Trusted data acquisition method, device and system and readable storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses a trusted data acquisition method, device and system and a readable storage medium, the trusted data acquisition method, device and system are applied to terminal equipment of the trusted data acquisition system, the terminal equipment is provided with an image acquisition component, the trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module, and the terminal equipment is connected with the trusted storage module. The method comprises: in response to an image data acquisition request, determining a target security state of a terminal device based on specified information, the specified information comprising at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device; if the target security state is secure, acquiring target image data required by the image data acquisition request based on an image acquisition component; obtaining first metadata of the target image data; and the target image data and the first metadata are spliced and then uploaded to a trusted storage module for storage. According to the method and the device, the convenience of confirming the credibility of the data can be improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of data technology, and more specifically, to a trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium. Background Art

[0002] At present, with the development of electronic information technology, data can be generated through terminal devices. Although the credibility of the data can be confirmed, the existing method for confirming the credibility of the data is relatively cumbersome. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present application proposes a trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium.

[0004] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted data acquisition method, which is applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system, wherein the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, and the trusted data acquisition system further includes a trusted storage module, and the terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module, wherein the method includes: in response to an image data acquisition request, determining a target security state of the terminal device based on specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device; if the target security state is safe, acquiring target image data required for the image data acquisition request based on the image acquisition component; acquiring first metadata of the target image data; and splicing the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0005] In the second aspect, the embodiment of the present application also provides a trusted data acquisition device, which is applied to a terminal device of a trusted data acquisition system, wherein the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, and the trusted data acquisition system further includes a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module, and the device includes: a state determination unit, an acquisition unit, an acquisition unit, and an upload unit. Among them, the state determination unit is used to determine the target security state of the terminal device based on specified information in response to an image data acquisition request, and the specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information; the acquisition unit is used to acquire the target image data required for the image data acquisition request based on the image acquisition component if the target security state is safe; the acquisition unit is used to acquire the first metadata of the target image data; the upload unit is used to splice the target image data and the first metadata and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0006] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides an image trusted data acquisition system, the system comprising a terminal device, the terminal device being provided with an image acquisition component, the image trusted data acquisition system further comprising a trusted storage module, the terminal device being connected to the trusted storage module; the terminal device being used to execute the method described in the first aspect.

[0007] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a program code is stored. The program code can be called by a processor to execute the method described in the first aspect above.

[0008] The trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium provided by the embodiment of the present application are applied to the terminal device of the trusted data acquisition system. First, in response to the image data acquisition request, the target security state of the terminal device is determined based on the specified information; if the target security state is safe, the target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component; the first metadata of the target image data is acquired; the target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. That is to say, the target image data is acquired only when the target security state is safe, so as to ensure that the acquired image data is not generated by a device tampered with by a third party, and the credibility of the obtained target image data is ensured more conveniently. And, the target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Since the data stored in the trusted storage module is generally unmodifiable, the credibility of the target image data can be further improved by splicing the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage while ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0009] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0010] Figure 1 A structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition system provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0011] Figure 2 A method flow chart of a method for obtaining trusted data provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0012] Figure 3A schematic diagram showing the first metadata in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0013] Figure 4 A method flow chart of a method for obtaining trusted data provided by another embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0014] Figure 5 A method flow chart of a method for obtaining trusted data provided by another embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0015] Figure 6 A structural block diagram of a trusted data acquisition device provided by another embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0016] Figure 7 A structural block diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0017] Figure 8 A structural block diagram of a computer program product provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0018] In order to make those skilled in the art better understand the present application scheme, the technical scheme in the present application embodiment will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the present application embodiment. Obviously, the described embodiment is only a part of the present application embodiment, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the present application embodiment usually described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for protection, but merely represents the selected embodiment of the present application. Based on the embodiments of the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative work belong to the scope of protection of the present application.

[0019] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters represent similar items in the following drawings, so once an item is defined in one drawing, it does not need to be further defined and explained in subsequent drawings. At the same time, in the description of this application, the terms "first", "second", etc. are only used to distinguish the description and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance.

[0020] At present, with the development of electronic information technology, data can be generated through terminal devices. Although the credibility of the data can be confirmed. However, the existing methods for confirming the credibility of data are relatively cumbersome. How to improve the convenience of confirming the credibility of data is an urgent problem to be solved.

[0021] Currently, a terminal device can generate data. For example, the terminal device can be equipped with an image acquisition component, so that the terminal device can acquire image data through the image acquisition component. For the generated image data, the credibility of the image data needs to be determined.

[0022] For example, the generated data can be registered through copyright registration, and the copyright of the image data can be registered with the National Copyright Administration or its authorized agency to obtain a copyright certificate, thereby proving the credibility of the image data.

[0023] For another example, a watermark can be added to the image data to add a mark, which can usually include text, pattern, date and other information. This can effectively prevent others from stealing or tampering with the image data, making the image data credible.

[0024] However, the inventors found in their research that confirming the credibility of image data through copyright registration has problems such as cumbersome copyright registration process, extra fees or limited validity of copyright registration certificates. Confirming the credibility of image data through adding watermarks has problems such as watermarks being easily removed or replaced, which may affect the appearance and integrity of image data.

[0025] Therefore, in order to solve or partially solve the above problems, the present application provides a trusted data acquisition method, device, system and readable storage medium.

[0026] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1 The structure block diagram of the trusted data acquisition system provided by the embodiment of the present application is shown. The trusted data acquisition system 100 includes a terminal device 110 and a trusted storage module 120, wherein the terminal device 110 is connected to the trusted storage module 120. The terminal device 110 is also provided with an image acquisition component 111.

