Drive system for vehicle
By using two accelerator pedal sensors and signal processing mechanisms in the vehicle assisted driving system, forced downshift control is identified and safety integrity requirements are reduced, and misidentification and high cost in the prior art are solved, and driver manipulation is achieved Reliable identification and accurate disabling of assisted driving functions.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202380034067.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-05-04
- Filing Date
- 2023-03-02
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-29
AI Technical Summary
The existing vehicle assisted driving system has an error identification problem when identifying the driver taking over, resulting in the assisted driving function being erroneously turned off, and the prior art has high safety integrity requirements, resulting in increased development costs.
Two accelerator pedal sensors are used to independently obtain the original accelerator pedal value and connect it to the accelerator pedal control device and auxiliary control device through different signal paths. Through signal processing and end-to-end protection mechanisms, the signal credibility and integrity of the signal are ensured. This will identify forced downshift manipulation and reduce safety integrity requirements.
It realizes the reduction of the development cost of vehicle assist system without sacrificing safety integrity, improves the reliable identification ability of the driver to operate the accelerator pedal, and ensures the accurate deactivation of the assisted driving function when the driver takes over.
Smart Images

Figure CN119053501A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention relates to a drive system for a vehicle according to the preamble of claim 1 and to a method for operating such a drive system. Background Art
[0002] This type of vehicle has an assisted driving function or an automatic driving function, which takes over the driving operation from the driver when activated. When the driver deactivates the assisted driving function, the driver takes over. The vehicle's drive system has an accelerator pedal with an accelerator pedal control device, which performs the driving task when the driver actuates the accelerator pedal. The accelerator pedal control device is connected to an auxiliary control device that performs the assisted driving function. When there is a kickdown actuation by the driver, the assisted driving function or the automatic driving function is deactivated, so that the driver is responsible for taking over the driving task again.
[0003] Therefore, in the above-mentioned assistance system, in order to recognize that the driver has taken over, a fully depressed accelerator pedal (downshift) must be recognized. However, only a slight manipulation of the accelerator pedal should not cause the deactivation of the assisted driving function. Therefore, the recognition and evaluation of the accelerator pedal information in the auxiliary control device is highly relevant to safety. Specifically, when there is an erroneous recognition of the driver's takeover, the assisted driving function will be turned off even if the driver may not be ready to take over. Therefore, in the prior art, all components, starting from the acquisition of the accelerator pedal raw value, its processing to the output, are developed with the highest safety integrity (ASIL = Automotive Safety Integrity Level) so that the required information reaches the auxiliary control device with the required safety integrity (ASIL). The safety integrity required for each component leads to very high procedural and technical requirements.
[0004] DE 10150422 A1 discloses a method and a device for determining a driving desire. DE 10 2016 011 175 A1 discloses a device for detecting an actuation of an accelerator pedal of a motor vehicle. WO 2020 / 180140 A1 discloses a brake pedal system for an electronically controlled vehicle brake. Summary of the invention
[0005] The object of the present invention is to provide an assistance system for a vehicle and a method for operating such an assistance system which can be produced with reduced complexity compared to the prior art without sacrificing safety integrity.
[0006] This object is achieved by the features of claim 1. Preferred developments of the invention are disclosed in the dependent claims.
[0007] It is emphasized that the present invention relates primarily to drive systems in which a kick-down maneuver can be detected with high safety integrity and by means of which the driver-independent automated driving task can be deactivated. However, the present invention is not limited to this specific application case. Instead, the present invention can also be used generally to detect accelerator pedal manipulations. However, for easier understanding, reference is made below to the detection of a kick-down maneuver as an example:
[0008] The invention is therefore based on a drive system having an accelerator pedal control device with an associated accelerator pedal. In the case of an accelerator pedal actuation by the driver, the driver performs the driving task. The accelerator pedal control device is connected as a transmitter control device to an auxiliary control device as a receiver control device. The auxiliary control device can perform autonomous driving tasks independently of the driver. In the case of a kickdown actuation by the driver, the driver assistance function or the autonomous driving function is deactivated, so that the driver is again responsible for taking over the driving task. In order to reliably detect such a kickdown actuation by the accelerator pedal, the following measures are adopted according to the characterizing part of claim 1: two accelerator pedal sensors are assigned to the accelerator pedal. The first accelerator pedal sensor acquires a first accelerator pedal raw value, while the second accelerator pedal sensor acquires a second accelerator pedal raw value independently of the first accelerator pedal sensor in parallel operation. The first accelerator pedal sensor is connected to the accelerator pedal control device via a first signal path and to the auxiliary control device in a further signal path. In the same way, the second accelerator pedal sensor is also connected to the accelerator pedal control device via a second signal path and to the auxiliary control device in a further signal path. In the case of no erroneous signal processing, the kickdown actuation by the driver is detected by the two accelerator pedal sensors. Accordingly, a kickdown signal is generated in each signal path. In the auxiliary control device, the signal processing in the signal paths is checked for error-freeness by checking the plausibility of the two kickdown signals.
