Signal modification for control channel physical layer security

By using a secret key to modify the binary scrambling, modulation, and OFDM tone mapping of the physical control channel signal in a wireless communication system, a protected signal is generated, which solves the problem of the physical layer channel being vulnerable to attack and improves the security of wireless communication.

CN118975168APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15QUALCOMM INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202380032355.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2022-04-14
Filing Date
2023-04-06
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing wireless communication systems, the physical control channel signal is vulnerable to attacks from potential eavesdropping devices and lacks effective physical layer security protection, leading to the leakage of sensitive information and a decline in network services.

Method used

Information security is ensured by using a secret key in the transmitter and receiver devices to modify the binary scrambling, modulation, and OFDM tone mapping of the physical control channel signal to generate and resolve protected physical control channel signals.

Benefits of technology

It effectively protects information on the physical control channel, enhances the security between wireless communication devices, prevents attacks from potential eavesdropping devices, and improves the overall security of communication.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communications. In some aspects, a transmitter device can modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a secret key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal. The transmitter device is capable of transmitting the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device. Numerous other aspects are described.
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Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This patent application claims priority to U.S. non-provisional patent application No. 17 / 659,319, filed on April 14, 2022, entitled “SIGNAL MODIFICATION FOR CONTROL CHANNEL PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY,” which is hereby expressly incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0003] Aspects of the present disclosure relate generally to wireless communications, and to techniques and apparatus for signal modification for control channel physical layer security. Background Art

[0004] Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide a variety of telecommunication services, such as telephony, video, data, messaging, and broadcasting. Typical wireless communication systems may employ multiple access technologies that can support communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmit power, etc.). Examples of such multiple access technologies include code division multiple access (CDMA) systems, time division multiple access (TDMA) systems, frequency division multiple access (FDMA) systems, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems, single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) systems, time division synchronous code division multiple access (TD-SCDMA) systems, and long term evolution (LTE). LTE / LTE-Advanced is a set of enhancements to the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) mobile standard promulgated by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

[0005] A wireless network may include one or more base stations that support communications for a user equipment (UE) or multiple UEs. A UE may communicate with a base station via downlink communications and uplink communications. A "downlink" (or "DL") refers to the communication link from a base station to a UE, and an "uplink" (or "UL") refers to the communication link from a UE to a base station.

[0006] The above-mentioned multiple access technologies have been adopted in various telecommunication standards to provide a common protocol that enables different UEs to communicate at a city, country, region and / or global level. New Radio (NR), which may be referred to as 5G, is a set of enhancements to the LTE mobile standard promulgated by 3GPP. NR is designed to better support mobile broadband Internet access by improving spectrum efficiency, reducing costs, improving services, utilizing new spectrum, and using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with cyclic prefix (CP) (CP-OFDM) on the downlink, using CP-OFDM and / or single carrier frequency division multiplexing (SC-FDM) (also known as discrete Fourier transform spread OFDM (DFT-s-OFDM)) on the uplink to better integrate with other open standards, as well as supporting beamforming, multiple input multiple output (MIMO) antenna technology and carrier aggregation. As the demand for mobile broadband access continues to increase, further improvements in LTE, NR and other radio access technologies remain useful. Summary of the invention

[0007] Some aspects described herein relate to a transmitter device for wireless communication. The transmitter device may include a memory and one or more processors coupled to the memory. The one or more processors may be configured to modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal. The one or more processors may be configured to send the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0008] Some aspects described herein relate to a receiver device for wireless communication. The receiver device may include a memory and one or more processors coupled to the memory. The one or more processors may be configured to receive a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitter device. The one or more processors may be configured to retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0009] Some aspects described herein relate to a method of wireless communication performed by a transmitter device. The method may include modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal. The method may include sending the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0010] Some aspects described herein relate to a method of wireless communication performed by a receiver device. The method may include receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a sender device. The method may include retrieving information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0011] Some aspects described herein relate to a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing an instruction set for wireless communication by a transmitter device. The instruction set, when executed by one or more processors of the transmitter device, may cause the transmitter device to modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal. The instruction set, when executed by one or more processors of the transmitter device, may cause the transmitter device to send the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0012] Some aspects described herein relate to a non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a set of instructions for wireless communication by a receiver device. The set of instructions, when executed by one or more processors of the receiver device, may cause the receiver device to receive a protected physical control channel signal from a sender device. The set of instructions, when executed by one or more processors of the receiver device, may cause the receiver device to retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0013] Some aspects described herein relate to an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus may include means for modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal. The apparatus may include means for sending the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0014] Some aspects described herein relate to an apparatus for wireless communication. The apparatus may include means for receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitting device. The apparatus may include means for retrieving information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0015] Aspects of the present invention generally include methods, apparatus, systems, computer program products, non-transitory computer-readable media, user equipment, base stations, wireless communication devices and / or processing systems as fully described herein with reference to the accompanying drawings and descriptions and as illustrated in the accompanying drawings and descriptions.

[0016] The features and technical advantages of examples according to the present disclosure have been outlined quite extensively above so that the following specific embodiments may be better understood. Additional features and advantages will be described below. The disclosed concepts and specific examples may be easily used as a basis for modifying or designing other structures for achieving the same purpose of the present disclosure. Such equivalent constructions do not depart from the scope of protection of the appended claims. The characteristics of the concepts disclosed herein, both in terms of their organization and method of operation, and the associated advantages will be better understood by considering the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Each of the accompanying drawings is provided for the purpose of illustration and description, and not as a definition of the limitations of the claims.

[0017] Although various aspects are described in the present disclosure by illustrating some examples, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that such aspects can be implemented in many different arrangements and scenarios. The technology described herein can be implemented using different platform types, devices, systems, shapes, sizes and / or packaging arrangements. For example, some aspects can be implemented via integrated chip implementations or other devices based on non-module components (e.g., end-user devices, vehicles, communication equipment, computing equipment, industrial equipment, retail / shopping equipment, medical equipment and / or artificial intelligence devices). Various aspects can be implemented in chip-level components, modular components, non-modular components, non-chip-level components, device-level components and / or system-level components. The equipment incorporating the various aspects and features described may include additional components and features for implementing and practicing the various aspects claimed and described. For example, the transmission and reception of wireless signals may include one or more components (e.g., hardware components, including antennas, radio frequency (RF) chains, power amplifiers, modulators, buffers, processors, interleavers, adders and / or summers) for analog and digital purposes. The various aspects described herein are intended to be practiced in various devices, components, systems, distributed arrangements and / or end-user devices of various sizes, shapes and configurations. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] In order to fully understand the above features of the present disclosure, a more specific description of the invention briefly summarized above can be obtained by referring to various aspects (some of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings). However, it should be noted that the accompanying drawings only illustrate certain typical aspects of the present disclosure and are therefore not to be considered as limiting the scope thereof, as the specification may admit other equally effective aspects. The same figure numbers in different drawings may identify the same or similar elements.

[0019] Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless network according to the present disclosure.

[0020] Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of communication between a base station and a user equipment (UE) in a wireless network according to the present disclosure.

[0021] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless network with a potential eavesdropping device according to the present disclosure.

[0022] Figures 4 to 5 is a diagram illustrating an example associated with signal modification for physical layer security of a control channel according to the present disclosure.

[0023] Figure 6 to Figure 7 is a diagram illustrating an example process associated with signal modification for control channel physical layer security according to the present disclosure.

[0024] Figures 8 to 9 is a diagram of an example apparatus for wireless communications according to the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0025] The various aspects of the present disclosure are described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the present disclosure can be embodied in many different forms, and should not be construed as being limited to any specific structure or function presented throughout the present disclosure. On the contrary, these aspects are provided so that the present disclosure will be thorough and complete, and the protection scope of the present disclosure will be fully conveyed to those skilled in the art. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the scope of the present disclosure is intended to cover any aspect of the present disclosure disclosed herein, whether it is implemented independently or in combination with any other aspect of the present disclosure. For example, any number of aspects set forth herein may be used to implement a device or practice method. In addition, the scope of the present disclosure is intended to cover such devices or methods implemented using other structures, functions, or structures and functions in addition to or different from the various aspects of the disclosure set forth herein. It should be understood that any aspect of the disclosure disclosed herein may be embodied by one or more elements of the claims.

[0026] Several aspects of telecommunication systems will now be presented with reference to various devices and techniques. These devices and techniques will be described in the following detailed description and illustrated in the accompanying drawings by various blocks, modules, components, circuits, steps, processes, algorithms, etc. (collectively referred to as "elements"). These elements may be implemented using hardware, software, or a combination thereof. Whether such elements are implemented as hardware or software depends on the specific application and the design constraints imposed on the overall system.

[0027] Although various aspects may be described herein using terms generally associated with 5G or new radio (NR) radio access technology (RAT), various aspects of the present disclosure may be applied to other RATs, such as 3G RAT, 4G RAT, and / or post-5G RATs (e.g., 6G).

[0028] Figure 1 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless network 100 according to the present disclosure. The wireless network 100 may be a 5G (e.g., NR) network and / or a 4G (e.g., Long Term Evolution (LTE)) network, or may include elements of a 5G (e.g., NR) network and / or elements of a 4G (e.g., Long Term Evolution (LTE)) network, among other examples. The wireless network 100 may include one or more base stations 110 (shown as BS110a, BS110b, BS110c, and BS110d), a user equipment (UE) 120 or multiple UEs 120 (shown as UE 120a, UE 120b, UE 120c, UE 120d, and UE 120e), and / or other network entities. The base station 110 is an entity that communicates with the UE 120. Base station 110 (sometimes referred to as BS) may include, for example, an NR base station, an LTE base station, a Node B, an eNB (e.g., in 4G), a gNB (e.g., in 5G), an access point, and / or a transmit receive point (TRP). Each base station 110 may provide communication coverage for a particular geographic area. In the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the term "cell" may refer to a coverage area of ​​a base station 110 and / or a base station subsystem serving the coverage area, depending on the context in which the term is used.

