Data processing method, device, equipment, movable platform, unmanned aerial vehicle, storage medium and program product

Abstract

The invention provides a data processing method and device, equipment, a mobile platform, an unmanned aerial vehicle, a storage medium and a program product, the method is applied to electronic equipment, the electronic equipment locally stores a private key, an equipment certificate and a verification certificate used for verifying the equipment certificate, the equipment certificate comprises a public key, and the public key is a private key. The private key corresponds to the public key, and the method comprises the following steps: acquiring sensing data acquired by the electronic equipment; signing the sensing data through the private key to obtain signature information; wherein after the verification certificate verifies that the equipment certificate is legal, the signature information and the public key are used for determining whether the sensing data is tampered after being signed. The technical problem of verifying whether the sensing data is tampered or not in the prior art can be solved.

Description

Data processing method, device, equipment, mobile platform, drone, storage medium and program product Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of data processing technology, and specifically, to a data processing method, apparatus, device, mobile platform, drone, storage medium and program product. Background Art

[0002] Electronic devices collect sensor data during operation. How to verify whether the sensor data has been tampered with is a technical issue that is currently receiving much attention.

[0003] Some solutions rely on servers to verify online whether sensor data has been tampered with. These solutions require connecting to a server to obtain a verification certificate. Based on the certificate returned by the server, the user then connects back to the server to verify the certificate's issuing authority is trustworthy. This completes the verification process, relying on online connectivity.

[0004] However, in some application scenarios, the network environment may be unstable, which may cause the verification process to be unstable or even impossible to complete. In addition, in some specific scenarios, such as when the sensor data itself is confidential, users may want to complete the sensor data verification process offline.

[0005] Other solutions can be used in offline scenarios, such as adding watermarks or changing specific pixels in an image in the field of image processing. However, these solutions have weaker security and can be circumvented by removing anti-counterfeiting information, making it impossible to detect image tampering.

[0006] Summary of the Invention

[0007] In view of this, the present application provides a data processing method, device, equipment, mobile platform, drone, storage medium and program product to solve the technical problem of verifying whether data has been tampered with in the related art.

[0008] In a first aspect, a data processing method is provided. The method is applied to an electronic device, wherein the electronic device locally stores a private key, a device certificate, and a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate, the device certificate including a public key, the private key and the public key corresponding to each other, the method comprising:

[0009] Acquiring sensor data collected by the electronic device;

[0010] Signing the sensor data using the private key to obtain signature information;

[0011] After the verification certificate verifies that the device certificate is legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0012] In a second aspect, a data processing method is provided, which is applied to a verification device and includes:

[0013] Acquiring sensor data, signature information, a device certificate, and a verification certificate from the electronic device, wherein the sensor data is collected by the electronic device, the signature information is obtained by the electronic device signing the sensor data using a private key locally stored in the electronic device, the device certificate includes a public key corresponding to the private key, and the verification certificate is used to verify the device certificate;

[0014] Verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate using the verification certificate;

[0015] After the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0016] According to a third aspect, a data processing device is provided, comprising a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements the data processing method embodiment described in the first aspect when executing the computer program.

[0017] In a fourth aspect, an electronic device is provided, comprising a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements the data processing method embodiment described in the first aspect when executing the computer program.

[0018] In a fifth aspect, a verification device is provided, which further includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the data processing method embodiment described in the second aspect.

[0019] In a sixth aspect, a drone is provided, comprising:

[0020] body;

[0021] a power system, disposed in the fuselage, for providing power to the UAV;

[0022] Also, a processor and a memory are provided in the body, the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the data processing method embodiment described in the first aspect or the second aspect is implemented.

[0023] In a seventh aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed, an embodiment of the data processing method described in the first aspect or the second aspect is implemented.

[0024] In an eighth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements an embodiment of the data processing method described in the first aspect or the second aspect.

[0025] Using the solution provided by this application, the electronic device locally stores a private key, and the private key corresponds to the public key in the device certificate. Therefore, the signature information is obtained by signing the sensor data with the private key. Since the electronic device also locally stores a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate, the verification certificate can be directly used to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate. After the device certificate is legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed. Therefore, this embodiment does not require networking with a server for verification and does not rely on networking capabilities. It can verify whether the data has been tampered with offline. The electronic device can work in an offline state, and the verification process can also be performed in an offline state, meeting the user's demand for offline device operation. It realizes the verification of whether the data has been tampered with in an offline state and ensures the security of the sensor data. In addition, based on the characteristics of cryptography, the signing process of the sensor data is trustworthy and irreversible. The legitimate signature cannot be forged by attackers, and the security strength is high. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0026] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0027] FIG1A is a flowchart of a data processing method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0028] FIG1B is a verification diagram of an embodiment of the present application.

[0029] FIG1C is a schematic diagram of data processing according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0030] 1D to 1F are schematic diagrams of user interfaces according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] FIG1G is a schematic diagram of an electronic device and a remote control device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0032] FIG1H is a schematic diagram of a user interface of a remote control device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0033] FIG2A is a schematic diagram of a data processing method according to another embodiment of the present application.

[0034] FIG2B is a schematic diagram of a drone transmitting a file to a verification device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0035] FIG2C is a flowchart of another data processing method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0036] FIG2D is a schematic diagram of processing signature information and certificate chain information according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0037] FIG2E is a flowchart of an online verification according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0038] FIG3 is a flow chart of a data processing method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0039] FIG4 and FIG5 are hardware structure diagrams of a data processing device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0040] FIG6 is a hardware structure diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0041] FIG7 is a hardware structure diagram of a verification device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0042] FIG8 is a structural diagram of a drone according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, with examples illustrated in the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the described embodiments represent only some, and not all, of the embodiments of this application. When the following description refers to the drawings, identical numerals in different drawings represent identical or similar elements, unless otherwise indicated. The implementations described in the following exemplary embodiments are not intended to represent all implementations consistent with this specification. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatus and methods consistent with certain aspects of this specification, as detailed in the appended claims.

[0044] The terms used in this specification are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit this specification. As used in this specification and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," "the," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" as used herein refers to any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0045] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used in this specification to describe various information, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are merely used to distinguish information of the same type from one another. For example, first information may also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information without departing from the scope of this specification. Depending on the context, the term "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "when," "when," or "in response to determining."

[0046] In many application scenarios, users need to verify whether sensor data collected by electronic devices during operation has been tampered with. Examples include point cloud data collected by lidar and images or videos captured by cameras. For example, drones generate a variety of data types during operation, such as images, audio, point clouds, and flight trajectory data. In some scenarios, users need to use drone-captured images for investigations and evidence collection. If these images are maliciously forged or tampered with, the validity of the evidence collected will be challenged. Furthermore, the copyright of the images themselves is also a matter of great concern.

[0047] Some image anti-counterfeiting technologies claim ownership of an image by adding a watermark to the original image. However, this technique destroys the original image content and is visually noticeable. Attackers can use watermark removal techniques to remove the watermark.

[0048] Another similar technique is steganographic watermarking: Image data is first transformed through a Fourier transform, converting it from a time-domain image to a frequency-domain image. After the watermark is superimposed on the image, the frequency-domain image is converted back to a time-domain image. This ensures minimal distortion of the original image content, making it difficult to detect. However, this scheme can still be removed through simple watermark removal methods.

[0049] Some solutions also modify specific pixels in the image to embed the author's information. This approach makes the image changes almost imperceptible, but it still cannot avoid deleting this information, thus circumventing this protection scheme.

[0050] The aforementioned solutions are based on image processing and can all achieve image anti-counterfeiting and copyright protection. However, these solutions have weak security capabilities and can be effectively eliminated by removing anti-counterfeiting information. Furthermore, these solutions are unable to protect against image tampering, meaning that tampering with an image is undetectable.

[0051] To address these issues, some solutions employ techniques based on mathematics or cryptography. For example, some solutions calculate the file's hash value to prove that the file has not been tampered with. The main process includes:

[0052] For the image file file1, calculate its hash value hash1, and store the image file file1 and the hash value hash1;

[0053] The user gets the image file file2 and hash1, and calculates the hash value hash2 of the image file file2;

[0054] Compare hash1 and hash2. If they are equal, the image file file2 obtained by the user is the same file as the image file file1. Otherwise, the image file file2 obtained by the user is a tampered image file.