[0009] The safety integrity of the accelerator pedal control can be reduced by the signal processing according to the invention. By means of clever signal processing and plausibility checks in the auxiliary control (i.e. the receiver control), part of the action chain (i.e. the accelerator pedal control) can be developed with lower safety integrity requirements (i.e., for example, ASIL B) than the accelerator pedal and the auxiliary control. On the other hand, the accelerator pedal and the auxiliary control are developed with higher safety integrity requirements (i.e., for example, ASIL D).
[0010] The signal path from the accelerator pedal to the auxiliary control unit is explained below: Thus, the raw accelerator pedal value, which can have, for example, ASIL B(D) quality, can be routed unchanged from one of the accelerator pedal sensors to the auxiliary control unit (receiver control unit). Together with the accelerator pedal information processed in the accelerator pedal control unit, these two information can be meaningfully linked in the auxiliary control unit, so that the required high safety integrity ASIL D is ultimately achieved (see the decomposition rules of ISO26262).
[0011] The accelerator pedal control transmits one of the two ASIL B(D) messages (accelerator pedal raw value) of the accelerator pedal to the auxiliary control (ie the receiver control), ie together with a check message checksum and a message counter.
[0012] For example, the following error situation may occur in signal processing: because the accelerator pedal control device is not so trustworthy (i.e., has a lower safety integrity), the message is distorted during transmission. According to the present invention, the error determination is carried out in the following way: the auxiliary control device (receiver control device) receives the processed accelerator pedal information from the accelerator pedal control device (transmitter control device) via a first signal path with integrity ASIL B (D). In addition, the receiver control device obtains the original information of another accelerator pedal sensor via a second signal path with ASIL B (D) and can form the same information with ASIL B (D). In order to obtain downshift information with ASIL D, the results from the first signal path and the second signal path must be combined. In order for the auxiliary control device to detect the distortion of the accelerator pedal raw value in the second signal path, the auxiliary control device must use the additionally obtained check information (message counter, checksum) to check the integrity of the accelerator pedal information.
[0013] As already mentioned above, it is emphasized that in addition to the information “downshift”, the information “accelerator pedal operated” or “accelerator pedal not operated” can also be described in the same way in principle.
[0014] In a technical implementation scheme, the signal processing in the first signal path can be performed in the following manner: the accelerator pedal control device may have a comparison module, which compares the first accelerator pedal raw value with the forced downshift boundary value. If the first accelerator pedal raw value is greater than the forced downshift boundary value, the comparison module sets the forced downshift signal to "downshift performed" (ie, K1 = yes). In addition, potential error diagnosis can also be performed in the accelerator pedal control device. When performing potential error diagnosis, the diagnostic module compares the first accelerator pedal raw value and the second accelerator pedal raw value with each other. In the case where the two accelerator pedal raw values deviate significantly, the diagnostic module identifies a potential error. In this case, the diagnostic module sets the diagnostic information to an error value. Alternatively, in the case where the two accelerator pedal raw values are consistent, the diagnostic module does not identify the potential error, so that the diagnostic module sets the diagnostic information to a non-error value. The diagnostic information generated in the diagnostic module is added to the first forced downshift signal. It should be emphasized that according to ISO 26262, potential error diagnosis is allowed to be performed with lower integrity. In this context, the potential error diagnosis according to the invention can be easily performed in an accelerator pedal control, which is preferably developed with lower safety integrity requirements (ie, for example, ASIL B) than the accelerator pedal and auxiliary control.
