Blind countermeasures to protect multiplication operations against side channel attacks
By using shift or bit flip operations to generate blinded operands in multiplication operations, the sensitive information leakage problem caused by side channel attacks in the prior art is solved, and the cost-effective solution to combat side channel attacks is realized, reducing performance overhead and Improved the security of password algorithms.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410641256.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-25
- Filing Date
- 2024-05-22
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively defend against side channel attacks, especially because conventional countermeasures have losses in equipment area, power and performance overhead, resulting in a high risk of leaking sensitive information.
By using shift or bit flip operations in the multiplication operation to generate blinded operands, the leakage of power consumption-related information is reduced, and side channel attacks are prevented. Specific methods include Hamming weight changes to operands, using low-cost shift and subtraction/addition operations, selectively blinding or de-blining to reduce data leakage.
Effectively reduce the risk of side channel attacks, especially against simple power analysis, differential power analysis, timing analysis and differential electromagnetic analysis attacks, reduce performance impact, and improve the security of symmetric/asymmetric keys and post-quantum cryptography algorithms .
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Figure CN119026185A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates generally to performing blinded multiplication operations, and more particularly, to performing blinded multiplication operations using shift or bit-flip operations. Background Art
[0002] A side channel attack is a physical attack that exploits vulnerabilities created by hardware implementations, leading to information leakage from a system. Side channel attacks can exploit information leakage, such as electromagnetic radiation associated with the power consumption of a system. These information leakages can be used to infer secret information, such as encryption keys in encryption and decryption cores. Side channel attacks are difficult to detect and defend against because they can be performed remotely using very few resources. Conventional countermeasures against side channel attacks incur a penalty in terms of device area, power, and performance overhead. Therefore, there is a need for improved countermeasures against side channel attacks to protect sensitive information. Summary of the invention
[0003] A simplified summary of one or more aspects of the present disclosure is presented below in order to provide a basic understanding of these aspects. This summary is not an extensive overview of all expected features of the present disclosure, and is neither intended to identify the key or critical elements of all aspects of the present disclosure, nor is it intended to describe the scope of any or all aspects of the present disclosure. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more aspects of the present disclosure in a simplified form as a prelude to a more detailed description presented later.
[0004] Certain aspects of the present disclosure are directed to a method for performing a blinding operation. The method generally includes: obtaining a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; performing one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinding operand via one or more processors; and performing a multiplication operation based on the first blinding operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result.
[0005] Certain aspects of the present disclosure are directed to an apparatus for performing a blinding operation. The apparatus generally includes a memory and one or more processors coupled to the memory, and the one or more processors are configured to: obtain a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; perform one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinding operand via the one or more processors; and perform a multiplication operation based on the first blinding operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result.
[0006] Certain aspects of the present disclosure are directed to a computer-readable medium having instructions stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, are configured to: obtain a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; perform one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinded operand; and perform a multiplication operation based on the first blinded operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0007] The present disclosure will be more fully understood from the detailed description given below and the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present disclosure. The accompanying drawings are used to provide knowledge and understanding of the embodiments of the present disclosure and do not limit the scope of the present disclosure to these specific embodiments. In addition, the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale.
[0008] Figure 1 The different power consumption associated with processing products with different Hamming weights is shown.
[0009] Figure 2 An example computing system having a blinding component and an unblinding component in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure is shown.
[0010] Figure 3 An example blinding method for multiplication of multiple hexadecimal numbers in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure is shown.
[0011] Figure 4 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations for performing blinding operations in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure.
[0012] Figure 5 An example machine of a computer system is shown in which a set of instructions may be executed to cause the machine to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0013] Certain aspects of the present disclosure are directed to cost-effective blinding countermeasures for protecting multiplication operations from side-channel attacks. The countermeasures described herein can be applied to protect any algorithm that uses multiplication, such as public key cryptographic algorithms. Side-channel attacks threaten symmetric / asymmetric key and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms.