[0029] The base station 110 may provide communication coverage for a macro cell, a pico cell, a femto cell, and / or another type of cell. A macro cell may cover a relatively large geographic area (e.g., a radius of several kilometers) and may allow unrestricted access by a UE 120 with a service subscription. A pico cell may cover a relatively small geographic area and may allow unrestricted access by a UE 120 with a service subscription. A femto cell may cover a relatively small geographic area (e.g., a home) and may allow restricted access by a UE 120 associated with the femto cell (e.g., a UE 120 in a closed subscriber group (CSG)). A base station 110 for a macro cell may be referred to as a macro base station. A base station 110 for a pico cell may be referred to as a pico base station. A base station 110 for a femto cell may be referred to as a femto base station or a home base station. In Figure 1In the example shown in , BS 110a may be a macro base station for macro cell 102a, BS 110b may be a pico base station for pico cell 102b, and BS 110c may be a femto base station for femto cell 102c. A base station may support one or more (eg, three) cells.

[0030] In some examples, the cell may not necessarily be stationary, and the geographic area of ​​the cell may move according to the location of the mobile base station 110 (e.g., a mobile base station). In some examples, the base stations 110 can be interconnected with each other and / or to one or more other base stations 110 or network nodes (not shown) in the wireless network 100 through various types of backhaul interfaces, such as direct physical connections or virtual networks, using any suitable transport network.

[0031] The wireless network 100 may include one or more relay stations. A relay station is an entity that can receive transmissions of data from an upstream station (e.g., a base station 110 or a UE 120) and transmit the transmissions of data to a downstream station (e.g., a UE 120 or a base station 110). A relay station may be a UE 120 that is capable of relaying transmissions for other UEs 120. Figure 1 In the example shown in , BS 110d (eg, a relay base station) can communicate with BS 110a (eg, a macro base station) and UE 120d to facilitate communication between BS 110a and UE 120d. Base station 110 that relays communication may be referred to as a relay station, relay base station, relay, etc.

[0032] The wireless network 100 may be a heterogeneous network that includes different types of base stations 110, such as macro base stations, pico base stations, femto base stations, relay base stations, etc. These different types of base stations 110 may have different transmit power levels, different coverage areas, and / or different impacts on interference in the wireless network 100. For example, a macro base station may have a high transmit power level (e.g., 5 watts to 40 watts), while a pico base station, a femto base station, and a relay base station may have a lower transmit power level (e.g., 0.1 watt to 2 watts).

[0033] A network controller 130 may be coupled to or in communication with a set of base stations 110 and may provide coordination and control for the base stations 110. The network controller 130 may communicate with the base stations 110 via backhaul communication links. The base stations 110 may communicate directly with each other or indirectly via wireless or wired backhaul communication links.

[0034] UE 120 can be dispersed throughout the wireless network 100, and each UE 120 can be stationary or mobile. UE 120 can include, for example, access terminals, terminals, mobile stations, and / or subscriber units. UE 120 can be a cellular phone (e.g., a smart phone), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wireless modem, a wireless communication device, a handheld device, a laptop computer, a cordless phone, a wireless local loop (WLL) station, a tablet computer, a camera, a gaming device, a netbook, a smartbook, an ultrabook, a medical device, a biometric device, a wearable device (e.g., a smart watch, smart clothing, smart glasses, a smart wristband, smart jewelry (e.g., a smart ring or a smart bracelet)), an entertainment device (e.g., a music device, a video device, and / or a satellite radio), a vehicle component or sensor, a smart meter / sensor, an industrial manufacturing equipment, a global positioning system device, and / or any other suitable device configured to communicate via a wireless medium.

[0035] Some UEs 120 may be considered as machine type communication (MTC) or evolved or enhanced machine type communication (eMTC) UEs. MTC UEs and / or eMTC UEs may include, for example, robots, drones, remote devices, sensors, meters, monitors, and / or location tags that may communicate with a base station, another device (e.g., a remote device), or some other entity. Some UEs 120 may be considered as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and / or may be implemented as NB-IoT (narrowband IoT) devices. Some UEs 120 may be considered as customer premises equipment. UE 120 may be included in a housing that houses components of UE 120, such as a processor component and / or a memory component. In some examples, the processor component and the memory component may be coupled together. For example, a processor component (e.g., one or more processors) and a memory component (e.g., a memory) may be operationally coupled, communicatively coupled, electronically coupled, and / or electrically coupled.

[0036] In general, any number of wireless networks 100 may be deployed in a given geographic area. Each wireless network 100 may support a specific RAT and may operate on one or more frequencies. RAT may be referred to as a radio technology, an air interface, etc. Frequency may be referred to as a carrier, a frequency channel, etc. Each frequency may support a single RAT in a given geographic area to avoid interference between wireless networks of different RATs. In some cases, NR or 5G RAT networks may be deployed.

[0037] In some examples, two or more UEs 120 (e.g., shown as UE 120a and UE 120e) may communicate directly using one or more side link channels (e.g., without using base station 110 as an intermediary to communicate with each other). For example, UE 120 may communicate using peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, device-to-device (D2D) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) protocols (e.g., which may include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) protocols, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) protocols, or vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) protocols), and / or mesh networks. In such examples, UE 120 may perform scheduling operations, resource selection operations, and / or other operations described elsewhere herein as being performed by base station 110.

[0038] The devices of the wireless network 100 may communicate using an electromagnetic spectrum, which may be subdivided into various categories, bands, channels, etc., based on frequency or wavelength. For example, the devices of the wireless network 100 may communicate using one or more operating bands. In 5G NR, two initial operating bands have been identified as frequency range designations FR1 (410 MHz-7.125 GHz) and FR2 (24.25 GHz-52.6 GHz). It should be understood that, although a portion of FR1 is greater than 6 GHz, FR1 is often (interchangeably) referred to as the "below 6 GHz" band in various documents and articles. A similar naming problem sometimes occurs with respect to FR2, which is often (interchangeably) referred to as the "millimeter wave" band in documents and articles, although different from the extremely high frequency (EHF) band (30 GHz-300 GHz) identified as the "millimeter wave" band by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

[0039] Frequencies between FR1 and FR2 are generally referred to as mid-band frequencies. Recent 5G NR research has identified the operating bands for these mid-band frequencies as frequency range designation FR3 (7.125GHz-24.25GHz). The bands falling within FR3 can inherit FR1 characteristics and / or FR2 characteristics, so the features of FR1 and / or FR2 can be effectively extended to mid-band frequencies. In addition, higher frequency bands are currently being explored to extend 5G NR operations to more than 52.6GHz. For example, three higher operating bands have been identified as frequency range designations FR4a or FR4-1 (52.6GHz-71GHz), FR4 (52.6GHz-114.25GHz) and FR5 (114.25GHz-300GHz). Each of these higher frequency bands falls within the EHF band.

[0040] In view of the above examples, unless otherwise explicitly stated, it should be understood that if the term "below 6 GHz" or the like is used herein, the term can be broadly referred to as a frequency that can be less than 6 GHz, can be within FR1, or can include mid-band frequencies. In addition, unless otherwise explicitly stated, it should be understood that if the term "millimeter wave" or the like is used herein, the term can be broadly referred to as a frequency that can include mid-band frequencies, can be within FR2, FR4, FR4-a or FR4-1 and / or FR5, or can be within the EHF band. It is contemplated that the frequencies included in these operating bands (e.g., FR1, FR2, FR3, FR4, FR4-a, FR4-1, and / or FR5) can be modified, and the techniques described herein are applicable to those modified frequency ranges.

[0041] In some aspects, UE 120 may include a communications manager 140. As described in greater detail elsewhere herein, communications manager 140 may modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal; and transmit the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device. Additionally or alternatively, communications manager 140 may perform one or more other operations described herein.

[0042] In some aspects, as described in greater detail elsewhere herein, the communications manager 140 may receive a protected physical control channel signal from a sender device; and retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key. Additionally or alternatively, the communications manager 140 may perform one or more other operations described herein.

[0043] In some aspects, the base station 110 may include a communication manager 150. As described in more detail elsewhere herein, the communication manager 150 may modify an input or output of at least one of a binary scrambling code, a modulation, or an OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal; and transmit the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device. Additionally or alternatively, the communication manager 150 may perform one or more other operations described herein.

[0044] In some aspects, as described in greater detail elsewhere herein, the communications manager 150 may receive a protected physical control channel signal from a sender device; and retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key. Additionally or alternatively, the communications manager 150 may perform one or more other operations described herein.

[0045] As indicated above, Figure 1 are provided as examples. Other examples can be found in the Figure 1 Different than described.

[0046] Figure 2 2 is a diagram illustrating an example 200 of base station 110 communicating with UE 120 in wireless network 100 according to the present disclosure. Base station 110 may be equipped with a set of antennas 234a to 234t, such as T antennas (T≥1). UE 120 may be equipped with a set of antennas 252a to 252r, such as R antennas (R≥1).

[0047] At the base station 110, the transmit processor 220 may receive data intended for the UE 120 (or a set of UEs 120) from the data source 212. The transmit processor 220 may select one or more modulation and coding schemes (MCS) for the UE 120 based at least in part on one or more channel quality indicators (CQI) received from the UE 120. The base station 110 may process (e.g., encode and modulate) the data for the UE 120 based at least in part on the MCS selected for the UE 120, and may provide data symbols for the UE 120. The transmit processor 220 may process system information (e.g., for semi-static resource partitioning information (SRPI)) and control information (e.g., CQI requests, grants, and / or upper layer signaling), and provide overhead symbols and control symbols. The transmit processor 220 may generate reference symbols for reference signals (e.g., cell-specific reference signals (CRS) or demodulation reference signals (DMRS)) and synchronization signals (e.g., primary synchronization signals (PSS) or secondary synchronization signals (SSS)). The transmit (TX) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) processor 230 may perform spatial processing (e.g., pre-coding) on ​​data symbols, control symbols, overhead symbols, and / or reference symbols, where applicable, and may provide a set of output symbol streams (e.g., T output symbol streams) to a corresponding set of modems 232 (e.g., T modems) (shown as modems 232a to 232t). For example, each output symbol stream may be provided to a modulator component (shown as MOD) of the modem 232. Each modem 232 may process a corresponding output symbol stream (e.g., for OFDM) using a corresponding modulator component to obtain an output sample stream. Each modem 232 may further process (e.g., convert to analog, amplify, filter, and / or up-convert) the output sample stream using a corresponding modulator component to obtain a downlink signal. The modems 232a to 232t may transmit a set of downlink signals (e.g., T downlink signals) via a corresponding set of antennas 234 (e.g., T antennas) (shown as antennas 234a to 234t).