[0015] In another technical embodiment, the signal processing in the second signal path can be performed as follows: the information transmission / routing can be carried out in the second signal path in the accelerator pedal control device, wherein the second accelerator pedal raw value is transmitted to the auxiliary control device without signal processing. In this case, the signal processing of the second accelerator pedal raw value is only performed in the auxiliary control device. This is done by a comparison module, which compares the second accelerator pedal raw value with the kick-down limit value. If the second accelerator pedal raw value is greater than the kick-down limit value, the comparison module sets the kick-down signal to "downshift performed" (i.e., K2=yes).
[0016] Preferably, the second signal path can have an end-to-end protection. By means of the end-to-end protection, signal transmission errors in the second signal path can be detected, which are caused by faulty transmission / routing in the accelerator pedal control. The end-to-end protection can be designed essentially as described in EP 2454864 B1, to which reference is hereby made. For example, the end-to-end protection in the auxiliary control can have a check module, which performs the protection by checking the checksum and the message count value.
[0017] The following is an explanation of end-to-end protection using the second signal path as an example: For checksum checking, the transmitter calculation module (equipped for the accelerator pedal control device) uses a calculation formula to calculate the transmitter checksum based on the second accelerator pedal original value (before the routing route in the accelerator pedal control device). The transmitter checksum is added to the second accelerator pedal original value. A receiver calculation module (equipped for the auxiliary control device) is provided in the signal path after the routing route. The receiver calculation module uses the same checksum calculation formula to calculate the receiver checksum, that is, it is calculated based on the received second accelerator pedal original value. In addition, the check module compares the transmitter checksum with the receiver checksum. If the transmitter checksum deviates from the receiver checksum, the check module identifies a transmission error.
[0018] The message counter of the end-to-end protection (also provided for the accelerator pedal) increases the message count value by an increment, for example, by a value of one, for each sampling period of the second accelerator pedal raw value. For each sampling period, the current message count value is added to the second accelerator pedal raw value. In the check module of the auxiliary control device, the credibility of the message count value is checked. In particular, it is checked whether the current message count value has increased compared to the message count value of the second accelerator pedal raw value received last time. If it is not credible, a transmission error is detected.
[0019] The check module present in the auxiliary control device generates a check information after the check. If the message count value checked in the check module is not credible and / or in the case of a receiver checksum not being consistent with the transmitter checksum, the check module sets the check information to an error value. Alternatively, if the message count value checked in the check module is credible and the two checksums are consistent, the check module sets the check information to a non-error value. The check information generated by the check module is added to the second kick-down signal.
[0020] Likewise, the first signal path can also have an end-to-end protection, by which signal transmission errors in the first signal path can be detected. Unlike the second signal path, the calculation module and the message counter are not assigned to the accelerator pedal, but to the accelerator pedal control. Therefore, in the first signal path, the safety data / protection data (i.e., the transmitter checksum and the message count value) are not added to the first accelerator pedal raw value in the signal flow direction before the accelerator pedal control, but are added to the first accelerator pedal raw value directly in the accelerator pedal control.
[0021] The core of the invention is that the route from the accelerator pedal to the accelerator pedal control device and the route from the accelerator pedal control device to the auxiliary control device are protected by end-to-end protection. In order to be able to process the accelerator pedal raw value in the accelerator pedal control device (for example for potential error checking), the accelerator pedal control device must unpack the data of the two accelerator pedal raw values and check the validity before transmitting them to the potential error checking. The validity check of the data is carried out in the accelerator pedal control device within the framework of end-to-end protection. In addition, the second accelerator pedal raw value is compared with the safety data SD (i.e. the transmitter checksum C S and the message count value BZ) are sent to the auxiliary control device.
[0022] In a preferred embodiment variant, the two signal paths can lead to an evaluation module of the auxiliary control device. The evaluation module is signal-connected to the program module of the first signal path and to the program module of the second signal path. Thus, on the one hand, the evaluation module receives a first kick-down signal with associated diagnostic information and with associated check information. On the other hand, the evaluation module receives a second kick-down signal with associated check information. Based on this, if the following conditions are met at the same time:
[0023] - the first kick-down signal K1 is set to K1=yes;
[0024] - the diagnostic information added to the first kick-down signal is set to a non-error value;
[0025] - The check information added to the first kick-down signal is set to a non-error value.
