Verification method and system for legality of Internet of Vehicles SIM card, vehicle and equipment

Abstract

The invention provides an Internet of Vehicles SIM card legality verification method and system, a vehicle and equipment, and relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, a request is sent to an Internet of Vehicles SIM card through a TBOX terminal, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates and feeds back a first verification file, and the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file. And then, the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, and the cloud data security platform verifies the legality of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the two verification files. And finally, the TBOX terminal judges whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be networked or not according to the verification result, so that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card which is illegally replaced can be effectively prevented from being networked.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, and in particular to a method, system, vehicle and device for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card. Background Art

[0002] At present, with the widespread application of intelligent connected cars, Internet of Vehicles technology plays an important role in providing mobile network services, remote control, in-car entertainment and other functions. Car companies use the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the TBOX terminal to operate traffic and obtain value-added service fees. For example, Tesla's in-car entertainment service makes a profit by charging a monthly service fee.

[0003] However, although the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the TBOX terminal is usually in the form of a patch card, this method does not completely eliminate the risk of illegal replacement. Some technical means can modify the Internet of Vehicles SIM card base of the TBOX terminal to replace the Internet of Vehicles SIM card pre-installed by the car manufacturer. This replacement behavior can not only bypass the traffic operation strategy of the car manufacturer, but also may cause a series of problems, including user data leakage and failure of vehicle remote control functions. Especially when the Internet of Vehicles SIM card of the vehicle is replaced, the normal function of the Internet of Vehicles will be seriously affected, and may even cause irreparable safety hazards.

[0004] Therefore, in order to effectively deal with the risks brought by the replacement of Internet of Vehicles SIM cards, this paper proposes a method for verifying the legitimacy of Internet of Vehicles SIM cards. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the above problems, the embodiments of the present application provide a method, system, vehicle and device for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card, so as to overcome the above problems or at least partially solve the above problems.

[0006] In a first aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card is provided, which is applied to a vehicle side, wherein the vehicle side includes a TBOX terminal and a connected vehicle SIM card, and the TBOX terminal is in communication connection with the connected vehicle SIM card, and the method includes: The TBOX terminal sends a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, and feeds the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal, where the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, wherein the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, so that the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file; The TBOX terminal receives the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform, and determines that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet if the verification result indicates that the legality verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed.

[0007] Optionally, in response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, including: In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card obtains a current timestamp, a preset key, and generates a random true number and a first counter value, wherein the preset key is preset during the card manufacturing stage of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card calculates a first signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card combines the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code to generate the first verification file.

[0008] Optionally, the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, including: The TBOX terminal decompresses the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; The TBOX terminal performs a hash calculation on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a first hash value; The TBOX terminal obtains the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and combines the first hash value with the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the second verification file.

[0009] In a second aspect of the present application, a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card is provided, which is applied to a cloud data security platform. The method comprises: Receiving the first verification file and the second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side; Decompressing the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; Decompressing the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and the first hash value; Based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified, and the verification result is sent to the TBOX terminal at the vehicle end.

[0010] Optionally, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Determine the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file; Calculate a second signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp in the first decompressed file, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; Compare the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code; Based on the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0011] Optionally, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Perform a hash calculation according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a second hash value; Compare the first Hash value in the second decompressed file with the second Hash value to verify the legitimacy of the second Hash value; Based on the legitimacy of the second hash value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0012] Optionally, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: generating a second counter value in response to receiving the first verification file and the second verification file; Compare the first counter value in the first decompressed file with the second counter value to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value; Based on the legitimacy of the second counter value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0013] In a third aspect of the present application, a system for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card is provided, the system comprising: A first sending module, used for sending a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal; a first generating module, configured to generate a first verification file through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in response to the first request, and feed the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal, wherein the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A second generating module, configured to generate a second verification file according to the first verification file through the TBOX terminal, wherein the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A second sending module, configured to send the first verification file and the second verification file to the first receiving module through the TBOX terminal, so as to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file through a cloud data security platform; A first receiving module is used to receive a first verification file and a second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side; A first decompression module, used to decompress the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; A second decompression module is used to decompress the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and a first hash value; A verification module, configured to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and send the verification result to a second receiving module; The second receiving module is used to receive the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform through the TBOX terminal, and determine that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet when the verification result indicates that the legitimacy verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed.