[0055] Other solutions are based on symmetric cryptographic algorithms and hashing algorithms. They use a symmetric key held by the device to calculate the file's CMAC (Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code) value to prove that the file has not been tampered with. The general process is similar to the above, so the specific process is not repeated here. The difference is that the symmetric key is required during the CMAC calculation and the verification process.

[0056] Other solutions rely on asymmetric cryptographic algorithms for document security signatures. Traditional PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) solutions are primarily used for identity verification in online scenarios, such as common browser authentication of website identities. The browser requests a certificate from the website being visited and then verifies the trustworthiness of the issuing authority based on the certificate returned by the website. In browser-based scenarios, the verifier (browser) must be able to connect to the internet. Therefore, the verification process in traditional PKI systems relies on online connectivity.

[0057] The above solutions have the following disadvantages:

[0058] For solutions based on image processing, it is impossible to detect if the image has been tampered with; on the other hand, such technical solutions can remove anti-counterfeiting information through technical means, thereby eliminating the protective effect of such solutions.

[0059] To calculate the hash value of a file, you only need to know the hash algorithm, and the hash value can be calculated by anyone. Currently, mainstream hash algorithms are public, so an attacker can complete the attack by tampering with the file and recalculating the hash value.

[0060] The CMAC-based verification algorithm requires the verifier to use a key during the verification process. Symmetric keys are private data. Before verifying whether a file has been tampered with, the verifier must obtain this key through a secure channel. If the key is lost, CMAC can still be forged. The key transfer process to the verifier also greatly increases the possibility of key loss.

[0061] In asymmetric key solutions, the verification process requires an internet connection. Therefore, in some specific scenarios, such as when the data itself is confidential, users may need to be offline.

[0062] In summary, current solutions either cannot verify offline whether photos have been forged or maliciously tampered with, or their security features are incomplete and cannot detect malicious tampering, or their security strength is too weak to meet the requirements of protecting photo authentication or verifying whether they have been tampered with. However, these characteristics are highly valued in industrial applications such as drones.

[0063] 1) Offline photo verification is essential for industrial applications like drones, as many outdoor operations often require no internet connection. Furthermore, when electronic devices are used to collect image data, such as images, the data itself must be highly confidential and cannot be posted online, making online data verification impossible.

[0064] 2) Regarding verifying whether an image has been tampered with, in some scenarios, images are important forensic materials. In such scenarios, proving that an image has not been maliciously tampered with is an important basis for ensuring the legitimacy of the image as forensic material.

[0065] 3) The scenario of image authentication is more common, and the issue of how to prove the copyright of an image is also very common.

[0066] 4) Reducing the complexity of the solution in actual application scenarios is also something that needs to be considered.

[0067] Based on this, an embodiment of this specification provides a data processing method that can verify offline whether data has been tampered with. As shown in Figure 1A, it is a flowchart of a data processing method according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification. This embodiment method is applied to an electronic device, which locally stores a private key, a device certificate, and a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate. The device certificate includes a public key, and the private key and the public key correspond to each other. The method may include the following steps:

[0068] In step 102, sensor data collected by the electronic device is obtained;

[0069] In step 104, the sensor data is signed using the private key to obtain signature information.

[0070] As shown in Figure 1B, this specification shows a schematic diagram of a verification process according to an exemplary embodiment. After the verification certificate verifies that the device certificate is legitimate, the signature information and the public key in the device certificate are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0071] In this embodiment, the electronic device locally stores a private key, and the private key corresponds to the public key in the device certificate, so the signature information is obtained by signing the sensor data with the private key; since the electronic device also locally stores a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate, the verification certificate can be directly used to verify whether the device certificate is legal, and after the device certificate is legal, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed. Therefore, this embodiment can verify offline whether the data has been tampered with, the electronic device can work in an offline state, and the verification process can also be performed in an offline state, meeting the user's demand for offline device operation; the security of the sensor data is also guaranteed in an offline state.

[0072] This embodiment can be applied to any electronic device. For example, the electronic device may include a camera, a movable platform, a lidar, a mobile terminal, an audio device, or a computer device, etc.; wherein the movable platform may include a drone, a robot, a car, or an automatic cleaning device, etc.; the mobile terminal may include a smartphone or a wearable device, etc.

[0073] Depending on the implementation of the electronic device, the sensor data can be implemented in a variety of ways. For example, the sensor data can include data collected by one or more sensor modules in the electronic device, so that the electronic device can verify whether any type of sensor data has been tampered with after signing.

[0074] Exemplarily, the sensing module may include any of the following: a camera module, an audio module, a point cloud module, or a motion control module, so that data collected by the above sensing modules can be verified to be tampered with after being signed.

[0075] Exemplarily, the sensor data may include any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device, so that the above sensor data can be verified to be tampered with after being signed.

[0076] There are many ways to implement local storage of private keys, device certificates and verification certificates in electronic devices. For example, based on the security requirements of private keys, electronic devices can use a more secure way to store private keys. For example, private keys can be stored in an offline security chip in the electronic device; or, the central processing unit (CPU) of the electronic device can include a trusted execution environment (TEE), that is, a secure area TEE is built in the central processing unit through software and hardware methods to ensure that the programs and data loaded inside it are protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity. Device certificates and verification certificates are public certificates, and their storage method can be different from that of private keys. For example, their storage location can be flexibly configured as needed; of course, the storage method of device certificates and verification certificates is the same as the storage method of private keys, which is also optional, and this embodiment does not limit this. Of course, those skilled in the art will understand that other storage methods can also be used in actual applications, and this embodiment does not limit this.

[0077] Exemplarily, the private key, device certificate, and verification certificate may be stored in the electronic device at the same or different times. For example, the three may be stored in the electronic device before the electronic device leaves the factory. Alternatively, they may be stored in the electronic device by user operation, for example, the electronic device obtains and stores the information after communicating with another device such as a server. When stored by user operation, the security of the storage process may be optionally ensured by various means such as verifying the user's identity. Alternatively, some of the three may be stored in the electronic device before it leaves the factory, and some may be stored in the electronic device by user operation, etc. For example, the private key may be stored in the electronic device before it leaves the factory, and the other two may be stored in the electronic device by user operation, etc. This embodiment does not limit this.

[0078] In some examples, the device certificate carries device information of the electronic device. In actual applications, this device information can include a variety of information, which is not limited in this embodiment. For example, it can include information indicating the identity of the electronic device. For example, this information can include a device identification code, such as the mobile device's MEID (Mobile Equipment Identifier) ​​code or IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) code, or a drone's unique product identification code. In actual applications, it can be configured according to the type of electronic device used in this embodiment, which is not limited in this embodiment. In other examples, the device certificate carrying the device information of the electronic device can also include information indicating the sensor module in the electronic device that collects sensor data, thereby determining the identity of the sensor module. Based on this, this embodiment can ensure that the source of the sensor data is trustworthy. For example, because the device certificate of this embodiment carries the device information of the electronic device, and the device certificate includes a public key, the signature of the sensor data is issued using the private key corresponding to the public key. Therefore, if the sensor data is not tampered with, the copyright ownership of the sensor data can also be determined to be trustworthy. Moreover, because this embodiment verifies whether the sensor data has been tampered with, it also makes the copyright ownership of the sensor data difficult to forge.

[0079] In this embodiment, the verification certificate may be used to verify the legitimacy of the device certificate. For example, the device certificate is issued by the verification certificate.

[0080] In some examples, the verification certificate may include a root certificate. A root certificate is a public key certificate belonging to a root certificate authority (CA) and serves as the starting point of a trust chain in a public key infrastructure. The device certificate may be issued by the root certificate. Therefore, when verifying a device certificate, the root certificate verifies the device certificate.