[0048] At the UE 120, a set of antennas 252 (shown as antennas 252a to 252r) may receive downlink signals from the base station 110 and / or other base stations 110, and a set of received signals (e.g., R received signals) may be provided to a set of modems 254 (e.g., R modems) (shown as modems 254a to 254r). For example, each received signal may be provided to a demodulator component (shown as DEMOD) of the modem 254. Each modem 254 may use a corresponding demodulator component to condition (e.g., filter, amplify, downconvert, and / or digitize) the received signal to obtain input samples. Each modem 254 may use a demodulator component to further process the input samples (e.g., for OFDM) to obtain received symbols. A MIMO detector 256 may obtain received symbols from the modem 254, may perform MIMO detection on the received symbols where applicable, and may provide detected symbols. The receive processor 258 may process (e.g., demodulate and decode) the detected symbols, may provide decoded data for the UE 120 to the data sink 260, and may provide decoded control information and system information to the controller / processor 280. The term "controller / processor" may refer to one or more controllers, one or more processors, or a combination thereof. The channel processor may determine a reference signal received power (RSRP) parameter, a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) parameter, a reference signal received quality (RSRQ) parameter, and / or a CQI parameter, among other things. In some examples, one or more components of the UE 120 may be included in the housing 284.

[0049] The network controller 130 may include a communication unit 294, a controller / processor 290, and a memory 292. The network controller 130 may include, for example, one or more devices in a core network. The network controller 130 may communicate with the base station 110 via the communication unit 294.

[0050] One or more antennas (e.g., antennas 234a to 234t and / or antennas 252a to 252r) may include or be included within one or more antenna panels, one or more antenna groups, one or more sets of antenna elements, and / or one or more antenna arrays, etc. Antenna panels, antenna groups, sets of antenna elements, and / or antenna arrays may include one or more antenna elements (in a single housing or multiple housings), sets of coplanar antenna elements, sets of non-coplanar antenna elements, and / or may be coupled to one or more transmit and / or receive components (such as, Figure 2 One or more antenna elements of one or more components in.

[0051] On the uplink, at the UE 120, the transmit processor 264 may receive and process data from the data source 262 and control information from the controller / processor 280 (e.g., for reports including RSRP, RSSI, RSRQ, and / or CQI). The transmit processor 264 may generate reference symbols for one or more reference signals. The symbols from the transmit processor 264 may be pre-decoded by the TX MIMO processor 266, where applicable, further processed by the modem 254 (e.g., for DFT-s-OFDM or CP-OFDM), and transmitted to the base station 110. In some examples, the modem 254 of the UE 120 may include a modulator and a demodulator. In some examples, the UE 120 includes a transceiver. The transceiver may include any combination of an antenna 252, a modem 254, a MIMO detector 256, a receive processor 258, a transmit processor 264, and / or a TX MIMO processor 266. The transceiver may be used by a processor (eg, controller / processor 280) and memory 282 to perform the functions described herein (eg, reference Figures 4 to 9 ) or any aspect of any of the methods described herein.

[0052] At the base station 110, uplink signals from the UE 120 and / or other UEs may be received by the antenna 234, processed by the modem 232 (e.g., a demodulator component of the modem 232 shown as DEMOD), detected by the MIMO detector 236 where applicable, and further processed by the receive processor 238 to obtain decoded data and control information transmitted by the UE 120. The receive processor 238 may provide the decoded data to the data sink 239 and the decoded control information to the controller / processor 240. The base station 110 may include a communication unit 244 and may communicate with the network controller 130 via the communication unit 244. The base station 110 may include a scheduler 246 to schedule one or more UEs 120 for downlink and / or uplink communications. In some examples, the modem 232 of the base station 110 may include a modulator and a demodulator. In some examples, the base station 110 includes a transceiver. The transceiver may include any combination of antenna 234, modem 232, MIMO detector 236, receive processor 238, transmit processor 220, and / or TX MIMO processor 230. The transceiver may be used by a processor (e.g., controller / processor 240) and memory 242 to perform operations described herein (e.g., with reference to Figures 4 to 9 ) or any aspect of any of the methods described herein.

[0053] The controller / processor 240 of the base station 110, the controller / processor 280 of the UE 120, and / or Figure 2Any other component in may perform one or more techniques associated with signal modification for physical layer security of a control channel, as described in more detail elsewhere herein. In some aspects, the transmitter device described herein is a UE 120, is included in a UE 120, or includes Figure 2 One or more components of the UE 120 shown. In some aspects, the transmitter device described herein is a base station 110, is included in a base station 110, or includes Figure 2 In some aspects, the receiver device described herein is a UE 120, is included in a UE 120, or includes Figure 2 One or more components of the UE 120 shown. In some aspects, the receiver device described herein is a base station 110, is included in a base station 110, or includes Figure 2 One or more components of the base station 110 shown. For example, the controller / processor 240 of the base station 110, the controller / processor 280 of the UE 120, and / or Figure 2 Any other component of the Figure 6 The process of 600 Figure 7 700 and / or operations of other processes as described herein. Memory 242 and memory 282 may store data and program codes for base station 110 and UE 120, respectively. In some examples, memory 242 and / or memory 282 may include a non-transitory computer-readable medium that stores one or more instructions (e.g., code and / or program code) for wireless communication. For example, one or more instructions, when executed by one or more processors of base station 110 and / or UE 120 (e.g., directly, or after compilation, conversion, and / or interpretation), may cause one or more processors, UE 120, and / or base station 110 to perform or direct, for example Figure 6 The process of 600 Figure 7 The process 700 and / or operations of other processes as described herein. In some examples, executing instructions may include running instructions, converting instructions, compiling instructions, and / or interpreting instructions, etc.

[0054] In some aspects, the transmitter device includes means for modifying an input or output of at least one of a binary scrambling code, a modulation, or an OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal; and / or means for transmitting the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device. In some aspects, the means for the transmitter device to perform operations described herein may include, for example, one or more of the communication manager 150, the transmit processor 220, the TX MIMO processor 230, the modem 232, the antenna 234, the MIMO detector 236, the receive processor 238, the controller / processor 240, the memory 242, or the scheduler 246. In some aspects, the means for the transmitter device to perform operations described herein may include, for example, one or more of the communication manager 140, the antenna 252, the modem 254, the MIMO detector 256, the receive processor 258, the transmit processor 264, the TX MIMO processor 266, the controller / processor 280, or the memory 282.

[0055] In some aspects, the receiver device includes means for receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitter device; and / or means for retrieving information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key. In some aspects, the means for the receiver device to perform the operations described herein may include, for example, one or more of the communication manager 150, the transmit processor 220, the TX MIMO processor 230, the modem 232, the antenna 234, the MIMO detector 236, the receive processor 238, the controller / processor 240, the memory 242, or the scheduler 246. In some aspects, the means for the receiver device to perform the operations described herein may include, for example, one or more of the communication manager 140, the antenna 252, the modem 254, the MIMO detector 256, the receive processor 258, the transmit processor 264, the TX MIMO processor 266, the controller / processor 280, or the memory 282.

[0056] Although Figure 2 The blocks in the 2000 and 2010 are illustrated as distinct components, but the functionality described above for these blocks may be implemented in a single hardware, software, or combined component or in various combinations of components. For example, the functionality described for the transmit processor 264, the receive processor 258, and / or the TX MIMO processor 266 may be performed by or under the control of the controller / processor 280.

[0057] As indicated above, Figure 2 are provided as examples. Other examples can be found in the Figure 2 Different than described.

[0058] Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating an example 300 of a wireless network with potential eavesdropping devices according to the present disclosure.

[0059] Secure communication may be important in wireless communication systems. For example, security may be particularly beneficial in wireless communication systems (such as IoT systems) where a large number of devices communicate with each other. In some cases, such as when the UE is in radio resource control (RRC) connection mode, layer 3 (L3) security may be applied to some communications (e.g., RRC messages) between the base station and the UE. However, some channels such as layer 1 (L1) (e.g., physical layer or PHY layer) channels may not have L3 security. For example, such physical layer channels may include a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH), a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH), a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH), a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH), a physical sidelink control channel (PSCCH), a physical sidelink shared channel (PSSCH) and / or a physical sidelink feedback channel (PSFCH). In some examples, such physical layer channels may be easily eavesdropped.

[0060] like Figure 3 As shown, example 300 includes a base station, a first UE (UE1) and a second UE (UE2). As shown by reference numeral 305, UE1 may send uplink communications to the base station. For example, UE1 may send PUCCH communications and / or PUSCH communications to the base station. As shown by reference numeral 310, the base station may send downlink communications to UE1. For example, the base station may send PDCCH communications and / or PDSCH communications to UE1. UE2 may be a potential eavesdropping device. For example, UE2 may attempt to eavesdrop on communications between UE1 and the base station. As shown by reference numeral 315, UE2 may attempt to eavesdrop on uplink communications sent by UE1 and intended for the base station. In this case, UE2 may receive uplink communications intended for the base station and attempt to decode the uplink communications. As shown by reference numeral 320, UE2 may attempt to eavesdrop on downlink communications intended for UE1. In this case, UE2 may receive downlink communications intended for UE1 and attempt to decode the downlink communications intended for UE1.

