[0010] 1. In multi-level diversity coding systems, the effect of preventing illegal access to channels through physical layer technology is not good
[0011] In an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, the premise for implementing strict permission level restrictions is to preset the decryption level for each user and to preset that the user will follow the preset rules to access a specific channel set during the communication process. In real application scenarios, the above settings are too ideal: if there are "dishonest" users in the system, they may not follow the preset rules to access the channel set, but illegally monitor the channel information outside their permission, and try to decrypt beyond their permission, resulting in information leakage.
[0012] The main means of preventing illegal access to the above-mentioned channels are mostly physical layer technologies. Although they have a certain preventive effect on external eavesdropping, in a multi-level diversity coding system, their defense capabilities against internal "dishonest" eavesdroppers are relatively weak: for example, using frequency hopping technology, setting the working frequency band of each channel to frequency hopping, and controlling the user's access rights by distributing a frequency hopping spectrum containing only the channel information within the authority to the user, but "dishonest" users may still be able to infer the frequency hopping patterns of the remaining working channels in the environment based on the partial receiving spectrum information they hold, and capture and eavesdrop on the channels.
[0013] For example, the use of directional beam and digital beamforming technology requires that the user group that has the right to receive the signal is geographically close and at a certain distance from the eavesdropper. However, in fact, "dishonest" users, as part of the communication system user group, are often intertwined with other users and cannot be distinguished geographically. Therefore, "dishonest" users have a certain chance of successful eavesdropping. Therefore, to prevent illegal access to the channel, it is necessary to control the decryption authority when the information is encoded and encrypted, so that eavesdroppers who try to exceed their authority cannot decrypt even if they eavesdrop on the channel. This requires a secure and efficient multicast protocol used in multi-level diversity coding systems. We need to assume that each user may be a "dishonest" user, and we need to ensure that users cannot infer the key information of other users through the key information they have.
[0014] 2. Traditional public key encryption schemes have security vulnerabilities when used in multicast systems
[0015] When the public key encryption system was first created, it was mainly designed for unicast (one-to-one communication) communication, which is characterized by one key for encryption and one key for decryption. Multicast is a transmission method in which one or more senders transmit data to multiple listeners, which is one-to-many or many-to-many communication. Therefore, the direct use of the public key encryption system in the multicast network is prone to collusion cracking problems. The group members participating in the multicast in the multicast network often change. If the public key encryption system is used directly, not only will the key update occupy a lot of resources, but it will also be difficult to meet the security multicast requirements of forward secrecy (nodes that voluntarily exit the multicast group or are forced to exit cannot continue to participate in multicast communication) and backward secrecy (newly joined group members cannot crack the multicast messages before they joined).
[0016] 3. Traditional public key encryption schemes are inefficient when used in multicast systems
[0017] First, when the traditional public key encryption scheme is used in a multicast system, in order to meet the encryption and decryption requirements, a set of keys needs to be distributed to users for each multicast structure. However, when a user belongs to a multi-group multicast structure, the user needs to hold many groups of decryption keys, which results in high storage overhead. When the key is updated, the large amount of data required to update the key will reduce the maximum update rate of the system key under a certain bandwidth.
[0018] Second, when traditional public key encryption schemes are used in multicast systems, in order to meet the requirements of forward secrecy and backward secrecy, the key needs to be updated frequently: if a user leaves the group, other users holding the key must also update the key, and the old key is not allowed to be used again, otherwise the forward secrecy requirement is not met; if a user joins the group, the key used in the past cannot be distributed to the user, otherwise the backward secrecy requirement is not met. Therefore, the joining and leaving of the user will trigger the key update of the entire multicast network, and the update frequency is too frequent, resulting in high communication overhead. Summary of the invention
[0019] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system. The protocol can be applied to an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with any number of encoders and any decryption threshold (the coding scheme designed for the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system is also applicable to the symmetric system), and prevent "dishonest" users in the multi-level diversity coding system from unauthorized access to channels outside their own authority.
[0020] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system, comprising the following steps:
[0021] S1. Define system parameters and symbols;
[0022] S2. define different receiving channel sets, i.e., the decryption levels corresponding to the encoder sets accessible to the destination end;
[0023] S3. Calculate the decryption level of the encoder set accessible to each sink
[0024] S4, based on the decryption level calculation formula of the set of encoders accessible to each sink end given in step S3, reversely solve the accessible encoder set A corresponding to the decryption level level;
[0025] S5. Before entering the channel, the sender uses the public key to convert L encoders E i The generated data M i Encrypted to C i , the receiving end receives C i Then, use the private key to decrypt and restore M i ;
[0026] The public key and the secret key are generated and distributed by the trusted key management center. For an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with L encoders and a security threshold of m, the trusted key management center will generate L public keys. The specific steps include:
[0027] S51, the trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e;
[0028] S52, trusted key management center generation Private key;
[0029] S53, the trusted key management center generates L public keys;
[0030] S54, the trusted key management center distributes the key to the participants in the multi-level diversity coding system;
[0031] S55, the transmitting end in the multi-level diversity coding system encrypts information;
[0032] S56. Decoder D in a multi-level diversity coding system i For E with permission to receive i The information sent C i Decrypt information.
