Island power distribution information physical system information attack endurance capability assessment method and device

By establishing a matrix evaluation method for distributed power, load and circuit breaker, we evaluate the information attack tolerance of the island distribution information physical system, solve the problem of lack of effective evaluation and response to island information attacks in the existing technology, and improve the system's Adaptability and recovery capabilities ensure the safe and stable operation of the distribution network.

CN118890182APending Publication Date: 2024-11-01STATE GRID CHONGQING ELECTRIC POWER CO ELECTRIC POWER RES INST +2
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410941733.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-15
Publication Date
2024-11-01

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing technology lacks methods to effectively evaluate the information attack tolerance of silo distribution information physical systems, resulting in the system being unable to respond quickly and effectively after the attack occurs, which may lead to the silo system being shut down or greater losses.

Method used

By obtaining the distribution network information physics system architecture in the island operation mode, establishing a distributed power output matrix, load demand matrix and circuit breaker state matrix, calculate the entropy value ratio of the matrix and assigning weight values, and establishing an information attack consequence evaluation index function , evaluate the evaluation value of distributed power, load requirements and circuit breaker status, judge the degree of impact of information attacks, and decide whether to cut off the island.

Benefits of technology

The equipment information attack tolerance assessment matrix of the isolated island distribution network was constructed, and the information attack tolerance of the information physical system of the isolated island distribution network was quantified, which enhanced the adaptability and recovery capabilities of the isolated island distribution information physical system, and provided intelligence. Theoretically supported by the safe and stable operation of the distribution network.

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Abstract

The invention provides an island power distribution cyber-physical system information attack tolerance assessment method and device, and relates to the field of power cyber-physical systems. The method comprises the following steps: constructing a power distribution network information physical system architecture in an isolated island operation mode; analyzing the influence of different attack objects and different information attacks on the internal load and the distributed power supply of the island power distribution network; constructing an equipment information attack tolerance evaluation matrix of the island power distribution network; and evaluating the capability of the island power distribution network for tolerating different types of information attacks by utilizing the coupling of the distributed power supply, load and circuit breaker information attack tolerance capability evaluation matrixes. Influences of different devices and different types of information attacks in the island power distribution network on the evaluation method are considered, and the information attack tolerance of the information physical system of the island power distribution network is quantified. And effective theoretical support and actual guidance are provided for enhancing the adaptability and recovery capability of the island power distribution information physical system to the information attack.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of electric power information-physical systems, and in particular to a method and device for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution information-physical system. Background Art

[0002] As the proportion of distributed power sources represented by wind power and photovoltaic power continues to rise, active distribution networks are developing rapidly and gradually developing towards a new type of distribution network with distributed power sources as the core. When an active distribution network fails, the distribution network dispatching center usually maintains the power supply reliability of important loads in the distribution network through planned islanding. At the same time, with the addition of a large number of sensor devices, communication devices, and computing devices, the power system has gradually developed into an information-physical system. The information system supports the efficient and reliable operation of the power system. Multivariate information is obtained from widely distributed intelligent monitoring devices and information communication devices, which helps the information system make intelligent decisions while also introducing multivariate information interference factors.

[0003] When the isolated power distribution information-physical system is attacked, the traditional response strategy is to directly cut off the faulty part. IEEE929-2000 stipulates that after a fault occurs, the distributed generation system should be disconnected from the power system in a short time until the fault is removed and the system resumes normal operation. Subsequently, the distributed generation system can be reintegrated into the power system. However, with the expansion of the scale and capacity of distributed power sources, the limitations of this strategy have gradually emerged: directly cutting off the island may have an adverse effect on the continuous power supply of key loads in the island, and also increase the time and difficulty of fault recovery. Regarding how to maintain the stability of the power grid after the isolated power distribution information-physical system is attacked by information, the existing technology provides a regional power grid control strategy under the influence of disturbances, but does not analyze the causes and consequences of the disturbances. In addition, for typical signal anomalies caused by network attacks, a resilient control strategy for the isolated operation of the distribution network is proposed, but only the single information attack type of transmission signal anomalies is discussed.