[0061] In some examples, a potential eavesdropping device (such as UE2) may use a fake base station attack in which the potential eavesdropping device attempts to present itself as a base station to another UE (e.g., UE1) to receive uplink communications sent by the UE. Such eavesdropping may result in the leakage of sensitive information such as personal information, financial information, confidential information, and / or medical information, as well as loss of network services and / or reduction in network throughput. Figure 3 As shown, a potential eavesdropping device for communications between a UE (eg, UE1) and a base station may be another UE (eg, UE2). In some examples, a potential eavesdropping device for communications between a UE (eg, UE1) and a base station may be another base station.

[0062] As indicated above, Figure 3 are provided as examples. Other examples can be found in the Figure 3 Different than described.

[0063] In some cases, upper layer (e.g., L3) security may be the only available source of security from a potential eavesdropping device. However, while upper layer security may be efficient, it may also be breakable, and key changes may be slow for security keys used for upper layer security. In addition, physical control channel signals (e.g., PDCCH, PUCCH, and / or physical broadcast channel (PBCH)) may not be protected by upper layer security. Therefore, downlink control information (DCI), uplink control information (UCI), and / or synchronization signal blocks (SSBs) carried on physical control channels may be vulnerable to attacks by potential eavesdropping devices.

[0064] Some techniques and apparatuses described herein enable a transmitter device to modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal. The transmitter device may send the protected physical channel control signal to a receiver device. In some aspects, the receiver device may receive the protected physical channel control signal, and the receiver device may retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key. Thus, information carried on the physical control channel signal may be protected. For example, a polarization code used to send control information on a physical control channel may be protected. This may protect the transmission of control information on the physical control channel from potential eavesdropping devices and improve the overall security of wireless communications between wireless communication devices (e.g., UEs and base stations).

[0065] Figure 44 is a diagram illustrating an example 400 associated with signal modification for physical layer security of a control channel according to the present disclosure. Figure 4 As shown, example 400 includes communication between a transmitter device (Tx device) 405 and a receiver device (Rx device) 410. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may be included in a wireless network such as the wireless network 100. The Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may communicate via a wireless access link, which may include an uplink, a downlink, and / or a side link. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may be a base station (e.g., base station 110), and the Rx device 410 may be a UE (e.g., UE 120). In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may be a UE (e.g., UE 120), and the Rx device 410 may be a base station (e.g., base station 110). In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may be a first UE (e.g., UE 120), and the Rx device 410 may be a second UE (e.g., UE 120).

[0066] like Figure 4 As shown and indicated by reference numeral 415, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may obtain one or more confidentiality keys. A confidentiality key (or cryptographic key) is a bit sequence that can be used to encrypt or mask information transmitted from a transmitter (e.g., the Tx device 405) and to decrypt or unmask information received by a receiver (e.g., the Rx device 410). In some aspects, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may use L3 key generation techniques (such as Diffie-Hellman techniques) to obtain symmetric keys. Such L3 key generation techniques may rely on RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), etc. to generate confidentiality keys. For example, in some aspects, the Rx device 410 may generate a public key (n, e) and a private key (d), where n is the modulus for both the public key and the private key, e is the public encryption exponent, and d is the private decryption exponent. The Rx device 410 may transmit the private key to other devices including the Tx device 405. The Tx device may encrypt the secret key (m) using the public key (n, e) and send the encrypted secret key (m) to the Rx device 410. e mod n). The Rx device 410 can use the private key (d) to calculate (m e ) d =m(mod n) to decrypt the encrypted secret key to determine the secret key m, which makes both the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 aware of the secret key m.

[0067] In some aspects, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may obtain a confidentiality key from the physical layer based at least in part on channel reciprocity and randomness. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may obtain or generate a plurality of confidentiality keys to be used to protect the physical control channel signal. For example, in some aspects, the Tx device 405 and the Rx device 410 may obtain or generate a first confidentiality key for modifying the input and / or output of the binary scrambling code for the physical control channel signal, a second confidentiality key for modifying the input and / or output of the modulation (e.g., quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation) for the physical control channel signal, and / or a third confidentiality key for modifying the input and / or output of the OFDM tone mapping for the physical control channel signal.

[0068] like Figure 4 As further shown and further shown by reference numeral 420, the Tx device 405 may generate a protected physical control channel signal based at least in part on one or more confidentiality keys. In some aspects, where the Tx device 405 is a base station and the Rx device 410 is a UE, the physical control channel signal may be a PDCCH signal including a DCI or a PDCCH signal including an SSB. In some aspects, where the Tx device 405 is a UE and the Rx device 410 is a base station, the physical control channel signal may be a PUCCH signal including a UCI. The Tx device 405 may append a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) (e.g., a 24-bit CRC) to a payload of control information (e.g., DCI or UCI) for the physical control channel signal. The Tx device 405 may interleave the CRC with the information bits in the payload, decode the bits in the payload (including the CRC) into decoded bits (e.g., using polarization decoding), and perform rate matching to match the number of decoded bits with the resources available for physical control channel transmission. The Tx device 405 may then perform binary scrambling to scramble the decoded bits and perform QPSK (or QAM) modulation to modulate the scrambled bits into QPSK (or QAM) symbols. The Tx device 405 may then perform OFDM tone mapping to map the QPSK (or QAM) symbols to OFDM tones, which may be modulated onto resource elements to be used to send physical control channel signals.

[0069] In some aspects, to generate a protected physical control channel signal, the Tx device 405 may protect the physical control channel signal by modifying a binary scrambling code for the physical control channel, a modulation (e.g., QAM or QPSK modulation) for the physical control channel, or an input or output of an OFDM tone mapping signal for the physical control channel, or any combination thereof based at least in part on one or more confidentiality keys.

[0070] like Figure 4 As shown and indicated by reference numeral 425, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the binary scrambling code used for physical control channel communication based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the binary scrambling code based at least in part on the first confidentiality key.

[0071] In some aspects, a binary scrambling code may be applied to the bit blocks b(0), ..., b(M bit -1) scramble code, where M bit is the number of bits sent on the physical channel, so according to Generate scrambled bit blocks Where c(i) is determined according to the scrambling sequence c(n) generated by the scrambling sequence generator. For example, the scrambling sequence generator may generate a scrambling sequence of length M according to the following: bit The scrambling sequence c(n), where n = 0, 1, ..., M bit :

[0072] c(n)=(x1(n+N c )+x2(n+N c ))mod2

[0073] x1(n+31)=(x1(n+3)+x1(n))mod2

[0074] x2(n+31)=(x2(n+3)+x2(n+2)+x2(n+1)+x2(n))mod2

[0075] Where N c =1600, x1(n) is a first m-sequence, and x2(n) is a second first m-sequence. In some aspects, to mask or encrypt the scrambled code bits, the Tx device 405 may initialize the scrambled code sequence generator using a confidentiality key. For example, in some aspects, the Tx device 405 may initialize the first m-sequence (x1(n)) of the scrambled code sequence generator using a first portion of the confidentiality key (e.g., a first portion of the bits in the confidentiality key), and initialize the second m-sequence (x2(n)) of the scrambled code sequence generator using a second portion of the confidentiality key (e.g., a second portion of the bits in the confidentiality key).

[0076] In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may mask the scrambled bits by encrypting (or encoding) the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling code using a confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device may encrypt (or encode) the scrambled bits using a bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) operation with the confidentiality key, a block cipher with the confidentiality key as an encryption key input, or an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption with the confidentiality key as an encryption key input. For example, the Tx device 405 may perform a bitwise XOR operation between the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling code and the bits of the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may perform a bitwise XOR operation between the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling code and the corresponding bits of the sequence generated using the confidentiality key. For example, the sequence may be the same length as the scrambled bit block, and the sequence may be generated by initializing a scrambled sequence generator using the confidentiality key.

[0077] In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may initialize a scrambling sequence generator using a first portion of the secret key, perform binary scrambling based at least in part on the scrambling sequence generator, and mask the resulting scrambled bits by encrypting the scrambled bits using a second portion of the secret key (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation, a block cipher, or AES encryption). In this case, the Tx device 405 may initialize a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence generator using a first sub-portion of the first portion of the secret key, and the Tx device 405 may initialize a second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence generator using a second sub-portion of the first portion of the secret key.

[0078] like Figure 4 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 430, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the modulation (e.g., QAM or QPSK modulation) based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the modulation (e.g., QAM or QPSK modulation) based at least in part on the second confidentiality key different from the first confidentiality key used for binary scrambling.

[0079] In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may mask the scrambled bits input to the QPSK (or QAM) modulation by encrypting the scrambled bits input to the QPSK (or QAM) modulation using a secret key (e.g., using a bit-by-bit XOR operation with the secret key, a block cipher with the secret key as an encryption key input, or AES encryption with the secret key as an encryption key input). For example, the Tx device 405 may perform a bit-by-bit XOR operation between the scrambled bits and bits of the secret key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may perform a bit-by-bit XOR operation between the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling and corresponding bits of a sequence generated using the secret key.

[0080] In some aspects, QPSK (or QAM) modulation may represent bits as QPSK (or QAM) constellation points associated with QPSK (or QAM) symbols. In this case, the QPSK (or QAM) constellation points may have corresponding real and imaginary parts. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may switch the real and imaginary parts associated with one or more of the QPSK (or QAM) constellation points based at least in part on a confidentiality key. For example, the Tx device 405 may determine to switch the real and imaginary parts for a subset of the QPSK (or QAM) constellation points based on a bit value of the confidentiality key (e.g., 0 or 1) or a bit value of a sequence generated using the confidentiality key (e.g., 0 or 1).

[0081] In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may modify the QPSK (or QAM) symbols generated by the QPSK (or QAM) modulation by applying a phase shift generated at least in part based on a confidentiality key. In this case, the Tx device 405 may use the confidentiality key to determine the corresponding phase shift to be applied to each QPSK (or QAM) symbol. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may modify the QPSK (or QAM) symbols generated by the QPSK (or QAM) modulation by rotating the QPSK (or QAM) symbols based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In this case, the Tx device 405 may use the confidentiality key to determine the corresponding rotation to be applied to each QPSK (or QAM) symbol.