[0033] Preferably, in step S1, the system parameters and symbols include:
[0034] L: the number of encoders in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system;
[0035] m: the safety threshold of the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system. When the number of channels that the sink can receive does not exceed m, no source information can be decrypted from the received data.
[0036] S: The number of different access structures in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with threshold. In the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, this number is equal to the decoder levels that can be divided in the system. S is calculated by the following formula:
[0037]
[0038] E i : The encoder labeled i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤L;
[0039] D i : The decoder with decryption level i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤S;
[0040] M i :Encoder E in asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system iGenerated data, 1≤i≤L;
[0041] C i : Encrypt M using the public key i The ciphertext generated later, 1≤i≤L.
[0042] Preferably, in step S2, the decryption levels corresponding to different receiving channel sets, that is, the sets of encoders accessible to the destination end, are defined, specifically:
[0043] When the number of elements in the accessible encoder set does not exceed the security threshold, there is no decryption level;
[0044] For any two sets of accessible encoders with different numbers of elements, the set with more elements has a higher decryption level;
[0045] For any two accessible encoder sets with the same number of elements, first arrange the encoder labels from small to large to generate a sequence, and then compare the lexicographic order of the two label sequences. The one with a higher lexicographic order corresponds to a higher decryption level;
[0046] All accessible encoder sets whose number of elements exceeds the security threshold are sorted from low to high according to their levels, and the decryption level of each set is defined from 1 to S in sequence.
[0047] Preferably, in step S3, each sink terminal can access the decryption level of the encoder set The calculation formula is:
[0048]
[0049] Where a0=0, f1(n) and f2(k) are defined as follows:
[0050]
[0051]
[0052] Preferably, in step S51, the trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e through the following steps:
[0053] S511, Order At the group key control center, 2k non-repeating large prime numbers are randomly selected and recorded as:
[0054] p1,p2,…,p k ,q1,q2,…,q k ;
[0055] S512, calculate each modulus n i =p i *q i , 1≤i≤k;
[0056] S513, calculate each modulus n i Euler function
[0057] S514. Select a number e, which is smaller than any Euler function. And with any Euler function Positive integers that are all mutually prime.
[0058] Preferably, in step S52, the trusted key management center generates The process of obtaining a private key is:
[0059] Traversal Perform the following steps:
[0060] S521. Solve for each d that satisfies the following congruence equation i :
[0061]
[0062] S522, each group {d i ,n i} as a private key, strip.
[0063] Preferably, in step S53, the trusted key management center generates L public keys through the following steps:
[0064] Traverse 1≤i≤L and perform the following steps:
[0065] S531. List all sets of size m+1 that contain E i The encoder subset A is denoted as the set
[0066]
[0067] S532, using the method in step S3, respectively calculate The decryption levels of all subsets in and store them as a set
[0068]
[0069] S533, selecting a random large prime number α as a confusion factor;
[0070] S534, according to the collection The elements in the public key modulus N are calculated i :
[0071] N i =α*Πn i , for all
[0072] S535, each group {e,N i} as a public key, a total of L.
[0073] Preferably, in step S54, the trusted key management center distributes the keys to the participants in the multi-level diversity coding system through the following steps:
[0074] S541, distribute the public key to the encoder E at the sending end i :Distribute L public keys to L encoders respectively. Assume that the public keys {e,N i}Distributed to encoder E i , where 1≤i≤L, the public key will be used to encrypt the data generated by each encoder;
[0075] S542: Distribute the private key to the decoder D at the destination i .