[0026] - the second kick-down signal K2 is set to K2=yes;
[0027] - the check information added to the second kick-down signal is set to a non-error value;
[0028] The evaluation module detects a valid kick-down maneuver on the part of the driver. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0029] The following is an explanation of the embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0030] Figure 1 A drive system for a vehicle is shown in a schematic block diagram connection diagram;
[0031] Figures 2 to 6 Corresponding to Figure 1 The views show different operating states of the drive system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0032] exist Figure 1In the figure, a drive system for a vehicle is shown in a block diagram connection diagram within the scope required for understanding the present invention. The program modules of the block diagram connection diagram are selected for the purpose of simplifying the understanding of the present invention and do not reflect the actual software architecture in the drive system. The drive system has an accelerator pedal 1 and an associated accelerator pedal control device 3, which performs a driving task when the driver manipulates the accelerator pedal. The accelerator pedal control device 3 is connected as a transmitter control device to an auxiliary control device 5 as a receiver control device. With the help of the auxiliary control device 5, automatic driving tasks independent of the driver can be performed without the need for driver intervention. In the presence of a forced downshift manipulation on the driver's side, the auxiliary control device 5 deactivates the auxiliary driving function or the driving function, so that the driver is again responsible for taking over the driving task. In the figure, the accelerator pedal 1 and the auxiliary control device 5 have a high safety integrity ASIL D, while the accelerator pedal control device 3 has a reduced safety integrity ASIL B.
[0033] As from Figure 1 As can be seen, two accelerator pedal sensors 7 and 9 are provided for the accelerator pedal 1. They acquire the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 and the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 independently of each other. The first accelerator pedal sensor 7 is connected to the accelerator pedal control device 3 via a first signal path I, and is connected to the auxiliary control device 5 in the further signal path. Similarly, the second accelerator pedal sensor 9 is connected to the accelerator pedal control device 3 via a second signal path II, and is connected to the auxiliary control device 5 in the further signal path.
[0034] Signal processing of the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 is performed in the accelerator pedal control device 3, that is, using the comparison module 11, which compares the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 with the forced downshift boundary value y (for example, y=95%). The comparison module 11 generates a forced downshift signal K1. If the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 is greater than the forced downshift boundary value y, the forced downshift signal K1 is set to "downshift has been performed", that is, K1=yes. If the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 is less than the forced downshift boundary value y, the forced downshift signal K1 is set to "downshift has not been performed", that is, K1=no.
[0035] In addition, the accelerator pedal control device 3 checks potential errors (such as drift errors) between the accelerator pedal raw values F1 and F2 and discloses the errors. This check is sufficient with ASIL B (ISO 26262-4:2018, 6.4.2.5). The potential error diagnosis is completed using a diagnostic module 13, which compares the first accelerator pedal raw value F1 with the second accelerator pedal raw value F2. In the event of a significant deviation between the two accelerator pedal raw values F1 and F2, the diagnostic module 13 identifies a potential error, such as a drift error. In this case, the diagnostic module 13 sets the diagnostic information DI to the error value "niO". Alternatively, in the event that the two accelerator pedal raw values F1 and F2 are consistent, the diagnostic module 13 does not identify the potential error. In this case, the diagnostic module 13 sets the diagnostic information DI to the error-free value "iO". According to Figure 1 , the diagnostic information DI generated in the diagnostic module 13 is added to the first kick-down signal K1 at the program module 15 .
[0036] The accelerator pedal control device 3 uses the sensor information F1 to generate not only the accelerator pedal information:
[0037] -Accelerator pedal value, ASIL B(D)
[0038] - Downshift has been manipulated, ASIL B(D)
[0039] - Downshift not operated, ASIL B(D),
[0040] And the following accelerator pedal information is formed:
[0041] -Accelerator pedal operated, ASIL B(D)
[0042] -Accelerator pedal not operated, ASIL B(D).
[0043] In general, the accelerator pedal control 3 can only provide information with ASIL B(D), because the basic software / hardware of the accelerator pedal control 3 only provides measures for E / E errors with a maximum ASIL B(D) standard.
[0044] In contrast to the first signal path I, in the second signal path II the accelerator pedal raw value F2 is guided in the accelerator pedal control device 3 via a routing path 20 , along which the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 is transmitted to the auxiliary control device 5 without signal processing.
[0045] Therefore, the accelerator pedal control device 3 transmits the accelerator pedal raw value F2 of the accelerator pedal 1 to the auxiliary control device 5 together with the safety data SD described later. If other bus protocols are used, they must be "repackaged" into other bus messages if necessary. Errors can also occur during "repackaging" and "transmission". Errors are determined in the auxiliary control device 5 with the help of the safety data SD.
