Attack-tolerant controller design method for unidirectional grid-connected inverters under periodic denial-of-service attacks
By designing an attack tolerance controller of a one-way grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attack, the grid instability caused by denial of service attack in wind power generation systems is solved, and the stable operation of the system under malicious attack is achieved, and the system is enhanced. System stability and security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210130364.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-02-11
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-02-11
AI Technical Summary
In wind power generation systems, the unpredictability and intermittentity of wind resources lead to unstable grid operation, and denial of service attacks will occupy communication channels, resulting in instability and energy consumption loss of energy generation systems. The existing technology is difficult to effectively resist this. Attack to ensure the stable operation of the system under malicious attacks.
Design an attack tolerance controller for a one-way grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attack. By establishing the topological structure and mathematical model of a one-way grid-connected inverter, a periodic denial of service attack model is introduced, and an attack tolerance is designed. Controller to ensure the system runs stably when attacked.
Effectively resist periodic denial of service attacks, ensure the stability and reliability of the energy power generation system, ensure the safe operation of the system under malicious attacks, and enhance the stability and security of the power grid.
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Figure CN114914927B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of networked control systems, and is applied to grid-connected inverters in renewable energy power generation grid systems, and in particular to a method for designing an attack-tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks. Background Art
[0002] In 2019, the world's newly installed wind power capacity exceeded 60GW, an increase of 19% over 2018, and the total installed capacity reached 650GW. With the continuous launch of large-scale wind turbines in my country, the conversion technology has also continued to develop. In wind power generation systems, there are three main types of conversion technologies: direct-drive wind power system grid-side converter, wind power grid-connected system converter control under output current control mode, and wind power grid-connected system inverter control under output voltage control mode.
[0003] Due to the unpredictability, randomness and intermittency of wind resources, there is a large uncertainty in sending the power output of wind farms into the power grid system, which seriously affects the smooth operation of the power grid, so higher requirements are put forward for power grid control. At present, many scholars have proposed their frequency control methods and created many excellent interim results. Zou Zubing et al. (Zou Zubing, Cai Lijuan, Gan Huixia. Self-disturbance rejection control strategy for voltage-source PWM inverter [J]. Transactions of China Electrotechnical Society, 2004, 19 (2): 84-88.) proposed to apply self-disturbance rejection control to wind power inverters. From the experimental results, it can be seen that this method has a good control effect on complex systems with strong coupling, multivariables and nonlinearities. Liu Bo et al. (Liu Bo, Jin Hao. Feedforward compensation control of dual PWM converters in permanent magnet direct-drive wind power systems [J]. Power System Protection and Control, 2014, 42 (15): 52-57.) used the power feedforward control method to directly apply the current inner loop to adjust the active power, reducing the adjustment time of the DC bus voltage. Considering that the open communication infrastructure is embedded in the grid-connected wind turbine system, denial of service attacks will occupy the communication channel, resulting in normal communication being blocked and reducing the utilization rate of the communication channel, which will cause great malicious losses and damage to the energy generation system and grid-connected inverters. Therefore, how to ensure that the grid-connected inverters in energy generation can minimize energy consumption losses and allow the system to operate normally in the presence of malicious denial of service attacks from the outside world is a potential research topic. When the grid-connected process in the energy generation environment is attacked by denial of service, how to describe the mathematical model of the inverter has great practical significance. At the same time, when considering the attack, how to design a controller to ensure the stable operation of the system is also an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the invention
[0004] The main purpose of the present invention is to provide an attack tolerance controller design method for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks. Through this method, the unidirectional grid-connected inverter can ensure the stable operation of the system to the greatest extent even when it is subjected to a denial of service attack during operation.
[0005] A method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks is applied to an energy generation environment when the grid-connected inverter is subjected to external malicious attacks. The specific method includes the following steps:
[0006] S1: Establish the topological structure and mathematical model of unidirectional grid-connected inverter;
[0007] S2: Introduce a mathematical model of periodic denial of service attacks and analyze the stability of the system when it is subjected to periodic denial of service attacks;
[0008] S3: Establish the final mathematical model of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks and design an attack-tolerant controller for the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks.
[0009] A further improvement of the present invention is that it also includes the step of establishing a topological structure and a mathematical model of a unidirectional grid-connected inverter in an energy generation system.