[0076] Preferably, in step S542, for a decryption level less than or equal to Decoder D i ,Will The private keys are distributed to decoders D i , assuming that the private key {d i ,n i}Distributed to decoder D i , used to decrypt the data received by the decoder, where
[0077] For decryption levels greater than Decoder D i , distribute the private key to it through the following steps, here,
[0078] S5421. Using the method in step S4, calculate the decoder D of the decryption level i. i The corresponding acceptable encoder subset And sort them from small to large so that the labels satisfy a1 <a2<…<a n ;
[0079] S5422, Calculation | A i |=r,r>m+1;
[0080] S5423, to D i The corresponding receivable encoder subset A i Divide into subsets:
[0081] If m+1|r, that is, m+1 divides r, then t encoder subsets are generated by the following steps:
[0082] Calculate t = r ÷ (m + 1), and then add A i The elements in are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into
[0083] If m+1 does not divide r, then t+1 encoder subsets are generated by the following steps:
[0084] calculate Then A i The first t×(m+1) elements in the t×(m+1) element are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into Then, take A i The inverse m+1 elements in are taken as the t+1th subset;
[0085] S5424, respectively solve the decryption levels of all subsets obtained in step S5423, and store them as a set Then get the value that should be distributed to user D i The private key collection
[0086]
[0087] Preferably, in step S55, the transmitting end in the multi-level diversity coding system performs information encryption by using the corresponding public key {e, N i}, the generated data M is converted into i Its encryption is ciphertext C i And send:
[0088] C i =M i e mod N i
[0089] In step S56, the decoder D in the multi-stage diversity coding system i For E with permission to receive i The information sent C i To decrypt information, the calculation formula is:
[0090]
[0091] Therefore, the present invention adopts the above-mentioned secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to the multi-level diversity coding system, and the beneficial effects are as follows:
[0092] (1) The technical solution of the present invention can be applied to a wide range of practical application scenarios and multi-channel communication system structures, and is applicable to multi-level diversity coding systems with different numbers of encoders and different security thresholds.
[0093] (2) In the technical solution of the present invention, when a receiving user leaves / joins the system, the system does not need to redistribute keys to other receivers in the network. It only needs to change the modulus setting of the distributed public key to cancel / add user permissions, thereby achieving forward security and backward security, and realizing rapid response to dynamic joining / exit of system users.
[0094] (3) In the technical solution of the present invention, it is difficult to deduce the private key from the public key: First, from the current technical level, it is still not possible to crack the modulus of the RSA key protocol with a prime length of 1024 bits within the key validity period. Moreover, the scheme of constructing the modulus by multiplying multiple prime numbers selected in the technical solution of the present invention is based on a more complex structure, and its cracking complexity is even higher; even if the eavesdropper has super computing power and completes the cracking, the public key modulus N is decomposed to obtain p1,…,p k ,q1,…,q k However, there are many random combinations of the two-way multiplication of these prime numbers, so it is difficult for an eavesdropper to accurately separate and restore each n i , which requires huge computing power cost.
[0095] (4) The design of the “confusion factor” in the present invention ensures that the public key versions accumulated in the channel will not be directly divided to a certain n i The following attacks can be effectively prevented: Hackers pretend to be "senders" and frequently apply to the key management center for multiple public keys corresponding to different receiving permissions, and try to crack the n public keys that constitute the public key modulus N through mutual operations between public keys. i , thereby cracking the user's private key and stealing information.
[0096] (5) In the technical solution of the present invention, each private key can decrypt information in multiple channels, which greatly reduces the number of private keys that the receiving user needs to hold and the amount of data consumed for private key synchronization during multi-channel diversity reception, especially when there are a large number of receivers in the system.
[0097] The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0098] Figure 1 It is an overall flow chart of an embodiment of a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system of the present invention;
[0099] Figure 2It is a model diagram of an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system of the present invention, which is a background technology of a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system;
[0100] Figure 3 It is a communication flow chart of a unicast public key encryption system of the present invention, which is applied to the background technology of the secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol of the multi-level diversity coding system;
[0101] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of a centralized multicast key management solution of the present invention, which is applied to the background technology of the secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol of a multi-level diversity coding system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0102] The technical solution of the present invention is further described below through the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0103] Unless otherwise defined, technical or scientific terms used in the present invention shall have the common meanings understood by one having ordinary skills in the field to which the present invention belongs.
[0104] like Figure 1 As shown, a secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to a multi-level diversity coding system comprises the following steps:
[0105] S1. Define system parameters and symbols including:
[0106] L: the number of encoders in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system;
[0107] m: the safety threshold of the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system. When the number of channels that the sink can receive does not exceed m, no source information can be decrypted from the received data.
[0108] S: The number of different access structures in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with threshold. In the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, this number is equal to the decoder (receiver) level that can be divided in the system. S is calculated by the following formula:
[0109]
[0110] E i : The encoder labeled i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤L;
[0111] D i : The decoder (receiver) with decryption level i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤S;
[0112] M i :Encoder E in asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system i Generated data, 1≤i≤L;
[0113] C i : Encrypt M using the public key i The ciphertext generated later, 1≤i≤L.