[0081] Exemplarily, the verification certificate may only include a root certificate, that is, the root certificate can issue a device certificate for each electronic device. In order to ensure the security of the root certificate, in other examples, the verification certificate includes a root certificate and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest-level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in the other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest-level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate. Similarly, when verifying a device certificate, the root certificate can verify the highest-level sub-certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in the other levels is verified by the sub-certificate of the previous level. In this embodiment, the number of sub-certificates is not limited, and can be configured as needed in actual applications.

[0082] In some examples, the verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority (CA), which can be the CA of the electronic device manufacturer or a third-party CA, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment. Based on this, the authority and fairness of the verification certificate can be guaranteed.

[0083] Exemplarily, the private key and the public key correspond to each other, and the private key and the public key may form an asymmetric key pair. This embodiment does not limit the number of private keys, device certificates, and verification certificates. The public key in the device certificate corresponds to the private key, meaning the number of device certificates corresponds to the number of private keys. For example, if m private keys are stored, there are m device certificates. Verification certificates are used to verify device certificates, and the number of verification certificates can be implemented in various ways. For example, m device certificates may be verified using the same verification certificate or different verification certificates. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that this can be implemented based on actual needs, and this embodiment does not limit this.

[0084] As in the aforementioned embodiment, there may be multiple sensor modules in the electronic device, which may collect different types of sensor data, or the same sensor module may also collect different types of sensor data. For example, when there are multiple private keys stored locally in the electronic device, each private key may be used to sign the sensor data collected by different sensor modules, or each private key may be used to sign different types of sensor data.

[0085] The private key signature process can be implemented in a variety of ways. It can be to directly use the private key to encrypt the sensor data to obtain the signature information, or it can be combined with a hash value algorithm to perform private key signing. For example, it can be to calculate the first hash value of the sensor data and then use the private key to encrypt the first hash value to obtain the signature information; in other examples, it can also be to encrypt the sensor data with the private key and then calculate the hash value of the encryption result as the signature information. Optionally, the hash value can be calculated using any hash algorithm. When calculating the hash value of the sensor data, it can be all the information of the sensor data or part of the information. For example, the sensor data is image data, including pixel information, and can also include shooting time information, resolution information or camera information, etc. All or part of the information can be selected to calculate the hash value, and this embodiment does not limit this. Optionally, the calculation of the hash value can be performed in the TEE.

[0086] Permissions can be set for the private key signing process to ensure the security of the private key. For example, the sensor module that collects the sensor data calls the private key to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information, that is, only the sensor module in the electronic device can call the private key to sign data, while other modules cannot call it. Optionally, this can be achieved by setting a whitelist. For example, the sensor module that collects the sensor data can call the private key to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information after verification by the trusted execution environment, which can prevent other modules running in the electronic device from calling the private key.

[0087] Exemplarily, the private key is stored in the TEE, and the signing process is also executed in the trusted execution environment; the execution process may be that the requester calls the signature interface to initiate a signature application, the requester may be a sensor module that collects sensor data, and the signature interface may be a module running in an electronic device implemented using the scheme of this embodiment. The signature application may carry the requester's information and the indication information of the sensor data. The requester's information may include the requester's identification information, etc. The indication information may include the address information of the sensor data in the memory, etc. The signature interface may call the TEE based on the signature application, determine the requester's authority based on the requester's information, and if not, return a call failure message, etc.; after the authority is passed, the sensor data is read from the memory according to the indication information of the sensor data, and signed using the private key, and then the signature information is returned to the requester.

[0088] The process of verifying whether the sensor data has been tampered with corresponds to the above-mentioned signing process. In this embodiment, whether the sensor data has been tampered with refers to whether the sensor data has changed after it was signed. For example, if the signing process encrypts the sensor data using a private key to obtain signature information, the verification process decrypts the signature information using a public key, compares the decrypted result with the sensor data to determine whether tampering has occurred. If the signing process calculates a first hash value of the sensor data and then encrypts the first hash value using a private key to obtain signature information, the verification process can be to calculate a second hash value of the sensor data and decrypt the signature information using the public key in the device certificate to obtain the first hash value; based on the first and second hash values, determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed. For example, if the first and second hash values ​​are the same, it can be determined that the sensor data has not been tampered with after being signed; if they are different, it can be determined that tampering has occurred. If the signing process is to encrypt the sensor data with a private key and calculate a first hash value for the encryption result as signature information, then the verification process is to encrypt the sensor data with a public key and calculate a second hash value for the encryption result, and compare the first hash value with the second hash value to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0089] In this embodiment, there are multiple entities that can verify whether the sensor data has been tampered with:

[0090] (1) Executed on the electronic device itself; in some examples, the method may further include: storing the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate; using the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate; after the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, using the signature information and the public key to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0091] The solution of this embodiment can be applied to the electronic device itself, and verification of whether the data has been tampered with is performed on the electronic device itself. In this way, the sensor data does not need to be transmitted to other devices, ensuring the security of the sensor data and meeting the user's offline needs.

[0092] (2) Executed in a verification device; for example, in other examples, the method may further include: providing the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate to the verification device, so that the verification device uses the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legal, and then uses the signature information and the public key to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0093] In this embodiment, the way in which the electronic device provides information to the verification device may include an offline method. As shown in FIG1C , this is a schematic diagram of a data processing method shown in this specification according to an exemplary embodiment. In this embodiment, the verification of whether the data has been tampered with may be performed in the verification device. For example, the electronic device in this embodiment may provide sensor data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate to the verification device in an offline state in an offline state. The verification device does not need to be connected to the Internet. It only needs to use the verification certificate provided by the electronic device to verify whether the device certificate is legal. If it is legal, the signature information and the public key may be further used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed. Therefore, offline verification of the verification device is achieved, which prevents data leakage problems that may occur when the verification device is connected to the Internet, and meets the user's offline verification needs.

[0094] In this case, the offline method can be that the electronic device and the verification device are connected via a data cable, and the above four items are transmitted via the data cable. Alternatively, in other examples, when the electronic device is connected to a storage medium, the method further includes: storing the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate in the storage medium, so that after the storage medium is connected to the verification device, the verification device reads the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate from the storage medium. In this embodiment, the storage medium can be used for transmission, that is, the two are transmitted offline, which can ensure the security of the sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate. It is clear to those skilled in the art that the storage medium can include many types, and this embodiment does not limit this. For example, it can include any non-volatile memory, such as flash memory, etc. Exemplary, it can include a disk, SD card, or USB flash drive, etc. In other examples, it is also optional for the electronic device to provide the information to another offline device offline, and then the device to provide the information to the verification device offline.

[0095] In other examples, the electronic device may send the sensing data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate online to the verification device. For example, the electronic device may send the above four directly to the verification device. For example, the electronic device and the verification device may be communicatively connected. The communication connection method may include a wired communication connection or a wireless communication connection, or may include a direct connection or an indirect connection through other devices. For example, the electronic device and the verification device may be connected through Bluetooth, near-field communication or the Internet, and the electronic device sends the sensing data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate to the verification device, which is then received by the verification device. In other examples, it may also be sent indirectly, for example, the electronic device provides the above four to another electronic device, which then provides them to the verification device.

[0096] Exemplarily, the method of this embodiment may further include any of the following steps: if the verification certificate verifies that the device certificate is illegal, outputting first verification failure information; if it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, outputting second verification failure information.

[0097] Exemplarily, the first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; when the verification process is executed by an electronic device, the user interface may include the user interface of the electronic device, and / or the user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the electronic device. Exemplarily, when the verification process is executed by a verification device, the user interface may include the user interface of the verification device, and / or the user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the verification device.

[0098] Figures 1D and 1E are schematic diagrams of a user interface according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification. Figure 1D shows the verification result of image AAAA, with the first verification failure message being "Device certificate verification failed" as an example. Figure 1E shows the verification result of image AAAB, with the second verification failure message being "Image tampered with" as an example. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the first verification failure message and / or the second verification failure message can be output in any format, such as text, audio, or video, and this embodiment does not limit this.

[0099] Optionally, if it is determined that the sensor data has not been tampered with after being signed, a verification pass message can be output. For example, FIG. 1F is a user interface diagram according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification, showing a prompt message indicating that the image AAAC verification has passed. The prompt message can be implemented in various ways, such as text, audio, or video, and this embodiment does not limit this.

