A power inspection unmanned aerial vehicle anti-deception interference data protection method and system

Abstract

The application belongs to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicle information security, and particularly relates to an anti-deception interference data protection method and system for power inspection unmanned aerial vehicle, which first acquires the flight speed and position information of the unmanned aerial vehicle in real time, and dynamically adjusts the actual flight constraint radius of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to the comparison result of the flight speed and a preset threshold value. The actual flight distance between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the nearest route point is calculated, and compared with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the unmanned aerial vehicle is subjected to position deception interference. In the case that the position of the unmanned aerial vehicle is safe, a token transmission mechanism is used to receive the inspection data transmitted by the unmanned aerial vehicle, and the time window of data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed. Through real-time acquisition of the flight speed and position information of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and dynamic adjustment of the flight constraint radius and the data transmission strategy according to the flight speed and position information, dynamic identification and response to deception interference are realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of information security for power drones, specifically relating to a method and system for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous improvement of the intelligence and automation level of power systems, power drone inspection, as an emerging inspection method, has occupied a pivotal position in the power operation and maintenance system. Compared with traditional inspection methods, power drone inspection has advantages such as wide inspection coverage, high efficiency, less human intervention, and low risk, playing a crucial role in the stable operation of power systems.

[0003] However, power plant drone inspections face numerous challenges in terms of data transmission and information security. During inspections, drones need to transmit sensitive information such as the status of inspected power facilities in real time. This data is crucial for the safe operation of the power system, but it can also become a target for attacks. When drones are subjected to malicious attacks from third parties, such as GPS spoofing or data link hijacking, inaccurate drone location information and the alteration or leakage of inspection data can occur. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a data protection method and system for power inspection drones against deceptive interference, so as to solve the problems in the prior art that when drones are subjected to deceptive interference, the drone's position information will be inaccurate, and the inspection data will be tampered with or leaked.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution:

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data, comprising:

[0007] Real-time acquisition of flight speed and location information of drones during inspections;

[0008] The flight speed is compared with a preset threshold speed, and the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius;

[0009] The actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point is calculated based on the location information. The actual flight distance is compared with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing. When the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the inspection data transmitted by the UAV is received using a token transmission mechanism.

[0010] Based on the received inspection data, the system uses information comparison to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing; if the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0011] As an optional embodiment of the present invention, the actual flight constraint radius is obtained by adjusting the preset flight constraint radius based on the size comparison result, including:

[0012] When the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is expanded to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is shrunk to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0013] As an optional solution of the present invention, in the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; wherein, when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the time window is narrowed; and when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0014] As an optional embodiment of the present invention, comparing the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing includes:

[0015] When the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the UAV's position has been deceived and interfered with; otherwise, the UAV's position has not been deceived and interfered with.

[0016] As an optional embodiment of the present invention, calculating the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information includes:

[0017] Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route;

[0018] Based on the latitude and longitude of the starting and ending points, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route based on the north and east components.

[0019] Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point.

[0020] Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point, and use it as the actual flight distance.

[0021] As an optional embodiment of the present invention, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection points, specifically including:

[0022] Calculate the vector between the UAV's position and the starting point of the inspection route. ;

[0023] Calculate vectors The projection length in the direction of the direction vector of the inspection route;

[0024] The projection length is added to the latitude and longitude of the starting point of the inspection route, and the latitude and longitude of the projection point are obtained by moving along the direction vector.

[0025] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a data protection device against deceptive interference for power line inspection drones, comprising:

[0026] The data acquisition module is used to acquire the flight speed and location information of the drone during the inspection process in real time;

[0027] The first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with the preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius;

[0028] The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing; when the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the module receives the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism.

[0029] The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing based on the received inspection data; when the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0030] As an optional embodiment of the present invention, the second comparison module calculates the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, including:

[0031] Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route;

[0032] Based on the latitude and longitude of the starting and ending points, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route based on the north and east components.

[0033] Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point.

[0034] Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point, and use it as the actual flight distance.

[0035] In a third aspect, the present invention provides an electronic device including a processor and a memory, the processor being configured to execute a computer program stored in the memory to implement the above-described method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data.

[0036] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing at least one instruction that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described method for protecting data from deceptive interference by a power line inspection drone.