[0082] like Figure 4 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 435, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the OFDM tone map for the physical control channel signal based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may modify the input and / or output of the OFDM tone map based at least in part on a third confidentiality key different from the first confidentiality key used for binary scrambling and the second confidentiality key used for QPSK (or QAM) modulation.

[0083] OFDM tone mapping may map QPSK (or QAM) symbols generated by QPSK (or QAM) modulation to OFDM tones (and resource elements associated with the OFDM tones). In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may remap the OFDM tones based at least in part on the confidentiality key, thereby modifying the mapping of QPSK (or QAM) symbols to OFDM tones before performing OFDM modulation to modulate the OFDM tones onto the resource elements. For example, the Tx device 405 may scramble the resource elements to which the QPSK (or QAM) symbols are mapped based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device 405 may use a predefined scrambling function to scramble the resource elements for the QPSK (or QAM) symbols according to the confidentiality key (e.g., remap the OFDM tones). For example, the UE (e.g., Tx device 405 or Rx device 410) may be configured with a scrambling function (e.g., via an RRC message or a medium access control (MAC) control element (MAC-CE)) so that both the base station (e.g., Tx device 405 or Rx device 410) and the UE (e.g., Tx device 405 or Rx device 410) know the scrambling function to be used with the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the configuration may include multiple possible scrambling functions, and the base station (e.g., Tx device 405 or Rx device 410) may send an indication of which scrambling function to be used with the confidentiality key to the UE (e.g., Tx device 405 or Rx device 410). In some aspects, the configuration may include multiple possible scrambling functions, and the Tx device 405 (and Rx device 410) may determine which scrambling function to use based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0084] like Figure 4 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 440, the Tx device 405 may transmit a protected physical control channel signal to the Rx device 410. The Rx device 410 may receive the protected physical control channel signal transmitted by the Tx device 405. In some aspects, where the Tx device 405 is a base station and the Rx device 410 is a UE, the protected physical control channel signal may be a protected PDCCH transmission or a protected PBCH transmission. In some aspects, where the Tx device 405 is a UE and the Rx device 410 is a base station, the protected physical control channel signal may be a PUCCH transmission.

[0085] like Figure 4As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 445, the Rx device 410 may retrieve control information (e.g., DCI or UCI) from a payload of a protected physical control channel signal based at least in part on one or more confidentiality keys. In conjunction with receiving the physical control channel signal, the Rx device 410 may demodulate the received physical control channel signal into OFDM tones, perform OFDM mapping (e.g., inverse OFDM mapping) to map the OFDM tones to OPSK (or QAM) symbols, perform OPSK (or QAM) demodulation to retrieve a block of scrambled bits, and perform binary descrambling to descramble the scrambled bits. The Rx device 410 may then decode the block of descrambled bits (e.g., polarization coded bits) to retrieve control information included in the payload of the physical control channel communication.

[0086] In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of OFDM tone mapping (e.g., reverse OFDM tone mapping) for protected physical control channel communications, OPSK (or QAM) demodulation for protected physical control channel communications, binary descrambling for protected physical control channel communications, or any combination thereof based at least in part on one or more confidentiality keys.

[0087] like Figure 4 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 450, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of the OFDM tone mapping (e.g., reverse OFDM tone mapping) based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of the OFDM tone mapping to reverse (e.g., decrypt) modifications to the input and / or output of the OFDM tone mapping performed by the Tx device 405 for protected physical control channel communications. For example, before mapping the OFDM tones to OPSK (or QAM) symbols, the Rx device 410 may reverse the remapping of the OFDM tones to OPSK (or QAM) performed by the Tx device 405 (e.g., descramble the scrambled resource elements / OFDM tones) using a predefined scrambling function and a confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of the OFDM tone mapping using a third secret key used by the Tx device 405 to perform remapping of OFDM tones (e.g., to invert or descramble the remapping of OFDM tones performed by the Tx device 405).

[0088] like Figure 4As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 455, the Rx device 410 may modify input and / or output for demodulation (e.g., QAM or QPSK demodulation) of the protected physical control channel signal based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output for QPSK (or QAM) demodulation to reverse (e.g., decrypt) the modification of the input and / or output of the QPSK (or QAM) modulation performed by the Tx device 405. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output for the QPSK (or QAM) demodulation using a second confidentiality key used by the Tx device 405 to modify the input and / or output for the QPSK (or QAM) modulation of the protected physical control channel signal.

[0089] In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the demodulated QPSK (or QAM) symbol by a phase shift generated based at least in part on the confidentiality key (e.g., to reverse the phase shift applied to the QPSK (or QAM) symbol by the Tx device 405 based at least in part on the confidentiality key). In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may rotate the modulated QPSK (or QAM) symbol based at least in part on the confidentiality key (e.g., to reverse the rotation applied to the QPSK (or QAM) symbol by the Tx device 405 based at least in part on the confidentiality key). In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may swap the real and imaginary parts associated with one or more QPSK (or QAM) constellation points for QPSK (or QAM) demodulation based at least in part on the confidentiality key (e.g., to reverse the swap of the real and imaginary parts associated with the one or more QPSK (or QAM) constellation points by the Tx device 405 based at least in part on the confidentiality key). In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may unmask the output bits resulting from the demodulation by decrypting the output bits from the QPSK (or QAM) demodulation using the secret key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may decrypt the output bits from the demodulation using the secret key to reverse the encryption performed by the Tx device 405 (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation with the secret key, a block cipher with the secret key as an encryption key input, or an AES encryption with the secret key as an encryption key input). For example, the Rx device 410 may reverse the bitwise XOR operation performed between the demodulated output bits and bits of the secret key (or bits of a sequence generated using the secret key).

[0090] like Figure 4As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 460, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of the binary descrambling for the protected physical control channel signal based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output of the binary descrambling to reverse (e.g., decrypt) the modification of the input and / or output of the binary scrambling performed by the Tx device 405 for the protected physical control channel signal. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may modify the input and / or output for the binary descrambling using the first confidentiality key used by the Tx device 405 to modify the input and / or output of the binary scrambling for the protected physical control channel signal.

[0091] The binary descrambling may reverse the binary scrambling performed by the Tx device 405 for the protected physical control channel signal. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may initialize the scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the confidentiality key, and descramble the scrambled bits based at least in part on the scrambling sequence generated by the scrambling sequence generator. For example, the Rx device 410 may initialize the first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence generator using the first part of the confidentiality key, and the Rx device 410 may initialize the second m-sequence generator using the second part of the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may unmask the scrambled bits by decrypting (or decoding) the scrambled bits to be descrambled using the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may decrypt (or decode) the scrambled bits using the confidentiality key to reverse the encryption of the scrambled bits performed by the Tx device 405 (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation with an encryption key, a block cipher with the confidentiality key as an encryption key input, or an AES encryption with the confidentiality key as an encryption key input). For example, the Rx device 410 may invert a bitwise XOR operation between the scrambled bits and the bits of the secret key (or the bits of the sequence generated using the secret key). In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may unmask the scrambled bits by decrypting the scrambled bits to be descrambled using a portion of the secret key. In this case, the Rx device may decrypt the scrambled bits to invert the encryption of the scrambled bits performed using the portion of the secret key (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation, a block cipher, or AES encryption). For example, the Rx device 410 may invert a bitwise XOR operation between the scrambled bits and the bits of the portion of the secret key (or the bits of the sequence generated using the portion of the secret key), and the Rx device 410 may descramble the scrambled bits based at least in part on a scrambled sequence generated by a scrambled sequence generator initialized using another portion of the secret key.

[0092] As described above, the Tx device 405 may modify the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for the physical control channel signal based at least in part on the confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal. The Tx device 405 may send the protected physical channel control signal to the Rx device 410. In some aspects, the Rx device 410 may receive the protected physical channel control signal, and the Rx device 410 may retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on the confidentiality key. Therefore, the information carried on the physical control channel signal may be protected. For example, the polarization code used to send control information (e.g., DCI or UCI) on the physical control channel may be protected. This may protect the transmission of control information on the physical control channel from potential eavesdropping devices and improve the overall security of wireless communications between wireless communication devices (e.g., UE and base station).

[0093] As indicated above, Figure 4 are provided as examples. Other examples can be found in the Figure 4 Different than described.

[0094] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating an example 500 associated with signal modification for control channel physical layer security according to the present disclosure. Figure 5 As shown, example 500 shows an example of generating a protected physical control channel communication by a Tx device (e.g., Tx device 405). In some aspects, the Tx device can be a base station (e.g., base station 110). In this case, the protected physical control channel communication can be a PDCCH signal or a PBCH signal sent to a UE. In some aspects, the Tx device can be a UE. In this case, the protected physical control channel communication can be a PUCCH signal sent to a base station.

[0095] like Figure 5 As shown and indicated by reference numeral 505, the Tx device may append a CRC (e.g., a 24-bit CRC) to a payload of control information (e.g., DCI or UCI) for a physical control channel signal. As shown by reference numeral 510, the Tx device may interleave the CRC with information bits in the payload, decode the bits in the payload (including the CRC) into decoded bits (e.g., using polar coding), and perform rate matching to match the number of decoded bits to resources available for physical control channel transmission.

[0096] like Figure 5As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 515, the Tx device may perform binary scrambling to scramble the decoded bits. In some aspects, as described above in conjunction with Figure 4 As described, the Tx device may use a first secret key to protect scrambled bits scrambled by a binary scrambling code. In some aspects, the Tx device may initialize a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the first secret key, and the Tx device may scramble bits based at least in part on a scrambling sequence generated using the scrambling sequence generator. In some aspects, the Tx device may mask the scrambled bits by encrypting the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling code using the first secret key (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation, a block cipher, or AES encryption). In some aspects, the Tx device may scramble bits based at least in part on a scrambling sequence generated by a scrambling sequence generator initialized using a first portion of the first secret key, and the Tx device may mask the scrambled bits by encrypting the scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling code using a second portion of the first secret key (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation, a block cipher, or AES encryption).