[0100] In order to verify the legitimacy of the sensor data, this embodiment requires additional signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate. In actual applications, there are many ways to implement the storage of sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate. For example, the above four can be stored independently. In order to reduce the complexity of managing data, any two can be stored as one file, any three can be stored as one file and the other can be stored independently, or all four can be stored as one file, etc. In other examples, the device certificate and verification certificate can also be combined for storage, for example, the two can be spliced ​​together as a certificate chain information storage, etc. This embodiment does not limit this.

[0101] For example, the verification certificate and the sensor data may be stored in one file. Based on this, the sensor data and the verification certificate may be read from one file, thereby reducing the complexity of data management.

[0102] Exemplarily, at least one of the signature information and the device certificate may be stored in a file together with the sensor data. The sensor data, as well as the signature information and / or the device certificate, can be read from the file, thereby reducing the complexity of data management.

[0103] For example, an electronic device can collect multiple sensor data, each of which corresponds to signature information. For example, if there are n sensor data, there are n signature information. If each sensor data is signed by a private key, then the n sensor data correspond to the same device certificate and verification certificate. The storage method can be: n sensor data, n signature information, i device certificates, and j verification certificates, where i and j are both positive integers, such as 1 or other integers greater than 1. The specific number can be configured as needed. Therefore, some storage methods require storing the corresponding relationship between sensor data and the other three.

[0104] Exemplarily, one implementation method is to store sensor data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate in one file, so there is no need to store the correspondence between the above four, and the complexity of data management, verification process or transmission to the verification device can be reduced.

[0105] In some examples, the sensor data can be stored as raw information. In other examples, the sensor data can be stored according to a storage format (encoding format) to reduce redundant information, achieve data compression, etc. Different types of sensor data have different storage formats, and the same type of sensor data can also have different storage formats. In actual applications, the required storage format can be selected as needed. The sensor data is stored in a file according to the storage format. When any of the sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate are stored in the file, they are also stored in the file according to the storage format. In other examples, not according to the storage format is also optional. For example, the signature information can be a string, and it is also optional to store the string of the signature information in the name of the file, so that the sensor data and the corresponding signature information are stored in the file.

[0106] In some examples, the verification certificate and the sensor data are stored in the same file, which may include: the verification certificate is stored in the free storage location of the sensor data; for example, when storing the sensor data, one or more free storage locations of the sensor data can be determined, and the free storage location indicates that the location does not store the original information of the sensor data, so that the verification certificate is stored in the free storage location, so that the two can be in the same file, which is convenient for data management. Similarly, the signature information or the verification certificate can also be stored in the free storage location of the sensor data, or all three of the above can be stored in the free storage location. The free storage locations where the three are stored can be the same or different. This can facilitate data management.

[0107] In some examples, one or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate, so that any of the three can be quickly and accurately obtained through the identifiers. For example, a single identifier can be used to indicate all three, or different identifiers can be used for each. Alternatively, one identifier can be used for the signature information, and one identifier can be used for the device certificate and the verification certificate, etc. This embodiment does not limit this.

[0108] In some examples, the identifier may be determined based on the storage format of the sensory data. For example, when the sensory data is stored in a storage format, some storage formats specify identifiers for various types of information in the sensory data. In this embodiment, the identifiers used for the signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate may be determined based on the storage format of the sensory data, as long as this does not affect the reading of the sensory data from the file. For example, an identifier different from the identifier specified in the storage format may be used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate, thereby preventing file decoding errors.

[0109] In some examples, the storage location of the verification certificate within the file can be determined based on the encoding format of the sensory data. The storage location of the signature information or verification certificate within the file can also be determined based on the encoding format of the sensory data. For example, some storage formats specify the storage locations for various types of information within the sensory data. Based on the storage format, a location that does not affect the original sensory data can be found to store any of the three aforementioned items, thereby preventing file decoding errors.

[0110] Exemplarily, a file may include multiple areas, some of which store sensor data. The storage area for any of the above three is different from the area storing the sensor data. Taking the sensor data as an image and the storage format as JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) format as an example, some JPEG storage formats are divided into areas APPx for storing various types of metadata of the image. This format can be used for applications to customize the creation of some APPx areas for storing custom information. This embodiment can create one or more APPx areas for storing any of the above three.

[0111] Exemplarily, the storage location of the sensor data in the file is different from the storage location of any of the above three. Taking the RAW image based on the DNG format as an example, the storage format includes a variety of tags for storing image information, as well as tags for storing non-image information such as debug. Any of the above three can be stored using one or more tags, such as DNGPrivateData. The above embodiment uses the two standard storage formats of JPEG and RAW as examples. In other examples, the sensor data of some electronic devices are in a storage format customized by the device manufacturer. Similarly, those skilled in the art understand that in actual applications, the storage method of any of the above three in the file can be determined according to the storage format, such as storage location or identification, etc. This embodiment does not limit this.

[0112] In practical applications, electronic devices may collect various types of sensor data and use it in a variety of scenarios. Some scenarios may require verification of data tampering, while others may not. Based on this, in some examples, the data processing method can be executed with the signature function of the electronic device enabled, thereby facilitating user use.

[0113] Exemplarily, the signature function may be automatically activated by the electronic device. For example, the electronic device may activate upon detecting that a preset activation condition has been met. Optionally, the preset activation condition may be pre-configured by a technician or configured by the user. Furthermore, the specific preset activation condition may also be flexibly configured, for example, including conditions regarding the geographic location of the electronic device, the type of sensor data collected by the electronic device, and / or the time at which the sensor data was collected, etc. This embodiment is not limited thereto.

[0114] In other examples, the process of starting the signature function of the electronic device may include: displaying a signature function startup object on a user interface; the user interface includes the user interface of the electronic device and / or the user interface of other terminals communicatively connected to the electronic device; in response to the signature function startup object being triggered by the user, starting the signature function. In this embodiment, the signature function can be started by the user, and the electronic device or other terminals communicatively connected to the electronic device can provide the user with the function of starting the signature function. In some examples, the electronic device includes a display, and the display can display the user interface. In other examples, the user interface can be displayed on the display of other terminals communicatively connected to the electronic device. This embodiment does not limit the other terminals communicatively connected to the electronic device, and can include shooting equipment, movable platforms, laser radars, mobile terminals, audio equipment or computer equipment, etc.

[0115] FIG1G is a schematic diagram of an electronic device 11 and a remote control device 12 according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification, wherein the electronic device 11 is in communication with the remote control device 12. FIG1H is a schematic diagram of a user interface of a remote control device according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification, wherein the signature function activation object is specifically a "Confirm Open" button, which the user clicks to activate the camera's signature function.

[0116] For example, there may be multiple types of sensor data that need to be verified for tampering, and the user interface may further provide a function for determining whether the signature function for different types of sensor data is activated, which is not limited in this embodiment.

[0117] Next, an embodiment will be used to illustrate.

[0118] Currently, there are no standardized solutions for verifying whether files have been tampered with, either in cameras or drones. However, in numerous industrial and personal applications, sensor data collected by electronic devices needs to be verified for tampering. For example, users have a strong need to verify whether images or videos captured by drone cameras, flight trajectory data collected by drone flight control modules, and point cloud data collected by drone-mounted lidars have been tampered with.

[0119] In outdoor settings, it's common for electronic devices to be unable to connect to the internet. In certain scenarios, such as when data like images, videos, or point clouds is inherently sensitive and confidential, offline verification of data tampering is essential. However, traditional PKI systems primarily rely on browsers verifying website identities. For web browsing, the verifier must be able to connect to the internet.

[0120] Therefore, this specification provides embodiments for offline verification of sensory data collected by an electronic device.

[0121] As the data producer, the electronic device holds a certificate issued by a public key infrastructure (PKI). The PKI issues and manages certificates to trusted electronic devices. These electronic devices may include drones, action cameras, cameras, or robots. These electronic devices include a sensor module for collecting sensor data. For example, a camera module captures images or videos. The electronic device can apply the solution of this embodiment, and the generated sensor data can be verified offline by a verifier. Online verification is also possible.