[0004] In terms of information attacks against the cyber-physical system of the power grid, the existing technology proposes a two-layer collaborative attack model that considers false injection of load data and proposes an evaluation method for quantitatively evaluating the hazards of cascading failures based on an improved attack graph algorithm. Some existing technologies also consider the characteristics of multi-microgrid distribution systems and design multi-microgrid collaborative intrusion detection and distribution system intrusion response. In addition, some existing technologies use machine learning to detect network attacks against cyber-physical systems, but do not involve research at the island level. At present, research on information attacks mainly focuses on the cyber-physical systems of the main grid and distribution grid, but there is little research on the level of the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network; at the same time, research on information attacks on the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network mainly focuses on how to identify and prevent information attacks, and lacks an assessment of the consequences of the attack and the provision of corresponding response strategies. This makes it impossible for the system to respond quickly and effectively after the attack occurs, which may cause the isolated system to shut down or cause greater losses.

[0005] In summary, by analyzing the impact of information attacks on the cyber-physical system of isolated power distribution, effective countermeasures can be taken to effectively improve the power supply reliability of the distribution network. However, the existing way of dealing with information attacks in the cyber-physical system of isolated power distribution fails to reasonably combine information attacks with the operation and control of the actual power grid, nor does it consider the impact of distributed power sources. There is a lack of flexible and reliable countermeasures for island failures caused by different information attacks. There is currently no feasible technical solution for how to effectively evaluate the information attack tolerance of the cyber-physical system of isolated power distribution and construct corresponding quantitative indicators and evaluation systems. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present invention aims to at least solve the technical problem in the prior art that there is a lack of a method that can effectively evaluate the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution information-physical system.

[0007] To this end, a first aspect of the present invention provides a method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system.

[0008] A second aspect of the present invention provides a computer device.

[0009] The present invention provides a method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system, comprising:

[0010] Obtain the information-physical system architecture of the distribution network under the island operation mode; establish the distributed power output matrix, load demand matrix and circuit breaker status matrix of the distribution network according to the parameters of the island distribution network;

[0011] Establishing normalized matrices of the distributed power output matrix and the load demand matrix respectively;

[0012] According to the entropy ratio of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix and the circuit breaker state matrix, weight values ​​are assigned to the three matrices respectively;

[0013] Calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the distributed power output after the information attack, and calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the load demand after the information attack;

[0014] An information attack consequence assessment index function is established, wherein the information attack consequence assessment index function includes evaluation factors and weight values ​​of each evaluation factor; wherein the evaluation factors include an evaluation value of distributed power output, an evaluation value of load demand, and an evaluation value of circuit breaker status, and the weight values ​​of the evaluation factors include weight values ​​assigned to the three matrices respectively.

[0015] The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to the above technical solution of the present invention may also have the following additional technical features:

[0016] In the above technical solution, the distributed power output matrix includes:

[0017]

[0018] Where n represents the number of distributed power sources in the island distribution network, the number of nodes in the island distribution network is k, the distributed power output matrix D is a k×k diagonal matrix, and D(k) represents the distributed power output of the kth node; the element P DGi It represents the output of the i-th distributed power source, that is, the output power, and i represents the number of the distributed power source; if the k-th node is not connected to the distributed power source, D(k) is equal to 0.

[0019] In the above technical solution, the load demand matrix includes:

[0020]

[0021] Among them, the number of loads in the island distribution network is m; the load demand matrix L is a k×k diagonal matrix; L(k) represents the load power of the kth node; the element P loadj represents the power of the jth load, that is, the required power, and j represents the number of the load; if the kth node is not connected to the load, L(k) is equal to 0.

[0022] In the above technical solution, the circuit breaker state matrix includes:

[0023]

[0024] The circuit breaker state matrix B of the island distribution network is a 0-1 matrix used to describe the state and position of the circuit breaker of the island distribution network; the circuit breaker state matrix B is a k×k symmetric matrix; the element b ij represents the connectivity from node i to node j;

[0025]

[0026] Among them, a ij (l) represents the state of the lth line between the ith node and the jth node of the island distribution network; A represents the set of lines from the ith node to the jth node; if the circuit breaker of any line between the ith node and the jth node is closed, then b ij Take 1; if the circuit breakers between the i-th node and the j-th node are both disconnected, then b ij Take 0.