[0114] S2. Since any two different receiving channel sets at the destination correspond to different decryption levels, it is necessary to first define the decryption levels corresponding to different receiving channel sets, that is, the sets of encoders accessible to the destination; combined with the system properties of the multi-level diversity coding system, the following three rules are defined to compare the decryption levels corresponding to the sets of encoders accessible to the destination, specifically:
[0115] When the number of elements in the accessible encoder set does not exceed the security threshold (less than or equal to m), there is no decryption level, that is, no source information can be decrypted;
[0116] For any two accessible encoder sets with different numbers of elements, the set with more elements has a higher decryption level, for example: the set {E1, E2, E3, E4} has a higher decryption level than the set {E1, E2, E3};
[0117] For any two accessible encoder sets with the same number of elements, first arrange the encoder labels from small to large to generate a sequence, and then compare the lexicographic order of the two label sequences. The one with a higher lexicographic order corresponds to a higher decryption level.
[0118] For example: the decryption level of the set {E1, E3, E4} is higher than that of the set {E1, E2, E5}, and the decryption level of the set {E2, E3, E4} is higher than that of the set {E1, E4, E5}.
[0119] According to the above three rules, all accessible encoder sets with the number of elements exceeding the security threshold can be sorted from low to high according to the level, and the decryption level of each set can be defined from 1 to S. The highest source level that can be decrypted by the accessible encoder set with level k (1≤k≤S) is also k.
[0120] S3. Based on the judgment rule in step S2, for a sink with element number |A|=n>m (exceeding the safety threshold), the set of encoders accessible to the sink is (Encoder number meets a1 <a2<…<a n ), the following formula is given to calculate the decryption level of the encoder set accessible to each sink:
[0121]
[0122] Among them, a0=0, a0 is only used to simplify the formula calculation and has no practical significance;
[0123] In the formula, f1(n) and f2(k) are defined as follows:
[0124]
[0125]
[0126] S4, based on the decryption level calculation formula of each sink end accessible encoder set given in step S3, execute a recursive function to reversely solve the accessible encoder set A corresponding to the decryption level level;
[0127] The recursive function takes three input parameters, namely the decryption level level required by the task, the number of encoders L, and the security threshold m. The return value of the recursive function is the accessible encoder set A corresponding to level. The following operations are performed in the recursive function:
[0128] According to the input parameters, determine whether there is If yes, call the solver function (with level, L and m as the solver function input), and then use the return value of the solver function as the return value of the recursive function; if no, let Then it recursively calls itself (taking level, L, and m+1 as inputs to call itself), and finally uses the return value of the call itself as the return value of the recursive function.
[0129] The solution function has three input parameters, namely the decryption level level required by the task, the number of encoders L, and the security threshold m. The return value of the solution function is the accessible encoder set A corresponding to level. The following operations are performed in the solution function:
[0130] Initialize internal parameters: variable index = 1; variable i = 1; internal set A = {};
[0131] Step 1: Calculate: tempL = L-index; tempM = m+1-i;
[0132] Step 2: If the current Then loop the following calculation until
[0133] index=index+1, tempL=tempL-1;
[0134] Step 3: Set the encoder E with index index Add to set A;
[0135] Step 4: Calculate: index = index + 1;
[0136] Step 5: If i < m, then let i = i + 1, and repeat Steps 1 - 4 again; otherwise, proceed to Step 6;
[0137] Step 6: Add the encoder E numbered index + level - 1 index+level-1 to the set A.至此,求解函数步骤结束,返回可访问编码器集合A;
[0138] S5. The data M i generated by L encoders E i (1 ≤ i ≤ L) is transmitted over L different channels. Before entering the channels, the sender uses the public key to encrypt the data M i generated by L encoders E i into C i . After the receiver receives C i , it decrypts and restores M i using the private key; In the technical solution of the present invention, both the public key and the private key are generated and distributed by a trusted key management center.
[0139] For an asymmetric multi - level diversity coding system with L encoders and a security threshold of m, the trusted key management center will generate L public keys and private keys, specifically including the following steps:
[0140] S51. The trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e;
[0141] The trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e through the following steps:
[0142] S511. Let Randomly select 2k non - repeating large prime numbers at the group key control center, denoted as:
[0143] p1, p2, …, p k , q1, q2, …, q k ;
[0144] S512. Calculate each modulus n i = p i * q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
[0145] S513. Calculate the Euler's totient function of each modulus n i
[0146] S514. Select a number e, where e is a positive integer less than any Euler's totient function and relatively prime to any Euler's totient function .
[0147] S52, trusted key management center generation Private key;
[0148] Trusted Key Management Center Generation The process of obtaining a private key is:
[0149] Traversal Perform the following steps:
[0150] S521. Solve for each d that satisfies the following congruence equation i :
[0151]
[0152] S522, each group {d i ,n i} as a private key, strip.
[0153] S53, the trusted key management center generates L public keys;
[0154] The trusted key management center generates L public keys through the following steps:
[0155] Traverse 1≤i≤L and perform the following steps:
[0156] S531. List all sets of size m+1 that contain E i The encoder subset A is denoted as the set
[0157]
[0158] S532, using the method in step S3, respectively calculate The decryption levels of all subsets in are stored as a set
[0159]
[0160] S533. Select a random large prime number α as a confusion factor. Note that, to meet security requirements, the confusion factors selected for the L public keys cannot be the same, and cannot be repeated with the prime number selected in S51.