[0122] Taking images as an example, in a drone scenario, the camera module operates as follows: collecting light signals, converting them into electrical signals, processing them through the ISP circuit, generating image data, and storing them in memory. The operating system then encodes the image data in memory according to a pre-set image storage format and writes it to a storage medium such as a hard drive, generating an image file containing the image information.

[0123] The certificates held by an electronic device include: a certificate chain issued by the PKI for the public-private key pair held by the electronic device; this certificate chain includes: the device certificate, the certificate of the first-level subordinate CA that issued the device certificate (i.e., the first-level sub-certificate), and the self-signed certificate of the root CA that issued the first-level sub-certificate (i.e., the root certificate). This certificate chain can fully provide a device trust relationship. In this embodiment, there are three certificates, that is, the certificate chain length is 3. In actual applications, the number of certificates can be adjusted as needed.

[0124] Optionally, the private key can be stored in the TEE of the electronic device to ensure its security. The certificate chain is public information that can prove the correspondence between the private key held by the device and the electronic device. Its storage location can be configured as needed.

[0125] Figure 2A is a schematic diagram of data processing for a drone in this embodiment, illustrating the process from camera image capture to file storage on a storage medium. For example, the method of the aforementioned embodiment can be a data processing module running in an electronic device. During operation, after the device's camera converts the optical signal into an image in memory, it can invoke the device's TEE. After the TEE verifies the legitimacy of the invocation, it can read the image in memory and use the private key to sign the data to be verified, generating signature information. After obtaining the signature information, the certificate chain can be retrieved, and the sensor data, signature information, and certificate chain can be stored as a file in a storage medium according to the sensor data storage format. This file can then be verified by the verifier to determine if it has been tampered with after signing. In other words, the signing process in this embodiment is performed before the data captured by the sensor module is stored as a file. The verifier can be a drone, or as shown in the schematic diagram of Figure 2B, drone 21 can transmit the file to verification device 22 for verification.

[0126] Among them, the private key needs to be called during the image generation process, and permissions can be set for the caller who calls the private key. For example, only the camera is allowed to call it during the process of taking a photo to generate an image file, and other modules in the electronic device have no right to call this interface.

[0127] In this embodiment, the verifier is the object that verifies the legitimacy of the sensor data. The verifier can be the electronic device of the aforementioned manufacturer, or other devices, including but not limited to: drones, remote controls, cloud platforms, mobile applications, or PC interactive software. It can also be offline software or an online verification server. After obtaining a file stored in the electronic device, the verifier can parse the signature information and certificate chain in the file. By verifying the legitimacy of the certificate chain and the legitimacy of the signature, it can verify whether the file has been forged or maliciously tampered with.

[0128] Next, the sensor data is an image as an example for explanation.

[0129] After obtaining the signature information of the image, the electronic device needs to store it as an image file.

[0130] (1) For an image file stored in JPEG format, its generation method may be as follows.

[0131] According to the storage format of JPEG, JPEG files can be simply divided into the following areas:

[0132] (1) Jpeg Head: fixed 2 bytes 0xFFD8

[0133] (2) APPx: The area used to store various image metadata, starting with marker 0xFFEx.

[0134] All APP areas are stored in a continuous buffer.

[0135] For example, there can be multiple APP1s, and different APP1s are distinguished by identifier_code, which is a string ending with '\0'. Each APP1 has a 2-byte length field, which is used to mark the length of the APP area excluding the marker.

[0136] Take jpeg with two APP1s as an example. These two APP1s store exif and xmp respectively. Exif contains a very small thumb nail, which is also a complete photo.

[0137] APP2 stores the screen image information.

[0138] In some examples, based on the JPEG storage format, one or more APP areas may be created to store custom information. For example, APP7 may be created to store debug information.

[0139] (3) Stream area: stores the main, screen, and other streams, i.e. the encoded images, until the end of the file.

[0140] As can be seen from the above embodiment, the stored JPEG format image files are stored in the form of partitions, and each partition starts with a marker field:

[0141] Optionally, in this embodiment, two new APP areas can be created in the original field to store signature information and certificate chains. The storage location of the signature information and certificate chain can be behind all APPs, that is, the newly created APP area is located behind all APPs, for example:

[0142] 1) marker = 0xFFE7, identifier_code = "SIGNATURE"; this area stores signature information

[0143] 2) marker = 0xFFE7, identifier_code = "CERTIFICATION"; this area stores the certificate chain.

[0144] With the addition of these fields, the JPEG image files generated by the drone are signed and include a certificate chain. Once the verifier obtains the image file, they can parse it to obtain the signature information and certificate chain, thereby verifying the image signature and proving whether the image has been tampered with.

[0145] It is understandable that in the JPEG encoding format, the marker field indicating the signature information and certificate chain can also select other fields, and the identifier_code can also select other fields, as long as they are not the same as the fields used in the existing encoding standards.

[0146] (2) For an image file stored in RAW format, its generation method may be as follows.

[0147] Take the DNG format for example. DNG is an extension of TIFF, which is an Adobe format designed to unify the format of RAW images. TIFF files are composed of the following three basic components:

[0148] (1) IFH: image file header, that is, the file header, which contains the byte order and type of the file, and also contains the address of the first IFD.

[0149] (2) IFD: image file directory, which can have multiple directories organized in a linked list-like format. In each directory, except for the initial "cnt", the rest is the IFD entry, also known as the tag.

[0150] (3) Tag: Also called an IFD Entry. Each tag contains a tag_id, data type, number of data items, and value. For data types with a length of less than 4 bytes, the value can be read directly. If the data length is greater than 4 bytes, the value indicates the address of the data.

[0151] Each tag will be marked with a piece of information, such as width, height, image address or other metadata. By identifying the tag, you can find and read the location of image information, thumbnails, etc., and you can also find custom information.

[0152] Based on this, according to the RAW storage format, it includes a tag called DNGPrivateData, which only stores 3a_debug_info. This embodiment can expand the tag based on the original data. For example, signature information and certificate chain can be added after 3a_debug_info. For example, the tag can be expanded to:

[0153]

[0154] The aforementioned sig and crt_list represent the signature information and certificate chain identifiers, respectively. It is understood that the sig field can be named differently, and crt_list can be named differently, as long as they are not identical to the fields already used in existing standards. Furthermore, the locations of these two fields can be stored in the DNGPrivateData segment or in other tags, and this embodiment does not limit this.

[0155] After adding these two fields to the tag, the RAW image files generated by the drone are signed and include a certificate chain. Once the verifier obtains the image file, they can parse it to obtain the signature information and certificate chain, thereby verifying the image signature and proving whether the image has been tampered with.

[0156] As can be seen from the above embodiments, the electronic device can generate an image file with a signature and a certificate chain in JPEG format or RAW format respectively through the above two methods. Since the image file is not affected, it can be used, stored and transmitted in the same way as a normal JPEG format or RAW format image file.

[0157] FIG2C is a flowchart of another data processing method according to an exemplary embodiment of the present specification. The data processing method of this embodiment involves a camera, a memory, a signature interface, and a storage medium (using an SD card as an example in the figure) when the electronic device is running, and includes the following steps:

[0158] Step 201: The camera collects image data; the collected image data is written into the memory.

[0159] Step 202: The camera transmits the memory address to the signature interface to request a signature.

[0160] Step 203: The signature interface accesses the image data according to the memory address.

[0161] Step 204: The signature interface generates signature information based on the image data.

[0162] Step 205: The signature interface returns signature information to the camera.

[0163] Step 206: The camera requests the certificate chain information from the signature interface.

[0164] Step 207: The signature interface returns the certificate chain information to the camera.

[0165] Step 208: The camera writes the image with signature information and certificate chain information into the memory.

[0166] Step 209: The image with signature information and certificate chain information in the memory is stored in the SD card.

[0167] In other examples, as shown in FIG2D , the signature information sig and the certificate chain information crt_list may also be stored separately. For example, the image file, signature information, and certificate chain information in the figure are stored independently and provided to the verifier for verification.

[0168] Taking offline verification as an example, the verifier can obtain the image file file from the electronic device (or other declarant), parse the file, and obtain the signed data data, signature information sig, and certificate chain crt_list.