[0027] In the above technical solution, the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix is:

[0028]

[0029] Among them, P DGi * is the per-unit value of the output power of the i-th distributed generation in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P DGi *The calculation method is as follows:

[0030]

[0031] Among them, P DGi,N is the rated power of the i-th distributed power source; when the output power of the i-th distributed power source exceeds the rated power, P DGi * is greater than 1, and when the output power is less than the rated power, P DGi * less than 1;

[0032] The normalized matrix of the load demand matrix is:

[0033]

[0034] Among them, P loadj * represents the per-unit value of the j-th load power in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P loadj *The calculation method is as follows:

[0035]

[0036] in, is the average power of the jth load; when the required power of the jth load is higher than the average power of the load, P loadj * is greater than 1, and when the required power is lower than the average power of the load, Ploadj *Less than 1.

[0037] In the above technical solution, weight values ​​are assigned to the three matrices respectively according to the entropy ratios of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix, and the circuit breaker state matrix, including:

[0038] Calculate the total entropy value of the normalized matrix of the distributed generation output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix and the circuit breaker state matrix respectively;

[0039] Among them, the total entropy of the matrix is ​​the sum of the entropy values ​​of all elements in the matrix;

[0040] The entropy value of a single element in the matrix is ​​calculated as:

[0041]

[0042] Among them, p ij represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix; if p ij is 0, and its entropy value is also 0;

[0043] The weight value is assigned to the matrix according to the proportion of the total entropy value of each matrix in the sum of the total entropy values ​​of the three matrices, and the sum of the weight values ​​of the three matrices is equal to 1.

[0044] In the above technical solution, the calculation method of the mean square sum H1 of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after being attacked by information is:

[0045]

[0046] Among them, D attacked * represents the normalized matrix of distributed generation output after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network is attacked by information; D attackedij * Denotes the matrix D attacked *The element in row i and column j in D ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the distributed power generation output matrix that has not been subjected to information attack;

[0047] The calculation method of the mean square sum H2 of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after being attacked by information is:

[0048]

[0049] Among them, L attacked * represents the load demand normalized matrix after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network suffers from information attack; L attackedij * Represents the matrix L attacked*The element in row i and column j; L ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix that has not been subjected to information attack.

[0050] In the above technical solution, the information attack consequence assessment index function C is:

[0051] C=w1H1+w2H2+w3(det(B attacked )-det(B))

[0052] Among them, w1 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the distributed power output matrix; w2 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the load demand matrix; w3 represents the weight value assigned to the circuit breaker state matrix; det() represents the row-column matrix calculation; B attacked Represents the circuit breaker state matrix after the information attack.

[0053] The above technical solution also includes:

[0054] The information attack tolerance capability of the island distribution cyber-physical system is evaluated according to the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function. When the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is less than or equal to the set threshold, it is determined that the impact of the information attack is not sufficient to threaten the safe operation, and the distributed power sources of the island distribution network can restore balance through self-regulation without the need to remove the island; when the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is greater than the set threshold, it is determined that the island needs to be removed immediately.

[0055] A computer device provided by the present invention includes a processor and a memory, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory. When the computer program is loaded and executed by the processor, a method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution information-physical system as described in any one of the above technical solutions is implemented.

[0056] In summary, due to the adoption of the above technical features, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0057] The present invention constructs an evaluation matrix for the tolerance of information attacks of equipment in an isolated distribution network, and uses the coupling of the evaluation matrix for the tolerance of information attacks of distributed power sources, loads, and circuit breakers to evaluate the tolerance of the isolated distribution network to different types of information attacks. The present invention takes into account the impact of different internal devices and different types of information attacks on the evaluation method of the isolated distribution network, quantifies the tolerance of information attacks of the information-physical system of the isolated distribution network, and provides new theoretical support and practical guidance for enhancing the adaptability and recovery ability of the information-physical system of the isolated distribution network to tolerate information attacks and for the safe and stable operation of the intelligent distribution network.

[0058] Additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent from the following description or may be learned by practice of the present invention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0059] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent and easily understood from the description of the embodiments in conjunction with the following drawings, in which:

[0060] Figure 1 is a flow chart of a method for evaluating information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 2 It is a physical system schematic diagram of a planned island structure of a 10kV distribution network in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0062] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of an information system of a planned island structure of a 10kV distribution network in one embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] In order to more clearly understand the above-mentioned purpose, features and advantages of the present invention, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. It should be noted that the embodiments of the present application and the features in the embodiments can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0064] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention. However, the present invention may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0065] Refer to the following Figures 1 to 3 The following describes a method and device for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an island power distribution cyber-physical system according to some embodiments of the present invention.

