Wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method and device based on Polar code

Abstract

The invention relates to a wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method and device based on a Polar code, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining the interaction data and channel estimation information of a wireless keyboard, and coding the input and output data through the Polar code with a limited block length; confusing the encoded interaction data through a pseudo-random code; based on the channel estimation information, performing adaptive prediction on a channel of the wireless keyboard, and determining an optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmitting power according to a prediction result; modulating the obfuscated interaction data through a Turbo-Polar code, and carrying out the modulation of the obfuscated interaction data; and de-confusing the decoded data through a maximum likelihood estimation method and a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain interaction data of the wireless keyboard. According to the method, electromagnetic leakage of the wireless keyboard can be effectively reduced through a simplified limited block length Polar code encryption and lightweight pseudo-random code confusion mechanism and a Turbo-Polar code mechanism.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communications, and in particular relates to a method and device for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar codes. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread application of wireless communication technology, low-power, short-range devices such as wireless keyboards and wireless mice are increasingly relying on wireless channels for data transmission. This open wireless communication has the advantage of being easy to deploy, but it also brings serious security risks. Electromagnetic leakage is one of the main threats faced by these devices. Attackers can infer the data entered by the keyboard by capturing the electromagnetic waves emitted by the device, and even obtain information remotely without physical contact. This passive attack can not only steal information, but also threaten the privacy and security of users. Summary of the invention

[0003] In order to reduce the electromagnetic leakage problem of a wireless keyboard, a first aspect of the present invention provides a wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method based on Polar code, comprising:

[0004] Acquire interactive data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, encode the input and output data by using a finite block length Polar code; and confuse the encoded interactive data by using a pseudo-random code;

[0005] Based on the channel estimation information, adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard, and determine the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result;

[0006] Based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power, the obfuscated interactive data is modulated by Turbo-Polar code;

[0007] The modulated interactive data is received and demodulated, and the demodulated data is decoded by a maximum likelihood estimation method; the decoded data is deobfuscated by a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

[0008] In some embodiments of the present invention, obfuscating the encoded interaction data by using a pseudo-random code includes: generating a pseudo-random code by using a pseudo-random code generator or a key press time; and obfuscating the interaction data by an XOR operation based on the pseudo-random code.

[0009] Furthermore, the pseudo-random code is generated by a pseudo-random code generator or key press time, including: each time a key of the wireless keyboard triggers a time, the time is used as a synchronization mark, and the same pseudo-random code is generated at the local end and the opposite end.

[0010] In some embodiments of the present invention, determining the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power based on the prediction results includes: determining the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power based on Shannon's theorem and a preset signal-to-noise ratio value: if the signal-to-noise ratio is lower than a threshold, QPSK modulation is used for modulation.

[0011] In some embodiments of the present invention, modulating the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power includes: encoding the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the code rate; and modulating the encoded interactive data according to the modulation mode and transmission power.

[0012] In the above embodiment, encoding the input and output data by using a Polar code with a finite block length includes: determining a generator matrix of the Polar code; pre-transforming the generator matrix, and encoding the input and output data based on the pre-transformed generator matrix.

[0013] A second aspect of the present invention provides a wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage device based on Polar code, comprising:

[0014] An acquisition module is used to acquire the interaction data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, encode the input and output data by a Polar code of a finite block length, and confuse the encoded interaction data by a pseudo-random code;

[0015] A determination module, configured to adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard based on the channel estimation information, and determine the best modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result;

[0016] A modulation module, used for modulating the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power;

[0017] The decoding module is used to receive and demodulate the modulated interactive data, decode the demodulated data through the maximum likelihood estimation method; and de-obfuscate the decoded data through a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

[0018] Furthermore, the acquisition module includes: a generation unit, which is used to generate a pseudo-random code through a pseudo-random code generator or a key press time; and a confusion unit, which is used to confuse the interaction data through an XOR operation based on the pseudo-random code.

[0019] The third aspect of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising: one or more processors; a storage device for storing one or more programs, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the Polar code-based wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method provided in the first aspect of the present invention.

[0020] A fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein when the computer program is executed by a processor, the Polar code-based wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method provided in the first aspect of the present invention is implemented.