[0169] An offline verification program can be run on the verification device to verify whether the three certificates in the certificate chain crt_list are valid:

[0170] First, the root certificate in the file is verified to be legitimate. If not, a verification failure is returned. For example, a root certificate is the starting point of a chain of trust, so the obtained root certificate can be considered legitimate. Alternatively, the verification device can obtain the root certificate from a certificate authority in advance and store it locally. The locally stored root certificate is then compared with the root certificate in the file to confirm its consistency. If they are consistent, the certificate is considered legitimate.

[0171] If the root certificate is valid, the first-level sub-certificate will be verified to be valid. That is, the root certificate will be used to verify the first-level sub-certificate. If it is not valid, the verification will be directly returned as failed.

[0172] If the first-level sub-certificate is valid, the device certificate will be verified to be valid. If it is not valid, the verification will be returned as failed.

[0173] If the device certificate is valid, the signature sig is verified. Specifically, the public key key_pub from the device certificate is obtained; the hash value (hash) of the data segment data is calculated, and key_pub is used to decrypt sig to obtain hash'. If hash matches hash', verification is successful. Otherwise, verification fails.

[0174] Through the above method, the verification party can verify whether the photo is forged or maliciously tampered with.

[0175] In other examples, after the verification requester obtains the photo file file from the device (or other declarant), parses the file, obtains the signature sig, and the signature device certificate chain crt_list, online verification is also optional. As shown in Figure 2E, this is a flowchart of an online verification according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification, including:

[0176] Step 211: The verification device sends a verification request for the file to the security server. For example, the verification device sends file, sig, and crt_list to the security server.

[0177] Step 212: The security server requests an OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) server to check whether the certificates in the certificate chain sent by the verification device are revoked.

[0178] Step 213: OCSP checks whether the certificates in the certificate chain are revoked.

[0179] Step 214: OCSP returns the check result. If it is revoked, it directly returns verification failure. Otherwise, proceed to the next step.

[0180] Step 215: The security server verifies the file.

[0181] For example, the security server verifies the validity of the three certificates in the certificate chain crt_list in turn. First, it verifies whether the root certificate is valid. If not, it directly returns verification failure. Otherwise, it continues to verify whether the first-level sub-certificate is valid. If not, it directly returns verification failure. Otherwise, it continues to verify whether the device certificate is valid. If not, it directly returns verification failure. If it is valid, it obtains the public key key_pub in the device certificate. It parses the file file, obtains the signed data segment data, calculates its hash value hash, and uses key_pub to decrypt sig to obtain hash'. Whether the hash is consistent with hash' is determined to determine whether the verification is successful. If they are, the verification is successful, otherwise the verification fails.

[0182] Step 216: The security server returns the verification result to the verification device.

[0183] As can be seen from the above embodiment, the drone camera module in this embodiment can generate a communication file that carries signature information and a certificate chain. Any verifier can verify the ownership and whether it has been maliciously tampered with offline using a single photo file.

[0184] It can be seen that this embodiment has the following advantages:

[0185] Security: In this embodiment, legitimate signatures cannot be forged by attackers. This solution, based on cryptographic properties, offers reliable security. The signature process is initiated by the camera, and authentication is completed by the device's TEE. This ensures that the image signature process is reliable and irreversible, meeting requirements for image file anti-counterfeiting and tamper-proof verification. Image files in formats such as JPEG and RAW can be proven to three parties to be secure and unauthorized.

[0186] High Flexibility: In this embodiment, the drone can independently complete the image signature. The verifier can independently verify the image signature without the need for additional certificate transfer or public key query operations. In industrial applications, the verifier can verify the legitimacy of the photo by holding the root certificate. This certificate is public information and can be obtained from public channels.

[0187] Ease of use: In this embodiment, signature information and certificate chains are encoded into the original image file using encoding formats such as JPEG and RAW. This does not affect the normal reading of the original file and does not add any additional files. The image file generated based on this embodiment is as easy to use as a normal image file.

[0188] Reliability: In this embodiment, the signature private key is protected by TEE and does not need to be disseminated. The photo generation process is irreversible, reducing the overall risk of the solution. Reliability relies on strong mathematically verifiable security guarantees. Users can choose whether to enable this function during use, and the overall solution is reliable.

[0189] FIG3 is a flowchart of another data processing method according to an exemplary embodiment of this specification. This embodiment takes a verification device as an example. The method includes the following steps:

[0190] In step 302, sensing data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate are obtained from the electronic device.

[0191] The sensor data is collected by an electronic device, the signature information is obtained by the electronic device signing the sensor data using a private key stored locally in the electronic device, the device certificate includes a public key corresponding to the private key, and the verification certificate is used to verify the device certificate.

[0192] In step 304, the verification certificate is used to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate.

[0193] In step 306 , after the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0194] In this embodiment, the verification device may obtain the sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate directly from the electronic device, or may obtain them indirectly, which is not limited in this embodiment.

[0195] In some examples, if the sensor data provided by the electronic device to the verification device has not been tampered with, the verification device can use the verification certificate to verify the legitimacy of the device certificate, and then use the signature information and the public key to determine that the received sensor data has not been tampered with after being signed. If the electronic device has tampered with the sensor data after signing it, the sensor data received by the verification device is tampered data. After using the verification certificate to verify the legitimacy of the device certificate, the verification device can use the signature information and the public key to determine that the currently received sensor data is different from the sensor data signed by the electronic device, that is, the sensor data signed by the electronic device has been tampered with after being signed. The specific implementation process can be referred to the aforementioned embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0196] In some examples, the authentication certificate is stored in a file with the sensory data.

[0197] In some examples, at least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data.

[0198] In some examples, storing the verification certificate and the sensor data in a file includes:

[0199] The verification certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0200] In some examples, the processor 301 executes storing at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in a file with the sensor data, including:

[0201] At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0202] In some examples, one or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate.

[0203] In some examples, the identifier is determined based on an encoding format of the sensor data.

[0204] In some examples, the storage location of the verification certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

[0205] In some examples, a storage location of at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in the file is determined according to a storage format of the sensor data.

[0206] In some examples, the sensory data includes any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device.

[0207] In some examples, the verification certificate includes a root certificate, and the device certificate is signed by the root certificate; or

[0208] The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate.

[0209] In some examples, the processor 301 executes the step of verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate by using the verification certificate when the device certificate is issued by a root certificate, including: verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate by using the root certificate; or

[0210] The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is verified by the root certificate to determine whether it is legal, and among the sub-certificates of other levels, each level of sub-certificates is verified by the sub-certificate of the previous level to determine whether it is legal, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to verify whether the device certificate is legal.

[0211] In some examples, the verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority.

[0212] In some examples, the device certificate carries device information of the electronic device.

[0213] In some examples, the processor 301 further performs any of the following steps:

[0214] If the device certificate is verified to be illegal by the verification certificate, outputting a first verification failure message;

[0215] If it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, a second verification failure message is output.

[0216] In some examples, the first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the verification device and / or a user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the verification device.

[0217] In some examples, the processor 301 obtaining the sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate from the electronic device includes:

[0218] Obtain sensor data, signature information, device certificates, and verification certificates sent online by electronic devices; and / or,

[0219] In an offline state, sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate provided by an offline electronic device are obtained.

[0220] In some examples, the processor 301 further executes the acquiring of sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate from the electronic device, including:

[0221] When connected to a storage medium, the sensor data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate stored by the electronic device in the storage medium are read from the storage medium.

[0222] In some examples, the verification device includes:

[0223] Camera equipment, movable platform, remote control device, mobile terminal, audio equipment, computer equipment or server.

[0224] The above-mentioned data processing method embodiment can be implemented by software, or by hardware or a combination of software and hardware. Taking software implementation as an example, as a device in a logical sense, it is formed by the processor in which the data is processed reading the corresponding computer program instructions in the non-volatile memory into the memory for execution. From the hardware level, as shown in Figure 4, it is a hardware structure diagram of a data processing device 400 for implementing the data processing method of this embodiment. In addition to the processor 401 and the memory 402 shown in Figure 4, the data processing device used to implement the data processing method in the embodiment can also include other hardware according to the actual function of the data processing device, which will not be described in detail.