[0066] Some embodiments of the present application provide a method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an island power distribution cyber-physical system.

[0067] like Figure 1 As shown, the first embodiment of the present invention proposes a method for assessing the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system, including the following steps S1-S6. It should be noted that the following steps S1-S6 do not have to be performed in the order of the steps shown in the present disclosure, and those skilled in the art can adjust the order of the steps according to actual needs, and different steps can also be performed simultaneously.

[0068] S1. Obtain the information-physical system architecture of the distribution network under the island operation mode; establish the distributed power output matrix, load demand matrix and circuit breaker status matrix of the distribution network according to the parameters of the island distribution network.

[0069] Specifically, the information-physical system architecture of the distribution network under the island operation mode is the specific connection method of the power grid architecture (physical system) and the communication architecture (information system) of the information-physical system of the distribution network under the island operation mode. The parameters of the island distribution network include at least data information such as the output of distributed power sources, the power size of each load, and the on-off status of each circuit breaker.

[0070] In some embodiments, the distributed power output matrix includes:

[0071]

[0072] Where n represents the number of distributed power sources in the island distribution network, the number of nodes in the island distribution network is k, the distributed power output matrix D is a k×k diagonal matrix, and D(k) represents the distributed power output of the kth node; the element P DGi It represents the output of the i-th distributed power source, that is, the output power, and i represents the number of the distributed power source; if the k-th node is not connected to the distributed power source, D(k) is equal to 0.

[0073] In some embodiments, the load demand matrix includes:

[0074]

[0075] Among them, the number of loads in the island distribution network is m; the load demand matrix L is a k×k diagonal matrix; L(k) represents the load power of the kth node; the element P loadj represents the power of the jth load, that is, the required power, and j represents the number of the load; if the kth node is not connected to the load, L(k) is equal to 0.

[0076] In the above technical solution, the circuit breaker state matrix includes:

[0077]

[0078] The circuit breaker state matrix B of the island distribution network is a 0-1 matrix used to describe the state and position of the circuit breaker of the island distribution network; the circuit breaker state matrix B is a k×k symmetric matrix; the element b ij represents the connectivity from node i to node j;

[0079]

[0080] Among them, a ij (l) represents the state of the lth line between the ith node and the jth node of the island distribution network; A represents the set of lines from the ith node to the jth node; if the circuit breaker of any line between the ith node and the jth node is closed, then bij Take 1; if the circuit breakers between the i-th node and the j-th node are both disconnected, then b ij Take 0.

[0081] It can be understood that by establishing the above matrix, the real-time operating status of the isolated power distribution information-physical system can be effectively reflected; when attacked, the impact of the attack is concretely displayed through the changes in the elements of the above matrix. When not attacked, the initial matrix of each matrix is ​​the standard operating status of the isolated power distribution information-physical system.

[0082] S2, respectively establish the normalized matrices of the distributed power output matrix and the load demand matrix. The representation forms of the above three matrices are unified through step S2.

[0083] Specifically, the normalized matrix D* of the distributed power output matrix is:

[0084]

[0085] Among them, P DGi * is the per-unit value of the output power of the i-th distributed generation in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P DGi *The calculation method is as follows:

[0086]

[0087] Among them, P DGi,N is the rated power of the i-th distributed power source; when the output power of the i-th distributed power source exceeds the rated power, P DGi * is greater than 1, and when the output power is less than the rated power, P DGi * less than 1;

[0088] The normalized matrix L* of the load demand matrix is:

[0089]

[0090] Among them, P loadj * represents the per-unit value of the j-th load power in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P loadj *The calculation method is as follows:

[0091]

[0092] in, is the average power of the jth load in a certain period of time; when the required power of the jth load is higher than the average power of the load, P loadj * is greater than 1, and when the required power is lower than the average power of the load, P loadj *Less than 1.

[0093] S3. Assign weight values ​​to the three matrices according to the entropy ratios of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix, and the circuit breaker state matrix.

