Data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model

Abstract

The present invention discloses a data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model, which relates to the field of behavior analysis technology, including a game subject construction unit, which sets up three participants, namely, data provider, data user and regulator, as three game subjects in the blockchain network, and a transaction agreement unit, which constrains the behavior of data provider and data user by formulating smart contracts. After the transaction is completed, the smart contract automatically calculates the reputation through feedback from both parties. The present invention constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between data user, data provider and regulator on the blockchain platform, analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy selection of each participant, explores the influence of each assumption parameter on the strategy selection of the three parties, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the three-party game system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of behavior analysis, and in particular to a data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game models. Background Art

[0002] Data trading is a key link in the market-based allocation of data elements. The participants in data trading can effectively utilize data and realize its value through data trading, thereby improving the operational efficiency of the entire supply chain. However, due to the difficulty in guaranteeing data ownership and protecting privacy, some companies may regard data trading as a threat to their competitive advantage, resulting in a reluctance to share data.

[0003] With the continuous development of blockchain technology, transactions based on blockchain technology are also increasing. At present, transactions based on blockchain technology have involved multiple regions and various participants. However, due to information asymmetry, unreliable data and other issues, unnecessary delays and losses are often caused. Therefore, how to promote trust between transaction participants is a problem that must be solved in the transaction process. In addition, blockchain technology can ensure the authenticity of transaction data that has been uploaded to the blockchain platform to a large extent, but it cannot solve the authenticity of data that has not been uploaded to the blockchain platform. Therefore, it is necessary to explore this issue to serve the development of blockchain technology and the development of the global supply chain. The data transaction behavior on the blockchain platform is actually the data transaction participants taking competitive or confrontational behaviors in order to achieve their respective goals. Evolutionary games are used to study competitive and cooperative behaviors and strategy choices. Summary of the invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model to solve the problems raised in the above background technology.

[0005] To achieve the above purpose, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model, comprising:

[0006] A game subject construction unit, wherein the game subject construction unit establishes three participants, namely, a data provider, a data user and a regulator, as three game subjects in the blockchain network;

[0007] A transaction agreement unit, which constrains the behavior of data providers and data users by formulating smart contracts. After the transaction is completed, the smart contract automatically calculates the reputation based on the feedback from both parties.

[0008] An interest transaction unit, wherein the interest transaction unit selects a transaction type for a gaming subject from the perspective of interest maximization and reputation;

[0009] A game model construction unit, which constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among data providers, data users and regulators based on the needs of the data providers, data users and regulators on the blockchain, so as to analyze the strategy stability of each game subject and the influence of each factor on the strategy selection;

[0010] A matrix judgment unit, wherein the matrix judgment unit determines the equilibrium point of the pure strategy according to the selection strategies of the three participants, and judges whether the equilibrium point obtained from the game model construction unit is an evolutionary stable strategy by constructing a Jacobian matrix.

[0011] Preferably, in the game subject construction unit, the data provider obtains benefits by joining the blockchain and actively participating in data transactions. The transaction types of the data provider include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. The honest transactions of the data provider refer to the data provider providing the required real data to stakeholders on the blockchain. The opportunistic transactions of the data provider refer to the data provider not providing real data to stakeholders on the blockchain, and providing false data to data users to obtain benefits.

[0012] The data user obtains real data through the blockchain to bring benefits to himself. The transaction types of the data user include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. The honest transaction of the data user refers to the use of data in accordance with the agreement with the data provider and the behavior of not providing the data to a third party. The opportunistic transaction of the data user refers to the use of data not in accordance with the agreement and the behavior of leaking data to a third party. When receiving opportunistic data from the data user, the user chooses whether to continue to use the blockchain according to the cost of rights protection. If the cost of rights protection is high, the user chooses not to protect the rights and exits the blockchain. If the benefits of rights protection are higher than the cost of rights protection, the user chooses to protect the rights and continues to use the blockchain.

[0013] The regulator improves its own credibility and social benefits by selecting blockchain models, adjusting blockchain policies, and supervising the operating systems of all participants. The regulators include strict supervision and lax supervision. Strict supervision means that the regulators on the blockchain strictly supervise the behavior of data providers and data users in accordance with the agreement, review whether the transaction behavior is conducted in accordance with the agreed smart contract, and reward data providers who trade data in good faith and punish dishonest trading parties. Lax supervision means that the regulators do not strictly review the identity confirmation and authentication of data providers and data users, and do not strictly supervise whether the two parties to the transaction on the blockchain conduct data transactions in accordance with the agreed smart contract.