[0097] like Figure 5 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 520, the Tx device may perform QPSK modulation to modulate the scrambled code bits into QPSK symbols. In some aspects, as described above in conjunction with Figure 4 As described, the Tx device may use a second secret key to protect the QPSK symbols generated by the QPSK modulation. In some aspects, the Tx device may mask the QPSK modulated input bits by encrypting the QPSK modulated input bits using the second secret key (e.g., using a bitwise XOR operation, a block cipher, or AES encryption). In some aspects, the Tx device may exchange the real and imaginary parts associated with one or more QPSK constellation points based at least in part on the second secret key. In some aspects, the Tx device may modify the QPSK symbols generated by the QPSK modulation by a phase shift or rotation generated at least in part based on the second secret key.

[0098] like Figure 5 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 525, the Tx device may perform OFDM tone mapping to map the QPSK symbols to OFDM tones. As further shown by reference numeral 530, the Tx device may perform OFDM tone remapping using a third confidentiality key. For example, the Tx device may scramble the OFDM tones (e.g., resource elements) mapped to the QPSK symbols based at least in part on the confidentiality key. In some aspects, the Tx device may scramble the resource elements for the QPSK symbols (e.g., remap the OFDM tones) using a predefined / configured scrambling function according to the confidentiality key.

[0099] like Figure 5 As further shown and further indicated by reference numeral 535, the OFDM tone may be modulated onto a resource element for transmitting a physical control channel signal to an Rx device (e.g., Rx device 410). In some aspects, the Rx device may be a UE that receives a protected PDCCH signal including a DCI. In some aspects, the Rx device may be a base station that receives a protected PUCCH signal including a UCI. Figure 4 As described, the Rx device can use the first secret key, the second secret key, and the third secret key to reverse (e.g., decrypt) the modification (e.g., encryption) performed on the protected physical control channel signal in order to retrieve the control information (e.g., DCI or UCI) in the payload of the protected physical control channel signal.

[0100] As indicated above, Figure 5 are provided as examples. Other examples can be found in the Figure 5 Different than described.

[0101] Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating an example process 600 performed, for example, by a transmitter device in accordance with the present disclosure. Example process 600 is an example of a transmitter device (eg, transmitter device 405) performing operations associated with signal modification for control channel physical layer security.

[0102] like Figure 6 As shown, in some aspects, process 600 may include modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal (block 610). Figure 8 The communication manager 140 and / or modification component 808 depicted in Fig. 9 The communication manager 150 and / or modification component 908 depicted in the figure may modify the input or output of at least one of the binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping used for the physical control channel signal based at least in part on the confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal, as described above.

[0103] like Figure 6 As further shown, in some aspects, process 600 may include sending a protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device (block 620). For example, a transmitter device (e.g., using Figure 8 The communications manager 140 and / or sending component 804 depicted in FIG. 8 ; or Fig. 9 The communications manager 150 and / or transmitting component 904 depicted in FIG. 1 may transmit a protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device, as described above.

[0104] Process 600 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect or any combination of aspects described below and / or in conjunction with one or more other processes described elsewhere herein.

[0105] In a first aspect, modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a secret key, and the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for binary scrambling.

[0106] In a second aspect, alone or in combination with the first aspect, initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a secret key comprises: initializing a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a first portion of the secret key; and initializing a second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a second portion of the secret key.

[0107] In a third aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first and second aspects, modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping comprises masking scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling by encrypting them using a secret key.

[0108] In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to third aspects, modifying an input or output of at least one of a binary scrambling code, a modulation, or an OFDM tone map comprises: initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a first portion of a secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling code; and masking the scrambling bits generated by the binary scrambling code by encrypting the scrambling bits using a second portion of the secret key.

[0109] In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fourth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes: masking the modulated input bits by encrypting the modulated input bits using a secret key.

[0110] In a sixth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fifth aspects, modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping comprises exchanging real and imaginary parts associated with a constellation point for QAM or QPSK modulation based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0111] In the seventh aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to sixth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes: modifying a QAM symbol or QPSK symbol generated by QAM or QPSK modulation by a phase shift generated at least in part based on a secret key.

[0112] In the eighth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to seventh aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes: rotating QAM symbols or QPSK symbols generated by QAM or QPSK modulation based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0113] In the ninth aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to eighth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes: remapping the OFDM tones generated by the OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0114] In the tenth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to ninth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping includes: modifying the input or output of the binary scrambling based at least in part on a first secret key; modifying the input or output of the modulation based at least in part on a second secret key; and modifying the input or output of the OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on a third secret key.

[0115] In the eleventh aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to tenth aspects, the transmitter device is a base station, the receiver device is a user equipment, and the physical control channel signal is a physical downlink control channel signal or a physical broadcast control channel signal.

[0116] In a twelfth aspect alone or in combination with one or more of the first to tenth aspects, the transmitter device is a user equipment, the receiver device is a base station, and the physical control channel signal is a physical uplink control channel signal.

[0117] although Figure 6 An example block diagram of process 600 is shown, but in some aspects, process 600 may include Figure 6 Additional blocks, fewer blocks, different blocks, or blocks arranged in a different manner than those depicted in the process 600. Additionally or alternatively, two or more of the blocks in the process 600 may be performed in parallel.

[0118] Figure 7is a diagram illustrating an example process 700 performed, for example, by a receiver device in accordance with the present disclosure. Example process 700 is an example of a receiver device (eg, receiver device 410) performing operations associated with signal modification for control channel physical layer security.

[0119] like Figure 7 As shown, in some aspects, process 700 may include receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitting device (block 710). For example, a receiver device (e.g., using Figure 8 The communications manager 140 and / or receiving component 802 depicted in FIG. 8 ; or Fig. 9 The communications manager 150 and / or receiving component 902 depicted in FIG. 1 may receive a protected physical control channel signal from a sending device, as described above.

[0120] like Figure 7 As further shown, in some aspects, process 700 may include retrieving information from a protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key (block 720). For example, a receiver device (e.g., using Figure 8 The communications manager 140 and / or modification component 808 depicted in FIG. 8 ; or Fig. 9 The communication manager 150 and / or modification component 908 depicted in the figure can retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key, as described above.

[0121] Process 700 may include additional aspects, such as any single aspect or any combination of aspects described below and / or in conjunction with one or more other processes described elsewhere herein.

[0122] In a first aspect, modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a secret key, and the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for binary descrambling.

[0123] In a second aspect, alone or in combination with the first aspect, initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a secret key comprises: initializing a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a first portion of the secret key; and initializing a second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a second portion of the secret key.

[0124] In a third aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first and second aspects, modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling comprises unmasking the scrambled bits by decrypting the scrambled bits to be descrambled in the binary descrambling using a secret key.

[0125] In a fourth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to third aspects, modifying at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling comprises: unmasking the scrambled bits by decrypting the scrambled bits to be descrambled in the binary descrambling using a first portion of a secret key; and descrambling the scrambled bits based at least in part on a scrambling sequence generated by a scrambling sequence generator initialized using a second portion of the secret key.

[0126] In a fifth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fourth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes: unmasking the output bits from the demodulation by decrypting the output bits from the demodulation using a secret key.

[0127] In a sixth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to fifth aspects, modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling comprises exchanging real and imaginary parts associated with a constellation point for QAM or QPSK demodulation based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0128] In the seventh aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to sixth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes modifying a QAM symbol or QPSK symbol for QAM or QPSK demodulation by generating a phase shift based at least in part on a secret key.

[0129] In the eighth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to seventh aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes: rotating QAM symbols or QPSK symbols used for QAM or QPSK demodulation based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0130] In the ninth aspect, either alone or in combination with one or more of the first to eighth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes descrambling OFDM tones that would be mapped to QAM symbols or QPSK symbols in the OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0131] In the tenth aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to ninth aspects, modifying the input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling includes: modifying the input or output of binary descrambling based at least in part on a first confidentiality key; modifying the input or output of demodulation based at least in part on a second confidentiality key; and modifying the input or output of OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on a third confidentiality key.

[0132] In the eleventh aspect, alone or in combination with one or more of the first to tenth aspects, the receiver device is a user equipment, the transmitter device is a base station, and the physical control channel signal is a physical downlink control channel signal or a physical broadcast control channel signal.

[0133] In a twelfth aspect alone or in combination with one or more of the first to eleventh aspects, the receiver device is a base station, the transmitter device is a user equipment, and the physical control channel signal is a physical uplink control channel signal.

[0134] although Figure 7 An example block diagram of process 700 is shown, but in some aspects, process 700 may include Figure 7 Additional blocks, fewer blocks, different blocks, or blocks arranged in a different manner than those depicted in the process 700. Additionally or alternatively, two or more blocks of the blocks of process 700 may be performed in parallel.

[0135] Figure 8 800 is a diagram of an example apparatus 800 for wireless communication. Apparatus 800 may be a UE, or a UE may include apparatus 800. In some aspects, apparatus 800 includes a receiving component 802 and a transmitting component 804 that may communicate with each other (e.g., via one or more buses and / or one or more other components). As shown, apparatus 800 may communicate with another apparatus 806 (such as a UE, a base station, or another wireless communication device) using receiving component 802 and transmitting component 804. As further shown, apparatus 800 may include a communication manager 140. Communication manager 140 may include a modification component 808.

