Unmanned aerial vehicle safety cooperative computing method based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature

Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of cryptography and network security, and provides an unmanned aerial vehicle security cooperative computing method based on a certificateless homomorphic network coding signature, which aims at solving the security problem of data transmission in cooperative computing of an unmanned aerial vehicle group, and mainly comprises the following steps: a KGC initializes an Internet of Things data transmission system by generating private and public parameters; the method comprises the following steps of: running a Setup algorithm to generate a bilinear group, a master key and a hash function by taking a security parameter and a dimension of an augmented vector as input; the unmanned aerial vehicle sends an ID to the KGC for registration, and obtains a part of private keys from the KGC; in order to resist pollution attacks, a user divides data into a plurality of vectors before sending a data packet, and generates signatures for the vectors; and after each unmanned aerial vehicle node receives the data packet transmitted by the channel, performing integrity verification on the transmitted data packet, discarding the damaged data packet, and merging the undamaged data packets. And if the node is an intermediate node, sending a vector and signed data packet to a downstream node.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of cryptography and network security, and proposes a drone secure collaborative computing method based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of drone technology, the application of drones has expanded from the initial military application to the civilian field, including agriculture, logistics, environmental monitoring, news reporting, search and rescue, film production and many other aspects. On this basis, drone swarm technology has been developed to adapt to more complex application scenarios. However, the computing power of drones is very limited, and it is difficult to train neural network models or make complex decisions. It is difficult for a single drone to adapt to complex environments with its own computing power. Therefore, the collaborative computing of drone swarms is particularly important in this scenario. Drone swarms need to solve the problem of insufficient computing power of a single drone through edge-cloud collaboration or edge-edge collaboration.

[0003] Collaborative computing involves a large amount of data transmission and sharing, and there are many security issues that need to be solved in actual use. For example, malicious drone users can inject damaged data packets into the communication network to carry out pollution attacks, and honest nodes will linearly combine damaged data packets with valid data packets, causing polluted data to spread throughout the network. Since the destination node cannot reply to the original data, malicious attackers can easily launch distributed denial of service attacks on the information transmission system of drone collaborative computing based on network coding.

[0004] To this end, the present invention proposes a UAV secure collaborative computing technology based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature. This method does not require certificate generation, verification and management operations, and realizes the authentication of data packet validity and defense against pollution attacks.

[0005] Previously, the signature authentication algorithms between drones mostly adopted certificate-based signature algorithms or identity-based signature algorithms. The certificate-based signature algorithm not only requires cumbersome certificate generation, storage, and verification operations, but also requires a reliable third party KGC to ensure the confidentiality of keys and certificates. Although the identity-based signature algorithm does not require the participation of certificates, avoids the cumbersome operations related to certificates, and saves communication overhead, it still requires a reliable third party KGC to generate and store keys, and cannot resist the collusion attack between KGC and the adversary.

[0006] The computing power and storage space of drones are limited. Excessive communication overhead will greatly affect the communication efficiency of drone networks and their own operating speed. A large number of operations such as storage, management and verification of certificates will consume the drone's own memory and limited computing power. Therefore, the signature authentication system used in drone systems needs to minimize communication, computing and storage overhead to adapt to the limitations of the drone's own computing power.

[0007] The introduction of the certificateless signature system solves this problem. It not only eliminates the participation of certificates in the algorithm, but also KGC only holds part of the private key and cannot collude with the adversary to attack the system. However, the existing certificateless signature algorithm cannot resist pollution attacks, that is, malicious drone users can inject damaged data packets into the communication network to carry out pollution attacks, and honest nodes will linearly combine damaged data packets with valid data packets, causing polluted data to spread throughout the network.

[0008] Therefore, we propose a secure collaborative computing method for drones based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures. In this method, network coding signatures are introduced on the basis of certificateless signature algorithms. By authenticating and verifying the integrity of messages in the communication network, the spread of damaged or malicious data in the drone communication network is avoided to resist the contamination attack of the adversary. Summary of the invention

[0009] The present invention provides a method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures. The method supports the verification of data validity and defense against pollution attacks in the data transmission link of collaborative computing by unmanned aerial vehicles. Considering the problem that traditional signature keys based on certificates or identifiers need to be managed by a trusted third party, this solution adopts a certificateless signature mechanism, which does not require operations such as certificate generation, verification and management, so there is no need to worry about the third-party KGC leaking private keys. However, the existing certificateless signature system cannot resist pollution attacks, so the present invention introduces a network coding signature system to verify the correctness of the message to resist pollution attacks.