[0014] Preferably, the transaction agreement unit agrees on a smart contract when conducting data transactions on the blockchain. The content of the smart contract is: the two parties to the data transaction pay a deposit to the blockchain platform before the transaction, the data provider and the data user bear the penalty for breach of contract, and the party that suffers losses due to honest transactions is compensated, so as to constrain the transaction behavior of the data provider and the data user.

[0015] Preferably, in the interest transaction unit, for data providers and data users, if the benefits of opportunistic transactions are greater than the benefits of honest transactions and only short-term benefits are chosen, opportunistic transactions are given priority, otherwise honest transactions are given priority. For regulators, if the benefits of lax supervision are greater than the benefits of strict supervision and short-term benefits are chosen, the regulators give priority to lax supervision and otherwise strict supervision.

[0016] Preferably, in the game model construction unit (4), the three-party evolutionary game model construction process is: constructing the replication dynamic equations of the three participants through parameter assumptions, and then finding the evolutionary stable point of the evolutionary game based on the replication dynamic equations, thereby deriving the evolutionary stable strategy under the stable state.

[0017] Preferably, the parameters are assumed to be as follows:

[0018] set up represents the potential benefits of reputation, represents the cost of the operation that the regulator chooses to strictly regulate. It represents the cost for data users to verify the authenticity of data. Represents the cost for the data provider to prove the authenticity of the data. It represents the cost spent by the data provider to collect and organize data. Indicates the cost spent by the data user to purchase data. represents the cost of regulators identifying opportunistic transactions, It refers to the loss suffered by the data provider when the data user trades in good faith, It refers to the loss suffered by the data user due to the honest transaction and the opportunistic transaction of the data provider. It indicates the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract that the data provider will bear if its opportunistic trading behavior is discovered, and the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract that the data user will bear if its opportunistic trading behavior is discovered. It means compensation for losses incurred due to honest transactions. It represents the profit gained by the data provider from honest transactions. represents the profit obtained by the data provider from opportunistic transactions, It represents the income gained by the data user through honest transactions. It represents the benefits gained by the data user from opportunistic use of data. It represents the benefits when the regulator strictly supervises. Represents the benefits when the regulator does not supervise strictly.

[0019] Preferably, in the game model construction unit, the data provider is The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing strict regulation is The probability of choosing not to strictly regulate, , is the probability value;

[0020] Assume that the expected profit of the data provider in honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the data provider behavior strategy is: ;

[0021] Assume that the expected benefit of the data user's honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the data user behavior strategy is:

[0022] ;

[0023] Assume that the expected benefit of the regulator choosing strict regulation is The expected return of choosing less strict regulation is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the regulator's behavior strategy is:

[0024] .

[0025] Preferably, the matrix judgment unit (5) determines the equilibrium points of the eight pure strategies according to the selection strategies of the three participants, which can be expressed as , Indicates A pure strategy equilibrium point, Represents or operation, Indicates the serial number, , Indicates the selection strategy of the data provider, Indicates the selection strategy of the data user, It represents the selection strategy of the regulator. The equilibrium points of the eight pure strategies are brought into the constructed Jacobian matrix to obtain the three eigenvalues ​​of each equilibrium point, and the judgment is made according to the Lyapunov first law. The judgment rule is: if the three eigenvalues ​​are all negative, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is met; if at least one eigenvalue is positive, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is not met.

[0026] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0027] 1. This invention selects data transaction behavior on the blockchain platform as the research object, considers the phenomenon of opportunism and honest behavior in the data transaction process, and the phenomenon of strict supervision and lax supervision, and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between data users, data providers and regulators on the blockchain platform, analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategy selection of each participant, explores the influence of each assumption parameter on the strategy selection of the three parties, further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the three-party game system, and binds the influence of reputation with the interests of the participants, which helps the participants in data transactions to adopt honest behavior;

[0028] 2. The present invention constructs an evolutionary game model of data users, data providers and regulators, analyzes the evolutionary stable strategies of various behavioral entities in the data transaction process, and the stable conditions for achieving an ideal equilibrium state, and explores the interaction mechanism among data users, data providers and regulators, as well as the main influencing factors affecting the honest behavior and opportunistic behavior of data providers and data users, so as to determine the evolutionary stable strategy under the stable state. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the overall system flow provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0030] Figure 2 A schematic flow chart of a process for constructing a three-party evolutionary game model provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0031] In the figure: 1. Game subject construction unit; 2. Transaction agreement unit; 3. Interest transaction unit; 4. Game model construction unit; 5. Matrix judgment unit. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0032] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0033] See also Figure 1 to Figure 2 The present invention provides a technical solution: a data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model, comprising:

[0034] Game subject construction unit 1, game subject construction unit 1 sets up three participants, data provider, data user and regulator, as three game subjects in the blockchain network;

[0035] Transaction agreement unit 2: Transaction agreement unit 2 constrains the behavior of data providers and data users by formulating smart contracts. After the transaction is completed, the smart contract automatically calculates the reputation based on the feedback from both parties.

[0036] Interest transaction unit 3, interest transaction unit 3 selects the transaction type for the game subject from the perspective of interest maximization and reputation;

[0037] Game model construction unit 4: Game model construction unit 4 constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among data providers, data users and regulators based on the needs of data providers, data users and regulators on the blockchain, so as to analyze the strategy stability of each game subject and the influence of various factors on strategy selection;

[0038] The matrix judgment unit 5 determines the equilibrium point of the pure strategy according to the selection strategies of the three participants, and judges whether the equilibrium point obtained from the game model construction unit 4 is an evolutionary stable strategy by constructing a Jacobian matrix.

[0039] In the game subject construction unit 1, data providers gain benefits by joining the blockchain and actively participating in data transactions. The transaction types of data providers include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. Honest transactions of data providers refer to data providers providing stakeholders with the required real data on the blockchain. Opportunistic transactions of data providers refer to data providers not providing stakeholders with real data on the blockchain, and providing false data to data users to gain benefits.

[0040] Data users obtain real data through blockchain to benefit themselves. The transaction types of data users include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. Honest transactions of data users refer to the use of data in accordance with the agreement with the data provider and the behavior of not providing data to third parties. Opportunistic transactions of data users refer to the use of data not in accordance with the agreement and the behavior of leaking data to third parties. When receiving opportunistic data from data users, they choose whether to continue to use the blockchain based on the cost of rights protection. If the cost of rights protection is high, they choose not to protect their rights and the data user exits the blockchain. If the benefits of rights protection are higher than the cost of rights protection, they choose to protect their rights and continue to use the blockchain.

[0041] Regulators improve their own credibility and social benefits by selecting blockchain models, adjusting blockchain policies, and supervising the operating systems of all participants. Regulators include strict supervision and lax supervision. Strict supervision means that regulators on the blockchain strictly supervise the behavior of data providers and data users in accordance with the agreement, review whether the transaction behavior is conducted in accordance with the agreed smart contract, and reward data providers who trade data in good faith and punish dishonest trading parties. Lax supervision means that regulators do not strictly review the identity confirmation and authentication of data providers and data users, and do not strictly supervise whether the two parties in the blockchain transaction conduct data transactions in accordance with the agreed smart contract.

[0042] Transaction agreement unit 2 agrees on a smart contract when conducting data transactions on the blockchain. The content of the smart contract is: before the transaction, both parties to the data transaction pay a deposit to the blockchain platform, the data provider and the data user bear the penalty for breach of contract, and at the same time, the party that suffers losses due to honest transactions will be compensated, so as to constrain the transaction behavior of the data provider and the data user.

[0043] In the interest transaction unit 3, for data providers and data users, if the benefits of opportunistic transactions are greater than the benefits of honest transactions and only short-term benefits are chosen, opportunistic transactions are preferred, otherwise honest transactions are preferred. For regulators, if the benefits of lax supervision are greater than the benefits of strict supervision and short-term benefits are chosen, regulators give priority to lax supervision, otherwise strict supervision is preferred;

[0044] In the game model construction unit 4, the three-party evolutionary game model construction process is as follows: construct the replication dynamic equations of the three participants through parameter assumptions, and then find the evolutionary stable point of the evolutionary game based on the replication dynamic equation, so as to obtain the evolutionary stable strategy under the stable state. The evolutionary stable strategy is the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game, which describes the final evolved system state and is the result of evolution, that is, adopting the selection strategy adopted by the majority of members;