[0027] The terminal device 110 and the trusted storage module 120 can be connected via the Internet. For example, the terminal device 110 can access the Internet, for example, through a cellular data network, or through wireless communication technology Wi-Fi. Similarly, the trusted storage module 120 can also access the Internet, so that the terminal device 110 and the trusted storage module 120 can achieve data communication.

[0028] For some implementations, the trusted storage module 120 may be a blockchain storage, wherein the blockchain storage has the characteristics of decentralization, non-tamperability, and traceability. In other words, the trusted data may be stored in the trusted storage module 120, thereby ensuring that the trusted data stored in the trusted storage module 120 will not be tampered with, that is, the credibility of the trusted data may be ensured.

[0029] The trusted data may be image data, and the terminal device 110 may collect the image data based on the image acquisition component 111 as the trusted data, and then store the image data in the trusted storage module 120. For a specific introduction to the trusted data acquisition method, please refer to the subsequent embodiments.

[0030] See also Figure 2 , Figure 2 A method flow chart of a method for obtaining trusted data provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown. The trusted data obtaining method can be applied to Figure 1 The trusted data acquisition system shown can specifically use the terminal device in the trusted data acquisition system as the execution subject of the trusted data acquisition method, which includes steps S110 to S140.

[0031] Step S110: In response to the image data acquisition request, determine the target security state of the terminal device based on designated information, where the designated information includes at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device.

[0032] The terminal device can respond to the image data acquisition request to obtain the target image data required by the image data acquisition request. However, if the image acquisition component set on the terminal device is directly called to acquire the target image data in response to the image data acquisition request, if the information in the terminal device has been tampered with, or the terminal device is forged or simulated by a third party, the credibility of the directly acquired target image data is low.

[0033] Therefore, in an embodiment provided by the present application, after detecting an image data acquisition request, in response to the image data acquisition request, the target security state of the terminal device is first determined based on the specified information. Subsequently, if the target security state is determined to be safe, the target image data is further acquired, thereby ensuring the credibility of the target image data to a certain extent.

[0034] Among them, the image data acquisition request can be a request generated by a terminal device, for example, it can be a request generated by a user controlling the terminal device; it can also be a request sent to the terminal device by other devices that have established a communication connection with the terminal device, and the embodiments of the present application do not make specific limitations.

[0035] The designated information may include at least one of the hardware information and software information of the terminal device, so that the target security state of the terminal device can be determined based on the designated information. In other words, if the designated information of the terminal device is tampered with or counterfeited, the target security state of the terminal device can be determined to be non-secure, and then the second prompt information for indicating non-security can be generated in time. For details, please refer to the introduction of the subsequent embodiments.

[0036] Step S120: If the target security status is safe, the target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component.

[0037] Further, after obtaining the target security status, if the target security status is safe, the target image data required by the image data acquisition request can be acquired based on the image acquisition component.

[0038] The target security state is safe, which can be used to indicate that no tampering or counterfeiting of the hardware or software in the terminal device is detected. At this time, the image acquisition component is controlled to acquire the target image data required by the image data acquisition request, thereby ensuring the credibility of the acquired target image data.

[0039] Among them, the target image data may be image data corresponding to the image data acquisition request. For example, if the image data acquisition request is to take a document image, then the target image data may be image data related to evidence. For another example, if the image data acquisition request is to take a portrait image, then the target image data may be image data related to the portrait.

[0040] Step S130: Acquire first metadata of the target image data.

[0041] It is understandable that when the target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component, the first metadata of the target image data can also be acquired, and the first metadata and the target image data have a corresponding relationship. The target image data can be further associated with the first data to further improve the credibility of the target image data.

[0042] See also Figure 3 , Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the first metadata in an embodiment of the present application is shown. In some embodiments, the first metadata may include hardware parameters of the terminal device and shooting parameters of the target image data. The first metadata may be information corresponding to the target image data. The first metadata may be used to describe the attributes or content of the target image data, and may also be used to verify the authenticity and integrity of the target image data. For example Figure 3, the first metadata 300 is shown, and the first metadata 300 includes hardware parameters 320 and shooting parameters 310 of target image data. The shooting parameters 310 of the target image data may include shooting time 311, shooting location 312, shooting resolution 313, and other information 314 of the target image data, and other information may include sensitivity, exposure time, white balance or flash, etc.; the hardware parameters 320 of the terminal device may include processor model 321, camera model 322, memory capacity 323, etc. The first metadata 300 also includes a tag 390 of the target image data, so that the shooting time 311, shooting location 312, shooting resolution 313, other information 314, processor model 321, camera model 322 and memory capacity 323 can all correspond to the tag 390 of the target image data. The tag 390 of the target image data may be a tag information used to characterize the identity of the target image data, so that the hardware parameters 320 and the shooting parameters 310 can establish an association relationship with the corresponding target image data through the tag 390 of the target image data.

[0043] Different terminal devices may generate different first metadata, and may use different formats and standards to store the first metadata, which is not specifically limited in this application. The first metadata can be obtained through the system application programming interface (Application Programming Interface, API) provided by the terminal device, while the first metadata cannot be obtained for an illegally simulated terminal device, thereby ensuring the authenticity of the terminal device, rather than an illegally simulated device.

[0044] As an exemplary example, the shooting parameters of the image data may also be stored in the shooting parameter table shown in Table 1 below.

[0045] Table 1 Shooting parameters

[0046]

[0047]

[0048] As can be seen from the shooting parameter table in Table 1, there are multiple items and information corresponding to each item, so that the shooting parameters of the acquired image data can be stored in the form of a table.

[0049] It can be understood that the first metadata shown in the above example is only an example and does not constitute a limitation to the embodiments of the present application. In actual applications, it can be flexibly adjusted as needed.