[0161] S534, according to the collection The elements in the public key modulus N are calculated i :
[0162] N i =α*Πn i , for all
[0163] S535, each group {e,N i} as a public key, a total of L.
[0164] S54, the trusted key management center distributes the key to the participants in the multi-level diversity coding system;
[0165] The trusted key management center distributes keys to participants in the multi-level diversity coding system through the following steps:
[0166] S541, distribute the public key to the encoder E at the sending end i :Distribute L public keys to L encoders respectively. Assume that the public keys {e,N i}Distributed to encoder E i , where 1≤i≤L, the public key will be used to encrypt the data generated by each encoder;
[0167] S542: Distribute the private key to the decoder (receiver) D at the destination i .
[0168] For decryption levels less than or equal to Decoder D i ,Will The private keys are distributed to decoders D i , assuming that the private key {d i ,n i}Distributed to decoder D i , used to decrypt the data generated by the decoder, where
[0169] For decryption levels greater than Decoder (receiver) D i , distribute the private key to it through the following steps, here,
[0170] S5421. Using the method in step S4, calculate the decoder (receiver) D of the decryption level i. i The corresponding acceptable encoder subset And sort them from small to large, that is: make the labels satisfy a1 <a2<…<a n ;
[0171] S5422, Calculation | A i |=r,r>m+1;
[0172] S5423, to D i The corresponding receivable encoder subset A i Divide into subsets:
[0173] ① If m+1|r, that is, m+1 divides r, then t encoder subsets are generated by the following steps:
[0174] Calculate t = r ÷ (m + 1), and then add A i The elements (encoders) in are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into
[0175] ② If m+1 does not divide r, generate t+1 encoder subsets by the following steps:
[0176] calculate (round down), and then A i The first t×(m+1) elements (encoders) in are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into Then, take A i The inverse m+1 elements (encoders) in are taken as the t+1th subset.
[0177] S5424, respectively solve the decryption levels of all subsets obtained in step S5423, and store them as a set Then get the value that should be distributed to user D i The private key collection
[0178]
[0179] S55. The sending end in the multi-level diversity coding system performs information encryption:
[0180] For each encoder E at the sending end i (1≤i≤L) generated data M i (To ensure successful decryption, ), using the corresponding public key {e,N i}, and encrypt it into ciphertext C by the following formula i And send:
[0181] C i =M i e mod N i ;
[0182] S56. Decoder D in a multi-level diversity coding system i For E with permission to receive i The information sent C i The information is decrypted by following the steps below:
[0183]
[0184] For E without permission to receivej The encrypted and transmitted information C j , the above steps cannot restore / decrypt M j .
[0185] When the present invention is implemented, for an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with a number of encoders L=4 and a safety threshold m=1: the number of source levels (According to step S1) To implement the sink decryption level rule mentioned in step S2, the trusted key management center generates L=4 public keys according to the following steps: Private key:
[0186] According to step S51: the trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e through the following steps:
[0187] S511, Order In the group key control center, 2k non-repeating large prime numbers are randomly selected (for the convenience of example demonstration, a smaller prime number is selected here), which are recorded as:
[0188] p1=7, p2=11, p3=13, p4=17, p5=19, p6=23,
[0189] q1=47, q2=43, q3=41, q4=37, q5=31, q6=29;
[0190] S513, calculate each modulus n i Euler function
[0191] S512, calculate each modulus n i =p i *q i , 1≤i≤k;
[0192] n1=p1*q1=329, n2=p2*q2=473, n3=p3*q3=533;
[0193] n4=p4*q4=629, n5=p5*q5=589, n6=p6*q6=667;
[0194] S513, calculate each modulus n i Euler function
[0195]
[0196]
[0197] S514, select a number e=53, e is smaller than any Euler function And with any Euler function are mutually prime;
[0198] According to step S52: the trusted key management center generates Private key:
[0199] Solution That is, 53*d1≡1mod276, the solution is d1=125, and the private key is {d1,n1}={125,329};
[0200] Solution That is, 53*d2≡1mod420, the solution is d2=317, and the private key is {d2,n2}={317,473};
[0201] Solution That is, 53*d3≡1mod480, the solution is d3=317, and the private key is {d3,n3}={317,533};
[0202] Solution That is, 53*d4≡1mod576, the solution is d4=413, and the private key is {d4,n4}={413,629};
[0203] Solution That is, 53*d5≡1mod540, the solution is d5=377, and the private key is {d5,n5}={377,589};