[0014] Some aspects provide techniques for preventing any suitable side channel attack by blinding the multiplication operation, such as simple power analysis (SPA) attack, differential power (DPA) analysis attack, attack based on simple electromagnetic analysis (SEMA), timing analysis (TA), and differential electromagnetic analysis (DEMA), and the blind multiplication operation reduces the impact on performance compared to conventional implementations. SPA attack refers to a side channel attack in which the attacker analyzes the power consumption of the system to identify secret information about the system. For example, the attacker can infer the secret key used for cryptography based on the power consumption. SPA attack can use a single trace to infer the secret key, use timing information (e.g., how long it took to complete the operation) to identify the underlying password, and / or identify the start and end of the intermediate module. DPA attack can involve comparing the power consumption of known operations and unknown operations. DPA attack can involve multiple traces to decrypt the secret key and can be used when noise is added to prevent SPA. In other words, DPA is a technique involving correlating collected power measurements. Similarly, DEMA involves correlating the collected electromagnetic emissions of the system and can involve multiple traces to infer the secret key. A variant can include TA. If for DPA / DEMA a graph with a y-axis corresponding to power consumption measurements or electromagnetic emissions is generated, then in TA the x-axis may correspond to the time / duration of the measurement under consideration. For multiplication, if two different operands result in different power traces, and the difference may indicate the value of the operands, then the associated secret information may be leaked.
[0015] Certain aspects of the present disclosure are directed to countermeasures against attacks that attempt to infer secret information by blinding the values of operands. Certain aspects may be applied to multiplicands and / or multipliers during multiplication operations. The countermeasures described herein may be used to protect any cryptographic algorithm that includes multiplication operations, such as, but not limited to, the Rivest-Samour-Adleman (RSA) public key algorithm, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) symmetric key algorithm, the Diffie Hellman key exchange, and the Kyber post-quantum algorithm.
[0016] For example, consider the product between a value of 4 and a value of 2, which is equal to 0100×0010=1000 in binary form. Also consider the product between a value of 3 and a value of 5, which is equal to 0011×0101=1111 in binary form. The Hamming weight of the first product (e.g., 0100×0010=1000) is 1 and the Hamming weight of the second product (e.g., 0011×0101=1111) is 4. The Hamming weight of a binary code is the number of non-zero elements (e.g., logical high or 1) in the binary code. When the products are processed using a device, the difference in the Hamming weights between the products translates into different power consumption.
[0017] Figure 11 is a graph 100 illustrating different power consumption associated with processing products having different Hamming weights. Figure 1 As shown in , the power consumption associated with processing a product with a Hamming weight of 7 is different from the power consumption associated with processing a product with a Hamming weight of 4. These power consumption differences can be used to identify secret information about the system (e.g., the processing of the product). Conventionally, preventing (or at least reducing) side channel attacks such as DPA / DEMA-based attacks results in significant performance overhead.
[0018] Certain aspects are directed to cost-effective blinding countermeasures such that power traces associated with processing products of values do not leak information about the Hamming weights of the operands (or at least reduce information leakage). For example, certain aspects provide countermeasures to protect multiplication operations using low processing cost. The countermeasures may involve only shift and subtraction / addition operations (e.g., compared to some conventional implementations that involve multiplication or squaring operations, incurring higher processing costs).
[0019] The countermeasures described herein can be applied to any operand value. The countermeasures can involve changing the Hamming weight of any operand to blind / mask the associated product operation. As described, the countermeasures can involve using shift and subtraction / addition operands to blind or de-blind the operands, allowing the countermeasures to be implemented using reduced processing costs. In some embodiments, the countermeasures can be blinded to the operands having 0 values in the MSb position, 0 values in the LSb position, or even 0 / 1 values in the non-MSb / LSb position. The countermeasures can use randomness to select the operands to be blinded and the position of (one or more) bits to be blinded, preventing (or at least reducing) data leakage.
[0020] The countermeasure techniques described herein may involve blinding operations and unblinding operations. For example, a blinding operation may involve flipping a value of 0 to a value of 1, or vice versa, to change the Hamming weight of the operand. Unblinding operations may involve shifting and subtraction / addition operations depending on the method and the number of bits flipped, as described in more detail herein. The countermeasure techniques may be applied to any multiplication operation and therefore may be extended to multiple cryptographic algorithms.
