A method and system for categorizing properties based on functional hazard and task influence analysis

Abstract

The application belongs to the technical field of aircraft design, and particularly relates to a characteristic classification method and system based on function danger and task influence analysis, which analyzes functions from the perspective of influencing safety and tasks, performs characteristic analysis by using a system engineering concept, implements a top-down characteristic capturing, decomposing and transferring process, constructs a characteristic analysis process covering the whole chain of an aircraft, from the aircraft to the system and then to the airborne equipment, and allocates the characteristic analysis process from top to bottom, follows the decomposition and transfer of top-down analysis, realizes comprehensive identification of key, important and general characteristics of the aircraft level, the system level and the airborne equipment level, and provides input conditions for realizing hierarchical control in the process of aircraft design, manufacturing and use guarantee, and further improves the aircraft safety and the task completion level.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application belongs to the field of aircraft design technology, and specifically relates to a characteristic classification method and system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis. Background Art

[0002] During the aircraft development process, implementing characteristic grade classification is an important measure to ensure product quality, which is conducive to improving product quality stability and traceability.

[0003] Current characteristic classification efforts are poorly aligned with safety and mission reliability analysis results. The analysis method lacks a top-down decomposition and transfer process, relying primarily on engineering experience. The results are not objective and accurate, making them difficult to adapt to the systems engineering-based aircraft development and support process. This application is therefore being submitted. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a feature classification method and system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis to overcome or alleviate at least one of the known technical deficiencies.

[0005] The technical solution of this application is:

[0006] On the one hand, a characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided, including aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps;

[0007] Aircraft-level characterization steps include:

[0008] S11. Obtain all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0009] S12. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a consequence level for the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions;

[0010] S13. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;

[0011] S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function;

[0012] S15. Assign aircraft-level characteristics and levels to relevant systems;

[0013] The system-level characteristic analysis steps include the system-level top-level characteristic step and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis step;

[0014] The system-level top-level characterization steps include:

[0015] S211, undertake the assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;

[0016] S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0017] S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classifications;

[0018] S214. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;

[0019] The system-level low-level airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps include:

[0020] S221. Acquire the function of the onboard device;

[0021] S222. Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment;

[0022] S223. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function.

[0023] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S12, the consequence level of the impact of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically includes catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;

[0024] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

[0025] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S13, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic level is established, specifically:

[0026] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:

[0027] The aircraft-level function's failure status development assurance level is A, or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the aircraft-level function's development assurance level is B, and the function failure directly leads to severe consequences;

[0028] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance:

[0029] The failure state development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0030] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General:

[0031] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.

[0032] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S213, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification is established, specifically:

[0033] The feature level of system-level functions is critical

[0034] The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences;

[0035] System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level:

[0036] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0037] The feature level of system-level functions is General:

[0038] The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0039] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S221, the development assurance level of the functional failure state of the airborne equipment is directly assigned using system-level fault tree analysis.

[0040] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in S222, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state and the characteristic level is established, specifically:

[0041] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical:

[0042] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure;

[0043] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:

[0044] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of critical characteristic level, but the development assurance level is B;

[0045] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment function is general:

[0046] The level of performance of the onboard equipment functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0047] On the other hand, a characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided to implement the above-mentioned characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, including an aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and a system-level characteristic analysis module;

[0048] The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including:

[0049] Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0050] Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a consequence level for the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions;

[0051] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;

[0052] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified;

[0053] Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems;

[0054] The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit;

[0055] The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including:

[0056] Undertake assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;

[0057] Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0058] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classification;

[0059] Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;

[0060] The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including:

[0061] Get the capabilities of onboard equipment;

[0062] Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment;

[0063] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.

[0064] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;

[0065] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

[0066] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the aforementioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic level is established in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, specifically:

[0067] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:

[0068] The aircraft-level function's failure status development assurance level is A, or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the aircraft-level function's development assurance level is B, and the function failure directly leads to severe consequences;

[0069] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance:

[0070] The failure state development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0071] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General:

[0072] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.

[0073] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned feature classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and feature classifications is established in the system-level top-level feature unit, specifically:

[0074] The feature level of system-level functions is critical

[0075] The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences;

[0076] System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level:

[0077] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0078] The feature level of system-level functions is General:

[0079] The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0080] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit uses system-level fault tree analysis to directly assign the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state.