[0010] In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present invention adopts the following technical means:

[0011] The present invention provides a method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature, comprising the following steps:

[0012] A. System initialization: Input the security parameter λ and the dimension of the augmented vector N = N + m to the key generation center KGC, KGC initializes the authentication system and generates a bilinear group (G1, G2, G T ,P,e), from Select an s as the master key and calculate the master public key P pub =(g') s ;

[0013] Select four different cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3 and H4. The cryptographic hash function converts 0, 1 * Map to represents the multiplicative group of integers modulo p;

[0014] Among them, G1, G2, GT is a cyclic group of order p, p is a prime number and p ≥ 2 λ , e is a bilinear mapping: G1×G2→G T , g' is the generator of G2\{1}, {1} represents the identity element in group G2, and G2\{1} represents the set of all elements in G2 except the identity element 1;

[0015] B User Registration: When the drone transmits data, it needs to register and obtain some private keys from KGC The user sets the identity value ID and calculates the secret value X, and sends a registration application (ID, X) to KGC;

[0016] KGC selects a random number y and calculates Y, which is used to calculate part of the private key And send it back to the drone, the drone verifies its validity, and if it is valid, it calculates the complete private key and the complete public key, where X is (g') x , g' is the generator of G2\{1}, x is Random numbers in ;

[0017] C. Signature generation: To defend against pollution attacks, the drone needs to divide the data into vectors and generate a signature before sending the data packet. Specifically:

[0018] The drone divides the generated data into m vectors And expand each vector to:

[0019]

[0020] The drone randomly selects an identifier id∈0,1 for V λ , and run the sign algorithm to generate the signature σ i , where V = span (v1, ..., v m ) is the subspace formed by m augmented vectors, and λ is the security parameter;

[0021] D. Data detection: After receiving the data packets from the channel, each drone node merges the data packets and processes them as follows: Run the verification algorithm to perform integrity verification on the received data packets and perform integrity verification on each vector v i and the corresponding signature σ i Verify the equation:

[0022]

[0023] Is it true? If so, all undamaged data with the same ID are combined and sent to the downstream drone node. and A data packet consisting of H1, H2, H3, and H4 are the hash functions selected in step A; Y represents a parameter used by KGC to calculate a partial private key in step B; j is an increment, which represents the values ​​from g1 to g4. j , from h1 to h m ; X represents a secret value; e(·,·) represents a bilinear mapping; g j 、h j is a random number selected from G1\{1}; v i，j Represents the dimensions of the vector after splitting in step C; v i，n+j Take each dimension of vector V in turn; P pub Represents the master public key; In Represents H3(id, j) and v i，n+j The product of; H3 represents the third hash function selected in step A; is the coding vector group divided in step C, For Signature.

[0024] In the above technical solution, step A includes:

[0025] A1. Given the security parameter λ and the dimension of the augmented vector N = N + m as input, KGC runs the setup algorithm to do the following:

[0026] A1.1. Generate a bilinear group tuple in and G T is a cyclic group of prime order p, p ≥ 2 λ , e: For a bilinear map, choose the generator and random selection where h m Indicates from Randomly select m h, g n Indicates from Randomly select n g from ;

[0027] A1.2. Randomly select s as the master key and calculate the master public key P pub =(g′) s ;

[0028] A1.3. Choose four different sets of {0, 1} λ Map to Cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, H4;

[0029] A1.4. KGC publishes parameters params(λ, p, G1, G2, GT ,e,g′,P pub , h1,…,h m , g1,…,g m , H1, H2, H3, H4), and keep the master key msk=s confidential.