[0204] Solution That is, 53*d6≡1mod616, the solution is d6=93, and the private key is {d6,n6}={93,667};
[0205] According to step S3: the trusted key management center generates L=4 public keys through the following steps:
[0206] S531. List all sets of size 2 that contain E i The encoder subset of
[0207]
[0208]
[0209] S532, using the method in step S3, respectively calculate The decryption levels of all subsets in and store them as a set
[0210]
[0211]
[0212]
[0213]
[0214] S533, select the prime number "confusion factor":
[0215] α1=71, α2=67, α3=61, α4=59
[0216] S534, according to the collection The elements in the public key modulus N are calculated i :
[0217] N1=α1*Πn i (For all )=71*n1*n2*n3=5889014131;
[0218] N2=α2*Πn i (For all )=67*n1*n4*n5=8166512683;
[0219] N3=α3*Πn i (For all )=61*n2*n4*n6=12105074179;
[0220] N4=α4*Πni(for all =59*n3*n5*n6=12354362761;
[0221] S535, each group {e,N i} as a public key, a total of L = 4;
[0222] {e,N1}={53,5889014131},{e,N2}={53,8166512683};
[0223] {e,N3}={53,12105074179},{e,N4}={53,12354362761};
[0224] According to step S541: the trusted key management center distributes {e, N1} = {53, 5889014131} to encoder E1, distributes {e, N2} = {53, 8166512683} to encoder E2, distributes {e, N3} = {53, 12105074179} to encoder E3, and distributes {e, N4} = {53, 12354362761} to encoder E4.
[0225] According to step S542: the trusted key management center distributes the key to each decoder (receiver) in the multi-level diversity coding system through the following steps: i :
[0226] For decryption levels less than or equal to The decoder (receiver), namely D1~D6, converts the 6 private keys {d i ,n i} respectively distributed to the decoder (receiver) D i (1≤i≤6), that is, the private key {d1,n1} is distributed to D1, the private key {d2,n2} is distributed to D2, and so on;
[0227] For decryption levels greater than Decoder (receiver), namely D7~D 11 , distribute the private key to it by following the steps below:
[0228] S5421. Using the method in step S4, calculate the decoder (receiver) D of the decryption level i. i The corresponding acceptable encoder subset
[0229] The receivable encoder subset A7 corresponding to the decoder (receiver) D7 = {E1, E2, E3};
[0230] The receivable encoder subset A8 corresponding to the decoder (receiver) D8 = {E1, E2, E4};
[0231] The receivable encoder subset A9 corresponding to the decoder (receiver) D9 = {E1, E3, E4};
[0232] Decoder (Receiver) D 10 The corresponding receivable encoder subset A 10 ={E2,E3,E4};
[0233] Decoder (Receiver) D 11 The corresponding receivable encoder subset A 11 ={E1,E2,E3,E4};
[0234] S5422, calculate r1=|A7|=|A8|=|A9|=|A 10 |=3,r2=|A 11 |=4;
[0235] S5423, to D i The corresponding receivable encoder subset A i Divide into subsets:
[0236] Since m+1=2, 2 does not divide r1, calculate Therefore, A7, A8, A9, A 10 The first 1*2=2 elements of are divided into one subset, and then the last 2 elements are taken as the second subset, that is, divided into:
[0237]
[0238]
[0239] Since m+1=2, 2 divides r2, we can calculate t=r2÷(m+1)=2, so A 11 Equally divided into t = 2 subsets, that is, divided into:
[0240]
[0241] S5424, respectively solve the decryption levels of all subsets obtained in step S5423, and store them as a set
[0242]
[0243]
[0244]
[0245]
[0246]
[0247] Then get the value that should be distributed to user D i The private key collection
[0248] Sent to D7 Sent to D8 Sent to D9 Send to D 10 of Send to D 11 of
[0249] According to step S55, the encoder at the transmitting end encrypts the information using the key held by each of them:
[0250] Encoder E i Generate information M1=21 and encrypt it using {e,N1}={53,5889014131}:
[0251] C1=M1 e mod N1=21 53mod5889014131=1356063730;
[0252] Encoder E2 generates information M2=60, which is encrypted using {e,N2}={53,8166512683}:
[0253] C2=M2 e mod N2=60 53 mod8166512683=181913727;
[0254] Encoder E3 generates information M3=43, which is encrypted using {e, N3}={53,12105074179}:
[0255] C3=M3 e modN3=43 53 mod12105074179=6206834699;
[0256] Encoder E4 generates information M4=39, which is encrypted using {e, N4}={53,12354362761}:
[0257] C4=M4 e modN4=39 53 mod12354362761=11645728445;
[0258] According to step S56, the decoder (receiver) at the destination end decrypts the information using the key held by each. Since there are many levels of receivers at the destination end, three decryption examples are listed below:
[0259] Decoder D3: The set of encoders with permission to receive is {E1, E4}. It receives the information C1 = 1356063730, C4 = 11645728445, and then uses the private key {d3, n3} = {317, 533} to decrypt:
[0260]
[0261]
[0262] It can be seen that decoder D3 has successfully recovered the information transmitted by the encoder within the authority. If you try to decrypt information outside the authority:
[0263]
[0264]
[0265] Meets expected decryption permissions.