[0014] Optionally, in response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, and the first generating module includes: A first acquisition submodule, configured to obtain a current timestamp and a preset key through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in response to the first request, and to generate a random true number and a first counter value, wherein the preset key is pre-set during the card manufacturing stage of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A first calculation submodule, configured to calculate a first signature message authentication code through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value; The first combining submodule is used to combine the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the first verification file.

[0015] Optionally, the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, and the second generation module includes: A first decompression submodule, configured to decompress the first verification file through the TBOX terminal to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; A second calculation submodule is configured to perform a hash calculation on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file through the TBOX terminal to obtain a first hash value; The second combining submodule is used to obtain the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal, and combine the first hash value with the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the second verification file.

[0016] Optionally, the verification module verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and includes: A first determination submodule, configured to determine a preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file; A third calculation submodule, configured to calculate a second signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp in the first decompressed file, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A first comparison submodule, used to compare the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code; Based on the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0017] Optionally, the verification module verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and includes: a fourth calculation submodule, configured to perform a hash calculation according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a second hash value; A second comparison submodule, used to compare the first hash value in the second decompressed file with the second hash value to verify the legitimacy of the second hash value; Based on the legitimacy of the second hash value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0018] Optionally, the verification module verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and includes: a first generating submodule, configured to generate a second counter value in response to receiving the first verification file and the second verification file; A third comparison submodule, used for comparing the first counter value in the first decompressed file with the second counter value to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value; The verification submodule is used to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the legitimacy of the second counter value.

[0019] In a fourth aspect of the present application, a vehicle is provided, comprising a system for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the third aspect of the present application, and / or executing a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application and executing a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0020] In a fifth aspect of the present application, an electronic device is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application, or the processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0021] Beneficial effects of this application: The present application provides a method for verifying the legitimacy of a car networking SIM card. First, a request is sent to the car networking SIM card through a TBOX terminal. The car networking SIM card generates and feeds back a first verification file. The TBOX terminal generates a second verification file based on the first verification file. Then, the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, and the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the car networking SIM card based on the two verification files. Finally, the TBOX terminal determines whether the car networking SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification result. Before the car networking SIM card is connected to the Internet, the present application can jointly verify the legitimacy of the car networking SIM card based on the first data in the first verification file and the second data in the second verification file, and determine whether the car networking SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification result, thereby effectively preventing the car networking SIM card that has been illegally replaced from being connected to the Internet. For car companies, it ensures the smooth implementation of traffic operation strategies and safeguards the interests of car companies. For users, it avoids the leakage of user data and ensures the normal use of vehicle functions. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments of the present application will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0023] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the steps of a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card applied to a vehicle side provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of a car networking SIM card manufacturing process provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the steps of a method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card applied to a cloud data security platform provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 4 This is a timing diagram of the legitimacy verification of a car networking SIM card provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an architecture for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of a system for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 7 It is a schematic diagram of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] The exemplary embodiments of the present application will be described in more detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Although the exemplary embodiments of the present application are shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the present application can be implemented in various forms and should not be limited by the embodiments set forth herein. On the contrary, these embodiments are provided in order to enable a more thorough understanding of the present application and to enable the scope of the present application to be fully communicated to those skilled in the art.

[0025] In a first aspect of an embodiment of the present application, a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card is provided, which is applied to a vehicle end, wherein the vehicle end includes a TBOX terminal and a connected vehicle SIM card, and the TBOX terminal is in communication connection with the connected vehicle SIM card. Figure 1 As shown, including: Step S101: the TBOX terminal sends a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card.

[0026] In this step, when the vehicle is powered on and ready to connect to the Internet of Vehicles, the TBOX terminal will first initialize the networking process through the internal control system. At this time, the TBOX terminal needs to confirm the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to prevent the Internet of Vehicles SIM card from being illegally replaced or tampered with, so it starts the verification process by sending a request containing the necessary verification information to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card. In some examples, the first request is transmitted using a secure communication protocol (such as HTTPS or other encryption methods) to ensure that the data is not tampered with or monitored during the transmission process. In addition, the communication between the TBOX terminal and the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is encrypted to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the request data.

[0027] Step S102: In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file and feeds the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal, where the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card.

[0028] In this step, when the Internet of Vehicles SIM card receives the first request from the TBOX terminal, the processing module in the Internet of Vehicles SIM card (such as the security computing unit in the Internet of Vehicles SIM card) begins to parse the first request. The request content includes dynamic parameters such as the current timestamp, random true number, counter value, and the built-in key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card. These parameters will be used to generate the verification file and ensure the uniqueness and validity of each verification process.

[0029] The Internet of Vehicles SIM card performs cryptographic operations based on the received first request in combination with the preset key, current timestamp, random true number, counter value and other information stored internally. Specifically, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card uses the pre-stored preset key to perform signature operations or message authentication code generation. Through the above calculations, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, which includes multiple first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card. In this application, the first verification file may include: preset key, current timestamp, random true number, counter value and other information.

[0030] Step S103: the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, where the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card.

[0031] In this step, after the TBOX terminal receives the first verification file fed back by the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, the TBOX terminal will parse the first verification file. The first verification file includes multiple first data for verifying the legitimacy of the SIM card. The TBOX terminal generates a second verification file based on the first data extracted from the first verification file, combined with the internal state of the TBOX and other context information, and the second verification file includes multiple second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card.

[0032] Step S104: the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, so that the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file.

[0033] In this step, after generating the first verification file and the second verification file, the TBOX terminal packages the two together and prepares to send them to the cloud data security platform. In actual applications, in order to ensure the security and integrity of the data, the TBOX terminal can perform necessary encryption processing on the files. Usually, a secure transmission protocol (such as HTTPS or TLS) is used to encrypt the data to ensure that it will not be stolen or tampered with during the transmission process. After receiving the first verification file and the second verification file, the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file.

[0034] Step S105 , the TBOX terminal receives the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform, and determines that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet if the verification result indicates that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed the legitimacy verification.

[0035] In this step, after the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, the cloud data security platform will perform a legality verification and generate a verification result. The verification result will be returned to the TBOX terminal through a secure communication channel. In actual applications, after receiving the verification result, the TBOX terminal needs to ensure that the received verification result has not been tampered with, and the verification result needs to be consistent with the feedback from the cloud data security platform.

[0036] The TBOX terminal makes a judgment based on the verification result. If the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform indicates that the legitimacy verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed (i.e. "verification is successful"), it means that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has not been replaced or tampered with, and meets the legitimacy requirements preset by the car manufacturer. At this point, the TBOX terminal can continue to perform networking operations.

[0037] This application sends a request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates and feeds back a first verification file, and the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file based on the first verification file. Then, the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, and the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the two verification files. Finally, the TBOX terminal determines whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification results. Before the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is connected to the Internet, this application can jointly verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first data in the first verification file and the second data in the second verification file, and determine whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification results, thereby effectively preventing the Internet of Vehicles SIM card that has been illegally replaced from being connected to the Internet. For car companies, it ensures the smooth implementation of traffic operation strategies and safeguards the interests of car companies. For users, it avoids the leakage of user data and ensures the normal use of vehicle functions.

[0038] In one embodiment, in response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, including: In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card obtains a current timestamp, a preset key, and generates a random true number and a first counter value, wherein the preset key is preset during the card manufacturing stage of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card calculates a first signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card combines the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code to generate the first verification file.

[0039] In this embodiment, after receiving the first request from the TBOX terminal, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card obtains the current timestamp. The timestamp is used to mark the time point of the request to ensure that the generated verification file is timely. By introducing the timestamp in the verification process, replay attacks can be effectively prevented to ensure the uniqueness and security of the verification process.

[0040] The car networking SIM card uses its internal random number generator to generate a random true number. The introduction of the random true number further improves the randomness and security of the verification file, preventing attackers from forging legitimate requests by reproducing historical data.

[0041] The Internet of Vehicles SIM card reads the current counter value from its internal counter module and uses it as the first counter value for subsequent calculations. The counter value is unidirectionally increasing, and is incremented each time a legal verification is completed, and is used to record the number and status of verifications. By using the counter value, replay attacks can be effectively prevented and the integrity of the verification process can be ensured.

[0042] The Internet of Vehicles SIM card accesses its secure storage area and reads the preset key from it. The key is generated by the car manufacturer through the cloud data security platform during the card manufacturing stage and written into the secure storage space of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card by the card manufacturer. Since the preset key is stored in the secure space of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and cannot be changed, it has high security and can effectively resist tampering and forgery.

[0043] Furthermore, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card calculates the first signature message authentication code using a secure cryptographic algorithm (such as HMAC or other symmetric cryptographic algorithms) based on the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value. The specific steps are as follows: the Internet of Vehicles SIM card uses its internal cryptographic operation module, takes the above parameters as input, performs encryption operation through a preset algorithm, and obtains the first signature message authentication code. In practical applications, the first signature message authentication code can be an encrypted data of a fixed length.

[0044] The Internet of Vehicles SIM card combines the calculated first signature message authentication code, the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value to generate a first verification file.

[0045] In this embodiment, the first verification file is generated by combining the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code, thereby ensuring the uniqueness and security of the verification file and effectively preventing the risk of illegal replacement and tampering.

[0046] In one embodiment, if Figure 2 As shown, it is a schematic diagram of a car networking SIM card manufacturing process provided by this application, from Figure 2It can be seen that the card making process of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card includes: The car company puts forward the card production demand to the communication operator, and specifies the number of car networking SIM cards required and related requirements. According to the car company's card production demand, the communication operator generates and feedbacks the relevant card number information of the car networking SIM card (such as unique identification codes such as ICCID or IMSI) to the car company. The communication operator synchronizes the card number information fed back to the car company to the card dealer responsible for card production to ensure that the card dealer can perform subsequent operations based on this information. The car company's cloud data security platform generates a key corresponding to the card number based on the card number information provided by the communication operator. Subsequently, the car company synchronizes the generated card number and key information to the card dealer for key presetting during the card production process. After receiving the card number information provided by the communication operator and the key information of the car company, the card dealer starts card production. During the card production process, the key information provided by the car company is pre-set to the car networking SIM card to ensure that each car networking SIM card can use its unique key for communication security in subsequent verification.

[0047] In one embodiment, the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, including: The TBOX terminal decompresses the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; The TBOX terminal performs a hash calculation on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a first hash value; The TBOX terminal obtains the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and combines the first hash value with the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the second verification file.

[0048] In this embodiment, the TBOX terminal first obtains and decompresses the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code.

[0049] On the TBOX terminal, the decompressed data is first hashed. The purpose of the hash calculation is to encrypt the four parameters of the current timestamp, random true number, counter value and first signature message authentication code to generate a hash value. This hash value represents the data content of this specific session, and its calculation process ensures that the data is not tampered with during transmission and storage.

[0050] Next, the TBOX terminal obtains the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, which can usually be identified and recognized by a unique identifier such as the ICCID or IMSI of the SIM card. This unique card number information is combined with the previously calculated hash value to form the second verification file.

[0051] The TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file together to the cloud data security platform to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the cloud data security platform.

[0052] This application sends a request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates and feeds back a first verification file, and the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file based on the first verification file. Then, the TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, and the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the two verification files. Finally, the TBOX terminal determines whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification results. Before the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is connected to the Internet, this application can jointly verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first data in the first verification file and the second data in the second verification file, and determine whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be connected to the Internet based on the verification results, thereby effectively preventing the Internet of Vehicles SIM card that has been illegally replaced from being connected to the Internet. For car companies, it ensures the smooth implementation of traffic operation strategies and safeguards the interests of car companies. For users, it avoids the leakage of user data and ensures the normal use of vehicle functions.

[0053] Based on the same inventive concept, the second aspect of the present application provides a method for verifying the legitimacy of a SIM card in an Internet of Vehicles, which is applied to a cloud data security platform, such as Figure 3 As shown, the method includes: Step S201, receiving a first verification file and a second verification file sent by a TBOX terminal on the vehicle side.

[0054] In this step, the cloud data security platform receives the first verification file and the second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side. In some examples, in the process of receiving the first verification file and the second verification file, in order to prevent the data in the file from being tampered with or stolen during the transmission process, the file transmission can be performed through an encrypted communication channel.

[0055] Step S202, decompress the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code.

[0056] In this step, the cloud data security platform decompresses the received first verification file, restores the original data structure of the first verification file, and obtains a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signature message authentication code.

[0057] Step S203: decompress the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and a first hash value.

[0058] In this step, the cloud data security platform decompresses the received second verification file, restores the original data structure of the second verification file, and obtains a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and the first hash value.

[0059] Step S204: verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and send the verification result to the TBOX terminal at the vehicle end.

[0060] In steps S202 and S203, the cloud data security platform decompresses the received first verification file and the second verification file respectively to obtain the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the data in the first decompressed file and the data in the second decompressed file.

[0061] The present application receives the first verification file and the second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side through the cloud data security platform, and decompresses the first verification file and the second verification file to obtain the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and at the same time verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the data in the decompressed file, thereby effectively preventing the Internet of Vehicles SIM card that has been illegally replaced from connecting to the Internet.

[0062] In one embodiment, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Determine the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file; Calculate a second signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp in the first decompressed file, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; Compare the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code; Based on the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0063] In this embodiment, the cloud data security platform searches for the pre-generated preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file. The preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is generated by the cloud data security platform and stored in the cloud data security platform and the Internet of Vehicles SIM card respectively. Therefore, in this embodiment, the cloud data security platform can find the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card.

[0064] The cloud data security platform combines the current timestamp, random true number, and first counter value extracted from the first decompressed file with the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and uses a secure cryptographic algorithm (such as HMAC or other symmetric cryptographic algorithms) to calculate the second signature message authentication code. The specific steps are as follows: The cloud data security platform uses its internal cryptographic operation module, takes the above parameters as input, performs encryption operations through a preset algorithm, and obtains the second signature message authentication code. In actual applications, the second signature message authentication code can also be an encrypted data of a fixed length.

[0065] After obtaining the second signed message authentication code, the cloud data security platform will compare the first signed message authentication code extracted from the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code. If the first signed message authentication code is consistent with the second signed message authentication code, it can be determined that the second signed message authentication code is legal; if the first signed message authentication code is inconsistent with the second signed message authentication code, it can be determined that the second signed message authentication code is illegal.

[0066] In some examples, if the second signature message authentication code passes the legitimacy verification, it can be determined that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card passes the legitimacy verification. In some other examples, after the second signature message authentication code passes the legitimacy verification, other necessary data needs to be verified. Only when all necessary data pass the verification can it be determined that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card passes the legitimacy verification. Other necessary data that need to be verified may include: hash value and counter value, etc.

[0067] In one embodiment, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Perform a hash calculation according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a second hash value; Compare the first Hash value in the second decompressed file with the second Hash value to verify the legitimacy of the second Hash value; Based on the legitimacy of the second hash value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0068] In this embodiment, the second hash value is obtained by performing hash calculation on the current timestamp, random true number, first counter value and first signature message authentication code in the first decompressed file. The hash value calculation utilizes dynamic parameters (such as timestamp, random true number and counter value) and signature authentication code to ensure the uniqueness and non-tamperability of each verification. Next, the first hash value in the second decompressed file is compared with the calculated second hash value. If the two match, it means that the data has not been tampered with, the second hash value is legal, and the verification process passes, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card. If the comparison fails, it means that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card may have been illegally replaced or tampered with, the verification fails, and the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is judged to be illegal. Through this verification method based on hash value comparison, the security of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be effectively guaranteed to prevent illegal replacement and data tampering.