[0225] In this embodiment, the data processing device locally stores a private key, a device certificate, and a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate. The device certificate includes a public key, and the private key and the public key correspond to each other. When the processor 401 executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0226] Acquiring sensor data collected by the electronic device;

[0227] Signing the sensor data using the private key to obtain signature information;

[0228] After the verification certificate verifies that the device certificate is legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0229] In some examples, the processor 401 further performs:

[0230] storing the sensing data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate;

[0231] Verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate using the verification certificate;

[0232] After the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0233] In some examples, the processor 401 further performs:

[0234] The sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate are provided to the verification device, so that the verification device uses the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legal, and then uses the signature information and the public key to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0235] In some examples, the authentication certificate is stored in a file with the sensory data.

[0236] In some examples, at least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data.

[0237] In some examples, storing the verification certificate and the sensor data in a file includes:

[0238] The verification certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0239] In some examples, the processor 401 executes storing at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in a file with the sensor data, including:

[0240] At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0241] In some examples, one or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate.

[0242] In some examples, the identifier is determined based on an encoding format of the sensor data.

[0243] In some examples, the storage location of the verification certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

[0244] In some examples, a storage location of at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in the file is determined according to a storage format of the sensor data.

[0245] In some examples, the processor 401 executes the step of signing the sensor data using the private key to obtain signature information, including:

[0246] The sensor module that collects the sensor data uses the private key to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information.

[0247] In some examples, the electronic device includes a trusted execution environment, and the private key is stored in the trusted execution environment.

[0248] In some examples, the sensing module that collects the sensing data uses the private key to sign the sensing data to obtain signature information, including:

[0249] After the sensor module that collects the sensor data passes the verification of the trusted execution environment, the private key is called to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information.

[0250] In some examples, the sensory data includes data collected by one or more sensor modules in the electronic device.

[0251] In some examples, the sensory data includes any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device.

[0252] In some examples, the sensing module includes any of the following: a camera module, an audio module, a point cloud module, or a motion control module.

[0253] In some examples, the verification certificate includes a root certificate, and the device certificate is signed by the root certificate; or

[0254] The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate.

[0255] In some examples, the verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority.

[0256] In some examples, the device certificate carries device information of the electronic device.

[0257] In some examples, the processor 401 further performs any of the following steps:

[0258] If the device certificate is verified to be illegal by the verification certificate, outputting a first verification failure message;

[0259] If it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, a second verification failure message is output.

[0260] In some examples, the first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the electronic device and / or a user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the electronic device.

[0261] In some examples, the processor 401 performs the step of providing the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate to the verification device, including:

[0262] Sending the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate to the verification device online; and / or,

[0263] In an offline state, the sensing data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate are provided to an offline verification device.

[0264] In some examples, when the electronic device is connected to a storage medium, the processor 401 further executes:

[0265] The sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate are stored in a storage medium, so that after the storage medium is connected to the verification device for communication connection, the verification device reads the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate from the storage medium.

[0266] In some examples, the data processing device is executed when a signature function of the electronic device is activated.

[0267] In some examples, the processor 401 executes a process for starting a signature function of the electronic device, including:

[0268] Displaying a signature function activation object on a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the electronic device and / or a user interface of another terminal communicatively connected to the electronic device;

[0269] In response to the signature function starting object being triggered by the user, the signature function is started.

[0270] In some examples, the electronic device includes any of the following:

[0271] Camera equipment, movable platform, lidar, mobile terminal, audio equipment or computer equipment.

[0272] As shown in FIG5 , this is another hardware structure diagram of a data processing device 400 for implementing the data processing method of this embodiment. In addition to the processor 501 and the memory 502 shown in FIG5 , the data processing device for implementing the data processing method in the embodiment may also include other hardware according to the actual function of the data processing device, which will not be described in detail.

[0273] In this embodiment, when the processor 501 executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0274] Acquire sensor data, signature information, a device certificate, and a verification certificate from an electronic device. The sensor data is collected by the electronic device, the signature information is obtained by the electronic device signing the sensor data using a private key stored locally on the electronic device, the device certificate includes a public key corresponding to the private key, and the verification certificate is used to verify the device certificate.

[0275] The verification certificate is used to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate.

[0276] After the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

[0277] In some examples, the authentication certificate is stored in a file with the sensory data.

[0278] In some examples, at least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data.

[0279] In some examples, storing the verification certificate and the sensor data in a file includes:

[0280] The verification certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0281] In some examples, storing at least one of the signature information and the device certificate together with the sensor data in a file includes:

[0282] At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

[0283] In some examples, one or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate.

[0284] In some examples, the identifier is determined based on an encoding format of the sensor data.

[0285] In some examples, the storage location of the verification certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

[0286] In some examples, a storage location of at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in the file is determined according to a storage format of the sensor data.

[0287] In some examples, the sensory data includes any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device.

[0288] In some examples, the verification certificate includes a root certificate, and the device certificate is signed by the root certificate; or

[0289] The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate.

[0290] In some examples, the device certificate is issued by a root certificate, and the using the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate includes: using the root certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate; or

[0291] The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is verified by the root certificate to determine whether it is legal, and among the sub-certificates of other levels, each level of sub-certificates is verified by the sub-certificate of the previous level to determine whether it is legal, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to verify whether the device certificate is legal.

[0292] In some examples, the verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority.

[0293] In some examples, the device certificate carries device information of the electronic device.

[0294] In some examples, when the processor 501 executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0295] If the device certificate is verified to be illegal by the verification certificate, outputting a first verification failure message;

[0296] If it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, a second verification failure message is output.

[0297] In some examples, the first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the verification device and / or a user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the verification device.

[0298] In some examples, obtaining sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate from the electronic device includes:

[0299] After communicating with the electronic device, obtaining the sensor data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate sent by the electronic device; and / or,

[0300] After being communicatively connected with the storage medium, the sensing data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate stored by the electronic device in the storage medium are read from the storage medium.

[0301] In some examples, the verification device includes:

[0302] Camera equipment, movable platform, remote control device, mobile terminal, audio equipment, computer equipment or server.

[0303] As shown in FIG6 , this embodiment further provides an electronic device, which includes a processor 61 , a memory 62 , and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, wherein the processor implements an embodiment of the aforementioned data processing method when executing the computer program.

[0304] As shown in FIG7 , this embodiment further provides a verification device, which includes a processor 71 , a memory 71 , and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the embodiment of the aforementioned data processing method is implemented.

[0305] As shown in FIG8 , this embodiment further provides a drone 80, which includes:

[0306] fuselage 81;

[0307] a power system 811 , disposed in the fuselage 81 and configured to provide power to the UAV;

[0308] Also, a processor 812 and a memory 813 are provided in the body 81, wherein the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, an embodiment of the aforementioned data processing method is implemented.

[0309] This embodiment further provides a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed, the embodiment of the aforementioned data processing method is implemented.

[0310] This embodiment further provides a computer program product, including a computer program, which implements the embodiment of the aforementioned data processing method when executed by a processor.

[0311] The embodiments of this specification may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing program code. Computer-usable storage media include permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, and information storage can be achieved by any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Examples of computer storage media include but are not limited to: phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, read-only compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transmission medium that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device.

[0312] The steps of the various methods described above are divided only for clarity of description. During implementation, they can be combined into one step or some steps can be split and decomposed into multiple steps. As long as they contain the same logical relationship, they are all within the scope of protection of this patent; adding insignificant modifications or introducing insignificant designs to the algorithm or process, but not changing the core design of its algorithm and process, are all within the scope of protection of this application. In addition, the processes depicted in the drawings do not necessarily require the specific order or continuous order shown to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.

[0313] The phrases "specific examples" or "some examples" mean that the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of this specification. In this specification, schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.

[0314] For the device embodiments, since they basically correspond to the method embodiments, the relevant parts can be referred to the partial description of the method embodiments. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment. A person of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without expending creative work.