[0030] In the above technical solution, step B comprises:

[0031] B1. The user sets his unique identity ID∈{0, 1}* and runs the set-secret-value algorithm to generate the drone’s secret value X:

[0032] Select a random As a secret value calculation, calculate X = (g') x And send a registration application (ID, X) to KGC;

[0033] B2. After receiving the registration application, KGC runs the partial-private-key algorithm to generate a partial private key:

[0034] KGC choose one Calculate Y = (g') y And k = (y + H1 (ID, Y) · s) mod p and the partial private key d ID =(k, Y), then KGC calculates the hash mask Protecting Partial Private Keys And return through the public drone communication network For drones, modp means modular p operation;

[0035] B3. The drone receives After that, calculate And check the equation Is it true? If true, the drone ID considers k to be valid. After that, the drone sets the complete private key to SK ID ={k, x}, the complete public key is PK ID ={Y,X}.

[0036] In the above technical solution, step C comprises:

[0037] C1. The drone divides the collected data into m vectors in , before transmission, the drone sets the vector Expand to V=span(v1,…,v m ) is the subspace spanned by m augmented vectors;

[0039] C2. The drone randomly selects an identifier id∈0,1 for V λ , and run the Sign algorithm to generate a signature, that is, for each vector v i (i∈[1,m]) calculates the signature:

[0040]

[0041] In the above technical solution, step D comprises:

[0042] D1. The drone node uses a verification algorithm to perform integrity verification on the received data packets, that is, for each vector v i and the corresponding signature σ i , check the equation:

[0043]

[0044] Is it established?

[0045] D2. is the subset of indices of the packets to be combined, the coding coefficients The intermediate node randomly selects and combines all the undamaged packets with the same identifier id by running the Combine algorithm. Then the intermediate node transmits the packet represented by the combination vector to the downstream node. and signature The data packets composed of

[0046]

[0048] The unmanned aerial vehicle secure collaborative computing solution with certificateless homomorphic network coding signature of the present invention has the following advantages:

[0049] (1) It uses a certificateless signature algorithm and does not require a trusted third party.

[0050] (2) No need for cumbersome certificate authentication and management operations, saving communication overhead.

[0051] (3) Network coding can be used to efficiently authenticate the validity of messages.

[0052] (4) It can effectively resist pollution attacks from malicious users and ensure the reliability of data packets. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0053] Figure 1 Flowchart of secure collaborative computing of drones with certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] The following is a detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention. Although the present invention will be described and illustrated in conjunction with some specific embodiments, it should be noted that the present invention is not limited to these embodiments. On the contrary, modifications or equivalent substitutions made to the present invention should all be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.

[0055] In addition, in order to better illustrate the present invention, numerous specific details are given in the following specific embodiments. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention can also be implemented without these specific details.

[0056] The detailed algorithm flow is:

[0057] Step A, system initialization:

[0058] KGC initializes the drone secure collaborative computing system with certificateless homomorphic network coding signature by generating private and public parameters. The specific operations are as follows:

[0059] A1. Given the security parameter λ and the dimension of the augmented vector N = N + m as input, KGC runs the setup algorithm to perform the following operations;

[0060] A2. Generate a bilinear group tuple in and GT is a prime p-order cyclic group (p ≥ 2λ), e: is a bilinear map, in Select the generator g′ and randomly select Select elements h1, ..., h m , g1,…,g n ;

[0061] A3. Randomly select s as the master key and calculate the master public key P pub =(g′) s , g′ is the The generators selected in

[0062] A4. Choose four different {0, 1} λ Map to Cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, H4;

[0063] A5. KGC publishes parameters params = (λ, p, G1, G2, G T ,e,g′,P pub , h1,…,h m , g1,…,g m , H1, H2, H3, H4), and keep the master key msk=s confidential.

[0064] Step B, User Registration:

[0065] If a drone wants to transmit data securely through this system, it should register with the system and obtain a partial private key from KGC. The drone registration process consists of three steps:

[0066] B1. The drone sets its unique identity ID∈{0, 1}* and runs the set-secret-value algorithm to generate a secret value. The algorithm is as follows: Select a random As a secret value calculation, calculate X = (g') x And send a registration application (ID, X) to KGC.

[0067] B2. After receiving the registration application, KGC runs the partial-private-key algorithm to generate a partial private key: KGC selects one Calculate Y = (g') y And k = (y + H1 (ID, Y) s) mod p, and the partial private key d ID =(k, Y), then KGC calculates the hash mask Protecting Partial Private Keys and returned via the public drone communication network To the drone.