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0038] This invention proposes a data protection method against deceptive interference for power line inspection drones, providing an effective solution to the data transmission and information security challenges faced by power line inspection drones. The method achieves dynamic identification and response to deceptive interference by acquiring the drone's flight speed and position information in real time and dynamically adjusting the flight constraint radius and data transmission strategy based on this information. The anti-deceptive interference communication data protection device, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium provided by this invention also solve the problems raised in the background section.

[0039] This solution further ensures the security of inspection data by introducing a token transmission mechanism and using identity authentication and encrypted transmission.

[0040] This solution can adjust the protection strategy in real time based on the drone's flight speed and location information, adapting to different inspection scenarios and interference conditions.

[0041] This solution achieves both data security and the transmission of important data by dynamically adjusting the data transmission time window.

[0042] This solution, through information comparison and integrity verification, can identify data link hijacking, deception, and interference, ensuring the authenticity and reliability of inspection data. Attached Figure Description

[0043] The accompanying drawings, which form part of this application, are used to provide a further understanding of the invention. The illustrative embodiments of the invention and their descriptions are used to explain the invention and do not constitute an undue limitation of the invention. In the drawings:

[0044] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 2 This is a structural block diagram of an anti-deception interference communication data protection device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 3 This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0047] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in this application can be combined with each other.

[0048] The following detailed description is exemplary and intended to provide further detailed explanation of the invention. Unless otherwise specified, all technical terms used in this invention have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application pertains. The terminology used in this invention is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of exemplary embodiments according to the invention.

[0049] Example 1

[0050] In this scheme, "flight radius" refers to the distance between the UAV and the nearest waypoint during flight. This distance is represented by the distance of the UAV vertically mapped onto the inspection route.

[0051] Existing security protection methods mostly rely on static preset parameters and fixed protection strategies, making it difficult to adapt to the complex and ever-changing environment and interference during drone inspections. Especially in dynamic scenarios such as changes in drone flight speed and flight path adjustments, traditional protection methods often fail to identify and respond to various deceptive interferences in a timely and effective manner, resulting in a significant reduction in security protection effectiveness. This invention provides a data protection method for power line inspection drones against deceptive interference. The method stores a pre-planned inspection route in the drone, acquires the drone's current GPS information, and dynamically updates the drone's flight constraint radius based on its flight speed. The method checks whether the distance between the drone's current position and the inspection route is consistently less than the constraint radius. If the distance is consistently less than the constraint radius, the drone is in a safe inspection state and data transmission can proceed; otherwise, data transmission is interrupted.

[0052] like Figure 1 As shown, a method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data includes:

[0053] S1. Real-time acquisition of flight speed and location information of drones during inspection.

[0054] Specifically, the inspection route is the power line that the drone needs to inspect. During the inspection, the drone flies according to the pre-planned inspection route. Both the remote control and the drone store the pre-planned inspection route.

[0055] In this solution, flight speed can be obtained in real time through the drone's sensors or control system.

[0056] In this solution, the location information of the drone is GPS location information.

[0057] In other embodiments, an inertial navigation system or similar device can be used to assist in the positioning of the UAV.

[0058] S2. Compare the flight speed with the preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius.

[0059] It should be noted that the length of the flight constraint radius depends to some extent on the speed at which the operator controls the drone's flight. When the drone flies at a higher speed, it indicates that the current inspection route is less important, and the flight constraint radius is larger to reduce the transmission overhead between information. When the drone flies at a lower speed, the flight constraint distance is reduced to improve accuracy and ensure that the drone is always in a safe state.

[0060] In step S2, the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius. Specifically, this includes: when the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is expanded to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is shrunk to become the actual flight constraint radius; and when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0061] In this scheme, the actual flight constraint radius of the UAV is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed.

[0062] When adjusting the actual flight constraint radius, the initial parameters include the UAV's preset flight constraint radius. speed threshold When the drone flies at a speed threshold, the actual flight constraint radius is the preset flight constraint radius. When the drone's current speed is detected to exceed the threshold, a speed diffusion factor is introduced. Adjust the flight constraint radius.

[0063] The mathematical formula model for adjusting the flight constraint radius is described as follows:

[0064]

[0065] in, For the actual flight constraint radius, is the velocity diffusion factor.

[0066] S3. Calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing; when the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, receive the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism.