[0050] Step S140: splicing the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0051] Furthermore, after obtaining the target image data and the first metadata, the target image data and the first metadata can be spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The trusted storage module can be a blockchain storage, which can ensure that the uploaded data is not tampered with, forged, deleted, or copied, thereby ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the target image data, that is, ensuring the credibility of the target image data. Optionally, the trusted storage module can also be a distributed storage involving multiple parties or a trusted storage solution based on confidential computing.

[0052] Optionally, since the target image data and the first metadata are uploaded to the trusted storage module, in subsequent scenarios where the target image data is needed, the source, shooting time, location and other information of the target image data can be quickly and conveniently verified by searching the first metadata, thereby improving the convenience of subsequent calls to the target image data.

[0053] For some implementations, the target image data and the first metadata may be spliced ​​and uploaded directly to the trusted storage module for storage; or the target image data and the first metadata may be spliced ​​and then the spliced ​​data may be signed or encrypted, and the signed or encrypted data and the target image data may be uploaded to the trusted storage module together, and the signed or encrypted data and the target image data may be stored correspondingly. Exemplarily, a hash calculation may be performed on the spliced ​​data to obtain a corresponding hash value.

[0054] The trusted data acquisition method provided by the embodiment of the present application is applied to the terminal device of the trusted data acquisition system. First, in response to the image data acquisition request, the target security state of the terminal device is determined based on the specified information; if the target security state is safe, the target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component; the first metadata of the target image data is acquired; the target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. That is to say, the target image data is acquired only when the target security state is safe, so as to ensure that the acquired image data is not generated by a device tampered with by a third party, and the credibility of the obtained target image data is ensured more conveniently. And, the target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Since the data stored in the trusted storage module is generally unmodifiable, the credibility of the target image data can be further improved by splicing the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage while ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data.

[0055] See also Figure 4 , Figure 4 A method flow chart of a method for obtaining trusted data provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown. The trusted data obtaining method can be applied to Figure 1 The trusted data acquisition system shown can specifically use the terminal device in the trusted data acquisition system as the execution subject of the trusted data acquisition method, including steps S210 to S2120.

[0056] Step S210: In response to an image data acquisition request, generating first verification data based on verification information of the hardware information.

[0057] In some implementations, the designated information includes hardware information and software information, so that the target security state of the terminal device can be comprehensively determined based on the hardware information and the software information respectively.

[0058] Exemplarily, the hardware information may include the model of the terminal device, the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), the CPU model, the memory size, the model of the image acquisition module, the lens model used by the image acquisition module, etc. The hardware information may correspond to verification information, for example, the hash value obtained by performing a hash operation on the hardware information is the verification information of the hardware information.

[0059] Furthermore, the first verification data can also be generated based on the verification information, for example, by signing the verification information with a pre-acquired digital certificate, thereby obtaining the first verification data. Since the first verification data is obtained by signing with a digital certificate, a trusted institution that also holds a digital certificate can verify the signature of the first verification data, thereby confirming that the hardware information of the terminal device that generates the signed information has not been tampered with. If a third party tampers with some hardware information of the terminal device, the verification information of the hardware information will change, and the first verification data obtained will not be able to be verified by a trusted institution that also holds a digital certificate, thereby proving that the tampered hardware information is unreliable.

[0060] Specifically, step S211 and step S212 may be included when executing step S210.

[0061] Step S211: in response to the image data acquisition request, obtaining verification information of hardware information in the trusted execution environment of the terminal device.

[0062] Step S212: Sign the verification information based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance to obtain first verification data.

[0063] The terminal device also includes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which can be used to provide a trusted execution environment for the terminal device. Among them, the terminal device can also include a Rich Execution Environment (REE), which is a common execution environment for terminal devices. When the terminal device runs an application, it can run in a trusted execution environment; it can also run in a rich execution environment. Exemplary, for example, opening a music player application, opening an album application, etc. can be run in a rich execution environment; in cases related to security or trustworthiness, such as modifying the lock screen password, making payments through a payment application, etc., it can be executed in a trusted execution environment.

[0064] Among them, the trusted computing platform module is a security chip, which can specifically include a trusted storage root (Root of Trust for Storage, RTS) and a trusted reporting root (Root of Trust for Report, RTR). RTS is responsible for generating and storing the keys of the terminal device, including the endorsement key (Endorsement Key, EK), the storage root key (Storage Root Key, SRK) and the application key (Access Key Id, AK). The storage root key is the highest level storage key, which is used to protect other keys. The application key is a key used for a specific application, such as a signature key, a binding key, a sealing key, etc. The trusted reporting root is responsible for generating and verifying the proof of the terminal device, that is, proving the identity and status of the terminal device to an external entity. The proof process mainly depends on the platform identity authentication key (Attestation Identity Key, AIK) and the platform configuration register (Platform Configuration Register, PCR). The platform identity authentication key is an anonymous identity authentication key, which is used to replace the endorsement key for remote authentication to protect the privacy of the endorsement key. The platform configuration register is a register used to record the status of the mobile phone, which is used to prove whether the mobile phone is in a trusted state.

[0065] The information or data generated in the trusted computing platform module of the terminal device can be signed by the trusted computing platform module according to the corresponding first digital certificate, thereby ensuring the credibility of the signed data or information.

[0066] The trusted computing platform module has an unmodifiable and non-migratable identity authentication key. Specifically, the identity authentication key can be an endorsement key, which can represent the true identity of each trusted computing platform module. Each trusted computing platform module has a unique endorsement key, which is the unique cryptographic identity of the trusted computing platform module.