[0021] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0022] By strengthening the encryption algorithm and security protocol of the wireless keyboard through Polar Code, its security can be effectively improved. The use of advanced encryption technology and real-time security monitoring mechanism can timely detect and prevent potential security threats, ensuring the security and integrity of user data during transmission. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] Figure 1 It is a basic flow chart of the method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code in some embodiments of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the principle of the method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code in some embodiments of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of the anti-electromagnetic leakage device of the wireless keyboard for Polar code in some embodiments of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 It is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in some embodiments of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0027] The principles and features of the present invention are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The examples given are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0028] refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2 In a first aspect of the present invention, a method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code is provided, comprising:

[0029] S100. Obtaining the interaction data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, encoding the input and output data by a finite block length Polar code; obfuscating the encoded interaction data by a pseudo-random code;

[0030] S200. Based on the channel estimation information, adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard, and determine the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction results;

[0031] S300. Based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmit power, the obfuscated interactive data is modulated by Turbo-Polar code;

[0032] S400. Receive and demodulate the modulated interactive data, and decode the demodulated data using a maximum likelihood estimation method; de-obfuscate the decoded data using a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

[0033] It should be noted that the receiving end, access device or attack device of the above wireless keyboard includes but is not limited to: Personal computer (PC): including desktop and laptop computers, which are usually connected to wireless keyboards via USB interface or Bluetooth technology; Laptop computers: many laptop computers also support pairing with wireless keyboards via Bluetooth. Tablet computers: devices running Windows, iOS or Android operating systems, connected to wireless keyboards via Bluetooth. Smart phones: now pair with wireless keyboards via Bluetooth to facilitate text input. Smart TVs and TV boxes: some smart TVs and TV boxes support Bluetooth function and can connect wireless keyboards as remote controls. Game consoles: such as PlayStation, Xbox, etc., they may support connection with wireless keyboards via wireless receivers or Bluetooth. Raspberry Pi: This microcomputer can also connect to wireless keyboards via Bluetooth or USB interface. Smart home devices: some smart home devices, such as smart central control systems, may support wireless keyboards as input devices. Industrial computers or corresponding host computers: such as some industrial control systems or professional audio / video equipment, they may be designed with specific wireless interfaces to receive keyboard input.

[0034] In step S100 of some embodiments of the present invention, encoding the input and output data by using a finite block length Polar code includes:

[0035] S101. Determine a generator matrix of a Polar code;

[0036] Specifically, in order to reduce complexity, a limited block length Polar code is used for encryption. By reducing the block length, the Polar code can adapt to the characteristics of small data volume and short distance transmission of wireless keyboards.

[0037] Given a bit sequence u of length N, 1 ,u 2 ,…,u N ), the generator matrix is ​​G N:

[0038]

[0039] in, is the basic polarization matrix of Polar code, represents the Kronecker product, log 2 N represents the recursive depth of the generator matrix. Block length refers to the length of the encoded data block. In the wireless keyboard scenario, the block length is generally a smaller value, such as 64 or 128 bits, to reduce complexity and meet the transmission requirements of the wireless keyboard.

[0040] It can be understood that the weight spectrum optimization of the pre-transformed Polar code mainly adjusts the weight spectrum of the Polar code by introducing a preprocessing step to modify the generator matrix. The optimization goal is to reduce the number of low-weight codewords, thereby increasing the minimum Hamming distance, improving the error correction capability, and reducing the bit error rate.

[0041] Therefore, S102. pre-transform the generator matrix, and encode the input and output data based on the pre-transformed generator matrix.

[0042] Specifically, pre-transformation includes:

[0043] 1. Reordering-based transformation: Rearrange the rows or columns in the generator matrix to ensure that the reliable bits are concentrated in the positions with larger weights, thereby improving the error correction performance.

[0044] 2. Symmetric transformation: Symmetric transformation or interleaving is performed on the input bit sequence before the encoding process to change the distribution of codewords.

[0045] 3. Dynamic weight adjustment: According to the channel conditions, the weights of some columns of the generator matrix are dynamically adjusted so that the generated codewords have a larger Hamming distance.

[0046] Suppose the generator matrix after pre-transformation is The encoding process is as follows:

[0047]

[0048] in, is the transformed generator matrix. Through the optimized matrix structure, the number of low-weight codewords can be effectively reduced and the minimum Hamming distance d can be improved. min , and reduce the number of low-weight codewords with weights 1 or 2.