[0315] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. The terms "comprise", "include" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device that includes a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements that are not explicitly listed, or also includes elements that are inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprises a..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device that includes the element.

[0316] The above is a detailed introduction to the methods and devices provided in the embodiments of the present invention. Specific examples are used herein to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present invention. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the methods and core ideas of the present invention. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the ideas of the present invention, there may be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scopes. In summary, the contents of this specification should not be understood as limiting the present invention.

[0317] Other embodiments of the present invention will readily occur to those skilled in the art upon consideration of the present invention and practice of the invention claimed herein. This specification is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of the present invention that follow the general principles of this specification and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not claimed herein. The description and examples are to be considered as exemplary only, with the true scope and spirit of the present invention being indicated by the following claims.

Claims

1. A data processing method, applied to an electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device locally stores a private key, a device certificate, and a verification certificate for verifying the device certificate, the device certificate includes a public key, the private key and the public key correspond to each other, and the method includes: Acquiring sensor data collected by the electronic device; Signing the sensor data using the private key to obtain signature information; After the verification certificate verifies that the device certificate is legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: storing the sensing data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate; Verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate using the verification certificate; After the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate are provided to the verification device, so that the verification device uses the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legal, and then uses the signature information and the public key to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The verification certificate and the sensor data are stored in a file.

5. The method according to claim 1 or 4, characterized in that At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The storage of the verification certificate and the sensor data in one file includes: The verification certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

7. The method according to claim 5 or 6, characterized in that At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data, including: At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that One or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that The identifier is determined according to the encoding format of the sensor data.

10. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The storage location of the verification certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

11. The method according to claim 5 or 10, characterized in that The storage location of at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

12. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of signing the sensor data using the private key to obtain signature information includes: The sensor module that collects the sensor data uses the private key to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information.

13. The method according to claim 1 or 12, characterized in that The electronic device includes a trusted execution environment, and the private key is stored in the trusted execution environment.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that The sensor module that collects the sensor data uses the private key to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information, including: After the sensor module that collects the sensor data passes the verification of the trusted execution environment, the private key is called to sign the sensor data to obtain signature information.

15. The method according to claim 1, wherein The sensor data includes data collected by one or more sensor modules in the electronic device.

16. The method according to claim 1, wherein The sensor data includes any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device.

17. The method according to claim 12, 14 or 15, characterized in that The sensing module includes any one of the following: a camera module, an audio module, a point cloud module or a motion control module.

18. The method according to claim 1, wherein The verification certificate includes a root certificate, and the device certificate is issued by the root certificate; or, The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate.

19. The method according to claim 1, wherein The verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority.

20. The method according to claim 1, wherein The device certificate carries device information of the electronic device.

21. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 20, characterized in that The method further comprises any of the following steps: If the device certificate is verified to be illegal by the verification certificate, outputting a first verification failure message; If it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, a second verification failure message is output.

22. The method according to claim 21, characterized in that The first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the electronic device and / or a user interface of another terminal that is communicatively connected to the electronic device.

23. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Providing the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate to the verification device includes: Sending the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate to the verification device online; and / or, In an offline state, the sensing data, the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate are provided to an offline verification device.

24. The method according to claim 1, 3 or 23, characterized in that In the case where the electronic device is connected to a storage medium, the method further includes: The sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate are stored in a storage medium, so that after the storage medium is connected to the verification device, the verification device reads the sensor data, the signature information, the device certificate and the verification certificate from the storage medium.

25. The method according to claim 1, wherein The data processing method is executed when the signature function of the electronic device is activated.

26. The method according to claim 25, characterized in that The process of starting the signature function of the electronic device includes: Displaying a signature function activation object on a user interface; the user interface includes a user interface of the electronic device and / or a user interface of another terminal communicatively connected to the electronic device; In response to the signature function starting object being triggered by the user, the signature function is started.

27. The method according to claim 1, wherein The electronic device includes any one of the following: Camera equipment, movable platform, lidar, mobile terminal, audio equipment or computer equipment.

28. A data processing method, characterized in that: The method is applied to a verification device, and the method includes: Acquiring sensor data, signature information, a device certificate, and a verification certificate from the electronic device, wherein the sensor data is collected by the electronic device, the signature information is obtained by the electronic device signing the sensor data using a private key locally stored in the electronic device, the device certificate includes a public key corresponding to the private key, and the verification certificate is used to verify the device certificate; Verifying whether the device certificate is legitimate using the verification certificate; After the device certificate is verified to be legitimate, the signature information and the public key are used to determine whether the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed.

29. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that The verification certificate and the sensor data are stored in a file.

30. The method according to claim 28 or 29, characterized in that At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data.

31. The method according to claim 29, wherein The storage of the verification certificate and the sensor data in one file includes: The verification certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

32. The method according to claim 30 or 31, characterized in that At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a file with the sensor data, including: At least one of the signature information and the device certificate is stored in a free storage location of the sensor data.

33. The method according to claim 28, wherein One or more identifiers are used to indicate the signature information, the device certificate, and the verification certificate.

34. The method according to claim 33, wherein The identifier is determined according to the encoding format of the sensor data.

35. The method according to claim 29, wherein The storage location of the verification certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

36. The method according to claim 30 or 35, characterized in that The storage location of at least one of the signature information and the device certificate in the file is determined according to the storage format of the sensor data.

37. The method according to claim 28, wherein The sensor data includes any of the following: images, audio, point clouds, or movement trajectory data of the electronic device.

38. The method according to claim 28, wherein The verification certificate includes a root certificate, and the device certificate is issued by the root certificate; or, The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more levels of sub-certificates; among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is issued by the root certificate, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is issued by the sub-certificate of the previous level, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to issue the device certificate.

39. The method according to claim 38, characterized in that The device certificate is issued by a root certificate, and the using the verification certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate includes: using the root certificate to verify whether the device certificate is legitimate; or, The verification certificate includes: a root certificate, and one or more sub-certificates; Among the one or more levels of sub-certificates, the highest level sub-certificate is verified by the root certificate for legitimacy, and each level of sub-certificates in other levels is verified by the sub-certificate of the previous level for legitimacy, and the lowest level sub-certificate is used to verify the legitimacy of the device certificate.

40. The method according to claim 28, wherein The verification certificate is issued by a certificate authority.

41. The method according to claim 28, wherein The device certificate carries device information of the electronic device.

42. The method according to claim 28, wherein The method further comprises any of the following steps: If the device certificate is verified to be illegal by the verification certificate, outputting a first verification failure message; If it is determined that the sensor data has been tampered with after being signed, a second verification failure message is output.

43. The method according to claim 42, characterized in that The first verification failure information and / or the second verification failure information is output in a user interface; the user interface includes the user interface of the verification device and / or the user interface of other terminals that are communicatively connected to the verification device.

44. The method according to claim 28, wherein The step of obtaining sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate from the electronic device includes: Acquire sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate sent online by an electronic device; and / or, in an offline state, acquire sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate provided by an offline electronic device.

45. The method according to claim 28 or 44, characterized in that The step of obtaining sensor data, signature information, device certificate, and verification certificate from the electronic device includes: When the storage medium is accessed, the sensing data, signature information, device certificate and verification certificate stored by the electronic device in the storage medium are read from the storage medium.

46. ​​The method according to claim 28, wherein The verification device comprises: Camera equipment, movable platform, remote control device, mobile terminal, audio equipment, computer equipment or server.

47. A data processing device, characterized in that: The device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 46 is implemented.

48. An electronic device, characterized in that The electronic device includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 27 is implemented.

49. A verification device, characterized in that The verification device further includes a processor, a memory, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable by the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the method according to any one of claims 28 to 46 is implemented.

50. A drone, characterized in that: The drone includes: body; a power system, disposed in the fuselage, for providing power to the UAV; Also, a processor and a memory are provided in the body, the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor, and the processor implements any one of the methods described in claims 1 to 46 when executing the computer program.

51. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed, implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 46.

52. A computer program product, characterized in that The invention comprises a computer program, which implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 46 when executed by a processor.

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