[0046] According to the present invention, the signal processing of the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 is not performed in the accelerator pedal control device 3, but only in the auxiliary control device 5. The signal processing is completed by using a comparison module 17, which compares the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 with the forced downshift boundary value y. If the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 is greater than the forced downshift boundary value y, the comparison module 17 sets the forced downshift signal K2 to "downshift has been performed", that is, K2 = Yes. If the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 is less than the forced downshift boundary value y, the forced downshift signal K2 is set to "downshift has not been performed", that is, K2 = No.
[0047] Faulty transmissions in the accelerator pedal control 3 can lead to signal transmission errors in the second signal path II. To detect such signal transmission errors, an end-to-end protection 19 is provided, as is already known in principle from EP 2 454 865 B1. The end-to-end protection / end-to-end protection component 19 has a receiver check module 21 in the auxiliary control unit 5, which performs protection by means of a checksum check and by means of a message counter 23.
[0048] For the checksum check, the end-to-end protection 19 has a transmitter calculation module 25 in addition to the message counter 23. Both the message counter 23 and the transmitter calculation module 25 are assigned to the accelerator pedal 1. The transmitter calculation module 25 uses the checksum calculation formula C S =f(x)Calculate the transmitter checksum C S In practice, the calculation formula is a polynomial, such as CRC8 or 16Bit. In order to make the present invention easier to understand, in the transmitter calculation module 25 and in the receiver check module 27, the calculation formula is roughly simplified to: S =F2 / 2. Figure 1 In the transmitter checksum C S Together with the message count value BZ, security data SD are formed, which are added to the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 before routing 20. Security data SD are already generated in accelerator pedal 1, since this information must be present with the highest security integrity.
[0049] After the routing route 20, the end-to-end protection 19 has a receiver calculation module 27. The receiver calculation module uses the same checksum calculation formula to calculate the receiver checksum C from the received second accelerator pedal raw value F2.E In the receiver check module 27, the transmitter checksum C S and receiver checksum C E The transmitter checks and C S Deviation from receiver checksum C E , the receiver check module 27 recognizes a transmission error.
[0050] As mentioned above, in Figure 1 In the embodiment, the message counter 23 and the transmitter calculation module 25 of the end-to-end protection 19 are assigned to the accelerator pedal 1. The accelerator pedal control device 3 only compares the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 with the safety data SD (ie, the message count value BZ and the transmitter checksum C S ) are transmitted together without signal processing. For each sampling period of the second accelerator pedal raw value F2, the message counter 23 increases the message count value BZ by an increment, for example, by one. For each sampling period, the current message count value BZ is added to the second accelerator pedal raw value F2. In the receiver check module 21, the credibility of the message count value BZ is checked. In particular, it is checked whether the current message count value BZ has increased compared with the message count value BZ of the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 received last time. In the case of unreliability, a transmission error is identified.
[0051] If the message count value BZ checked in the receiver check module 21 is implausible and / or the receiver checksum C E Checksum with transmitter C S In the case of inconsistency, the receiver check module 21 sets the check information PI2 to an error value n10. Alternatively, if the message count value BZ checked in the receiver check module 21 is credible and the two checksums C E , C S If the second kick-down signal K2 is consistent, the receiver check module 21 sets the check information PI2 to the error-free value i0. The check information PI2 generated by the receiver check module 21 is added to the second kick-down signal K2 at the program module 29.
[0052] The first signal path I is also assigned an end-to-end protection 19, which is constructed essentially the same as the end-to-end protection 19 of the second signal path II described above, but is only shown in the figure for the sake of clarity. Unlike the second signal path II, in the first signal path I, the security data SD of the end-to-end protection 19 (i.e., the transmitter checksum C S and message count value BZ) are added to the forced downshift signal K1 to meet the integrity requirements of ASIL B(D).
[0053] The core of the invention is that the path from the accelerator pedal 1 to the accelerator pedal control 3 and the path from the accelerator pedal control 3 to the auxiliary control 5 are protected by end-to-end protection 19. This means that in order to be able to process the data (e.g. for potential error checking in the diagnosis module 13), the accelerator pedal control 3 must unpack the data from the accelerator pedal raw value F1 and from the accelerator pedal raw value F2 and check the validity before using them, e.g. for potential error checking.