[0049] Furthermore, the obfuscating the encoded interactive data by using a pseudo-random code includes:

[0050] S103. Generate a pseudo-random code by a pseudo-random code generator or key time;

[0051] Specifically, in order to avoid pseudo-random code synchronization problems caused by wireless keyboards without precise clock synchronization, a pseudo-random code synchronization mechanism driven by key events is adopted. Each key press triggers an event, which will serve as a synchronization mark to generate the same pseudo-random code at both the sending and receiving ends, thereby avoiding decoding failures caused by clock synchronization failures.

[0052] S104. Based on the pseudo-random code, the interactive data is obfuscated through an XOR operation.

[0053] Specifically, the data block c encoded by the Polar code is obfuscated with a pseudo-random code. Assuming that the pseudo-random code sequence is r, the obfuscated data block c' is:

[0054]

[0055] in Represents a bitwise exclusive-or operation.

[0056] It should be noted that the pseudo-random code is generated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), and the code length is the same as the data block length. The generated pseudo-random code should have sufficient randomness and periodicity to ensure data security.

[0057] In some embodiments S200 of the present invention, it includes:

[0058] S201. Based on the channel estimation information, adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard;

[0059] Specifically, before modulation, the system estimates the current wireless channel status and obtains channel state information (CSI). Based on the CSI, the system dynamically adjusts the data transmission parameters, such as the modulation mode, the coding rate of the Turbo-Polar code, and the transmission power. Assuming that the SNR of the channel is γ and the channel bandwidth is B, the code rate R can be adjusted according to the Shannon theorem:

[0060] R≤B.log2(1+γ)

[0061] When the channel quality is poor, the transmission code rate is reduced to improve the error correction capability; when the channel quality is good, the code rate can be increased to increase the transmission efficiency.

[0062] S202. Determine the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction results.

[0063] In some embodiments S300 of the present invention, the modulating the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmit power includes:

[0064] S301. Based on the code rate, the obfuscated interactive data is encoded by Turbo-Polar code;

[0065] Specifically, after the transmission parameters are determined, Turbo-Polar code is used for encoding. Turbo-Polar code improves the error correction capability in a low SNR environment through interleaving and soft decoding technology.

[0066] The encoding process can be expressed as:

[0067] cT=f(u,interleaver)

[0068] Among them, c T is the encoded data, u is the input data, and interleaver is an interleaver, which is used to rearrange the input data to increase the randomness of the codeword and improve the anti-interference ability.

[0069] S302. Modulate the encoded interactive data according to the modulation mode and the transmission power.

[0070] Specifically, the coded data is modulated by a modulator, usually using QPSK (quadrature phase shift keying) or QAM (quadrature amplitude modulation) modulation. The modulated signal is sent to the receiving end through a wireless transmission module.

[0071] In some embodiments S400 of the present invention, it includes:

[0072] S401. Receive and demodulate the modulated interactive data, and decode the demodulated data by a maximum likelihood estimation method;

[0073] Specifically, the receiving end first demodulates the received modulated signal and recovers the encoded binary data. Assuming the received signal is y, the data sequence is restored through the demodulator:

[0074]

[0075] Next, the demodulated data is soft-decoded using the Turbo-Polar code. The original data is restored using the maximum likelihood (ML) or SCL decoding algorithm combined with the interleaver information.

[0076]

[0077] S402. De-obfuscate the decoded data using a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain interaction data of the wireless keyboard.

[0078] Specifically, on the decoded data, the same pseudo-random sequence r is first generated by a pseudo-random code generator, and the received data is To deobfuscate:

[0079]

[0080] Next, combined with the dynamic key update mechanism, the encryption key dynamically generated during each transmission is verified at the receiving and sending ends to ensure that the decoded data is secure and correct.

[0081] It can be understood that the fusion scheme in this embodiment organically combines the anti-leakage capability of finite block length Polar code, the signal confusion of pseudo-random code, the error correction performance of Turbo-Polar code, and the security guarantee of dynamic key update. Through targeted optimization and fusion in the three stages of encoding, modulation and transmission, and decoding, the challenges of wireless keyboards in electromagnetic leakage and data security can be effectively solved, ensuring the security and efficiency of data transmission in complex channel environments.

[0082] In particular, to improve the security of the pseudo-random sequence, a long-term master key is generated during system initialization, which is used to generate subkeys for each session. The master key does not need to be updated frequently, reducing the computation and communication overhead of the wireless keyboard during the Kmaster key synchronization process.