[0266] Decoder D8: The set of encoders with permission to receive is {E1, E2, E4}. It receives the information C1=1356063730, C2=181913727, C4=11645728445, and then uses the private key {{d1, n1}={125, 329}, {d5, n5}={377, 589}} to decrypt:
[0267]
[0268]
[0269]
[0270] It can be seen that decoder D8 has successfully recovered the information transmitted by the encoder within the authority. If you try to decrypt information outside the authority:
[0271]
[0272]
[0273] Meets expected decryption permissions.
[0274] Decoder D 11 :The set of encoders with permission to receive is {E1, E2, E3, E4}, and the received information C1 = 1356063730, C2 = 181913727, C3 = 6206834699, C4 = 11645728445, and then the private key {{d1, n1} = {125, 329}, {d6, n6} = {93, 667}} is used for decryption:
[0275]
[0276]
[0277]
[0278]
[0279] Meets expected decryption permissions.
[0280] The following is a mathematical proof of the encryption and decryption process of the scheme:
[0281] 1) Before proving it, let's introduce Euler's theorem as follows:
[0282] If the greatest common divisor of a and m is 1, then
[0283] 2) Before the proof, it is necessary to prove the lemma first (where n = p * q, M < n):
[0284]
[0285] The proof process is as follows:
[0286] If M and n are relatively prime, by Euler's theorem: Then
[0287] If M and n are not relatively prime, without loss of generality, it can be assumed that M is a multiple of p, that is, M = c * p. Since M < n, M cannot be a multiple of both p and q at the same time, so M must be relatively prime to q. Then by Euler's theorem: Then That is Furthermore 1 mod q, then Furthermore Therefore It is proved.
[0288] 3) Prove the encryption and decryption principle of the scheme: That is, prove that for the encryption algorithm
[0289] C = M e mod(n * r)
[0290] It must be possible to restore C to M through the following operations:
[0291] M = C d mod n
[0292] Proof:
[0293] From C = M e mod(n * r), that is, M e ≡ C mod(n * r),
[0294] It can be obtained that M ed ≡ C d mod(n * r),
[0295] Also, when the key is generated, it satisfies: It can be obtained that
[0296] Then That is
[0297] From the lemma It is obtained that:
[0298] Furthermore
[0299] Therefore, from C d mod(n*r)=M+(α-β*r)*n, then we get C d =M+(α-β*r)*n+γ*(n*r)=M+(α-β*r+γ*r)*n, further, then C d modn=M, proved.
[0300] Therefore, the present invention adopts the above-mentioned secure multicast public key cryptographic protocol applied to the multi-level diversity coding system, and implements the encryption of plaintext into ciphertext by a single key (public key) for the asymmetric key (public key, private key) construction scheme, and the ciphertext can be decrypted by multiple different keys (private keys). Specifically, the above-mentioned asymmetric key scheme is applied to the key distribution scheme and encryption and decryption scheme in the multi-level diversity coding system, and the private key is distributed according to the preset decoder decryption level. At the same time, the decryption authority of the public key to be allocated to different encoders is preset when constructing the public key, so that the multi-level diversity coding system can achieve strict decryption level authority division at the destination end.