[0067] In this scheme, the drone's flight constraint radius is dynamically determined based on its flight speed. This constraint radius is then used to determine the drone's current safe state, ensuring that information is transmitted only under safe conditions. Encrypted inspection data is transmitted to the remote control via an authentication method using a token containing drone information characteristics. The data transmitted through this token transmission mechanism includes, in addition to the essential token information, a timestamp, the drone's current GPS location, its unique serial number, and its current speed. The drone generates a token containing its own identity and signs it using its private key. The drone then sends the generated token to the remote control. The remote control receives and verifies the token. If verification is successful, the remote control sends its own token to the drone for verification. If verification is also successful, a communication connection is established between the two parties.

[0068] Specifically, the token transmission mechanism includes:

[0069] Token generation and signing: The drone generates a token containing its own identity information and signs it using its private key.

[0070] Token verification: The remote terminal receives the token and verifies it. Once the verification is successful, the two parties establish a communication connection.

[0071] Time window adjustment: The time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed to optimize information transmission efficiency.

[0072] In step S3, the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism involves dynamically adjusting the data transmission time window based on the flight speed. Specifically, when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the time window is narrowed; and when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0073] It should be noted that the speed of the drone indirectly reflects the importance of the current inspection location information. The drone's flight speed indirectly indicates the priority of the current inspection task. When the flight speed is slower, it reflects that the inspection data is more important. Shortening the time window for receiving information can achieve rapid information transmission and reduce the risk of data link deception and hijacking.

[0074] As an example, if the drone is currently moving slowly, such as when photographing a faulty power pole, it indirectly proves that the inspection information has a high priority. Setting a smaller time window, that is, reducing the time range within which the receiver can accept the request or token, can improve the security of information transmission verification.

[0075] In step S3, the actual flight distance and the actual flight constraint radius are compared to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing. Specifically, when the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the UAV's position is being interfered with by spoofing and the UAV is currently in an unsafe state, and no data transmission is performed; if the actual flight distance of the UAV is less than or equal to the actual flight constraint radius, the current position information of the UAV is safe, and information transmission or further verification operations are performed.

[0076] When calculating the actual flight distance of the UAV relative to the inspection route, the current position of the UAV is vertically mapped onto the inspection route, and it is determined whether this mapped distance exceeds the limit. If the data transmission is outside the safe range, it indicates that the drone is in an unsafe state and will not transmit data. If the data transmission is within the safe range, reliable information transmission is possible.

[0077] Specifically, to calculate the actual flight distance of the UAV relative to the inspection route, the UAV's real-time latitude and longitude coordinates can be projected onto the inspection route, and the straight-line distance between the projection point and the UAV's current position can be calculated. For ease of explanation, this scheme assumes that the inspection route is a straight line segment, or approximately a straight line segment. The specific steps are as follows:

[0078] 1) Determine the start and end points of the inspection route. Assume the start point of the inspection route is... A ( lat A , lon A The destination is B ( lat B , lon B ), lat Indicates latitude, lon Indicates longitude.

[0079] 2) Based on the latitude and longitude of the starting and ending points, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route based on the north and east components. Specifically:

[0080] North direction component: △ lat dir =lat B - latA

[0081] Eastward component: △ lon dir ≈lon B - lonA

[0082] Direction vector: =(△ lat dir , △ lon dir )

[0083] 3) Calculate the projection point of the UAV's current position. This involves calculating the UAV's real-time latitude and longitude coordinates. P ( lat P , lon P Projecting the points onto the inspection route yields the projection points. P ′( lat P′ , lon P′ The details are as follows:

[0084] First, calculate the drone's position. P and the starting point of the inspection route A Vectors between :

[0085]

[0086] Then, calculate the vector. Directional vector of the inspection route Projected length in the direction: ;in, Represents the dot product. express (Modulus length).

[0087] Finally, add the projected length to the starting point of the inspection route. A On the latitude and longitude, and along the direction vector The projection point is obtained by moving in the direction. P The latitude and longitude of ′.

[0088] Specifically: projection point P The approximate latitude and longitude of ′ is:

[0089]

[0090]

[0091] 4) Calculate the current position of the drone P With projection point P The straight-line distance between ′ d This serves as the actual flight distance.

[0092] As an optional example, the distance formula in Cartesian coordinates is used as an approximation:

[0093]

[0094] in, The radius is the Earth's radius; the cosine term in the formula is used to correct for the effect of latitude on longitude difference.

[0095] In other embodiments, the straight-line distance can also be calculated using the following formula:

[0096]

[0097] in, The radius of the Earth; This represents the latitude difference between the drone and the nearest flight path point. This represents the difference in longitude between the drone and the nearest route point; and These are the latitudes of the drone and the nearest flight path point, respectively.

[0098] In this solution, both the drone terminal and the remote control terminal store the inspection route information. The drone flies according to the preset route, and the vertical projection distance between the drone and the route is... d This represents the distance of the drone from the nearest flight path point. d The smaller the value, the smaller the distance deviation between the actual position and the flight path of the drone. d When the value is below the threshold, the drone can perform inspections in a safe state and transmit data; otherwise, data transmission is interrupted.

[0099] The token transmission method described in this example only includes the data formed by the above combination, which is different from the traditional JWT (JSON Web Token) type token transmission method. The token in this example is only used for the secure transmission of inspection data, and is only for the security and integrity of the inspection data. The lightweight design and secure verification method reduce system operating overhead.

[0100] S4. Based on the received inspection data, verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing using information comparison; if the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, decrypt the inspection data.

[0101] Specifically, in step S4, after receiving the inspection data, the remote control first verifies the validity of the token, including whether the token has expired and whether the signature is abnormal. It then compares the drone's unique serial number with the current inspection data to verify whether the information originates from the target drone. Next, it checks whether the GPS location information of the drone when generating the inspection data is within the specified radius of the flight path, verifying the authenticity and completeness of the data. If the verification passes, the inspection data is decrypted to obtain the original data.

[0102] More specifically, after receiving the inspection data, the remote control terminal performs information integrity verification, including: first, verifying the validity of the token. If the token is valid and the signature is normal, the drone serial number and GPS location information are extracted from the token to determine if the serial number is correct and if the drone's GPS location is within the flight path area. The drone's unique serial number is compared with the current inspection data to verify if the information originates from the target drone. Simultaneously, the GPS location information generated by the drone in the inspection data is compared to ensure it is within the specified flight path radius. This verifies the GPS location information while checking whether the current inspection data has been tampered with, reducing the risk of data link deception and hijacking.

[0103] Example 2

[0104] like Figure 2 As shown, based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, the present invention also provides a data protection device for power line inspection drones against deception interference, comprising:

[0105] The data acquisition module is used to acquire the flight speed and location information of the drone during the inspection process in real time;

[0106] The first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with the preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius;

[0107] The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing; when the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the module receives the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism.

[0108] The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing based on the received inspection data; when the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0109] Specifically, in the first comparison module, the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted based on the size comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius, including:

[0110] When the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is expanded to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is shrunk to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

[0111] Specifically, in the second comparison module, in the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; wherein, when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the time window is narrowed; and when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

[0112] Example 3

[0113] like Figure 3 As shown, the present invention also provides an electronic device 100 for implementing a method for protecting power inspection drones from deceptive interference data;

[0114] The electronic device 100 includes a memory 101, at least one processor 102, a computer program 103 stored in the memory 101 and executable on at least one processor 102, and at least one communication bus 104.

[0115] The memory 101 can be used to store computer program 103. The processor 102 implements the steps of the anti-deceptive interference data protection method for a power inspection drone in Embodiment 1 by running or executing the computer program stored in the memory 101 and calling the data stored in the memory 101.

[0116] The memory 101 may primarily include a program storage area and a data storage area. The program storage area may store the operating system, application programs required for at least one function (such as sound playback function, image playback function, etc.), etc.; the data storage area may store data created based on the use of the electronic device 100 (such as audio data), etc. In addition, the memory 101 may include non-volatile memory, such as hard disk, RAM, plug-in hard disk, smart media card (SMC), secure digital (SD) card, flash card, at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-volatile solid-state storage device.

[0117] At least one processor 102 may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. Processor 102 may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. Processor 102 is the control center of electronic device 100, connecting various parts of electronic device 100 via various interfaces and lines.

[0118] The memory 101 in the electronic device 100 stores multiple instructions to implement a data protection method against deceptive interference for power inspection drones, and the processor 102 can execute multiple instructions to achieve the following:

[0119] Real-time acquisition of flight speed and location information of drones during inspections;

[0120] The flight speed is compared with a preset threshold speed, and the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius;

[0121] The actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point is calculated based on the location information. The actual flight distance is compared with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing. When the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the inspection data transmitted by the UAV is received using a token transmission mechanism.