[0045] The parameter assumptions are as follows: represents the potential benefits of reputation, represents the cost of the operation that the regulator chooses to strictly regulate. It represents the cost for data users to verify the authenticity of data. Represents the cost for the data provider to prove the authenticity of the data. It represents the cost spent by the data provider to collect and organize data. Indicates the cost spent by the data user to purchase data. represents the cost of regulators identifying opportunistic transactions, It refers to the loss suffered by the data provider when the data user trades in good faith, It refers to the loss suffered by the data user due to the honest transaction and the opportunistic transaction of the data provider. It indicates the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract that the data provider will bear if its opportunistic trading behavior is discovered, and the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract that the data user will bear if its opportunistic trading behavior is discovered. It means compensation for losses incurred due to honest transactions. It represents the profit gained by the data provider from honest transactions. represents the profit obtained by the data provider from opportunistic transactions, It represents the income gained by the data user through honest transactions. It represents the benefits gained by the data user from opportunistic use of data. It represents the benefits when the regulator strictly supervises. It represents the benefits when the regulator does not supervise strictly;

[0046] In the game model building unit 4, the data provider is assumed to be The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing strict regulation is The probability of choosing not to strictly regulate, , is the probability value;

[0047] Assume that the expected profit of the data provider in honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , , , , , , , , , , All represent parameters;

[0048] ;

[0049] ;

[0050] ;

[0051] ;

[0052] ;

[0053] ;

[0054] ;

[0055] ;

[0056] ;

[0057] ;

[0058] ;

[0059] ;

[0060] Then the replication dynamic equation of the data provider's behavior strategy is:

[0061] ;

[0062] Let equation , find the equilibrium point of the equation evolution process;

[0063] The probability that the data user chooses to trade in good faith When , which represents the probability that the data provider chooses to trade in good faith is the equilibrium point;

[0064] The probability that the data user chooses to trade in good faith When , the probability that the data provider chooses honest transaction and For the equation Two equilibrium points of

[0065] Command Parameters , and the equation about Find the first-order partial derivative and get: ;

[0066] when and When, regardless of Whatever the value, the selection strategy of the data provider is in a stable state;

[0067] when and hour, , ,at this time To evolve a stable point, the selection strategy of data providers is opportunistic trading;

[0068] when and hour, , ,at this time To evolve a stable point, the selection strategy of the data provider is honest transaction;

[0069] Assume that the expected benefit of the data user's honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , , , , , , , , , , All represent parameters;

[0070] ;

[0071] ;

[0072] ;

[0073] ;

[0074] ;

[0075] ;

[0076] ;

[0077] ;

[0078] ;

[0079] ;

[0080] ;

[0081] ;

[0082] Then the replication dynamic equation of the data user behavior strategy is:

[0083] ;

[0084] Let equation , find the equilibrium point of the equation evolution process;

[0085] The probability that the regulator chooses strict regulation When , indicating the probability that the user chooses to trade in good faith They are all equilibrium points;

[0086] The probability that the regulator chooses strict regulation When , the probability that the user chooses honest transaction and For the equation The two equilibrium points of

[0087] Command Parameters , and the equation about Find the first-order partial derivative and get: ;

[0088] when and When, regardless of Whatever the value, the selection strategy of data users is in a stable state;

[0089] when and hour, , ,at this time To evolve a stable point, the selection strategy of data users is opportunistic trading;

[0090] when and hour, , ,at this time To evolve a stable point, the data user's choice strategy is honest transaction;

[0091] Assume that the expected benefit of the regulator choosing strict regulation is The expected return of choosing less strict regulation is The average expected return is , , , , , , , , , , All represent parameters;

[0092] ;

[0093] ;

[0094] ;

[0095] ;

[0096] ;

[0097] ;

[0098] ;

[0099] ;

[0100] ;

[0101] ;

[0102] ;

[0103] ;

[0104] The replication dynamic equation of the regulator's behavior strategy is:

[0105] ;

[0106] Let equation , find the equilibrium point of the equation evolution process, when the data provider chooses the probability of honest transaction When , indicating that the regulator chooses to strictly regulate any probability are all equilibrium points. When the data provider chooses the probability of honest transaction When and For the equation The two equilibrium points of

[0107] Command Parameters , and the equation about Find the first-order partial derivative and get: ;

[0108] when and When, regardless of Whatever the value, the supervisor’s selection strategy is in a stable state;

[0109] when and hour, , ,at this time To achieve the evolutionary stable point, the regulator’s choice strategy is not to regulate strictly;

[0110] when and hour, , ,at this time To evolve a stable point, the strategy chosen by the regulator is strict regulation;