[0021] The operands of a multiplication operation may change on each run and trace collection, thereby leaking any information about the operands. Consider, for example, the multiplication operation 12×3=36. In binary, the multiplication operation can be represented as 1100×0011=100100, which has a Hamming weight of 2. In some aspects, the operands can be blinded by providing different Hamming weights. For example, assume that one of the most significant bits (MSb) of the value 3 is blinded as follows: (3) M1=0111=7. Therefore 12×7=84=1010100 has a Hamming weight of 3. The subscript M1 indicates that 1 MSb is blinded. In other words, by flipping the logic value of the third bit of the binary value 3, 0011 can be changed to 0111. Therefore, the associated multiplication operation provides a result with a Hamming weight of 3 instead of 2.
[0022] As another example, the median value of 12 can be blinded as follows: (12) I1 =1110×0011=42=101010, which has a Hamming weight of 3. Here, the subscript I1 indicates that the middle bit 1 is flipped. In other words, the second bit of the binary value 12 flips from 0 to 1, resulting in a Hamming weight of 3 instead of 2.
[0023] As another example, the least significant bit (LSb) of the value 12 may be blinded as follows: (12) L2 =1111=15. Therefore, 15×3=1111×0011=45=101101 has a Hamming weight of 4. Here, the subscript L2 indicates that the two LSbs are blinded. In other words, the first and second bits of the binary value 12 are flipped, resulting in a Hamming weight of 4 instead of 2.
[0024] In some aspects, the choice of blinding mode and the number of bits that are blinded, or the intermediate values that are flipped, can be randomized on each run / trace. The blinding operation can involve shifts and subtraction / addition operations, such as described in more detail herein. If multiple intermediate values are flipped, the number of shifts and subtraction / addition operations increases linearly. Blinding can be applied on a single number to further increase the blinding effect of power / electromagnetic (EM) tracking (e.g., further changing the Hamming weights and disassociating the correct product value from the power / EM tracking).
[0025] Figure 2 An example computing system 200 having a blinding component 202 and a de-blinding component 210 in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure is shown. As shown, the blinding component receives operand A and operand B and generates a blinded multiplication result C' of operand A and operand B. De-blinding component 210 de-blinds C' to generate a de-blinded multiplication result C, as shown.
[0026] In some aspects, different methods for generating the blinded multiplication result C' may be available. Blinding methods are described in more detail herein. The blinding component may include a method selection component 204 for selecting a blinding method to use.
[0027] Certain aspects of the present disclosure provide blinding / de-blinding operations for operands having 0 in the MSb position of the operand. In other words, if operand A or operand B to be blinded has 0 in the MSb position, the method selection component 204 may select the method. Consider two operands A and B. A may have an MSb of x bits of 0. A random number (b) may be selected between 0 and x (e.g., via a random selection component 208 of the blinding component 202). The random number b may represent the number of shifts to be done in operand A. Operand A may be blinded according to the following representation (e.g., via a shift component 206):
[0028] A′=A<<b 1 =A x 2 b +(2 b -1)
[0029] Where < 1 Indicates a left shift b times, using the value 1 as the LSb after each shift. For example, when b is 1, 0010< 1 can be equal to 0101. Therefore, the value C' (the result of the multiplication after blinding A) can be calculated as the expression:
[0030] C′=A′x B=(A x 2 b +(2 b -1))x B
[0031] To restore the original value C=A×B, the following unblinding operation may be performed by the unblinding component 210:
[0032] (A x 2 b +(2 b -1))x B=C′
[0033] (A x 2 b x B)=C′-[(2 b -1)x B]
[0034] A x B = [C′-[(2 b -1)x B]]x 2 -b
[0035] A x B = [C′-[(B<<b 0 )-B]]>>b 0 =C
[0036] Where < 0 Indicates a left shift b times, with the value 0 as LSb after each shift and >>b 0 indicates a shift to the right b times, with a value of 0 used as the LSb after each shift. De-blinding is performed using two shifts (eg, via shift component 212) and two subtraction operations (eg, via addition / subtraction component 214) to recover the original output value C.