[0083] Specifically, let the master key be Kmaster, which is used to generate the dynamic subkey in the session. The generation process of the dynamic subkey is:

[0084] Ksession=H(Kmaster,nounce),

[0085] Among them, H is a cryptographic hash function, and nonce is a unique random number or counter used to prevent key reuse attacks. The master key Kmaster is generated when the device is initialized and is usually 128 bits or 256 bits long.

[0086] After each key event or a set time interval, a new subkey is generated from the master key. In this way, even if an attacker obtains part of the encrypted information, it is still difficult to decrypt other data due to the key update mechanism. The subkey Ksession is generated from the master key and is used to encrypt the current communication data. After each update, the subkey should be different to ensure security.

[0087] Example 2

[0088] refer to Figure 3 In a second aspect of the present invention, a wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage device 1 based on Polar code is provided, comprising:

[0089] The acquisition module 11 is used to acquire the interaction data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, encode the input and output data by using the Polar code of the finite block length, and confuse the encoded interaction data by using the pseudo-random code;

[0090] A determination module 12, configured to adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard based on the channel estimation information, and determine the best modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result;

[0091] A modulation module 13, configured to modulate the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power;

[0092] The decoding module 14 is used to receive and demodulate the modulated interactive data, decode the demodulated data by using the maximum likelihood estimation method, and de-obfuscate the decoded data by using a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

[0093] Furthermore, the acquisition module 11 includes:

[0094] A generating unit, used for generating a pseudo-random code through a pseudo-random code generator or a key press time;

[0095] The obfuscation unit is used to obfuscate the interaction data through an XOR operation based on a pseudo-random code.

[0096] Example 3

[0097] refer to Figure 4 According to the third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising: one or more processors; a storage device for storing one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the Polar code-based wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage method of the first aspect of the present invention.

[0098] The electronic device 500 may include a processing device (e.g., a central processing unit, a graphics processing unit, etc.) 501, which can perform various appropriate actions and processes according to a program stored in a read-only memory (ROM) 502 or a program loaded from a storage device 508 into a random access memory (RAM) 503. In the RAM 503, various programs and data required for the operation of the electronic device 500 are also stored. The processing device 501, the ROM 502, and the RAM 503 are connected to each other via a bus 504. An input / output (I / O) interface 505 is also connected to the bus 504.

[0099] Typically, the following devices may be connected to the I / O interface 505: an input device 506 including, for example, a touch screen, a touch pad, a keyboard, a mouse, a camera, a microphone, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, etc.; an output device 507 including, for example, a liquid crystal display (LCD), a speaker, a vibrator, etc.; a storage device 508 including, for example, a hard disk, etc.; and a communication device 509. The communication device 509 may allow the electronic device 500 to communicate with other devices wirelessly or by wire to exchange data. Although Figure 4 The electronic device 500 is shown with various devices, but it should be understood that it is not required to implement or possess all the devices shown. More or fewer devices may be implemented or possessed instead. Figure 4 Each block shown in the figure may represent one device, or may represent multiple devices as required.

[0100] In particular, according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, the process described above with reference to the flowchart can be implemented as a computer software program. For example, an embodiment of the present disclosure includes a computer program product, which includes a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, and the computer program includes a program code for executing the method shown in the flowchart. In such an embodiment, the computer program can be downloaded and installed from the network through a communication device 509, or installed from a storage device 508, or installed from a ROM 502. When the computer program is executed by the processing device 501, the above functions defined in the method of the embodiment of the present disclosure are executed. It should be noted that the computer-readable medium described in the embodiment of the present disclosure can be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium or any combination of the above two. The computer-readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device or device, or any combination of the above. More specific examples of computer-readable storage media may include, but are not limited to, an electrical connection with one or more conductors, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. In an embodiment of the present disclosure, a computer-readable storage medium may be any tangible medium containing or storing a program that can be used by or in combination with an instruction execution system, an apparatus, or a device. In an embodiment of the present disclosure, a computer-readable signal medium may include a data signal propagated in a baseband or as part of a carrier wave, in which a computer-readable program code is carried. Such propagated data signals may take a variety of forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination of the above. A computer-readable signal medium may also be any computer-readable medium other than a computer-readable storage medium, which may send, propagate, or transmit a program for use by or in combination with an instruction execution system, an apparatus, or a device. The program code embodied on the computer readable medium may be transmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited to: wire, optical cable, RF (radio frequency), etc., or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