[0094] In some embodiments, step S3 includes:

[0095] Calculate the total entropy of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix, and the circuit breaker state matrix respectively; the total entropy of the matrix is ​​the sum of the entropy values ​​of all elements in the matrix. The entropy value of a single element in the matrix is ​​calculated as follows:

[0096]

[0097] Among them, p ij represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix; if p ij is 0, and its entropy value is also 0; according to the proportion of the total entropy value of each matrix in the sum of the total entropy values ​​of the three matrices, the three matrices are assigned weight values ​​w1, w2 and w3 respectively, and the sum of the weight values ​​of the three matrices is equal to 1.

[0098] S4. Calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the distributed power output after the information attack, and calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the load demand after the information attack.

[0099] In some embodiments, the calculation method of the mean square sum H1 of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after being attacked by information is:

[0100]

[0101] Among them, D attacked * represents the normalized matrix of distributed generation output after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network is attacked by information; D attackedij * Denotes the matrix D attacked *The element in row i and column j in D ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the distributed generation output matrix that has not been subjected to information attack.

[0102] The calculation method of the mean square sum H2 of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after being attacked by information is:

[0103]

[0104] Among them, L attacked* represents the load demand normalized matrix after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network suffers from information attack; L attackedij * Represents the matrix L attacked *The element in row i and column j; L ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix that has not been subjected to information attack.

[0105] S5. Establish an information attack consequence assessment index function, wherein the information attack consequence assessment index function includes evaluation factors and weight values ​​of each evaluation factor; wherein the evaluation factors include the evaluation value of distributed power output, the evaluation value of load demand and the evaluation value of circuit breaker status, and the weight values ​​of the evaluation factors include the weight values ​​assigned to the three matrices respectively.

[0106] In a specific embodiment, the information attack consequence assessment index function C is:

[0107] C=w1H1+w2H2+w3(det(B attacked )-det(B))

[0108] Among them, w1 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the distributed power output matrix; w2 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the load demand matrix; w3 represents the weight value assigned to the circuit breaker state matrix; det() represents the row-column matrix calculation; B attacked Represents the circuit breaker state matrix after the information attack.

[0109] S6. Evaluate the information attack tolerance capability of the island distribution cyber-physical system based on the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function. When the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is less than or equal to the set threshold, it is determined that the impact of the information attack is not sufficient to threaten the safe operation, and the distributed power sources of the island distribution network can restore balance through self-regulation without removing the island. When the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is greater than the set threshold, it is determined that the island needs to be removed immediately.

[0110] In a specific embodiment, the threshold C is set according to the specific actual situation. th Setting it to 20 can more effectively form an evaluation of the information attack tolerance capability of the island distribution cyber-physical system.

[0111] In a specific embodiment of the present invention, the information attack tolerance evaluation process of the isolated island distribution information physical system of a 10kV distribution network is shown. The power grid architecture (physical system) of the 10kV distribution network is as follows: Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, the communication architecture (information system) of the 10kV distribution network is as follows: Figure 3As shown, the communication layer backbone network in the 10kV distribution network adopts the SDH ring network structure, and the access network adopts the industrial Ethernet ring network structure. Figure 2 and Figure 3 In the figure, DG stands for distributed generation, 1-11 stands for node number, MGCC stands for microgrid central controller, SW1-SW9 stands for switching equipment, and IED1-IED11 stands for intelligent electronic devices. Each distributed generation in the island outputs according to maximum power point tracking (MPPT). The parameters of distributed generation and feeder load are shown in Table 1.

[0112] Table 1 Load and distributed power parameters

[0113]

[0114] In order to evaluate the impact of multi-type information attacks on the island distribution cyber-physical system of the 10kV distribution network, the following three scenarios can be studied.

[0115] Scenario 1: The IED devices (intelligent electronic devices) in the information system are subjected to FDIA attacks (false data injection attacks), and the tolerance of the isolated power distribution information-physical system is evaluated.

[0116] Scenario 2: The isolated dispatch center in the information system suffers a DoS attack (denial of service attack), and the tolerance of the isolated power distribution information-physical system is evaluated.

[0117] Scenario 3: The communication link in the information system is attacked by induced communication delay, and the tolerance of the isolated power distribution information-physical system is evaluated.