[0037] Certain aspects of the present disclosure provide blinding / de-blinding operations for operands containing 0s in the LSb position. Consider two operands A and B, where A has x LSb bits of 0. A random number (b) may be selected between 0 and x (e.g., via random selection component 208). The variable represents the number of shifts to be performed in operand A. After applying blinding to A, variable A' may be generated by the expression (e.g., via shift component 206):
[0038]
[0039] Therefore, the variable C′ (the result of the multiplication operation after blinding A) can be calculated as the expression:
[0040]
[0041] To restore the original value C=A×B, the following unblinding operation may be performed via the unblinding component 210:
[0042]
[0043]
[0044] A×B=[C′-[(2 b -1)2 b ×B]]×2 b
[0045]
[0046] Or when b = 1, A × B = [C '-(B << b 0 )]<<b 0 =C
[0047] In this manner, de-blinding is performed using two subtraction operations (eg, via addition / subtraction component 214 ) and three shift operations (eg, via shift component 212 ) to recover the original output value C.
[0048] Certain aspects of the present disclosure provide a method for blinding the middle bits in an operand by flipping the middle bit values. Consider two operands A and B of size x bits. Bits from the range [0, x-1] may be randomly selected to flip (e.g., via random selection component 208). For example, bit b may be selected, where b is an integer between 0 and x-1. The blinding of operand A may be performed via bit flip component 209 as equation:
[0049] A′=A xor X
[0050] X=x′b0
[0051] X[b]=1
[0052] Where x is the size of operand A. In other words, to flip the second bit of operand A (e.g., b=2), A can be XORed with 0010. Therefore, variable C' (the result of the multiplication operation after blinding A) can be calculated as the following expression:
[0053] If A[b]=0 (for example, b of operand A is 0) C′=A′x B=A x B+
[0054] 2 b x B
[0055] Otherwise C′=A′x B=A x B-2 b x B
[0056] To restore the original value C=A×B, the following unblinding operation may be performed via the unblinding component 210:
[0057] A x B+2 b x B=C′, if A[b]=0
[0058] A x B = C′-2 b x B
[0059] A x B = C'-[B<<b]
[0060] If A[b]=1, then A x B=C′+[B<<b]
[0061] De-blinding is performed using a subtraction / addition operation (eg, via addition / subtraction component 214) and a shift operation (eg, via shift component 212) to recover the original output value C.
[0062] Although the described technique is described by blinding one operand of a multiplication operation, in some aspects both operands can be blinded. In this case, the unblinding can be performed sequentially. For example, for the multiplication of operands A and B, the following expression can be used to blind A and B:
[0063] A x B=C→Blind(A,a)xBlind(B,b)=A'x B'=C”
[0064] Where variable a represents the bits that are flipped to blind A (or the number of shifts used) and b represents the bits that are flipped to blind B (or the number of shifts used). Operand A may be blinded to identify A' by flipping bits or performing a certain number of shift operations as described herein. Similarly, operand B may be blinded to identify B' by flipping bits or performing a certain number of shift operations as described herein. A' and B' may be multiplied to identify C". Unblinding C" may occur in sequence by the following expressions:
[0065] Unblind(C”,B’,a)=C’→Unblind(C’,A’,b)→C
[0066] In other words, C" can be unblinded based on B' and variable a to obtain C'. Then, C' can be unblinded based on A' and variable b to obtain C.
[0067] In addition, during multiplication operations, blinding / unblinding methods can be applied to entire numbers or individual digits. For example, to blind the hexadecimal value 4F, the entire hexadecimal value can be blinded, or individual digits of the value can be blinded individually (e.g., 4 is blinded individually and F is blinded individually).
[0068] Figure 3 An example blinding method for Comba method multiplication of multiple hexadecimal numbers according to certain aspects of the present disclosure is shown. For example, consider multiplying 23 and 54. Blinding can be performed by treating the multiple hexadecimal numbers as a unit, or by dividing the multiple hexadecimal numbers into individual hexadecimal digits and blinding the internal multiplication operation. In other words, when performing the multiplication operation as shown in FIG. Figure 3 When multiplying 23 and 54 using the Comba method shown in , each of the hexadecimal digits 2, 3, 5, and 4 can be blinded separately. Figure 3In the example shown in , in each row of the Comba method multiplication, one number can be blinded. For example, the blinded hexadecimal number 4 provides a blinded number of 9. Therefore, as shown, instead of multiplying 4 and 3, a multiplication of 9 and 3 is performed. The blinded hexadecimal number 2 provides a blinded number of 11, the blinded hexadecimal number 3 provides a blinded number of 7, and the blinded hexadecimal number 5 provides a blinded number of 11. As shown, performing the Comba method multiplication using the blinded numbers provides a blinded multiplication result of 3017 (e.g., compared to 1242 for the unblinded multiplication).