[0067] Exemplarily, when the trusted computing platform module leaves the factory, the manufacturer may generate a random number as the endorsement primary seed (EPS) and store it in the non-volatile memory inside the trusted computing platform module. When the trusted computing platform module needs to generate an endorsement key, the key derivation function (KDF) may be called according to the endorsement primary seed and some fixed parameters to obtain the private key part of the endorsement key. The fixed parameters may be, for example, key type, algorithm, purpose, etc.

[0068] The trusted computing platform module then calculates the public key part of the endorsement key based on the private key part of the endorsement key, and forms a key pair with the private key part. The trusted computing platform module will apply for a digital certificate for the endorsement key. The digital certificate is issued by the manufacturer of the trusted computing platform module or a trusted third-party certificate authority to prove that the endorsement key is generated and protected by a real trusted computing platform module. The issued digital certificate is the first digital certificate. In other words, the data signed by the first digital certificate in the trusted computing platform module is trusted data.

[0069] In some implementations, the data generated in the trusted computing platform module may be signed by a platform authentication key, for example, the data may be signed based on a first digital certificate.

[0070] Among them, the platform authentication key is a key used for the authentication of the trusted computing platform module. The platform authentication key can be generated based on the endorsement key of the trusted computing platform module, and is used to sign the data generated by the trusted computing platform module to prove the identity and status of the trusted computing platform module. The generation process of the platform authentication key requires the support of a trusted third-party certificate authority. The certificate authority will verify the platform authentication key request and sign the certificate, which can be used as the first digital certificate. Optionally, there can be multiple platform authentication keys, each corresponding to a specific platform configuration or application scenario.

[0071] Therefore, in response to the image data acquisition request, verification information of the hardware information can be obtained in the trusted execution environment of the terminal device, and the verification information is signed based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance to obtain the first verification data.

[0072] Step S220: Determine a first safety state based on the first verification data.

[0073] Furthermore, the first security state can be determined based on the first verification data. It should be noted that the first security state is only determined based on the first verification data and cannot directly represent the target security state of the terminal device. The target security state can be determined by combining the second security state with the first security state.

[0074] In some embodiments, if the first verification data can be verified by a third-party certificate authority that also holds the first digital certificate, the first security state can be determined to be secure; if the first verification data cannot be verified by a third-party certificate authority that also holds the first digital certificate, the first security state can be determined to be insecure.

[0075] Step S230: Obtain a hash value of the software information as second verification data, the software information including at least one of first software information and second software information, the first software information including at least one of basic input / output system information, boot program information and operating system kernel information, the second software information is software information of an application program that responds to the image data acquisition request.

[0076] Furthermore, the designated information also includes software information, so the second security state can also be determined through the software information, and then the target security state can be determined in combination with the second security state and the first security state, thereby improving the accuracy of determining the target security state.

[0077] In some embodiments, the software information may include at least one of first software information and second software information, wherein the first software information includes at least one of basic input and output system information, boot program information, and operating system kernel information, and the second software information is software information of an application program that responds to the image data acquisition request. For example, the second software information may be software information corresponding to a camera application program; for another example, the second software information may also be software information corresponding to a blockchain camera application program.

[0078] That is, the software information may include only the first software information; may include only the second software information; or may include both the first software information and the second software information.

[0079] In the case where the software information includes the first software information and the second software information, when executing step S230, step S231 and step S232 may also be included.

[0080] Step S231: Obtain a first hash value of the first software information and a second hash value of the second software information.

[0081] Step S232: using the first hash value and the second hash value as second verification data.

[0082] It is understandable that for the same software information, the corresponding hash value is the same. That is, if the software information is illegally tampered with, the hash value of the tampered software information will also change, so that the software information can be subsequently determined to be tampered with by the hash value.

[0083] Therefore, in some embodiments, the first hash value of the first software information may be obtained. Exemplarily, obtaining the first hash value of the first software information may be to perform a hash operation on the software information, and the result value of the hash operation is the first hash value. Exemplarily, the first software information may be hashed by executing a root of trust for measurement (RTM). The root of trust for measurement may be a fixed program stored in the terminal device.

[0084] Take the example that the first software information includes basic input / output system information, boot program information and operating system kernel information. At this time, hash operations can be performed on the basic input / output system information, the boot program information and the operating system kernel information respectively, and the first result value after the basic input / output system information is hashed, the second result value after the boot program information is hashed and the third result value after the operating system kernel information is hashed is used as the first hash value.

[0085] Furthermore, since the image data acquisition request can be responded to through the application, the image acquisition component of the terminal device can be controlled based on the application to acquire the target image data. Therefore, the second software information can be the software information of the application that responds to the image data acquisition request. Similar to obtaining the first hash value, if the second software information is illegally tampered with, the hash value of the tampered second software information will also change. Therefore, the second hash value of the second software information can also be obtained, and the first hash value and the second hash value can be used as the second verification data. Therefore, the second security state can be determined based on the second verification data, and the target security state can be determined based on the first security state and the second security state, thereby improving the accuracy of determining the target security state.

[0086] Similar to obtaining the first hash value, obtaining the second hash value of the second software information may be to perform a hash operation on the second software information, thereby obtaining a result value after the hash operation on the second software information as the second hash value. Exemplarily, the second software information may also be hashed by executing a trusted measurement root.

[0087] Further, after the first hash value and the second hash value are obtained, the first hash value and the second hash value may be used as second verification data, and the second verification data may be used to subsequently determine target verification data.

[0088] Step S240: Determine a second safety state based on the second verification data.

[0089] Since the second verification data includes a hash value, specifically includes at least one of the first hash value and the second hash value. In the case where the software information includes the first software information and the second software information, the second verification data may include the first hash value and the second hash value.

[0090] Therefore, when executing step S240, steps S241 to S244 may also be included.