[0111] The matrix judgment unit 5 determines the equilibrium points of eight pure strategies according to the selection strategies of the three participants, which is expressed as , Indicates A pure strategy equilibrium point, Represents or operation, Indicates the serial number, , Indicates the selection strategy of the data provider, Indicates the selection strategy of the data user, It represents the selection strategy of the regulator. The equilibrium points of the eight pure strategies are brought into the constructed Jacobian matrix to obtain the three eigenvalues ​​of each equilibrium point, and the three eigenvalues ​​are judged according to the Lyapunov first law. The judgment rule is: if the three eigenvalues ​​are all negative, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is met; if at least one eigenvalue is positive, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is not met;

[0112] The Jacobian matrix is ​​expressed as:

[0113] = ,in, represents the Jacobian matrix, , and Respectively represent equations about , and Find the first-order partial derivative, , and Represent the replication dynamic equations of the behavior strategies of data providers, data users and regulators, respectively.

[0114] represents the probability that the data provider chooses honest transaction, represents the probability that the data user chooses honest transaction, Represents the probability that the regulator chooses strict regulation.

[0115] Working principle: When the present invention is used, the data provider, data and regulator are set up as three game subjects in the blockchain network through the game subject construction unit 1. The data provider obtains benefits by joining the blockchain and actively participating in data transactions. The data user obtains real data through the blockchain to bring benefits to himself. The regulator improves its own reputation and social benefits by selecting the blockchain model, adjusting the blockchain policy and supervising the operation system of each participant. The smart contract is agreed upon when conducting data transactions on the blockchain through the transaction agreement unit 2, so as to constrain the behavior of the data provider and the data user. After the transaction is completed, the smart contract automatically calculates the reputation through the feedback of the two parties to the transaction. Influence is tied to the interests of the participants, which helps the participants in data transactions to act in good faith. The interest transaction unit 3 takes into account the existence of opportunistic transactions and honest transactions in the data transaction process, as well as the existence of strict supervision and lax supervision. The game model construction unit 4 constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between data users, data providers and regulators on the blockchain platform, thereby analyzing the strategy stability of each game subject. Finally, the matrix judgment unit 5 determines the equilibrium point of the pure strategy according to the selection strategies of the three participants, and constructs the Jacobian matrix to judge whether the equilibrium point obtained from the game model construction unit 4 is an evolutionary stable strategy, thereby forming a stable evolution result.

[0116] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device.

[0117] Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and that the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model, characterized by: include: A game subject construction unit (1), wherein the game subject construction unit (1) establishes three participants, namely, a data provider, a data user and a regulator, as three game subjects in a blockchain network; A transaction agreement unit (2), wherein the transaction agreement unit (2) constrains the behavior of the data provider and the data user by formulating a smart contract. After the transaction is completed, the smart contract automatically calculates the reputation based on the feedback of the transaction parties; An interest transaction unit (3), wherein the interest transaction unit (3) selects a transaction type for the gaming subject from the perspective of interest maximization and reputation; A game model construction unit (4), wherein the game model construction unit (4) constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among the data provider, the data user and the regulator according to the needs of the data provider, the data user and the regulator on the blockchain, so as to analyze the strategy stability of each game subject and the influence of each factor on the strategy selection; In the game model construction unit (4), the three-party evolutionary game model construction process is: constructing the replication dynamic equations of the three participants through parameter assumptions, and then finding the evolutionary stable point of the evolutionary game according to the replication dynamic equations, thereby obtaining the evolutionary stable strategy under the stable state; The parameter assumptions are as follows: represents the potential benefits of reputation, Indicates the cost of the operation that the regulator chooses to strictly regulate, It represents the cost for data users to verify the authenticity of data. Represents the cost for the data provider to prove the authenticity of the data. It represents the cost spent by the data provider to collect and organize data. Indicates the cost spent by the data user to purchase data. represents the cost of regulators identifying opportunistic transactions, It refers to the loss suffered by the data provider when the data user trades in good faith, It refers to the loss suffered by the data user due to the honest transaction and the opportunistic transaction of the data provider. It indicates that if the data provider is found to have engaged in opportunistic trading, the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract will be borne, and if the data user is found to have engaged in opportunistic trading, the liquidated damages agreed in the smart contract will be borne. It means compensation for losses incurred due to honest transactions. It represents the profit gained by the data provider through honest transactions. represents the profit obtained by the data provider from opportunistic transactions, It represents the income gained by the data user through honest transactions. It represents the benefits gained by the data user from opportunistic use of data. It represents the benefits when the regulator strictly supervises. It represents the benefits when the regulator does not supervise strictly; A matrix judgment unit (5), wherein the matrix judgment unit (5) determines the equilibrium point of the pure strategy according to the selection strategies of the three participants, and judges whether the equilibrium point obtained from the game model construction unit (4) is an evolutionary stable strategy by constructing a Jacobian matrix.