[0069] As the operand size increases, the applicability of blinding may increase. The Hamming weight may be further changed by blinding more of the middle bits in the number. This may be referred to as the blinding effect. In some aspects, as the operand size increases, the performance overhead associated with the blinding / de-blinding operations may be reduced.
[0070] In some aspects, the choice of method, the choice of underlying shift, or the decision of the position of the bits can be randomly chosen and thus different for each traced power profile. In some cases, the choice of method can be chosen in a way that makes the Hamming weights of the two multiplication operations equal. For example, assume the following code: A times B if variable k is equal to 1, otherwise A times C. Based on the power consumption difference, an attacker can infer that A x B multiplication was performed or A x C multiplication was performed. Therefore, one or more of the operands can be blinded in such a way that the Hamming weight associated with A x B and the Hamming weight associated with A x C are equal.
[0071] Some aspects provide techniques for protecting secure multiplication operations by using blinding. The techniques described herein apply to any symmetric / asymmetric or post-quantum cryptographic algorithm. The techniques described herein can be used to prevent SPA, TA, DPA, SEMA, and DEMA attacks, and have little impact on performance. Compared to conventional implementations, the techniques described herein improve performance by 44% for operand sizes greater than 256 bits, and may not incur memory overhead. For a fixed multiplier size, the number of blindings increases with the increase of the operand size.
[0072] Figure 4 4 is a flow diagram illustrating example operations 400 for performing a blinding operation in accordance with certain aspects of the present disclosure. Operation 400 may be performed by, for example, a processing device such as processing device 502, a blinding component (e.g., blinding component 202), and / or a de-blinding component (e.g., de-blinding component (210).
[0073] Operations 400 begin at block 402, where a processing device obtains a first operand (e.g., A as described herein) and a second operand (e.g., B as described herein) for a multiplication operation. At block 404, the processing device performs one or more shift operations on the first operand (e.g., Figure 2 Shift unit 206) or a bit flip operation (eg, via Figure 2 The bit flipping component 209) is used to generate a first blinded operand (eg, the blinded operand A' described herein).
[0074] In some aspects, the first blinding operand is generated by performing one or more shift operations.In some aspects, the processing device may randomly select a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations (eg, randomly select a variable b as described herein).
[0075] Performing one or more shift operations may include appending a logic high value to the first operand after each shift operation of the one or more shift operations (e.g., performing operation >>b as described herein). 1 or 1 ). The first blinding operand can be generated by performing one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a logically low MSb. In some aspects, the number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations (e.g., associated with the selected variable b as described herein) is less than the number of logically low (one or more) MSb of the first operand.
[0076] In some aspects, the first blinding operand is generated by performing one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a logically low LSb. In some aspects, the number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations (e.g., associated with the selected variable b as described herein) is less than the number of logically low LSb(s) of the first operand.
[0077] In some aspects, the first blinded operand is generated by performing a bit flip operation.For the bit flip operation, the processing device may randomly select bits of the first operand to flip.
[0078] In some aspects, the processing device performs one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the second operand to generate a second blinded operand (e.g., B' described herein). A multiplication operation may be performed based on the first blinded operand and the second blinded operand to generate a blinded multiplication result (e.g., C" described herein).
[0079] At block 406, the processing device performs a multiplication operation based on the first blinded operand and the second blinded operand to generate a blinded multiplication result. In some aspects, the processing device may perform one or more shift operations on the second operand (e.g., via the shift component 212 of the de-blinding component 210) to produce a shifted second operand, and de-blind the blinded multiplication result based on the shifted second operand. In some aspects, performing the one or more shift operations on the second operand may include appending a logical low value to the second operand after each shift operation of the one or more shift operations on the second operand (e.g., performing an operation < 0.001 ). 0 ).
[0080] Figure 5 An example machine of a computer system 500 is shown within which a set of instructions may be executed to cause the machine to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein. In alternative implementations, the machine may be connected (e.g., networked) to other machines in a LAN, an intranet, an extranet, and / or the Internet. The machine may operate in the capacity of a server or a client machine in a client-server network environment, in the capacity of a peer machine in a peer-to-peer (or distributed) network environment, or as a server or a client machine in a cloud computing infrastructure or environment.