[0136] In some aspects, the apparatus 800 may be configured to perform Figures 4 to 5 Additionally or alternatively, the apparatus 800 may be configured to perform one or more processes described herein, such as Figure 6 The process of 600 Figure 7 In some aspects, the apparatus 800 and / or Figure 8 One or more of the components shown may include a combination of Figure 2 Additionally or alternatively, Figure 8One or more of the components shown may be combined with Figure 2 Additionally or alternatively, one or more components in the set of components may be implemented at least in part as software stored in a memory. For example, a component (or a portion of a component) may be implemented as an instruction or code that is stored in a non-transitory computer-readable medium and can be executed by a controller or processor to perform the function or operation of the component.

[0137] The receiving component 802 may receive communications from the device 806, such as reference signals, control information, data communications, or combinations thereof. The receiving component 802 may provide the received communications to one or more other components of the device 800. In some aspects, the receiving component 802 may perform signal processing (such as filtering, amplification, demodulation, analog-to-digital conversion, demultiplexing, deinterleaving, demapping, equalization, interference cancellation, or decoding, etc.) on the received communications and may provide the processed signals to one or more other components of the device 800. In some aspects, the receiving component 802 may include combining Figure 2 One or more antennas, modems, demodulators, MIMO detectors, receive processors, controllers / processors, memories, or combinations thereof of the described UE.

[0138] The transmitting component 804 may transmit communications, such as reference signals, control information, data communications, or combinations thereof, to the device 806. In some aspects, one or more other components of the device 800 may generate communications and may provide the generated communications to the transmitting component 804 for transmission to the device 806. In some aspects, the transmitting component 804 may perform signal processing (such as filtering, amplification, modulation, digital-to-analog conversion, multiplexing, interleaving, mapping, or encoding, etc.) on the generated communications and may transmit the processed signals to the device 806. In some aspects, the transmitting component 804 may include combining Figure 2 One or more antennas, modems, modulators, transmit MIMO processors, transmit processors, controllers / processors, memories, or combinations thereof of the described UE. In some aspects, the transmit component 804 can be co-located with the receive component 802 in a transceiver.

[0139] Modification component 808 can modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal. Transmission component 804 can transmit the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0140] Receiving component 802 can receive a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitting device.Modifying component 808 can retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0141] Figure 8 The number and arrangement of components shown are provided as examples. In practice, there may be Figure 8 Additional components, fewer components, different components, or components arranged in a different manner than those shown. Figure 8 Two or more components shown may be implemented in a single component, or Figure 8 The single component shown may be implemented as multiple distributed components. Additionally or alternatively, Figure 8 The illustrated set of component(s) may be described as being executable by Figure 8 Another collection of components shown performs one or more functions.

[0142] Fig. 9 900 is a diagram of an example apparatus 900 for wireless communication. Apparatus 900 may be a base station, or a base station may include apparatus 900. In some aspects, apparatus 900 includes a receiving component 902 and a transmitting component 904 that may communicate with each other (e.g., via one or more buses and / or one or more other components). As shown, apparatus 900 may communicate with another apparatus 906 (such as a UE, a base station, or another wireless communication device) using receiving component 902 and transmitting component 904. As further shown, apparatus 900 may include a communication manager 150. Communication manager 150 may include a modification component 908, among others.

[0143] In some aspects, the apparatus 900 may be configured to perform Figures 4 to 5 Additionally or alternatively, the apparatus 900 may be configured to perform one or more processes described herein, such as Figure 6 The process of 600 Figure 7 In some aspects, the apparatus 900 and / or Fig. 9 One or more of the components shown may include a combination of Figure 2 Additionally or alternatively, Fig. 9 One or more of the components shown may be combined with Figure 2Additionally or alternatively, one or more components in the set of components may be implemented at least in part as software stored in a memory. For example, a component (or a portion of a component) may be implemented as an instruction or code that is stored in a non-transitory computer-readable medium and can be executed by a controller or processor to perform the function or operation of the component.

[0144] The receiving component 902 may receive communications from the device 906, such as reference signals, control information, data communications, or combinations thereof. The receiving component 902 may provide the received communications to one or more other components of the device 900. In some aspects, the receiving component 902 may perform signal processing (such as filtering, amplification, demodulation, analog-to-digital conversion, demultiplexing, deinterleaving, demapping, equalization, interference cancellation, or decoding, etc.) on the received communications and may provide the processed signals to one or more other components of the device 900. In some aspects, the receiving component 902 may include combining Figure 2 One or more antennas, modems, demodulators, MIMO detectors, receive processors, controllers / processors, memories, or combinations thereof of the described base stations.

[0145] The transmitting component 904 may transmit communications, such as reference signals, control information, data communications, or combinations thereof, to the device 906. In some aspects, one or more other components of the device 900 may generate communications and may provide the generated communications to the transmitting component 904 for transmission to the device 906. In some aspects, the transmitting component 904 may perform signal processing (such as filtering, amplification, modulation, digital-to-analog conversion, multiplexing, interleaving, mapping, or encoding, etc.) on the generated communications and may transmit the processed signals to the device 906. In some aspects, the transmitting component 904 may include combining Figure 2 One or more antennas, modems, modulators, transmit MIMO processors, transmit processors, controllers / processors, memories, or combinations thereof of the described base stations. In some aspects, the transmit component 904 can be co-located with the receive component 902 in a transceiver.

[0146] Modification component 908 can modify an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or OFDM tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal. Transmission component 904 can transmit the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0147] Receiving component 902 can receive a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitting device. Modifying component 908 can retrieve information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of OFDM tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0148] Fig. 9 The number and arrangement of components shown are provided as examples. In practice, there may be Fig. 9 Additional components, fewer components, different components, or components arranged in a different manner than those shown. Fig. 9 Two or more components shown may be implemented in a single component, or Fig. 9 The single component shown may be implemented as multiple distributed components. Additionally or alternatively, Fig. 9 The illustrated set of component(s) may be described as being executable by Fig. 9 Another collection of components shown performs one or more functions.

[0149] The following provides an overview of some aspects of the disclosure:

[0150] Aspect 1: A method of wireless communication performed by a transmitter device, comprising: modifying the input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby generating a protected physical control channel signal; and sending the protected physical control channel signal to a receiver device.

[0151] Aspect 2: A method according to aspect 1, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the confidentiality key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling code.

[0152] Aspect 3: A method according to aspect 2, wherein initializing the scrambling sequence generator at least in part based on the secret key includes: initializing a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a first part of the secret key; and initializing a second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a second part of the secret key.

[0153] Aspect 4: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 3, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: masking the scrambling code bits by encrypting the scrambling code bits generated by the binary scrambling code using the confidentiality key.

[0154] Aspect 5: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 4, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on a first portion of the confidentiality key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling code; and masking the scrambling bits by encrypting the scrambling bits generated by the binary scrambling code using a second portion of the confidentiality key.

[0155] Aspect 6: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 5, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: masking the input bits of the modulation by encrypting the input bits of the modulation using the confidentiality key.

[0156] Aspect 7: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 6, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: exchanging the real and imaginary parts associated with the constellation points used for orthogonal amplitude modulation (QAM) or orthogonal phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0157] Aspect 8: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 7, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: modifying a QAM symbol or a QPSK symbol generated by a quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation by a phase shift generated at least in part based on the secret key.

[0158] Aspect 9: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 8, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: rotating a QAM symbol or a QPSK symbol generated by a quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0159] Aspect 10: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 9, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping includes: remapping the OFDM tones generated by the OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0160] Aspect 11: A method according to any one of Aspects 1 to 10, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone map includes: modifying the input or output of the binary scrambling code based at least in part on a first confidentiality key; modifying the input or output of the modulation based at least in part on a second confidentiality key; and modifying the input or output of the OFDM tone map based at least in part on a third confidentiality key.

[0161] Aspect 12: The method according to any one of aspects 1 to 11, wherein the transmitter device is a base station, the receiver device is a user equipment, and the physical control channel signal is a physical downlink control channel signal or a physical broadcast control channel signal.

[0162] Aspect 13: The method according to any one of aspects 1 to 11, wherein the transmitter device is a user equipment, the receiver device is a base station, and the physical control channel signal is a physical uplink control channel signal.

[0163] Aspect 14: A method of wireless communication performed by a receiver device, comprising: receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a transmitting device; and retrieving information from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a confidentiality key.

[0164] Aspect 15: A method according to Aspect 14, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the confidentiality key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary descrambling.

[0165] Aspect 16: A method according to Aspect 15, wherein initializing the scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the confidentiality key includes: initializing a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a first part of the confidentiality key; and initializing a second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a second part of the confidentiality key.

[0166] Aspect 17: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 16, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation or the binary descrambling includes: unmasking the scrambled bits by decrypting the scrambled bits descrambled in the binary descrambling using the confidentiality key.

[0167] Aspect 18: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 17, wherein modifying at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: unmasking the scrambled bits by decrypting the scrambled bits to be descrambled in the binary descrambling using the first part of the secret key; and descrambling the scrambled bits based at least in part on a scrambling sequence generated by a scrambling sequence generator initialized using the second part of the secret key.

[0168] Aspect 19: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 18, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: unmasking the output bits from the demodulation by decrypting the output bits from the demodulation using the confidentiality key.

[0169] Aspect 20: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 19, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: exchanging the real and imaginary parts associated with the constellation points used for orthogonal amplitude modulation (QAM) or orthogonal phase shift keying (QPSK) demodulation based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0170] Aspect 21: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 20, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: modifying a QAM symbol or a QPSK symbol used for quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) demodulation by generating a phase shift based at least in part on the secret key.

[0171] Aspect 22: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 21, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: rotating QAM symbols or QPSK symbols used for orthogonal amplitude modulation (QAM) or orthogonal phase shift keying (QPSK) demodulation based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0172] Aspect 23: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 22, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: descrambling the OFDM tones that are mapped to quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbols in the OFDM tone mapping based at least in part on the confidentiality key.

[0173] Aspect 24: A method according to any one of Aspects 14 to 23, wherein modifying the input or the output of at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling includes: modifying the input or output of the binary descrambling at least partially based on a first confidentiality key; modifying the input or output of the demodulation at least partially based on a second confidentiality key; and modifying the input or output of the OFDM tone mapping at least partially based on a third confidentiality key.