[0122] Based on the received inspection data, the system uses information comparison to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing; if the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted.

[0123] Example 4

[0124] If the modules / units integrated in the electronic device 100 are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments of the present invention can also be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code, recording media, USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, optical disks, computer memory, and read-only memory (ROM).

[0125] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0126] This invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0127] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0128] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0129] In the description of this specification, references to terms such as "an embodiment," "example," "specific example," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.

[0130] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can still be made to the specific implementation of the present invention. Any modifications or equivalent substitutions that do not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be covered within the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data, characterized in that, include: Real-time acquisition of flight speed and location information of drones during inspections; The flight speed is compared with a preset threshold speed, and the preset flight constraint radius is adjusted according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius; The actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point is calculated based on the location information. The actual flight distance is compared with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing. When the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the inspection data transmitted by the UAV is received using a token transmission mechanism. Based on the received inspection data, the system uses information comparison to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing; if the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted. The actual flight constraint radius is obtained by adjusting the preset flight constraint radius based on the size comparison results, including: When the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is expanded to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is shrunk to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

2. The data protection method against deceptive interference for power line inspection drones according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the step of receiving the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism, the time window for data transmission is dynamically adjusted according to the flight speed; wherein, when the flight speed is greater than a threshold speed, the time window is expanded; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the time window is narrowed; and when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the time window remains unchanged.

3. The method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data according to claim 1, characterized in that, Comparing the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius to determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing includes: When the actual flight distance is greater than the actual flight constraint radius, it is determined that the UAV's position has been deceived and interfered with; otherwise, the UAV's position has not been deceived and interfered with.

4. The method for protecting power line inspection drones from deceptive interference data according to claim 1, characterized in that, Calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, including: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; Based on the latitude and longitude of the starting and ending points, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route based on the north and east components. Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point. Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point, and use it as the actual flight distance.

5. The data protection method against deceptive interference for power line inspection drones according to claim 4, characterized in that, The real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection points, specifically including: Calculate the vector between the UAV's position and the starting point of the inspection route. ; Calculate vectors The projection length in the direction of the direction vector of the inspection route; The projection length is added to the latitude and longitude of the starting point of the inspection route, and the latitude and longitude of the projection point are obtained by moving along the direction vector.

6. A data protection device against deceptive interference for power line inspection drones, characterized in that, include: The data acquisition module is used to acquire the flight speed and location information of the drone during the inspection process in real time; The first comparison module is used to compare the flight speed with the preset threshold speed, and adjust the preset flight constraint radius according to the comparison result to obtain the actual flight constraint radius; The second comparison module is used to calculate the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point based on the location information, compare the actual flight distance with the actual flight constraint radius, and determine whether the UAV is being interfered with by position spoofing; when the UAV is not being interfered with by position spoofing, the module receives the inspection data transmitted by the UAV using a token transmission mechanism. The third comparison module is used to verify whether the drone has been hijacked by link spoofing based on the received inspection data by comparing information; when the drone has not been hijacked by link spoofing, the inspection data is decrypted. The actual flight constraint radius is obtained by adjusting the preset flight constraint radius based on the size comparison results, including: When the flight speed is greater than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is expanded to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is less than the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is shrunk to become the actual flight constraint radius; when the flight speed is equal to the threshold speed, the preset flight constraint radius is used as the actual flight constraint radius.

7. The anti-spoofing interference data protection device for power line inspection drones according to claim 6, characterized in that, In the second comparison module, the actual flight distance between the UAV and the nearest flight path point is calculated based on the location information, including: Determine the starting and ending points of the inspection route; Based on the latitude and longitude of the starting and ending points, calculate the north and east components of the direction vector, and determine the direction vector of the inspection route based on the north and east components. Based on the direction vector of the inspection route, the real-time latitude and longitude coordinates of the UAV are projected onto the inspection route to obtain the projection point. Calculate the straight-line distance between the current position of the drone and the projection point, and use it as the actual flight distance.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes a processor and a memory, the processor being used to execute a computer program stored in the memory to implement the anti-spoofing interference data protection method for power inspection drones as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores at least one instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the anti-spoofing interference data protection method for power inspection drones as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

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