[0081] The machine may be a personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a set-top box (STB), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a cellular phone, a network appliance, a server, a network router, a switch or bridge, or any machine capable of executing a set of instructions (sequential or otherwise) that specify operations to be performed by the machine. Further, when a single machine is shown, the term "machine" should also be understood to include any collection of machines that individually or jointly execute an instruction set (or multiple instruction sets) to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein.
[0082] The example computer system 500 includes a processing device 502, a main memory 504 (e.g., read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, dynamic random access memory (DRAM) such as synchronous DRAM (SDRAM)), a static memory 506 (e.g., flash memory, static random access memory (SRAM)), etc.), and a data storage device 518, which communicate with each other via a bus 530.
[0083] Processing device 502 represents one or more processors, such as a microprocessor, a central processing unit, etc. More specifically, the processing device can be a complex instruction set computing (CISC) microprocessor, a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) microprocessor, a very long instruction word (VLIW) microprocessor, or a processor that implements other instruction sets, or a processor that implements a combination of instruction sets. Processing device 502 can also be one or more special-purpose processing devices, such as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a digital signal processor (DSP), a network processor, etc. Processing device 502 can be configured to execute instructions 526 to perform the operations and steps described herein.
[0084] The computer system 500 may further include a network interface device 508 to communicate over the network 520. The computer system 500 may also include a video display unit 510 (e.g., a liquid crystal display (LCD) or a cathode ray tube (CRT)), an alphanumeric input device 512 (e.g., a keyboard), a cursor control device 514 (e.g., a mouse), a graphics processing unit 522, a signal generating device 516 (e.g., a speaker), a graphics processing unit 522, a video processing unit 528, and an audio processing unit 532.
[0085] The data storage device 518 may include a machine-readable storage medium 524 (also referred to as a non-transitory computer-readable medium) on which one or more instruction sets 526 or software embodying one or more methods or functions described herein are stored. During the implementation of the instructions by the computer system 500, the instruction set 526 may also be retained in whole or at least in part within the main memory 504 and / or within the processing device 502, which also constitute the machine-readable storage medium.
[0086] In some implementations, the instructions 526 include instructions that implement functions corresponding to the present disclosure. When the machine-readable storage medium 524 is shown as a separate medium in the example implementation, the term "machine-readable storage medium" should be understood to include a separate medium or multiple media (e.g., a centralized or distributed database, and / or associated caches and servers) that store one or more instruction sets. The term "machine-readable storage medium" should also be understood to include any medium capable of storing or encoding instruction sets that are executed by the machine and cause the machine and processing device 502 to perform any one or more methods of the present disclosure. The term "machine-readable storage medium" should therefore be understood to include, but is not limited to, solid-state memory, optical media, and magnetic media. In some aspects of the present disclosure, the processing device 502 may include a blinding component 202 and a de-blinding component 210.
[0087] Some portions of the above detailed description have been presented in terms of algorithms and symbolic representations of operations on data bits within a computer memory. These algorithmic descriptions and representations are methods used by those skilled in the art of data processing to most effectively convey the essence of their work to those skilled in the art. An algorithm may be a series of operations that lead to a desired result. These operations are those that require physical manipulation of physical quantities. These quantities may take the form of electrical or magnetic signals that can be stored, combined, compared, and otherwise manipulated. These signals may be referred to as bits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, etc.
[0088] It should be remembered, however, that all of these and similar terms are associated with the appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient labels applied to these quantities. Unless otherwise apparent from the present disclosure, it should be understood that throughout the description certain terms refer to actions and processes of computer systems, or similar electronic computing devices, that manipulate and transform data represented as physical (electronic) quantities in the computer system's registers and memories into other data similarly represented as physical quantities in the computer system's memories or registers or other such information storage devices.
[0089] The present disclosure also relates to an apparatus for performing the operations herein. The apparatus may be specially constructed for the intended purpose, or it may include a computer selectively activated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in the computer. Such a computer program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as, but not limited to, any type of disk including a floppy disk, an optical disk, a CD-ROM, and a magneto-optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), an EPROM, an EEPROM, a magnetic card or an optical card, or any type of medium suitable for storing electronic instructions, each of which is coupled to a computer system bus.