[0068] B3. The drone receives After that, calculate And check the equation Is it true? If true, the drone ID considers k to be valid. After that, the drone sets the complete private key to SK ID ={k, x}, the complete public key is PK ID ={Y,X}.

[0069] Step C, signature generation:

[0070] To defend against pollution attacks, the drone generates a valid signature for the data vector before sending the data packet. This process includes two steps:

[0071] C1. The drone divides the collected data into m vectors in Before transmission, the drone transforms the vector Expanded to:

[0072]

[0073] Let V = span (v1, ..., v m) is the subspace spanned by m augmented vectors.

[0074] C2. The drone randomly selects an identifier id∈{0, 1} for V λ , and run the Sign algorithm to generate a signature, that is, for each vector v i (i∈[1,m]) calculates the signature:

[0075]

[0076] In the drone communication network, each data packet consists of a header and a payload. The header of the data packet includes user information, a file identifier, and a signature of some augmented vector. The payload of the data packet carries the augmented vector. Finally, the user sends the data packet to the downstream transmission node.

[0077] Step D, data detection:

[0078] After receiving the data packets from the channel, other drones will check the integrity of the data packets and merge the undamaged data packets. The processing steps are as follows:

[0079] D1. The drone node uses a verification algorithm to perform integrity verification on the received data packets. That is, for each vector v i and the corresponding signature σ i , check the equation: Is it true? If the above equation holds, the verification algorithm outputs 1, indicating that the data packet is correct. Otherwise, the verification algorithm outputs 0 and discards the data packet. If this drone node is the destination node, the original data can be restored using the network coding decoding method. If this node is an intermediate node, the next step will be taken.

[0080] D2. Remember is the subset of indices of the packets to be combined, the coding coefficients Randomly selected. The intermediate node combines all undamaged packets with the same identifier id by running the Combine algorithm. That is, it calculates: and the corresponding Afterwards, the intermediate node transmits the combined vector and signature The data packet consists of.

[0081] At this point, the secure certificateless message transmission process ends.

[0082] In summary, the UAV secure collaborative computing solution is based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature technology, which aims to solve the security problem of data transmission in collaborative computing of UAV groups. Its technical effect analysis is as follows:

[0083] System initialization: By generating bilinear groups and cryptographic hash functions, the problem of secure initialization of system parameters is solved. This provides a basic security framework for subsequent user registration and data transmission. Compared with traditional certificate-based systems, there is no need for the participation of a reliable third-party certificate authority, which reduces security risks.

[0084] User registration: Part of the private key is obtained through user registration, which realizes the verification of drone identity and the distribution of part of the key. This avoids the security issues caused by the collusion between a third party and an adversary to leak the private key.

[0085] Signature generation: Data packets are divided into multiple vectors before transmission, and a signature is generated for each vector, which realizes the identity authentication of messages in the network and effectively resists pollution attacks. This ensures the integrity and reliability of data transmission and improves the system's resistance to malicious attacks.

[0086] Data detection: After receiving the data packet, the drone node performs authentication and integrity check, discards the data packets that cannot pass the authentication and are damaged, and merges the authenticated and undamaged data packets. This mechanism effectively prevents the spread of polluted data in the network and ensures the quality of data transmission.

[0087] Certificateless Signature Mechanism: This solution adopts a certificateless signature mechanism, which does not require cumbersome certificate authentication and management operations, saving communication overhead. This makes the system more flexible and efficient, and suitable for resource-limited drone environments.

[0088] In summary, this scheme realizes the secure transmission of data among drone swarms in collaborative computing through certificateless homomorphic network coding signature technology, which is highly secure, efficient and flexible.