[0081] According to at least one embodiment of the present application, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level of the functional failure state of the airborne equipment and the characteristic level is established in the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, specifically:

[0082] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical:

[0083] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure;

[0084] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:

[0085] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B;

[0086] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is general characteristics:

[0087] The level of performance of the onboard equipment functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0088] This application has at least the following beneficial technical effects:

[0089] A feature classification method and system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is provided. Functions are analyzed from the perspective of their impact on safety and missions. The system engineering concept is used for feature analysis. A top-down feature capture, decomposition, and transfer process is implemented. A top-down feature analysis process covering the entire aircraft chain, from aircraft to system to airborne equipment, is constructed. Following the decomposition and transfer of top-down analysis, comprehensive identification of key, important, and general features at the aircraft level, system level, and airborne equipment level is achieved. This can provide input conditions for hierarchical management and control in the aircraft design, manufacturing, and use assurance processes, thereby improving aircraft safety and mission completion levels. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0090] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0091] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the implementation of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis provided by an embodiment of the present application in the entire aircraft chain;

[0092] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0093] In order to better illustrate this embodiment, some parts of the drawings may be omitted, enlarged or reduced, and do not represent the size of the actual product. In addition, the drawings are only used for illustrative purposes and should not be understood as limiting this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0094] To make the technical solution and its advantages of this application more clear, the technical solution of this application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described here are only some of the embodiments of this application and are only used to explain this application, not to limit this application. It should be noted that for ease of description, only the parts relevant to this application are shown in the accompanying drawings, and other relevant parts can refer to the general design.

[0095] In addition, unless otherwise defined, the technical terms or scientific terms used in the description of this application should have the usual meanings understood by those skilled in the art in the field to which this application belongs. The words indicating orientation used in the description of this application are only used to indicate relative directions or positional relationships. When the absolute position of the described object changes, its relative positional relationship may also change accordingly. The word "include" used in the description of this application means that the elements or objects appearing before the word include the elements or objects listed after the word and their equivalents, but does not exclude other elements or objects.

[0096] In addition, it should be noted that, unless otherwise clearly stipulated and limited, the words "installation", "connection" and similar terms used in the description of this application should be understood in a broad sense. For example, the connection can be a fixed connection or a detachable connection; it can be a mechanical connection or an electrical connection; it can be a direct connection or an indirect connection through an intermediate medium. Technical personnel in the field can understand its specific meaning in this application according to the specific circumstances.

[0097] A characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis, such as Figure 1 As shown, it includes aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps.

[0098] Aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps Aircraft-level characteristic analysis can be carried out during the aircraft scheme design phase by characteristic professionals to generate an aircraft-level characteristic analysis report, as follows:

[0099] S11. Obtain all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis.

[0100] S12. Establish the consequence level of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety and flight mission.

[0101] The consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety may include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact.

[0102] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission may include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

[0103] S13. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a mapping relationship between the consequences of functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic levels, as follows:

[0104] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:

[0105] The aircraft-level function's failure status development assurance level is A, or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the aircraft-level function's development assurance level is B, and the function failure directly leads to severe consequences;

[0106] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance:

[0107] The failure state development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0108] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General:

[0109] The feature level for aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.

[0110] "Directly cause" means that the failure of a single function will lead to the corresponding level of impact consequences. If the probability of an external event occurring in a combined function failure is 1, it should also be considered as "directly cause" (for example, icing weather).

[0111] S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function.

[0112] S15. Allocate aircraft-level characteristics and levels to relevant systems to generate an aircraft-level characteristics analysis report. The aircraft-level characteristics analysis results and allocation table are as follows;

[0113]

[0114] The system-level characteristic analysis steps can be carried out during the preliminary design phase of the aircraft by system professionals, including the system-level top-level characteristic steps and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis steps.

[0115] System-level top-level feature analysis steps: Carry out system-level top-level feature analysis and generate a system-level top-level feature analysis report, as follows:

[0116] S211. Undertake the distribution results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis.

[0117] S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis.

[0118] S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classifications. This can be done by referring to the mapping relationship between the impact of functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic levels. The details are as follows:

[0119] The feature level of system-level functions is critical

[0120] The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences;

[0121] System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level:

[0122] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0123] The feature level of system-level functions is General:

[0124] The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0125] S214. Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each system-level function is clarified, and a system-level top-level characteristic analysis report can be generated. The form of the system-level top-level characteristic analysis result is shown in the following table:

[0126] Serial number Function Failure state Functional development assurance level Property Level

[0127] System-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps: Carry out system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis and generate a system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristics analysis report, as follows:

[0128] S221. Acquire the function of the onboard device.