[0090] The algorithm and display provided herein are not inherently associated with any particular computer or other device. Various other systems can be used together with the program according to the teaching of this article, or it can be proved that it is convenient to construct a more specialized device to perform the method. In addition, the present disclosure is not described with reference to any specific programming language. It should be understood that various programming languages can be used to implement the teaching of the present disclosure described herein.
[0091] The present disclosure may be provided as a computer program product or software, which may include a machine-readable medium having instructions stored thereon, which may be used to program a computer system (or other electronic device) to perform a process according to the present disclosure. A machine-readable medium includes any mechanism for storing information in a machine (e.g., computer) readable form. For example, a machine-readable (e.g., computer-readable) medium includes a machine (e.g., computer) readable storage medium, such as a read-only memory ("ROM"), a random access memory ("RAM"), a disk storage medium, an optical storage medium, a flash memory device, etc.
[0092] In the foregoing disclosure, implementations of the present disclosure have been described with reference to specific example implementations thereof. It will be apparent that various modifications may be made thereto without departing from the broader spirit and scope of implementation of the present disclosure in the following claims. Where the present disclosure refers to some elements in the singular tense, more than one element may be depicted in the figures, and similar elements are marked with similar numbers. Therefore, the present disclosure and the accompanying drawings should be considered in an illustrative sense rather than in a restrictive sense.
Claims
1. A method for performing a blinding operation, comprising: obtaining a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; performing, via one or more processors, one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinded operand; as well as The multiplication operation is performed based on the first blinded operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, and wherein performing the one or more shift operations comprises appending a logic high value to the first operand after each shift operation of the one or more shift operations. 3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a most significant bit (MSb) of logic low.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, and wherein a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations is less than a number of logically low MSbs of the first operand. 5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a least significant bit (LSb) of logic low.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, and wherein a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations is less than a number of logical low LSbs of the first operand.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, the method further comprising randomly selecting a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations.
8. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: performing one or more shift operations on the second operand to produce a shifted second operand; as well as The blinded multiplication result is unblinded based on the shifted second operand.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein performing the one or more shift operations of the second operand comprises: A logic low value is appended to the second operand after each shift operation of the one or more shift operations of the second operand.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the bit flipping operation, the method further comprising randomly selecting bits of the first operand for the bit flipping operation to flip.
11. The method of claim 1 , further comprising performing one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the second operand to generate a second blinded operand, wherein the multiplication operation is performed based on the first blinded operand and the second blinded operand to generate the blinded multiplication result.
12. An apparatus for performing a blinding operation, comprising: Memory; as well as One or more processors coupled to the memory and configured to: obtaining a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; performing, via one or more processors, one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinded operand; as well as The multiplication operation is performed based on the first blinded operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result.
13. The device according to claim 12, wherein: To generate the first blinding operand, the one or more processors are configured to perform the one or more shift operations; and To perform the one or more shift operations, the one or more processors are configured to append a logic high value to the first operand after each shift operation of the one or more shift operations.
14. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein to generate the first blinding operand, the one or more processors are configured to perform the one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a most significant bit (MSb) that is logically low.
15. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, and wherein a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations is less than a number of logically low MSbs of the first operand.
16. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein to generate the first blinding operand, the one or more processors are configured to perform the one or more shift operations based on the first operand having a least significant bit (LSb) that is logically low.
17. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the first blinding operand is generated by performing the one or more shift operations, and wherein a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations is less than a number of logical low LSbs of the first operand.
18. The device according to claim 12, wherein: To generate the first blinding operand, the one or more processors are configured to perform the one or more shift operations, and the one or more processors are further configured to randomly select a number of shift operations associated with the one or more shift operations.
19. The apparatus of claim 12, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to: performing one or more shift operations on the second operand to produce a shifted second operand; and The blinded multiplication result is unblinded based on the shifted second operand.
20. A computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by one or more processors, are configured to: obtaining a first operand and a second operand for a multiplication operation; performing one or more shift operations or bit flip operations on the first operand to generate a first blinded operand; and The multiplication operation is performed based on the first blinded operand and the second operand to generate a blinded multiplication result.