[0301] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify or replace the technical solution of the present invention with equivalents, and these modifications or equivalent replacements cannot cause the modified technical solution to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for generating a secure multicast public key password based on a multi-level diversity coding system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Define system parameters and symbols; S2. define different receiving channel sets, i.e., the decryption levels corresponding to the encoder sets accessible to the destination end; S3. Calculate the decryption level of the encoder set accessible to each sink S4, based on the decryption level calculation formula of the set of encoders accessible to each sink end given in step S3, reversely solve the accessible encoder set A corresponding to the decryption level level; S5. Before entering the channel, the sender uses the public key to convert L encoders E i The generated data M i Encrypted to C i , the receiving end receives C i Then, use the private key to decrypt and restore M i ; The public key and the secret key are generated and distributed by the trusted key management center. For an asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with L encoders and a security threshold of m, the trusted key management center will generate L public keys. The specific steps include: S51, the trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e; S52, trusted key management center generation Private key; S53, the trusted key management center generates L public keys; S54, the trusted key management center distributes the key to the participants in the multi-level diversity coding system; S55, the transmitting end in the multi-level diversity coding system encrypts information; S56. Decoder D in a multi-level diversity coding system i For E with permission to receive i The information sent C i Decrypt information; In step S51, the trusted key management center constructs k moduli and selects e through the following steps: S511, Order At the group key control center, 2k non-repeating large prime numbers are randomly selected and recorded as: p1,p2,…,p k ,q1,q2,…,q k ; S512, calculate each modulus n i =p i *q i , 1≤i≤k; S513, calculate each modulus n i Euler function S514. Select a number e, which is smaller than any Euler function. And with any Euler function positive integers that are all mutually prime; In step S52, the trusted key management center generates The process of obtaining a private key is: Traversal Perform the following steps: S521. Solve for each d that satisfies the following congruence equation i : S522, each group {d i ,n i } as a private key, strip; In step S53, the trusted key management center generates L public keys through the following steps: Traverse 1≤i≤L and perform the following steps: S531. List all sets of size m+1 that contain E i The encoder subset A is denoted as the set S532, using the method in step S3, respectively calculate The decryption levels of all subsets in and store them as a set S533, selecting a random large prime number α as a confusion factor; S534, according to the collection The elements in the public key modulus N are calculated i : N i =α*Πn i , for all S535, each group {e,N i } as a public key, a total of L; In step S54, the trusted key management center distributes the keys to the participants in the multi-level diversity coding system through the following steps: S541, distribute the public key to the encoder E at the sending end i :Distribute L public keys to L encoders respectively. Assume that the public keys {e,N i }Distributed to encoder E i , where 1≤i≤L, the public key will be used to encrypt the data generated by each encoder; S542: Distribute the private key to the decoder D at the destination i ; In step S542, for the decryption level less than or equal to Decoder D i ,Will The private keys are distributed to decoders D i , assuming that the private key {d i ,n i }Distributed to decoder D i , used to decrypt the data received by the decoder, where For decryption levels greater than Decoder D i , distribute the private key to it through the following steps, here, S5421. Using the method in step S4, calculate the decoder D of the decryption level i. i The corresponding acceptable encoder subset And sort them from small to large so that the labels satisfy a1 <a2<…<a n ; S5422, Calculation | A i |=r,r>m+1; S5423, D i The corresponding receivable encoder subset A i Divide into subsets: If m+1|r, that is, m+1 divides r, then t encoder subsets are generated by the following steps: Calculate t = r ÷ (m + 1), and then add A i The elements in are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into If m+1 does not divide r, then t+1 encoder subsets are generated by the following steps: calculate Then A i The first t×(m+1) elements in the t×(m+1) element are equally divided into t subsets, each containing m+1 encoders, and the division is carried out from small to large numbers. Divide into Then, take A i The inverse m+1 elements in are taken as the t+1th subset; S5424, respectively solve the decryption levels of all subsets obtained in step S5423, and store them as a set Then get the value that should be distributed to user D i The private key collection In step S55, the transmitting end in the multi-level diversity coding system performs information encryption by using the corresponding public key {e, N i }, the generated data M is converted into i Its encryption is ciphertext C i And send: C i =M i emod N i In step S56, the decoder D in the multi-stage diversity coding system i For E with permission to receive i The information sent C i To decrypt information, the calculation formula is:
2. The method for generating a secure multicast public key password based on a multi-level diversity coding system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, the system parameters and symbols include: L: the number of encoders in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system; m: the safety threshold of the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system. When the number of channels that the sink can receive does not exceed m, no source information can be decrypted from the received data. S: The number of different access structures in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system with threshold. In the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, this number is equal to the decoder levels that can be divided in the system. S is calculated by the following formula: E i : The encoder labeled i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤L; D i : The decoder with decryption level i in the asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system, 1≤i≤S; M i :Encoder E in asymmetric multi-level diversity coding system i Generated data, 1≤i≤L; C i : Encrypt M using the public key i The ciphertext generated later, 1≤i≤L.
3. The method for generating a secure multicast public key password based on a multi-level diversity coding system according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step S2, the decryption levels corresponding to different receiving channel sets, that is, the set of encoders accessible to the destination end, are defined, specifically: When the number of elements in the accessible encoder set does not exceed the security threshold, there is no decryption level; For any two sets of accessible encoders with different numbers of elements, the set with more elements has a higher decryption level; For any two accessible encoder sets with the same number of elements, first arrange the encoder labels from small to large to generate a sequence, and then compare the lexicographic order of the two label sequences. The one with a higher lexicographic order corresponds to a higher decryption level; All accessible encoder sets whose number of elements exceeds the security threshold are sorted from low to high according to their levels, and the decryption level of each set is defined from 1 to S in sequence.
4. The method for generating a secure multicast public key password based on a multi-level diversity coding system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S3, the decryption level of the encoder set accessible to each sink is The calculation formula is: Where a0=0, f1(n) and f2(k) are defined as follows:
