Hardware equipment verification method based on improved physical unclonable function

Abstract

The invention discloses a hardware equipment verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function. Comprising the following steps: in a registration stage, a verification party obtains a physical model of a physical unclonable function used by an equipment party and sends an equipment verification party key to the equipment party; in the verification stage, the device sends data normally transmitted by the device to the verification party, the verification party generates a dynamic challenge through the data normally transmitted by the device, the device party generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp according to the dynamic challenge and forms transmission data, and the device party encrypts the transmission data through a device verification party key and then sends the transmission data to the verification party. And the verification party performs decryption, validity verification and correctness verification on the encrypted transmission data in combination with the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the equipment party, and then obtains a corresponding equipment verification result. The method is suitable for a complex and dynamically changing environment, and overcomes the limitations of an existing verification method of inputting challenge-response pairs in advance in real-time performance, adaptability and safety.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to a hardware device verification method, in particular to a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function. Background Art

[0002] With the widespread application of the Internet of Things, embedded systems and mobile devices, device authentication and secure communication have become key issues in network security. Traditional authentication methods mostly rely on passwords, tokens or certificate-based methods, but these methods have problems such as difficult key management, vulnerability to attacks, and high storage overhead. In order to improve security and reduce the risk of key leakage, methods based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have become an ideal alternative. PUF technology does not rely on traditional key storage, but uses the physical properties of the hardware itself to generate a unique identity identifier, so it has higher security and is especially suitable for low-power, resource-constrained devices.

[0003] However, most existing PUF authentication methods rely on pre-recorded challenge-response pairs (CRPs) for authentication. These methods often face problems such as high data storage and transmission overhead, lack of flexibility, and vulnerability to replay attacks, as follows:

[0004] The pre-entered challenge-response method requires the device to generate and store a large number of challenge and response pairs when it leaves the factory. This method can usually only verify fixed challenges and lacks adaptability to dynamic changes. As the device operating environment changes (such as temperature, network latency, device load, etc.), the accuracy and reliability of the challenge-response may be affected, thereby reducing the flexibility and security of verification.

[0005] The pre-entered CRP authentication method is vulnerable to replay attacks. In this method, the challenge-response pairs are pre-stored, and the attacker only needs to intercept and replay the valid challenge-response pairs to forge the identity of the device, thereby bypassing the authentication. Therefore, the pre-entered authentication method lacks an effective defense mechanism to resist replay attacks, resulting in reduced security of the system.

[0006] In dynamic environments, such as when devices are connected to different networks or face different operating conditions, the pre-entered CRP method cannot flexibly adjust challenges and responses. The pre-entered verification mechanism does not adapt to dynamic factors such as network latency, bandwidth fluctuations, or device performance changes, which affects the real-time and accuracy of verification.

[0007] The current pre-entry CRP method is mostly used for traditional device identity authentication, but in modern network environments, especially in scenarios with high real-time requirements, the pre-entry verification mechanism cannot guarantee the timeliness and security of identity authentication. With the increasing complexity of inter-device communication and security threats, the pre-entry CRP method faces increasing challenges.

[0008] Therefore, with the growing demand for device authentication, it is necessary to propose a secure and effective device authentication method in a dynamically changing environment. Summary of the invention

[0009] In order to solve the problems and needs existing in the background technology, the present invention proposes a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function. The present invention generates challenges through polymorphic inputs such as real-time data and device status and verifies in real time, avoiding the storage overhead and replay attack risks in traditional methods. By generating challenges using real-time data and current environmental information transmitted by the device, combined with a response generation mechanism for real-time calculation, the present invention provides a more flexible, secure and efficient authentication scheme, which is suitable for complex and dynamically changing environments, and overcomes the limitations of existing verification methods of pre-entering challenge-response pairs in terms of real-time, adaptability and security.

[0010] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0011] 1. A hardware device verification method based on improved physical unclonable function

[0012] During the registration phase, the verifier obtains the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device and sends the device verifier key to the device.

[0013] During the verification phase, the device sends the data normally transmitted by the device to the verifier. The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the device. The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp based on the dynamic challenge generated by the verifier and composes the transmission data. The device encrypts the transmission data with the device verifier's key and then sends it to the verifier. The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and correctness of the received encrypted transmission data based on the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device, and obtains the corresponding device verification result.

[0014] The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the received device, specifically including:

[0015] The authenticator generates a dynamic challenge based on the received data normally transmitted by the device, the first timestamp of the authenticator, and the network delay between the authenticator and the device.

[0016] The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp according to the dynamic challenge generated by the verification party, specifically including:

[0017] The device side generates a dynamic challenge based on the verification side and the device’s current timestamp T dt Generate the first pseudo-random number seed Seed t The pseudo-random number generator in the device generates a pseudo-random number seed according to the first pseudo-random number seed. t Generate dynamic response, device current timestamp T dt as a second timestamp.

[0018] The device party encrypts the transmission data using the device verification party key, including:

[0019] Based on the device verification party key, the device party uses a symmetric encryption method to encrypt the dynamic response and the corresponding timestamp respectively, and obtains the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp;

[0020] The device uses its private key DeviceKey to encrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp with public and private keys to obtain the signature Signature t , the encrypted dynamic response and timestamp and signature Signature t Sent to the verifier together.

[0021] The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and verifies the correctness of the received encrypted transmission data in combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, specifically including:

[0022] S1: After the authenticator receives the encrypted transmission data sent back by the device, the authenticator records the timestamp T′ at this time vt And recorded as the third timestamp;

[0023] S2: Perform time dynamic window verification: If the third timestamp T′ vt If the time difference with the first timestamp of the verifier does not exceed the maximum allowable time, the next step is carried out; otherwise, a timeout message is returned, the verification is rejected and the verification ends;

[0024] S3: The verifier uses the device verifier key Key to decrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp in the received encrypted transmission data, respectively, to obtain the decrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp;

[0025] S4: The verifier uses the device's public key DevicePublicKey to sign the device's signature t Verify. If the validity verification is successful, proceed to the next step. Otherwise, it returns that the signature information has been tampered with, and the verification is rejected and ended.

[0026] S5: In combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, the verifier generates a second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ based on the data previously transmitted normally by the device, the dynamic challenge and the decrypted second timestamp t , the verifier uses the second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ t Generate a calculated response and compare it with the decrypted dynamic response. If the comparison result meets the expected conditions, the correctness verification passes and the final device verification passes. Otherwise, the device verification fails.

[0027] 2. A computer device

[0028] The device includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function are implemented.

[0029] 3. A computer-readable storage medium

[0030] The medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function are implemented.

[0031] IV. A COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCT

[0032] The product includes a computer program / instruction, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function.

[0033] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0034] The present invention overcomes the technical problems of the existing pre-entered challenge-response pair (CRP) method by generating a dynamic challenge based on real-time data and device status, especially in terms of adaptability, security and real-time performance in device identity authentication. The details are as follows:

[0035] The limitations of pre-entered challenges are solved: polymorphic data input is introduced, and dynamic factors such as device status, timestamps, pseudo-random numbers, and network delays are incorporated into the challenge generation process, so that each generated challenge is unique and unpredictable. This not only improves the randomness of the challenge, but also prevents the risk of being easily replayed by attackers due to fixed challenges in the traditional pre-entered challenge-response method.

[0036] Improved resistance to replay attacks: The challenge generation mechanism proposed by the present invention combines real-time data and environmental changes, so that each verification process relies on real-time generated challenges and responses. In this way, attackers cannot bypass identity authentication by replaying historical data, thus effectively preventing replay attacks.

[0037] Enhanced real-time and adaptability: Through dynamic adjustment of network delay and PUF response generation speed, this technical solution ensures the real-time nature of identity authentication. The verifier adjusts the verification window according to the actual network delay and device response speed to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of each identity authentication.

[0038] Provides a flexible PUF verification mechanism: The present invention supports any type of inherent identity extraction circuit designed based on random fluctuations in hardware parameter performance, meets the basic response generation mechanism of any PUF, and can flexibly select the corresponding verification method according to different hardware platforms and environments. The output of PUF no longer depends solely on the physical characteristics of the chip, but also incorporates environmental factors, making the response generation more diverse and unpredictable. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 Flowchart for hardware device authentication. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] The present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0041] In this embodiment, the Nordic nRF52840DK kit is used as the hardware platform for detailed description. Figure 1 The process is shown starting from the verifier generating a challenge using polymorphic inputs such as the data normally transmitted by the device, the verifier's first timestamp, a pseudo-random number generated by the verifier's own pseudo-random number generator, and the network delay between the verifier and the device, to the device generating a response, encrypting it and sending it to the verifier, to the verifier decrypting the received response and comparing it with the calculated expected response to give a verification result.

[0042] The specific process is as follows:

[0043] During the registration phase, the verifier obtains the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device and sends the device verifier key to the device.

[0044] During the verification phase, the device sends the data normally transmitted by the device to the verifier. The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the device. The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp based on the dynamic challenge generated by the verifier and forms the transmission data. The device encrypts the transmission data with the device verifier's key and then sends it to the verifier. The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and correctness of the received encrypted transmission data based on the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device, obtains the corresponding device verification result, and completes the verification of the current device.

[0045] The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the received device, including:

[0046] The verifier generates a dynamic challenge C based on the data received from the device, the first timestamp of the verifier, and the network delay between the verifier and the device. t , the continuously dynamically changing data can be adjusted according to the real-time environmental conditions to ensure that each generated challenge is unique, so as to ensure that the generated challenge is unpredictable and irreversible. The specific formula is as follows:

[0047] C t =H(D t ⊕T vt ⊕P t ⊕ΔT net )

[0048] Wherein, H() is a one-way encryption function, including but not limited to a hash algorithm such as SHA-256; D t T is the data normally transmitted by the device. vt is the first timestamp of the verifier, P t is a pseudo-random number generated by the verifier’s own pseudo-random number generator, ΔT net The network delay between the verification party and the device can be obtained through measurement; ⊕ represents a bitwise XOR operation to ensure data diversity.

[0049] By combining network delay, the present invention not only relies on device data and timestamp, but also incorporates actual network conditions, so that the generated challenge is more dynamic and can effectively prevent replay attacks by network attackers.

[0050] The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp based on the dynamic challenge generated by the verifier, including:

[0051] The device side generates a dynamic challenge based on the verification side and the device’s current timestamp T dt Generate the first pseudo-random number seed Seed t , the formula is as follows:

[0052] Seed t=H(C t ⊕T dt )

[0053] Among them, H() is a one-way encryption function, c t T is the dynamic challenge sent by the authenticator and received by the device. dt Generates a pseudo-random number seed timestamp for the device;

[0054] The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) in the device generates a pseudo-random number according to the first pseudo-random number seed Seed. t Generate dynamic response, device current timestamp T dt as a second timestamp.

[0055] Specifically:

[0056] In the design of the inherent identity extraction circuit for identity authentication, the pseudo-random number seed generated can be used regardless of the method used. t To generate a response, the following two forms of PUF are given as examples: For the delay-based PUF of the Arbiter PUF type, the device uses Seed t The generated random number is used as the input to the PUF challenge; for PUFs based on the distribution of charges 0 and 1, which are based on the random fluctuation of hardware parameters, the response is generated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) using the Seed t Select the specified bit from the stable bits to generate:

[0057] SelectBits t =PRNG(Seed t )

[0058] Among them, SelectBits t The bits of the PUF that need to be read are stable and based on the random fluctuations of hardware parameters. The 256 bits together constitute the response of the device PUF. PRNG() is a pseudo-random number generator that uses the previously generated seed Seed t Generate a string of data, Seed t The randomness ensures that each selection is the response R t The randomness and uniformity of PUF bits based on random fluctuations in hardware parameters.

[0059] The device uses the device authenticator key to encrypt the transmitted data, including:

[0060] In order to ensure the confidentiality of the response and prevent tampering, the device uses a symmetric encryption method (including but not limited to AES encryption methods) based on the device verifier key to encrypt the dynamic response R t and the corresponding timestamp T dtEncrypt them separately to obtain the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp. The formula is as follows:

[0061]

[0062] Among them, Encrypt() is the encryption method, and They are the encrypted dynamic response and encrypted timestamp respectively, and Key is the device authenticator key;

[0063] In order to ensure the authenticity of the response, the device uses its private key DeviceKey to encrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp with public and private keys to obtain the signature Signature t , complete the response To perform efficient integrity protection, the formula is Sign() is a public-private key encryption algorithm. The encrypted dynamic response, timestamp, and signature are t The public and private key encryption algorithms include but are not limited to signature algorithms such as ECDSA, etc. The specific method is selected according to the application scenario.

[0064] The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and correctness of the received encrypted transmission data in combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, including:

[0065] In order to ensure the timeliness of the challenge and response, after the authenticator receives the encrypted transmission data sent back by the device, the authenticator records the timestamp T at this time. v ' t And record it as the third timestamp, then perform time dynamic window verification: if the third timestamp T v ' t The time difference with the first timestamp of the verifier does not exceed the maximum allowable time ΔT tor , that is, |T v ' t -T vt |≤ΔT tor , ΔT tor is the dynamic time tolerance window, which is the maximum permissible time allowed by the device from generating a response to receiving a response. If the device fails, it will proceed to the next step. Otherwise, it will return a timeout message, fail the verification, and end the verification. tor The selection is based on network delay and PUF response generation speed. The verifier measures the PUF response generation speed during registration. Different PUF categories will affect the PUF response generation speed. The network delay is dynamically measured during use and ΔT is calculated after the measurement. tor Make adjustments.