[0010] A further improvement of the present invention is that it also includes the steps of designing a periodic denial of service attack model and introducing it into the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system model to establish a mathematical model of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system under periodic denial of service attacks.
[0011] A further improvement of the present invention is that it also includes the steps of establishing an attack tolerance controller design criterion for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter system under periodic denial of service attacks so that the system meets the stability criterion and determining the attack tolerance controller gain matrix of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system model under periodic denial of service attacks.
[0012] The beneficial effects achieved by the present invention are as follows: an attack tolerance controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks of the present invention is applied to a unidirectional grid-connected inverter in an energy power generation system, so that the unidirectional grid-connected inverter can effectively resist periodic denial of service attacks; compared with the prior art, the present invention can effectively resist denial of service attacks, ensure that the system can operate safely and stably even when there are malicious attacks from the outside world, enhance the stability and reliability of the system operation, and provide a new solution for safe power generation. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0013] Figure 1 The figure is a flow chart of a method for designing an attack tolerant controller in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0014] Figure 2 The system block diagram of a unidirectional grid-connected inverter system in an energy generation environment under a periodic denial of service attack in an embodiment of the present invention.
[0015] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the topological structure of a unidirectional grid-connected inverter in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0016] The technical solution of the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0017] from Figure 2 It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present invention, after receiving the data sent by the unidirectional grid-connected inverter, the AC power grid feeds back information through the phase-locked loop to achieve the control effect of the grid-connected process. This grid-connected communication link is susceptible to periodic denial of service attacks, which makes the server unable to provide normal services or even completely paralyzed. This behavior poses a great threat to power safety and stable operation of the power grid. The present invention thus designs an attack-tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks. The specific method includes the following steps:
[0018] S1: Establish a mathematical model of a unidirectional grid-connected inverter in an energy generation environment.
[0019] In reality, the power system is a large-scale nonlinear system with multiple time scales. Its stability analysis is very complicated. Therefore, it is very important to simplify the power system. The singular perturbation system is used to achieve systematic order reduction. Therefore, the dynamics of the load frequency control system is simplified to linear equations. Considering the topological structure of the linearized unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system model, Figure 2 and 3 shown. Figure 3 According to Kirchhoff's law, the differential equation of the unidirectional LCL grid-connected inverter is:
[0020]
[0021] where v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Represents the output current of the grid side, and the three constitute the state vector; i g It is also used as an output variable, v inv is the inverter bridge output voltage, v g is the grid voltage, L1 is the inverter side inductance, L2 is the grid side inductance, C f is the filter capacitor, d uis an external disturbance, here it is the disturbance caused by the load current, δ is the perturbation parameter, and 0<δ<<1. Compared with the change of the filter voltage, the current change on the inverter side is a fast variable, so the perturbation parameter is used to make the system on the same time scale.
[0022] The system model of a unidirectional grid-connected inverter is:
[0023]
[0024] where x(t) = [v c i g i1] T is the state vector of the inverter, y(t) represents the output, u(t)=[v inv v g ] T is the control input, E δ =diag{I,δI,δI}, δ is the perturbation parameter, and 0<δ<<1, v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Represents the grid-side output current, v inv is the inverter bridge output voltage, v g is the grid voltage, L1 is the inverter side inductance, L2 is the grid side inductance, C f is the filter capacitor, d u The disturbance caused by the load on the inverter side.
[0025] The parameters used in the system matrix can be: switching frequency f is 10kHz, grid voltage is 220V, grid current is 10A, inverter bridge side inductor L1 is 3.7mH, inverter bridge side inductor L2 is 0.6mH, filter capacitor C is 4.7μF, grid current is in phase with grid voltage, and grid current can error track command value (10A), disturbance perturbation d u (t) is taken as 2.1, and the perturbation parameter δ is taken as 0.0085.
[0026] S2: Introduce a periodic denial of service attack model and establish a system model of the grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks.
[0027] In order to fully understand the impact of periodic denial of service attacks on a unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system, the embodiment of the present invention establishes a mathematical model to realize some specific conditions of the system under periodic denial of service attacks. The specific process of establishing the mathematical model is as follows:
[0028] Considering the impact of periodic denial of service attacks, a periodic denial of service attack model is established, and the denial of service attack is introduced into the unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system. Specifically, the denial of service attack signal is a set of attack signals with limited energy, which will maliciously occupy the communication channel. The specific mathematical model is:
[0029]
[0030] Among them, S DoS (t) represents the state of the denial of service attack in the time domain, T is the attack period of the periodic denial of service attack, T off represents the interval time of the attack in the denial of service cycle, n∈N represents the number of cycles of the denial of service attack, when S DoS (t) = 0 means that in the time domain [nT, nT + T off ) does not cause a denial of service attack. At this time, the communication channel of the system can communicate normally, that is, the time domain [nT,nT+T off ) is the dormant period of the denial of service attack; and when S DoS When (t) = 1, that is, in the time domain [nT+T off ,nT+T) a denial of service attack occurs, at which time the system's communication channel is blocked, called the time domain [nT+T off ,nT+T) is the active period of the denial of service attack.
[0031] Depend on Figure 2 It can be seen from the control model diagram that when a denial of service attack exists, the control input of the system is zero, so it is necessary to design a controller so that the system can operate stably even when an attack exists. That is, the control input of the system is expressed in the time domain as K is the designed attack-tolerant controller gain matrix, x(t) = [v c i g i1] T is the state vector of the inverter, v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Indicates the grid-side output current.
[0032] The present invention can ensure the operating stability of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter in the energy generation system through the attack tolerance controller. Therefore, the mathematical model of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under the periodic denial of service attack is considered:
[0033]
[0034] In the formula, the system state vector x(t) = [v c i g i1] T , y(t) represents the output, u(t) = [vinv v g ] T is the control input, C = [0 1 0], E δ =diag{I,δI,δI}, δ is the perturbation parameter, v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Represents the grid-side output current, v inv is the inverter bridge output voltage, v g is the grid voltage, L1 is the inverter side inductance, L2 is the grid side inductance, C f is the filter capacitor, d u is the disturbance caused by the inverter side load. K is the designed attack tolerance controller gain matrix.
[0035] S3: Establish the attack tolerance controller design criteria of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks so that the system meets the stable performance indicators and determine the attack tolerance controller gain matrix of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks.
[0036] In the embodiment of the present invention, for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under a periodic denial of service attack, if for positive constants ι1, ι2, μ1, μ2 and λ, there exists a matrix O ij >0(i,j=1,2) makes the following linear matrix inequality hold:
[0037]
[0038]
[0039] O i2 ≤ι 3-i O 3-i,1
[0040] in A1=A+BK, A2=A, C=[0 1 0], then the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system is exponentially stable under periodic denial of service attacks and the L2 gain is less than λ.
[0041] When the system is stable, for a given positive scalar ι i (i=1,2),κ i (i=1,2),η i (i=1,2),θ i (i=1,2) and λ, if there exists a positive definite matrix U of appropriate dimension ij (i,j=1,2) and matrix U0, The following linear matrix inequality is satisfied:
[0042] E δ T U ij =U ij T E δ
[0043]
[0044]
[0045] Π 21 <0,
[0046]
[0047] U 11 ≤ι1U 22 , U 21 ≤ι2U 12 ,
[0048] Where, β = [I 0 0],
[0049]
[0050]
[0051]
[0052]
[0053] Then according to the above linear matrix inequality, the controller gain matrix can be calculated as
[0054] The present invention aims to design an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system under a denial of service attack, so as to ensure that the unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system can operate safely and stably when subjected to periodic denial of service attacks.
[0055] The design method of the attack tolerant controller under denial of service attack of the present invention is applied to a unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system. First, the topological structure of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system is established and a mathematical model is constructed; at the same time, a periodic denial of service attack model is constructed and introduced into the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system model; finally, an attack tolerant controller is designed to ensure that the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system can operate safely and stably under periodic denial of service attacks and meet the stable performance index.
[0056] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiment. Any equivalent modifications or changes made by ordinary technicians in this field based on the contents disclosed by the present invention should be included in the protection scope recorded in the claims.