[0174] Aspect 25: The method according to any one of aspects 14 to 24, wherein the receiver device is a user equipment, the transmitter device is a base station, and the physical control channel signal is a physical downlink control channel signal or a physical broadcast control channel signal.

[0175] Aspect 26: The method according to any one of aspects 14 to 24, wherein the receiver device is a base station, the transmitter device is a user equipment, and the physical control channel signal is a physical uplink control channel signal.

[0176] Aspect 27: An apparatus for performing wireless communications at a device, comprising: a processor; a memory coupled to the processor; and instructions stored in the memory and executable by the processor to cause the apparatus to perform one or more of the methods described in Aspects 1 to 13.

[0177] Aspect 28: An apparatus for wireless communication at a device, comprising: a processor; a memory coupled to the processor; and instructions stored in the memory and executable by the processor to cause the apparatus to perform one or more of the methods described in Aspects 14 to 26.

[0178] Aspect 29: A device for wireless communication, comprising: a memory; and one or more processors, the one or more processors coupled to the memory, the one or more processors configured to execute the method according to one or more of aspects 1 to 13.

[0179] Aspect 30: An apparatus for wireless communication, comprising: a memory; and one or more processors, the one or more processors coupled to the memory, the one or more processors configured to perform the method according to one or more of aspects 14 to 26.

[0180] Aspect 31: An apparatus for wireless communication, comprising at least one means for performing the method according to one or more of aspects 1 to 13.

[0181] Aspect 32: An apparatus for wireless communication, comprising at least one means for performing the method according to one or more of aspects 14 to 26.

[0182] Aspect 33: A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing code for wireless communication, the code comprising instructions executable by a processor to perform the method according to one or more of aspects 1 to 13.

[0183] Aspect 34: A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing code for wireless communication, the code comprising instructions executable by a processor to perform the method according to one or more of aspects 14 to 26.

[0184] Aspect 35: A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing an instruction set for wireless communication, the instruction set comprising one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors of a device, cause the device to perform one or more of the methods described in aspects 1 to 13.

[0185] Aspect 36: A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing an instruction set for wireless communication, the instruction set comprising one or more instructions which, when executed by one or more processors of a device, cause the device to perform one or more of the methods described in aspects 14 to 26.

[0186] The foregoing disclosure provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the aspects to the precise forms disclosed. Modifications and variations may be made in light of the above disclosure or may be acquired from practice of these aspects.

[0187] As used herein, the term "component" is intended to be broadly interpreted as a combination of hardware and / or hardware and software. Whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language or other names, "software" should be broadly interpreted as meaning instructions, instruction sets, codes, code segments, program codes, programs, subroutines, software modules, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executable files, execution threads, procedures and / or functions, etc. As used herein, a "processor" is implemented by a combination of hardware and / or hardware and software. It will be apparent that the systems and / or methods described herein can be implemented by a combination of hardware and / or hardware and software in different forms. The actual dedicated control hardware or software code used to implement these systems and / or methods does not limit various aspects. Therefore, the operation and behavior of the system and / or method are not described herein with reference to specific software codes, because it will be understood by those skilled in the art that software and hardware can be designed to implement the system and / or method based at least in part on the description herein.

[0188] As used herein, "satisfying a threshold" may refer to a value being greater than a threshold, greater than or equal to a threshold, less than a threshold, less than or equal to a threshold, equal to a threshold, not equal to a threshold, etc., depending on the context.

[0189] Although the specific combination of features is set forth in the claims and / or disclosed in the specification, these combinations are not intended to limit the disclosure of various aspects. Many of these features can be combined in a manner that is not specifically listed in the claims and / or is not disclosed in the specification. The disclosure of various aspects includes each dependent claim combined with each other claim in the claim set. As used herein, the phrase "at least one of" the list of items refers to any combination of these items (which includes a single member). As an example, "at least one of a, b or c" is intended to cover a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c and a+b+c, and any combination with multiple identical elements (e.g., a+a, a+a+a, a+a+b, a+a+c, a+b+b, a+c+c, b+b, b+b+b, b+b+c, c+c and c+c+c, or any other ordering of a, b and c).

[0190] Any element, action or instruction used herein should not be interpreted as key or necessary, unless clearly stated so. In addition, as used herein, the articles "one" and "an" are intended to include one or more items, and can be used interchangeably with "one or more". In addition, as used herein, the article "the" is intended to include one or more items connected to the article "the", and can be used interchangeably with "one or more". In addition, as used herein, the terms "set" and "group" are intended to include one or more items, and can be used interchangeably with "one or more". If only one item is intended to be referred to, the phrase "only one" or similar terms will be used. Moreover, as used herein, the terms "have", "have" etc. are intended to be open terms, which do not limit the elements they modify (for example, "elements with" A can also have B). In addition, the phrase "based on" is intended to represent "based at least in part on", unless explicitly stated otherwise. Furthermore, as used herein, the term "or" when used in a series is intended to be open-ended and can be used interchangeably with "and / or" unless expressly stated otherwise (eg, if used in conjunction with "either" or "only one of").

Claims

1. A transmitter device for wireless communication, comprising: Memory; and one or more processors coupled to the memory and configured to: modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal; and The protected physical control channel signal is sent to a receiver device.

2. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: A scrambling sequence generator is initialized based at least in part on the secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling.

3. The transmitter device of claim 2, wherein to initialize the scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the secret key, the one or more processors are configured to: Initializing a first m-sequence of the scrambling sequence using a first portion of the secret key; and A second m-sequence of the scrambling sequence is initialized using the second portion of the secret key.

4. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: The scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling are masked by encrypting the scrambled bits using the secret key.

5. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: initializing a scrambling sequence generator based at least in part on the first portion of the secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling code; and The scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling are masked by encrypting the scrambled bits using a second portion of the secret key.

6. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: The modulated input bits are masked by encrypting the modulated input bits using the secret key.

7. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: Real and imaginary parts associated with constellation points for quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation are exchanged based at least in part on the secret key.

8. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: A quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbol generated by QAM or QPSK modulation is modified by a phase shift generated based at least in part on the secret key.

9. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: A quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbol generated by QAM modulation or QPSK modulation is rotated based at least in part on the secret key.

10. The transmitter device of claim 1, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: OFDM tones produced by the OFDM tone mapping are remapped based at least in part on the secret key.

11. The transmitter device of claim 1 , wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping, the one or more processors are configured to: modifying an input or an output of the binary scrambling code based at least in part on a first secret key; modifying the modulated input or output based at least in part on a second secret key; as well as An input or an output of the OFDM tone map is modified based at least in part on a third secret key.

12. The transmitter device according to claim 1, wherein the transmitter device is a base station, the receiver device is a user equipment, and the physical control channel signal is a physical downlink control channel signal or a physical broadcast control channel signal.

13. The transmitter device according to claim 1, wherein the transmitter device is a user equipment, the receiver device is a base station, and the physical control channel signal is a physical uplink control channel signal.

14. A receiver device for wireless communication, comprising: Memory; and one or more processors coupled to the memory and configured to: receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a sending device; as well as Information is retrieved from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a secret key.

15. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: A scrambling sequence generator is initialized based at least in part on the secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary descrambling.

16. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: The scrambled bits are unmasked by decrypting the scrambled bits descrambled in the binary descrambling using the secret key.

17. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: The output bits from the demodulation are unmasked by decrypting the output bits from the demodulation using the secret key.

18. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: Real and imaginary parts associated with constellation points for quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) demodulation are exchanged based at least in part on the secret key.

19. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: A quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbol for QAM or QPSK demodulation is modified by a phase shift or rotation based at least in part on the secret key generation.

20. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: OFDM tones that are to be mapped to quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbols in the OFDM tone map are descrambled based at least in part on the secret key.

21. The receiver device of claim 14, wherein to modify the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling, the one or more processors are configured to: modifying an input or an output of the binary descrambled based at least in part on a first secret key; modifying the demodulated input or output based at least in part on a second secret key; as well as An input or an output of the OFDM tone map is modified based at least in part on a third secret key.

22. A method of wireless communication performed by a transmitter device, comprising: modifying an input or output of at least one of binary scrambling, modulation, or orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping for a physical control channel signal based at least in part on a confidentiality key, thereby producing a protected physical control channel signal; and The protected physical control channel signal is sent to a receiver device.

23. The method of claim 22, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping comprises: A scrambling sequence generator is initialized based at least in part on the secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary scrambling.

24. The method of claim 22, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping comprises: The scrambled bits generated by the binary scrambling are masked by encrypting the scrambled bits using the secret key.

25. The method of claim 22, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping comprises: A quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbol generated by QAM or QPSK modulation is modified by a phase shift or rotation based at least in part on the secret key generation.

26. The method of claim 22, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the binary scrambling code, the modulation, or the OFDM tone mapping comprises: OFDM tones produced by the OFDM tone mapping are remapped based at least in part on the secret key.

27. A method of wireless communication performed by a receiver device, comprising: receiving a protected physical control channel signal from a sending device; as well as Information is retrieved from the protected physical control channel signal by modifying an input or output of at least one of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) tone mapping, demodulation, or binary descrambling based at least in part on a secret key.

28. The method of claim 27, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling comprises: A scrambling sequence generator is initialized based at least in part on the secret key, wherein the scrambling sequence generator generates a scrambling sequence for the binary decoding.

29. The method of claim 27, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling comprises: A quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbol or a quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbol for QAM or QPSK demodulation is modified by a phase shift or rotation based at least in part on the secret key generation.

30. The method of claim 27, wherein modifying the input or the output of the at least one of the OFDM tone mapping, the demodulation, or the binary descrambling comprises: OFDM tones that are to be mapped to quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols or quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) symbols in the OFDM tone map are descrambled based at least in part on the secret key.