Claims

1. A method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: A. System initialization: Input the security parameter λ and the dimension of the augmented vector N = N + m to the key generation center KGC. KGC initializes the authentication system and generates a bilinear group (G1, G2, G T ,P,e), from Select an s as the master key and calculate the master public key P pub =(g') s ; Choose four different cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, and H4 that map 0.1* to represents the multiplicative group of integers modulo p; Among them, G1, G2, G T is a cyclic group of order p, p is a prime number and p ≥ 2 λ , e is a bilinear mapping: G1×G2→G T , g' is the generator of G2\{1}, {1} represents the identity element in group G2, and G2\{1} represents the set of all elements in G2 except the identity element 1; B User Registration: When the drone transmits data, it needs to register and obtain some private keys from KGC The user sets the identity value ID and calculates the secret value X, and sends a registration application (ID, X) to KGC; KGC selects a random number y and calculates Y, which is used to calculate part of the private key And send it back to the drone, the drone verifies its validity, and if it is valid, it calculates the complete private key and the complete public key, where X is (g') x , g' is the generator of G2\{1}, x is Random numbers in ; C. Signature generation: To defend against pollution attacks, the drone needs to divide the data into vectors and generate a signature before sending the data packet. Specifically: The drone divides the generated data into m vectors And expand each vector to: The drone randomly selects an identifier id∈0,1 for V λ , and run the sign algorithm to generate the signature σ i , where V = span (v1, ..., v m ) is the subspace formed by m augmented vectors, and λ is the security parameter; D. Data detection: After receiving the data packets from the channel, each drone node merges the data packets and processes them as follows: Run the verification algorithm to perform integrity verification on the received data packets, and perform integrity verification on each vector v i and the corresponding signature σ i Verify the equation: Is it true? If so, all undamaged data with the same ID are combined and sent to the downstream drone node. and A data packet consisting of H1, H2, H3, and H4 are the hash functions selected in step A; Y represents a parameter used by KGC to calculate a partial private key in step B; j is an increment, which represents the values ​​from g1 to g4. j , taking values ​​from h1 to h m ; X represents a secret value; e(·,·) represents a bilinear mapping; g j 、h j is a random number selected from G1\{1}; v i，j Represents the dimensions of the vector after splitting in step C; v i，n+j Take each dimension of vector V in turn; P pub Represents the master public key; In Represents H3(id,j) and v i，n+j The product of; H3 represents the third hash function selected in step A; is the coding vector group divided in step C, For Signature.

2. A method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Step A includes: A1. Given the security parameter λ and the dimension of the augmented vector N = N + m as input, KGC runs the setup algorithm to do the following: A1.

1. Generate a bilinear group tuple in and G T is a cyclic group of prime order p, p ≥ 2 λ , For a bilinear map, choose the generator and random selection where h m Indicates from Randomly select m h, g n Indicates from Randomly select n g from; A1.

2. Randomly select s as the master key and calculate the master public key P pub =(g′) s ; A1.

3. Choose four different sets of {0, 1} λ Map to The cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, H4; A1.

4. KGC publishes parameters params = (λ, p, G1, G2, G T ,e,g′,P pub ,h 1， …,h m , g1,…,g m , H1, H2, H3, H4), and keep the master key msk=s confidential.

3. A method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: Step B includes: B1. The user sets his unique identity ID∈{0,1} * And run the set-secret-value algorithm to generate the drone’s secret value X: Select a random As a secret value calculation, calculate X = (g') x And send a registration application (ID, X) to KGC; B2. After receiving the registration application, KGC runs the partial-private-key algorithm to generate a partial private key: KGC choose one Calculate Y = (g') y And k = (y + H1 (ID, Y) · s) mod p and the partial private key d ID =(k, Y), then KGC calculates the hash mask Protecting Partial Private Keys And return through the public drone communication network For drones, modp means modular p operation; B3. The drone receives After that, calculate And check the equation Is it true? If true, the drone ID considers k to be valid. After that, the drone sets the complete private key to SK ID ={k, x}, the complete public key is PK ID ={Y,X}.

4. A method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: Step C includes: C1. The drone divides the collected data into m vectors in Before transmission, the drone converts the vector Expand to V=span(v1,…,v m ) is the subspace spanned by m augmented vectors; C2. The drone randomly selects an identifier id∈0,1 for V λ , and run the Sign algorithm to generate a signature, that is, for each vector v i (i∈[1,m]) calculates the signature:

5. A method for secure collaborative computing of unmanned aerial vehicles based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signatures as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: Step D includes: D1. The drone node uses a verification algorithm to perform integrity verification on the received data packets, that is, for each vector v i and the corresponding signature σ i , check the equation: Is it established? D2. is the subset of indices of the packets to be combined, the coding coefficients The intermediate node randomly selects and combines all the undamaged packets with the same identifier id by running the Combine algorithm. Then the intermediate node transmits the packet represented by the combination vector to the downstream node. and signature The data packets composed of

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