[0129] System-level fault tree analysis can be used to directly assign the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state.

[0130] S222. Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure status, as follows:

[0131] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical:

[0132] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure;

[0133] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is heavy:

[0134] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B;

[0135] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is general characteristics:

[0136] The characteristic level of the development assurance level for the functional failure state of airborne equipment is neither a critical characteristic nor an important characteristic.

[0137] S223. Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified, and an airborne equipment characteristic analysis report can be generated. The form of the airborne equipment characteristic analysis result is shown in the following table:

[0138] The characteristic analysis results can be delivered to the airborne equipment research and development unit through the airborne equipment agreement, providing input for the research and development unit to carry out airborne equipment characteristic analysis work.

[0139] The feature classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment analyzes functions from the perspective of safety and mission impact, applies the system engineering concept to feature analysis, implements a top-down feature capture, decomposition, and transfer process, and builds a feature analysis process covering the entire chain of the aircraft, from aircraft to system to airborne equipment. Following the decomposition and transfer of the top-down analysis, it realizes the comprehensive identification of key, important, and general features at the aircraft level, system level, and airborne equipment level. Figure 2 As shown, it can provide input conditions for achieving hierarchical control in the process of aircraft design, manufacturing, and use assurance, thereby improving aircraft safety and mission completion level.

[0140] A characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis is used to implement the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment, such as Figure 3 As shown, it includes aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and system-level characteristic analysis module;

[0141] The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including:

[0142] Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0143] Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a consequence level for the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions;

[0144] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level;

[0145] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified;

[0146] Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems;

[0147] The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit;

[0148] The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including:

[0149] Undertake assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis;

[0150] Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis;

[0151] Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classification;

[0152] Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function;

[0153] The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including:

[0154] Get the capabilities of onboard equipment;

[0155] Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment;

[0156] Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.

[0157] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequence levels of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety specifically include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact;

[0158] The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

[0159] Optionally, in the aforementioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically:

[0160] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical:

[0161] The aircraft-level function's failure status development assurance level is A, or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the aircraft-level function's development assurance level is B, and the function failure directly leads to severe consequences;

[0162] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance:

[0163] The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0164] Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General:

[0165] The characteristic level of aircraft-level functional failures is neither critical nor important.

[0166] Optionally, in the above-mentioned feature classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, a mapping relationship between the impact consequences of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and feature classification is established in the system-level top-level feature unit, specifically:

[0167] The feature level of system-level functions is critical

[0168] The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences;

[0169] System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level:

[0170] The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure status on the flight mission is mission failure;

[0171] The feature level of system-level functions is General:

[0172] The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0173] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is directly assigned using system-level fault tree analysis.

[0174] Optionally, in the above-mentioned characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, in the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure state and the characteristic level is established, specifically:

[0175] The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical:

[0176] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure;

[0177] The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important:

[0178] The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of critical characteristic level, but the development assurance level is B;

[0179] The characteristic level of the onboard equipment function is general:

[0180] The level of performance of the onboard equipment functionality is neither critical nor important.

[0181] The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment corresponds to the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis disclosed in the above embodiment. The description is relatively simple. For specific related matters, please refer to the relevant description of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis. Its technical effects can also refer to the technical effects of the relevant parts of the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, which will not be repeated here.

[0182] In addition, technicians in the field should also be able to realize that the various modules and units of the characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, this application generally describes them according to their functions. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Technicians in the field can choose to adopt different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application and its actual constraints, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

[0183] So far, the technical solution of the present application has been described in conjunction with the preferred embodiments shown in the accompanying drawings. Those skilled in the art should understand that the scope of protection of the present application is obviously not limited to these specific embodiments. Without departing from the principles of the present application, those skilled in the art can make equivalent changes or replacements to the relevant technical features, and the technical solutions after these changes or replacements will fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. A characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis, characterized in that: Includes aircraft-level characteristic analysis steps and system-level characteristic analysis steps; Aircraft-level characterization steps include: S11. Obtain all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis; S12. Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a consequence level for the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions; S13. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level; S14. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function; S15. Assign aircraft-level characteristics and levels to relevant systems; The system-level characteristic analysis steps include the system-level top-level characteristic step and the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis step; The system-level top-level characterization steps include: S211, undertake the assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis; S212. Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis; S213. Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classifications; S214. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function; The system-level low-level airborne equipment characteristics analysis steps include: S221. Acquire the function of the onboard device; S222. Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment; S223. Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function.

2. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In S12, the consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety include catastrophic, severe, mild, minor, and no safety impact; The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

3. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 2 is characterized in that: In S13, a mapping relationship between the consequences of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is A-level or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B-level and the function failure directly leads to serious consequences; Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance: The failure state development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General: Aircraft-level functions have a characteristic level that is neither critical nor important.

4. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 3 is characterized in that: In S213, a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classification is established, specifically: The feature level of system-level functions is critical The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences; System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level: The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The feature level of system-level functions is General: The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

5. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 4 is characterized in that: In S221, the system-level fault tree analysis is used to directly assign the development assurance level of the functional failure state of the airborne equipment.

6. The characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 5 is characterized in that: In S222, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and the characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is established, specifically: The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure; The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B; The characteristic level of the onboard equipment function is general: The level of performance of the onboard equipment functionality is neither critical nor important.

7. A characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis, used to implement the characteristic classification method based on functional hazard and mission impact analysis according to claim 1, characterized in that: Including aircraft-level characteristic analysis module and system-level characteristic analysis module; The aircraft-level characteristic analysis module is used to perform aircraft-level characteristic analysis, including: Capture all aircraft-level functions applicable to functional hazard and mission impact analysis; Analyze the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions, and establish a consequence level for the impact of aircraft-level functional failures on flight safety and missions; Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level; Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each aircraft-level function is clarified; Assign aircraft-level characteristics and ratings to relevant systems; The system-level characteristic analysis module includes a system-level top-level characteristic unit and a system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit; The system-level top-level characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level top-level characteristic analysis, including: Undertake assigned results of aircraft-level characteristic analysis; Obtain system-level capabilities suitable for functional hazard and mission impact analysis; Establish a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failures on flight safety and missions and characteristic classification; Based on the mapping relationship, clarify the characteristic level of each system-level function; The system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit is used to perform system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis, including: Get the capabilities of onboard equipment; Establish a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the functional failure status of airborne equipment; Based on the mapping relationship, the characteristic level of each airborne equipment function is clarified.

8. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 7, characterized in that: In the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, the consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on flight safety include catastrophic, severe, mild, slight, and no safety impact; The consequences of aircraft-level functional failure on the flight mission include mission failure, mission degradation and no impact.

9. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 8, characterized in that: In the aircraft-level characteristic analysis module, a mapping relationship between the impact of functional failure on flight safety and mission and the characteristic level is established, specifically: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is critical: The aircraft-level function's failure status development assurance level is A, or the function failure directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or, the aircraft-level function's development assurance level is B, and the function failure directly leads to severe consequences; Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of importance: The failure status development assurance level of the aircraft-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; Aircraft-level functionality has a feature level of General: The characteristic level of aircraft-level functions is neither critical nor important.

10. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 9, characterized in that: In the system-level top-level characteristic unit, a mapping relationship between the impact of system-level functional failure on flight safety and mission and characteristic classification is established, specifically: The feature level of system-level functions is critical The failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class A, or the failure of the function directly leads to catastrophic consequences; or the failure state development assurance level of the system-level function is Class B, and the failure of the function directly leads to serious consequences; System-level functionality is ranked as important by feature level: The failure status development assurance level of the system-level function is B and the consequence level of the function failure on the flight mission is mission failure; The feature level of system-level functions is General: The level of features for system-level functionality is neither critical nor important.

11. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 10, characterized in that: In the system-level underlying airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, the system-level fault tree analysis is used to directly assign the development assurance level of the airborne equipment functional failure status.

12. The characteristic classification system based on functional hazard and task impact analysis according to claim 11, characterized in that: In the system-level bottom-level airborne equipment characteristic analysis unit, a mapping relationship between the development assurance level and characteristic level of the airborne equipment functional failure state is established, specifically: The characteristic level of the airborne equipment function is critical: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is A; or, the development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the state of functional failure is B and the airborne equipment is a single point failure; The characteristics of the onboard equipment functions are ranked as important: The development assurance level of the airborne equipment in the failure state does not meet the requirement of the characteristic level being a key characteristic, but the development assurance level is B; The characteristic level of the onboard equipment function is general: The level of performance of the onboard equipment functionality is neither critical nor important.

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