[0091] As can be seen from the above introduction, if the software information is illegally tampered with, the corresponding hash value will change. Therefore, the standard hash value corresponding to the software information can be obtained in advance, so that the hash value of the software information can be compared with the standard hash value to determine the second security state.

[0092] Step S241: obtaining a first difference between the first hash value and a first standard hash value, where the first standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the first software information.

[0093] Step S242: Obtain a second difference between the second hash value and a second standard hash value, where the second standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the second software information.

[0094] Specifically, the first hash value may be compared with a first standard hash value to obtain a first difference between the first hash value and the first standard hash value, wherein the first standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the first software information.

[0095] In some implementations, the first standard hash value may be pre-stored in a platform configuration register (PCR). Thus, the acquired first hash value may be compared with the first standard hash value stored in the platform configuration register to determine the first difference.

[0096] It should be noted that if the first software information is changed, for example, the first software information is updated, a first standard hash value corresponding to the changed first software information may be generated.

[0097] Similarly, the second hash value may be compared with a second standard hash value to obtain a second difference between the second hash value and the second standard hash value, wherein the second standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the second software information.

[0098] In some implementations, the second standard hash value may be pre-stored in the trusted computing platform module. Thus, the acquired second hash value may be compared with the second standard hash value stored in the trusted computing platform to determine the second difference.

[0099] Step S243: If the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold, and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold, then the second safety state is determined to be safe.

[0100] Step S244: If the first difference is greater than a first threshold or the second difference is greater than a second threshold, the second safety state is determined to be unsafe.

[0101] Furthermore, if the first difference is larger, the difference between the first hash value and the first standard hash value is larger, and the first software information is more likely to be illegally tampered with. Similarly, if the second difference is larger, the difference between the second hash value and the second standard hash value is larger, and the second software information is more likely to be illegally tampered with.

[0102] Therefore, the first threshold and the second threshold may be preset, and then the magnitude relationship between the first difference and the first threshold may be determined, and the magnitude relationship between the second difference and the second threshold may be determined.

[0103] For some implementation modes, the second safety state may be determined to be safe only when the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold.

[0104] If at least one of the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold is not satisfied, that is, the first difference is greater than the first threshold or the second difference is greater than the second threshold, the second safety state is determined to be unsafe. Thus, the situation of misjudging unsafe as safe can be minimized.

[0105] Step S250: Determine the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0106] Further, after the first security state and the second security state are acquired, the target security state may be determined based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0107] In some implementations, in order to improve the trustworthiness of the determination as safe, the target safety state may be determined to be safe only when both the first safety state and the second safety state are safe. If the first safety state or the second safety state is unsafe, the target safety state is determined to be unsafe.

[0108] Specifically, if the first security state is safe and the second security state is unsafe, the target security state is determined to be unsafe; if the first security state is unsafe and the second security state is safe, the target security state is determined to be unsafe; if the first security state is unsafe and the second security state is unsafe, the target security state is determined to be unsafe. This can improve the reliability of determining that the target security state is safe.

[0109] Step S251: Whether the target safety state is safe.

[0110] If the target security state is safe, the process may jump to step S260 ; if the target security state is unsafe, the process may jump to step S2120 .

[0111] Step S260: If the target security status is safe, the target image data required by the image data acquisition request is acquired based on the image acquisition component.

[0112] Among them, step S260 has been introduced in detail in the above embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0113] Step S270: Acquire a designated environment in the terminal device for acquiring target image data required by the image data acquisition request.

[0114] Step S280: Acquire verification information of hardware information in the specified environment.

[0115] In some embodiments, since the aforementioned determination of the target security state can be performed in a trusted execution environment of the terminal device, the target image data required for the image data acquisition request can also be acquired in the trusted execution environment based on the image acquisition component. If it is detected that the target image data is not acquired in the trusted execution environment, it can be determined that the target image data is untrustworthy.

[0116] Thus, the designated environment in the terminal device for collecting the target image data required by the image data collection request can also be obtained, and then whether the designated environment is a trusted execution environment is judged. If the designated environment is a trusted execution environment, it indicates that the target image data is data collected in the trusted execution environment, so that the target image data is trustworthy data. The designated environment can include a trusted execution environment or a rich execution environment.

[0117] Furthermore, verification information of the hardware information may be obtained in a specified environment, wherein the verification information may be a hash operation performed on the hardware information in the specified environment, thereby obtaining a result value after the hash operation as the verification information.

[0118] Step S290: Sign the verification information based on the pre-acquired second digital certificate corresponding to the designated environment to obtain third verification data.

[0119] The verification information can be signed by the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment, thereby obtaining the third verification data. It should be noted that, when the specified environment is a trusted execution environment, the second digital certificate is the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment, so that signing the verification information by the second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment is essentially signing the verification information by the first digital certificate. When the specified environment is a rich execution environment, the second digital certificate is essentially the digital certificate corresponding to the rich execution environment. Therefore, the third verification data can be used to determine whether the specified environment used to collect the target image data is a trusted execution environment.

[0120] Step S2100: Acquire first metadata of the target image data.

[0121] Among them, step S2100 has been introduced in detail in the above-mentioned embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0122] Step S2110: splicing the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0123] In some implementations, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data may be spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. Similar to the above-mentioned embodiments, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data may be directly spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module; or the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data may be spliced, and then the spliced ​​data may be signed or encrypted, and the signed or encrypted data and the target image data may be uploaded to the trusted storage module together.

[0124] In other implementations, it is also possible to determine whether the target image data is obtained in a trusted execution environment before uploading to the trusted storage module. Specifically, when executing step S2110, steps S2111 to S2113 may also be included.

[0125] Step S2111: verifying the third verification data based on the pre-acquired first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment.