[0069] In one embodiment, the verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: generating a second counter value in response to receiving the first verification file and the second verification file; Compare the first counter value in the first decompressed file with the second counter value to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value; Based on the legitimacy of the second counter value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0070] In this embodiment, after receiving the first verification file and the second verification file, the cloud data security platform first generates a second counter value. The generated second counter value is used to compare with the first counter value in the first decompressed file to ensure the increment and legitimacy of the counter. If the two match, it means that the value of the counter has not been tampered with, the verification is successful, and the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is legal; if the comparison is inconsistent, it means that the value of the counter may have been tampered with or replayed, the verification fails, and the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is judged to be illegal. This counter value-based comparison and verification method can effectively prevent replay attacks and illegal tampering, and further enhance the security of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card legitimacy verification.

[0071] In some embodiments, for the verification of the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, it is necessary to first verify the legitimacy of the second hash value. Only when the legitimacy verification of the second hash value is passed, proceed to the next step to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value, and when the legitimacy verification of the second counter value is passed, proceed to the legitimacy verification of the second signature message authentication code. Only after the legitimacy of the second signature message authentication code is also verified, can it be determined that the legitimacy verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is passed. For the second hash value, the second counter value and the second signature message authentication code, if any one of them is not verified, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card cannot be verified either. The Internet of Vehicles SIM card can only be connected to the Internet if the legitimacy verification is passed. If the verification fails, the Internet connection is not allowed, thereby ensuring that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can be connected to the Internet safely.

[0072] In one embodiment, there is provided Figure 4 The legitimacy verification sequence diagram of the car networking SIM card is shown in Figure 4 As shown, the legitimacy verification sequence of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card includes the following steps: S1: Vehicle powered on; S2: The TBOX terminal on the vehicle sends a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; S3: The Internet of Vehicles SIM card receives the first request and calculates a first signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; S4: The Internet of Vehicles SIM card returns the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code to the TBOX terminal; S5: The TBOX terminal calculates a first hash value according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code; S6: The TBOX terminal sends the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, the first signature message authentication code, the first hash value, and the card number of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to the cloud data security platform; S7.1: The cloud data security platform calculates a second hash value based on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signature message authentication code, and verifies the legitimacy of the second hash value based on the first hash value; S7.2: The cloud data security platform generates a second counter value, and verifies the legitimacy of the second counter value based on the first counter value; S7.3: The cloud data security platform calculates the second signed message authentication code based on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and verifies the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code based on the first signed message authentication code.

[0073] S8: Return the verification result of the second hash value, the second counter value and the second signature message authentication code to the TBOX terminal; S9: The TBOX terminal feeds back the verification result to the vehicle's onboard system to determine whether the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet.

[0074] In one embodiment, there is provided a Figure 5 The schematic diagram of the architecture for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is shown, which includes a vehicle-side and a cloud data security platform, wherein a SIM card verification module is provided in the TBOX terminal on the vehicle-side, the SIM card verification module sends a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card returns a signed message authentication code, the vehicle-side sends a legitimacy verification application to the cloud data security platform, and the cloud data security platform returns the verification result to the vehicle-side.

[0075] Based on the same inventive concept, the third aspect of the present application provides a system for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card, such as Figure 6 As shown, the system comprises: The first sending module 101 is used to send a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal; A first generating module 102, configured to generate a first verification file through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in response to the first request, and feed the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal, wherein the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A second generating module 103, configured to generate a second verification file according to the first verification file through the TBOX terminal, wherein the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A second sending module 104, configured to send the first verification file and the second verification file to the first receiving module through the TBOX terminal, so as to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file through a cloud data security platform; The first receiving module 105 is used to receive the first verification file and the second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side; A first decompression module 106, configured to decompress the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; A second decompression module 107, configured to decompress the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and a first hash value; A verification module 108, configured to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and send the verification result to a second receiving module; The second receiving module is used to receive the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform through the TBOX terminal, and determine that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet when the verification result indicates that the legitimacy verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed.