[0054] The validity of the data is checked in the accelerator pedal control 3 within the framework of the end-to-end protection 19, which is not shown in the figure by a program module. The validity is checked in the same way as described with the aid of the receiver check module 21 and the receiver calculation module 27 in the auxiliary control unit 5.
[0055] Additionally, the accelerator pedal raw value F2 is compared with the safety data SD (ie, the transmitter checksum C S If the message count value BZ checked in the receiver check module 21 is not credible and / or in the receiver checksum C E Checksum with transmitter C S In the case of inconsistency, the receiver check module 21 sets the check information PI1 to the error value n10. Alternatively, if the message count value BZ checked in the receiver check module 21 is credible and the two checksums C E , C S If the first kick-down signal K1 is consistent with the first kick-down signal K2, the receiver check module 21 sets the check information PI1 to the error-free value i0. The check information PI1 generated by the receiver check module 21 is added to the first kick-down signal K1.
[0056] In the further signal progression, the first kick-down signal K1 (with added diagnostic information DI and test information PI1 ) and the second kick-down signal K2 with added test information PI2 are supplied to an evaluation module 31 present in the auxiliary control device 5 .
[0057] The evaluation module 31 detects a valid kick-down maneuver by the driver if the following conditions are simultaneously met:
[0058] - the first forced downshift signal K1 is set to K1=yes;
[0059] - the diagnostic information DI added to the first kick-down signal K1 is set to the error-free value "i0";
[0060] - the check information PI1 added to the first kick-down signal K1 is set to the error-free value "i0";
[0061] - the second forced downshift signal K2 is set to K2=yes;
[0062] The check information PI2 added to the second kick-down signal K2 is set to the error-free value “i0”.
[0063] exist Figure 2 , in which the driver does not perform a forced downshift operation on the accelerator pedal 1. Accordingly, both accelerator pedal raw values F1, F2 are at 0%. Therefore, in the accelerator pedal control device 3 and in the auxiliary control device 5, the forced downshift signals K1, K2 are respectively set to K1=No and K2=No. Based on this, the evaluation module 31 recognizes that no effective forced downshift operation by the driver has been performed. Figure 3 , in which the driver has performed a forced downshift operation. Accordingly, both accelerator pedal raw values F1, F2 are at 100%. Therefore, in the accelerator pedal control device 3, the first forced downshift signal K1 is set to K1=yes, and in the auxiliary control device 5, the second forced downshift signal K2 is set to K2=yes. The diagnostic information DI determined in the accelerator pedal control device 3 is set to the error-free value iO. Similarly, the inspection information PI1, PI2 determined in the auxiliary control device 5 is set to the error-free value iO. Therefore, the evaluation module 31 of the auxiliary control device 5 recognizes that a valid driver-side forced downshift operation has been performed.
[0064] exist Figure 4 In FIG. 1 , an erroneous signal processing is shown, in which the driver does not perform a forced downshift operation, so that both accelerator pedal raw values F1 and F2 are at 0%. However, in Figure 4 In the signal processing of the accelerator pedal control device 3, an error situation 32 occurs, in which the comparison module 11 incorrectly sets the first kick-down signal K1 to K1=Yes. Therefore, the evaluation module 31 determines that the first kick-down signal K1 is set to K1=Yes, but the second kick-down signal K2 is correctly set to K2=No. Based on this, the evaluation module 31 recognizes that no valid kick-down maneuver by the driver has been carried out.
[0065] exist Figure 5, in which the driver does not perform a forced downshift maneuver, but a potential error (such as a drift error) is identified in the potential error diagnosis in the accelerator pedal control device 3. Therefore, the accelerator pedal sensor 7 generates a 100% erroneous accelerator pedal raw value F1, while the second accelerator pedal sensor 9 generates a 96% erroneous accelerator pedal raw value F2. Therefore, in the accelerator pedal control device 3, the forced downshift signal K1 is set to K1=yes. In addition, in the accelerator pedal control device 3, the diagnostic information DI is set to the error value niO because the two accelerator pedal raw values F1 and F2 are inconsistent. In addition, the first forced downshift signal K1 is assigned a check information PI1, which is set to the error-free value iO. In accordance with Figure 5 In the case of a potential error, in the auxiliary control device 5, the second forced downshift signal K2 is set to K2=Yes. The second forced downshift signal K2 is added with the check information PI2, which is set to the error-free value iO. Based on this, the evaluation module 31 determines that although the two forced downshift signals K1, K2 are set to K1=Yes and K2=Yes, the diagnostic information DI is set to the error value niO. Therefore, the evaluation module 31 recognizes that no effective forced downshift operation by the driver has been performed.