[0126] Step S2112: If the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The successful verification is used to characterize that the designated environment is the trusted execution environment.

[0127] Step S2113: If the verification fails, a first prompt message is generated to indicate that the verification fails.

[0128] The third verification data can be verified based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance. If the designated environment is a trusted execution environment, the third verification data obtained by signing the verification information of the hardware information based on the second digital certificate corresponding to the designated environment can be verified by the first digital certificate, where the verification can be passed by the verification signature.

[0129] If the verification is successful, the designated environment for obtaining the verification information of the hardware information is a trusted execution environment, and the designated environment is the environment for collecting the target image data. Therefore, it can be known that the target image data is collected in the trusted execution environment, thereby ensuring the credibility of the obtained target image data.

[0130] Furthermore, when the verification is passed, the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0131] Among them, the trusted storage module can be a blockchain storage. In addition, since the target image data is uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage only if the verification is passed in the embodiment of the present application, it is avoided that untrusted image data is also uploaded to the trusted storage module. In addition, since the terminal device and the trusted storage module have a connection relationship, that is, other devices that have not established a connection relationship with the trusted storage module cannot upload data to the trusted storage module at will, which realizes a high degree of control over the trusted storage module and enhances the credibility of the target image data in the trusted storage module.

[0132] However, if the designated environment is not a trusted execution environment, for example, the designated environment is a rich execution environment, the third verification data obtained by signing the verification information of the hardware information based on the second digital certificate corresponding to the designated environment cannot be verified by the first digital certificate, that is, the verification fails, where the verification failure can be the verification signature failure.

[0133] If the verification fails, the specified environment for obtaining the verification information of the hardware information is not a trusted execution environment, and the specified environment is the environment for collecting the target image data. Therefore, it can be known that the target image data is not collected in the trusted execution environment, and the credibility of the obtained target image data cannot be ensured.

[0134] Furthermore, if the verification fails, a first prompt message indicating that the verification has not passed can be generated. The first prompt message can be prompted through the display module of the terminal device, such as displaying "failed the verification"; the first prompt message can also be prompted through other devices that have pre-established a communication connection with the terminal device, such as displaying "the terminal device has not passed the verification" through other smart phones that have pre-established a communication connection with the terminal device. It should be noted that the above introduction to the first prompt message is only an example, and it can be flexibly set as needed in actual applications, and this application does not make specific limitations.

[0135] Step S2120: If the target safety state is unsafe, generate second prompt information for indicating unsafe state.

[0136] When the target safety state is an unsafe state, the target image data may not be collected, and a second prompt information for indicating unsafe state may be generated. The relevant introduction of the second prompt information may refer to the introduction of the first prompt information in the above steps, and will not be repeated here.

[0137] In the trusted data acquisition method provided by the embodiment of the present application, the designated information also includes software information, so the second security state can also be determined by the software information, and then the target security state can be determined by combining the second security state with the first security state, thereby improving the accuracy of determining the target security state. In addition, the second security state can be determined based on the second verification data, and then the target security state can be determined based on the first security state and the second security state, thereby improving the accuracy of determining the target security state. Furthermore, if the first difference is less than or equal to the first threshold value, and the second difference is less than or equal to the second threshold value, the second security state is determined to be safe. Thus, the situation of misjudging non-safety as safe can be minimized. In the case of passing the verification, the designated environment for characterizing the verification information for obtaining the hardware information is a trusted execution environment, and the designated environment is the environment for collecting the target image data, so it can be known that the target image data is collected in the trusted execution environment, thereby ensuring the credibility of the acquired target image data.

[0138] See also Figure 5 , Figure 5 The method flow chart of the trusted data acquisition method provided by the embodiment of the present application is shown. The trusted data acquisition method can be applied to Figure 1 The trusted data acquisition system shown can specifically use the terminal device in the trusted data acquisition system as the execution subject of the trusted data acquisition method, which includes steps S310 to S390.

[0139] Step S310: Initiate an image data acquisition request.

[0140] The image data acquisition request may be a request generated by the terminal device, for example, a request generated by a user controlling the terminal device; or a request sent to the terminal device by another device that has established a communication connection with the terminal device. For example, the user may start a camera application in the rich execution environment, thereby triggering the terminal device to generate an image data acquisition request.

[0141] Step S320: Send an image data acquisition request to the trusted execution environment.

[0142] In order to improve the credibility of the target image data, the terminal device can send an image data acquisition request to the trusted execution environment, thereby obtaining the target image data in the trusted execution environment.

[0143] Step S330: Whether the target safety state is safe.

[0144] The terminal device may first determine whether the target security state is safe, and if so, jump to step S350; if not, jump to step S340. Specifically, the target security state of the terminal device may be determined based on the specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of the hardware information and software information of the terminal device. The specific method for determining the target security state can refer to the introduction of the aforementioned embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0145] Step S340: If it is not safe, reject the image data acquisition request and generate a second prompt message for indicating that it is not safe.

[0146] If the target security status is non-safe, the image data acquisition request may be rejected, and a second prompt message for indicating non-safety may be generated. Rejecting the image data acquisition request may mean not collecting the target image data. For the relevant introduction of generating the second prompt message for indicating non-safety, please refer to the aforementioned embodiment.

[0147] Step S350: If it is safe, call the image acquisition component to acquire target image data and obtain first metadata of the target image data.

[0148] If the target security status is safe, the image acquisition component can be called to acquire the target image data, and the first metadata of the target image data can be acquired, which can be called by the underlying hardware. The acquired target image data can be the data required for the image data acquisition request. The first metadata can include the hardware parameters of the terminal device and the shooting parameters of the target image data. For a detailed description, please refer to the aforementioned embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0149] Step S360: returning the target image data and the first metadata to the trusted execution environment.