[0066] The authenticator uses the shared device authenticator key Key to decrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp in the received encrypted transmission data, respectively, to obtain the decrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp, the formula is as follows:

[0067]

[0068] Among them, R′ t and T′ dt They are the dynamic response and the second timestamp after decryption respectively, and Decrypt() is the decryption algorithm;

[0069] Next, the verifier uses the device's public key DevicePublicKey to verify the signature sent by the device. t Verify. If the validity verification is successful, the response is valid, ensuring the integrity of the response and that the response has not been tampered with before proceeding to the next step. Otherwise, if the signature information is tampered with, the response will be rejected and the verification will end.

[0070] Then, in combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, the verifier generates a second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ based on the data previously transmitted normally by the device, the dynamic challenge, and the second timestamp transmitted by the device to the verifier and decrypted. t , the verifier uses the second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ t Generate a calculated response, such as a PUF based on random fluctuations in hardware parameters, which selects the corresponding bit stored in the verifier. Compare the calculated response with the decrypted dynamic response. If the comparison result meets the expected conditions, the correctness verification passes and the final device verification passes. Otherwise, the device party returned for this verification does not match the expected device party identity and fails the correctness verification.

[0071] The present invention also proposes a computer device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the processor implements the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function.

[0072] The present invention also proposes a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function are implemented.

[0073] The present invention also proposes a computer program product, comprising a computer program / instruction, which implements the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function when executed by a processor.

[0074] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments and explanations are only used to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention rather than to limit it. Those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solution of the present invention can be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope disclosed in the technical solution of the present invention, which should be included in the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function, characterized in that: include: During the registration phase, the verifier obtains the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device and sends the device verifier key to the device. During the verification phase, the device sends the data normally transmitted by the device to the verifier. The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the device. The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp based on the dynamic challenge generated by the verifier and composes the transmission data. The device encrypts the transmission data with the device verifier's key and then sends it to the verifier. The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and correctness of the received encrypted transmission data based on the physical model of the physical unclonable function used by the device, and obtains the corresponding device verification result.

2. According to claim 1, a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function is characterized in that: The verifier generates a dynamic challenge based on the data normally transmitted by the received device, specifically including: The authenticator generates a dynamic challenge based on the received data normally transmitted by the device, the first timestamp of the authenticator, and the network delay between the authenticator and the device.

3. The method for hardware device verification based on an improved physical unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that: The device generates a dynamic response and a second timestamp according to the dynamic challenge generated by the verification party, specifically including: The device side generates a dynamic challenge based on the verification side and the device's current timestamp T dt Generate the first pseudo-random number seed Seed t The pseudo-random number generator in the device generates a pseudo-random number seed according to the first pseudo-random number seed. t Generate dynamic response, device current timestamp T dt as the second timestamp.

4. The method for hardware device verification based on an improved physical unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that: The device party encrypts the transmission data using the device verification party key, including: Based on the device verification party key, the device party uses a symmetric encryption method to encrypt the dynamic response and the corresponding timestamp respectively, and obtains the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp; The device uses its private key DeviceKey to encrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp with public and private keys to obtain the signature Signature t , the encrypted dynamic response and timestamp and signature Signature t Sent to the verifier together.

5. The method for hardware device verification based on an improved physical unclonable function according to claim 1, characterized in that: The verifier decrypts, verifies the validity and verifies the correctness of the received encrypted transmission data in combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, specifically including: S1: After the authenticator receives the encrypted transmission data sent back by the device, the authenticator records the timestamp T′ at this time vt And recorded as the third timestamp; S2: Perform time dynamic window verification: If the third timestamp T′ vt If the time difference with the first timestamp of the verifier does not exceed the maximum allowable time, the next step is carried out; otherwise, a timeout message is returned, the verification is rejected and the verification ends; S3: The verifier uses the device verifier key Key to decrypt the encrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp in the received encrypted transmission data, respectively, to obtain the decrypted dynamic response and the second timestamp; S4: The verifier uses the device's public key DevicePublicKey to sign the device's signature t Verify. If the validity verification is successful, proceed to the next step. Otherwise, it returns that the signature information has been tampered with, and the verification is rejected and ended. S5: In combination with the physical unclonable function physical model used by the device, the verifier generates a second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ based on the data previously transmitted normally by the device, the dynamic challenge and the decrypted second timestamp t , the verifier uses the second pseudo-random number seed Seed′ t Generate a calculated response and compare it with the decrypted dynamic response. If the comparison result meets the expected conditions, the correctness verification passes and the final device verification passes. Otherwise, the device verification fails.

6. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the processor implements the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function as described in any one of claims 1 to 5 are implemented.

8. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that When the computer program / instruction is executed by a processor, the steps of a hardware device verification method based on an improved physical unclonable function as described in any one of claims 1 to 5 are implemented.

Images