2. The data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model according to claim 1 is characterized by: In the game subject construction unit (1), the data provider obtains benefits by joining the blockchain and actively participating in data transactions. The transaction types of the data provider include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. The honest transactions of the data provider refer to the data provider providing the required real data to the stakeholders on the blockchain. The opportunistic transactions of the data provider refer to the data provider not providing the real data to the stakeholders on the blockchain, and providing false data to the data users to obtain benefits. The data user obtains real data through the blockchain to bring benefits to himself. The transaction types of the data user include honest transactions and opportunistic transactions. The honest transaction of the data user refers to the use of data in accordance with the agreement with the data provider and the behavior of not providing the data to a third party. The opportunistic transaction of the data user refers to the use of data not in accordance with the agreement and the behavior of leaking data to a third party. When receiving opportunistic data from the data user, the user chooses whether to continue to use the blockchain according to the cost of rights protection. If the cost of rights protection is high, the user chooses not to protect the rights and exits the blockchain. If the benefits of rights protection are higher than the cost of rights protection, the user chooses to protect the rights and continues to use the blockchain. The regulator improves its own credibility and social benefits by selecting blockchain models, adjusting blockchain policies, and supervising the operating systems of all participants. The regulators include strict supervision and lax supervision. Strict supervision means that the regulators on the blockchain strictly supervise the behavior of data providers and data users in accordance with the agreement, review whether the transaction behavior is conducted in accordance with the agreed smart contract, and reward data providers who trade data in good faith and punish dishonest trading parties. Lax supervision means that the regulators do not strictly review the identity confirmation and authentication of data providers and data users, and do not strictly supervise whether the two parties to the transaction on the blockchain conduct data transactions in accordance with the agreed smart contract.

3. The data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model according to claim 1 is characterized by: The transaction agreement unit (2) agrees on a smart contract when conducting data transactions on the blockchain. The content of the smart contract is: before the transaction, both parties to the data transaction pay a deposit to the blockchain platform, the data provider and the data user bear the penalty for breach of contract, and at the same time, the party that suffers losses due to honest transactions is compensated, so as to constrain the transaction behavior of the data provider and the data user.

4. The data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model according to claim 1 is characterized by: In the interest transaction unit (3), for data providers and data users, if the benefits of opportunistic transactions are greater than the benefits of honest transactions and only short-term benefits are chosen, opportunistic transactions are preferred. Otherwise, honest transactions are preferred. For regulators, if the benefits of lax regulation are greater than the benefits of strict regulation and short-term benefits are chosen, regulators give priority to lax regulation. Otherwise, strict regulation is preferred.

5. The data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model according to claim 1 is characterized by: In the game model construction unit (4), the data provider is assumed to be The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing honest transactions is The probability of choosing opportunistic transactions is The probability of choosing strict regulation is The probability of choosing not to strictly regulate, , is the probability value; Assume that the expected profit of the data provider in honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the data provider behavior strategy is: ; Assume that the expected benefit of the data user's honest transaction is , the expected return of opportunistic trading is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the data user behavior strategy is: ； Assume that the expected benefit of the regulator choosing strict regulation is The expected return of choosing less strict regulation is The average expected return is , then the replication dynamic equation of the regulator's behavior strategy is: 。 6. The data transaction participant behavior analysis system based on blockchain and game model according to claim 1 is characterized by: The matrix judgment unit (5) determines the equilibrium points of the eight pure strategies according to the selection strategies of the three participants, which can be expressed as ,in, Indicates A pure strategy equilibrium point, Represents or operation, Indicates the serial number, , Indicates the selection strategy of the data provider, Indicates the selection strategy of the data user, It represents the selection strategy of the regulator. The equilibrium points of the eight pure strategies are brought into the constructed Jacobian matrix to obtain the three eigenvalues ​​of each equilibrium point, and the judgment is made according to the Lyapunov first law. The judgment rule is: if the three eigenvalues ​​are all negative, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is met; if at least one eigenvalue is positive, the condition of the evolutionary stable strategy is not met.

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