[0066] With the help of Figure 6 1 shows an erroneous signal processing, in which the driver does not perform a kick-down maneuver, but an error situation 32 occurs in the routing path 20 of the accelerator pedal control device 3, in which the second accelerator pedal raw value F2 is set from 0% to 100%. In this case, the transmitter calculation module 25 of the end-to-end protection 19 calculates a transmitter checksum C of 0%. S , and the receiver calculation module 27 of the end-to-end protection 19 calculates a 50% receiver checksum C E By comparing the two C E and C S , the checking module 21 in the auxiliary control device 5 determines that it is not credible, and thus recognizes a transmission error of the routing path 20 in the accelerator pedal control device 3. Therefore, the checking information PI2 is added to the second kick-down signal K2, which is set to the error value n10. Based on this, the evaluation module 31 recognizes that no valid kick-down maneuver by the driver has been carried out.
[0067] Reference numerals list
[0068] 1 Accelerator pedal control
[0069] 5 Auxiliary control devices
[0070] 7, 9 Accelerator pedal sensor
[0071] 11 Comparison Module
[0072] 13 Diagnostic Module
[0073] 15 Program Modules
[0074] 17 Comparison Module
[0075] 19 End-to-end protection
[0076] 20 Routing
[0077] 21 Receiver Check Module
[0078] 23 Message Counter
[0079] 25 Transmitter Computing Module
[0080] 27 Receiver Computation Module
[0081] 29 Program Modules
[0082] 31 Evaluation Modules
[0083] 32 Error Conditions
[0084] Y Kickdown limit value
[0085] I. II Signal Path
[0086] ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level
[0087] DI diagnostic information
[0088] PI1, PI2 inspection information
[0089] C E Receiver Checksum
[0090] C S Transmitter Checksum
[0091] F1 Accelerator pedal raw value
[0092] F2 Accelerator pedal original value
[0093] SD Secure Data
[0094] K1, K2 forced downshift signal
Claims
1. A drive system for a vehicle, comprising an accelerator pedal (1), the accelerator pedal having an associated accelerator pedal control device (3), the accelerator pedal control device performing a driving task when the accelerator pedal is actuated by the driver, wherein: An accelerator pedal control device (3) as a transmitter control device is connected to an auxiliary control device (5) as a receiver control device, which performs an automatic driving task independent of the driver, wherein in particular the auxiliary control device (5) deactivates the automatic driving task independent of the driver when there is an effective kickdown operation by the driver, characterized in that in order to reliably detect pedal operation, in particular an effective kickdown operation as a driver takeover request, two accelerator pedal sensors (7, 9) are assigned to the accelerator pedal (1), the two accelerator pedal sensors each independently of one another acquire a first accelerator pedal raw value (F1) and a second accelerator pedal raw value (F2), the first accelerator pedal sensor (7) being connected to the accelerator pedal control device (3) and the auxiliary control device (5) via a first signal path (I), the second accelerator pedal sensor (9) being connected to the accelerator pedal control device (3) and the auxiliary control device (5) via a second signal path (II), when the pedal is operated, an operation signal, in particular a kickdown signal (K1, K2), is generated in each signal path (I, II), and the auxiliary control device (5) checks whether the signal processing in the control devices (3, 5) is error-free.
2. The drive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: Signal processing of a first accelerator pedal original value (F1) is performed in an accelerator pedal control device (3), specifically using a comparison module (11) for comparing the first accelerator pedal original value (F1) with a boundary value, in particular a forced downshift boundary value (y); when the first accelerator pedal original value (F1) is greater than the boundary value (y), the comparison module (11) sets the first operating signal (K1) to (K1=yes).