Claims
1. An attack tolerant controller design method for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks, characterized by: The method comprises the following steps: S1: Establish differential equations and mathematical models for unidirectional grid-connected inverters in energy generation environments; S2: Introduce a mathematical model of periodic denial of service attacks, analyze the stability of the system when it is attacked by periodic denial of service, and establish a system model of the grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks; S3: Design an attack-tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial-of-service attacks, and determine the gain matrix of the attack-tolerant controller according to the performance indicators that need to be met; In step S3, for the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attack, if for the positive constants ι1, ι2, μ1, μ2 and λ, there exists a matrix O ij >0(i,j=1,2) makes the following linear matrix inequality hold: THE ij T AND δ =And δ T THE ij The i2 ≤i 3-i The 3-i,1 in A1=A+BK,A2=A,C=[0 1 0],then the unidirectional grid-connected inverter system is exponentially stable under periodic denial of service attack and the L2 gain is less than λ; In step S3, when the system is stable, for a given positive scalar ι i (i=1,2),κ i (i=1,2),η i (i=1,2),θ i (i=1,2) and λ, if there exists a positive definite matrix U of appropriate dimension ij (i,j=1,2) and matrix U0, The following linear matrix inequality is satisfied: And δ T The ij =U ij T And δ P 21 <0 IN 11 ≤ι1U 22 ,IN 21 ≤ι2U 12 Where, β=[I 0 0], According to the above linear matrix inequality, the controller gain matrix is calculated as follows:
2. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, the differential equation of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter is: where v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Represents the output current of the grid side, and the three constitute the state vector; i g It is also used as an output variable, v inv is the inverter bridge output voltage, v g is the grid voltage, L1 is the inverter side inductance, L2 is the grid side inductance, C f is the filter capacitor, d u is the external disturbance, here it is the disturbance caused by the load current, δ is the perturbation parameter, and 0<δ<<1. The perturbation parameter is used to make the system on the same time scale.
3. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step S1, the system model of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter is: where x(t) = [v c i g i1] T is the state vector of the inverter, y(t) represents the output, u(t)=[v inv v g ] T is the control input, C=[0 1 0], E δ =diag{I,δI,δI}, where I is the one-dimensional identity matrix.
4. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 3, characterized in that: In step S1, the parameters used in the system matrix are as follows: the switching frequency f is 10kHz, the grid voltage is 220V, the grid current is 10A, the inverter bridge side inductor L1 is 3.7mH, the inverter bridge side inductor L2 is 0.6mH, the filter capacitor C is 4.7μF, the grid current is in phase with the grid voltage, and the grid current can error track the command value 10A, the disturbance perturbation d u (t) is taken as 2.1, and the perturbation parameter δ is taken as 0.0085.
5. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S2, considering the impact of periodic denial of service attacks, a periodic denial of service attack model is established, and the denial of service attack is introduced into the unidirectional grid-connected inverter power system. Specifically, the denial of service attack signal is a set of attack signals with limited energy, which will maliciously occupy the communication channel. The specific mathematical model is: Among them, S DoS (t) represents the state of the denial of service attack in the time domain, T is the attack period of the periodic denial of service attack, T off represents the attack interval time in the denial of service cycle, n∈N represents the number of cycles of the denial of service attack, when S DoS (t) = 0 means that in the time domain [nT, nT + T off ) does not cause a denial of service attack. At this time, the communication channel of the system can communicate normally, that is, the time domain [nT,nT+T off ) is the dormant period of the denial of service attack; and when S DoS When (t) = 1, that is, in the time domain [nT+T off ,nT+T) a denial of service attack occurs, at which time the system's communication channel is blocked, called the time domain [nT+T off ,nT+T) is the active period of the denial of service attack.
6. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 5, characterized in that: In step S2, when a denial of service attack exists, the control input of the system is zero, and the controller is required to make the system run stably even when the attack exists. That is, the control input of the system is expressed in the time domain as K is the designed attack-tolerant controller gain matrix, x(t) = [v c i g i1] T is the state vector of the inverter, v c represents the filter capacitor voltage, i1 represents the inverter side inductor current, i g Indicates the grid-side output current.
7. The method for designing an attack tolerant controller for a unidirectional grid-connected inverter under periodic denial of service attacks according to claim 6, characterized in that: In step S2, the mathematical model of the unidirectional grid-connected inverter under the periodic denial of service attack is:
Citation Information
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