[0076] Optionally, in response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, and the first generating module 102 includes: A first acquisition submodule, configured to obtain a current timestamp and a preset key through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in response to the first request, and to generate a random true number and a first counter value, wherein the preset key is pre-set during the card manufacturing stage of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A first calculation submodule, configured to calculate a first signature message authentication code through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value; The first combining submodule is used to combine the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the first verification file.

[0077] Optionally, the TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, and the second generation module 103 includes: A first decompression submodule, configured to decompress the first verification file through the TBOX terminal to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; A second calculation submodule is configured to perform a hash calculation on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file through the TBOX terminal to obtain a first hash value; The second combining submodule is used to obtain the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal, and combine the first hash value with the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the second verification file.

[0078] Optionally, the verification module 108 verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, including: A first determination submodule, configured to determine a preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file; A third calculation submodule, configured to calculate a second signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp in the first decompressed file, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A first comparison submodule, used to compare the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code; Based on the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0079] Optionally, the verification module 108 verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, including: a fourth calculation submodule, configured to perform a hash calculation according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a second hash value; A second comparison submodule, used to compare the first hash value in the second decompressed file with the second hash value to verify the legitimacy of the second hash value; Based on the legitimacy of the second hash value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

[0080] Optionally, the verification module 108 verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, including: a first generating submodule, configured to generate a second counter value in response to receiving the first verification file and the second verification file; A third comparison submodule, used for comparing the first counter value in the first decompressed file with the second counter value to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value; A verification submodule is used to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the legitimacy of the second counter value. In a fourth aspect of the present application, a vehicle is provided, the vehicle comprising a system for verifying the legitimacy of an Internet of Vehicles SIM card as described in the third aspect of the present application, and / or executing a method for verifying the legitimacy of an Internet of Vehicles SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application and executing a method for verifying the legitimacy of an Internet of Vehicles SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0081] In a fifth aspect of the present application, an electronic device is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application, or the processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0082] Based on the same inventive concept, in the fourth aspect of the present application, a vehicle is provided, which includes a system for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the third aspect of the present application, and / or executes a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application and executes a method for verifying the legitimacy of a connected vehicle SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0083] Based on the same inventive concept, in the fifth aspect of the present application, there is provided a Figure 7 The electronic device 100 shown includes a memory 110, a processor 120, and a computer program stored on the memory 110. The processor 120 executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card as described in the first aspect of the present application, or the processor 120 executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card as described in the second aspect of the present application.

[0084] Each embodiment in this specification focuses on the differences from other embodiments, and the same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referenced to each other.

[0085] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, devices, or computer program products. Therefore, the embodiments of the present application may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment in combination with software and hardware. Moreover, the embodiments of the present application may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.

[0086] The embodiments of the present application are described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, terminal devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing terminal device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing terminal device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0087] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing terminal device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a manufactured product including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0088] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing terminal device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable terminal device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for executing on the computer or other programmable terminal device to implement the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0089] Although the preferred embodiments of the present application have been described, those skilled in the art may make additional changes and modifications to these embodiments once they have learned the basic creative concept. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the embodiments of the present application.

[0090] Finally, it should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or terminal device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or terminal device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or terminal device including the elements.

[0091] The above is a detailed introduction to the provided method, system, vehicle and device for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card. This article uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method of the present application and its core idea; at the same time, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of ​​the present application, there will be changes in the specific implementation method and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.

Claims

1. A method for verifying the legitimacy of a SIM card in a vehicle network, characterized in that: Applied to a vehicle side, the vehicle side includes a TBOX terminal and a vehicle networking SIM card, the TBOX terminal is communicatively connected with the vehicle networking SIM card, and the method includes: The TBOX terminal sends a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, and feeds the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal, where the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, wherein the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The TBOX terminal sends the first verification file and the second verification file to the cloud data security platform, so that the cloud data security platform verifies the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file; The TBOX terminal receives the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform, and determines that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet if the verification result indicates that the legality verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed.