3. The drive system according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: A potential error diagnosis is performed in an accelerator pedal control device (3), wherein a diagnostic module (13) compares a first accelerator pedal original value (F1) and a second accelerator pedal original value (F2) with each other, and when the two accelerator pedal original values (F1, F2) deviate significantly, the diagnostic module (13) identifies a potential error, so that the diagnostic module (13) sets the diagnostic information (DI) to an error value (niO), or when the two accelerator pedal original values (F1, F2) are consistent, the diagnostic module (13) does not identify a potential error, so that the diagnostic module (13) sets the diagnostic information (DI) to a non-error value (iO), and the diagnostic information (DI) generated in the diagnostic module (13) is added to a first operating signal (K1).
4. A drive system according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that In the second signal path (II), the transmission takes place in the accelerator pedal control device (3), wherein the second accelerator pedal raw value (F2) is transmitted to the auxiliary control device (5) via a routing line (20) without signal processing.
5. A drive system according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that Signal processing of the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) is performed in the auxiliary control device (5), specifically using a comparison module (17) that compares the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) with the boundary value (y); if the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) is greater than the boundary value (y), the comparison module (17) sets the second manipulation signal (K2) to (K2=yes).
6. The drive system according to claim 4 or 5, characterized in that: An end-to-end protection (19) is provided, by means of which signal transmission errors in the first signal path (I) and / or in the second signal path (II) can be detected, the signal transmission errors being caused by faulty signal processing in an accelerator pedal control device (3), and the end-to-end protection (19) has a receiver check module (21) in the auxiliary control device (5), which performs protection by means of a checksum check and by means of a message counter (23).
7. The drive system according to claim 6, characterized in that: To perform the checksum check, the transmitter calculation module (25) uses the calculation formula (C S = f(x)) Calculate the transmitter checksum (C) from the accelerator pedal raw value (F1, F2) S ), the transmitter checksum is added to the accelerator pedal raw value (F1, F2) before the routing route (20), and the receiver calculation module (27) uses the same calculation formula (C E =f(x)) Calculate the receiver checksum (C) from the received accelerator pedal raw values (F1, F2) E ), the receiver checking module (21) checks the transmitter and (C S ) and the receiver checksum (C E ) is compared with the transmitter checksum (C S ) deviates from the receiver checksum (C E ), the receiver check module (21) detects a transmission error, in particular in the first signal path (I), the transmitter calculation module (25) and the message counter (23) are assigned to the accelerator pedal control device (3), so that the transmitter checksum (C S ) and a message count value (BZ) of a message counter (23) are added to a first accelerator pedal raw value (F1) in an accelerator pedal control device (3), and in particular in a second signal path (II), the transmitter calculation module (25) and the message counter (23) are assigned to the accelerator pedal (1), so that the transmitter checksum (C S ) and the message count value (BZ) of the message counter (23) have already been added to the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) in the accelerator pedal (1).
8. The drive system according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that: The message counter (23) increases the message count value (BZ) by one increment for each sampling cycle of the second accelerator pedal original value (F2), and adds the current message count value (BZ) to the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) for each sampling cycle. The receiver check module (21) checks the credibility of the message count value (BZ), in particular checking whether the current message count value is increased relative to the message count value of the second accelerator pedal original value (F2) received last time, and in the case of unreliability, the check module (21) identifies a transmission error.
9. The drive system according to claim 8, characterized in that: If the message counter (BZ) checked in the receiver check module (21) is not credible and / or the receiver checksum (C E ) and the transmitter checksum (C S ) are inconsistent, the receiver check module (21) sets the check information (PI1, PI2) to an error value (niO), or if the message count value (BZ) checked in the receiver check module (21) is credible and the two checksums (C S , C E ), the receiver check module (21) sets the check information (PI1, PI2) to an error-free value (iO), and / or the check information (PI1, PI2) generated by the receiver check module (21) is assigned to the corresponding first control signal (K1) or the second control signal (K2).
10. The drive system according to any one of claims 3 to 9, characterized in that: The two signal paths (I, II) lead to an evaluation module (31) of the auxiliary control device (5) if the following conditions are simultaneously met in the evaluation unit (31): - the first manipulation signal (K1) is set to (K1=yes); - the diagnostic information (DI) added to said first operating signal (K1a) is set to a non-error value (iO); - the check information (PI1) added to the first manipulation signal (K1) is set to an error-free value (iO); - the second operating signal (K2) is set (K2=yes); - the check information (PI2) added to the second manipulation signal (K2) is set to an error-free value (i0); The evaluation module (31) detects a pedal actuation by the driver.