[0150] The acquired image data and the first metadata are transmitted back to the trusted execution environment.

[0151] Step S370: obtaining verification information of the hardware information in the specified environment, and signing the verification information with a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain third verification data.

[0152] For some implementations, verification information of hardware information can be obtained in a specified environment, and the verification information is signed by a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain third verification data. The specified environment may include a trusted execution environment or a rich execution environment. The third verification data can be subsequently verified to ensure that the target image data is obtained in the trusted execution environment, thereby improving the credibility of the target image data.

[0153] Step S380: returning the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data to the rich execution environment.

[0154] Furthermore, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data can be transmitted back to the rich execution environment. It should be noted that, when the designated environment is a trusted execution environment, the second digital certificate is the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment, so that signing the verification information with the second digital certificate corresponding to the designated environment is essentially signing the verification information with the first digital certificate. When the designated environment is a rich execution environment, the second digital certificate is essentially the digital certificate corresponding to the rich execution environment. Therefore, the third verification data can be used to determine whether the designated environment used to collect the target image data is a trusted execution environment.

[0155] Step S390: verify the third verification data based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance. If the verification passes, concatenate the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0156] Then, the third verification data can be verified based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance, and if the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage. The successful verification may be a successful verification signature.

[0157] Optionally, after the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, they can be combined with smart contracts to achieve automated copyright licensing or transactions. Among them, smart contracts are executable codes based on blockchain, which can automatically execute the terms in the copyright agreement according to preset conditions and rules, such as payment of fees, granting of usage rights, etc., thereby reducing manual intervention and the participation of intermediaries, reducing transaction costs and time, improving transaction transparency and traceability, and improving convenience.

[0158] Please continue reading Figure 1 The terminal device 110 may further include a trusted computing platform module 112, wherein the trusted computing platform module 112 may be used to provide a trusted execution environment for the terminal device.

[0159] The terminal device 110 may also include one or more of the following components: a processor, a memory, and one or more applications, wherein the processor is electrically connected to the memory. The terminal device can execute the methods described in the aforementioned embodiments of the trusted data acquisition method, and specifically can be configured through one or more programs to execute the methods described in the aforementioned embodiments of the trusted data acquisition method.

[0160] The processor may include one or more processing cores. The processor uses various interfaces and lines to connect the various parts of the entire terminal device 110, and executes various functions and processes data of the terminal device 110 by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets or instruction sets stored in the memory, and calling data stored in the memory. Optionally, the processor can be implemented in at least one hardware form of digital signal processing (Digital Signal Processing, DSP), field programmable gate array (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGA), and programmable logic array (Programmable Logic Array, PLA). The processor can integrate one or a combination of a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, CPU), a graphics processing unit (Graphics Processing Unit, GPU) and a modem. Among them, the CPU mainly processes the operating system, user interface and computer programs; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing display content; and the modem is used to process wireless communications. It can be understood that the above-mentioned modem may not be integrated into the processor, but implemented separately through a communication chip. Specifically, the method described in the above embodiment can be executed by one or more processors.

[0161] For some embodiments, the memory may include a random access memory (RAM) or a read-only memory (ROM). The memory may be used to store instructions, programs, codes, code sets, or instruction sets. The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for implementing at least one function, instructions for implementing the following various method embodiments, etc. The data storage area may also store data created by the terminal device 110 during use, etc.

[0162] See also Figure 6 , Figure 6 The structure block diagram of a trusted data acquisition device 600 provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. The trusted data acquisition device 600 includes: a state determination unit 610, a collection unit 620, an acquisition unit 630 and an upload unit 640.

[0163] The state determination unit 610 is used to determine the target security state of the terminal device based on specified information in response to the image data acquisition request, and the specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information.

[0164] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to generate first verification data based on the verification information of the hardware information in response to the image data acquisition request; determine the first security state based on the first verification data; obtain a hash value of the software information as the second verification data, the software information including at least one of the first software information and the second software information, the first software information including at least one of basic input and output system information, boot program information and operating system kernel information, the second software information is the software information of the application program that responds to the image data acquisition request; determine the second security state based on the second verification data; determine the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state.

[0165] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 may also be configured to obtain a first hash value of the first software information and a second hash value of the second software information; and use the first hash value and the second hash value as second verification data.

[0166] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 can also be used to obtain a first difference between the first hash value and a first standard hash value, the first standard hash value including a standard hash value corresponding to the first software information; obtain a second difference between the second hash value and a second standard hash value, the second standard hash value including a standard hash value corresponding to the second software information; if the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold, and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold, determine that the second security state is secure; if the first difference is greater than the first threshold or the second difference is greater than the second threshold, determine that the second security state is insecure.

[0167] Optionally, the status determination unit 610 can also be used to obtain verification information of the hardware information in the trusted execution environment of the terminal device in response to an image data acquisition request; sign the verification information based on a first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance to obtain first verification data.

[0168] Optionally, the state determination unit 610 may also be configured to determine that the target safety state is safe if both the first safety state and the second safety state are safe; and to determine that the target safety state is unsafe if the first safety state or the second safety state is unsafe.

[0169] The acquisition unit 620 is configured to acquire the target image data required by the image data acquisition request based on the image acquisition component if the target security status is safe.

[0170] Optionally, the acquisition unit 620 can also be used to obtain a specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring the target image data required for the image data acquisition request; obtain verification information of the hardware information in the specified environment; sign the verification information based on a second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment obtained in advance to obtain third verification data.

[0171] The acquisition unit 630 is configured to acquire first metadata of the target image data.