[0118] When the information system is operating normally, the IED device sampling Figure 2 The output of each distributed power source, the power size of each load, and the on / off status of each circuit breaker in the planned island are shown, and each is filled in the D, L, and B matrices. Then, combined with the parameters of each distributed power source and load in Table 1, the elements in D and L are normalized to obtain the normalized matrices D* and L*. According to the information entropy formula in step S3, the weights w1, w2, and w3 corresponding to the D*, L*, and B matrices are calculated, as shown in Table 2.

[0119] Table 2 Distributed generation, load and circuit breaker matrix parameters

[0120]

[0121]

[0122] because Figure 2There are 11 nodes in total, of which nodes 4, 8, and 10 are connected to distributed power sources, and nodes 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are connected to loads. Therefore, the 4th, 8th, and 10th elements in the diagonal matrix D* are non-0, and the rest are all 0. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th elements in the diagonal matrix L* are non-0, and the rest are also all 0. Since the island distribution cyber-physical system is in normal operation, the circuit breakers are all in the closed state, and the elements of the symmetric matrix B are all 1 except the diagonal elements.

[0123] When the island power distribution cyber-physical system is in the above three scenarios, the sequential Monte Carlo method is used to sample and determine the status of physical components and information components in the island power distribution cyber-physical system. Therefore, according to the attack consequence calculation formulas of various information attacks on the island power distribution cyber-physical system in S4-S5, the information attack tolerance capability of the island power distribution cyber-physical system can be evaluated.

[0124] In the three types of information attack scenarios, 30 sequential Monte Carlo samplings are performed respectively to calculate the normalized matrix D of the isolated island distribution cyber-physical system after the attack. attacked *, L attacked *、B attacked Then, the mean square sum indexes H1 and H2 in S107 are calculated, and then the attack consequence index C is calculated. The attack consequence index C calculated from the 30 sampling results is averaged to obtain the tolerance of the isolated power distribution cyber-physical system under this type of information attack scenario. The corresponding calculation results are shown in Table 3 below.

[0125] Table 3 Evaluation indicators of cyber-physical systems under different attack types

[0126]

[0127]

[0128] As shown in Table 3, when the isolated power distribution information-physical system is attacked by FDIA, the attack consequence index C is the largest. The attack consequence index C obtained by induced communication delay attack is the second largest. The attack consequence index C of the isolated island dispatch center in the information system is the smallest after being attacked by DoS. It can be judged that the physical consequences of information attacks on IED devices through FDIA attacks and communication delays in communication links are more serious. When the isolated island dispatch center of the isolated power distribution information-physical system is attacked by DoS, the isolated island dispatch center loses its island control capability. If it is further supplemented by other types of information attacks, it will cause more serious physical consequences.

[0129] In order to ensure that the isolated island system can respond to information attacks in a timely and effective manner, coordinate the functional balance within the island in a timely manner, and maintain the stable operation of the power grid, power grid managers should fully understand the potential risks of each attack, formulate corresponding response strategies, and adjust the output of distributed power groups.

[0130] Some other embodiments of the present invention provide a computer device, including a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is loaded and executed by the processor, the method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution information-physical system as described in any of the above embodiments is implemented.

[0131] In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described can be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner.

[0132] Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system, characterized in that: include: Obtain the cyber-physical system architecture of the distribution network in island operation mode; According to the parameters of the isolated distribution network, the distributed power output matrix, load demand matrix and circuit breaker status matrix of the distribution network are established; Establishing normalized matrices of the distributed power output matrix and the load demand matrix respectively; According to the entropy ratio of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix and the circuit breaker state matrix, weight values ​​are assigned to the three matrices respectively; Calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the distributed power output after the information attack, and calculate the mean square sum of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after the information attack and use it as the evaluation value of the load demand after the information attack; An information attack consequence assessment index function is established, wherein the information attack consequence assessment index function includes evaluation factors and weight values ​​of each evaluation factor; wherein the evaluation factors include an evaluation value of distributed power output, an evaluation value of load demand, and an evaluation value of circuit breaker status, and the weight values ​​of the evaluation factors include weight values ​​assigned to the three matrices respectively.

2. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The distributed power output matrix includes: Where n represents the number of distributed power sources in the island distribution network, the number of nodes in the island distribution network is k, the distributed power output matrix D is a k×k diagonal matrix, and D(k) represents the distributed power output of the kth node; the element P DGi It represents the output of the i-th distributed power source, that is, the output power, and i represents the number of the distributed power source; if the k-th node is not connected to the distributed power source, D(k) is equal to 0.

3. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The load demand matrix includes: Among them, the number of loads in the island distribution network is m; the load demand matrix L is a k×k diagonal matrix; L(k) represents the load power of the kth node; the element P loadj represents the power of the jth load, that is, the required power, and j represents the number of the load; if the kth node is not connected to the load, L(k) is equal to 0.

4. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The circuit breaker state matrix comprises: The circuit breaker state matrix B of the island distribution network is a 0-1 matrix used to describe the state and position of the circuit breaker of the island distribution network; the circuit breaker state matrix B is a k×k symmetric matrix; the element b ij represents the connectivity from node i to node j; Among them, a ij (l) represents the state of the lth line between the ith node and the jth node of the island distribution network; A represents the set of lines from the ith node to the jth node; if the circuit breaker of any line between the ith node and the jth node is closed, then b ij Take 1; if the circuit breakers between the i-th node and the j-th node are both disconnected, then b ij Take 0.

5. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 4 is characterized in that: The normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix is: Among them, P DGi * is the per-unit value of the output power of the i-th distributed generation in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P DGi *The calculation method is as follows: Among them, P DGi,N is the rated power of the i-th distributed power source; when the output power of the i-th distributed power source exceeds the rated power, P DGi * is greater than 1, and when the output power is less than the rated power, P DGi * less than 1; The normalized matrix of the load demand matrix is: Among them, P loadj * represents the per-unit value of the j-th load power in the cyber-physical system of the island distribution network, P loadj *The calculation method is as follows: in, is the average power of the jth load; when the required power of the jth load is higher than the average power of the load, P loadj * is greater than 1, and when the required power is lower than the average power of the load, P loadj *Less than 1.

6. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method assigns weight values ​​to the three matrices respectively according to the entropy ratios of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix, and the circuit breaker state matrix, including: Calculate the total entropy value of the normalized matrix of the distributed generation output matrix, the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix and the circuit breaker state matrix respectively; Among them, the total entropy of the matrix is ​​the sum of the entropy values ​​of all elements in the matrix; The entropy value of a single element in the matrix is ​​calculated as: Ep ij =-page2(page) Among them, p ij represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix; if p ij is 0, and its entropy value is also 0; The weight value is assigned to the matrix according to the proportion of the total entropy value of each matrix in the sum of the total entropy values ​​of the three matrices, and the sum of the weight values ​​of the three matrices is equal to 1.

7. The method for assessing the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The calculation method of the mean square sum H1 of the normalized matrix of the distributed power output matrix after being attacked by information is: Among them, D attacked * represents the normalized matrix of distributed generation output after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network is attacked by information; D attackedij * Denotes the matrix D attacked *The element in row i and column j in D ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the distributed power generation output matrix that has not been subjected to information attack; The calculation method of the mean square sum H2 of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix after being attacked by information is: Among them, L attacked * represents the load demand normalized matrix after the cyber-physical system of the isolated distribution network suffers from information attack; L attackedij * Represents the matrix L attacked *The element in row i and column j; L ij * Represents the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the normalized matrix of the load demand matrix that has not been subjected to information attack.

8. The method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The information attack consequence assessment index function C is: C=w1H1+w2H2+w3(the(B attacked )-it(B)) Among them, w1 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the distributed power generation output matrix; w2 represents the weight value of the normalized matrix assigned to the load demand matrix; w3 represents the weight value assigned to the circuit breaker state matrix; det() represents the row-column matrix calculation; B attacked Represents the circuit breaker state matrix after the information attack.

9. The method for assessing the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated power distribution cyber-physical system according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes: The information attack tolerance capability of the island distribution cyber-physical system is evaluated according to the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function. When the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is less than or equal to the set threshold, it is determined that the impact of the information attack is not sufficient to threaten the safe operation, and the distributed power sources of the island distribution network can restore balance through self-regulation without the need to remove the island; when the calculation result of the information attack consequence assessment index function is greater than the set threshold, it is determined that the island needs to be removed immediately.

10. A computer device, characterized in that: It comprises a processor and a memory, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the computer program is loaded and executed by the processor, the method for evaluating the information attack tolerance capability of an isolated island power distribution information-physical system as described in any one of claims 1 to 9 is implemented.