[0101] The computer-readable medium may be included in the electronic device, or may exist independently without being installed in the electronic device. The computer-readable medium carries one or more computer programs. When the one or more programs are executed by the electronic device, the electronic device:

[0102] Computer program code for performing the operations of embodiments of the present disclosure may be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages, such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, Python, and conventional procedural programming languages, such as "C" or similar programming languages. The program code may be executed entirely on a user's computer, partially on a user's computer, as a separate software package, partially on a user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In cases involving a remote computer, the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer via any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0103] The flow chart and block diagram in the accompanying drawings illustrate the possible architecture, function and operation of the system, method and computer program product according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. In this regard, each box in the flow chart or block diagram can represent a module, a program segment or a part of a code, and the module, the program segment or a part of the code contains one or more executable instructions for realizing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the box can also occur in a different order from the order marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two boxes represented in succession can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should be noted that each box in the block diagram and / or flow chart, and the combination of the boxes in the block diagram and / or flow chart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or operation, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.

[0104] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code, characterized in that: include: Acquire interactive data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, and encode the input and output data by using a finite block length Polar code; Obfuscate the encoded interaction data through pseudo-random codes; Based on the channel estimation information, adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard, and determine the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result; Based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power, the obfuscated interactive data is modulated by Turbo-Polar code; Receive and demodulate the modulated interactive data, and decode the demodulated data by using the maximum likelihood estimation method; The decoded data is deobfuscated through a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

2. The method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method of obfuscating the encoded interactive data by using a pseudo-random code includes: Generate a pseudo-random code through a pseudo-random code generator or key press time; Based on pseudo-random code, the interaction data is obfuscated through XOR operation.

3. The method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code according to claim 2, characterized in that: The generating of the pseudo-random code by the pseudo-random code generator or the key pressing time comprises: Each time a key of the wireless keyboard triggers a time, the time is used as a synchronization mark, and the same pseudo-random code is generated at the local end and the opposite end.

4. The method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code according to claim 1, characterized in that: Determining the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result includes: According to Shannon's theorem and the preset value of signal-to-noise ratio, the optimal modulation mode, code rate and transmission power are determined: If the signal-to-noise ratio is lower than the threshold, QPSK modulation is used for modulation.

5. The method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code according to claim 1, characterized in that: The modulating the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power includes: Based on the code rate, encoding the obfuscated interaction data by Turbo-Polar code; The encoded interactive data is modulated according to the modulation mode and the transmission power.

6. The method for preventing electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code according to claim 1, characterized in that: The encoding of the input and output data by using a Polar code of a finite block length includes: Determine the generator matrix of the Polar code; The generator matrix is ​​pre-transformed, and the input and output data are encoded based on the pre-transformed generator matrix.

7. A wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage device based on Polar code, characterized in that: include: An acquisition module, used for acquiring interaction data and channel estimation information of the wireless keyboard, and encoding the input and output data by a finite block length Polar code; Obfuscate the encoded interaction data through pseudo-random codes; A determination module, configured to adaptively predict the channel of the wireless keyboard based on the channel estimation information, and determine the best modulation mode, code rate and transmission power according to the prediction result; A modulation module, used for modulating the obfuscated interactive data by Turbo-Polar code based on the modulation mode, code rate and transmission power; A decoding module, used for receiving and demodulating the modulated interactive data, and decoding the demodulated data by using a maximum likelihood estimation method; The decoded data is deobfuscated through a preset pseudo-random sequence to obtain the interactive data of the wireless keyboard.

8. The wireless keyboard anti-electromagnetic leakage device based on Polar code according to claim 7, characterized in that: The acquisition module comprises: A generating unit, used for generating a pseudo-random code through a pseudo-random code generator or a key press time; The obfuscation unit is used to obfuscate the interaction data through an XOR operation based on a pseudo-random code.

9. An electronic device, comprising: one or more processors; A storage device for storing one or more programs, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, enables the one or more processors to implement the anti-electromagnetic leakage method for a wireless keyboard based on Polar code as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the method for anti-electromagnetic leakage of a wireless keyboard based on Polar code as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

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