[0172] The uploading unit 640 is used to upload the target image data and the first metadata after splicing them to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0173] Optionally, the uploading unit 640 may also be used to upload the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data to the trusted storage module for storage.

[0174] Optionally, the upload unit 640 can also be used to verify the third verification data based on the first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance; if the verification passes, the target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, and the verification is used to characterize that the designated environment is the trusted execution environment; if the verification fails, a first prompt message is generated to characterize the failure of the verification.

[0175] Optionally, the trusted data acquisition device may further include a prompting unit ( Figure 6 (not shown), the prompt unit can be used to generate second prompt information for indicating non-safety if the target safety state is non-safe.

[0176] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described devices and units can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0177] In several embodiments provided in the present application, the coupling between the units may be electrical, mechanical or other forms of coupling. In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into a processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.

[0178] See also Figure 7 , which shows a structural block diagram of a computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present application. The computer-readable medium 700 stores program codes, which can be called by a processor to execute the method described in the above method embodiment.

[0179] The computer readable storage medium 700 may be an electronic memory such as a flash memory, an EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read-only memory), an EPROM, a hard disk, or a ROM. Optionally, the computer readable storage medium 700 includes a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium 700 has storage space for program code 710 that performs any method steps in the above method. These program codes can be read from or written to one or more computer program products. The program code 710 can be compressed, for example, in an appropriate form.

[0180] Please refer to Figure 8 , which shows a structural block diagram of a computer program product 800 provided in an embodiment of the present application. The computer program product 800 includes a computer program / instruction 810, and when the computer program / instruction 810 is executed by a processor, the steps of the above method are implemented.

[0181] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, rather than to limit it. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for obtaining trusted data, characterized in that: A terminal device applied to a trusted data acquisition system, wherein the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, the trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module, and the method comprises: In response to the image data acquisition request, determining a target security state of the terminal device based on specified information, the specified information including at least one of hardware information and software information of the terminal device; If the target security state is safe, collecting target image data required by the image data collection request based on the image collection component; Acquire first metadata of the target image data; The target image data and the first metadata are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The designated information includes hardware information and software information, and the step of responding to the image data acquisition request and determining the target security state of the terminal device based on the designated information includes: In response to the image data acquisition request, generating first verification data based on the verification information of the hardware information; determining a first safety state based on the first verification data; Acquire a hash value of the software information as second verification data, the software information including at least one of first software information and second software information, the first software information including at least one of basic input and output system information, boot program information, and operating system kernel information, the second software information being software information of an application program that responds to the image data acquisition request; determining a second safety state based on the second verification data; The target security state is determined based on the first security state and the second security state.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The software information includes first software information and second software information, and obtaining a hash value of the software information as second verification data includes: Obtaining a first hash value of the first software information and a second hash value of the second software information; The first hash value and the second hash value are used as second verification data.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The determining the second safety state based on the second verification data comprises: Obtaining a first difference between the first hash value and a first standard hash value, where the first standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the first software information; Obtaining a second difference between the second hash value and a second standard hash value, where the second standard hash value includes a standard hash value corresponding to the second software information; If the first difference is less than or equal to a first threshold, and the second difference is less than or equal to a second threshold, determining that the second safety state is safe; If the first difference is greater than a first threshold or the second difference is greater than a second threshold, the second safety state is determined to be unsafe.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step of generating first verification data based on verification information of the hardware information in response to the image data acquisition request includes: In response to the image data acquisition request, obtaining verification information of hardware information in a trusted execution environment of the terminal device; The verification information is signed based on a pre-acquired first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment to obtain first verification data.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The determining the target security state based on the first security state and the second security state includes: If both the first safety state and the second safety state are safe, determining that the target safety state is safe; If the first safety state or the second safety state is unsafe, the target safety state is determined to be unsafe.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that If the target security state is safe, after the image acquisition component acquires the target image data required by the image data acquisition request, the method further includes: Acquire a specified environment in the terminal device for acquiring target image data required by the image data acquisition request; Acquiring verification information of hardware information in the specified environment; Signing the verification information based on the pre-acquired second digital certificate corresponding to the specified environment to obtain third verification data; The step of splicing the target image data and the first metadata and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage includes: The target image data, the first metadata and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The step of splicing the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data and uploading them to the trusted storage module for storage includes: Verifying the third verification data based on a first digital certificate corresponding to the trusted execution environment obtained in advance; If the verification is successful, the target image data, the first metadata, and the third verification data are spliced ​​and uploaded to the trusted storage module for storage, and the successful verification is used to indicate that the designated environment is the trusted execution environment; If the verification fails, first prompt information is generated to indicate that the verification fails.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: If the target safety state is unsafe, second prompt information for indicating unsafe status is generated.

10. A trusted data acquisition device, characterized in that: A terminal device applied to a trusted data acquisition system, wherein the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, the trusted data acquisition system further comprises a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module, and the device comprises: a state determination unit, configured to determine, in response to an image data acquisition request, a target security state of the terminal device based on specified information, wherein the specified information includes at least one of hardware information and software information; a collection unit, configured to collect target image data required by the image data collection request based on the image collection component if the target security state is safe; An acquisition unit, configured to acquire first metadata of the target image data; An uploading unit is used to splice the target image data and the first metadata and upload them to the trusted storage module for storage.

11. A system for acquiring trusted image data, characterized in that: The system includes a terminal device, the terminal device is provided with an image acquisition component, the image trusted data acquisition system also includes a trusted storage module, the terminal device is connected to the trusted storage module; The terminal device is used to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.

12. The system according to claim 11, characterized in that The terminal device also includes a trusted computing platform module, and the trusted computing platform module is used to provide a trusted execution environment for the terminal device.

13. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores program code, and the program code can be called by a processor to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9.

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