2. The method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card according to claim 1, characterized in that: In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card generates a first verification file, including: In response to the first request, the Internet of Vehicles SIM card obtains a current timestamp, a preset key, and generates a random true number and a first counter value, wherein the preset key is preset during the card manufacturing stage of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card calculates a first signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp, the preset key, the random true number and the first counter value; The Internet of Vehicles SIM card combines the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value and the first signed message authentication code to generate the first verification file.

3. The method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card according to claim 1, characterized in that: The TBOX terminal generates a second verification file according to the first verification file, including: The TBOX terminal decompresses the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; The TBOX terminal performs a hash calculation on the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a first hash value; The TBOX terminal obtains the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and combines the first hash value with the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card to generate the second verification file.

4. A method for verifying the legitimacy of a SIM card in a vehicle network, characterized in that: Applied to a cloud data security platform, the method includes: Receiving the first verification file and the second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side; Decompressing the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; Decompressing the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and the first hash value; Based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified, and the verification result is sent to the TBOX terminal at the vehicle end.

5. The method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card according to claim 4, characterized in that: The verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Determine the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card according to the card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in the second decompressed file; Calculate a second signature message authentication code according to the current timestamp in the first decompressed file, the random true number, the first counter value, and the preset key of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; Compare the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file with the second signed message authentication code to verify the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code; Based on the legitimacy of the second signed message authentication code, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

6. The method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card according to claim 4, characterized in that: The verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: Perform a hash calculation according to the current timestamp, the random true number, the first counter value, and the first signed message authentication code in the first decompressed file to obtain a second hash value; Compare the first Hash value in the second decompressed file with the second Hash value to verify the legitimacy of the second Hash value; Based on the legitimacy of the second hash value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

7. The method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card according to claim 4, characterized in that: The verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file includes: generating a second counter value in response to receiving the first verification file and the second verification file; Compare the first counter value in the first decompressed file with the second counter value to verify the legitimacy of the second counter value; Based on the legitimacy of the second counter value, the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card is verified.

8. A system for verifying the legitimacy of a SIM card in a connected vehicle network, characterized in that: The system comprises: A first sending module, used for sending a first request to the Internet of Vehicles SIM card through the TBOX terminal; A first generating module, configured to generate a first verification file through the Internet of Vehicles SIM card in response to the first request, and feed the first verification file back to the TBOX terminal; a second generating module, configured to generate a second verification file through the TBOX terminal according to the first verification file, wherein the first verification file includes a plurality of first data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card, and the second verification file includes a plurality of second data for verifying the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card; A second sending module, configured to send the first verification file and the second verification file to the first receiving module through the TBOX terminal, so as to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first verification file and the second verification file through a cloud data security platform; A first receiving module is used to receive a first verification file and a second verification file sent by the TBOX terminal on the vehicle side; A first decompression module, used to decompress the first verification file to obtain a first decompressed file, wherein the first decompressed file includes: a current timestamp, a random true number, a first counter value, and a first signed message authentication code; A second decompression module is used to decompress the second verification file to obtain a second decompressed file, wherein the second decompressed file includes: card number information of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card and a first hash value; A verification module, configured to verify the legitimacy of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card based on the first decompressed file and the second decompressed file, and send the verification result to a second receiving module; The second receiving module is used to receive the verification result fed back by the cloud data security platform through the TBOX terminal, and determine that the Internet of Vehicles SIM card can connect to the Internet when the verification result indicates that the legitimacy verification of the Internet of Vehicles SIM card has passed.

9. A vehicle, characterized in that: The vehicle includes the vehicle networking SIM card legitimacy verification system as claimed in claim 8, and / or executes the vehicle networking SIM card legitimacy verification method as claimed in any one of claims 1-3 and executes the vehicle networking SIM card legitimacy verification method as claimed in any one of claims 4-7.

10. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory, characterized in that: The processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 3, or the processor executes the computer program to implement the method for verifying the legitimacy of a vehicle networking SIM card as claimed in any one of claims 4 to 7.

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